Implement V2 registration support

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>
2026-10-24 14:03:40 +03:00 · 2026-09-18 17:00:15 +02:00
33 changed files with 2727 additions and 3376 deletions
@@ -403,7 +403,6 @@
 ## - "cxp-export-mobile": Enable the export via CXP on iOS (Clients >= 2025.9.2)
 ## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins":
 ## - "pm-32009-new-item-types": Enable new item types: Bank Account, Driver's License, and Passport (Clients >= 2026.4.0)
-## - "pm-34171-card-scanner": Enable the new card scanner feature on mobile (Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.4.1)
 ## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-1": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-2": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-3": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
    steps:
      # Start Docker Buildx
      - name: Setup Docker Buildx
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@f87e5991a6d7451dcb8d9637bfbc97413f497069 # v4.4.1
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@37fe631027851001ddb9b187196cc803df7f5f0e # v4.3.0
        # https://github.com/moby/buildkit/issues/3969
        # Also set max parallelism to 2, the default of 4 breaks GitHub Actions and causes OOMKills
        with:
@@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ jobs:

    steps:
      - name: Initialize QEMU binfmt support
-        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@99012661954931238ded8c8b007157a8430204e1 # v4.4.0
+        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@1f40c72289eff860ee54a304f1438e3cff362e0a # v4.3.0
        with:
          platforms: "arm64,arm"

      # Start Docker Buildx
      - name: Setup Docker Buildx
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@f87e5991a6d7451dcb8d9637bfbc97413f497069 # v4.4.1
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@37fe631027851001ddb9b187196cc803df7f5f0e # v4.3.0
        # https://github.com/moby/buildkit/issues/3969
        # Also set max parallelism to 2, the default of 4 breaks GitHub Actions and causes OOMKills
        with:
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ jobs:

      - name: Bake ${{ matrix.base_image }} containers
        id: bake_vw
-        uses: docker/bake-action@018cb6412ab401ebaa809aa5f85966b74628600f # v7.4.0
+        uses: docker/bake-action@d3418bd7d0e9324001bca92fa8ba175ea7e6dc9b # v7.3.0
        env:
          BASE_TAGS: "${{ steps.determine-version.outputs.BASE_TAGS }}"
          SOURCE_COMMIT: "${{ env.SOURCE_COMMIT }}"
@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ jobs:
          severity: CRITICAL,HIGH

      - name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@1c5b675653bb5c22dbe9b12b556ec555138e09fd # v4.38.1
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938 # v4.37.9
        with:
          sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ jobs:

      # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.pre-commit-config.yaml` too
      - name: Spell Check Repo
-        uses: crate-ci/typos@512fc24f32f44ab01972217aaaf3dc86ec234d53 # v1.50.2
+        uses: crate-ci/typos@d43b6c087ac471e2ea7b8af622ff15f05c0c365b # v1.50.1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ repos:

  # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.github/workflows/typos.yaml` too
  - repo: https://github.com/crate-ci/typos
-    rev: 512fc24f32f44ab01972217aaaf3dc86ec234d53 # v1.50.2
+    rev: d43b6c087ac471e2ea7b8af622ff15f05c0c365b # v1.50.1
    hooks:
      - id: typos
        always_run: true
@@ -18,7 +18,6 @@ extend-ignore-re = [
    "COSE",
    "COSEKey",
    "COSEAlgorithm",
-    "CoseEncrypt0",
    # Ignore this specific string as it's valid
    "Ensure they are valid OTPs",
    # This word is misspelled upstream
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
 "syn 2.0.119",
- "synstructure 0.13.2",
+ "synstructure",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -151,9 +151,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "async-compression"
-version = "0.4.48"
+version = "0.4.45"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "fb61aea1a7def73ee7c350a184f0e70b32c182344e2e75bf70c9b621b83417fd"
+checksum = "24a8ec73eb862508b7041723c89386365894b4e7d9f6998bf1b8529e5b0ee254"
 dependencies = [
 "compression-codecs",
 "compression-core",
@@ -318,14 +318,18 @@ checksum = "82f6aeea286b8eb4dd3431a1be1b59d290ace00f5bfd8e2a159bc2a05e2c1667"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "asyncband"
-version = "0.7.2"
+version = "0.6.7"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f2d85fd3d291fabcc40c7232c92c280ec1754fd7b5d7ea769f143222143e179a"
+checksum = "94a214ba60d6231afd0e805e3c27c45a1626d9debaa5a5061c45a1ea1b2f1ed0"
+dependencies = [
+ "hashbrown 0.17.1",
+ "slab",
+]

 [[package]]
 name = "atomic"
@@ -399,9 +403,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-runtime"
-version = "1.9.4"
+version = "1.9.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "25b43ad47adc2517efe3d706559d94b97e50e80e0321b3cadbc9f77cee88adcd"
+checksum = "ef47857a1d4488b528f4a5d5715fa7c3300820897824152234d3fa22b1426657"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-credential-types",
 "aws-sigv4",
@@ -424,9 +428,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-sdk-sso"
-version = "1.111.0"
+version = "1.109.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "65700d75f6da78c89a61a49f1539979400a4609d3329376b1dc2133d7a1b2b90"
+checksum = "c3cfe74df5d9ad2fedd691973ad3521ebf4f27a3c68c792556686aedb5519bab"
 dependencies = [
 "arc-swap",
 "aws-credential-types",
@@ -450,9 +454,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-sdk-ssooidc"
-version = "1.113.0"
+version = "1.111.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "eb1147c254af7b6cee3ace90ae7da6f21366ce9a9b899035fa8a0fdf586eb75a"
+checksum = "81b0ec31ed6191bd11350aae4b2004198f2db21350cb0a20c57e0a92e55dd161"
 dependencies = [
 "arc-swap",
 "aws-credential-types",
@@ -476,9 +480,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-sdk-sts"
-version = "1.116.0"
+version = "1.114.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "035c7392e751d20bf1060d625d023587eb14099646110a9cff7c697bfe4b253a"
+checksum = "ef45745026107ec30c4ef86bd8ae4b002e7e5f6a86e4225240bdf6b06a0b944a"
 dependencies = [
 "arc-swap",
 "aws-credential-types",
@@ -503,9 +507,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-sigv4"
-version = "1.5.3"
+version = "1.5.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "31d955e76ff96acd555bf06fa0fa6d5bf9335fa84ae7c64481b20ae61d231f70"
+checksum = "723c2234ad7511ceef63eab016b7ba6ff7c55590fefb96fa8467af014a07309f"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-credential-types",
 "aws-smithy-http",
@@ -557,9 +561,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-json"
-version = "0.63.1"
+version = "0.63.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3385d469edbe8b60cc72002784652b5efca39178192aa9cc4b44c9875c6bdc18"
+checksum = "3dc65a121adb4b33729919fcfa14fa36fb33c1555a8f06bb0e2188dbfdc1d9ef"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-runtime-api",
 "aws-smithy-schema",
@@ -577,9 +581,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-query"
-version = "0.62.1"
+version = "0.62.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f1d1d71f6562be974caa85442ecd90194c40fdb5df045f182a6c2e872ce95056"
+checksum = "512346c7212ab7436df2d77a16d976a468ae44a418835511d2a69269810aaf62"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-runtime-api",
 "aws-smithy-schema",
@@ -590,9 +594,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-runtime"
-version = "1.14.2"
+version = "1.14.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3296253d3a91b3f938a3f2bcce4daebadcb4aa4228153fcec90f9d23532b4484"
+checksum = "b82e438d30e02a825d363bd639a9efaed68a8089d86101054b0081e7e0d3e606"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-async",
 "aws-smithy-http",
@@ -615,9 +619,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-runtime-api"
-version = "1.16.2"
+version = "1.16.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "6d881a7b7ad179fd6611680c9de89f716fb00ab40299a9a7b8c6913e8f7511a8"
+checksum = "9c054752dd9e4dc73d0b75748c99ac2d0feafbf2f25c7b0516f03a3534161223"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-async",
 "aws-smithy-runtime-api-macros",
@@ -644,9 +648,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-schema"
-version = "0.2.1"
+version = "0.2.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "e8f395d93304280b64b7632fea798d177e74897fe7f063416ce627cd6fa24829"
+checksum = "7d56e0a4e53127a632224e43633b0fe045fa9e1e3cfc68b9830f1115e103f910"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-runtime-api",
 "aws-smithy-types",
@@ -655,9 +659,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-types"
-version = "1.6.4"
+version = "1.6.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0b791f3ac597193fe1d08b82366986eb1f5bc31f2ac6c194c0855276116c76cd"
+checksum = "8f94d16e797ec62cd999fc9d5942b48fa7050c3093ddadff48e4d7528d16fcb9"
 dependencies = [
 "base64-simd",
 "bytes",
@@ -678,9 +682,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-xml"
-version = "0.62.1"
+version = "0.62.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0b932c8d6dc127fc980eecd78f8694ae9b9551b69a93a7def2a199c1c0033daf"
+checksum = "ce84f71c72fee2cbbadde6e7d082f5fb466e3a84733855295fa7aafd1b31b7d8"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-runtime-api",
 "aws-smithy-schema",
@@ -781,9 +785,9 @@ checksum = "bef38d45163c2f1dde094a7dfd33ccf595c92905c8f8f4fdc18d06fb1037718a"

 [[package]]
 name = "bitflags"
-version = "2.13.2"
+version = "2.13.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3ded4057c258ba199e2d26386d3af3780957ecaee6c4ef4041c6b4b8b97c0b06"
+checksum = "b588b76d00fde79687d7646a9b5bdf3cc0f655e0bbd080335a95d7e96f3587da"

 [[package]]
 name = "blake2"
@@ -926,9 +930,9 @@ checksum = "f5813789573ae815c8b4be58c4428e0e7ae05f0227678ba9de332ded585b9159"

 [[package]]
 name = "cc"
-version = "1.4.7"
+version = "1.4.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "54413ede23c2daf518f35156dfde027feb2374004d63bd497f983c8db9c0e313"
+checksum = "005ec2760ca554fae18df7a11195552ec576cd665632a881bc011d5bb2fd4d80"
 dependencies = [
 "find-msvc-tools",
 "jobserver",
@@ -938,9 +942,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "cfg-if"
-version = "1.0.5"
+version = "1.0.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4e7648175b45a9a48536d676f68d918270699102aa8dab5496df06904c914600"
+checksum = "9330f8b2ff13f34540b44e946ef35111825727b38d33286ef986142615121801"

 [[package]]
 name = "cfg_aliases"
@@ -1007,9 +1011,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "compression-codecs"
-version = "0.4.43"
+version = "0.4.40"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "bef16c47ba2797aa6a909cc37d39911f3a6743811fe7408ac0b0cc0276b656e9"
+checksum = "100590da849306918656ffbb22576bbdfc1382b50ad10d1d50ec177d3b205fb2"
 dependencies = [
 "brotli",
 "compression-core",
@@ -1166,9 +1170,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "crc32fast"
-version = "1.5.2"
+version = "1.5.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "01a7799fd6b852db0e61728dde9a204c423b44d689dbd432522543614b490e78"
+checksum = "8498c871161e1742aaa9d52551b2d6ebdd4c3d45a3be423e3728f33b955be550"
 dependencies = [
 "cfg-if",
 ]
@@ -1356,7 +1360,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
 "strsim",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -1389,7 +1393,7 @@ checksum = "2ac7135c3ef02b2f7833bbeb1be5ba7f966dcde8a87c6b87f65a778d71a02785"
 dependencies = [
 "darling_core 0.24.1",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -1563,7 +1567,7 @@ version = "0.4.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b035a542cf7abf01f2e3c4d5a7acbaebfefe120ae4efc7bde3df98186e4b8af7"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.2",
+ "bitflags 2.13.1",
 "proc-macro2",
 "proc-macro2-diagnostics",
 "quote",
@@ -1577,7 +1581,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e3b934ddbdcb2abb9f9fc9c30bd47bcc5618b615eea1d334cda5fdf8ff9b072a"
 dependencies = [
 "bigdecimal",
- "bitflags 2.13.2",
+ "bitflags 2.13.1",
 "byteorder",
 "chrono",
 "diesel_derives",
@@ -1672,7 +1676,7 @@ checksum = "c6232dd377dcc64799954cbd3a9bb882e9cdc1308ccd87b1c098f1fb2eaf82a8"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -1916,9 +1920,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "find-msvc-tools"
-version = "0.1.13"
+version = "0.1.12"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ef25905e51abafe4dcea6c15fec58c57b601cdbd0ee53d22ea1d3016c587d39b"
+checksum = "3e0f1c7c3a72c66fd80abe965175f7523475c0489a87d3ff9d6e8c87d87a9d2d"

 [[package]]
 name = "flate2"
@@ -2036,7 +2040,7 @@ checksum = "9fb9654ba8355388abeb8dcb4fc62f511300867002afc858860463bdd9fe0c44"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -2307,9 +2311,9 @@ checksum = "7f24254aa9a54b5c858eaee2f5bccdb46aaf0e486a595ed5fd8f86ba55232a70"

 [[package]]
 name = "hickory-net"
-version = "0.26.3"
+version = "0.26.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c480823ed7c2c5d0f09c41020cb6b7c28029ce60ec42dc942158dcf22f8e0a4d"
+checksum = "084e7bd6a377435d568f652153e571b50970d7ccc1d1eeec0519f834632287e1"
 dependencies = [
 "async-trait",
 "cfg-if",
@@ -2331,9 +2335,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "hickory-proto"
-version = "0.26.3"
+version = "0.26.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "12b92608f679a6fa515dd1d15c1ff89443026e391200a2c840c7afcba482893d"
+checksum = "7e2da0694c15b44c6f68a6b05e0233617008c54080e31d6eb848d858a9c5b38d"
 dependencies = [
 "data-encoding",
 "idna",
@@ -2351,9 +2355,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "hickory-resolver"
-version = "0.26.3"
+version = "0.26.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3f3da5255c95d5a716857d54b5b8f4e8d67c3484d3beaaaae2ce25063b3ba981"
+checksum = "0e4f9f4603319422d482738f3f6fe5aac03157fdbfed1cd85a3ff45adb09072f"
 dependencies = [
 "cfg-if",
 "futures-util",
@@ -2551,7 +2555,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "http 1.5.0",
 "hyper 1.11.1",
 "hyper-util",
- "rustls 0.23.45",
+ "rustls 0.23.44",
 "tokio",
 "tokio-rustls 0.26.5",
 "tower-service",
@@ -2801,9 +2805,9 @@ checksum = "47f142fe24a9c9944451e8349de0a56af5f3e7226dc46f3ed4d4ecc0b85af75e"

 [[package]]
 name = "jiff"
-version = "0.2.37"
+version = "0.2.35"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0ab1baf72f08796de0260609515130699b890ac25f30e610ad894bc5856cafdb"
+checksum = "668b7183bd07af9a4885f5c35b0cc5c83c4607a913c16b7e17291832910d2dcc"
 dependencies = [
 "defmt",
 "jiff-core",
@@ -2820,19 +2824,18 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "jiff-core"
-version = "0.1.1"
+version = "0.1.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "5e52fe76043ccecc9005d2305ebaadf7d7fc0cc89ca6baa10a94d6bc68c7128c"
+checksum = "7feca88439efe53da3754500c1851dedf3cb36c524dd5cf8225cc0794de95d09"
 dependencies = [
 "defmt",
- "log",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "jiff-static"
-version = "0.2.37"
+version = "0.2.35"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "378268a1116ad67ae6228701118ac9f491d78fda38a40a1f1a9e1348de6f7212"
+checksum = "3a69dcb3a21cfb32ce1cd056169337ca284af0766dd766e7878819b251a49204"
 dependencies = [
 "jiff-core",
 "proc-macro2",
@@ -2938,9 +2941,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "jsonwebtoken"
-version = "11.1.0"
+version = "11.0.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "e75fe14a82d81e5f5af639997db37d8b96045938a7ac6ab18cdbe1c7467e05e1"
+checksum = "881733cbc631fc9e472e24447ce32a64bedf2da498d6d8570b08edc87de71f65"
 dependencies = [
 "base64 0.22.1",
 "ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3008,7 +3011,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "nom 8.0.0",
 "percent-encoding",
 "quoted_printable",
- "rustls 0.23.45",
+ "rustls 0.23.44",
 "rustls-native-certs",
 "serde",
 "socket2 0.6.5",
@@ -3106,7 +3109,7 @@ name = "macros"
 version = "0.1.0"
 dependencies = [
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -3264,7 +3267,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
 "rustversion",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -3296,7 +3299,7 @@ version = "0.31.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "cf20d2fde8ff38632c426f1165ed7436270b44f199fc55284c38276f9db47c3d"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.2",
+ "bitflags 2.13.1",
 "cfg-if",
 "cfg_aliases",
 "libc",
@@ -3376,7 +3379,7 @@ checksum = "e4e98dc3b890f6c23a0f9d3d491a2823d0dea0fa656302a13dd225fa924112a8"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -3482,9 +3485,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "opendal"
-version = "0.59.2"
+version = "0.59.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9fe43e16d96bed57937eb7c4a28559bf4c5fc4a3951656505d1fdd4f856349b4"
+checksum = "f950151f9587a51a7bed70a15fa0cff464eae96e41ae7499f97067bdafdf43eb"
 dependencies = [
 "opendal-core",
 "opendal-service-fs",
@@ -3493,9 +3496,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "opendal-core"
-version = "0.59.2"
+version = "0.59.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "de4566a412776e3f65d53dd9fceced5b432a0a9c9a1e8d50ccf58823795e5c5b"
+checksum = "a43405d217dfdfb543f58847336d3af672897dd1939bb7dcf314b63cf364f1c9"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "asyncband",
@@ -3519,9 +3522,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "opendal-http-transport-reqwest"
-version = "0.59.2"
+version = "0.59.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f772ce6c137ab43647726116d505a649a88d41928fcd813438eb30b02312bcbb"
+checksum = "401999057db611e592f883fcf2cbd6754ff37af587deaadd07b8c1398b2b6b06"
 dependencies = [
 "bytes",
 "futures",
@@ -3533,9 +3536,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "opendal-service-fs"
-version = "0.59.2"
+version = "0.59.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "a0e7d8974aebd33be899200c9d0d50b2141fd5fa5c462b29e20653e3ddbfe339"
+checksum = "fb9caf04d6d38713299dd4abac984b95ab16ee20e1ff09160f495c5a64644083"
 dependencies = [
 "bytes",
 "log",
@@ -3547,9 +3550,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "opendal-service-s3"
-version = "0.59.2"
+version = "0.59.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "2942f2d8d3d4953c0e8d07cd1244879628d084948e48ce6b6d808c5938f7858d"
+checksum = "388b1d39b62535c62803754ebef89808859558697366dbedd0299345887ba461"
 dependencies = [
 "base64 0.23.1",
 "bytes",
@@ -3603,7 +3606,7 @@ version = "0.10.81"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "77823a27f0babb03091cb9ed9ef80af3b39dbc82f97e8fa530374b7dafd87a45"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.2",
+ "bitflags 2.13.1",
 "cfg-if",
 "foreign-types",
 "libc",
@@ -4057,7 +4060,7 @@ version = "3.5.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e67ba7e9b2b56446f1d419b1d807906278ffa1a658a8a5d8a39dcb1f5a78614f"
 dependencies = [
- "toml_edit 0.25.15+spec-1.1.0",
+ "toml_edit 0.25.13+spec-1.1.0",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -4249,7 +4252,7 @@ version = "11.6.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "498cd0dc59d73224351ee52a95fee0f1a617a2eae0e7d9d720cc622c73a54186"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.2",
+ "bitflags 2.13.1",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -4258,7 +4261,7 @@ version = "0.5.18"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "ed2bf2547551a7053d6fdfafda3f938979645c44812fbfcda098faae3f1a362d"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.2",
+ "bitflags 2.13.1",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -4278,7 +4281,7 @@ checksum = "92ecd8964f8453721699a1ed72037b0db49ce2f5a5138486ee89bed6f67cdf3a"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -4421,7 +4424,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "mime",
 "percent-encoding",
 "pin-project-lite",
- "rustls 0.23.45",
+ "rustls 0.23.44",
 "rustls-pki-types",
 "rustls-platform-verifier",
 "serde",
@@ -4665,11 +4668,11 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "rustix"
-version = "1.1.5"
+version = "1.1.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "891efababe418670775f199f0d233d84843c227a0949a883ce15b37c78d6629d"
+checksum = "b6fe4565b9518b83ef4f91bb47ce29620ca828bd32cb7e408f0062e9930ba190"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.2",
+ "bitflags 2.13.1",
 "errno",
 "libc",
 "linux-raw-sys",
@@ -4690,9 +4693,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "rustls"
-version = "0.23.45"
+version = "0.23.44"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0d41d731c7d2f962d1ccc364cec258de3c0e93b38c2fb3ba97ac74513048d634"
+checksum = "6725596c3f2c3a0aef021139e145d4eafe314a6623e4680ca83852b2c67ab2ba"
 dependencies = [
 "log",
 "once_cell",
@@ -4744,7 +4747,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "jni",
 "log",
 "once_cell",
- "rustls 0.23.45",
+ "rustls 0.23.44",
 "rustls-native-certs",
 "rustls-platform-verifier-android",
 "rustls-webpki 0.103.15",
@@ -4886,7 +4889,7 @@ version = "3.7.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b7f4bc775c73d9a02cde8bf7b2ec4c9d12743edf609006c7facc23998404cd1d"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.2",
+ "bitflags 2.13.1",
 "core-foundation 0.10.1",
 "core-foundation-sys",
 "libc",
@@ -4956,7 +4959,7 @@ checksum = "e7a5d71263a5a7d47b41f6b3f06ba276f10cc18b0931f1799f710578e2309348"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -5052,7 +5055,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "darling 0.24.1",
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -5192,9 +5195,9 @@ checksum = "0c790de23124f9ab44544d7ac05d60440adc586479ce501c1d6d7da3cd8c9cf5"

 [[package]]
 name = "smallvec"
-version = "1.16.1"
+version = "1.16.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ba467056f1b547ed52077911161fc86985becbc60e8e1857c8a144dab0def891"
+checksum = "b9be42f50aa861c555654aa3a37f52f4b1074bacf4e48fe0ef7fa584e80f1f0f"

 [[package]]
 name = "socket2"
@@ -5321,9 +5324,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "syn"
-version = "3.0.6"
+version = "3.0.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8593e8e72159ed2257d083c7a454a85cbf854f37a0966d8d483aff8c8a3ebcee"
+checksum = "12df2e0110f65b775f769bb17ef989067a1d931b2eb822bd4346631eeada89f9"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
@@ -5350,17 +5353,6 @@ dependencies = [
 "syn 2.0.119",
 ]

-[[package]]
-name = "synstructure"
-version = "0.14.0"
-source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "901704edd0dfe137f1987838ee4f259e4e063c31371bdb423f7ae38ec6f77f02"
-dependencies = [
- "proc-macro2",
- "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
-]
-
 [[package]]
 name = "syslog"
 version = "7.0.0"
@@ -5379,7 +5371,7 @@ version = "0.7.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "a13f3d0daba03132c0aa9767f98351b3488edc2c100cda2d2ec2b04f3d8d3c8b"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.2",
+ "bitflags 2.13.1",
 "core-foundation 0.9.4",
 "system-configuration-sys",
 ]
@@ -5450,7 +5442,7 @@ checksum = "bc04cd3e1236dd4a98afca4569f2deb3f120e5422a4023be2cb683f8486292af"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -5515,9 +5507,18 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "tinyvec"
-version = "1.13.3"
+version = "1.13.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "fd3ca314f692efd6c868f8408f53fe444634a845f96c028b97d35f6a1f79f0ee"
+checksum = "4cf0ded5c4e56918d8f8a339e1bb67d038d3bc6d144ac407904015ba2e4cde9b"
+dependencies = [
+ "tinyvec_macros",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "tinyvec_macros"
+version = "0.1.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "1f3ccbac311fea05f86f61904b462b55fb3df8837a366dfc601a0161d0532f20"

 [[package]]
 name = "tokio"
@@ -5544,7 +5545,7 @@ checksum = "78773a2a397f451582ce068015985c33193cf6dea8b74d2a639fe457b2f07b0e"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -5563,7 +5564,7 @@ version = "0.26.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b0c85f2c3ef0b1cd58b36682f4b17aaa995f0e5db534d85692b4903abce21f67"
 dependencies = [
- "rustls 0.23.45",
+ "rustls 0.23.44",
 "tokio",
 ]

@@ -5673,9 +5674,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "toml_edit"
-version = "0.25.15+spec-1.1.0"
+version = "0.25.13+spec-1.1.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "1340ea94a5856333492c9064b02c778b191dd2c853778d9609debdcdfea3a614"
+checksum = "6975367e4d2ef766d86af01ffad14b622fecc8d4357a998fbc4deb6e9bacaf9b"
 dependencies = [
 "indexmap 2.14.2",
 "toml_datetime 1.1.1+spec-1.1.0",
@@ -5732,7 +5733,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "4cfcf7e2740e6fc6d4d688b4ef00650406bb94adf4731e43c096c3a19fe40840"
 dependencies = [
 "async-compression",
- "bitflags 2.13.2",
+ "bitflags 2.13.1",
 "bytes",
 "futures-core",
 "futures-util",
@@ -5880,9 +5881,9 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-ident"
-version = "1.0.26"
+version = "1.0.24"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "d245f478577f809a851594d02313b640fb437e0bb33866753cff937863096954"
+checksum = "e6e4313cd5fcd3dad5cafa179702e2b244f760991f45397d14d4ebf38247da75"

 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-segmentation"
@@ -5935,9 +5936,9 @@ checksum = "b6c140620e7ffbb22c2dee59cafe6084a59b5ffc27a8859a5f0d494b5d52b6be"

 [[package]]
 name = "uuid"
-version = "1.26.1"
+version = "1.26.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "2ef6dac1e96601b4fb3acccccff2139741fcb757cb9a36089bf5be91cfb285ce"
+checksum = "b5772d71c9be8a8a6ac2117d949c5b224c1b72241bb611d9a3012edcf8af7812"
 dependencies = [
 "getrandom 0.4.3",
 "js-sys",
@@ -6018,7 +6019,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "rocket",
 "rocket_ws",
 "rpassword",
- "rustls 0.23.45",
+ "rustls 0.23.44",
 "semver",
 "serde",
 "serde_json",
@@ -6133,7 +6134,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "bumpalo",
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 "wasm-bindgen-shared",
 ]

@@ -6611,14 +6612,14 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "yoke-derive"
-version = "0.8.3"
+version = "0.8.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "33811428bee40dbceb6d545e95754741d17a6aef9a4849f0fd62e2ba4f412a78"
+checksum = "de844c262c8848816172cef550288e7dc6c7b7814b4ee56b3e1553f275f1858e"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
- "synstructure 0.14.0",
+ "syn 2.0.119",
+ "synstructure",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -6665,14 +6666,14 @@ dependencies = [

 [[package]]
 name = "zerofrom-derive"
-version = "0.1.8"
+version = "0.1.7"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f75b4683f6c7f45248d4d64056a24298c6281e0993356d7d1b4a1a962ef10d4a"
+checksum = "11532158c46691caf0f2593ea8358fed6bbf68a0315e80aae9bd41fbade684a1"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
- "synstructure 0.14.0",
+ "syn 2.0.119",
+ "synstructure",
 ]

 [[package]]
@@ -6725,14 +6726,14 @@ checksum = "34df6fc39dbd26ddc9c10e6a2984476e13acce22e64e4487636ef494369225da"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.6",
+ "syn 3.0.5",
 ]

 [[package]]
 name = "zlib-rs"
-version = "0.6.8"
+version = "0.6.7"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b268e58e7c693d7c271f93ffc4ba3b380412554231c85bf61ca7af91042a4112"
+checksum = "34b31d188d9d685a4f9c7b46d6e36631b07058d2cfe190267adce54dc230bf12"

 [[package]]
 name = "zmij"
@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ libsqlite3-sys = { version = "0.38.2", optional = true }
 # Crypto-related libraries
 rand = "0.10.2"
 ring = "0.17.14"
-rustls = { version = "0.23.45", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
+rustls = { version = "0.23.44", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
 subtle = "2.6.1"

 # UUID generation
-uuid = { version = "1.26.1", features = ["v4"] }
+uuid = { version = "1.26.0", features = ["v4"] }

 # Date and time libraries
 chrono = { version = "0.4.45", default-features = false, features = ["clock", "serde"] }
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ job_scheduler_ng = "2.5.0"
 data-encoding = "2.11.1"

 # JWT library
-jsonwebtoken = { version = "11.1.0", default-features = false, features = ["rust_crypto", "use_pem"] }
+jsonwebtoken = { version = "11.0.0", default-features = false, features = ["rust_crypto", "use_pem"] }

 # TOTP library
 totp-lite = "2.0.1"
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ reqwest = { version = "0.13.5", default-features = false, features = [
    "socks",
    "system-proxy",
 ] }
-hickory-resolver = "0.26.3"
+hickory-resolver = "0.26.2"

 # Favicon extraction libraries
 html5gum = "0.8.4"
@@ -257,8 +257,8 @@ rpassword = "7.5.4"
 grass_compiler = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false }

 # File are accessed through Apache OpenDAL
-opendal = { version = "0.59.2", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
-opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.2", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
+opendal = { version = "0.59.1", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
+opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.1", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }

 # For retrieving AWS credentials, including temporary SSO credentials
 aws-config = { version = "1.12.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ aws-config = { version = "1.12.0", optional = true, default-features = false, fe
    "sso",
 ] }
 aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0", optional = true }
-aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.16.2", optional = true }
+aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.16.0", optional = true }
 http = { version = "1.5.0", optional = true }
 reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.3.0", optional = true }
 reqsign-core = { version = "3.3.1", optional = true }
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ proc-macro = true

 [dependencies]
 quote = "1.0.47"
-syn = "3.0.6"
+syn = "3.0.5"

 [lints]
 workspace = true
@@ -4,4 +4,3 @@ ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
+
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;

 CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
    uuid                CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
@@ -4,4 +4,3 @@ ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
+
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;

 CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
    uuid                CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
@@ -4,4 +4,3 @@ ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@ ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
+
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;

 CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
    uuid                TEXT     NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 use std::collections::HashSet;

 use chrono::Utc;
-use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
 use rocket::{
    http::Status,
    request::{FromRequest, Outcome, Request},
@@ -12,7 +11,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{
-        AnonymousNotify, ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, LogOutReason, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
+        AnonymousNotify, ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
        core::{accept_org_invite, log_user_event, two_factor::email},
        master_password_policy, register_push_device, unregister_push_device,
    },
@@ -49,10 +48,8 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<rocket::Route> {
        post_password,
        post_set_password,
        post_kdf,
-        get_key_rotation_data,
        post_rotatekey,
        post_user_key,
-        post_rotate_user_keys,
        post_sstamp,
        post_email_token,
        post_email,
@@ -176,14 +173,6 @@ impl RegisterDataCompat {
        self.fold(|rdc| &rdc.key, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_unlock.key).to_owned()
    }

-    /// The id of the user key, which only the current format carries.
-    fn key_id(&self) -> Option<KeyId> {
-        match self {
-            RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataOld(_) => None,
-            RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataCur(rdcu) => rdcu.master_password_unlock.contained_key_id.clone(),
-        }
-    }
-
    // When comparing with salt, email need to be normalized:
    //  - https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/web-v2026.5.0/libs/common/src/key-management/master-password/services/master-password.service.ts#L171
    fn unprocessable(&self, email: &str) -> bool {
@@ -285,7 +274,7 @@ impl AccountKeysData {

        let v2 = match (signed_public_key, self.signature_key_pair, self.security_state) {
            (Some(signed_public_key), Some(signature_key_pair), Some(security_state)) => {
-                let Some(signature_algorithm) = SignatureAlgorithm::parse(&signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm)
+                let Some(signature_algorithm) = SignatureAlgorithm::from_str(&signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm)
                else {
                    err!(format!("Unsupported signature algorithm: {}", signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm))
                };
@@ -313,23 +302,6 @@ impl AccountKeysData {
    }
 }

-impl WrappedAccountCryptographicState {
-    /// This shape is v2-only: the key pairs and security state were already required by the
-    /// deserializer, so a missing signed public key fails the all-or-nothing check in
-    /// [`AccountKeysData::validate`] rather than falling back to v1, which would silently turn a
-    /// rotation into a downgrade.
-    fn validate(self) -> ApiResult<ValidatedAccountKeys> {
-        AccountKeysData {
-            user_key_encrypted_account_private_key: None,
-            account_public_key: None,
-            public_key_encryption_key_pair: Some(self.public_key_encryption_key_pair),
-            signature_key_pair: Some(self.signature_key_pair),
-            security_state: Some(self.security_state),
-        }
-        .validate()
-    }
-}
-
 impl From<KeysData> for ValidatedAccountKeys {
    fn from(keys: KeysData) -> Self {
        Self {
@@ -341,19 +313,6 @@ impl From<KeysData> for ValidatedAccountKeys {
 }

 impl ValidatedAccountKeys {
-    /// The keys of a request that may carry either shape. `accountKeys` supersedes the flat `keys`
-    /// object when both are sent.
-    fn from_request(account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>, keys: Option<KeysData>) -> ApiResult<Option<Self>> {
-        match (account_keys, keys) {
-            (Some(account_keys), _) => account_keys.validate().map(Some),
-            (None, keys) => Ok(keys.map(Self::from)),
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn is_v2(&self) -> bool {
-        self.v2.is_some()
-    }
-
    /// Writes the parts of the state that live on the user itself. The user still needs saving, and
    /// [`Self::save_signature_key_pair`] still needs calling once it has been.
    ///
@@ -381,7 +340,7 @@ impl ValidatedAccountKeys {
            return Ok(());
        };

-        let mut key_pair = match UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(user_id, conn).await {
+        let mut key_pair = match UserSignatureKeyPair::find_active_by_user(user_id, conn).await {
            Some(mut key_pair) => {
                key_pair.signature_algorithm = v2.signature_algorithm as i32;
                key_pair.signing_key.clone_from(&v2.signing_key);
@@ -417,7 +376,6 @@ pub struct MasterPasswordUnlock {

    #[serde(alias = "masterKeyWrappedUserKey")]
    key: String,
-    contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -545,11 +503,10 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, email_verification: bool, conn:
        err!("The field Name must be a string with a maximum length of 50.");
    }

-    // Check against the password hint setting and the keys here so if they fail,
-    // the user can retry without losing their invitation below.
+    // Check against the password hint setting here so if it fails, the user
+    // can retry without losing their invitation below.
    let password_hint = clean_password_hint(data.master_password_hint.as_ref());
    enforce_password_hint_setting(password_hint.as_ref())?;
-    let account_keys = ValidatedAccountKeys::from_request(data.account_keys, data.keys)?;

    let mut user = match User::find_by_mail(&email, &conn).await {
        Some(user) => {
@@ -606,13 +563,13 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, email_verification: bool, conn:
        user.name = name;
    }

+    let account_keys = match (data.account_keys, data.keys) {
+        (Some(account_keys), _) => Some(account_keys.validate()?),
+        (None, Some(keys)) => Some(keys.into()),
+        (None, None) => None,
+    };
    if let Some(ref account_keys) = account_keys {
        account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
-        // Like upstream, only a v2 registration records the user key id. A v1 account reports it
-        // later, through `user-key-id`.
-        if account_keys.is_v2() {
-            user.key_id = data.compat.key_id();
-        }
    }

    if email_verified {
@@ -671,7 +628,11 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<SetPasswordData>, headers: Headers, conn:
    let password_hint = clean_password_hint(data.master_password_hint.as_ref());
    enforce_password_hint_setting(password_hint.as_ref())?;

-    let account_keys = ValidatedAccountKeys::from_request(data.account_keys, data.keys)?;
+    let account_keys = match (data.account_keys, data.keys) {
+        (Some(account_keys), _) => Some(account_keys.validate()?),
+        (None, Some(keys)) => Some(keys.into()),
+        (None, None) => None,
+    };

    set_kdf_data(&mut user, data.compat.kdf())?;

@@ -687,10 +648,6 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<SetPasswordData>, headers: Headers, conn:

    if let Some(ref account_keys) = account_keys {
        account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
-        // As in `register`, only a v2 account records the user key id here
-        if account_keys.is_v2() {
-            user.key_id = data.compat.key_id();
-        }
    }

    if let Some(identifier) = data.org_identifier
@@ -834,8 +791,6 @@ struct PostKeysData {
    #[serde(flatten)]
    keys: Option<KeysData>,
    account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>,
-    // The id of the user key these account keys belong to, only honored for v2 `accountKeys`
-    user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }

 #[post("/accounts/keys", data = "<data>")]
@@ -844,25 +799,9 @@ async fn post_keys(data: Json<PostKeysData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) ->

    let mut user = headers.user;

-    // This only sets the keys of an account that has none yet. Replacing existing ones is what a key
-    // rotation does, with the checks that go with it.
-    if user.private_key.is_some() || user.public_key.is_some() {
-        err!("User has existing keypair")
-    }
-
    // `accountKeys` supersedes the flat `keys` object when both are sent.
    let account_keys = match (data.account_keys, data.keys) {
-        (Some(account_keys), _) => {
-            let account_keys = account_keys.validate()?;
-            if !account_keys.is_v2() {
-                err!("AccountKeys are only supported for V2 encryption.")
-            }
-            // A client that predates key ids sends none, and reports it later through `user-key-id`
-            if data.user_key_id.is_some() {
-                user.key_id = data.user_key_id;
-            }
-            account_keys
-        }
+        (Some(account_keys), _) => account_keys.validate()?,
        (None, Some(keys)) => keys.into(),
        (None, None) => err!("No account keys provided"),
    };
@@ -915,8 +854,6 @@ async fn post_password(data: Json<ChangePassData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
                err!("Invalid master password salt")
            }

-            validate_key_id_unchanged(&user, &unlock_data)?;
-
            (authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
        } else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (data.new_master_password_hash, data.key) {
            (new_master_password_hash, new_key)
@@ -1002,21 +939,6 @@ struct UnlockData {
    salt: String,
    kdf: KDFData,
    master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
-    contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
-}
-
-/// A password or KDF change re-wraps the same user key, so a key id sent with it has to be the
-/// current one. Either may be missing: from a client that predates key ids, or a user whose key id
-/// isn't known yet. There is nothing to compare in those cases.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/MasterPasswordUnlockData.cs>
-fn validate_key_id_unchanged(user: &User, unlock_data: &UnlockData) -> EmptyResult {
-    if let (Some(current), Some(contained)) = (&user.key_id, &unlock_data.contained_key_id)
-        && current != contained
-    {
-        err!("Invalid user key sent in master-password unlock data.")
-    }
-    Ok(())
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -1043,8 +965,6 @@ async fn post_kdf(data: Json<ChangeKdfData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
        err!("Invalid master password salt")
    }

-    validate_key_id_unchanged(&headers.user, &data.unlock_data)?;
-
    let mut user = headers.user;

    set_kdf_data(&mut user, &data.unlock_data.kdf)?;
@@ -1086,62 +1006,43 @@ struct UpdateEmergencyAccessData {
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct UpdateResetPasswordData {
    organization_id: OrganizationId,
-    // Absent in a v1 -> v2 upgrade, which keeps the key the organization already holds
-    reset_password_key: Option<String>,
+    reset_password_key: String,
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct KeyData {
    account_unlock_data: RotateAccountUnlockData,
-    account_keys: AccountKeysData,
+    account_keys: RotateAccountKeys,
    account_data: RotateAccountData,
    old_master_key_authentication_hash: String,
-    new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct RotateAccountUnlockData {
+    emergency_access_unlock_data: Vec<UpdateEmergencyAccessData>,
    master_password_unlock_data: MasterPasswordUnlockData,
-    #[serde(flatten)]
-    common: CommonUnlockData,
+    organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: Vec<UpdateResetPasswordData>,
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct MasterPasswordUnlockData {
-    #[serde(flatten)]
-    kdf: KDFData,
+    kdf_type: i32,
+    kdf_iterations: i32,
+    kdf_parallelism: Option<i32>,
+    kdf_memory: Option<i32>,
    email: String,
    master_key_authentication_hash: String,
    master_key_encrypted_user_key: String,
-    contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }

-/// The unlock data both rotation endpoints share. Vaultwarden has neither trusted device encryption
-/// nor passkey login, so `key-rotation-data` reports none of either and these must arrive empty.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Api/KeyManagement/Models/Requests/CommonUnlockDataRequestModel.cs>
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct CommonUnlockData {
-    emergency_access_unlock_data: Vec<UpdateEmergencyAccessData>,
-    organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: Vec<UpdateResetPasswordData>,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    passkey_unlock_data: Vec<Value>,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    device_key_unlock_data: Vec<Value>,
-    v2_upgrade_token: Option<V2UpgradeTokenData>,
-}
-
-/// Lets clients that still hold the v1 user key derive the v2 one after another client upgraded the
-/// account, so a v1 -> v2 upgrade doesn't have to log every other session out. Opaque to us.
-#[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct V2UpgradeTokenData {
-    wrapped_user_key1: String,
-    wrapped_user_key2: String,
+struct RotateAccountKeys {
+    user_key_encrypted_account_private_key: String,
+    account_public_key: String,
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -1152,148 +1053,31 @@ struct RotateAccountData {
    sends: Vec<SendData>,
 }

-/// Body of `rotate-user-keys`, which rotates the keys without touching the master password.
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct RotateUserKeysData {
-    wrapped_account_cryptographic_state: WrappedAccountCryptographicState,
-    unlock_data: CommonUnlockData,
-    account_data: RotateAccountData,
-    unlock_method_data: UnlockMethodData,
-    new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
-}
-
-/// The v2-only account cryptographic state, where all three parts are mandatory.
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct WrappedAccountCryptographicState {
-    public_key_encryption_key_pair: PublicKeyEncryptionKeyPairData,
-    signature_key_pair: SignatureKeyPairData,
-    security_state: SecurityStateData,
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct UnlockMethodData {
-    unlock_method: i32,
-    master_password_unlock_data: Option<RotateMasterPasswordUnlockData>,
-    // `keyConnectorKeyWrappedUserKey` is deliberately not read: that unlock method is rejected.
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct RotateMasterPasswordUnlockData {
-    kdf: KDFData,
-    salt: String,
-    master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
-    contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
-}
-
-/// The user key wrapped in the master password unlock data has to be the new one.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/MasterPasswordUnlockData.cs>
-fn validate_contained_key_id(contained_key_id: Option<&KeyId>, new_user_key_id: Option<&KeyId>) -> EmptyResult {
-    match (contained_key_id, new_user_key_id) {
-        // Neither is sent by clients that predate key ids
-        (None, None) => Ok(()),
-        (Some(contained), Some(new)) if contained == new => Ok(()),
-        _ => err!("Invalid user key sent in master-password unlock data."),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Api/KeyManagement/Enums/UnlockMethod.cs>
-#[derive(num_derive::FromPrimitive)]
-enum UnlockMethod {
-    Tde = 0,
-    MasterPassword = 1,
-    KeyConnector = 2,
-}
-
-/// The rotation-specific checks on the new account keys.
-///
-/// A rotation re-wraps the existing keys under a new user key; it must not swap the identity the
-/// account presents to others. So the public key never changes, and for an account that is already
-/// v2 the verifying key doesn't either — only the *wrapped* signing key does. A v1 account may gain
-/// a signature key pair, which is the v1 -> v2 upgrade.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/UserKey/Implementations/RotateUserAccountKeysCommand.cs>
-async fn validate_rotation_account_keys(keys: &ValidatedAccountKeys, user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    if user.public_key.as_ref() != Some(&keys.public_key) {
-        err!("Changing the asymmetric keypair is not possible during key rotation")
-    }
-
-    let Some(v2) = &keys.v2 else {
-        if user.is_v2() {
-            err!("Cannot downgrade an account from v2 to v1 encryption during key rotation")
-        }
-        // A v1 rotation: the private key stays wrapped by an AES-CBC-HMAC user key
-        if enc_string_type(&keys.private_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_AES_CBC_256_HMAC_SHA256) {
-            err!("The provided account private key was not wrapped with AES-256-CBC-HMAC")
-        }
-        return Ok(());
-    };
-
-    // Both a v2 rotation and the v1 -> v2 upgrade end up with a COSE user key wrapping the private keys
-    if enc_string_type(&v2.signing_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0) {
-        err!("The provided signing key data is not wrapped with XChaCha20-Poly1305.")
-    }
-    if enc_string_type(&keys.private_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0) {
-        err!("The provided private key encryption key is not wrapped with XChaCha20-Poly1305.")
-    }
-    if v2.verifying_key.is_empty() || v2.signed_public_key.is_empty() || v2.security_state.is_empty() {
-        err!("The v2 account keys are missing the verifying key, signed public key or security state")
-    }
-
-    if !user.is_v2() {
-        // The v1 -> v2 upgrade, which is where the signature key pair comes from
-        return Ok(());
-    }
-
-    let Some(key_pair) = UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await else {
-        err!("The account is missing its signature key pair")
-    };
-    if key_pair.verifying_key != v2.verifying_key {
-        err!("Changing the verifying key is not possible during key rotation")
-    }
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// `AesCbc256_HmacSha256_B64`, the v1 user key
-const ENC_TYPE_AES_CBC_256_HMAC_SHA256: &str = "2";
-/// `CoseEncrypt0B64`, the v2 user key
-const ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0: &str = "7";
-
-/// The encryption type of an EncString, the number before the first `.`.
-fn enc_string_type(enc_string: &str) -> Option<&str> {
-    enc_string.split_once('.').map(|(enc_type, _)| enc_type)
-}
-
-impl KDFData {
-    /// Whether these are the settings the user already has, which a key rotation can't change.
-    fn is_unchanged_for(&self, user: &User) -> bool {
-        user.client_kdf_type == self.kdf
-            && user.client_kdf_iter == self.kdf_iterations
-            && user.client_kdf_memory == self.kdf_memory
-            && user.client_kdf_parallelism == self.kdf_parallelism
-    }
-}
-
-/// A rotation re-encrypts everything under the new user key, so anything left out would be
-/// unreadable afterwards. Both rotation endpoints require the client to send the complete set.
-fn validate_rotation_data(
-    data: &RotateData,
+fn validate_keydata(
+    data: &KeyData,
    existing_ciphers: &[Cipher],
    existing_folders: &[Folder],
    existing_emergency_access: &[EmergencyAccess],
    existing_memberships: &[Membership],
    existing_sends: &[Send],
+    user: &User,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
-    let account_data = &data.account_data;
+    if user.client_kdf_type != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_type
+        || user.client_kdf_iter != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_iterations
+        || user.client_kdf_memory != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_memory
+        || user.client_kdf_parallelism != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_parallelism
+        || user.email != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.email
+    {
+        err!("Changing the kdf variant or email is not supported during key rotation");
+    }
+    if user.public_key.as_ref() != Some(&data.account_keys.account_public_key) {
+        err!("Changing the asymmetric keypair is not possible during key rotation")
+    }

    // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's ciphers
    let existing_cipher_ids = existing_ciphers.iter().map(|c| &c.uuid).collect::<HashSet<&CipherId>>();
-    let provided_cipher_ids = account_data
+    let provided_cipher_ids = data
+        .account_data
        .ciphers
        .iter()
        .filter(|c| c.organization_id.is_none())
@@ -1305,7 +1089,8 @@ fn validate_rotation_data(

    // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's folders
    let existing_folder_ids = existing_folders.iter().map(|f| &f.uuid).collect::<HashSet<&FolderId>>();
-    let provided_folder_ids = account_data.folders.iter().filter_map(|f| f.id.as_ref()).collect::<HashSet<&FolderId>>();
+    let provided_folder_ids =
+        data.account_data.folders.iter().filter_map(|f| f.id.as_ref()).collect::<HashSet<&FolderId>>();
    if !provided_folder_ids.is_superset(&existing_folder_ids) {
        err!("All existing folders must be included in the rotation")
    }
@@ -1313,8 +1098,12 @@ fn validate_rotation_data(
    // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's emergency access keys
    let existing_emergency_access_ids =
        existing_emergency_access.iter().map(|ea| &ea.uuid).collect::<HashSet<&EmergencyAccessId>>();
-    let provided_emergency_access_ids =
-        data.unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data.iter().map(|ea| &ea.id).collect::<HashSet<&EmergencyAccessId>>();
+    let provided_emergency_access_ids = data
+        .account_unlock_data
+        .emergency_access_unlock_data
+        .iter()
+        .map(|ea| &ea.id)
+        .collect::<HashSet<&EmergencyAccessId>>();
    if !provided_emergency_access_ids.is_superset(&existing_emergency_access_ids) {
        err!("All existing emergency access keys must be included in the rotation")
    }
@@ -1323,7 +1112,7 @@ fn validate_rotation_data(
    let existing_reset_password_ids =
        existing_memberships.iter().map(|m| &m.org_uuid).collect::<HashSet<&OrganizationId>>();
    let provided_reset_password_ids = data
-        .unlock_data
+        .account_unlock_data
        .organization_account_recovery_unlock_data
        .iter()
        .map(|rp| &rp.organization_id)
@@ -1334,7 +1123,7 @@ fn validate_rotation_data(

    // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's sends
    let existing_send_ids = existing_sends.iter().map(|s| &s.uuid).collect::<HashSet<&SendId>>();
-    let provided_send_ids = account_data.sends.iter().filter_map(|s| s.id.as_ref()).collect::<HashSet<&SendId>>();
+    let provided_send_ids = data.account_data.sends.iter().filter_map(|s| s.id.as_ref()).collect::<HashSet<&SendId>>();
    if !provided_send_ids.is_superset(&existing_send_ids) {
        err!("All existing sends must be included in the rotation")
    }
@@ -1342,194 +1131,43 @@ fn validate_rotation_data(
    Ok(())
 }

-/// The public keys and encrypted keysets that participate in a key rotation, so the client can
-/// re-share the new user key without having to piece this together from several endpoints.
-///
-/// The four collections must always be present, even when empty: the SDK errors out if any of them
-/// is missing. `trustedDeviceKeyData` and `passkeyKeyData` are always empty here, since vaultwarden
-/// supports neither trusted device encryption nor passkey (PRF) login.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/UserKey/Queries/KeyRotationDataQuery.cs>
-#[get("/accounts/key-management/key-rotation-data")]
-async fn get_key_rotation_data(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let user_id = &headers.user.uuid;
-
-    let mut organization_data = Vec::new();
-    for membership in Membership::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await {
-        // Only memberships actually enrolled in account recovery take part in the rotation.
-        if membership.reset_password_key.is_none() {
-            continue;
-        }
-        let Some(org) = Organization::find_by_uuid(&membership.org_uuid, &conn).await else {
-            continue;
-        };
-        let Some(public_key) = org.public_key else {
-            continue;
-        };
-        organization_data.push(json!({
-            "organizationId": org.uuid,
-            "organizationName": org.name,
-            "organizationPublicKey": public_key,
-            "object": "organizationPasswordResetKeyData",
-        }));
-    }
-
-    let mut emergency_access_data = Vec::new();
-    for emergency_access in EmergencyAccess::find_all_confirmed_by_grantor_uuid(user_id, &conn).await {
-        // Without a stored key there is nothing to re-share.
-        if emergency_access.key_encrypted.is_none() {
-            continue;
-        }
-        let Some(grantee_id) = emergency_access.grantee_uuid.clone() else {
-            continue;
-        };
-        let Some(grantee) = User::find_by_uuid(&grantee_id, &conn).await else {
-            continue;
-        };
-        let Some(public_key) = grantee.public_key.clone() else {
-            continue;
-        };
-        emergency_access_data.push(json!({
-            "id": emergency_access.uuid,
-            "granteeId": grantee_id,
-            "granteeName": grantee.name,
-            "granteeEmail": grantee.email,
-            "publicKey": public_key,
-            "object": "emergencyAccessKeyData",
-        }));
-    }
-
-    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "organizationPasswordResetKeyData": organization_data,
-        "emergencyAccessKeyData": emergency_access_data,
-        "trustedDeviceKeyData": [],
-        "passkeyKeyData": [],
-        "object": "keyRotationData",
-    })))
-}
-
-/// Everything a rotation replaces, once each endpoint's wrapper has been peeled off.
-struct RotateData {
-    account_keys: ValidatedAccountKeys,
-    account_data: RotateAccountData,
-    unlock_data: CommonUnlockData,
-    /// Only v2 (COSE) user keys have an id, so this is `None` for a v1 -> v1 rotation.
-    new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
-    /// The new user key, wrapped by the master key.
-    wrapped_user_key: String,
-    /// Only for `rotate-user-account-keys`, where the master password changes along with the keys.
-    new_password_hash: Option<String>,
-}
-
-impl CommonUnlockData {
-    /// We advertise no trusted devices or passkeys in `key-rotation-data`, so a client sending
-    /// either has produced keys for something that doesn't exist here. Silently dropping them would
-    /// leave the client believing an unlock method was rotated when it wasn't.
-    fn validate(&self) -> EmptyResult {
-        if !self.passkey_unlock_data.is_empty() {
-            err!("Passkey unlock is not supported")
-        }
-        if !self.device_key_unlock_data.is_empty() {
-            err!("Trusted device unlock is not supported")
-        }
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
 #[post("/accounts/key-management/rotate-user-account-keys", data = "<data>")]
 async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json<KeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult {
+    // TODO: See if we can wrap everything within a SQL Transaction. If something fails it should revert everything.
    let data: KeyData = data.into_inner();

    if !headers.user.check_valid_password(&data.old_master_key_authentication_hash) {
        err!("Invalid password")
    }

-    let unlock_data = data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data;
-    if !unlock_data.kdf.is_unchanged_for(&headers.user) || unlock_data.email != headers.user.email {
-        err!("Changing the kdf variant or email is not supported during key rotation");
-    }
-    validate_contained_key_id(unlock_data.contained_key_id.as_ref(), data.new_user_key_id.as_ref())?;
-
-    let mut common = data.account_unlock_data.common;
-    // This endpoint always logs every session out, so an upgrade token is never kept here. That
-    // also clears one left over from an earlier upgrade. Ref: upstream's AccountsKeyManagementController
-    common.v2_upgrade_token = None;
-
-    rotate_account(
-        RotateData {
-            account_keys: data.account_keys.validate()?,
-            account_data: data.account_data,
-            unlock_data: common,
-            new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id,
-            wrapped_user_key: unlock_data.master_key_encrypted_user_key,
-            new_password_hash: Some(unlock_data.master_key_authentication_hash),
-        },
-        headers,
-        conn,
-        nt,
-    )
-    .await
-}
-
-/// The body shared by both rotation endpoints: check that the client re-encrypted everything, re-save
-/// it, then swap the account keys and the wrapped user key.
-async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult {
-    // TODO: See if we can wrap everything within a SQL Transaction. If something fails it should revert everything.
-    data.unlock_data.validate()?;
-
-    let user_id = &headers.user.uuid;
-    let mut existing_ciphers = Cipher::find_owned_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
-    let mut existing_folders = Folder::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
-    let mut existing_emergency_access = EmergencyAccess::find_all_confirmed_by_grantor_uuid(user_id, &conn).await;
-    let mut existing_memberships = Membership::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
-    // We only rotate the reset password key if it is set.
-    existing_memberships.retain(|m| m.reset_password_key.is_some());
-    let mut existing_sends = Send::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
-
-    validate_rotation_data(
-        &data,
-        &existing_ciphers,
-        &existing_folders,
-        &existing_emergency_access,
-        &existing_memberships,
-        &existing_sends,
-    )?;
-
-    validate_rotation_account_keys(&data.account_keys, &headers.user, &conn).await?;
-
-    // The upgrade token only means anything for a v1 account moving to v2: it lets sessions still
-    // holding the v1 user key pick up the v2 one instead of being forced to re-authenticate. For an
-    // account that is already v2 it is meaningless, so it gets discarded and the security stamp is
-    // reset, as a rotation otherwise would. That ends the refresh tokens, while the access tokens in
-    // use run out on their own, as upstream.
-    let is_upgrade = data.unlock_data.v2_upgrade_token.is_some() && !headers.user.is_v2();
-    let upgrade_token = match &data.unlock_data.v2_upgrade_token {
-        Some(token) if is_upgrade => Some(serde_json::to_string(token)?),
-        _ => None,
-    };
-
-    // An upgrade can't re-wrap the account recovery keys: that needs the organization's public key
-    // to be trusted, and an upgrade shows the user no prompt. So the stored keys are kept, and each
-    // organization gets the upgrade token instead, to unwrap the v2 user key with.
-    // Ref: upstream's OrganizationUserRotationValidator
-    for reset_password_data in &data.unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data {
-        let has_key = reset_password_data.reset_password_key.as_deref().is_some_and(|k| !k.is_empty());
-        if is_upgrade && has_key {
-            err!("Account recovery keys cannot be rotated during a V1 to V2 upgrade rotation.")
-        }
-        if !is_upgrade && !has_key {
-            err!("Account recovery keys cannot be null or empty during rotation.")
-        }
-    }
-
    // Validate the import before continuing
    // Bitwarden does not process the import if there is one item invalid.
    // Since we check for the size of the encrypted note length, we need to do that here to pre-validate it.
    // TODO: See if we can optimize the whole cipher adding/importing and prevent duplicate code and checks.
    Cipher::validate_cipher_data(&data.account_data.ciphers)?;

+    let user_id = &headers.user.uuid;
+
    // TODO: Ideally we'd do everything after this point in a single transaction.

+    let mut existing_ciphers = Cipher::find_owned_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
+    let mut existing_folders = Folder::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
+    let mut existing_emergency_access = EmergencyAccess::find_all_confirmed_by_grantor_uuid(user_id, &conn).await;
+    let mut existing_memberships = Membership::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
+    // We only rotate the reset password key if it is set.
+    existing_memberships.retain(|m| m.reset_password_key.is_some());
+    let mut existing_sends = Send::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
+
+    validate_keydata(
+        &data,
+        &existing_ciphers,
+        &existing_folders,
+        &existing_emergency_access,
+        &existing_memberships,
+        &existing_sends,
+        &headers.user,
+    )?;
+
    // Update folder data
    for folder_data in data.account_data.folders {
        // Skip `null` folder id entries.
@@ -1545,7 +1183,7 @@ async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: No
    }

    // Update emergency access data
-    for emergency_access_data in data.unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data {
+    for emergency_access_data in data.account_unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data {
        let Some(saved_emergency_access) =
            existing_emergency_access.iter_mut().find(|ea| ea.uuid == emergency_access_data.id)
        else {
@@ -1557,17 +1195,14 @@ async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: No
    }

    // Update reset password data
-    for reset_password_data in data.unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data {
+    for reset_password_data in data.account_unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data {
        let Some(membership) =
            existing_memberships.iter_mut().find(|m| m.org_uuid == reset_password_data.organization_id)
        else {
            err!("Reset password doesn't exist")
        };

-        if !is_upgrade {
-            membership.reset_password_key = reset_password_data.reset_password_key;
-        }
-        membership.v2_upgrade_token.clone_from(&upgrade_token);
+        membership.reset_password_key = Some(reset_password_data.reset_password_key);
        membership.save(&conn).await?;
    }

@@ -1589,95 +1224,33 @@ async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: No
            };

            // Prevent triggering cipher updates via WebSockets by settings UpdateType::None
-            // Other sessions still hold the old user key, so an update to a re-encrypted cipher could cause issues.
-            // After the user is saved they are logged out, or on an upgrade, told to sync the new key.
+            // The user sessions are invalidated because all the ciphers were re-encrypted and thus triggering an update could cause issues.
+            // We force the users to logout after the user has been saved to try and prevent these issues.
            update_cipher_from_data(saved_cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?;
        }
    }

    // Update user data
    let mut user = headers.user;
-    user.v2_upgrade_token = upgrade_token;

-    data.account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
-    // The old id names a key that no longer exists, so it is replaced even when the new key has none.
-    user.key_id = data.new_user_key_id;
+    user.private_key = Some(data.account_keys.user_key_encrypted_account_private_key);
+    user.set_password(
+        &data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.master_key_authentication_hash,
+        Some(data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.master_key_encrypted_user_key),
+        true,
+        None,
+        &conn,
+    )
+    .await?;

-    user.akey = data.wrapped_user_key;
-    if let Some(new_password_hash) = data.new_password_hash {
-        user.set_password(&new_password_hash, None, false, None, &conn).await?;
-    }
-    // An upgrade keeps the sessions alive, see `is_upgrade` above
-    if !is_upgrade {
-        user.reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&conn).await?;
-    }
-
-    // The key pair goes first: if saving the user then fails during an upgrade, the account is still
-    // v1 and the key pair unused, instead of a v2 account without one, which no client could unlock.
-    // A failure between the two writes of a v2 rotation still needs a transaction to undo.
-    data.account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
-    user.save(&conn).await?;
+    let save_result = user.save(&conn).await;

    // Prevent logging out the client where the user requested this endpoint from.
    // If you do logout the user it will causes issues at the client side.
    // Adding the device uuid will prevent this.
-    // When the sessions were kept alive, the reason lets the other clients sync the new keys (through
-    // the upgrade token) instead of logging out, if they have `pm-31050-no-logout-key-upgrade-rotation`.
-    let reason = is_upgrade.then_some(LogOutReason::KeyRotation);
-    nt.send_logout_with_reason(&user, Some(&headers.device), reason, &conn).await;
+    nt.send_logout(&user, Some(&headers.device), &conn).await;

-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// Rotates the account keys without changing the master password.
-///
-/// Unlike `rotate-user-account-keys` this carries no proof of the master password: the request is
-/// authorized by the session alone, which is how upstream defines it, and the client has to be
-/// unlocked to produce the payload in the first place.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Api/KeyManagement/Controllers/AccountsKeyManagementController.cs>
-#[post("/accounts/key-management/rotate-user-keys", data = "<data>")]
-async fn post_rotate_user_keys(
-    data: Json<RotateUserKeysData>,
-    headers: Headers,
-    conn: DbConn,
-    nt: Notify<'_>,
-) -> EmptyResult {
-    let data: RotateUserKeysData = data.into_inner();
-
-    let wrapped_user_key = match UnlockMethod::from_i32(data.unlock_method_data.unlock_method) {
-        Some(UnlockMethod::MasterPassword) => {
-            let Some(unlock_data) = data.unlock_method_data.master_password_unlock_data else {
-                err!("Missing master password unlock data")
-            };
-            if !unlock_data.kdf.is_unchanged_for(&headers.user) {
-                err!("Changing the kdf variant is not supported during key rotation")
-            }
-            if unlock_data.salt != headers.user.email {
-                err!("Invalid master password salt")
-            }
-            validate_contained_key_id(unlock_data.contained_key_id.as_ref(), data.new_user_key_id.as_ref())?;
-            unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key
-        }
-        Some(UnlockMethod::Tde) => err!("Trusted device encryption is not supported"),
-        Some(UnlockMethod::KeyConnector) => err!("Key connector is not supported"),
-        None => err!("Unrecognized unlock method"),
-    };
-
-    rotate_account(
-        RotateData {
-            account_keys: data.wrapped_account_cryptographic_state.validate()?,
-            account_data: data.account_data,
-            unlock_data: data.unlock_data,
-            new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id,
-            wrapped_user_key,
-            new_password_hash: None,
-        },
-        headers,
-        conn,
-        nt,
-    )
-    .await
+    save_result
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -1689,9 +1262,8 @@ struct KeyIdData {
 #[post("/accounts/key-management/user-key-id", data = "<data>")]
 async fn post_user_key(data: Json<KeyIdData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    let mut user = headers.user;
-    // Only a backfill for accounts that have none. Afterwards the id changes with the key, in a rotation.
    if user.key_id.is_some() {
-        err!("User key id is already set.")
+        err_code!("Unexpected data", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
    }

    user.key_id = Some(data.into_inner().user_key_id);
@@ -23,8 +23,7 @@ use crate::{
        models::{
            Archive, Attachment, AttachmentId, Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup,
            CollectionId, CollectionUser, EventType, Favorite, Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId, Group, KeyId,
-            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, User, UserId,
-            is_data_blob_encrypted,
+            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, UserId,
        },
    },
    util::{NumberOrString, deser_opt_nonempty_str, save_temp_file},
@@ -190,22 +189,12 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
            // https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
            "masterKeyEncryptedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
            "masterKeyWrappedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
-            "salt": headers.user.email,
-            "containedKeyId": headers.user.key_id,
+            "salt": headers.user.email
        })
    } else {
        Value::Null
    };

-    // Upstream omits these two when unset rather than sending null.
-    let mut user_decryption = json!({ "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock });
-    if let Some(key_id) = &headers.user.key_id {
-        user_decryption["userKeyId"] = json!(key_id);
-    }
-    if let Some(v2_upgrade_token) = headers.user.v2_upgrade_token_json() {
-        user_decryption["v2UpgradeToken"] = v2_upgrade_token;
-    }
-
    Ok(Json(json!({
        "profile": user_json,
        "folders": folders_json,
@@ -215,7 +204,11 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
        "ciphers": ciphers_json,
        "domains": domains_json,
        "sends": sends_json,
-        "userDecryption": user_decryption,
+        "userDecryption": {
+            "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock,
+            "userKeyId": headers.user.key_id,
+            "v2UpgradeToken": headers.user.v2_upgrade_token_json(),
+        },
        "object": "sync"
    })))
 }
@@ -292,8 +285,7 @@ pub struct CipherData {
    Passport = 8
    */
    pub r#type: i32,
-    // Absent on a blob-encrypted cipher, whose name is sealed inside `data`
-    pub name: Option<String>,
+    pub name: String,
    pub notes: Option<String>,
    fields: Option<Value>,

@@ -307,9 +299,6 @@ pub struct CipherData {
    drivers_license: Option<Value>,
    passport: Option<Value>,

-    // The sealed blob of a v2 account's cipher, which replaces all of the fields above
-    data: Option<String>,
-
    favorite: Option<bool>,
    reprompt: Option<i32>,

@@ -331,70 +320,6 @@ pub struct CipherData {
    archived_date: Option<String>,
 }

-/// A field of a [`CipherData`] that fails upstream's model validation.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct CipherValidationError {
-    pub field: &'static str,
-    pub message: String,
-}
-
-impl From<CipherValidationError> for crate::Error {
-    fn from(e: CipherValidationError) -> Self {
-        Self::new_msg(e.message)
-    }
-}
-
-/// A user-owned cipher must be encrypted with the user's current key. Organization ciphers use the
-/// organization key, which has no id yet, and either id may be missing: from a client that predates
-/// the field, or a user whose key id isn't known yet. There is nothing to compare in those cases.
-///
-/// Ref: upstream's `CiphersController.ValidateCipherEncryptedByUser`
-fn validate_encrypted_by_user_key(data: &CipherData, user: &User, is_org_cipher: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    if !is_org_cipher
-        && let (Some(cipher_key_id), Some(user_key_id)) = (&data.encrypted_by_key_id, &user.key_id)
-        && cipher_key_id != user_key_id
-    {
-        err!("Cipher was not encrypted with the current user key. Please try again.")
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// Upstream's `[StringLength(500000)]` on `CipherRequestModel.Data`
-const MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH: usize = 500_000;
-
-impl CipherData {
-    /// Whether the content is a single blob rather than the per-type fields. This parses `data`, so
-    /// callers that need the answer more than once should keep it.
-    pub fn is_blob(&self) -> bool {
-        self.data.as_deref().is_some_and(is_data_blob_encrypted)
-    }
-
-    /// Checks the content the way upstream's model validation does, before anything is saved.
-    /// `is_blob` is [`Self::is_blob`].
-    ///
-    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs>
-    pub fn validate_content(&self, is_blob: bool) -> Result<(), CipherValidationError> {
-        if let Some(data) = &self.data
-            && data.len() > MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH
-        {
-            return Err(CipherValidationError {
-                field: "Data",
-                message: format!("The field Data must be a string with a maximum length of {MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH}."),
-            });
-        }
-
-        // A blob carries the name inside it, so only the other formats need one
-        if !is_blob && self.name.as_deref().is_none_or(|n| n.trim().is_empty()) {
-            return Err(CipherValidationError {
-                field: "Name",
-                message: String::from("The Name field is required."),
-            });
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 pub struct PartialCipherData {
@@ -431,14 +356,13 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create(
    if data.cipher.encrypted_for != headers.user.uuid {
        err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
    }
-    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data.cipher, &headers.user, data.cipher.organization_id.is_some())?;

    // This check is usually only needed in update_cipher_from_data(), but we
    // need it here as well to avoid creating an empty cipher in the call to
    // cipher.save() below.
    enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data.cipher), &headers, &conn).await?;

-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, String::new());
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, data.cipher.name.clone());
    cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone());
    cipher.save(&conn).await?;

@@ -466,7 +390,12 @@ async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt
        err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
    }

-    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data, &headers.user, data.organization_id.is_some())?;
+    if let Some(cipher_key_id) = &data.encrypted_by_key_id
+        && let Some(user_key_id) = &headers.user.key_id
+        && cipher_key_id != user_key_id
+    {
+        err_code!("Invalid key cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
+    }

    // The web/browser clients set this field to null as expected, but the
    // mobile clients seem to set the invalid value `0001-01-01T00:00:00`,
@@ -474,7 +403,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt
    // needed when creating a new cipher, so just ignore it unconditionally.
    data.last_known_revision_date = None;

-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, String::new());
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, data.name.clone());
    update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate).await?;

    Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -523,9 +452,6 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(

    enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data), headers, conn).await?;

-    let is_blob = data.is_blob();
-    data.validate_content(is_blob)?;
-
    // Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data.
    // And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail.
    if ut != UpdateType::None
@@ -625,35 +551,24 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
        _ => err!("Invalid type"),
    };

-    if let Some(blob) = data.data.filter(|_| is_blob) {
-        // A blob holds all of the content, the name included, so nothing is kept outside it. The name
-        // column can't be null, so it's left empty; `to_json` reports it as null, as upstream does.
-        // TODO: Make `ciphers.name` nullable and store `None` here instead.
-        cipher.name = String::new();
-        cipher.notes = None;
-        cipher.fields = None;
-        cipher.password_history = None;
-        cipher.data = blob;
-    } else {
-        let Some(mut type_data) = type_data_opt else {
-            err!("Data missing")
-        };
+    let type_data = if let Some(mut data) = type_data_opt {
        // Remove the 'Response' key from the base object.
-        type_data.as_object_mut().unwrap().remove("response");
+        data.as_object_mut().unwrap().remove("response");
        // Remove the 'Response' key from every Uri.
-        if type_data["uris"].is_array() {
-            type_data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(type_data["uris"].clone());
+        if data["uris"].is_array() {
+            data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(data["uris"].clone());
        }
-
-        // `validate_content` made sure there is a name
-        cipher.name = data.name.unwrap_or_default();
-        cipher.notes = data.notes;
-        cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
-        cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
-        cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
-    }
+        data
+    } else {
+        err!("Data missing")
+    };

    cipher.key = data.key;
+    cipher.name = data.name;
+    cipher.notes = data.notes;
+    cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
+    cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
+    cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
    cipher.reprompt = data.reprompt.filter(|r| *r == RepromptType::None as i32 || *r == RepromptType::Password as i32);

    cipher.save(conn).await?;
@@ -750,7 +665,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers_import(data: Json<ImportData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
        let folder_id = relations_map.get(&index).and_then(|i| folders.get(*i).cloned());
        cipher_data.folder_id = folder_id;

-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, String::new());
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
        update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?;
    }

@@ -818,8 +733,6 @@ async fn put_cipher(
        err!("Cipher is not write accessible")
    }

-    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data, &headers.user, cipher.organization_uuid.is_some())?;
-
    update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate).await?;

    Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ async fn send_invite(
            && data.permissions.get("deleteAnyCollection") == Some(&json!(true))
            && data.permissions.get("createNewCollections") == Some(&json!(true)));

-    let mut user_created: bool;
+    let mut user_created: bool = false;
    for email in &data.emails {
        let mut member_status = MembershipStatus::Invited as i32;
        let user = match User::find_by_mail(email, &conn).await {
@@ -1110,7 +1110,6 @@ async fn send_invite(
                        member_status = MembershipStatus::Accepted as i32;
                    }
                }
-                user_created = false;
                user
            }
        };
@@ -1885,7 +1884,7 @@ async fn post_org_import(
        cipher_data.folder_id = None;
        // Replace the client-provided, unvalidated organizationId with the real target org
        cipher_data.organization_id = Some(org_id.clone());
-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, String::new());
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
        update_cipher_from_data(
            &mut cipher,
            cipher_data,
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ pub use crate::api::{
    icons::routes as icons_routes,
    identity::routes as identity_routes,
    notifications::routes as notifications_routes,
-    notifications::{AnonymousNotify, LogOutReason, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS},
+    notifications::{AnonymousNotify, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS},
    push::{
        push_cipher_update, push_folder_update, push_logout, push_send_update, push_user_update, register_push_device,
        unregister_push_device,
@@ -383,36 +383,23 @@ impl WebSocketUsers {
    }

    pub async fn send_logout(&self, user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) {
-        self.send_logout_with_reason(user, acting_device, None, conn).await;
-    }
-
-    /// A logout that clients may handle differently depending on `reason`, e.g. syncing instead of
-    /// logging out after a key rotation that kept the sessions alive.
-    pub async fn send_logout_with_reason(
-        &self,
-        user: &User,
-        acting_device: Option<&Device>,
-        reason: Option<LogOutReason>,
-        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) {
        // Skip any processing if both WebSockets and Push are not active
        if *NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED {
            return;
        }
        let acting_device_id = acting_device.map(|d| d.uuid.clone());
-        let mut payload =
-            vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))];
-        if let Some(reason) = reason {
-            payload.push(("Reason".into(), (reason as i32).into()));
-        }
-        let data = create_update(payload, UpdateType::LogOut, acting_device_id);
+        let data = create_update(
+            vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))],
+            UpdateType::LogOut,
+            acting_device_id,
+        );

        if CONFIG.enable_websocket() {
            self.send_update(&user.uuid, &data).await;
        }

        if CONFIG.push_enabled() {
-            push_logout(user, acting_device, reason, conn).await;
+            push_logout(user, acting_device, conn).await;
        }
    }

@@ -680,15 +667,6 @@ fn create_ping() -> Vec<u8> {
    serialize(&Value::Array(vec![6.into()]))
 }

-/// Why a logout was pushed. Absent for a plain logout.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/Enums/PushNotificationLogOutReason.cs>
-/// (`KdfChange = 0` is not sent by vaultwarden yet.)
-#[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
-pub enum LogOutReason {
-    KeyRotation = 1,
-}
-
 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/375af7c43b10d9da03525d41452f95de3f921541/src/Core/Enums/PushType.cs
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
 pub enum UpdateType {
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use tokio::sync::RwLock;

 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
-    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, LogOutReason, UpdateType},
+    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, UpdateType},
    db::{
        DbConn,
        models::{AuthRequestId, Cipher, Device, Folder, PushId, Send, User, UserId},
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ pub async fn push_cipher_update(ut: UpdateType, cipher: &Cipher, device: &Device
    }
 }

-pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, reason: Option<LogOutReason>, conn: &DbConn) {
+pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) {
    if Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, conn).await {
        tokio::task::spawn(send_to_push_relay(json!({
            "userId": user.uuid,
@@ -198,8 +198,7 @@ pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, reason: Op
            "type": UpdateType::LogOut as i32,
            "payload": {
                "userId": user.uuid,
-                "date": format_date(&user.updated_at),
-                "reason": reason.map(|r| r as i32),
+                "date": format_date(&user.updated_at)
            },
            "clientType": null,
            "installationId": null
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ use crate::{
        models::{
            AttachmentId, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, EmergencyAccessId,
            EventType, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId,
-            SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId,
+            SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, UserStampException,
        },
    },
    error::Error,
@@ -667,13 +667,31 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for Headers {
        };

        if user.security_stamp != claims.sstamp {
-            let Some(current_route) = request.route().and_then(|r| r.name.as_deref()) else {
-                err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception")
-            };
+            if let Some(stamp_exception) =
+                user.stamp_exception.as_deref().and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str::<UserStampException>(s).ok())
+            {
+                let Some(current_route) = request.route().and_then(|r| r.name.as_deref()) else {
+                    err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception")
+                };

-            // Expired exceptions are dropped the next time the stamp is reset, not here: writing them
-            // back from this request could undo a reset made since the user was read.
-            if !user.stamp_exceptions().iter().any(|e| e.allows(&claims.sstamp, current_route)) {
+                // Check if the stamp exception has expired first.
+                // Then, check if the current route matches any of the allowed routes.
+                // After that check the stamp in exception matches the one in the claims.
+                if Utc::now().timestamp() > stamp_exception.expire {
+                    // If the stamp exception has been expired remove it from the database.
+                    // This prevents checking this stamp exception for new requests.
+                    let mut user = user;
+                    user.reset_stamp_exception();
+                    if let Err(e) = user.save(&conn).await {
+                        error!("Error updating user: {e:#?}");
+                    }
+                    err_handler!("Stamp exception is expired")
+                } else if !stamp_exception.routes.contains(&current_route.to_owned()) {
+                    err_handler!("Invalid security stamp: Current route and exception route do not match")
+                } else if stamp_exception.security_stamp != claims.sstamp {
+                    err_handler!("Invalid security stamp for matched stamp exception")
+                }
+            } else {
                err_handler!("Invalid security stamp")
            }
        }
@@ -1434,18 +1434,12 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
    "ssh-key-vault-item",
    "pm-25373-windows-biometrics-v2",
    "pm-26340-linux-biometrics-v2",
-    "pm-31050-no-logout-key-upgrade-rotation",
-    "pm-27278-v2-password-registration",
-    "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
-    "pm-30144-sdk-key-rotation",
-    "force-upgrade-v2-encryption",
    // Mobile Team
    "anon-addy-self-host-alias",
    "simple-login-self-host-alias",
    "mutual-tls",
    "cxp-import-mobile",
    "cxp-export-mobile",
-    "pm-34171-card-scanner",
    // Platform Team
    "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins",
    // Vault Team
@@ -63,22 +63,6 @@ pub struct Cipher {
    pub reprompt: Option<i32>,
 }

-/// Whether `data` is a sealed cipher blob rather than the legacy per-type JSON.
-///
-/// Ciphers of v2 accounts are encrypted as a single blob that carries everything, name included,
-/// and is opaque to us. It is recognized the same way upstream does, by a top-level
-/// `format_version` key that the legacy JSON never has.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/Vault/Entities/Cipher.cs>
-pub fn is_data_blob_encrypted(data: &str) -> bool {
-    serde_json::from_str::<Value>(data).is_ok_and(|d| is_blob_value(&d))
-}
-
-/// [`is_data_blob_encrypted`] for `data` that was already parsed.
-fn is_blob_value(data: &Value) -> bool {
-    data.get("format_version").is_some()
-}
-
 pub enum RepromptType {
    None = 0,
    Password = 1,
@@ -126,11 +110,6 @@ impl Cipher {
                    .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].Notes"), serde_json::to_value([&max_note_size_msg]).unwrap());
            }

-            if let Err(e) = cipher.validate_content(cipher.is_blob()) {
-                validation_errors
-                    .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].{}", e.field), serde_json::to_value([e.message]).unwrap());
-            }
-
            // Validate the password history if it contains `null` values and if so, return a warning
            if let Some(Value::Array(password_history)) = &cipher.password_history {
                for pwh in password_history {
@@ -175,11 +154,6 @@ impl Cipher {
    ) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
        use crate::util::{format_date, validate_and_format_date};

-        // Parsed once here, since `data` can be large and this runs for every cipher in a sync.
-        // `LowerCase` only lowercases the first letter of each key, so it keeps `format_version`.
-        let type_data = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data).map(|d| d.data);
-        let is_blob_encrypted = type_data.as_ref().is_ok_and(is_blob_value);
-
        let mut attachments_json: Value = Value::Null;
        if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
            if let Some(attachments) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_attachments.get(&self.uuid)
@@ -215,62 +189,124 @@ impl Cipher {
            (false, false, false)
        };

-        // Like upstream, a cipher that was stored without fields or password history reports them as
-        // null rather than as an empty list; clients keep the two apart.
-        let fields_json: Option<Vec<_>> = self.fields.as_ref().map(|s| {
-            serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
-                .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing fields {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
-                .ok()
-                .map(|d| {
-                    d.into_iter()
-                        .map(|mut f| {
-                            // Check if the `type` key is a number, strings break some clients
-                            // The fallback type is the hidden type `1`. this should prevent accidental data disclosure
-                            // If not try to convert the string value to a number and fallback to `1`
-                            // If it is both not a number and not a string, fallback to `1`
-                            match f.data.get("type") {
-                                Some(t) if t.is_number() => {}
-                                Some(t) if t.is_string() => {
-                                    let type_num = &t.as_str().unwrap_or("1").parse::<u8>().unwrap_or(1);
-                                    f.data["type"] = json!(type_num);
-                                }
-                                _ => {
-                                    f.data["type"] = json!(1);
-                                }
+        let fields_json: Vec<_> = self
+            .fields
+            .as_ref()
+            .and_then(|s| {
+                serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
+                    .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing fields {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
+                    .ok()
+            })
+            .map(|d| {
+                d.into_iter()
+                    .map(|mut f| {
+                        // Check if the `type` key is a number, strings break some clients
+                        // The fallback type is the hidden type `1`. this should prevent accidental data disclosure
+                        // If not try to convert the string value to a number and fallback to `1`
+                        // If it is both not a number and not a string, fallback to `1`
+                        match f.data.get("type") {
+                            Some(t) if t.is_number() => {}
+                            Some(t) if t.is_string() => {
+                                let type_num = &t.as_str().unwrap_or("1").parse::<u8>().unwrap_or(1);
+                                f.data["type"] = json!(type_num);
                            }
-                            f.data
-                        })
-                        .collect()
-                })
-                .unwrap_or_default()
-        });
+                            _ => {
+                                f.data["type"] = json!(1);
+                            }
+                        }
+                        f.data
+                    })
+                    .collect()
+            })
+            .unwrap_or_default();

-        let password_history_json: Option<Vec<_>> = self.password_history.as_ref().map(|s| {
-            serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
-                .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing password history {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
-                .ok()
-                .map(|d| {
-                    // Check every password history item if they are valid and return it.
-                    // If a password field has the type `null` skip it, it breaks newer Bitwarden clients
-                    // A second check is done to verify the lastUsedDate exists and is a valid DateTime string, if not the epoch start time will be used
-                    d.into_iter()
-                        .filter_map(|d| match d.data.get("password") {
-                            Some(p) if p.is_string() => Some(d.data),
-                            _ => None,
-                        })
-                        .map(|mut d| {
-                            let lud = if let Some(l) = d.get("lastUsedDate").and_then(|l| l.as_str()) {
-                                validate_and_format_date(l)
-                            } else {
-                                "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z".to_owned()
-                            };
-                            d["lastUsedDate"] = json!(lud);
-                            d
-                        })
-                        .collect()
-                })
-                .unwrap_or_default()
-        });
+        let password_history_json: Vec<_> = self
+            .password_history
+            .as_ref()
+            .and_then(|s| {
+                serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
+                    .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing password history {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
+                    .ok()
+            })
+            .map(|d| {
+                // Check every password history item if they are valid and return it.
+                // If a password field has the type `null` skip it, it breaks newer Bitwarden clients
+                // A second check is done to verify the lastUsedDate exists and is a valid DateTime string, if not the epoch start time will be used
+                d.into_iter()
+                    .filter_map(|d| match d.data.get("password") {
+                        Some(p) if p.is_string() => Some(d.data),
+                        _ => None,
+                    })
+                    .map(|mut d| {
+                        let lud = if let Some(l) = d.get("lastUsedDate").and_then(|l| l.as_str()) {
+                            validate_and_format_date(l)
+                        } else {
+                            "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z".to_owned()
+                        };
+                        d["lastUsedDate"] = json!(lud);
+                        d
+                    })
+                    .collect()
+            })
+            .unwrap_or_default();
+
+        // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
+        // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
+        let mut type_data_json = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data)
+            .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid))
+            .map_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()), |d| d.data);
+
+        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
+        // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
+        if self.atype == 1 {
+            // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
+            type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
+            if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
+                && !uris.is_empty()
+            {
+                // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
+                // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
+                for uri in &mut *uris {
+                    if uri["match"].is_string() {
+                        let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
+                            Ok(n) => json!(n),
+                            _ => Value::Null,
+                        };
+                        uri["match"] = match_value;
+                    }
+                }
+                type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
+            }
+
+            // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
+            if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
+                type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
+        // This breaks at least the native mobile clients
+        if self.atype == 2 {
+            match type_data_json {
+                Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
+                _ => {
+                    type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Fix invalid SSH Entries
+        // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
+        // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
+        // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
+        if self.atype == 5
+            && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
+                || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
+                || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
+        {
+            warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
+            type_data_json = Value::Null;
+        }

        let collection_ids = if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
            if let Some(cipher_collections) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_collections.get(&self.uuid) {
@@ -367,83 +403,10 @@ impl Cipher {
            _ => err!(format!("Cipher {} has an invalid type {}", self.uuid, self.atype)),
        };

-        if is_blob_encrypted {
-            // The blob holds all of the content, so it is sent back as-is and the structured fields
-            // stay null, as upstream does. Only the name needs clearing, the others are never stored.
-            json_object["data"] = json!(self.data);
-            json_object["name"] = Value::Null;
-        } else {
-            json_object[key] = self.legacy_type_data_json(type_data);
-        }
+        json_object[key] = type_data_json;
        Ok(json_object)
    }

-    /// The per-type data (`login`, `card`, …) of a legacy cipher, from `type_data` as parsed from
-    /// `self.data`, with fixups for values that are known to break clients.
-    fn legacy_type_data_json(&self, type_data: Result<Value, serde_json::Error>) -> Value {
-        use crate::util::validate_and_format_date;
-
-        // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
-        // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
-        let mut type_data_json = type_data
-            .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid))
-            .unwrap_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()));
-
-        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
-        // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
-        if self.atype == 1 {
-            // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
-            type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
-            if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
-                && !uris.is_empty()
-            {
-                // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
-                // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
-                for uri in &mut *uris {
-                    if uri["match"].is_string() {
-                        let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
-                            Ok(n) => json!(n),
-                            _ => Value::Null,
-                        };
-                        uri["match"] = match_value;
-                    }
-                }
-                type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
-            }
-
-            // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
-            if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
-                type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
-        // This breaks at least the native mobile clients
-        if self.atype == 2 {
-            match type_data_json {
-                Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
-                _ => {
-                    type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Fix invalid SSH Entries
-        // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
-        // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
-        // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
-        if self.atype == 5
-            && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
-                || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
-                || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
-        {
-            warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
-            type_data_json = Value::Null;
-        }
-
-        type_data_json
-    }
-
    pub async fn update_users_revision(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<UserId> {
        let mut user_uuids = Vec::new();
        match self.user_uuid {
@@ -694,27 +657,16 @@ impl Cipher {
    }

    async fn get_user_collections_access_flags(&self, user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<(bool, bool, bool)> {
-        let user_uuid = user_uuid.to_string();
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            // Check whether this cipher is in any collections accessible to the
            // user. If so, retrieve the access flags for each collection.
-            // The user must have a confirmed membership in the cipher's
-            // organization, since users_collections rows are kept when a
-            // membership is revoked or not confirmed yet.
            ciphers::table
                .filter(ciphers::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
                .inner_join(ciphers_collections::table.on(ciphers::uuid.eq(ciphers_collections::cipher_uuid)))
-                .inner_join(
-                    users_organizations::table.on(ciphers::organization_uuid
-                        .eq(users_organizations::org_uuid.nullable())
-                        .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
-                        .and(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))),
-                )
                .inner_join(
                    users_collections::table.on(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid
                        .eq(users_collections::collection_uuid)
-                        // Only allow collection access via the confirmed membership.
-                        .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(users_collections::user_uuid))),
+                        .and(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))),
                )
                .select((users_collections::read_only, users_collections::hide_passwords, users_collections::manage))
                .load::<(bool, bool, bool)>(conn)
@@ -745,9 +697,6 @@ impl Cipher {
                        .and(groups::organizations_uuid.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid))),
                )
                .filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
-                // Only allow group access via a confirmed membership, since
-                // groups_users rows are kept when a membership is revoked.
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .select((collections_groups::read_only, collections_groups::hide_passwords, collections_groups::manage))
                .load::<(bool, bool, bool)>(conn)
                .expect("Error getting group access restrictions")
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use crate::{
 };
 use macros::UuidFromParam;

-use super::{CollectionId, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, OrganizationId, User, UserId};
+use super::{CollectionId, Membership, MembershipId, OrganizationId, User, UserId};

 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
 #[diesel(table_name = groups)]
@@ -268,9 +268,6 @@ impl Group {
                        .and(users_organizations::org_uuid.eq(groups::organizations_uuid))),
                )
                .filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
-                // Only allow full access via a confirmed membership, since
-                // groups_users rows are kept when a membership is revoked.
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .filter(groups::organizations_uuid.eq(org_uuid))
                .filter(groups::access_all.eq(true))
                .select(groups::access_all)
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ mod user_signature_key_pair;
 pub use self::archive::Archive;
 pub use self::attachment::{Attachment, AttachmentId};
 pub use self::auth_request::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId};
-pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType, is_data_blob_encrypted};
+pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType};
 pub use self::collection::{Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionId, CollectionUser};
 pub use self::device::{Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest, PushId};
 pub use self::emergency_access::{EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType};
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ pub use self::sso_auth::{OIDCAuthenticatedUser, OIDCCodeResponseError, SsoAuth};
 pub use self::two_factor::{TwoFactor, TwoFactorType};
 pub use self::two_factor_duo_context::TwoFactorDuoContext;
 pub use self::two_factor_incomplete::TwoFactorIncomplete;
-pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType};
+pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserStampException};
 pub use self::user_signature_key_pair::{SignatureAlgorithm, UserSignatureKeyPair};
@@ -57,10 +57,6 @@ pub struct Membership {
    pub atype: i32,
    pub reset_password_key: Option<String>,
    pub external_id: Option<String>,
-    /// A copy of the user's v2 upgrade token, kept when a v1 -> v2 upgrade leaves the account
-    /// recovery key (`reset_password_key`) wrapped by the v1 user key. It lets the organization
-    /// unwrap the v2 user key from it. Opaque to us, like `User::v2_upgrade_token`.
-    pub v2_upgrade_token: Option<String>,
 }

 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
@@ -278,7 +274,6 @@ impl Membership {
            atype: MembershipType::User as i32,
            reset_password_key: None,
            external_id: None,
-            v2_upgrade_token: None,
        }
    }

@@ -6,7 +6,6 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::EmptyResult,
-    auth::DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY,
    crypto,
    db::{
        DbConn,
@@ -110,28 +109,13 @@ enum UserStatus {
    _Disabled = 2,
 }

-/// A previous security stamp that is still accepted, until `expire`.
 #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct UserStampException {
-    /// The routes the stamp is still accepted on, or `None` for any route.
-    pub routes: Option<Vec<String>>,
+    pub routes: Vec<String>,
    pub security_stamp: String,
    pub expire: i64,
 }

-impl UserStampException {
-    pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool {
-        Utc::now().timestamp() > self.expire
-    }
-
-    /// Whether this exception lets a token carrying `security_stamp` through on `route`.
-    pub fn allows(&self, security_stamp: &str, route: &str) -> bool {
-        !self.is_expired()
-            && self.security_stamp == security_stamp
-            && self.routes.as_ref().is_none_or(|routes| routes.iter().any(|r| r == route))
-    }
-}
-
 /// Local methods
 impl User {
    pub const CLIENT_KDF_TYPE_DEFAULT: i32 = UserKdfType::Pbkdf2 as i32;
@@ -255,41 +239,10 @@ impl User {

    pub async fn reset_security_stamp(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
        self.security_stamp = get_uuid();
-        // A reset is meant to end the other sessions, which a key rotation's grace would undo. The
-        // route exceptions stay, since they are set right before a reset, for the stamp it replaces.
-        // This is also where expired exceptions get dropped.
-        let mut exceptions = self.stamp_exceptions();
-        exceptions.retain(|e| e.routes.is_some() && !e.is_expired());
-        self.set_stamp_exceptions(&exceptions);
        Device::rotate_refresh_tokens_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        Ok(())
    }

-    /// Resets the security stamp after a key rotation, while letting the access tokens already
-    /// issued keep working until they expire.
-    ///
-    /// This is what upstream does: there the stamp is only checked when a token is refreshed, so a
-    /// rotation invalidates refresh tokens but not the access tokens in use. Clients rely on it to
-    /// keep a session going across a rotation. Chained rotations keep every earlier stamp that is
-    /// still within its window.
-    pub async fn reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        let previous_stamp = self.security_stamp.clone();
-        let mut grace: Vec<UserStampException> =
-            self.stamp_exceptions().into_iter().filter(|e| e.routes.is_none() && !e.is_expired()).collect();
-
-        self.reset_security_stamp(conn).await?;
-
-        grace.push(UserStampException {
-            routes: None,
-            security_stamp: previous_stamp,
-            expire: (Utc::now() + *DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY).timestamp(),
-        });
-        let mut exceptions = self.stamp_exceptions();
-        exceptions.extend(grace);
-        self.set_stamp_exceptions(&exceptions);
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
    /// Set the stamp_exception to only allow a subsequent request matching a specific route using the current security-stamp.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
@@ -298,30 +251,17 @@ impl User {
    ///   After these 2 minutes this stamp will expire.
    ///
    pub fn set_stamp_exception(&mut self, route_exception: Vec<String>) {
-        self.set_stamp_exceptions(&[UserStampException {
-            routes: Some(route_exception),
+        let stamp_exception = UserStampException {
+            routes: route_exception,
            security_stamp: self.security_stamp.clone(),
            expire: (Utc::now() + TimeDelta::try_minutes(2).unwrap()).timestamp(),
-        }]);
+        };
+        self.stamp_exception = Some(serde_json::to_string(&stamp_exception).unwrap_or_default());
    }

-    /// The previous security stamps that are still accepted, expired ones included.
-    pub fn stamp_exceptions(&self) -> Vec<UserStampException> {
-        let Some(stored) = self.stamp_exception.as_deref() else {
-            return Vec::new();
-        };
-        // Before key rotations kept sessions alive, only a single route exception was stored.
-        serde_json::from_str::<Vec<UserStampException>>(stored)
-            .or_else(|_| serde_json::from_str::<UserStampException>(stored).map(|e| vec![e]))
-            .unwrap_or_default()
-    }
-
-    fn set_stamp_exceptions(&mut self, exceptions: &[UserStampException]) {
-        self.stamp_exception = if exceptions.is_empty() {
-            None
-        } else {
-            Some(serde_json::to_string(&exceptions).unwrap_or_default())
-        };
+    /// Resets the stamp_exception to prevent re-use of the previous security-stamp
+    pub fn reset_stamp_exception(&mut self) {
+        self.stamp_exception = None;
    }

    pub fn display_name(&self) -> &str {
@@ -340,7 +280,7 @@ impl User {
        if !self.is_v2() {
            return None;
        }
-        UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await
+        UserSignatureKeyPair::find_active_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await
    }

    pub async fn account_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
@@ -387,8 +327,8 @@ impl User {
        })
    }

-    pub fn v2_upgrade_token_json(&self) -> Option<Value> {
-        self.v2_upgrade_token.as_ref().and_then(|token| serde_json::from_str(token).ok())
+    pub fn v2_upgrade_token_json(&self) -> Value {
+        self.v2_upgrade_token.as_ref().and_then(|token| serde_json::from_str(token).ok()).unwrap_or(Value::Null)
    }

    pub async fn to_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
@@ -676,18 +616,7 @@ pub struct UserId(String);
 )]
 #[deref(forward)]
 #[from(forward)]
-pub struct KeyId(#[serde(deserialize_with = "deserialize_key_id")] String);
-
-/// Rejects a key id from a request that isn't 16 bytes as lowercase hex, as upstream's `[KeyId]` does.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/KeyId.cs>
-fn deserialize_key_id<'de, D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> Result<String, D::Error> {
-    let key_id = <String as serde::Deserialize>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
-    if key_id.len() != 32 || !key_id.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) {
-        return Err(serde::de::Error::custom("Key id must be a 32 character lowercase hex-encoded string."));
-    }
-    Ok(key_id)
-}
+pub struct KeyId(String);

 impl SsoUser {
    pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ use crate::{
    error::MapResult,
    util::get_uuid,
 };
+use macros::UuidFromParam;

 use super::UserId;

@@ -46,13 +47,28 @@ pub enum SignatureAlgorithm {
 }

 impl SignatureAlgorithm {
-    pub fn parse(algorithm: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+    pub fn from_str(algorithm: &str) -> Option<Self> {
        match algorithm {
            "ed25519" => Some(Self::Ed25519),
            "mldsa44" => Some(Self::MlDsa44),
            _ => None,
        }
    }
+
+    pub fn from_i32(algorithm: i32) -> Option<Self> {
+        match algorithm {
+            0 => Some(Self::Ed25519),
+            1 => Some(Self::MlDsa44),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            Self::Ed25519 => "ed25519",
+            Self::MlDsa44 => "mldsa44",
+        }
+    }
 }

 /// Local methods
@@ -112,8 +128,9 @@ impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
        }
    }

-    /// The user's key pair. There is at most one, enforced by a unique index on `user_uuid`.
-    pub async fn find_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
+    /// The key pair currently in use by the user. There is at most one today, enforced by a unique
+    /// index on `user_uuid`.
+    pub async fn find_active_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            user_signature_key_pairs::table
                .filter(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
@@ -133,5 +150,20 @@ impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
    }
 }

-#[derive(Clone, Debug, AsRef, Deref, DieselNewType, Display, From, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[derive(
+    Clone,
+    Debug,
+    AsRef,
+    Deref,
+    DieselNewType,
+    Display,
+    From,
+    FromForm,
+    Hash,
+    PartialEq,
+    Eq,
+    Serialize,
+    Deserialize,
+    UuidFromParam,
+)]
 pub struct UserSignatureKeyPairId(String);
@@ -259,7 +259,6 @@ table! {
        atype -> Integer,
        reset_password_key -> Nullable<Text>,
        external_id -> Nullable<Text>,
-        v2_upgrade_token -> Nullable<Text>,
    }
 }

@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
 *
 * To rebuild or modify this file with the latest versions of the included
 * software please visit:
- *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.0.4
+ *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.0.3
 *
 * Included libraries:
- *   DataTables 3.0.4
+ *   DataTables 3.0.3
 */

 /*! DataTables Bootstrap 5 integration
@@ -636,18 +636,6 @@ table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-type-date .dt-column-order,
 table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-type-numeric .dt-column-order {
  left: 0.25rem;
 }
-table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr th.dt-left .dt-column-order, table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr th.dt-head-left .dt-column-order,
-table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-left .dt-column-order,
-table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-head-left .dt-column-order {
-  left: auto;
-  right: 0.25rem;
-}
-table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr th.dt-right .dt-column-order, table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr th.dt-head-right .dt-column-order,
-table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-right .dt-column-order,
-table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-head-right .dt-column-order {
-  left: 0.25rem;
-  right: auto;
-}

 div.dt-scroll-head table.table-bordered {
  border-bottom-width: 0;