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-4
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@@ -394,15 +394,11 @@
## - "pm-5594-safari-account-switching": Enable account switching in Safari. (Safari >= 2026.2.0)
## - "pm-32413-multi-client-password-management": Enable changing the master password directly in the client. (Desktop/Extension >= 2026.4.0)
## - "ssh-agent-v2": Enable newer SSH agent support. (Desktop >= 2026.2.1)
## - "windows-desktop-autotype": Enable the autotype feature preview on Windows. (Desktop >= 2025.8.0)
## - "windows-desktop-autotype-ga": Enable the new, still in development, autotype implementation on Windows. (Desktop >= 2026.9.1)
## Only enable one of the two autotype flags, the clients disable autotype completely when both are enabled.
## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins":
## - "pm-32009-new-item-types": Enable new item types: Bank Account, Driver's License, and Passport (Clients >= 2026.4.0)
## - "pm-34171-card-scanner": Enable the new card scanner feature on mobile (Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.4.1)
## - "enable-basic-auth-response": Enable HTTP Basic Auth autofill in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.9.0)
## - "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic": Enable the rewritten add/update login notification triggering logic in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.2.0)
## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
# EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=
## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.
+2 -3
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@@ -14,9 +14,8 @@ extend-ignore-re = [
# In SMTP it's called HELO, so ignore it
"(?i)helo_name",
"Server name sent during.+HELO",
# COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption, ignore these specific items
"COSEKey",
"COSEAlgorithm",
# COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
"(?i)cose",
# Ignore this specific string as it's valid
"Ensure they are valid OTPs",
# This word is misspelled upstream
+1 -1
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@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1.0.151"
# A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
diesel = { version = "2.3.13", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
diesel = { version = "2.3.13", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric", "64-column-tables"] }
diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"
derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
+2 -2
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@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
---
vault_version: "v2026.8.0"
vault_image_digest: "sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a"
vault_version: "v2026.7.0"
vault_image_digest: "sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c"
# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.9.0
# We use the linux/amd64 platform shell scripts since there is no difference between the different platform scripts
# https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx | https://hub.docker.com/r/tonistiigi/xx/tags
+6 -6
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@@ -19,15 +19,15 @@
# - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
# click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
# - From the command line:
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
#
# - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
#
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault
########################## ALPINE BUILD IMAGES ##########################
## NOTE: The Alpine Base Images do not support other platforms then linux/amd64 and linux/arm64
+6 -6
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@@ -19,15 +19,15 @@
# - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
# click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
# - From the command line:
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
#
# - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
#
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault
########################## Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts ##########################
## We use the linux/amd64 no matter which Build Platform, since these are all bash scripts
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY (user_uuid) REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE
);
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-- DATETIME (not TIMESTAMP) to match this repo's convention for revision_date
-- columns elsewhere, and to avoid MySQL's implicit session-timezone
-- conversion and 2038 range limit on TIMESTAMP.
ALTER TABLE org_policies
ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = UTC_TIMESTAMP();
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
updated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL
);
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-- Backfill via `now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc'` rather than a DEFAULT of now():
-- assigning timestamptz now() into a naive TIMESTAMP column casts through
-- the server's TimeZone GUC, so a DEFAULT now() would store local wall-clock
-- instead of UTC on non-UTC servers, unlike every other naive-UTC timestamp
-- column in this schema.
ALTER TABLE org_policies
ADD COLUMN revision_date TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = (now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc');
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
uuid TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
user_uuid TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL
);
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-- SQLite forbids non-constant defaults in ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN, so add
-- the column with a constant placeholder and backfill separately.
ALTER TABLE org_policies
ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP;
Whitespace-only changes.
+2 -2
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@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
This allows running integration tests using [Playwright](https://playwright.dev/).
\
It uses its own [test.env](./test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.
It usse its own [test.env](/test/scenarios/test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.
## Install
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker compose --profile playwright --env-file test.env run Pl
### Keep services running
If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak running (states are not impacted by the tests):
If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak runnning (states are not impacted by the tests):
```bash
PW_KEEP_SERVICE_RUNNING=true npx playwright test
-131
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@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
import { test, expect, type Page, type TestInfo, Test } from '@playwright/test';
import { MailDev } from 'maildev';
import * as utils from "../global-utils";
import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
import { activateTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
let users = utils.loadEnv();
let mailserver;
test.beforeAll('Setup', async ({ browser }, testInfo: TestInfo) => {
mailserver = new MailDev({
port: process.env.MAILDEV_SMTP_PORT,
web: { port: process.env.MAILDEV_HTTP_PORT },
})
await mailserver.listen();
await utils.startVault(browser, testInfo, {
SMTP_HOST: process.env.MAILDEV_HOST,
SMTP_FROM: process.env.PW_SMTP_FROM,
});
});
test.afterAll('Teardown', async ({}) => {
utils.stopVault();
if( mailserver ){
await mailserver.close();
}
});
async function emergencyAccess(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string }) {
await test.step('Navigate', async () => {
await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Emergency access' }).click();
await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Emergency access', { exact: true })).toBeVisible();
});
}
test('Emergency access', async ({ browser, page }) => {
const context2 = await browser.newContext();
const page2 = await context2.newPage();
const mailBuffer = mailserver.buffer(users.user1.email);
const mailBuffer2 = mailserver.buffer(users.user2.email);
await createAccount(test, page, users.user1);
await createAccount(test, page2, users.user2);
await test.step('Add test2', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add emergency contact' }).click();
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email * (required)' }).fill(users.user2.email);
await page.getByRole('radio', { name: 'Takeover Can reset your' }).check();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'User(s) invited');
});
await test.step('Accept', async () => {
const email = await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access for " + users.user1.name);
const pageE = await context2.newPage();
await pageE.setContent(email.html);
const link = await pageE.getByTestId("emergency").getAttribute("href");
await pageE.close();
await page2.goto(link);
await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Invitation accepted');
});
await test.step('Confirm', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Needs confirmation')).toBeVisible();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page, users.user2.name + ' confirmed');
await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access contact for " + users.user1.name + " confirmed");
});
await test.step('Request', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Emergency access requested');
await mailBuffer.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request by " + users.user2.name + " initiated");
});
await test.step('Approved', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access approved');
await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request for " + users.user1.name + " approved");
});
await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
let newPassword = "TotoNewPassword";
await test.step('Access', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Takeover' }).click();
await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'New master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(newPassword);
await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Confirm new master password' }).fill(newPassword);
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Password reset for ' + users.user1.name);
});
await test.step('Changed no 2fa', async () => {
users.user1.password = newPassword;
await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
});
await test.step('Reject', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Reject' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access rejected');
await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request to " + users.user1.name + " rejected");
});
await test.step('Remove', async () => {
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Remove' }).click();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Yes' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Removed user ' + users.user2.name);
await expect(page.getByText('You have not added any emergency contacts')).toBeVisible();
});
});
+8 -29
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@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
import * as utils from "../global-utils";
import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP, recoveryCodes } from './setups/2fa';
import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
let users = utils.loadEnv();
let totp;
@@ -31,42 +31,21 @@ test('Authenticator 2fa', async ({ page }) => {
await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
await logUser(test, page, users.user1, { totp });
await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
});
test('Recovery codes', async ({ context, page }) => {
await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
let recovery = await recoveryCodes(test, page, users.user1);
await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
await test.step('login', async () => {
let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
await page.getByLabel(/Email address/).fill(users.user1.email);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(users.user1.password);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate({timestamp}));
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
await expect(page).toHaveTitle(/Vaultwarden Web/);
const newPagePromise = context.waitForEvent('page');
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Use your recovery code' }).click();
const newPage = await newPagePromise;
const tabs = context.pages();
await tabs[1].bringToFront();
await expect(tabs[1].getByRole('heading', { name: 'Recover account two-step login' })).toBeVisible();
await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email address * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.email);
await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.password);
await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Recovery code * (required)' }).fill(recovery);
await tabs[1].getByRole('button', { name: 'Submit' }).click();
await expect(tabs[1]).toHaveTitle(/Two-step login/);
});
});
await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
});
+1 -18
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@@ -4,24 +4,6 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
export async function recoveryCodes(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): string {
return await test.step('Recovery code', async () => {
await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Security' }).click();
await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Two-step login' }).click();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'View recovery code' }).click();
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
const recovery = await page.getByRole('code').innerText();
await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
return recovery;
})
}
export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): OTPAuth.TOTP {
return await test.step('Activate TOTP 2FA', async () => {
await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
@@ -39,6 +21,7 @@ export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string,
await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate());
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Turn on' }).click();
await page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Turned on', exact: true });
await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
return totp;
})
+2 -16
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@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import { expect, type Browser, Page } from '@playwright/test';
import { type MailBuffer } from 'maildev';
import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
import { retrieveEmailCode } from './2fa';
@@ -44,7 +43,6 @@ export async function logUser(
mailBuffer ?: MailBuffer,
mail2fa?: boolean,
notNewDevice?: boolean,
totp?: OTPAuth.TOTP,
} = {}
) {
await test.step(`Log user ${user.email}`, async () => {
@@ -57,23 +55,11 @@ export async function logUser(
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();
if( options.mail2fa || options.totp ){
let code;
if( options.mail2fa ){
await test.step('2FA check', async () => {
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
if( options.totp ) {
const totp = options.totp;
let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
code = totp.generate({timestamp});
} else if( options.mail2fa ){
code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
}
let code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(code);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
});
}
+410 -99
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@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ use crate::{
models::{
AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, Cipher, CipherId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest,
EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EventType, Folder, FolderId, Invitation, KeyId, Membership,
MembershipId, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationId, Send, SendId, User, UserId,
UserKdfType,
MembershipId, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationId, Send, SendId, SignatureAlgorithm,
User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserSignatureKeyPair,
},
},
mail,
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<rocket::Route> {
post_profile,
put_avatar,
get_public_keys,
get_account_public_keys,
get_keys,
post_keys,
post_password,
@@ -93,15 +94,6 @@ pub struct KDFData {
kdf_parallelism: Option<i32>,
}
impl KDFData {
pub(super) fn matches_user(&self, user: &User) -> bool {
self.kdf == user.client_kdf_type
&& self.kdf_iterations == user.client_kdf_iter
&& self.kdf_memory == user.client_kdf_memory
&& self.kdf_parallelism == user.client_kdf_parallelism
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct RegisterData {
@@ -113,6 +105,9 @@ pub struct RegisterData {
#[serde(alias = "userAsymmetricKeys")]
keys: Option<KeysData>,
// Supersedes `keys`, and the only way a v2 account can be registered.
account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>,
master_password_hint: Option<String>,
organization_user_id: Option<MembershipId>,
@@ -124,36 +119,6 @@ pub struct RegisterData {
org_invite_token: Option<String>,
}
impl RegisterData {
fn hash(&self) -> String {
self.compat.fold(|rdc| &rdc.master_password_hash, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_authentication.hash).to_owned()
}
fn kdf(&self) -> &KDFData {
self.compat.fold(|rdc| &rdc.kdf, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_authentication.kdf)
}
fn key(&self) -> String {
self.compat.fold(|rdc| &rdc.key, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_unlock.key).to_owned()
}
// When comparing with salt, email need to be normalized:
// - https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/web-v2026.5.0/libs/common/src/key-management/master-password/services/master-password.service.ts#L171
fn unprocessable(&self) -> bool {
let mut unprocessable = false;
*self.compat.fold(
|_| &false,
|rdcu| {
let email = self.email.trim().to_lowercase();
unprocessable = rdcu.master_password_authentication.kdf != rdcu.master_password_unlock.kdf
|| rdcu.master_password_authentication.salt != email
|| rdcu.master_password_unlock.salt != email;
&unprocessable
},
)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct RegisterDataOld {
#[serde(flatten)]
@@ -193,6 +158,42 @@ impl RegisterDataCompat {
RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataCur(rdcu) => fcu(rdcu),
}
}
fn hash(&self) -> String {
self.fold(|rdc| &rdc.master_password_hash, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_authentication.hash).to_owned()
}
fn kdf(&self) -> &KDFData {
self.fold(|rdc| &rdc.kdf, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_authentication.kdf)
}
fn key(&self) -> String {
self.fold(|rdc| &rdc.key, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_unlock.key).to_owned()
}
/// The id of the user key, which only the current format carries.
fn key_id(&self) -> Option<KeyId> {
match self {
RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataOld(_) => None,
RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataCur(rdcu) => rdcu.master_password_unlock.contained_key_id.clone(),
}
}
// When comparing with salt, email need to be normalized:
// - https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/web-v2026.5.0/libs/common/src/key-management/master-password/services/master-password.service.ts#L171
fn unprocessable(&self, email: &str) -> bool {
let mut unprocessable = false;
*self.fold(
|_| &false,
|rdcu| {
let email = email.trim().to_lowercase();
unprocessable = rdcu.master_password_authentication.kdf != rdcu.master_password_unlock.kdf
|| rdcu.master_password_authentication.salt != email
|| rdcu.master_password_unlock.salt != email;
&unprocessable
},
)
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -202,6 +203,198 @@ struct KeysData {
public_key: String,
}
/// Upstream's implicit `[Required]` on a non-nullable string: present and not blank.
fn required(value: Option<String>, field: &str) -> ApiResult<String> {
match value {
Some(value) if !value.trim().is_empty() => Ok(value),
_ => err!(format!("The {field} field is required.")),
}
}
/// The `accountKeys` payload: a v1 key pair, or v2 with a signature key pair and security state.
///
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Api/Request/AccountKeysRequestModel.cs#L6-L50>
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct AccountKeysData {
// Required like upstream, but only used without `public_key_encryption_key_pair`
user_key_encrypted_account_private_key: Option<String>,
account_public_key: Option<String>,
public_key_encryption_key_pair: Option<PublicKeyEncryptionKeyPairData>,
signature_key_pair: Option<SignatureKeyPairData>,
security_state: Option<SecurityStateData>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct PublicKeyEncryptionKeyPairData {
wrapped_private_key: String,
public_key: String,
signed_public_key: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct SignatureKeyPairData {
signature_algorithm: String,
wrapped_signing_key: String,
verifying_key: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct SecurityStateData {
security_state: String,
security_version: i32,
}
struct ValidatedAccountKeys {
private_key: String,
public_key: String,
v2: Option<ValidatedV2AccountKeys>,
}
struct ValidatedV2AccountKeys {
signed_public_key: String,
signing_key: String,
verifying_key: String,
signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
security_state: String,
security_version: i32,
}
impl AccountKeysData {
/// Upstream's model checks, plus the v2 fields all or none: no client can unlock a partial v2 state.
fn validate(self) -> ApiResult<ValidatedAccountKeys> {
let top_private_key =
required(self.user_key_encrypted_account_private_key, "UserKeyEncryptedAccountPrivateKey")?;
let top_public_key = required(self.account_public_key, "AccountPublicKey")?;
let (private_key, public_key, signed_public_key) = match self.public_key_encryption_key_pair {
Some(key_pair) => (
required(Some(key_pair.wrapped_private_key), "WrappedPrivateKey")?,
required(Some(key_pair.public_key), "PublicKey")?,
key_pair.signed_public_key,
),
// Older clients only send the top-level fields, which are always v1
None => (top_private_key, top_public_key, None),
};
if let Some(signature_key_pair) = &self.signature_key_pair {
required(Some(signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm.clone()), "SignatureAlgorithm")?;
required(Some(signature_key_pair.wrapped_signing_key.clone()), "WrappedSigningKey")?;
required(Some(signature_key_pair.verifying_key.clone()), "VerifyingKey")?;
}
if let Some(security_state) = &self.security_state {
required(Some(security_state.security_state.clone()), "SecurityState")?;
if security_state.security_state.encode_utf16().count() > 10_000 {
err!("The field SecurityState must be a string with a maximum length of 10000.")
}
}
let v2 = match (signed_public_key, self.signature_key_pair, self.security_state) {
(Some(signed_public_key), Some(signature_key_pair), Some(security_state)) => {
// Upstream fails on a null one, but takes an empty one that no client can unlock with
let signed_public_key = required(Some(signed_public_key), "SignedPublicKey")?;
let Some(signature_algorithm) = SignatureAlgorithm::parse(&signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm)
else {
err!(format!(
"Unsupported signature algorithm: {}",
signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm.escape_debug()
))
};
Some(ValidatedV2AccountKeys {
signed_public_key,
signing_key: signature_key_pair.wrapped_signing_key,
verifying_key: signature_key_pair.verifying_key,
signature_algorithm,
security_state: security_state.security_state,
security_version: security_state.security_version,
})
}
(None, None, None) => None,
_ => err!(
"Invalid account keys: the signed public key, signature key pair and security state must either all be present or all be absent"
),
};
Ok(ValidatedAccountKeys {
private_key,
public_key,
v2,
})
}
}
impl From<KeysData> for ValidatedAccountKeys {
fn from(keys: KeysData) -> Self {
Self {
private_key: keys.encrypted_private_key,
public_key: keys.public_key,
v2: None,
}
}
}
impl ValidatedAccountKeys {
/// The keys of a registration: `accountKeys` only for a v2 account, like upstream.
///
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Auth/Models/Api/Request/Accounts/RegisterFinishRequestModel.cs#L77-L100>
fn for_registration(account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>, keys: Option<KeysData>) -> ApiResult<Self> {
if let Some(account_keys) = account_keys {
let account_keys = account_keys.validate()?;
if account_keys.is_v2() {
return Ok(account_keys);
}
}
let Some(keys) = keys else {
err!("PublicKey and WrappedPrivateKey not found in RequestModel")
};
Ok(keys.into())
}
fn is_v2(&self) -> bool {
self.v2.is_some()
}
/// Sets the keys on the user, which then needs saving before [`Self::save_signature_key_pair`].
fn apply(&self, user: &mut User) -> EmptyResult {
user.private_key = Some(self.private_key.clone());
user.public_key = Some(self.public_key.clone());
user.signed_public_key = self.v2.as_ref().map(|v2| v2.signed_public_key.clone());
user.security_state = self.v2.as_ref().map(|v2| v2.security_state.clone());
user.security_version = self.v2.as_ref().map(|v2| v2.security_version);
Ok(())
}
/// Saves the signature key pair, which needs the user to exist for its foreign key.
async fn save_signature_key_pair(&self, user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
// Skip if the account is v1, since v1 accounts don't have a signature key pair.
let Some(v2) = &self.v2 else {
return Ok(());
};
let mut key_pair = match UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(user_id, conn).await {
Some(mut key_pair) => {
key_pair.signature_algorithm = v2.signature_algorithm as i32;
key_pair.signing_key.clone_from(&v2.signing_key);
key_pair.verifying_key.clone_from(&v2.verifying_key);
key_pair
}
None => UserSignatureKeyPair::new(
user_id.clone(),
v2.signature_algorithm,
v2.signing_key.clone(),
v2.verifying_key.clone(),
),
};
key_pair.save(conn).await
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct MasterPasswordAuthentication {
@@ -222,17 +415,19 @@ pub struct MasterPasswordUnlock {
#[serde(alias = "masterKeyWrappedUserKey")]
key: String,
contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct SetPasswordData {
#[serde(flatten)]
kdf: KDFData,
compat: RegisterDataCompat,
key: String,
keys: Option<KeysData>,
master_password_hash: String,
// Supersedes `keys`, and the only way a v2 account can be initialized here.
account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>,
master_password_hint: Option<String>,
org_identifier: Option<String>,
}
@@ -274,7 +469,7 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let mut name = None;
let mut pending_emergency_access = None;
if data.unprocessable() {
if data.compat.unprocessable(&data.email) {
err_code!("Unexpected RegisterData format", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
}
@@ -343,10 +538,11 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
err!("The field Name must be a string with a maximum length of 50.");
}
// Check against the password hint setting here so if it fails, the user
// can retry without losing their invitation below.
// Check against the password hint setting and the keys here so if they fail,
// the user can retry without losing their invitation below.
let password_hint = clean_password_hint(data.master_password_hint.as_ref());
enforce_password_hint_setting(password_hint.as_ref())?;
let account_keys = ValidatedAccountKeys::for_registration(data.account_keys, data.keys)?;
let mut user = match User::find_by_mail(&email, &conn).await {
Some(user) => {
@@ -393,9 +589,9 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
// Make sure we don't leave a lingering invitation.
Invitation::take(&email, &conn).await;
set_kdf_data(&mut user, data.kdf())?;
set_kdf_data(&mut user, data.compat.kdf())?;
user.set_password(&data.hash(), Some(data.key()), true, None, &conn).await?;
user.set_password(&data.compat.hash(), Some(data.compat.key()), true, None, &conn).await?;
user.password_hint = password_hint;
// Add extra fields if present
@@ -403,9 +599,10 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
user.name = name;
}
if let Some(keys) = data.keys {
user.private_key = Some(keys.encrypted_private_key);
user.public_key = Some(keys.public_key);
account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
// Like upstream, only a v2 registration records the key id; v1 accounts report it through `user-key-id`
if account_keys.is_v2() {
user.key_id = data.compat.key_id();
}
if email_verified {
@@ -428,6 +625,7 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
}
user.save(&conn).await?;
account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
// accept any open emergency access invitations
if !CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.emergency_access_allowed() {
@@ -441,25 +639,81 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
})))
}
/// Upstream's shape checks of the set-password body, on the raw JSON that the untagged compat would hide.
///
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Auth/Models/Request/Accounts/SetInitialPasswordRequestModel.cs#L75-L106>
fn validate_set_password_shape(body: &Value) -> EmptyResult {
let has = |name: &str| {
body.as_object().is_some_and(|o| o.iter().any(|(k, v)| k.eq_ignore_ascii_case(name) && !v.is_null()))
};
if has("accountKeys") && has("keys") {
err!("Cannot specify both AccountKeys and Keys. Provide exactly one keypair.")
}
let (authentication, unlock) = (has("masterPasswordAuthentication"), has("masterPasswordUnlock"));
if authentication != unlock {
err!(
"Must provide both MasterPasswordAuthentication and MasterPasswordUnlock together. Cannot provide one without the other."
)
}
if authentication && (has("masterPasswordHash") || has("key") || has("kdf")) {
err!(
"Cannot mix modern (MasterPasswordAuthentication/MasterPasswordUnlock) and legacy (MasterPasswordHash/Key/Kdf) fields. Provide one shape or the other."
)
}
Ok(())
}
#[post("/accounts/set-password", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_set_password(data: Json<SetPasswordData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: SetPasswordData = data.into_inner();
async fn post_set_password(data: Json<Value>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data = data.into_inner();
validate_set_password_shape(&data)?;
let Ok(data) = serde_json::from_value::<SetPasswordData>(data) else {
err_code!("Unexpected SetPasswordData format", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code)
};
if data.master_password_hint.as_ref().is_some_and(|h| h.encode_utf16().count() > 50) {
err!("The field MasterPasswordHint must be a string with a maximum length of 50.")
}
let mut user = headers.user;
if user.private_key.is_some() || !user.password_hash.is_empty() {
err!("Account already initialized, cannot set password")
}
if data.compat.unprocessable(&user.email) {
err_code!("Unexpected SetPasswordData format", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
}
// Check against the password hint setting here so if it fails,
// the user can retry without losing their invitation below.
let password_hint = clean_password_hint(data.master_password_hint.as_ref());
enforce_password_hint_setting(password_hint.as_ref())?;
set_kdf_data(&mut user, &data.kdf)?;
// Like upstream, `accountKeys` only through the v2 JIT flow
// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Auth/Controllers/AccountsController.cs#L314-L359>
let account_keys = match data.account_keys {
Some(account_keys) => {
if !matches!(data.compat, RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataCur(_))
|| !crate::util::is_client_feature_flag_enabled(
"enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
)
{
err!("Request includes V2 AccountKeys but V2 encryption is not enabled.")
}
let account_keys = account_keys.validate()?;
if !account_keys.is_v2() {
err!("AccountKeys are only supported for V2 encryption.")
}
Some(account_keys)
}
None => data.keys.map(ValidatedAccountKeys::from),
};
set_kdf_data(&mut user, data.compat.kdf())?;
user.set_password(
&data.master_password_hash,
Some(data.key),
&data.compat.hash(),
Some(data.compat.key()),
false,
Some(vec![String::from("revision_date")]), // We need to allow revision-date to use the old security_timestamp
&conn,
@@ -467,9 +721,12 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<SetPasswordData>, headers: Headers, conn:
.await?;
user.password_hint = password_hint;
if let Some(keys) = data.keys {
user.private_key = Some(keys.encrypted_private_key);
user.public_key = Some(keys.public_key);
if let Some(ref account_keys) = account_keys {
account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
// As in `register`, only a v2 account records the user key id here
if account_keys.is_v2() {
user.key_id = data.compat.key_id();
}
}
if let Some(identifier) = data.org_identifier
@@ -493,10 +750,15 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<SetPasswordData>, headers: Headers, conn:
Membership::accept_user_invitations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
}
log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
.await;
user.save(&conn).await?;
if let Some(account_keys) = account_keys {
account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
}
Ok(Json(json!({
"object": "set-password",
})))
@@ -577,8 +839,19 @@ async fn get_public_keys(user_id: UserId, _headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> Js
})))
}
#[get("/users/<user_id>/keys")]
async fn get_account_public_keys(user_id: UserId, _headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let user = match User::find_by_uuid(&user_id, &conn).await {
Some(user) if user.public_key.is_some() => user,
Some(_) => err_code!("User has no public_key", Status::NotFound.code),
None => err_code!("User doesn't exist", Status::NotFound.code),
};
Ok(Json(user.public_keys_json(&conn).await))
}
#[get("/accounts/keys")]
fn get_keys(headers: Headers) -> JsonResult {
async fn get_keys(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let user = headers.user;
// The SDK reads a 404 as the user having no key pair yet
@@ -590,29 +863,66 @@ fn get_keys(headers: Headers) -> JsonResult {
"key": (!user.akey.is_empty()).then_some(&user.akey),
"publicKey": user.public_key,
"privateKey": user.private_key,
"accountKeys": user.account_keys_json(),
"accountKeys": user.account_keys_json(&conn).await,
"object": "keys",
})))
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct PostKeysData {
// Required like upstream, even next to `accountKeys`
public_key: Option<String>,
encrypted_private_key: Option<String>,
account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>,
// The id of the user key these account keys belong to, only honored for v2 `accountKeys`
user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
}
#[post("/accounts/keys", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_keys(data: Json<KeysData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: KeysData = data.into_inner();
async fn post_keys(data: Json<PostKeysData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: PostKeysData = data.into_inner();
let mut user = headers.user;
// Only for an account without keys, replacing them is what a key rotation does
if user.private_key.is_some() || user.public_key.is_some() {
err!("User has existing keypair")
}
user.private_key = Some(data.encrypted_private_key);
user.public_key = Some(data.public_key);
// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Auth/Models/Api/Request/Accounts/KeysRequestModel.cs#L11-L19>
let public_key = required(data.public_key, "PublicKey")?;
let encrypted_private_key = required(data.encrypted_private_key, "EncryptedPrivateKey")?;
// `accountKeys` supersedes the flat keys when both are sent
let account_keys = match data.account_keys {
Some(account_keys) => {
let account_keys = account_keys.validate()?;
if !account_keys.is_v2() {
err!("AccountKeys are only supported for V2 encryption.")
}
// A client that predates key ids sends none, and reports it later through `user-key-id`
if data.user_key_id.is_some() {
user.key_id = data.user_key_id;
}
account_keys
}
None => KeysData {
encrypted_private_key,
public_key,
}
.into(),
};
account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
user.save(&conn).await?;
account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
Ok(Json(json!({
"key": (!user.akey.is_empty()).then_some(&user.akey),
"privateKey": user.private_key,
"publicKey": user.public_key,
"accountKeys": user.account_keys_json(&conn).await,
"object":"keys"
})))
}
@@ -639,7 +949,8 @@ async fn post_password(data: Json<ChangePassData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
err!("Invalid password")
}
log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
.await;
let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) =
if let (Some(unlock_data), Some(authentication_data)) = (data.unlock_data, data.authentication_data) {
@@ -726,35 +1037,21 @@ fn set_kdf_data(user: &mut User, data: &KDFData) -> EmptyResult {
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub(super) struct AuthenticationData {
struct AuthenticationData {
#[serde(alias = "Salt")]
salt: String,
#[serde(alias = "Kdf")]
pub(super) kdf: KDFData,
kdf: KDFData,
#[serde(alias = "MasterPasswordAuthenticationHash")]
pub(super) master_password_authentication_hash: String,
}
impl AuthenticationData {
pub(super) fn check(&self, user: &User, unlock: &UnlockData) -> EmptyResult {
if self.kdf != unlock.kdf {
err!("KDF settings must be equal for authentication and unlock")
}
if self.salt != user.master_password_salt() || self.salt != unlock.salt {
err!("Invalid master password salt")
}
Ok(())
}
master_password_authentication_hash: String,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub(super) struct UnlockData {
struct UnlockData {
salt: String,
kdf: KDFData,
pub(super) master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
}
@@ -786,7 +1083,13 @@ async fn post_kdf(data: Json<ChangeKdfData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
err!("Invalid password")
}
data.authentication_data.check(&headers.user, &data.unlock_data)?;
if data.authentication_data.kdf != data.unlock_data.kdf {
err!("KDF settings must be equal for authentication and unlock")
}
if headers.user.email != data.authentication_data.salt || headers.user.email != data.unlock_data.salt {
err!("Invalid master password salt")
}
validate_key_id_unchanged(&headers.user, &data.unlock_data)?;
@@ -965,6 +1268,14 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json<KeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
err!("Invalid password")
}
// Rotating v2 keys, or upgrading to them, would leave an account that can't be unlocked here
if headers.user.is_v2() {
err!("Key rotation is not supported for v2 accounts")
}
if !data.account_keys.user_key_encrypted_account_private_key.starts_with("2.") {
err!("The provided account private key was not wrapped with AES-256-CBC-HMAC")
}
// Validate the import before continuing
// Bitwarden does not process the import if there is one item invalid.
// Since we check for the size of the encrypted note length, we need to do that here to pre-validate it.
@@ -1712,7 +2023,7 @@ async fn post_auth_request(
nt.send_auth_request(&user.uuid, &auth_request.uuid, &device, &conn).await;
log_user_event(
EventType::UserRequestedDeviceApproval,
EventType::UserRequestedDeviceApproval as i32,
&user.uuid,
client_headers.device_type,
&client_headers.ip.ip,
@@ -1806,7 +2117,7 @@ async fn put_auth_request(
nt.send_auth_response(&auth_request.user_uuid, &auth_request.uuid, &headers.device, &conn).await;
log_user_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserApprovedAuthRequest,
EventType::OrganizationUserApprovedAuthRequest as i32,
&headers.user.uuid,
headers.device.atype,
&headers.ip.ip,
@@ -1817,7 +2128,7 @@ async fn put_auth_request(
// If denied, there's no reason to keep the request
auth_request.delete(&conn).await?;
log_user_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserRejectedAuthRequest,
EventType::OrganizationUserRejectedAuthRequest as i32,
&headers.user.uuid,
headers.device.atype,
&headers.ip.ip,
@@ -1950,10 +2261,10 @@ mod tests {
)
.unwrap();
assert!(!data.unprocessable());
assert_eq!(data.hash(), "hash");
assert_eq!(data.key(), "key");
assert_eq!(data.kdf().kdf_iterations, 600_000);
assert!(!data.compat.unprocessable(&data.email));
assert_eq!(data.compat.hash(), "hash");
assert_eq!(data.compat.key(), "key");
assert_eq!(data.compat.kdf().kdf_iterations, 600_000);
assert!(data.keys.is_some());
assert_eq!(data.email_verification_token.as_deref(), Some("token"));
}
@@ -1975,10 +2286,10 @@ mod tests {
)
.unwrap();
assert!(!data.unprocessable());
assert_eq!(data.hash(), "hash");
assert_eq!(data.key(), "key");
assert_eq!(data.kdf().kdf_iterations, 600_000);
assert!(!data.compat.unprocessable(&data.email));
assert_eq!(data.compat.hash(), "hash");
assert_eq!(data.compat.key(), "key");
assert_eq!(data.compat.kdf().kdf_iterations, 600_000);
assert!(data.keys.is_some());
}
}
+6 -28
View File
@@ -6,10 +6,7 @@ use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult,
core::{
CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType,
accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData},
},
core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType},
},
auth::{Headers, decode_emergency_access_invite},
db::{
@@ -618,7 +615,6 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
"kdfMemory": grantor_user.client_kdf_memory,
"kdfParallelism": grantor_user.client_kdf_parallelism,
"keyEncrypted": &emergency_access.key_encrypted,
"salt": grantor_user.master_password_salt(),
"object": "emergencyAccessTakeover",
});
@@ -628,13 +624,8 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct EmergencyAccessPasswordData {
// Legacy payload
new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
key: Option<String>,
// Current payload
authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
new_master_password_hash: String,
key: String,
}
#[post("/emergency-access/<emer_id>/password", data = "<data>")]
@@ -647,6 +638,8 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
check_emergency_access_enabled()?;
let data: EmergencyAccessPasswordData = data.into_inner();
let new_master_password_hash = &data.new_master_password_hash;
//let key = &data.Key;
let requesting_user = headers.user;
let Some(emergency_access) =
@@ -663,23 +656,8 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
err!("Grantor user not found.")
};
let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) =
if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) = (data.authentication_data, data.unlock_data) {
authentication_data.check(&grantor_user, &unlock_data)?;
if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&grantor_user) {
err!("KDF settings do not match the grantor account")
}
(authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
} else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (data.new_master_password_hash, data.key) {
(new_master_password_hash, new_key)
} else {
err!("Invalid request!")
};
// change grantor_user password
grantor_user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
grantor_user.set_password(new_master_password_hash, Some(data.key), true, None, &conn).await?;
grantor_user.save(&conn).await?;
// Disable TwoFactor providers since they will otherwise block logins
+2 -2
View File
@@ -242,11 +242,11 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
Ok(())
}
pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: EventType, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: i32, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
if !CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
return;
}
log_user_event_impl(event_type as i32, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
log_user_event_impl(event_type, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
}
async fn log_user_event_impl(
+51 -39
View File
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::admin::FAKE_ADMIN_UUID,
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType, accept_org_invite, log_event, two_factor},
},
auth::{AdminHeaders, Headers, ManagerHeaders, ManagerHeadersLoose, OrgMemberHeaders, OwnerHeaders, decode_invite},
@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ use crate::{
util::{NumberOrString, convert_json_key_lcase_first},
};
use super::accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData};
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![
get_organization,
@@ -2753,14 +2751,9 @@ struct OrganizationUserResetPasswordEnrollmentRequest {
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest {
// Legacy payload
new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
key: Option<String>,
// Current payload
authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
#[serde(default)]
reset_master_password: bool,
#[serde(default)]
@@ -2771,8 +2764,26 @@ struct OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest {
// But the clients do not seem to use this at all
// Just add it here in case they will
#[get("/organizations/<org_id>/public-key")]
async fn get_organization_public_key(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
if org_id != headers.membership.org_uuid {
async fn get_organization_public_key(
org_id: OrganizationId,
headers: Headers,
member: Result<OrgMemberHeaders, &'static str>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
// SSO users without an org get the fake one, whose key the v2 JIT password flow fetches anyway
if org_id.eq_ignore_ascii_case(FAKE_SSO_IDENTIFIER) && headers.user.private_key.is_none() {
return Ok(Json(json!({
"object": "organizationPublicKey",
"publicKey": fake_sso_org_public_key().await?,
})));
}
let member = match member {
Ok(member) => member,
// The guard already logged it
Err(e) => return Err(crate::error::Error::new_msg(e).with_code(Status::Unauthorized.code)),
};
if org_id != member.membership.org_uuid {
err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
}
let Some(org) = Organization::find_by_uuid(&org_id, &conn).await else {
@@ -2785,11 +2796,30 @@ async fn get_organization_public_key(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberH
})))
}
/// The SDK only uses this key to wrap an account recovery key that it never sends for the fake org,
/// so it is made once and its private half dropped.
async fn fake_sso_org_public_key() -> ApiResult<String> {
static PUBLIC_KEY: std::sync::LazyLock<Option<String>> = std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
let der = openssl::rsa::Rsa::generate(2048).and_then(|rsa| rsa.public_key_to_der()).ok()?;
Some(data_encoding::BASE64.encode(&der))
});
let Ok(Some(public_key)) = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(|| PUBLIC_KEY.clone()).await else {
err!("Failed to generate the organization key")
};
Ok(public_key)
}
// Obsolete - Renamed to public-key (2023.8), left for backwards compatibility with older clients
// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/AdminConsole/Controllers/OrganizationsController.cs#L487-L492
#[get("/organizations/<org_id>/keys")]
async fn get_organization_keys(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
get_organization_public_key(org_id, headers, conn).await
async fn get_organization_keys(
org_id: OrganizationId,
headers: Headers,
member: Result<OrgMemberHeaders, &'static str>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
get_organization_public_key(org_id, headers, member, conn).await
}
// Will allow to reset 2FA too
@@ -2840,34 +2870,11 @@ async fn recover_account(
let fallback_2fa_email =
if req.reset_two_factor && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.email_2fa_auto_fallback() && user.verified() {
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await.is_none()
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, &conn).await.is_none()
} else {
false
};
// Check the new password before the email below, so that a rejected request doesn't tell the user
// their password was reset
let new_password = if req.reset_master_password {
let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) = if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) =
(req.authentication_data, req.unlock_data)
{
authentication_data.check(&user, &unlock_data)?;
if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&user) {
err!("KDF settings do not match the user account")
}
(authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
} else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (req.new_master_password_hash, req.key) {
(new_master_password_hash, new_key)
} else {
err_code!("Unprocessable request", "Missing fields to reset password", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
};
Some((new_master_password_hash, new_key))
} else {
None
};
// Sending email first ensure working email configuration and the resulting user notification.
// Also this might add some protection against security flaws and misuse
if let Err(e) = mail::send_admin_account_recovery(
@@ -2883,8 +2890,14 @@ async fn recover_account(
err!(format!("Error sending user reset password email: {e:#?}"));
}
if let Some((new_master_password_hash, new_key)) = new_password {
user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
if req.reset_master_password {
if let Some(key) = req.key
&& let Some(hash) = req.new_master_password_hash
{
user.set_password(hash.as_str(), Some(key), true, None, &conn).await?;
} else {
err_code!("Unprocessable request", "Missing fields to reset password", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
}
}
if req.reset_two_factor {
@@ -2943,7 +2956,6 @@ async fn get_reset_password_details(
"kdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
"kdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
"kdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
"masterPasswordSalt": user.master_password_salt(),
"resetPasswordKey": member.reset_password_key,
"encryptedPrivateKey": org.private_key,
})))
+1 -5
View File
@@ -137,13 +137,9 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
if CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() {
for group_data in &data.groups {
let group_uuid = if let Some(mut group) =
let group_uuid = if let Some(group) =
Group::find_by_external_id_and_org(&group_data.external_id, &org_id, &conn).await
{
if group.name != group_data.name {
group.name = group_data.name.clone();
group.save(&conn).await?;
}
group.uuid
} else {
let mut group =
+45 -23
View File
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
use crate::{
api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event, core::two_factor::generate_recover_code},
auth::{ClientIp, Headers, two_factor},
auth::{ClientIp, Headers},
crypto,
db::{
DbConn,
models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
models::{Device, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
},
util::NumberOrString,
};
@@ -20,23 +20,27 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
#[post("/two-factor/get-authenticator", data = "<data>")]
async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
let user = headers.user;
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await;
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32;
let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await;
let (enabled, key) = match twofactor {
Some(tf) => (true, tf.data),
_ => (false, crypto::encode_random_bytes::<20>(&BASE32)),
};
// Upstream seems to also return `userVerificationToken`, but doesn't seem to be used at all.
// It should help prevent TOTP disclosure if someone keeps their vault unlocked.
// Since it doesn't seem to be used, and also does not cause any issues, lets leave it out of the response.
// See: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Auth/Controllers/TwoFactorController.cs#L94
Ok(Json(json!({
"authenticator": json!({
"enabled": enabled,
"key": key,
}),
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::authenticator_token(user.uuid, key, enabled),
"enabled": enabled,
"key": key,
"object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
})))
}
@@ -45,7 +49,8 @@ async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers,
struct EnableAuthenticatorData {
key: String,
token: NumberOrString,
user_verification_token: String,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
}
#[post("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
@@ -56,7 +61,12 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He
let mut user = headers.user;
two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &key, false)?;
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
otp: data.otp,
}
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
// Validate key as base32 and 20 bytes length
let decoded_key: Vec<u8> = if let Ok(decoded) = BASE32.decode(key.as_bytes()) {
@@ -74,13 +84,12 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
Ok(Json(json!({
"authenticator": json!({
"enabled": true,
"key": key,
}),
"enabled": true,
"key": key,
"object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
})))
}
@@ -116,7 +125,8 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
err!("Invalid TOTP secret")
};
let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, conn).await {
let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32, conn).await
{
Some(tf) => tf,
_ => TwoFactor::new(user_id.clone(), TwoFactorType::Authenticator, secret.to_owned()),
};
@@ -174,25 +184,37 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct DisableAuthenticatorData {
key: String,
user_verification_token: String,
master_password_hash: String,
r#type: NumberOrString,
}
#[delete("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let user = headers.user;
let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &data.key, true)?;
if !user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
err!("Invalid password");
}
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await {
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
if twofactor.data == data.key {
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
.await;
} else {
err!(format!("TOTP key for user {} does not match recorded value, cannot deactivate", &user.email));
}
}
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
super::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
}
Ok(())
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": false,
"keys": type_,
"object": "twoFactorProvider"
})))
}
+77 -48
View File
@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ use chrono::Utc;
use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{
ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
core::log_user_event,
core::two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event,
core::two_factor::generate_recover_code,
},
auth::{Headers, two_factor, two_factor::DuoData},
auth::Headers,
crypto,
db::{
DbConn,
@@ -18,7 +18,55 @@ use crate::{
};
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put, disable_duo,]
routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put,]
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct DuoData {
host: String, // Duo API hostname
ik: String, // client id
sk: String, // client secret
}
impl DuoData {
fn global() -> Option<Self> {
match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
(true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
host,
ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
}),
_ => None,
}
}
fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
Self {
host: s.into(),
ik: s.into(),
sk: s.into(),
}
}
fn secret() -> Self {
Self::msg("<global_secret>")
}
fn obscure(self) -> Self {
let mut host = self.host;
let mut ik = self.ik;
let mut sk = self.sk;
let digits = 4;
let replaced = "************";
host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
Self {
host,
ik,
sk,
}
}
}
enum DuoStatus {
@@ -47,19 +95,22 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let (enabled, duo) = match get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await {
let data = get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await;
let (enabled, data) = match data {
DuoStatus::Global(_) => (true, Some(DuoData::secret())),
DuoStatus::User(data) => (true, Some(data.obscure())),
DuoStatus::Disabled(true) => (false, Some(DuoData::msg(DISABLED_MESSAGE_DEFAULT))),
DuoStatus::Disabled(false) => (false, None),
};
let duo_json = if let Some(data) = duo.as_ref() {
let json = if let Some(data) = data {
json!({
"enabled": enabled,
"host": data.host,
"clientSecret": data.sk,
"clientId": data.ik,
"object": "twoFactorDuo"
})
} else {
json!({
@@ -67,13 +118,11 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
"host": null,
"clientSecret": null,
"clientId": null,
"object": "twoFactorDuo"
})
};
Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
"duo": duo_json,
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::duo_token(user.uuid, duo, enabled),
})))
Ok(Json(json))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -82,7 +131,8 @@ struct EnableDuoData {
host: String,
client_secret: String,
client_id: String,
user_verification_token: String,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
}
impl From<EnableDuoData> for DuoData {
@@ -109,7 +159,12 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
let data: EnableDuoData = data.into_inner();
let mut user = headers.user;
two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, None, false)?;
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
otp: data.otp.clone(),
}
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
let (data, data_str) = if check_duo_fields_custom(&data) {
let data_req: DuoData = data.into();
@@ -126,15 +181,14 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
Ok(Json(json!({
"duo": json!({
"enabled": true,
"host": data.host,
"clientSecret": data.sk,
"clientId": data.ik,
}),
"enabled": true,
"host": data.host,
"clientSecret": data.sk,
"clientId": data.ik,
"object": "twoFactorDuo"
})))
}
@@ -143,29 +197,6 @@ async fn activate_duo_put(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
activate_duo(data, headers, conn).await
}
#[delete("/two-factor/duo", data = "<data>")]
async fn disable_duo(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let user = headers.user;
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Duo, &conn).await {
// Apply the same transformation than in `get_duo` to check we are disabling the correct one
let duo = match to_user_duo_data(&twofactor) {
DuoStatus::Global(_) => Some(DuoData::secret()),
DuoStatus::User(data) => Some(data.obscure()),
DuoStatus::Disabled(_) => None,
};
two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, duo.as_ref(), true)?;
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
}
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData) -> EmptyResult {
use reqwest::{Method, header};
use std::str::FromStr;
@@ -191,15 +222,13 @@ async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData)
}
async fn get_user_duo_data(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> DuoStatus {
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Duo as i32;
// If the user doesn't have an entry, disabled
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Duo, conn).await else {
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await else {
return DuoStatus::Disabled(DuoData::global().is_some());
};
to_user_duo_data(&twofactor)
}
fn to_user_duo_data(twofactor: &TwoFactor) -> DuoStatus {
// If the user has the required values, we use those
if let Ok(data) = serde_json::from_str(&twofactor.data) {
return DuoStatus::User(data);
+52 -71
View File
@@ -5,26 +5,20 @@ use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
core::{
log_user_event,
two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
},
core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
},
auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers, two_factor},
auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers},
crypto,
db::{
DbConn,
models::{
AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User,
UserId,
},
models::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, User, UserId},
},
error::{Error, MapResult},
mail,
};
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email, disable_email]
routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email,]
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -97,20 +91,6 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
{
err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "Invalid device, IP or code")
}
} else if let Some(device_identifier) = &data.device_identifier {
// iOS/Android SSO logins send the email and device id but no password hash,
// so accept a device that has a pending 2FA login for this user
if TwoFactorIncomplete::find_by_user_and_device(&user.uuid, device_identifier, &conn).await.is_none() {
err!(
"Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, email.escape_debug())
)
}
debug!(
"Email 2FA fallback: pending login. Username: {}. Device: {}.",
user.email,
device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug()
);
} else {
err!("No password hash has been submitted.")
}
@@ -124,7 +104,7 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
let Some(user) = User::find_by_device_for_email2fa(device_identifier, &conn).await else {
err!(
"Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
format!("IP: {}. Device: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug())
format!("IP: {}. Device: {device_identifier}.", client_headers.ip.ip)
)
};
@@ -136,8 +116,8 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
/// Generate the token, save the data for later verification and send email to user
pub async fn send_token(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let mut twofactor =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let generated_token = crypto::generate_email_token(CONFIG.email_token_size());
@@ -160,19 +140,18 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let (enabled, mfa_email) =
if let Some(x) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
(true, Some(twofactor_data.email))
} else {
(false, None)
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, &conn).await {
Some(x) => {
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
(true, json!(twofactor_data.email))
}
_ => (false, serde_json::value::Value::Null),
};
Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
"email": rocket::serde::json::json!({
"enabled": enabled,
"email": mfa_email,
}),
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::email_token(user.uuid, mfa_email, enabled),
Ok(Json(json!({
"email": mfa_email,
"enabled": enabled,
"object": "twoFactorEmail"
})))
}
@@ -181,22 +160,30 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
struct SendEmailData {
/// Email where 2FA codes will be sent to, can be different than user email account.
email: String,
user_verification_token: String,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
}
/// Send a verification email to the specified email address to check whether it exists/belongs to user.
#[post("/two-factor/send-email", data = "<data>")]
async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let data: SendEmailData = data.into_inner();
let user = headers.user;
two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email.clone(), false)?;
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
otp: data.otp,
}
.validate(&user, false, &conn)
.await?;
if !CONFIG._enable_email_2fa() {
err!("Email 2FA is disabled")
}
if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
tf.delete(&conn).await?;
}
@@ -204,13 +191,12 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(data.email, Some(generated_token));
// Uses EmailVerificationChallenge as type to show that it's not verified yet.
let twofactor =
TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
let twofactor = TwoFactor::new(user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
twofactor.save(&conn).await?;
mail::send_token(&twofactor_data.email, &twofactor_data.last_token.map_res("Token is empty")?).await?;
Ok(Json(json!({})))
Ok(())
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)]
@@ -218,7 +204,8 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
struct EmailData {
email: String,
token: String,
user_verification_token: String,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
}
/// Verify email belongs to user and can be used for 2FA email codes.
@@ -227,11 +214,17 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
let data: EmailData = data.into_inner();
let mut user = headers.user;
two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email, false)?;
// This is the last step in the verification process, delete the otp directly afterwards
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
otp: data.otp,
}
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, &conn)
.await
.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let type_ = TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge as i32;
let mut twofactor =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
@@ -250,26 +243,13 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
Ok(Json(json!({})))
}
#[delete("/two-factor/email", data = "<data>")]
async fn disable_email(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let user = headers.user;
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, twofactor_data.email, true)?;
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
}
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
Ok(())
Ok(Json(json!({
"email": email_data.email,
"enabled": "true",
"object": "twoFactorEmail"
})))
}
/// Validate the email code when used as TwoFactor token mechanism
@@ -281,8 +261,9 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
conn: &DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(data)?;
let mut twofactor =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, conn)
.await
.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let Some(issued_token) = &email_data.last_token else {
err!(
format!("No token available! IP: {ip}"),
+44 -15
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ use serde_json::Value;
use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_event},
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
core::{log_event, log_user_event},
},
auth::Headers,
crypto,
db::{
@@ -18,6 +21,7 @@ use crate::{
},
},
mail,
util::NumberOrString,
};
pub mod authenticator;
@@ -65,7 +69,7 @@ pub fn is_twofactor_provider_usable(provider_type: &TwoFactorType, provider_data
}
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, get_device_verification_settings];
let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, disable_twofactor, get_device_verification_settings];
routes.append(&mut authenticator::routes());
routes.append(&mut duo::routes());
@@ -77,12 +81,6 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct VerificationTokenData {
user_verification_token: String,
}
#[get("/two-factor")]
async fn get_twofactor(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value> {
let twofactors = TwoFactor::find_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await;
@@ -122,14 +120,45 @@ async fn generate_recover_code(user: &mut User, conn: &DbConn) {
}
}
/// Call after a 2FA provider, or one of its keys, was removed. No remembered device may keep skipping
/// the providers that are left, and once every provider is gone the 2FA policy applies.
pub async fn check_2fa_state(user: &User, device_type: i32, ip: &std::net::IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await.is_empty() {
enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device_type, ip, conn).await?;
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct DisableTwoFactorData {
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
r#type: NumberOrString,
}
#[put("/two-factor/disable", data = "<data>")]
async fn disable_twofactor(data: Json<DisableTwoFactorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: DisableTwoFactorData = data.into_inner();
let user = headers.user;
// Delete directly after a valid token has been provided
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
otp: data.otp,
}
Ok(())
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
.await;
}
if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
}
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": false,
"type": type_,
"object": "twoFactorProvider"
})))
}
pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy(
+3 -2
View File
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ async fn request_otp(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let user = headers.user;
// Only one Protected Action per user is allowed to take place, delete the previous one
if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, &conn).await {
if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, &conn).await
{
let pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
let elapsed = pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds();
let delay = 30;
@@ -124,7 +125,7 @@ pub async fn validate_protected_action_otp(
delete_if_valid: bool,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, conn)
let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, conn)
.await
.map_res("Protected action token not found, try sending the code again or restart the process")?;
let mut pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
+72 -111
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
use std::{collections::HashSet, str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
use std::{str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
use serde_json::Value;
@@ -18,18 +18,16 @@ use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
core::{
log_user_event,
two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
},
core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
},
auth::{Headers, two_factor},
auth::Headers,
crypto::ct_eq,
db::{
DbConn,
models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
models::{Device, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
},
error::Error,
util::NumberOrString,
};
static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
@@ -47,14 +45,7 @@ static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
});
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![
get_webauthn,
generate_webauthn_challenge,
activate_webauthn,
activate_webauthn_put,
delete_webauthn,
delete_webauthns
]
routes![get_webauthn, generate_webauthn_challenge, activate_webauthn, activate_webauthn_put, delete_webauthn,]
}
// Some old u2f structs still needed for migrating from u2f to WebAuthn
@@ -128,36 +119,34 @@ async fn get_webauthn(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
let registrations_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
Ok(Json(json!({
"webAuthn": json!({
"enabled": enabled,
"keys": registrations_json,
}),
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::webauthn_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
"enabled": enabled,
"keys": registrations_json,
"object": "twoFactorWebAuthn"
})))
}
#[post("/two-factor/get-webauthn-challenge", data = "<data>")]
async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
let user = headers.user;
let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
let creds = registrations
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let registrations = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn)
.await?
.1
.into_iter()
.map(|r| r.credential.cred_id().to_owned()) // We return the credentialIds to the clients to avoid double registering
.collect();
two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, enabled)?;
let (mut challenge, state) = WEBAUTHN.start_passkey_registration(
Uuid::from_str(&user.uuid).expect("Failed to parse UUID"), // Should never fail
&user.email,
user.display_name(),
Some(creds),
Some(registrations),
)?;
let mut state = serde_json::to_value(&state)?;
@@ -177,19 +166,17 @@ async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers:
let mut challenge_value = serde_json::to_value(challenge.public_key)?;
challenge_value["status"] = "ok".into();
challenge_value["errorMessage"] = "".into();
Ok(Json(json!({
"options": challenge_value
})))
Ok(Json(challenge_value))
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct EnableWebauthnData {
id: i32,
id: NumberOrString, // 1..5
name: String,
device_response: RegisterPublicKeyCredentialCopy,
user_verification_token: String,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -270,14 +257,16 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
let data: EnableWebauthnData = data.into_inner();
let mut user = headers.user;
let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, !keys.is_empty())?;
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
otp: data.otp,
}
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
// Retrieve and delete the saved challenge state
let state = if let Some(tf) =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge, &conn).await
{
let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge as i32;
let state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
let state: PasskeyRegistration = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
tf.delete(&conn).await?;
state
@@ -288,9 +277,10 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
// Verify the credentials with the saved state
let credential = WEBAUTHN.finish_passkey_registration(&data.device_response.into(), &state)?;
let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
// TODO: Check for repeated ID's
registrations.push(WebauthnRegistration {
id: data.id,
id: data.id.into_i32()?,
name: data.name,
migrated: false,
@@ -303,13 +293,13 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
.await?;
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
let keys_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
Ok(Json(json!({
"webAuthn": json!({
"enabled": true,
"keys": registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
}),
"enabled": true,
"keys": keys_json,
"object": "twoFactorU2f"
})))
}
@@ -320,87 +310,58 @@ async fn activate_webauthn_put(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers,
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct DeleteWebauthnData {
id: i32,
user_verification_token: String,
struct DeleteU2FData {
id: NumberOrString,
master_password_hash: String,
}
#[delete("/two-factor/webauthn", data = "<data>")]
async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |key| key.id != data.id, headers, &conn).await
}
async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteU2FData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let id = data.id.into_i32()?;
if !headers.user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
err!("Invalid password");
}
#[delete("/two-factor/webauthn/all", data = "<data>")]
async fn delete_webauthns(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |_| false, headers, &conn).await
}
async fn inner_delete_webauthns(
token: &str,
retain: impl Fn(&WebauthnRegistration) -> bool,
headers: Headers,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
let user = headers.user;
let Some(mut tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await else {
let Some(mut tf) =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32, &conn).await
else {
err!("Webauthn data not found!")
};
let mut keys: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
let keys_id: Vec<i32> = keys.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
let mut data: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
two_factor::validate_webauthn(token, &user.uuid, &keys_id, true)?;
let mut removed: HashSet<Vec<u8>> = HashSet::new();
let mut migrated = false;
keys.retain(|key| {
let retained = retain(key);
if !retained {
removed.insert(key.credential.cred_id().to_vec());
migrated = migrated || key.migrated;
}
retained
});
if removed.is_empty() {
let Some(item_pos) = data.iter().position(|r| r.id == id) else {
err!("Webauthn entry not found")
}
};
if keys.is_empty() {
tf.delete(conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await;
} else {
tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&keys)?;
tf.save(conn).await?;
drop(tf);
}
let removed_item = data.remove(item_pos);
tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
tf.save(&conn).await?;
drop(tf);
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;
// If entry is migrated from u2f, delete the u2f entry as well
if migrated && let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f, conn).await {
let Ok(mut data) = serde_json::from_str::<Vec<U2FRegistration>>(&u2f.data) else {
if let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f as i32, &conn).await
{
let mut data: Vec<U2FRegistration> = if let Ok(d) = serde_json::from_str(&u2f.data) {
d
} else {
err!("Error parsing U2F data")
};
data.retain(|old| !removed.contains(&old.reg.key_handle));
data.retain(|r| r.reg.key_handle != removed_item.credential.cred_id().as_slice());
let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
if data.is_empty() {
u2f.delete(conn).await?;
} else {
let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
u2f.data = new_data_str;
u2f.save(conn).await?;
}
u2f.data = new_data_str;
u2f.save(&conn).await?;
}
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await?;
let keys_json: Vec<Value> = data.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
Ok(Json(json!({
"webAuthn": json!({
"enabled": !keys.is_empty(),
"keys": keys.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
}),
"enabled": true,
"keys": keys_json,
"object": "twoFactorU2f"
})))
}
@@ -408,7 +369,8 @@ pub async fn get_webauthn_registrations(
user_id: &UserId,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> Result<(bool, Vec<WebauthnRegistration>), Error> {
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await {
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32;
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
Some(tf) => Ok((tf.enabled, serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?)),
None => Ok((false, Vec::new())), // If no data, return empty list
}
@@ -455,9 +417,8 @@ pub async fn generate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> JsonRes
}
pub async fn validate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, response: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let mut state = if let Some(tf) =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge, conn).await
{
let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge as i32;
let mut state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
let state: PasskeyAuthentication = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
tf.delete(conn).await?;
state
+45 -53
View File
@@ -10,12 +10,9 @@ use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
core::{
log_user_event,
two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
},
core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
},
auth::{Headers, two_factor},
auth::Headers,
db::{
DbConn,
models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType},
@@ -25,7 +22,7 @@ use crate::{
};
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put, delete_yubikeys,]
routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put,]
}
struct HttpClientTransport {
@@ -63,7 +60,8 @@ struct EnableYubikeyData {
key4: Option<String>,
key5: Option<String>,
nfc: bool,
user_verification_token: String,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Serialize, Debug)]
@@ -127,47 +125,55 @@ async fn generate_yubikey(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn:
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let user_id = &user.uuid;
let yubikey_type = TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32;
let (enabled, keys, yubikey_json) =
if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
let enabled = !yubikey_metadata.keys.is_empty();
let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys.clone());
result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(enabled);
result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
(enabled, yubikey_metadata.keys, result)
} else {
(false, Vec::new(), json!({"enabled": false}))
};
Ok(Json(json!({
"yubiKey": yubikey_json,
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::yubikey_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
})))
let r = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, yubikey_type, &conn).await;
if let Some(r) = r {
let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
Ok(Json(result))
} else {
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": false,
"object": "twoFactorU2f",
})))
}
}
#[post("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: EnableYubikeyData = data.into_inner();
let yubikeys = parse_yubikeys(&data);
let mut user = headers.user;
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
otp: data.otp.clone(),
}
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
// Check if we already have some data
let mut yubikey_data =
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32, &conn).await {
Some(data) => data,
None => TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new()),
};
let yubikeys = parse_yubikeys(&data);
if yubikeys.is_empty() {
// Return an error to prevent saving empty keys which would cause users not being able to login anymore.
// To remove all keys users should click the `Deactivate all keys` button
err!("A key is required.");
}
// Check if we already have some data
let mut yubikey_data =
if let Some(yd) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
let ym: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&yd.data)?;
two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &ym.keys, !ym.keys.is_empty())?;
yd
} else {
two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &Vec::new(), false)?;
TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new())
};
// Ensure they are valid OTPs
for yubikey in &yubikeys {
if yubikey.is_empty() || yubikey.len() == 12 {
@@ -189,12 +195,15 @@ async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn:
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
Ok(Json(json!({"yubiKey": result})))
result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
Ok(Json(result))
}
#[put("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
@@ -202,23 +211,6 @@ async fn activate_yubikey_put(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, c
activate_yubikey(data, headers, conn).await
}
#[delete("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
async fn delete_yubikeys(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let user = headers.user;
if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &yubikey_metadata.keys, true)?;
r.delete(&conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
}
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
Ok(())
}
pub async fn validate_yubikey_login(response: &str, twofactor_data: &str) -> EmptyResult {
if response.len() != 44 {
err!("Invalid Yubikey OTP length");
+8 -29
View File
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
match &login_result {
Ok(_) => {
log_user_event(
EventType::UserLoggedIn,
EventType::UserLoggedIn as i32,
&user_id,
client_header.device_type,
&client_header.ip.ip,
@@ -128,7 +128,8 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
}
Err(e) => {
if let Some(ev) = e.get_event() {
log_user_event(ev.event, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(ev.event as i32, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn)
.await;
}
}
}
@@ -551,18 +552,7 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
Value::Null
};
let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
json!({
"publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
"wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
"publicKey": user.public_key,
"Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
},
"Object": "privateKeys"
})
} else {
Value::Null
};
let account_keys = user.account_keys_json(conn).await;
let mut result = json!({
"access_token": auth_tokens.access_token(),
@@ -708,18 +698,7 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
Value::Null
};
let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
json!({
"publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
"wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
"publicKey": user.public_key,
"Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
},
"Object": "privateKeys"
})
} else {
Value::Null
};
let account_keys = user.account_keys_json(conn).await;
// Note: No refresh_token is returned. The CLI just repeats the
// client_credentials login flow when the existing token expires.
@@ -903,7 +882,7 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa as i32, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
&& let Err(e) =
@@ -973,7 +952,7 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
}
Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::YubiKey) => {
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
err!("No YubiKey devices registered")
};
@@ -985,7 +964,7 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
}
Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::Email) => {
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
err!("No twofactor email registered")
};
+1 -1
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ pub type JsonResult = ApiResult<Json<Value>>;
pub type EmptyResult = ApiResult<()>;
// Common structs representing JSON data received
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct PasswordOrOtpData {
#[serde(alias = "MasterPasswordHash")]
+5 -33
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
use std::{
net::IpAddr,
sync::{Arc, LazyLock},
time::{Duration, Instant},
time::Duration,
};
use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
@@ -41,14 +41,6 @@ pub static WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS: LazyLock<Arc<AnonymousWebSocketSubscripti
/// One connection is needed per pending login request, several at once are only expected behind NAT.
const MAX_ANONYMOUS_CONNECTIONS_PER_IP: u32 = 25;
/// How often a Ping is sent to the client.
const WS_PING_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
/// Close the connection if nothing, not even a Pong, was received from the client for this long.
/// Otherwise half-open connections (client gone without a FIN, e.g. behind a proxy or NAT) are kept forever.
/// Same as the default `ClientTimeoutInterval` of ASP.NET Core SignalR, which the official server uses.
const WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
static NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: LazyLock<bool> = LazyLock::new(|| !CONFIG.enable_websocket() && !CONFIG.push_enabled());
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
@@ -164,16 +156,12 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
let mut ws = ws;
let _guard = guard;
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
let mut last_received = Instant::now();
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
loop {
tokio::select! {
res = ws.next() => {
match res {
Some(Ok(message)) => {
// Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
last_received = Instant::now();
match message {
// Respond to any pings
Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -207,13 +195,7 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
}
}
_ = interval.tick() => {
// The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
break;
}
yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
}
_ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
}
}
}}
@@ -247,16 +229,12 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
let mut ws = ws;
let _guard = guard;
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
let mut last_received = Instant::now();
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
loop {
tokio::select! {
res = ws.next() => {
match res {
Some(Ok(message)) => {
// Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
last_received = Instant::now();
match message {
// Respond to any pings
Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -290,13 +268,7 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
}
}
_ = interval.tick() => {
// The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
break;
}
yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
}
_ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
}
}
}}
-3
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
#[path = "auth/two_factor.rs"]
pub mod two_factor;
#[path = "auth/send.rs"]
pub mod send;
pub type SendTokens = send::SendTokens;
-281
View File
@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, ser::Serialize};
use std::sync::LazyLock;
use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult},
auth::{decode_jwt, encode_jwt},
db::models::UserId,
};
static JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|api.2fa", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct TwoFactorClaims<T> {
// Not before
pub nbf: i64,
// Expiration time
pub exp: i64,
// Issuer
pub iss: String,
// Subject
pub sub: UserId,
pub enabled: bool,
pub claims: T,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct AuthenticatorClaims {
#[serde(rename = "authenticator_key")]
pub key: String,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct DuoClaims {
#[serde(rename = "duo_data")]
pub data: Option<DuoData>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct WebauthnClaims {
#[serde(rename = "webauthn_keys")]
pub keys: Vec<i32>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct YubikeyClaims {
#[serde(rename = "yubi_keys")]
pub keys: Vec<String>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
pub struct DuoData {
pub host: String, // Duo API hostname
pub ik: String, // client id
pub sk: String, // client secret
}
impl DuoData {
pub fn global() -> Option<Self> {
match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
(true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
host,
ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
}),
_ => None,
}
}
pub fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
Self {
host: s.into(),
ik: s.into(),
sk: s.into(),
}
}
pub fn secret() -> Self {
Self::msg("<global_secret>")
}
pub fn obscure(self) -> Self {
let mut host = self.host;
let mut ik = self.ik;
let mut sk = self.sk;
let digits = 4;
let replaced = "************";
host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
Self {
host,
ik,
sk,
}
}
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct EmailClaims {
pub email: Option<String>,
}
fn token<T: Serialize>(user_id: UserId, enabled: bool, claims: T) -> String {
let time_now = Utc::now();
let claims = TwoFactorClaims {
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap()).timestamp(),
iss: JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string(),
sub: user_id,
enabled,
claims,
};
encode_jwt(&claims)
}
fn validate<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, enabled: bool) -> ApiResult<T> {
match decode_jwt::<TwoFactorClaims<T>>(token, JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string()) {
Ok(claims) => {
if claims.sub != *user_id {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid user");
}
if claims.enabled != enabled {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid state");
}
Ok(claims.claims)
}
Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to decode verification token: {err}")),
}
}
pub fn authenticator_token(user_id: UserId, key: String, enabled: bool) -> String {
token(
user_id,
enabled,
AuthenticatorClaims {
key,
},
)
}
pub fn validate_authenticator(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, key: &str, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
let claims = validate::<AuthenticatorClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
if claims.key != key {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid key");
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn duo_token(user_id: UserId, data: Option<DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> String {
token(
user_id,
enabled,
DuoClaims {
data,
},
)
}
// When disabling we check that it's the correct data
pub fn validate_duo(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, data: Option<&DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
let claims = validate::<DuoClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
if enabled && claims.data.as_ref() != data {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid duo data");
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn email_token(user_id: UserId, email: Option<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
token(
user_id,
enabled,
EmailClaims {
email,
},
)
}
// When disabling we check that it's the correct `email`
pub fn validate_email(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, email: String, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
let claims = validate::<EmailClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
if enabled && claims.email != Some(email) {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid email");
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn webauthn_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<i32>, enabled: bool) -> String {
token(
user_id,
enabled,
WebauthnClaims {
keys,
},
)
}
pub fn validate_webauthn(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &[i32], enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
let claims = validate::<WebauthnClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
if keys != claims.keys {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn yubikey_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
token(
user_id,
enabled,
YubikeyClaims {
keys,
},
)
}
pub fn validate_yubikey(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
let claims = validate::<YubikeyClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
if *keys != claims.keys {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use serde_json::{Value, from_value, to_value};
fn token<T: Serialize>(claims: T) -> Value {
to_value(TwoFactorClaims {
nbf: 0,
exp: 0,
iss: String::new(),
sub: UserId::from(String::from("4ff0f0a4-0aa4-4c1d-9d43-1f2bd4d5e8b1")),
enabled: false,
claims,
})
.unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn claims_only_parse_as_their_own_provider() {
let tokens = [
token(AuthenticatorClaims {
key: String::from("JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP"),
}),
token(DuoClaims {
data: None,
}),
token(WebauthnClaims {
keys: vec![1],
}),
token(YubikeyClaims {
keys: Vec::new(),
}),
token(EmailClaims {
email: None,
}),
];
for (issued, token) in tokens.iter().enumerate() {
let parsed = [
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<AuthenticatorClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<DuoClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<WebauthnClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<YubikeyClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<EmailClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
];
for (checked, ok) in parsed.into_iter().enumerate() {
assert_eq!(ok, issued == checked, "token {issued} parsed as {checked}");
}
}
}
}
+2 -11
View File
@@ -1266,14 +1266,6 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
err!("`AUTH_REQUEST_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
}
if !cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.is_empty() && cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
err!("`DUO_CONTEXT_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
}
if !cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.is_empty() && cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
err!("`PURGE_INCOMPLETE_SSO_AUTH` is not a valid cron expression")
}
if !cfg.disable_admin_token {
match cfg.admin_token.as_ref() {
Some(t) if t.starts_with("$argon2") => {
@@ -1430,11 +1422,10 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
"undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic",
"enable-basic-auth-response",
"ssh-agent-v2",
"windows-desktop-autotype",
"windows-desktop-autotype-ga",
// Key Management Team
"biometrics-sdk-ipc",
"windows-native-credential-sync",
"enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
"pm-27278-v2-password-registration",
// Mobile Team
"pm-34171-card-scanner",
// Platform Team
+2
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ mod two_factor;
mod two_factor_duo_context;
mod two_factor_incomplete;
mod user;
mod user_signature_key_pair;
pub use self::archive::Archive;
pub use self::attachment::{Attachment, AttachmentId};
@@ -40,3 +41,4 @@ pub use self::two_factor::{TwoFactor, TwoFactorType};
pub use self::two_factor_duo_context::TwoFactorDuoContext;
pub use self::two_factor_incomplete::TwoFactorIncomplete;
pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserStampException};
pub use self::user_signature_key_pair::{SignatureAlgorithm, UserSignatureKeyPair};
+7 -13
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
use derive_more::{AsRef, From};
use diesel::prelude::*;
use serde::Deserialize;
@@ -12,7 +11,6 @@ use crate::{
schema::{org_policies, users_organizations},
},
error::MapResult,
util::format_date,
};
use super::{Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrganizationId, TwoFactor, UserId};
@@ -26,7 +24,6 @@ pub struct OrgPolicy {
pub atype: i32,
pub enabled: bool,
pub data: String,
pub revision_date: NaiveDateTime,
}
// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Core/AdminConsole/Enums/PolicyType.cs
@@ -49,7 +46,7 @@ pub enum OrgPolicyType {
RemoveUnlockWithPin = 14,
RestrictedItemTypes = 15,
UriMatchDefaults = 16,
AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17,
// AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17, // Not supported yet
// AutoConfirm = 18, // Not supported (not implemented yet)
// BlockClaimedDomainAccountCreation = 19, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
OrganizationUserNotification = 20,
@@ -80,7 +77,6 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
atype: atype as i32,
enabled,
data,
revision_date: Utc::now().naive_utc(),
}
}
@@ -96,7 +92,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
"type": self.atype,
"data": data_json,
"enabled": self.enabled,
"revisionDate": format_date(&self.revision_date),
"revisionDate": null,
"object": "policy",
});
@@ -114,13 +110,11 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
/// Database methods
impl OrgPolicy {
pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
self.revision_date = Utc::now().naive_utc();
pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(org_policies::table)
.values(&*self)
.values(self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
@@ -128,7 +122,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(org_policies::table)
.filter(org_policies::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(&*self)
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving org_policy")
}
@@ -148,10 +142,10 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
.map_res("Error deleting org_policy for insert")?;
diesel::insert_into(org_policies::table)
.values(&*self)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(org_policies::uuid)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving org_policy")
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -137,11 +137,11 @@ impl TwoFactor {
.await
}
pub async fn find_by_user_and_type(user_uuid: &UserId, atype: TwoFactorType, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
pub async fn find_by_user_and_type(user_uuid: &UserId, atype: i32, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
conn.run(move |conn| {
twofactor::table
.filter(twofactor::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.filter(twofactor::atype.eq(atype as i32))
.filter(twofactor::atype.eq(atype))
.first::<Self>(conn)
.ok()
})
+53 -9
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ use macros::UuidFromParam;
use super::{
Cipher, Device, EmergencyAccess, Favorite, Folder, Membership, MembershipType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete,
UserSignatureKeyPair,
};
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
@@ -71,6 +72,11 @@ pub struct User {
pub external_id: Option<String>, // Todo: Needs to be removed in the future, this is not used anymore.
pub key_id: Option<KeyId>,
// The v2 state: all set, with a `user_signature_key_pairs` row, or none, see `User::is_v2`
pub signed_public_key: Option<String>,
pub security_state: Option<String>,
pub security_version: Option<i32>,
}
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable)]
@@ -158,9 +164,17 @@ impl User {
external_id: None, // Todo: Needs to be removed in the future, this is not used anymore.
key_id: None,
signed_public_key: None,
security_state: None,
security_version: None,
}
}
pub fn is_v2(&self) -> bool {
self.signed_public_key.is_some() && self.security_state.is_some() && self.security_version.is_some()
}
pub fn check_valid_password(&self, password: &str) -> bool {
crypto::verify_password_hash(
password.as_bytes(),
@@ -170,10 +184,6 @@ impl User {
)
}
pub fn master_password_salt(&self) -> String {
self.email.trim().to_lowercase()
}
pub fn check_valid_recovery_code(&self, recovery_code: &str) -> bool {
if let Some(ref totp_recover) = self.totp_recover {
crypto::ct_eq(recovery_code, totp_recover.to_lowercase())
@@ -265,18 +275,37 @@ impl User {
!CONFIG.mail_enabled() || self.verified_at.is_some()
}
async fn v2_signature_key_pair(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<UserSignatureKeyPair> {
if !self.is_v2() {
return None;
}
UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await
}
/// The `accountKeys` object (upstream's `PrivateKeysResponseModel`), null without a key pair
pub fn account_keys_json(&self) -> Value {
pub async fn account_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
if self.private_key.is_some() {
let (signed_public_key, signature_key_pair, security_state) = match self.v2_signature_key_pair(conn).await {
Some(key_pair) => (
json!(self.signed_public_key),
key_pair.to_json(),
json!({
"securityState": self.security_state,
"securityVersion": self.security_version,
}),
),
None => (Value::Null, Value::Null, Value::Null),
};
json!({
"publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
"wrappedPrivateKey": self.private_key,
"publicKey": self.public_key,
"signedPublicKey": null,
"signedPublicKey": signed_public_key,
"object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair",
},
"securityState": null,
"signatureKeyPair": null,
"securityState": security_state,
"signatureKeyPair": signature_key_pair,
"object": "privateKeys"
})
} else {
@@ -284,6 +313,20 @@ impl User {
}
}
pub async fn public_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
let (signed_public_key, verifying_key) = match self.v2_signature_key_pair(conn).await {
Some(key_pair) => (json!(self.signed_public_key), json!(key_pair.verifying_key)),
None => (Value::Null, Value::Null),
};
json!({
"publicKey": self.public_key,
"signedPublicKey": signed_public_key,
"verifyingKey": verifying_key,
"object": "publicKeys"
})
}
pub async fn to_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
let mut orgs_json = Vec::new();
for c in Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await {
@@ -304,7 +347,7 @@ impl User {
UserStatus::Enabled
};
let account_keys = self.account_keys_json();
let account_keys = self.account_keys_json(conn).await;
json!({
"_status": status as i32,
@@ -380,6 +423,7 @@ impl User {
Device::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
TwoFactorIncomplete::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
UserSignatureKeyPair::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
Invitation::take(&self.email, conn).await; // Delete invitation if any
conn.run(move |conn| {
+132
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
use diesel::prelude::*;
use serde_json::Value;
use crate::{
api::EmptyResult,
db::{DbConn, schema::user_signature_key_pairs},
error::MapResult,
util::get_uuid,
};
use super::UserId;
/// A user's signature key pair, part of the v2 state, in its own table like upstream.
///
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Sql/dbo/KeyManagement/Tables/UserSignatureKeyPair.sql#L1-L15>
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = user_signature_key_pairs)]
#[diesel(treat_none_as_null = true)]
#[diesel(primary_key(uuid))]
pub struct UserSignatureKeyPair {
pub uuid: UserSignatureKeyPairId,
pub user_uuid: UserId,
pub signature_algorithm: i32,
/// The signing (private) key, wrapped by the user key.
pub signing_key: String,
/// The COSE-encoded public verifying key.
pub verifying_key: String,
pub created_at: NaiveDateTime,
pub updated_at: NaiveDateTime,
}
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/KeyManagement/Enums/SignatureAlgorithm.cs#L6-L10>
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SignatureAlgorithm {
Ed25519 = 0,
MlDsa44 = 1,
}
impl SignatureAlgorithm {
pub fn parse(algorithm: &str) -> Option<Self> {
match algorithm {
"ed25519" => Some(Self::Ed25519),
"mldsa44" => Some(Self::MlDsa44),
_ => None,
}
}
}
/// Local methods
impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
pub fn new(
user_uuid: UserId,
signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
signing_key: String,
verifying_key: String,
) -> Self {
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
Self {
uuid: UserSignatureKeyPairId(get_uuid()),
user_uuid,
signature_algorithm: signature_algorithm as i32,
signing_key,
verifying_key,
created_at: now,
updated_at: now,
}
}
pub fn to_json(&self) -> Value {
json!({
"wrappedSigningKey": self.signing_key,
"verifyingKey": self.verifying_key,
"object": "signatureKeyPair",
})
}
}
/// Database methods
impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
self.updated_at = Utc::now().naive_utc();
db_run! { conn:
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(user_signature_key_pairs::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving user signature key pair")
}
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(user_signature_key_pairs::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving user signature key pair")
}
}
}
/// The user's key pair. There is at most one, enforced by a unique index on `user_uuid`.
pub async fn find_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
conn.run(move |conn| {
user_signature_key_pairs::table
.filter(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.first::<Self>(conn)
.ok()
})
.await
}
pub async fn delete_all_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
conn.run(move |conn| {
diesel::delete(user_signature_key_pairs::table.filter(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error deleting user signature key pairs")
})
.await
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, AsRef, Deref, DieselNewType, Display, From, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct UserSignatureKeyPairId(String);
+17 -1
View File
@@ -116,7 +116,6 @@ table! {
atype -> Integer,
enabled -> Bool,
data -> Text,
revision_date -> Timestamp,
}
}
@@ -219,6 +218,21 @@ table! {
avatar_color -> Nullable<Text>,
external_id -> Nullable<Text>,
key_id -> Nullable<Text>,
signed_public_key -> Nullable<Text>,
security_state -> Nullable<Text>,
security_version -> Nullable<Integer>,
}
}
table! {
user_signature_key_pairs (uuid) {
uuid -> Text,
user_uuid -> Text,
signature_algorithm -> Integer,
signing_key -> Text,
verifying_key -> Text,
created_at -> Timestamp,
updated_at -> Timestamp,
}
}
@@ -384,6 +398,7 @@ joinable!(collections_groups -> groups (groups_uuid));
joinable!(event -> users_organizations (uuid));
joinable!(auth_requests -> users (user_uuid));
joinable!(sso_users -> users (user_uuid));
joinable!(user_signature_key_pairs -> users (user_uuid));
allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
archives,
@@ -410,4 +425,5 @@ allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
collections_groups,
event,
auth_requests,
user_signature_key_pairs,
);
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Emergency access for {{{grantor_name}}}
</tr>
<tr style="margin: 0; font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; color: #333; line-height: 25px; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none;">
<td class="content-block" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; color: #333; line-height: 25px; margin: 0; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; padding: 0 0 10px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none; text-align: center;" valign="top" align="center">
<a data-testid="emergency" href="{{{url}}}"
<a href="{{{url}}}"
clicktracking=off target="_blank" style="color: #ffffff; text-decoration: none; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; border-radius: 5px; background-color: #3c8dbc; border-color: #3c8dbc; border-style: solid; border-width: 10px 20px; margin: 0; font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; line-height: 25px; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none;">
Become emergency contact
</a>
+6
View File
@@ -839,6 +839,12 @@ pub fn parse_experimental_client_feature_flags(
.collect()
}
/// Whether the admin enabled this supported client feature flag
pub fn is_client_feature_flag_enabled(flag: &str) -> bool {
parse_experimental_client_feature_flags(&CONFIG.experimental_client_feature_flags(), &FeatureFlagFilter::ValidOnly)
.contains_key(flag)
}
/// TODO: This is extracted from IpAddr::is_global, which is unstable:
/// https://doc.rust-lang.org/nightly/std/net/enum.IpAddr.html#method.is_global
/// Remove once https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/27709 is merged