Implement V2 registration support

.env.template

@@ -394,15 +394,11 @@
 ## - "pm-5594-safari-account-switching": Enable account switching in Safari. (Safari >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "pm-32413-multi-client-password-management": Enable changing the master password directly in the client. (Desktop/Extension >= 2026.4.0)
 ## - "ssh-agent-v2": Enable newer SSH agent support. (Desktop >= 2026.2.1)
-## - "windows-desktop-autotype": Enable the autotype feature preview on Windows. (Desktop >= 2025.8.0)
-## - "windows-desktop-autotype-ga": Enable the new, still in development, autotype implementation on Windows. (Desktop >= 2026.9.1)
-##   Only enable one of the two autotype flags, the clients disable autotype completely when both are enabled.
 ## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins":
 ## - "pm-32009-new-item-types": Enable new item types: Bank Account, Driver's License, and Passport (Clients >= 2026.4.0)
 ## - "pm-34171-card-scanner": Enable the new card scanner feature on mobile (Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.4.1)
 ## - "enable-basic-auth-response": Enable HTTP Basic Auth autofill in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.9.0)
 ## - "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic": Enable the rewritten add/update login notification triggering logic in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.2.0)
-## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
 # EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=
 
 ## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.

.typos.toml

@@ -14,8 +14,10 @@ extend-ignore-re = [
     # In SMTP it's called HELO, so ignore it
     "(?i)helo_name",
     "Server name sent during.+HELO",
-    # COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
-    "(?i)cose",
+    # COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption, ignore these specific items
+    "COSE",
+    "COSEKey",
+    "COSEAlgorithm",
     # Ignore this specific string as it's valid
     "Ensure they are valid OTPs",
     # This word is misspelled upstream

docker/DockerSettings.yaml

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 ---
-vault_version: "v2026.8.0"
-vault_image_digest: "sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a"
+vault_version: "v2026.7.0"
+vault_image_digest: "sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c"
 # Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.9.0
 # We use the linux/amd64 platform shell scripts since there is no difference between the different platform scripts
 # https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx | https://hub.docker.com/r/tonistiigi/xx/tags

docker/Dockerfile.alpine

@@ -19,15 +19,15 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault
 
 ########################## ALPINE BUILD IMAGES ##########################
 ## NOTE: The Alpine Base Images do not support other platforms then linux/amd64 and linux/arm64

docker/Dockerfile.debian

@@ -19,15 +19,15 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault
 
 ########################## Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts ##########################
 ## We use the linux/amd64 no matter which Build Platform, since these are all bash scripts

migrations/mysql/2026-10-07-120000_add_org_policy_revision_date/down.sql

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;

migrations/mysql/2026-10-07-120000_add_org_policy_revision_date/up.sql

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
--- DATETIME (not TIMESTAMP) to match this repo's convention for revision_date
--- columns elsewhere, and to avoid MySQL's implicit session-timezone
--- conversion and 2038 range limit on TIMESTAMP.
-ALTER TABLE org_policies
-ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
-
-UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = UTC_TIMESTAMP();

migrations/mysql/2026-10-08-120000_cipher_data_longtext/up.sql

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
--- A blob-encrypted cipher keeps all of its content in `data`, up to 500,000 characters, so the
--- 64 KiB of TEXT is too small. Like upstream, which uses LONGTEXT.
-ALTER TABLE ciphers MODIFY data LONGTEXT NOT NULL;

migrations/postgresql/2026-10-07-120000_add_org_policy_revision_date/down.sql

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;

migrations/postgresql/2026-10-07-120000_add_org_policy_revision_date/up.sql

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
--- Backfill via `now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc'` rather than a DEFAULT of now():
--- assigning timestamptz now() into a naive TIMESTAMP column casts through
--- the server's TimeZone GUC, so a DEFAULT now() would store local wall-clock
--- instead of UTC on non-UTC servers, unlike every other naive-UTC timestamp
--- column in this schema.
-ALTER TABLE org_policies
-ADD COLUMN revision_date TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
-
-UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = (now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc');

migrations/postgresql/2026-10-08-120000_cipher_data_longtext/up.sql

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
--- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change

migrations/sqlite/2026-10-07-120000_add_org_policy_revision_date/up.sql

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
--- SQLite forbids non-constant defaults in ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN, so add
--- the column with a constant placeholder and backfill separately.
-ALTER TABLE org_policies
-ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
-
-UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP;

migrations/sqlite/2026-10-08-120000_cipher_data_longtext/up.sql

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
--- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change

playwright/README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 This allows running integration tests using [Playwright](https://playwright.dev/).
 \
-It uses its own [test.env](./test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.
+It usse its own [test.env](/test/scenarios/test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.
 
 ## Install
 
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker compose --profile playwright --env-file test.env run Pl
 
 ### Keep services running
 
-If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak running (states are not impacted by the tests):
+If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak runnning (states are not impacted by the tests):
 
 ```bash
 PW_KEEP_SERVICE_RUNNING=true npx playwright test

playwright/tests/emergency.spec.ts

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-import { test, expect, type Page, type TestInfo, Test } from '@playwright/test';
-import { MailDev } from 'maildev';
-
-import * as utils from "../global-utils";
-import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
-import { activateTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
-
-let users = utils.loadEnv();
-let mailserver;
-
-test.beforeAll('Setup', async ({ browser }, testInfo: TestInfo) => {
-    mailserver = new MailDev({
-        port: process.env.MAILDEV_SMTP_PORT,
-        web: { port: process.env.MAILDEV_HTTP_PORT },
-    })
-
-    await mailserver.listen();
-
-    await utils.startVault(browser, testInfo, {
-        SMTP_HOST: process.env.MAILDEV_HOST,
-        SMTP_FROM: process.env.PW_SMTP_FROM,
-    });
-});
-
-test.afterAll('Teardown', async ({}) => {
-    utils.stopVault();
-    if( mailserver ){
-        await mailserver.close();
-    }
-});
-
-async function emergencyAccess(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string }) {
-    await test.step('Navigate', async () => {
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Emergency access' }).click();
-        await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Emergency access', { exact: true })).toBeVisible();
-    });
-}
-
-test('Emergency access', async ({ browser, page }) => {
-    const context2 = await browser.newContext();
-    const page2 = await context2.newPage();
-
-    const mailBuffer = mailserver.buffer(users.user1.email);
-    const mailBuffer2 = mailserver.buffer(users.user2.email);
-
-    await createAccount(test, page, users.user1);
-    await createAccount(test, page2, users.user2);
-
-    await test.step('Add test2', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add emergency contact' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email * (required)' }).fill(users.user2.email);
-        await page.getByRole('radio', { name: 'Takeover Can reset your' }).check();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'User(s) invited');
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Accept', async () => {
-        const email = await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access for " + users.user1.name);
-        const pageE = await context2.newPage();
-        await pageE.setContent(email.html);
-        const link = await pageE.getByTestId("emergency").getAttribute("href");
-        await pageE.close();
-
-        await page2.goto(link);
-        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Invitation accepted');
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Confirm', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Needs confirmation')).toBeVisible();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, users.user2.name + ' confirmed');
-        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access contact for " + users.user1.name + " confirmed");
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Request', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Emergency access requested');
-        await mailBuffer.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request by " + users.user2.name + " initiated");
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Approved', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access approved');
-        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request for " + users.user1.name + " approved");
-    });
-    await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
-
-    let newPassword = "TotoNewPassword";
-    await test.step('Access', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Takeover' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'New master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(newPassword);
-        await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Confirm new master password' }).fill(newPassword);
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Password reset for ' + users.user1.name);
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Changed no 2fa', async () => {
-        users.user1.password = newPassword;
-        await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Reject', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Reject' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access rejected');
-        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request to " + users.user1.name + " rejected");
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Remove', async () => {
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Remove' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Yes' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Removed user ' + users.user2.name);
-        await expect(page.getByText('You have not added any emergency contacts')).toBeVisible();
-    });
-});

playwright/tests/login.spec.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
 
 import * as utils from "../global-utils";
 import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
-import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP, recoveryCodes } from './setups/2fa';
+import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
 
 let users = utils.loadEnv();
 let totp;
@@ -31,42 +31,21 @@ test('Authenticator 2fa', async ({ page }) => {
 
     await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
 
-    await logUser(test, page, users.user1, { totp });
-
-    await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
-});
-
-test('Recovery codes', async ({ context, page }) => {
-    await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
-
-    await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
-    let recovery = await recoveryCodes(test, page, users.user1);
-
-    await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
-
     await test.step('login', async () => {
+        let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
+        timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
+
         await page.getByLabel(/Email address/).fill(users.user1.email);
         await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
         await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(users.user1.password);
         await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();
 
         await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
+        await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate({timestamp}));
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
 
         await expect(page).toHaveTitle(/Vaultwarden Web/);
-
-        const newPagePromise = context.waitForEvent('page');
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Use your recovery code' }).click();
-        const newPage = await newPagePromise;
-
-        const tabs = context.pages();
-        await tabs[1].bringToFront();
-        await expect(tabs[1].getByRole('heading', { name: 'Recover account two-step login' })).toBeVisible();
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email address * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.email);
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.password);
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Recovery code * (required)' }).fill(recovery);
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('button', { name: 'Submit' }).click();
-
-        await expect(tabs[1]).toHaveTitle(/Two-step login/);
     });
-});
 
+    await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
+});

playwright/tests/setups/2fa.ts

@@ -4,24 +4,6 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
 
 import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
 
-export async function recoveryCodes(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): string {
-    return await test.step('Recovery code', async () => {
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Security' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Two-step login' }).click();
-
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'View recovery code' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
-
-        const recovery = await page.getByRole('code').innerText();
-        await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
-
-        return recovery;
-    })
-}
-
 export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): OTPAuth.TOTP {
     return await test.step('Activate TOTP 2FA', async () => {
         await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
@@ -39,6 +21,7 @@ export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string,
         await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate());
         await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Turn on' }).click();
         await page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Turned on', exact: true });
+        await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
 
         return totp;
     })

playwright/tests/setups/user.ts

@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import { expect, type Browser, Page } from '@playwright/test';
 
 import { type MailBuffer } from 'maildev';
 
-import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
 import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
 import { retrieveEmailCode } from './2fa';
 
@@ -44,7 +43,6 @@ export async function logUser(
         mailBuffer ?: MailBuffer,
         mail2fa?: boolean,
         notNewDevice?: boolean,
-        totp?: OTPAuth.TOTP,
     } = {}
 ) {
     await test.step(`Log user ${user.email}`, async () => {
@@ -57,23 +55,11 @@ export async function logUser(
         await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
         await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();
 
-        if( options.mail2fa || options.totp ){
-            let code;
-
+        if( options.mail2fa ){
             await test.step('2FA check', async () => {
                 await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
-
-                if( options.totp ) {
-                    const totp = options.totp;
-                    let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
-                    timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
-                    code = totp.generate({timestamp});
-                } else if( options.mail2fa ){
-                    code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
-                }
-
+                let code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
                 await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(code);
-
                 await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
             });
         }

src/api/core/accounts.rs

@@ -94,15 +94,6 @@ pub struct KDFData {
     kdf_parallelism: Option<i32>,
 }
 
-impl KDFData {
-    pub(super) fn matches_user(&self, user: &User) -> bool {
-        self.kdf == user.client_kdf_type
-            && self.kdf_iterations == user.client_kdf_iter
-            && self.kdf_memory == user.client_kdf_memory
-            && self.kdf_parallelism == user.client_kdf_parallelism
-    }
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 pub struct RegisterData {
@@ -212,21 +203,17 @@ struct KeysData {
     public_key: String,
 }
 
-/// Upstream's implicit `[Required]` on a non-nullable string: present and not blank.
-fn required(value: Option<String>, field: &str) -> ApiResult<String> {
-    match value {
-        Some(value) if !value.trim().is_empty() => Ok(value),
-        _ => err!(format!("The {field} field is required.")),
-    }
-}
-
-/// The `accountKeys` payload: a v1 key pair, or v2 with a signature key pair and security state.
+/// The `accountKeys` payload, which replaces the flat `keys`/`userAsymmetricKeys` object.
 ///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Api/Request/AccountKeysRequestModel.cs#L6-L50>
+/// It carries either a "v1" state (just the encryption key pair) or a "v2" one, which adds a
+/// signature key pair, a signed public key, and a signed security state. The two deprecated
+/// top-level fields are still sent by the SDK alongside the nested ones and are only used as a
+/// fallback for clients that don't send `publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair` yet.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Api/Request/AccountKeysRequestModel.cs>
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct AccountKeysData {
-    // Required like upstream, but only used without `public_key_encryption_key_pair`
+pub struct AccountKeysData {
     user_key_encrypted_account_private_key: Option<String>,
     account_public_key: Option<String>,
 
@@ -258,7 +245,7 @@ struct SecurityStateData {
     security_version: i32,
 }
 
-struct ValidatedAccountKeys {
+pub struct ValidatedAccountKeys {
     private_key: String,
     public_key: String,
     v2: Option<ValidatedV2AccountKeys>,
@@ -274,37 +261,25 @@ struct ValidatedV2AccountKeys {
 }
 
 impl AccountKeysData {
-    /// Upstream's model checks, plus the v2 fields all or none: no client can unlock a partial v2 state.
-    fn validate(self) -> ApiResult<ValidatedAccountKeys> {
-        let top_private_key =
-            required(self.user_key_encrypted_account_private_key, "UserKeyEncryptedAccountPrivateKey")?;
-        let top_public_key = required(self.account_public_key, "AccountPublicKey")?;
-        let (private_key, public_key, signed_public_key) = match self.public_key_encryption_key_pair {
-            Some(key_pair) => (
-                required(Some(key_pair.wrapped_private_key), "WrappedPrivateKey")?,
-                required(Some(key_pair.public_key), "PublicKey")?,
-                key_pair.signed_public_key,
-            ),
-            // Older clients only send the top-level fields, which are always v1
-            None => (top_private_key, top_public_key, None),
+    /// Checks that the payload describes a complete account cryptographic state.
+    ///
+    /// The v2 fields have to be all present or all absent: a client that receives a COSE-wrapped
+    /// private key without the matching signature key pair and security state refuses to unlock the
+    /// vault, so storing half a state would produce an account nobody can log into.
+    pub fn validate(self) -> ApiResult<ValidatedAccountKeys> {
+        let (private_key, public_key, signed_public_key) = if let Some(key_pair) = self.public_key_encryption_key_pair {
+            (key_pair.wrapped_private_key, key_pair.public_key, key_pair.signed_public_key)
+        // Older clients only send the deprecated top-level fields, which are always v1.
+        } else if let (Some(private_key), Some(public_key)) =
+            (self.user_key_encrypted_account_private_key, self.account_public_key)
+        {
+            (private_key, public_key, None)
+        } else {
+            err!("The account keys are missing an encryption key pair")
         };
 
-        if let Some(signature_key_pair) = &self.signature_key_pair {
-            required(Some(signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm.clone()), "SignatureAlgorithm")?;
-            required(Some(signature_key_pair.wrapped_signing_key.clone()), "WrappedSigningKey")?;
-            required(Some(signature_key_pair.verifying_key.clone()), "VerifyingKey")?;
-        }
-        if let Some(security_state) = &self.security_state {
-            required(Some(security_state.security_state.clone()), "SecurityState")?;
-            if security_state.security_state.encode_utf16().count() > 10_000 {
-                err!("The field SecurityState must be a string with a maximum length of 10000.")
-            }
-        }
-
         let v2 = match (signed_public_key, self.signature_key_pair, self.security_state) {
             (Some(signed_public_key), Some(signature_key_pair), Some(security_state)) => {
-                // Upstream fails on a null one, but takes an empty one that no client can unlock with
-                let signed_public_key = required(Some(signed_public_key), "SignedPublicKey")?;
                 let Some(signature_algorithm) = SignatureAlgorithm::parse(&signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm)
                 else {
                     err!(format!(
@@ -347,28 +322,28 @@ impl From<KeysData> for ValidatedAccountKeys {
 }
 
 impl ValidatedAccountKeys {
-    /// The keys of a registration: `accountKeys` only for a v2 account, like upstream.
-    ///
-    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Auth/Models/Api/Request/Accounts/RegisterFinishRequestModel.cs#L77-L100>
-    fn for_registration(account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>, keys: Option<KeysData>) -> ApiResult<Self> {
-        if let Some(account_keys) = account_keys {
-            let account_keys = account_keys.validate()?;
-            if account_keys.is_v2() {
-                return Ok(account_keys);
-            }
+    /// The keys of a request that may carry either shape. `accountKeys` supersedes the flat `keys`
+    /// object when both are sent.
+    fn from_request(account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>, keys: Option<KeysData>) -> ApiResult<Option<Self>> {
+        match (account_keys, keys) {
+            (Some(account_keys), _) => account_keys.validate().map(Some),
+            (None, keys) => Ok(keys.map(Self::from)),
         }
-        let Some(keys) = keys else {
-            err!("PublicKey and WrappedPrivateKey not found in RequestModel")
-        };
-        Ok(keys.into())
     }
 
     fn is_v2(&self) -> bool {
         self.v2.is_some()
     }
 
-    /// Sets the keys on the user, which then needs saving before [`Self::save_signature_key_pair`].
-    fn apply(&self, user: &mut User) -> EmptyResult {
+    /// Writes the parts of the state that live on the user itself. The user still needs saving, and
+    /// [`Self::save_signature_key_pair`] still needs calling once it has been.
+    ///
+    /// Rejects downgrading an account from v2 back to v1.
+    pub fn apply(&self, user: &mut User) -> EmptyResult {
+        if user.is_v2() && self.v2.is_none() {
+            err!("Cannot downgrade an account from v2 to v1 encryption")
+        }
+
         user.private_key = Some(self.private_key.clone());
         user.public_key = Some(self.public_key.clone());
 
@@ -379,8 +354,9 @@ impl ValidatedAccountKeys {
         Ok(())
     }
 
-    /// Saves the signature key pair, which needs the user to exist for its foreign key.
-    async fn save_signature_key_pair(&self, user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+    /// Persists the signature key pair. Separate from [`Self::apply`] because the row has a foreign
+    /// key to the user, so it can only be written once the user exists.
+    pub async fn save_signature_key_pair(&self, user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
         // Skip if the account is v1, since v1 accounts don't have a signature key pair.
         let Some(v2) = &self.v2 else {
             return Ok(());
@@ -551,7 +527,7 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
     // the user can retry without losing their invitation below.
     let password_hint = clean_password_hint(data.master_password_hint.as_ref());
     enforce_password_hint_setting(password_hint.as_ref())?;
-    let account_keys = ValidatedAccountKeys::for_registration(data.account_keys, data.keys)?;
+    let account_keys = ValidatedAccountKeys::from_request(data.account_keys, data.keys)?;
 
     let mut user = match User::find_by_mail(&email, &conn).await {
         Some(user) => {
@@ -608,10 +584,13 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
         user.name = name;
     }
 
-    account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
-    // Like upstream, only a v2 registration records the key id; v1 accounts report it through `user-key-id`
-    if account_keys.is_v2() {
-        user.key_id = data.compat.key_id();
+    if let Some(ref account_keys) = account_keys {
+        account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
+        // Like upstream, only a v2 registration records the user key id. A v1 account reports it
+        // later, through `user-key-id`.
+        if account_keys.is_v2() {
+            user.key_id = data.compat.key_id();
+        }
     }
 
     if email_verified {
@@ -634,7 +613,10 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
     }
 
     user.save(&conn).await?;
-    account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
+
+    if let Some(account_keys) = account_keys {
+        account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
+    }
 
     // accept any open emergency access invitations
     if !CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.emergency_access_allowed() {
@@ -648,41 +630,9 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
     })))
 }
 
-/// Upstream's shape checks of the set-password body, on the raw JSON that the untagged compat would hide.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Auth/Models/Request/Accounts/SetInitialPasswordRequestModel.cs#L75-L106>
-fn validate_set_password_shape(body: &Value) -> EmptyResult {
-    let has = |name: &str| {
-        body.as_object().is_some_and(|o| o.iter().any(|(k, v)| k.eq_ignore_ascii_case(name) && !v.is_null()))
-    };
-
-    if has("accountKeys") && has("keys") {
-        err!("Cannot specify both AccountKeys and Keys. Provide exactly one keypair.")
-    }
-    let (authentication, unlock) = (has("masterPasswordAuthentication"), has("masterPasswordUnlock"));
-    if authentication != unlock {
-        err!(
-            "Must provide both MasterPasswordAuthentication and MasterPasswordUnlock together. Cannot provide one without the other."
-        )
-    }
-    if authentication && (has("masterPasswordHash") || has("key") || has("kdf")) {
-        err!(
-            "Cannot mix modern (MasterPasswordAuthentication/MasterPasswordUnlock) and legacy (MasterPasswordHash/Key/Kdf) fields. Provide one shape or the other."
-        )
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 #[post("/accounts/set-password", data = "<data>")]
-async fn post_set_password(data: Json<Value>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let data = data.into_inner();
-    validate_set_password_shape(&data)?;
-    let Ok(data) = serde_json::from_value::<SetPasswordData>(data) else {
-        err_code!("Unexpected SetPasswordData format", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code)
-    };
-    if data.master_password_hint.as_ref().is_some_and(|h| h.encode_utf16().count() > 50) {
-        err!("The field MasterPasswordHint must be a string with a maximum length of 50.")
-    }
+async fn post_set_password(data: Json<SetPasswordData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let data: SetPasswordData = data.into_inner();
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
     if user.private_key.is_some() || !user.password_hash.is_empty() {
@@ -698,25 +648,7 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<Value>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) ->
     let password_hint = clean_password_hint(data.master_password_hint.as_ref());
     enforce_password_hint_setting(password_hint.as_ref())?;
 
-    // Like upstream, `accountKeys` only through the v2 JIT flow
-    // Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Auth/Controllers/AccountsController.cs#L314-L359>
-    let account_keys = match data.account_keys {
-        Some(account_keys) => {
-            if !matches!(data.compat, RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataCur(_))
-                || !crate::util::is_client_feature_flag_enabled(
-                    "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
-                )
-            {
-                err!("Request includes V2 AccountKeys but V2 encryption is not enabled.")
-            }
-            let account_keys = account_keys.validate()?;
-            if !account_keys.is_v2() {
-                err!("AccountKeys are only supported for V2 encryption.")
-            }
-            Some(account_keys)
-        }
-        None => data.keys.map(ValidatedAccountKeys::from),
-    };
+    let account_keys = ValidatedAccountKeys::from_request(data.account_keys, data.keys)?;
 
     set_kdf_data(&mut user, data.compat.kdf())?;
 
@@ -759,7 +691,8 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<Value>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) ->
         Membership::accept_user_invitations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
     }
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+        .await;
 
     user.save(&conn).await?;
 
@@ -879,9 +812,8 @@ async fn get_keys(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct PostKeysData {
-    // Required like upstream, even next to `accountKeys`
-    public_key: Option<String>,
-    encrypted_private_key: Option<String>,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
+    keys: Option<KeysData>,
     account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>,
     // The id of the user key these account keys belong to, only honored for v2 `accountKeys`
     user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
@@ -893,18 +825,15 @@ async fn post_keys(data: Json<PostKeysData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) ->
 
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
-    // Only for an account without keys, replacing them is what a key rotation does
+    // This only sets the keys of an account that has none yet. Replacing existing ones is what a key
+    // rotation does, with the checks that go with it.
     if user.private_key.is_some() || user.public_key.is_some() {
         err!("User has existing keypair")
     }
 
-    // Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Auth/Models/Api/Request/Accounts/KeysRequestModel.cs#L11-L19>
-    let public_key = required(data.public_key, "PublicKey")?;
-    let encrypted_private_key = required(data.encrypted_private_key, "EncryptedPrivateKey")?;
-
-    // `accountKeys` supersedes the flat keys when both are sent
-    let account_keys = match data.account_keys {
-        Some(account_keys) => {
+    // `accountKeys` supersedes the flat `keys` object when both are sent.
+    let account_keys = match (data.account_keys, data.keys) {
+        (Some(account_keys), _) => {
             let account_keys = account_keys.validate()?;
             if !account_keys.is_v2() {
                 err!("AccountKeys are only supported for V2 encryption.")
@@ -915,11 +844,8 @@ async fn post_keys(data: Json<PostKeysData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) ->
             }
             account_keys
         }
-        None => KeysData {
-            encrypted_private_key,
-            public_key,
-        }
-        .into(),
+        (None, Some(keys)) => keys.into(),
+        (None, None) => err!("No account keys provided"),
     };
 
     account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
@@ -957,7 +883,8 @@ async fn post_password(data: Json<ChangePassData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
         err!("Invalid password")
     }
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+        .await;
 
     let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) =
         if let (Some(unlock_data), Some(authentication_data)) = (data.unlock_data, data.authentication_data) {
@@ -1044,41 +971,29 @@ fn set_kdf_data(user: &mut User, data: &KDFData) -> EmptyResult {
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-pub(super) struct AuthenticationData {
+struct AuthenticationData {
     #[serde(alias = "Salt")]
     salt: String,
     #[serde(alias = "Kdf")]
-    pub(super) kdf: KDFData,
+    kdf: KDFData,
     #[serde(alias = "MasterPasswordAuthenticationHash")]
-    pub(super) master_password_authentication_hash: String,
-}
-
-impl AuthenticationData {
-    pub(super) fn check(&self, user: &User, unlock: &UnlockData) -> EmptyResult {
-        if self.kdf != unlock.kdf {
-            err!("KDF settings must be equal for authentication and unlock")
-        }
-
-        if self.salt != user.master_password_salt() || self.salt != unlock.salt {
-            err!("Invalid master password salt")
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
+    master_password_authentication_hash: String,
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-pub(super) struct UnlockData {
+struct UnlockData {
     salt: String,
     kdf: KDFData,
-    pub(super) master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
+    master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
     contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }
 
-/// A password or KDF change keeps the user key, so its key id must be the current one, when both are known.
+/// A password or KDF change re-wraps the same user key, so a key id sent with it has to be the
+/// current one. Either may be missing: from a client that predates key ids, or a user whose key id
+/// isn't known yet. There is nothing to compare in those cases.
 ///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/MasterPasswordUnlockData.cs#L27-L47>
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/MasterPasswordUnlockData.cs>
 fn validate_key_id_unchanged(user: &User, unlock_data: &UnlockData) -> EmptyResult {
     if let (Some(current), Some(contained)) = (&user.key_id, &unlock_data.contained_key_id)
         && current != contained
@@ -1104,7 +1019,13 @@ async fn post_kdf(data: Json<ChangeKdfData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
         err!("Invalid password")
     }
 
-    data.authentication_data.check(&headers.user, &data.unlock_data)?;
+    if data.authentication_data.kdf != data.unlock_data.kdf {
+        err!("KDF settings must be equal for authentication and unlock")
+    }
+
+    if headers.user.email != data.authentication_data.salt || headers.user.email != data.unlock_data.salt {
+        err!("Invalid master password salt")
+    }
 
     validate_key_id_unchanged(&headers.user, &data.unlock_data)?;
 
@@ -1283,7 +1204,9 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json<KeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
         err!("Invalid password")
     }
 
-    // Rotating v2 keys, or upgrading to them, would leave an account that can't be unlocked here
+    // This only rotates the keys of a v1 account. A v2 account's signing key would stay wrapped by the
+    // old user key, and a v1 account can't be upgraded here, since the signature key pair isn't read.
+    // Either would leave an account that can't be unlocked.
     if headers.user.is_v2() {
         err!("Key rotation is not supported for v2 accounts")
     }
@@ -2038,7 +1961,7 @@ async fn post_auth_request(
     nt.send_auth_request(&user.uuid, &auth_request.uuid, &device, &conn).await;
 
     log_user_event(
-        EventType::UserRequestedDeviceApproval,
+        EventType::UserRequestedDeviceApproval as i32,
         &user.uuid,
         client_headers.device_type,
         &client_headers.ip.ip,
@@ -2132,7 +2055,7 @@ async fn put_auth_request(
         nt.send_auth_response(&auth_request.user_uuid, &auth_request.uuid, &headers.device, &conn).await;
 
         log_user_event(
-            EventType::OrganizationUserApprovedAuthRequest,
+            EventType::OrganizationUserApprovedAuthRequest as i32,
             &headers.user.uuid,
             headers.device.atype,
             &headers.ip.ip,
@@ -2143,7 +2066,7 @@ async fn put_auth_request(
         // If denied, there's no reason to keep the request
         auth_request.delete(&conn).await?;
         log_user_event(
-            EventType::OrganizationUserRejectedAuthRequest,
+            EventType::OrganizationUserRejectedAuthRequest as i32,
             &headers.user.uuid,
             headers.device.atype,
             &headers.ip.ip,

src/api/core/ciphers.rs

@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
         Value::Null
     };
 
-    // Upstream omits these when unset rather than sending null
+    // Upstream omits this when unset rather than sending null.
     let mut user_decryption = json!({ "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock });
     if let Some(key_id) = &headers.user.key_id {
         user_decryption["userKeyId"] = json!(key_id);
@@ -274,8 +274,7 @@ pub struct CipherData {
 
     key: Option<String>,
 
-    // Added in web-v2025.6.0. Deprecated upstream for `encrypted_by_key_id`, but still checked when sent
-    pub encrypted_for: Option<UserId>,
+    pub encrypted_for: UserId, // Added in web-v2025.6.0
     // Added in web-v2025.8.1, Optional for compat
     pub encrypted_by_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 
@@ -342,22 +341,12 @@ impl From<CipherValidationError> for crate::Error {
     }
 }
 
-/// The cipher must have been encrypted for the acting user. Only checked when the client sends the field.
+/// A user-owned cipher must be encrypted with the user's current key. Organization ciphers use the
+/// organization key, which has no id yet, and either id may be missing: from a client that predates
+/// the field, or a user whose key id isn't known yet. There is nothing to compare in those cases.
 ///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1857-L1870>
-fn validate_encrypted_for_user(data: &CipherData, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
-    if data.encrypted_for.as_ref().is_some_and(|encrypted_for| encrypted_for != user_id) {
-        err!("Cipher was not encrypted for the current user. Please try again.")
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// [`validate_encrypted_for_user`], plus the key id of a user-owned cipher, when both ids are known.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1886-L1911>
-fn validate_encrypted_by_user(data: &CipherData, user: &User, is_org_cipher: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    validate_encrypted_for_user(data, &user.uuid)?;
-
+/// Ref: upstream's `CiphersController.ValidateCipherEncryptedByUser`
+fn validate_encrypted_by_user_key(data: &CipherData, user: &User, is_org_cipher: bool) -> EmptyResult {
     if !is_org_cipher
         && let (Some(cipher_key_id), Some(user_key_id)) = (&data.encrypted_by_key_id, &user.key_id)
         && cipher_key_id != user_key_id
@@ -371,15 +360,16 @@ fn validate_encrypted_by_user(data: &CipherData, user: &User, is_org_cipher: boo
 const MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH: usize = 500_000;
 
 impl CipherData {
-    /// Whether `data` is a blob rather than the per-type fields. Parses `data`, so keep the result.
+    /// Whether the content is a single blob rather than the per-type fields. This parses `data`, so
+    /// callers that need the answer more than once should keep it.
     pub fn is_blob(&self) -> bool {
         self.data.as_deref().is_some_and(is_data_blob_encrypted)
     }
 
-    /// Upstream's model checks that depend on the format: the size of `data`, and a name unless it's a blob.
+    /// Checks the content the way upstream's model validation does, before anything is saved.
+    /// `is_blob` is [`Self::is_blob`].
     ///
-    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L76-L77>
-    /// and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L91-L99>
+    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs>
     pub fn validate_content(&self, is_blob: bool) -> Result<(), CipherValidationError> {
         if let Some(data) = &self.data
             && data.len() > MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH
@@ -435,14 +425,17 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create(
 ) -> JsonResult {
     let mut data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();
 
-    validate_encrypted_by_user(&data.cipher, &headers.user, data.cipher.organization_id.is_some())?;
+    if data.cipher.encrypted_for != headers.user.uuid {
+        err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
+    }
+    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data.cipher, &headers.user, data.cipher.organization_id.is_some())?;
 
     // This check is usually only needed in update_cipher_from_data(), but we
     // need it here as well to avoid creating an empty cipher in the call to
     // cipher.save() below.
     enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data.cipher), &headers, &conn).await?;
 
-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type);
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, String::new());
     cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone());
     cipher.save(&conn).await?;
 
@@ -466,7 +459,11 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create(
 async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> JsonResult {
     let mut data: CipherData = data.into_inner();
 
-    validate_encrypted_by_user(&data, &headers.user, data.organization_id.is_some())?;
+    if data.encrypted_for != headers.user.uuid {
+        err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
+    }
+
+    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data, &headers.user, data.organization_id.is_some())?;
 
     // The web/browser clients set this field to null as expected, but the
     // mobile clients seem to set the invalid value `0001-01-01T00:00:00`,
@@ -474,7 +471,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt
     // needed when creating a new cipher, so just ignore it unconditionally.
     data.last_known_revision_date = None;
 
-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type);
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, String::new());
     update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate).await?;
 
     Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -498,44 +495,6 @@ async fn enforce_personal_ownership_policy(data: Option<&CipherData>, headers: &
     Ok(())
 }
 
-/// The checks of saving a cipher, for callers that run them before writing anything else
-async fn validate_cipher_update(
-    cipher: &Cipher,
-    data: &CipherData,
-    headers: &Headers,
-    conn: &DbConn,
-    ut: UpdateType,
-) -> EmptyResult {
-    // Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data.
-    // And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail.
-    if ut != UpdateType::None
-        && let Some(dt) = &data.last_known_revision_date
-    {
-        match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(dt, "%+") {
-            // ISO 8601 format
-            Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing LastKnownRevisionDate '{dt}': {err}"),
-            Ok(dt) if cipher.updated_at.signed_duration_since(dt).num_seconds() > 1 => {
-                err!("The client copy of this cipher is out of date. Resync the client and try again.")
-            }
-            Ok(_) => (),
-        }
-    }
-
-    if let Some(note) = &data.notes {
-        let max_note_size = CONFIG._max_note_size();
-        if note.len() > max_note_size {
-            err!(format!("The field Notes exceeds the maximum encrypted value length of {max_note_size} characters."))
-        }
-    }
-
-    if let Some(folder_id) = &data.folder_id
-        && Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await.is_none()
-    {
-        err!("Invalid folder", "Folder does not exist or belongs to another user");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
     cipher: &mut Cipher,
     data: CipherData,
@@ -563,12 +522,33 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
 
     let is_blob = data.is_blob();
     data.validate_content(is_blob)?;
-    validate_cipher_update(cipher, &data, headers, conn, ut).await?;
+
+    // Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data.
+    // And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail.
+    if ut != UpdateType::None
+        && let Some(dt) = data.last_known_revision_date
+    {
+        match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(&dt, "%+") {
+            // ISO 8601 format
+            Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing LastKnownRevisionDate '{dt}': {err}"),
+            Ok(dt) if cipher.updated_at.signed_duration_since(dt).num_seconds() > 1 => {
+                err!("The client copy of this cipher is out of date. Resync the client and try again.")
+            }
+            Ok(_) => (),
+        }
+    }
 
     if cipher.organization_uuid.is_some() && cipher.organization_uuid != data.organization_id {
         err!("Organization mismatch. Please resync the client before updating the cipher")
     }
 
+    if let Some(note) = &data.notes {
+        let max_note_size = CONFIG._max_note_size();
+        if note.len() > max_note_size {
+            err!(format!("The field Notes exceeds the maximum encrypted value length of {max_note_size} characters."))
+        }
+    }
+
     // Check if this cipher is being transferred from a personal to an organization vault
     let transfer_cipher = cipher.organization_uuid.is_none() && data.organization_id.is_some();
 
@@ -599,6 +579,12 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
         cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone());
     }
 
+    if let Some(ref folder_id) = data.folder_id
+        && Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await.is_none()
+    {
+        err!("Invalid folder", "Folder does not exist or belongs to another user");
+    }
+
     // Modify attachments name and keys when rotating
     if let Some(attachments) = data.attachments2 {
         for (id, attachment) in attachments {
@@ -638,7 +624,8 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
     };
 
     if let Some(blob) = data.data.filter(|_| is_blob) {
-        // A blob holds everything, the name included; the column can't be null, so it's left empty
+        // A blob holds all of the content, the name included, so nothing is kept outside it. The name
+        // column can't be null, so it's left empty; `to_json` reports it as null, as upstream does.
         // TODO: Make `ciphers.name` nullable and store `None` here instead.
         cipher.name = String::new();
         cipher.notes = None;
@@ -763,7 +750,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers_import(data: Json<ImportData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
         let folder_id = relations_map.get(&index).and_then(|i| folders.get(*i).cloned());
         cipher_data.folder_id = folder_id;
 
-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type);
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, String::new());
         update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?;
     }
 
@@ -831,8 +818,7 @@ async fn put_cipher(
         err!("Cipher is not write accessible")
     }
 
-    // Against the cipher we hold rather than the organization the client claims, like upstream
-    validate_encrypted_by_user(&data, &headers.user, cipher.organization_uuid.is_some())?;
+    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data, &headers.user, cipher.organization_uuid.is_some())?;
 
     update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate).await?;
 
@@ -1092,7 +1078,9 @@ async fn post_cipher_share(
     conn: DbConn,
     nt: Notify<'_>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
-    put_cipher_share(cipher_id, data, headers, conn, nt).await
+    let data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();
+
+    share_cipher_by_uuid(&cipher_id, data, &headers, &conn, &nt, None).await
 }
 
 #[put("/ciphers/<cipher_id>/share", data = "<data>")]
@@ -1105,21 +1093,6 @@ async fn put_cipher_share(
 ) -> JsonResult {
     let data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();
 
-    // Upstream's `PutShare` checks, before anything is written.
-    // Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L899-L912>
-    // and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L498-L519>
-    if data.cipher.organization_id.is_none() {
-        err!("Cipher OrganizationId is required.")
-    }
-    if data.collection_ids.is_empty() {
-        err!("You must select at least one collection.")
-    }
-    if !Cipher::find_by_uuid(&cipher_id, &conn).await.is_some_and(|c| c.user_uuid.as_ref() == Some(&headers.user.uuid))
-    {
-        err_code!("Cipher doesn't exist", Status::NotFound.code)
-    }
-    validate_encrypted_for_user(&data.cipher, &headers.user.uuid)?;
-
     share_cipher_by_uuid(&cipher_id, data, &headers, &conn, &nt, None).await
 }
 
@@ -1139,33 +1112,18 @@ async fn put_cipher_share_selected(
 ) -> EmptyResult {
     let mut data: ShareSelectedCipherData = data.into_inner();
 
-    // Upstream's `PutShareMany` checks, before anything is written.
-    // Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1395-L1421>
-    // and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L560-L604>
     if data.ciphers.is_empty() {
         err!("You must select at least one cipher.")
     }
-    if data.ciphers.iter().any(|c| c.id.is_none() || c.organization_id.is_none()) {
-        err!("All Ciphers must have an Id and OrganizationId.")
-    }
-    if data.ciphers.iter().map(|c| &c.organization_id).collect::<HashSet<_>>().len() != 1 {
-        err!("All ciphers must be for the same organization.")
-    }
+
     if data.collection_ids.is_empty() {
         err!("You must select at least one collection.")
     }
+
     for cipher in &data.ciphers {
-        cipher.validate_content(cipher.is_blob())?;
-    }
-    for cipher in &data.ciphers {
-        validate_encrypted_for_user(cipher, &headers.user.uuid)?;
-    }
-    let owned_ciphers = Cipher::find_owned_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await;
-    for cipher_data in &data.ciphers {
-        let Some(cipher) = owned_ciphers.iter().find(|c| cipher_data.id.as_ref() == Some(&c.uuid)) else {
-            err!("Trying to share ciphers that you do not own.")
-        };
-        validate_cipher_update(cipher, cipher_data, &headers, &conn, UpdateType::None).await?;
+        if cipher.id.is_none() {
+            err!("Request missing ids field")
+        }
     }
 
     while let Some(cipher) = data.ciphers.pop() {
@@ -1212,20 +1170,6 @@ async fn share_cipher_by_uuid(
         err!("Organization mismatch. Please resync the client before updating the cipher")
     }
 
-    // When LastKnownRevisionDate is None, it is a new cipher, so send CipherCreate.
-    // If there is an override, like when handling multiple items, we want to prevent a push notification for every single item
-    let ut = if let Some(ut) = override_ut {
-        ut
-    } else if data.cipher.last_known_revision_date.is_some() {
-        UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate
-    } else {
-        UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate
-    };
-
-    // For the same reason, the other checks of saving
-    data.cipher.validate_content(data.cipher.is_blob())?;
-    validate_cipher_update(&cipher, &data.cipher, headers, conn, ut).await?;
-
     let mut shared_to_collections = vec![];
 
     if let Some(organization_id) = &data.cipher.organization_id {
@@ -1244,6 +1188,16 @@ async fn share_cipher_by_uuid(
         }
     }
 
+    // When LastKnownRevisionDate is None, it is a new cipher, so send CipherCreate.
+    // If there is an override, like when handling multiple items, we want to prevent a push notification for every single item
+    let ut = if let Some(ut) = override_ut {
+        ut
+    } else if data.cipher.last_known_revision_date.is_some() {
+        UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate
+    } else {
+        UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate
+    };
+
     update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data.cipher, headers, Some(shared_to_collections), conn, nt, ut).await?;
 
     Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, conn).await?))

src/api/core/emergency_access.rs

@@ -6,10 +6,7 @@ use crate::{
     CONFIG,
     api::{
         EmptyResult, JsonResult,
-        core::{
-            CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType,
-            accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData},
-        },
+        core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType},
     },
     auth::{Headers, decode_emergency_access_invite},
     db::{
@@ -618,7 +615,6 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
         "kdfMemory": grantor_user.client_kdf_memory,
         "kdfParallelism": grantor_user.client_kdf_parallelism,
         "keyEncrypted": &emergency_access.key_encrypted,
-        "salt": grantor_user.master_password_salt(),
         "object": "emergencyAccessTakeover",
     });
 
@@ -628,13 +624,8 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct EmergencyAccessPasswordData {
-    // Legacy payload
-    new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
-    key: Option<String>,
-
-    // Current payload
-    authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
-    unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
+    new_master_password_hash: String,
+    key: String,
 }
 
 #[post("/emergency-access/<emer_id>/password", data = "<data>")]
@@ -647,6 +638,8 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
     check_emergency_access_enabled()?;
 
     let data: EmergencyAccessPasswordData = data.into_inner();
+    let new_master_password_hash = &data.new_master_password_hash;
+    //let key = &data.Key;
 
     let requesting_user = headers.user;
     let Some(emergency_access) =
@@ -663,23 +656,8 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
         err!("Grantor user not found.")
     };
 
-    let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) =
-        if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) = (data.authentication_data, data.unlock_data) {
-            authentication_data.check(&grantor_user, &unlock_data)?;
-
-            if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&grantor_user) {
-                err!("KDF settings do not match the grantor account")
-            }
-
-            (authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
-        } else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (data.new_master_password_hash, data.key) {
-            (new_master_password_hash, new_key)
-        } else {
-            err!("Invalid request!")
-        };
-
     // change grantor_user password
-    grantor_user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
+    grantor_user.set_password(new_master_password_hash, Some(data.key), true, None, &conn).await?;
     grantor_user.save(&conn).await?;
 
     // Disable TwoFactor providers since they will otherwise block logins

src/api/core/events.rs

@@ -242,11 +242,11 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
     Ok(())
 }
 
-pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: EventType, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
+pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: i32, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
     if !CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
         return;
     }
-    log_user_event_impl(event_type as i32, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
+    log_user_event_impl(event_type, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
 }
 
 async fn log_user_event_impl(

src/api/core/organizations.rs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use crate::{
     CONFIG,
     api::admin::FAKE_ADMIN_UUID,
     api::{
-        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
+        EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
         core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType, accept_org_invite, log_event, two_factor},
     },
     auth::{AdminHeaders, Headers, ManagerHeaders, ManagerHeadersLoose, OrgMemberHeaders, OwnerHeaders, decode_invite},
@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ use crate::{
     util::{NumberOrString, convert_json_key_lcase_first},
 };
 
-use super::accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData};
-
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
     routes![
         get_organization,
@@ -1831,7 +1829,7 @@ async fn post_org_import(
         cipher_data.folder_id = None;
         // Replace the client-provided, unvalidated organizationId with the real target org
         cipher_data.organization_id = Some(org_id.clone());
-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type);
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, String::new());
         update_cipher_from_data(
             &mut cipher,
             cipher_data,
@@ -2753,14 +2751,9 @@ struct OrganizationUserResetPasswordEnrollmentRequest {
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest {
-    // Legacy payload
     new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
     key: Option<String>,
 
-    // Current payload
-    authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
-    unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
-
     #[serde(default)]
     reset_master_password: bool,
     #[serde(default)]
@@ -2771,26 +2764,8 @@ struct OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest {
 // But the clients do not seem to use this at all
 // Just add it here in case they will
 #[get("/organizations/<org_id>/public-key")]
-async fn get_organization_public_key(
-    org_id: OrganizationId,
-    headers: Headers,
-    member: Result<OrgMemberHeaders, &'static str>,
-    conn: DbConn,
-) -> JsonResult {
-    // SSO users without an org get the fake one, whose key the v2 JIT password flow fetches anyway
-    if org_id.eq_ignore_ascii_case(FAKE_SSO_IDENTIFIER) && headers.user.private_key.is_none() {
-        return Ok(Json(json!({
-            "object": "organizationPublicKey",
-            "publicKey": fake_sso_org_public_key().await?,
-        })));
-    }
-    let member = match member {
-        Ok(member) => member,
-        // The guard already logged it
-        Err(e) => return Err(crate::error::Error::new_msg(e).with_code(Status::Unauthorized.code)),
-    };
-
-    if org_id != member.membership.org_uuid {
+async fn get_organization_public_key(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    if org_id != headers.membership.org_uuid {
         err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
     }
     let Some(org) = Organization::find_by_uuid(&org_id, &conn).await else {
@@ -2803,30 +2778,11 @@ async fn get_organization_public_key(
     })))
 }
 
-/// The SDK only uses this key to wrap an account recovery key that it never sends for the fake org,
-/// so it is made once and its private half dropped.
-async fn fake_sso_org_public_key() -> ApiResult<String> {
-    static PUBLIC_KEY: std::sync::LazyLock<Option<String>> = std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
-        let der = openssl::rsa::Rsa::generate(2048).and_then(|rsa| rsa.public_key_to_der()).ok()?;
-        Some(data_encoding::BASE64.encode(&der))
-    });
-
-    let Ok(Some(public_key)) = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(|| PUBLIC_KEY.clone()).await else {
-        err!("Failed to generate the organization key")
-    };
-    Ok(public_key)
-}
-
 // Obsolete - Renamed to public-key (2023.8), left for backwards compatibility with older clients
 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/AdminConsole/Controllers/OrganizationsController.cs#L487-L492
 #[get("/organizations/<org_id>/keys")]
-async fn get_organization_keys(
-    org_id: OrganizationId,
-    headers: Headers,
-    member: Result<OrgMemberHeaders, &'static str>,
-    conn: DbConn,
-) -> JsonResult {
-    get_organization_public_key(org_id, headers, member, conn).await
+async fn get_organization_keys(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    get_organization_public_key(org_id, headers, conn).await
 }
 
 // Will allow to reset 2FA too
@@ -2877,34 +2833,11 @@ async fn recover_account(
 
     let fallback_2fa_email =
         if req.reset_two_factor && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.email_2fa_auto_fallback() && user.verified() {
-            TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await.is_none()
+            TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, &conn).await.is_none()
         } else {
             false
         };
 
-    // Check the new password before the email below, so that a rejected request doesn't tell the user
-    // their password was reset
-    let new_password = if req.reset_master_password {
-        let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) = if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) =
-            (req.authentication_data, req.unlock_data)
-        {
-            authentication_data.check(&user, &unlock_data)?;
-
-            if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&user) {
-                err!("KDF settings do not match the user account")
-            }
-
-            (authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
-        } else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (req.new_master_password_hash, req.key) {
-            (new_master_password_hash, new_key)
-        } else {
-            err_code!("Unprocessable request", "Missing fields to reset password", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
-        };
-        Some((new_master_password_hash, new_key))
-    } else {
-        None
-    };
-
     // Sending email first ensure working email configuration and the resulting user notification.
     // Also this might add some protection against security flaws and misuse
     if let Err(e) = mail::send_admin_account_recovery(
@@ -2920,8 +2853,14 @@ async fn recover_account(
         err!(format!("Error sending user reset password email: {e:#?}"));
     }
 
-    if let Some((new_master_password_hash, new_key)) = new_password {
-        user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
+    if req.reset_master_password {
+        if let Some(key) = req.key
+            && let Some(hash) = req.new_master_password_hash
+        {
+            user.set_password(hash.as_str(), Some(key), true, None, &conn).await?;
+        } else {
+            err_code!("Unprocessable request", "Missing fields to reset password", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
+        }
     }
 
     if req.reset_two_factor {
@@ -2980,7 +2919,6 @@ async fn get_reset_password_details(
         "kdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
         "kdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
         "kdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
-        "masterPasswordSalt": user.master_password_salt(),
         "resetPasswordKey": member.reset_password_key,
         "encryptedPrivateKey": org.private_key,
     })))

src/api/core/public.rs

@@ -137,13 +137,9 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
 
     if CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() {
         for group_data in &data.groups {
-            let group_uuid = if let Some(mut group) =
+            let group_uuid = if let Some(group) =
                 Group::find_by_external_id_and_org(&group_data.external_id, &org_id, &conn).await
             {
-                if group.name != group_data.name {
-                    group.name = group_data.name.clone();
-                    group.save(&conn).await?;
-                }
                 group.uuid
             } else {
                 let mut group =

src/api/core/two_factor/authenticator.rs

@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 
 use crate::{
     api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event, core::two_factor::generate_recover_code},
-    auth::{ClientIp, Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::{ClientIp, Headers},
     crypto,
     db::{
         DbConn,
-        models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
+        models::{Device, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
     },
     util::NumberOrString,
 };
@@ -20,23 +20,27 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
 
 #[post("/two-factor/get-authenticator", data = "<data>")]
 async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
     let user = headers.user;
 
     data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
 
-    let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await;
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32;
+    let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await;
 
     let (enabled, key) = match twofactor {
         Some(tf) => (true, tf.data),
         _ => (false, crypto::encode_random_bytes::<20>(&BASE32)),
     };
 
+    // Upstream seems to also return `userVerificationToken`, but doesn't seem to be used at all.
+    // It should help prevent TOTP disclosure if someone keeps their vault unlocked.
+    // Since it doesn't seem to be used, and also does not cause any issues, lets leave it out of the response.
+    // See: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Auth/Controllers/TwoFactorController.cs#L94
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "authenticator": json!({
-            "enabled": enabled,
-            "key": key,
-        }),
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::authenticator_token(user.uuid, key, enabled),
+        "enabled": enabled,
+        "key": key,
+        "object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
     })))
 }
 
@@ -45,7 +49,8 @@ async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers,
 struct EnableAuthenticatorData {
     key: String,
     token: NumberOrString,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[post("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
@@ -56,7 +61,12 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He
 
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
-    two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &key, false)?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;
 
     // Validate key as base32 and 20 bytes length
     let decoded_key: Vec<u8> = if let Ok(decoded) = BASE32.decode(key.as_bytes()) {
@@ -74,13 +84,12 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He
 
     generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
 
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "authenticator": json!({
-            "enabled": true,
-            "key": key,
-        }),
+        "enabled": true,
+        "key": key,
+        "object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
     })))
 }
 
@@ -116,7 +125,8 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
         err!("Invalid TOTP secret")
     };
 
-    let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, conn).await {
+    let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32, conn).await
+    {
         Some(tf) => tf,
         _ => TwoFactor::new(user_id.clone(), TwoFactorType::Authenticator, secret.to_owned()),
     };
@@ -174,25 +184,37 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct DisableAuthenticatorData {
     key: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: String,
+    r#type: NumberOrString,
 }
 
 #[delete("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
-async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
     let user = headers.user;
+    let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
 
-    two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &data.key, true)?;
+    if !user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
+        err!("Invalid password");
+    }
 
-    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await {
+    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
         if twofactor.data == data.key {
             twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
-            log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+            Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
+            log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+                .await;
         } else {
             err!(format!("TOTP key for user {} does not match recorded value, cannot deactivate", &user.email));
         }
     }
 
-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
+        super::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+    }
 
-    Ok(())
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "enabled": false,
+        "keys": type_,
+        "object": "twoFactorProvider"
+    })))
 }

src/api/core/two_factor/duo.rs

@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ use chrono::Utc;
 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 
 use crate::{
+    CONFIG,
     api::{
-        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::log_user_event,
-        core::two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
+        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event,
+        core::two_factor::generate_recover_code,
     },
-    auth::{Headers, two_factor, two_factor::DuoData},
+    auth::Headers,
     crypto,
     db::{
         DbConn,
@@ -18,7 +18,55 @@ use crate::{
 };
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put, disable_duo,]
+    routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put,]
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct DuoData {
+    host: String, // Duo API hostname
+    ik: String,   // client id
+    sk: String,   // client secret
+}
+
+impl DuoData {
+    fn global() -> Option<Self> {
+        match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
+            (true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
+                host,
+                ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
+                sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
+            }),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+    fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            host: s.into(),
+            ik: s.into(),
+            sk: s.into(),
+        }
+    }
+    fn secret() -> Self {
+        Self::msg("<global_secret>")
+    }
+    fn obscure(self) -> Self {
+        let mut host = self.host;
+        let mut ik = self.ik;
+        let mut sk = self.sk;
+
+        let digits = 4;
+        let replaced = "************";
+
+        host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+        ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+        sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+
+        Self {
+            host,
+            ik,
+            sk,
+        }
+    }
 }
 
 enum DuoStatus {
@@ -47,19 +95,22 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
 
     data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
 
-    let (enabled, duo) = match get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await {
+    let data = get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await;
+
+    let (enabled, data) = match data {
         DuoStatus::Global(_) => (true, Some(DuoData::secret())),
         DuoStatus::User(data) => (true, Some(data.obscure())),
         DuoStatus::Disabled(true) => (false, Some(DuoData::msg(DISABLED_MESSAGE_DEFAULT))),
         DuoStatus::Disabled(false) => (false, None),
     };
 
-    let duo_json = if let Some(data) = duo.as_ref() {
+    let json = if let Some(data) = data {
         json!({
             "enabled": enabled,
             "host": data.host,
             "clientSecret": data.sk,
             "clientId": data.ik,
+            "object": "twoFactorDuo"
         })
     } else {
         json!({
@@ -67,13 +118,11 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
             "host": null,
             "clientSecret": null,
             "clientId": null,
+            "object": "twoFactorDuo"
         })
     };
 
-    Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
-        "duo": duo_json,
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::duo_token(user.uuid, duo, enabled),
-    })))
+    Ok(Json(json))
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -82,7 +131,8 @@ struct EnableDuoData {
     host: String,
     client_secret: String,
     client_id: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 impl From<EnableDuoData> for DuoData {
@@ -109,7 +159,12 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
     let data: EnableDuoData = data.into_inner();
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
-    two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, None, false)?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
+        otp: data.otp.clone(),
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;
 
     let (data, data_str) = if check_duo_fields_custom(&data) {
         let data_req: DuoData = data.into();
@@ -126,15 +181,14 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
 
     generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
 
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "duo": json!({
-            "enabled": true,
-            "host": data.host,
-            "clientSecret": data.sk,
-            "clientId": data.ik,
-        }),
+        "enabled": true,
+        "host": data.host,
+        "clientSecret": data.sk,
+        "clientId": data.ik,
+        "object": "twoFactorDuo"
     })))
 }
 
@@ -143,29 +197,6 @@ async fn activate_duo_put(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
     activate_duo(data, headers, conn).await
 }
 
-#[delete("/two-factor/duo", data = "<data>")]
-async fn disable_duo(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Duo, &conn).await {
-        // Apply the same transformation than in `get_duo` to check we are disabling the correct one
-        let duo = match to_user_duo_data(&twofactor) {
-            DuoStatus::Global(_) => Some(DuoData::secret()),
-            DuoStatus::User(data) => Some(data.obscure()),
-            DuoStatus::Disabled(_) => None,
-        };
-
-        two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, duo.as_ref(), true)?;
-
-        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-    }
-
-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData) -> EmptyResult {
     use reqwest::{Method, header};
     use std::str::FromStr;
@@ -191,15 +222,13 @@ async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData)
 }
 
 async fn get_user_duo_data(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> DuoStatus {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Duo as i32;
+
     // If the user doesn't have an entry, disabled
-    let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Duo, conn).await else {
+    let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await else {
         return DuoStatus::Disabled(DuoData::global().is_some());
     };
 
-    to_user_duo_data(&twofactor)
-}
-
-fn to_user_duo_data(twofactor: &TwoFactor) -> DuoStatus {
     // If the user has the required values, we use those
     if let Ok(data) = serde_json::from_str(&twofactor.data) {
         return DuoStatus::User(data);

src/api/core/two_factor/email.rs

@@ -5,26 +5,20 @@ use crate::{
     CONFIG,
     api::{
         EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{
-            log_user_event,
-            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
-        },
+        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
     },
-    auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers},
     crypto,
     db::{
         DbConn,
-        models::{
-            AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User,
-            UserId,
-        },
+        models::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, User, UserId},
     },
     error::{Error, MapResult},
     mail,
 };
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email, disable_email]
+    routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email,]
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -97,20 +91,6 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
             {
                 err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "Invalid device, IP or code")
             }
-        } else if let Some(device_identifier) = &data.device_identifier {
-            // iOS/Android SSO logins send the email and device id but no password hash,
-            // so accept a device that has a pending 2FA login for this user
-            if TwoFactorIncomplete::find_by_user_and_device(&user.uuid, device_identifier, &conn).await.is_none() {
-                err!(
-                    "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
-                    format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, email.escape_debug())
-                )
-            }
-            debug!(
-                "Email 2FA fallback: pending login. Username: {}. Device: {}.",
-                user.email,
-                device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug()
-            );
         } else {
             err!("No password hash has been submitted.")
         }
@@ -124,7 +104,7 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
         let Some(user) = User::find_by_device_for_email2fa(device_identifier, &conn).await else {
             err!(
                 "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
-                format!("IP: {}. Device: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug())
+                format!("IP: {}. Device: {device_identifier}.", client_headers.ip.ip)
             )
         };
 
@@ -136,8 +116,8 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
 
 /// Generate the token, save the data for later verification and send email to user
 pub async fn send_token(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let mut twofactor =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
+    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
 
     let generated_token = crypto::generate_email_token(CONFIG.email_token_size());
 
@@ -160,19 +140,18 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
     data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
 
     let (enabled, mfa_email) =
-        if let Some(x) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
-            let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
-            (true, Some(twofactor_data.email))
-        } else {
-            (false, None)
+        match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, &conn).await {
+            Some(x) => {
+                let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
+                (true, json!(twofactor_data.email))
+            }
+            _ => (false, serde_json::value::Value::Null),
         };
 
-    Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
-        "email": rocket::serde::json::json!({
-            "enabled": enabled,
-            "email": mfa_email,
-        }),
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::email_token(user.uuid, mfa_email, enabled),
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "email": mfa_email,
+        "enabled": enabled,
+        "object": "twoFactorEmail"
     })))
 }
 
@@ -181,22 +160,30 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
 struct SendEmailData {
     /// Email where 2FA codes will be sent to, can be different than user email account.
     email: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 /// Send a verification email to the specified email address to check whether it exists/belongs to user.
 #[post("/two-factor/send-email", data = "<data>")]
-async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
     let data: SendEmailData = data.into_inner();
     let user = headers.user;
 
-    two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email.clone(), false)?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, false, &conn)
+    .await?;
 
     if !CONFIG._enable_email_2fa() {
         err!("Email 2FA is disabled")
     }
 
-    if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
+
+    if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
         tf.delete(&conn).await?;
     }
 
@@ -204,13 +191,12 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
     let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(data.email, Some(generated_token));
 
     // Uses EmailVerificationChallenge as type to show that it's not verified yet.
-    let twofactor =
-        TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
+    let twofactor = TwoFactor::new(user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
     twofactor.save(&conn).await?;
 
     mail::send_token(&twofactor_data.email, &twofactor_data.last_token.map_res("Token is empty")?).await?;
 
-    Ok(Json(json!({})))
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)]
@@ -218,7 +204,8 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
 struct EmailData {
     email: String,
     token: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 /// Verify email belongs to user and can be used for 2FA email codes.
@@ -227,11 +214,17 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
     let data: EmailData = data.into_inner();
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
-    two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email, false)?;
+    // This is the last step in the verification process, delete the otp directly afterwards
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;
 
-    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, &conn)
-        .await
-        .map_res("Two factor not found")?;
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge as i32;
+    let mut twofactor =
+        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
 
     let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
 
@@ -250,26 +243,13 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
 
     generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
 
-    Ok(Json(json!({})))
-}
-
-#[delete("/two-factor/email", data = "<data>")]
-async fn disable_email(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
-        let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
-        two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, twofactor_data.email, true)?;
-
-        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-    }
-
-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-
-    Ok(())
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "email": email_data.email,
+        "enabled": "true",
+        "object": "twoFactorEmail"
+    })))
 }
 
 /// Validate the email code when used as TwoFactor token mechanism
@@ -281,8 +261,9 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
     conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
     let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(data)?;
-    let mut twofactor =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
+    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, conn)
+        .await
+        .map_res("Two factor not found")?;
     let Some(issued_token) = &email_data.last_token else {
         err!(
             format!("No token available! IP: {ip}"),

src/api/core/two_factor/mod.rs

@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 
 use crate::{
     CONFIG,
-    api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_event},
+    api::{
+        EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
+        core::{log_event, log_user_event},
+    },
     auth::Headers,
     crypto,
     db::{
@@ -18,6 +21,7 @@ use crate::{
         },
     },
     mail,
+    util::NumberOrString,
 };
 
 pub mod authenticator;
@@ -65,7 +69,7 @@ pub fn is_twofactor_provider_usable(provider_type: &TwoFactorType, provider_data
 }
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, get_device_verification_settings];
+    let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, disable_twofactor, get_device_verification_settings];
 
     routes.append(&mut authenticator::routes());
     routes.append(&mut duo::routes());
@@ -77,12 +81,6 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
     routes
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct VerificationTokenData {
-    user_verification_token: String,
-}
-
 #[get("/two-factor")]
 async fn get_twofactor(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value> {
     let twofactors = TwoFactor::find_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await;
@@ -122,14 +120,45 @@ async fn generate_recover_code(user: &mut User, conn: &DbConn) {
     }
 }
 
-/// Call after a 2FA provider, or one of its keys, was removed. No remembered device may keep skipping
-/// the providers that are left, and once every provider is gone the 2FA policy applies.
-pub async fn check_2fa_state(user: &User, device_type: i32, ip: &std::net::IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
-    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await.is_empty() {
-        enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device_type, ip, conn).await?;
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct DisableTwoFactorData {
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
+    r#type: NumberOrString,
+}
+
+#[put("/two-factor/disable", data = "<data>")]
+async fn disable_twofactor(data: Json<DisableTwoFactorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let data: DisableTwoFactorData = data.into_inner();
+    let user = headers.user;
+
+    // Delete directly after a valid token has been provided
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
     }
-    Ok(())
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;
+
+    let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
+
+    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
+        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
+        Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
+        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+            .await;
+    }
+
+    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
+        enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "enabled": false,
+        "type": type_,
+        "object": "twoFactorProvider"
+    })))
 }
 
 pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy(

src/api/core/two_factor/protected_actions.rs

@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ async fn request_otp(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
     let user = headers.user;
 
     // Only one Protected Action per user is allowed to take place, delete the previous one
-    if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, &conn).await {
+    if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, &conn).await
+    {
         let pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
         let elapsed = pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds();
         let delay = 30;
@@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ pub async fn validate_protected_action_otp(
     delete_if_valid: bool,
     conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
-    let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, conn)
+    let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, conn)
         .await
         .map_res("Protected action token not found, try sending the code again or restart the process")?;
     let mut pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;

src/api/core/two_factor/webauthn.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use std::{collections::HashSet, str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
+use std::{str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
 
 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -18,18 +18,16 @@ use crate::{
     CONFIG,
     api::{
         EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{
-            log_user_event,
-            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
-        },
+        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
     },
-    auth::{Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::Headers,
     crypto::ct_eq,
     db::{
         DbConn,
-        models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
+        models::{Device, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
     },
     error::Error,
+    util::NumberOrString,
 };
 
 static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
@@ -47,14 +45,7 @@ static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
 });
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![
-        get_webauthn,
-        generate_webauthn_challenge,
-        activate_webauthn,
-        activate_webauthn_put,
-        delete_webauthn,
-        delete_webauthns
-    ]
+    routes![get_webauthn, generate_webauthn_challenge, activate_webauthn, activate_webauthn_put, delete_webauthn,]
 }
 
 // Some old u2f structs still needed for migrating from u2f to WebAuthn
@@ -128,36 +119,34 @@ async fn get_webauthn(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
     data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
 
     let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
-    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
     let registrations_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
 
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "webAuthn": json!({
-            "enabled": enabled,
-            "keys": registrations_json,
-        }),
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::webauthn_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
+        "enabled": enabled,
+        "keys": registrations_json,
+        "object": "twoFactorWebAuthn"
     })))
 }
 
 #[post("/two-factor/get-webauthn-challenge", data = "<data>")]
-async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
     let user = headers.user;
 
-    let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
-    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
-    let creds = registrations
+    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
+
+    let registrations = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn)
+        .await?
+        .1
         .into_iter()
         .map(|r| r.credential.cred_id().to_owned()) // We return the credentialIds to the clients to avoid double registering
         .collect();
 
-    two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, enabled)?;
-
     let (mut challenge, state) = WEBAUTHN.start_passkey_registration(
         Uuid::from_str(&user.uuid).expect("Failed to parse UUID"), // Should never fail
         &user.email,
         user.display_name(),
-        Some(creds),
+        Some(registrations),
     )?;
 
     let mut state = serde_json::to_value(&state)?;
@@ -177,19 +166,17 @@ async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers:
     let mut challenge_value = serde_json::to_value(challenge.public_key)?;
     challenge_value["status"] = "ok".into();
     challenge_value["errorMessage"] = "".into();
-
-    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "options": challenge_value
-    })))
+    Ok(Json(challenge_value))
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct EnableWebauthnData {
-    id: i32,
+    id: NumberOrString, // 1..5
     name: String,
     device_response: RegisterPublicKeyCredentialCopy,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -270,14 +257,16 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
     let data: EnableWebauthnData = data.into_inner();
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
-    let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
-    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
-    two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, !keys.is_empty())?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;
 
     // Retrieve and delete the saved challenge state
-    let state = if let Some(tf) =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge, &conn).await
-    {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge as i32;
+    let state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
         let state: PasskeyRegistration = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
         tf.delete(&conn).await?;
         state
@@ -288,9 +277,10 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
     // Verify the credentials with the saved state
     let credential = WEBAUTHN.finish_passkey_registration(&data.device_response.into(), &state)?;
 
+    let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
     // TODO: Check for repeated ID's
     registrations.push(WebauthnRegistration {
-        id: data.id,
+        id: data.id.into_i32()?,
         name: data.name,
         migrated: false,
 
@@ -303,13 +293,13 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
         .await?;
     generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
 
+    let keys_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "webAuthn": json!({
-            "enabled": true,
-            "keys": registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
-        }),
+        "enabled": true,
+        "keys": keys_json,
+        "object": "twoFactorU2f"
     })))
 }
 
@@ -320,87 +310,58 @@ async fn activate_webauthn_put(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers,
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct DeleteWebauthnData {
-    id: i32,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+struct DeleteU2FData {
+    id: NumberOrString,
+    master_password_hash: String,
 }
 
 #[delete("/two-factor/webauthn", data = "<data>")]
-async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |key| key.id != data.id, headers, &conn).await
-}
+async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteU2FData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let id = data.id.into_i32()?;
+    if !headers.user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
+        err!("Invalid password");
+    }
 
-#[delete("/two-factor/webauthn/all", data = "<data>")]
-async fn delete_webauthns(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |_| false, headers, &conn).await
-}
-
-async fn inner_delete_webauthns(
-    token: &str,
-    retain: impl Fn(&WebauthnRegistration) -> bool,
-    headers: Headers,
-    conn: &DbConn,
-) -> JsonResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    let Some(mut tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await else {
+    let Some(mut tf) =
+        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32, &conn).await
+    else {
         err!("Webauthn data not found!")
     };
 
-    let mut keys: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
-    let keys_id: Vec<i32> = keys.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
+    let mut data: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
 
-    two_factor::validate_webauthn(token, &user.uuid, &keys_id, true)?;
-
-    let mut removed: HashSet<Vec<u8>> = HashSet::new();
-    let mut migrated = false;
-
-    keys.retain(|key| {
-        let retained = retain(key);
-        if !retained {
-            removed.insert(key.credential.cred_id().to_vec());
-            migrated = migrated || key.migrated;
-        }
-        retained
-    });
-
-    if removed.is_empty() {
+    let Some(item_pos) = data.iter().position(|r| r.id == id) else {
         err!("Webauthn entry not found")
-    }
+    };
 
-    if keys.is_empty() {
-        tf.delete(conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await;
-    } else {
-        tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&keys)?;
-        tf.save(conn).await?;
-        drop(tf);
-    }
+    let removed_item = data.remove(item_pos);
+    tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
+    tf.save(&conn).await?;
+    drop(tf);
+    Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;
 
     // If entry is migrated from u2f, delete the u2f entry as well
-    if migrated && let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f, conn).await {
-        let Ok(mut data) = serde_json::from_str::<Vec<U2FRegistration>>(&u2f.data) else {
+    if let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f as i32, &conn).await
+    {
+        let mut data: Vec<U2FRegistration> = if let Ok(d) = serde_json::from_str(&u2f.data) {
+            d
+        } else {
             err!("Error parsing U2F data")
         };
 
-        data.retain(|old| !removed.contains(&old.reg.key_handle));
+        data.retain(|r| r.reg.key_handle != removed_item.credential.cred_id().as_slice());
+        let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
 
-        if data.is_empty() {
-            u2f.delete(conn).await?;
-        } else {
-            let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
-            u2f.data = new_data_str;
-            u2f.save(conn).await?;
-        }
+        u2f.data = new_data_str;
+        u2f.save(&conn).await?;
     }
 
-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await?;
+    let keys_json: Vec<Value> = data.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
 
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "webAuthn": json!({
-            "enabled": !keys.is_empty(),
-            "keys": keys.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
-        }),
+        "enabled": true,
+        "keys": keys_json,
+        "object": "twoFactorU2f"
     })))
 }
 
@@ -408,7 +369,8 @@ pub async fn get_webauthn_registrations(
     user_id: &UserId,
     conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> Result<(bool, Vec<WebauthnRegistration>), Error> {
-    match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32;
+    match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
         Some(tf) => Ok((tf.enabled, serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?)),
         None => Ok((false, Vec::new())), // If no data, return empty list
     }
@@ -455,9 +417,8 @@ pub async fn generate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> JsonRes
 }
 
 pub async fn validate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, response: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let mut state = if let Some(tf) =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge, conn).await
-    {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge as i32;
+    let mut state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
         let state: PasskeyAuthentication = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
         tf.delete(conn).await?;
         state

src/api/core/two_factor/yubikey.rs

@@ -10,12 +10,9 @@ use crate::{
     CONFIG,
     api::{
         EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{
-            log_user_event,
-            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
-        },
+        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
     },
-    auth::{Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::Headers,
     db::{
         DbConn,
         models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType},
@@ -25,7 +22,7 @@ use crate::{
 };
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put, delete_yubikeys,]
+    routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put,]
 }
 
 struct HttpClientTransport {
@@ -63,7 +60,8 @@ struct EnableYubikeyData {
     key4: Option<String>,
     key5: Option<String>,
     nfc: bool,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize, Serialize, Debug)]
@@ -127,47 +125,55 @@ async fn generate_yubikey(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn:
     data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
 
     let user_id = &user.uuid;
+    let yubikey_type = TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32;
 
-    let (enabled, keys, yubikey_json) =
-        if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
-            let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
-            let enabled = !yubikey_metadata.keys.is_empty();
-            let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys.clone());
-            result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(enabled);
-            result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
-            (enabled, yubikey_metadata.keys, result)
-        } else {
-            (false, Vec::new(), json!({"enabled": false}))
-        };
-    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "yubiKey": yubikey_json,
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::yubikey_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
-    })))
+    let r = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, yubikey_type, &conn).await;
+
+    if let Some(r) = r {
+        let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
+
+        let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
+
+        result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
+        result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
+        result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
+
+        Ok(Json(result))
+    } else {
+        Ok(Json(json!({
+            "enabled": false,
+            "object": "twoFactorU2f",
+        })))
+    }
 }
 
 #[post("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
 async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
     let data: EnableYubikeyData = data.into_inner();
-    let yubikeys = parse_yubikeys(&data);
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
+        otp: data.otp.clone(),
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;
+
+    // Check if we already have some data
+    let mut yubikey_data =
+        match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32, &conn).await {
+            Some(data) => data,
+            None => TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new()),
+        };
+
+    let yubikeys = parse_yubikeys(&data);
+
     if yubikeys.is_empty() {
         // Return an error to prevent saving empty keys which would cause users not being able to login anymore.
         // To remove all keys users should click the `Deactivate all keys` button
         err!("A key is required.");
     }
 
-    // Check if we already have some data
-    let mut yubikey_data =
-        if let Some(yd) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
-            let ym: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&yd.data)?;
-            two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &ym.keys, !ym.keys.is_empty())?;
-            yd
-        } else {
-            two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &Vec::new(), false)?;
-            TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new())
-        };
-
     // Ensure they are valid OTPs
     for yubikey in &yubikeys {
         if yubikey.is_empty() || yubikey.len() == 12 {
@@ -189,12 +195,15 @@ async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn:
 
     generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
 
     let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
+
     result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
     result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
-    Ok(Json(json!({"yubiKey": result})))
+    result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
+
+    Ok(Json(result))
 }
 
 #[put("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
@@ -202,23 +211,6 @@ async fn activate_yubikey_put(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, c
     activate_yubikey(data, headers, conn).await
 }
 
-#[delete("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
-async fn delete_yubikeys(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
-        let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
-        two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &yubikey_metadata.keys, true)?;
-
-        r.delete(&conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-    }
-
-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 pub async fn validate_yubikey_login(response: &str, twofactor_data: &str) -> EmptyResult {
     if response.len() != 44 {
         err!("Invalid Yubikey OTP length");

src/api/identity.rs

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
         match &login_result {
             Ok(_) => {
                 log_user_event(
-                    EventType::UserLoggedIn,
+                    EventType::UserLoggedIn as i32,
                     &user_id,
                     client_header.device_type,
                     &client_header.ip.ip,
@@ -128,7 +128,8 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
             }
             Err(e) => {
                 if let Some(ev) = e.get_event() {
-                    log_user_event(ev.event, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+                    log_user_event(ev.event as i32, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn)
+                        .await;
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -881,7 +882,7 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
 
             enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await?;
 
-            log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
+            log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa as i32, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
 
             if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
                 && let Err(e) =
@@ -951,7 +952,7 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
             }
 
             Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::YubiKey) => {
-                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
+                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
                     err!("No YubiKey devices registered")
                 };
 
@@ -963,7 +964,7 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
             }
 
             Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::Email) => {
-                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
+                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
                     err!("No twofactor email registered")
                 };
 

src/api/mod.rs

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ pub type JsonResult = ApiResult<Json<Value>>;
 pub type EmptyResult = ApiResult<()>;
 
 // Common structs representing JSON data received
-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct PasswordOrOtpData {
     #[serde(alias = "MasterPasswordHash")]

src/api/notifications.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use std::{
     net::IpAddr,
     sync::{Arc, LazyLock},
-    time::{Duration, Instant},
+    time::Duration,
 };
 
 use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
@@ -41,14 +41,6 @@ pub static WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS: LazyLock<Arc<AnonymousWebSocketSubscripti
 /// One connection is needed per pending login request, several at once are only expected behind NAT.
 const MAX_ANONYMOUS_CONNECTIONS_PER_IP: u32 = 25;
 
-/// How often a Ping is sent to the client.
-const WS_PING_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
-
-/// Close the connection if nothing, not even a Pong, was received from the client for this long.
-/// Otherwise half-open connections (client gone without a FIN, e.g. behind a proxy or NAT) are kept forever.
-/// Same as the default `ClientTimeoutInterval` of ASP.NET Core SignalR, which the official server uses.
-const WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
-
 static NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: LazyLock<bool> = LazyLock::new(|| !CONFIG.enable_websocket() && !CONFIG.push_enabled());
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
@@ -164,16 +156,12 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
         rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
             let mut ws = ws;
             let _guard = guard;
-            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
-            let mut last_received = Instant::now();
+            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
             loop {
                 tokio::select! {
                     res = ws.next() =>  {
                         match res {
                             Some(Ok(message)) => {
-                                // Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
-                                last_received = Instant::now();
-
                                 match message {
                                     // Respond to any pings
                                     Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -207,13 +195,7 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
                         }
                     }
 
-                    _ = interval.tick() => {
-                        // The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
-                        if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
-                            break;
-                        }
-                        yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
-                    }
+                    _ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
                 }
             }
         }}
@@ -247,16 +229,12 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
         rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
             let mut ws = ws;
             let _guard = guard;
-            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
-            let mut last_received = Instant::now();
+            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
             loop {
                 tokio::select! {
                     res = ws.next() =>  {
                         match res {
                             Some(Ok(message)) => {
-                                // Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
-                                last_received = Instant::now();
-
                                 match message {
                                     // Respond to any pings
                                     Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -290,13 +268,7 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
                         }
                     }
 
-                    _ = interval.tick() => {
-                        // The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
-                        if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
-                            break;
-                        }
-                        yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
-                    }
+                    _ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
                 }
             }
         }}

src/auth.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
-#[path = "auth/two_factor.rs"]
-pub mod two_factor;
-
 #[path = "auth/send.rs"]
 pub mod send;
 pub type SendTokens = send::SendTokens;

src/auth/two_factor.rs

@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
-use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, ser::Serialize};
-use std::sync::LazyLock;
-
-use crate::{
-    CONFIG,
-    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult},
-    auth::{decode_jwt, encode_jwt},
-    db::models::UserId,
-};
-
-static JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|api.2fa", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct TwoFactorClaims<T> {
-    // Not before
-    pub nbf: i64,
-    // Expiration time
-    pub exp: i64,
-    // Issuer
-    pub iss: String,
-    // Subject
-    pub sub: UserId,
-
-    pub enabled: bool,
-
-    pub claims: T,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct AuthenticatorClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "authenticator_key")]
-    pub key: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct DuoClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "duo_data")]
-    pub data: Option<DuoData>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct WebauthnClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "webauthn_keys")]
-    pub keys: Vec<i32>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct YubikeyClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "yubi_keys")]
-    pub keys: Vec<String>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
-pub struct DuoData {
-    pub host: String, // Duo API hostname
-    pub ik: String,   // client id
-    pub sk: String,   // client secret
-}
-
-impl DuoData {
-    pub fn global() -> Option<Self> {
-        match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
-            (true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
-                host,
-                ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
-                sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
-            }),
-            _ => None,
-        }
-    }
-    pub fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            host: s.into(),
-            ik: s.into(),
-            sk: s.into(),
-        }
-    }
-    pub fn secret() -> Self {
-        Self::msg("<global_secret>")
-    }
-    pub fn obscure(self) -> Self {
-        let mut host = self.host;
-        let mut ik = self.ik;
-        let mut sk = self.sk;
-
-        let digits = 4;
-        let replaced = "************";
-
-        host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-        ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-        sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-
-        Self {
-            host,
-            ik,
-            sk,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct EmailClaims {
-    pub email: Option<String>,
-}
-
-fn token<T: Serialize>(user_id: UserId, enabled: bool, claims: T) -> String {
-    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let claims = TwoFactorClaims {
-        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap()).timestamp(),
-        iss: JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string(),
-        sub: user_id,
-        enabled,
-        claims,
-    };
-    encode_jwt(&claims)
-}
-
-fn validate<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, enabled: bool) -> ApiResult<T> {
-    match decode_jwt::<TwoFactorClaims<T>>(token, JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string()) {
-        Ok(claims) => {
-            if claims.sub != *user_id {
-                err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid user");
-            }
-            if claims.enabled != enabled {
-                err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid state");
-            }
-            Ok(claims.claims)
-        }
-        Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to decode verification token: {err}")),
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn authenticator_token(user_id: UserId, key: String, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        AuthenticatorClaims {
-            key,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-pub fn validate_authenticator(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, key: &str, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<AuthenticatorClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if claims.key != key {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid key");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn duo_token(user_id: UserId, data: Option<DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        DuoClaims {
-            data,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-// When disabling we check that it's the correct data
-pub fn validate_duo(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, data: Option<&DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<DuoClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if enabled && claims.data.as_ref() != data {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid duo data");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn email_token(user_id: UserId, email: Option<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        EmailClaims {
-            email,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-// When disabling we check that it's the correct `email`
-pub fn validate_email(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, email: String, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<EmailClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if enabled && claims.email != Some(email) {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid email");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn webauthn_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<i32>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        WebauthnClaims {
-            keys,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-pub fn validate_webauthn(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &[i32], enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<WebauthnClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if keys != claims.keys {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn yubikey_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        YubikeyClaims {
-            keys,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-pub fn validate_yubikey(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<YubikeyClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if *keys != claims.keys {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use serde_json::{Value, from_value, to_value};
-
-    fn token<T: Serialize>(claims: T) -> Value {
-        to_value(TwoFactorClaims {
-            nbf: 0,
-            exp: 0,
-            iss: String::new(),
-            sub: UserId::from(String::from("4ff0f0a4-0aa4-4c1d-9d43-1f2bd4d5e8b1")),
-            enabled: false,
-            claims,
-        })
-        .unwrap()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn claims_only_parse_as_their_own_provider() {
-        let tokens = [
-            token(AuthenticatorClaims {
-                key: String::from("JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP"),
-            }),
-            token(DuoClaims {
-                data: None,
-            }),
-            token(WebauthnClaims {
-                keys: vec![1],
-            }),
-            token(YubikeyClaims {
-                keys: Vec::new(),
-            }),
-            token(EmailClaims {
-                email: None,
-            }),
-        ];
-        for (issued, token) in tokens.iter().enumerate() {
-            let parsed = [
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<AuthenticatorClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<DuoClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<WebauthnClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<YubikeyClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<EmailClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-            ];
-            for (checked, ok) in parsed.into_iter().enumerate() {
-                assert_eq!(ok, issued == checked, "token {issued} parsed as {checked}");
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}

src/config.rs

@@ -1266,14 +1266,6 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
         err!("`AUTH_REQUEST_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
     }
 
-    if !cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.is_empty() && cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
-        err!("`DUO_CONTEXT_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
-    }
-
-    if !cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.is_empty() && cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
-        err!("`PURGE_INCOMPLETE_SSO_AUTH` is not a valid cron expression")
-    }
-
     if !cfg.disable_admin_token {
         match cfg.admin_token.as_ref() {
             Some(t) if t.starts_with("$argon2") => {
@@ -1430,13 +1422,10 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
     "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic",
     "enable-basic-auth-response",
     "ssh-agent-v2",
-    "windows-desktop-autotype",
-    "windows-desktop-autotype-ga",
     // Key Management Team
-    "biometrics-sdk-ipc",
     "windows-native-credential-sync",
-    "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
     "pm-27278-v2-password-registration",
+    "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
     // Mobile Team
     "pm-34171-card-scanner",
     // Platform Team

src/db/models/cipher.rs

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use crate::{
         },
     },
     error::MapResult,
-    util::{LowerCase, convert_json_key_lcase_first},
+    util::LowerCase,
 };
 use macros::UuidFromParam;
 
@@ -63,9 +63,13 @@ pub struct Cipher {
     pub reprompt: Option<i32>,
 }
 
-/// Whether `data` is a v2 cipher blob, recognized like upstream by a top-level `format_version` key.
+/// Whether `data` is a sealed cipher blob rather than the legacy per-type JSON.
 ///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Vault/Entities/Cipher.cs#L36-L41>
+/// Ciphers of v2 accounts are encrypted as a single blob that carries everything, name included,
+/// and is opaque to us. It is recognized the same way upstream does, by a top-level
+/// `format_version` key that the legacy JSON never has.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/Vault/Entities/Cipher.cs>
 pub fn is_data_blob_encrypted(data: &str) -> bool {
     serde_json::from_str::<Value>(data).is_ok_and(|d| is_blob_value(&d))
 }
@@ -82,8 +86,7 @@ pub enum RepromptType {
 
 /// Local methods
 impl Cipher {
-    /// The name is set when the data is saved, since a blob-encrypted cipher has it inside `data`
-    pub fn new(atype: i32) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(atype: i32, name: String) -> Self {
         let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
 
         Self {
@@ -97,7 +100,7 @@ impl Cipher {
             key: None,
 
             atype,
-            name: String::new(),
+            name,
 
             notes: None,
             fields: None,
@@ -172,8 +175,9 @@ impl Cipher {
     ) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
         use crate::util::{format_date, validate_and_format_date};
 
-        // Parsed once, since `data` can be large and this runs for every cipher in a sync
-        let type_data = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&self.data);
+        // Parsed once here, since `data` can be large and this runs for every cipher in a sync.
+        // `LowerCase` only lowercases the first letter of each key, so it keeps `format_version`.
+        let type_data = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data).map(|d| d.data);
         let is_blob_encrypted = type_data.as_ref().is_ok_and(is_blob_value);
 
         let mut attachments_json: Value = Value::Null;
@@ -211,70 +215,62 @@ impl Cipher {
             (false, false, false)
         };
 
-        let fields_json: Vec<_> = self
-            .fields
-            .as_ref()
-            .and_then(|s| {
-                serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
-                    .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing fields {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
-                    .ok()
-            })
-            .map(|d| {
-                d.into_iter()
-                    .map(|mut f| {
-                        // Check if the `type` key is a number, strings break some clients
-                        // The fallback type is the hidden type `1`. this should prevent accidental data disclosure
-                        // If not try to convert the string value to a number and fallback to `1`
-                        // If it is both not a number and not a string, fallback to `1`
-                        match f.data.get("type") {
-                            Some(t) if t.is_number() => {}
-                            Some(t) if t.is_string() => {
-                                let type_num = &t.as_str().unwrap_or("1").parse::<u8>().unwrap_or(1);
-                                f.data["type"] = json!(type_num);
+        // Like upstream, a cipher that was stored without fields or password history reports them as
+        // null rather than as an empty list; clients keep the two apart.
+        let fields_json: Option<Vec<_>> = self.fields.as_ref().map(|s| {
+            serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
+                .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing fields {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
+                .ok()
+                .map(|d| {
+                    d.into_iter()
+                        .map(|mut f| {
+                            // Check if the `type` key is a number, strings break some clients
+                            // The fallback type is the hidden type `1`. this should prevent accidental data disclosure
+                            // If not try to convert the string value to a number and fallback to `1`
+                            // If it is both not a number and not a string, fallback to `1`
+                            match f.data.get("type") {
+                                Some(t) if t.is_number() => {}
+                                Some(t) if t.is_string() => {
+                                    let type_num = &t.as_str().unwrap_or("1").parse::<u8>().unwrap_or(1);
+                                    f.data["type"] = json!(type_num);
+                                }
+                                _ => {
+                                    f.data["type"] = json!(1);
+                                }
                             }
-                            _ => {
-                                f.data["type"] = json!(1);
-                            }
-                        }
-                        f.data
-                    })
-                    .collect()
-            })
-            .unwrap_or_default();
+                            f.data
+                        })
+                        .collect()
+                })
+                .unwrap_or_default()
+        });
 
-        let password_history_json: Vec<_> = self
-            .password_history
-            .as_ref()
-            .and_then(|s| {
-                serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
-                    .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing password history {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
-                    .ok()
-            })
-            .map(|d| {
-                // Check every password history item if they are valid and return it.
-                // If a password field has the type `null` skip it, it breaks newer Bitwarden clients
-                // A second check is done to verify the lastUsedDate exists and is a valid DateTime string, if not the epoch start time will be used
-                d.into_iter()
-                    .filter_map(|d| match d.data.get("password") {
-                        Some(p) if p.is_string() => Some(d.data),
-                        _ => None,
-                    })
-                    .map(|mut d| {
-                        let lud = if let Some(l) = d.get("lastUsedDate").and_then(|l| l.as_str()) {
-                            validate_and_format_date(l)
-                        } else {
-                            "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z".to_owned()
-                        };
-                        d["lastUsedDate"] = json!(lud);
-                        d
-                    })
-                    .collect()
-            })
-            .unwrap_or_default();
-
-        // Like upstream, fields and password history stored as NULL are sent as null, not `[]`
-        let fields_json = self.fields.is_some().then_some(fields_json);
-        let password_history_json = self.password_history.is_some().then_some(password_history_json);
+        let password_history_json: Option<Vec<_>> = self.password_history.as_ref().map(|s| {
+            serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
+                .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing password history {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
+                .ok()
+                .map(|d| {
+                    // Check every password history item if they are valid and return it.
+                    // If a password field has the type `null` skip it, it breaks newer Bitwarden clients
+                    // A second check is done to verify the lastUsedDate exists and is a valid DateTime string, if not the epoch start time will be used
+                    d.into_iter()
+                        .filter_map(|d| match d.data.get("password") {
+                            Some(p) if p.is_string() => Some(d.data),
+                            _ => None,
+                        })
+                        .map(|mut d| {
+                            let lud = if let Some(l) = d.get("lastUsedDate").and_then(|l| l.as_str()) {
+                                validate_and_format_date(l)
+                            } else {
+                                "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z".to_owned()
+                            };
+                            d["lastUsedDate"] = json!(lud);
+                            d
+                        })
+                        .collect()
+                })
+                .unwrap_or_default()
+        });
 
         let collection_ids = if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
             if let Some(cipher_collections) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_collections.get(&self.uuid) {
@@ -372,7 +368,8 @@ impl Cipher {
         };
 
         if is_blob_encrypted {
-            // Like upstream, sent as-is with the structured fields null
+            // The blob holds all of the content, so it is sent back as-is and the structured fields
+            // stay null, as upstream does. Only the name needs clearing, the others are never stored.
             json_object["data"] = json!(self.data);
             json_object["name"] = Value::Null;
         } else {
@@ -381,18 +378,16 @@ impl Cipher {
         Ok(json_object)
     }
 
-    /// The per-type data of a legacy cipher, with fixups for values known to break clients.
+    /// The per-type data (`login`, `card`, …) of a legacy cipher, from `type_data` as parsed from
+    /// `self.data`, with fixups for values that are known to break clients.
     fn legacy_type_data_json(&self, type_data: Result<Value, serde_json::Error>) -> Value {
         use crate::util::validate_and_format_date;
 
         // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
         // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
-        let mut type_data_json = if let Ok(data @ Value::Object(_)) = type_data {
-            convert_json_key_lcase_first(data)
-        } else {
-            warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid);
-            Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new())
-        };
+        let mut type_data_json = type_data
+            .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid))
+            .unwrap_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()));
 
         // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
         // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.

src/db/models/org_policy.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
 use derive_more::{AsRef, From};
 use diesel::prelude::*;
 use serde::Deserialize;
@@ -12,7 +11,6 @@ use crate::{
         schema::{org_policies, users_organizations},
     },
     error::MapResult,
-    util::format_date,
 };
 
 use super::{Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrganizationId, TwoFactor, UserId};
@@ -26,7 +24,6 @@ pub struct OrgPolicy {
     pub atype: i32,
     pub enabled: bool,
     pub data: String,
-    pub revision_date: NaiveDateTime,
 }
 
 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Core/AdminConsole/Enums/PolicyType.cs
@@ -49,7 +46,7 @@ pub enum OrgPolicyType {
     RemoveUnlockWithPin = 14,
     RestrictedItemTypes = 15,
     UriMatchDefaults = 16,
-    AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17,
+    // AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17, // Not supported yet
     // AutoConfirm = 18, // Not supported (not implemented yet)
     // BlockClaimedDomainAccountCreation = 19, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
     OrganizationUserNotification = 20,
@@ -80,7 +77,6 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
             atype: atype as i32,
             enabled,
             data,
-            revision_date: Utc::now().naive_utc(),
         }
     }
 
@@ -96,7 +92,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
             "type": self.atype,
             "data": data_json,
             "enabled": self.enabled,
-            "revisionDate": format_date(&self.revision_date),
+            "revisionDate": null,
             "object": "policy",
         });
 
@@ -114,13 +110,11 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
 
 /// Database methods
 impl OrgPolicy {
-    pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        self.revision_date = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-
+    pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
         db_run! { conn:
             sqlite, mysql {
                 match diesel::replace_into(org_policies::table)
-                    .values(&*self)
+                    .values(self)
                     .execute(conn)
                 {
                     Ok(_) => Ok(()),
@@ -128,7 +122,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
                     Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
                         diesel::update(org_policies::table)
                             .filter(org_policies::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
-                            .set(&*self)
+                            .set(self)
                             .execute(conn)
                             .map_res("Error saving org_policy")
                     }
@@ -148,10 +142,10 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
                 .map_res("Error deleting org_policy for insert")?;
 
                 diesel::insert_into(org_policies::table)
-                    .values(&*self)
+                    .values(self)
                     .on_conflict(org_policies::uuid)
                     .do_update()
-                    .set(&*self)
+                    .set(self)
                     .execute(conn)
                     .map_res("Error saving org_policy")
             }

src/db/models/two_factor.rs

@@ -137,11 +137,11 @@ impl TwoFactor {
         .await
     }
 
-    pub async fn find_by_user_and_type(user_uuid: &UserId, atype: TwoFactorType, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
+    pub async fn find_by_user_and_type(user_uuid: &UserId, atype: i32, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
         conn.run(move |conn| {
             twofactor::table
                 .filter(twofactor::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
-                .filter(twofactor::atype.eq(atype as i32))
+                .filter(twofactor::atype.eq(atype))
                 .first::<Self>(conn)
                 .ok()
         })

src/db/models/user.rs

@@ -73,7 +73,8 @@ pub struct User {
 
     pub key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 
-    // The v2 state: all set, with a `user_signature_key_pairs` row, or none, see `User::is_v2`
+    // "v2" account cryptographic state. Either all of these are set (together with a row in
+    // `user_signature_key_pairs`) or none of them are; see `User::is_v2`.
     pub signed_public_key: Option<String>,
     pub security_state: Option<String>,
     pub security_version: Option<i32>,
@@ -184,10 +185,6 @@ impl User {
         )
     }
 
-    pub fn master_password_salt(&self) -> String {
-        self.email.trim().to_lowercase()
-    }
-
     pub fn check_valid_recovery_code(&self, recovery_code: &str) -> bool {
         if let Some(ref totp_recover) = self.totp_recover {
             crypto::ct_eq(recovery_code, totp_recover.to_lowercase())
@@ -286,35 +283,34 @@ impl User {
         UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await
     }
 
-    /// The `accountKeys` object (upstream's `PrivateKeysResponseModel`), null without a key pair
     pub async fn account_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
-        if self.private_key.is_some() {
-            let (signed_public_key, signature_key_pair, security_state) = match self.v2_signature_key_pair(conn).await {
-                Some(key_pair) => (
-                    json!(self.signed_public_key),
-                    key_pair.to_json(),
-                    json!({
-                        "securityState": self.security_state,
-                        "securityVersion": self.security_version,
-                    }),
-                ),
-                None => (Value::Null, Value::Null, Value::Null),
-            };
-
-            json!({
-                "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
-                    "wrappedPrivateKey": self.private_key,
-                    "publicKey": self.public_key,
-                    "signedPublicKey": signed_public_key,
-                    "object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair",
-                },
-                "securityState": security_state,
-                "signatureKeyPair": signature_key_pair,
-                "object": "privateKeys"
-            })
-        } else {
-            Value::Null
+        if self.private_key.is_none() {
+            return Value::Null;
         }
+
+        let (signed_public_key, signature_key_pair, security_state) = match self.v2_signature_key_pair(conn).await {
+            Some(key_pair) => (
+                json!(self.signed_public_key),
+                key_pair.to_json(),
+                json!({
+                    "securityState": self.security_state,
+                    "securityVersion": self.security_version,
+                }),
+            ),
+            None => (Value::Null, Value::Null, Value::Null),
+        };
+
+        json!({
+            "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
+                "wrappedPrivateKey": self.private_key,
+                "publicKey": self.public_key,
+                "signedPublicKey": signed_public_key,
+                "object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair",
+            },
+            "signatureKeyPair": signature_key_pair,
+            "securityState": security_state,
+            "object": "privateKeys"
+        })
     }
 
     pub async fn public_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
@@ -616,7 +612,18 @@ pub struct UserId(String);
 )]
 #[deref(forward)]
 #[from(forward)]
-pub struct KeyId(String);
+pub struct KeyId(#[serde(deserialize_with = "deserialize_key_id")] String);
+
+/// Rejects a key id from a request that isn't 16 bytes as lowercase hex, as upstream's `[KeyId]` does.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/KeyId.cs>
+fn deserialize_key_id<'de, D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> Result<String, D::Error> {
+    let key_id = <String as serde::Deserialize>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+    if key_id.len() != 32 || !key_id.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) {
+        return Err(serde::de::Error::custom("Key id must be a 32 character lowercase hex-encoded string."));
+    }
+    Ok(key_id)
+}
 
 impl SsoUser {
     pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {

src/db/models/user_signature_key_pair.rs

@@ -12,9 +12,14 @@ use crate::{
 
 use super::UserId;
 
-/// A user's signature key pair, part of the v2 state, in its own table like upstream.
+/// A user's signature key pair, part of the "v2" account cryptographic state.
 ///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Sql/dbo/KeyManagement/Tables/UserSignatureKeyPair.sql#L1-L15>
+/// Upstream keeps this in its own table rather than as columns on the user, with a unique index on
+/// the user id. The stated intent is to eventually keep superseded key pairs around (an `active`
+/// flag was sketched but not shipped), which is why this is modelled as a row with its own identity
+/// instead of a set of user attributes.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Sql/dbo/KeyManagement/Tables/UserSignatureKeyPair.sql>
 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
 #[diesel(table_name = user_signature_key_pairs)]
 #[diesel(treat_none_as_null = true)]
@@ -33,7 +38,7 @@ pub struct UserSignatureKeyPair {
     pub updated_at: NaiveDateTime,
 }
 
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/KeyManagement/Enums/SignatureAlgorithm.cs#L6-L10>
+/// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Enums/SignatureAlgorithm.cs
 #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
 pub enum SignatureAlgorithm {
     Ed25519 = 0,

src/db/schema.rs

@@ -116,7 +116,6 @@ table! {
         atype -> Integer,
         enabled -> Bool,
         data -> Text,
-        revision_date -> Timestamp,
     }
 }
 

src/static/templates/email/send_emergency_access_invite.html.hbs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Emergency access for {{{grantor_name}}}
     </tr>
     <tr style="margin: 0; font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; color: #333; line-height: 25px; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none;">
        <td class="content-block" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; color: #333; line-height: 25px; margin: 0; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; padding: 0 0 10px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none; text-align: center;" valign="top" align="center">
-          <a data-testid="emergency" href="{{{url}}}"
+          <a href="{{{url}}}"
              clicktracking=off target="_blank" style="color: #ffffff; text-decoration: none; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; border-radius: 5px; background-color: #3c8dbc; border-color: #3c8dbc; border-style: solid; border-width: 10px 20px; margin: 0; font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; line-height: 25px; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none;">
           Become emergency contact
           </a>

src/util.rs

@@ -839,12 +839,6 @@ pub fn parse_experimental_client_feature_flags(
         .collect()
 }
 
-/// Whether the admin enabled this supported client feature flag
-pub fn is_client_feature_flag_enabled(flag: &str) -> bool {
-    parse_experimental_client_feature_flags(&CONFIG.experimental_client_feature_flags(), &FeatureFlagFilter::ValidOnly)
-        .contains_key(flag)
-}
-
 /// TODO: This is extracted from IpAddr::is_global, which is unstable:
 /// https://doc.rust-lang.org/nightly/std/net/enum.IpAddr.html#method.is_global
 /// Remove once https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/27709 is merged