Support blob-encrypted ciphers and match upstream's key id checks

2026-10-23 01:48:09 +03:00 · 2026-10-06 01:06:58 +02:00
74 changed files with 1300 additions and 2005 deletions
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
 # DB_CONNECTION_RETRIES=15

 ## Database timeout
-## Timeout in seconds when acquiring database connection
+## Timeout when acquiring database connection
 # DATABASE_TIMEOUT=30

 ## Database idle timeout
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@
 ## Defaults to daily. Set blank to disable this job. Also without EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN set, this job will not start.
 # EVENT_CLEANUP_SCHEDULE="0 10 0 * * *"
 ## Number of days to retain events stored in the database.
-## If unset (the default) or 0, events are kept indefinitely and the scheduled job is disabled!
+## If unset (the default), events are kept indefinitely and the scheduled job is disabled!
 # EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN=
 ##
 ## Cron schedule of the job that cleans old auth requests from the auth request.
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@
 # USER_SEND_LIMIT=

 ## Number of days to wait before auto-deleting a trashed item.
-## If unset (the default) or 0, trashed items are not auto-deleted.
+## If unset (the default), trashed items are not auto-deleted.
 ## This setting applies globally, so make sure to inform all users of any changes to this setting.
 # TRASH_AUTO_DELETE_DAYS=

@@ -394,15 +394,11 @@
 ## - "pm-5594-safari-account-switching": Enable account switching in Safari. (Safari >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "pm-32413-multi-client-password-management": Enable changing the master password directly in the client. (Desktop/Extension >= 2026.4.0)
 ## - "ssh-agent-v2": Enable newer SSH agent support. (Desktop >= 2026.2.1)
-## - "windows-desktop-autotype": Enable the autotype feature preview on Windows. (Desktop >= 2025.8.0)
-## - "windows-desktop-autotype-ga": Enable the new, still in development, autotype implementation on Windows. (Desktop >= 2026.9.1)
-##   Only enable one of the two autotype flags, the clients disable autotype completely when both are enabled.
 ## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins":
 ## - "pm-32009-new-item-types": Enable new item types: Bank Account, Driver's License, and Passport (Clients >= 2026.4.0)
 ## - "pm-34171-card-scanner": Enable the new card scanner feature on mobile (Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.4.1)
 ## - "enable-basic-auth-response": Enable HTTP Basic Auth autofill in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.9.0)
 ## - "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic": Enable the rewritten add/update login notification triggering logic in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.2.0)
-## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
 # EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=

 ## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.
@@ -463,7 +459,7 @@

 ## Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!)
 ## https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/connect-src
-## Allows other domains for URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
+## Allows other domains to URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
 ## This adds the configured value to the 'Content-Security-Policy' headers 'connect-src' value.
 ## Multiple values must be separated with a whitespace. And only HTTPS values are allowed.
 ## Example: "https://my-addy-io.domain.tld https://my-simplelogin.domain.tld"
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ jobs:

      # Enable Rust Caching
      - name: Rust Caching
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@6323deb102c322ba6fcbdcafc7e3dddab59af2b6 # v2.9.2
        with:
          # Use a custom prefix-key to force a fresh start. This is sometimes needed with bigger changes.
          # Like changing the build host from Ubuntu 20.04 to 22.04 for example.
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ jobs:

      - name: Bake ${{ matrix.base_image }} containers
        id: bake_vw
-        uses: docker/bake-action@59cb1203cd42bcefd40a1b6d73b589e48c86040e # v7.5.0
+        uses: docker/bake-action@018cb6412ab401ebaa809aa5f85966b74628600f # v7.4.0
        env:
          BASE_TAGS: "${{ steps.determine-version.outputs.BASE_TAGS }}"
          SOURCE_COMMIT: "${{ env.SOURCE_COMMIT }}"
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ jobs:
          touch "${RUNNER_TEMP}/digests/${digest#sha256:}"

      - name: Upload digest
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
        with:
          name: digests-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}-${{ matrix.base_image }}
          path: ${{ runner.temp }}/digests/*
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ jobs:
          subject-path: vaultwarden-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}

      - name: Upload binaries as artifacts
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
        with:
          name: vaultwarden-${{ env.SOURCE_VERSION }}-linux-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}-${{ matrix.base_image }}
          path: vaultwarden-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ jobs:

    steps:
      - name: Download digests
-        uses: actions/download-artifact@9000827ccba6bdab643e8b6fd33ac0654aef8333 # v8.0.2
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
        with:
          path: ${{ runner.temp }}/digests
          pattern: digests-*-${{ matrix.base_image }}
@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ jobs:
          severity: CRITICAL,HIGH

      - name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 # v4.39.1
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@2892aa5e19bbd11bc0cff5427e3b750a04d9e3c2 # v4.38.2
        with:
          sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ jobs:

      # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.pre-commit-config.yaml` too
      - name: Spell Check Repo
-        uses: crate-ci/typos@7f9d0819ca1c008ade73f4b41fa9d258d48f605b # v1.51.1
+        uses: crate-ci/typos@00f422f3b19c57bc6338715ebfe3316d38768461 # v1.50.3
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
          persist-credentials: false

      - name: Run zizmor
-        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@85b2b9fb8e3325e7a23d7d0a9d7ba5ae0f999e3e # v0.7.1
+        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@cc914d7f3750a2d13d75c7f184a1060aa0e9d482 # v0.6.4
        with:
          # intentionally not scanning the entire repository,
          # since it contains integration tests.
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ repos:

  # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.github/workflows/typos.yaml` too
  - repo: https://github.com/crate-ci/typos
-    rev: 7f9d0819ca1c008ade73f4b41fa9d258d48f605b # v1.51.1
+    rev: 00f422f3b19c57bc6338715ebfe3316d38768461 # v1.50.3
    hooks:
      - id: typos
        always_run: true
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ dashmap = "6.2.1"

 # Async futures
 futures = "0.3.34"
-tokio = { version = "1.54.1", features = [
+tokio = { version = "1.53.2", features = [
    "fs",
    "io-util",
    "net",
@@ -100,14 +100,14 @@ tokio = { version = "1.54.1", features = [
    "signal",
    "time",
 ] }
-tokio-util = { version = "0.7.20", features = ["compat"] }
+tokio-util = { version = "0.7.19", features = ["compat"] }

 # A generic serialization/deserialization framework
 serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
-serde_json = "1.0.154"
+serde_json = "1.0.151"

 # A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
-diesel = { version = "2.3.14", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
+diesel = { version = "2.3.13", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
 diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"

 derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ libsqlite3-sys = { version = "0.38.2", optional = true }
 # Crypto-related libraries
 rand = "0.10.3"
 ring = "0.17.14"
-rustls = { version = "0.23.46", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
+rustls = { version = "0.23.45", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
 subtle = "2.6.1"

 # UUID generation
-uuid = { version = "1.28.0", features = ["v4"] }
+uuid = { version = "1.27.0", features = ["v4"] }

 # Date and time libraries
 chrono = { version = "0.4.45", default-features = false, features = ["clock", "serde"] }
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ bytes = "1.12.1"
 svg-hush = "0.9.7"

 # Cache function results (Used for version check and favicon fetching)
-cached = { version = "4.0.3", features = ["async"] }
+cached = { version = "4.0.1", features = ["async"] }

 # Used for custom short lived cookie jar during favicon extraction
 cookie = "0.18.2"
@@ -257,18 +257,18 @@ rpassword = "7.5.4"
 grass_compiler = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false }

 # File are accessed through Apache OpenDAL
-opendal = { version = "0.59.5", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
-opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.5", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
+opendal = { version = "0.59.4", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
+opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.4", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }

 # For retrieving AWS credentials, including temporary SSO credentials
-aws-config = { version = "1.13.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
+aws-config = { version = "1.12.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
    "behavior-version-latest",
    "credentials-process",
    "rt-tokio",
    "sso",
 ] }
-aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.1", optional = true }
-aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.19.1", optional = true }
+aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0", optional = true }
+aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.19.0", optional = true }
 http = { version = "1.5.0", optional = true }
 reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.3.1", optional = true }
 reqsign-core = { version = "3.3.2", optional = true }
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ---
-vault_version: "v2026.8.0"
-vault_image_digest: "sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a"
-# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.10.0
+vault_version: "v2026.7.0"
+vault_image_digest: "sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c"
+# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.9.0
 # We use the linux/amd64 platform shell scripts since there is no difference between the different platform scripts
 # https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx | https://hub.docker.com/r/tonistiigi/xx/tags
-xx_image_digest: "sha256:40fe21f44bb8cddf1eb1226db190d0a984118f62ee02a91b77d99448d28264a6"
+xx_image_digest: "sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707"
 # The `rust_version` variable is extracted from `rust-toolchain.toml`
 # rust_version: x.yy.z # Rust version to be used
 debian_version: trixie # Debian release name to be used
@@ -19,23 +19,23 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault

 ########################## ALPINE BUILD IMAGES ##########################
 ## NOTE: The Alpine Base Images do not support other platforms then linux/amd64 and linux/arm64
 ## And for Alpine we define all build images here, they will only be loaded when actually used
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.99.1 AS build_amd64
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.99.1 AS build_arm64
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.99.1 AS build_armv7
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.99.1 AS build_armv6
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.99.0 AS build_amd64
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.99.0 AS build_arm64
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.99.0 AS build_armv7
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.99.0 AS build_armv6

 ########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
 # hadolint ignore=DL3006
@@ -19,24 +19,24 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault

 ########################## Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts ##########################
 ## We use the linux/amd64 no matter which Build Platform, since these are all bash scripts
 ## And these bash scripts do not have any significant difference if at all
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:40fe21f44bb8cddf1eb1226db190d0a984118f62ee02a91b77d99448d28264a6 AS xx
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707 AS xx

 ########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
 # hadolint ignore=DL3006
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.99.1-slim-trixie AS build
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.99.0-slim-trixie AS build
 # hadolint ignore=DL3067
 COPY --from=xx / /
 ARG TARGETARCH
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ Some unsupported platforms for Debian based images. These are not built and test
 - 386     (linux/386)
 - ppc64le (linux/ppc64le)
 - s390x   (linux/s390x)
- riscv64 (linux/riscv64)

 To build these containers you need to enable QEMU binfmt support to be able to run/emulate architectures which are different then your host.<br>
 This ensures the container build process can run binaries from other architectures.<br>
@@ -148,12 +148,6 @@ target "debian-s390x" {
  platforms = ["linux/s390x"]
  tags = generate_tags("", "-s390x")
 }
-
-target "debian-riscv64" {
-  inherits = ["debian"]
-  platforms = ["linux/riscv64"]
-  tags = generate_tags("", "-riscv64")
-}
 // ==== End of unsupported Debian architecture targets ===

 // A Group to build all platforms individually for local testing
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ proc-macro = true

 [dependencies]
 quote = "1.0.47"
-syn = "3.0.9"
+syn = "3.0.6"

 [lints]
 workspace = true
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+-- A blob-encrypted cipher keeps all of its content in `data`, up to 500,000 characters, so the
+-- 64 KiB of TEXT is too small. Like upstream, which uses LONGTEXT.
+ALTER TABLE ciphers MODIFY data LONGTEXT NOT NULL;
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-- DATETIME (not TIMESTAMP) to match this repo's convention for revision_date
-- columns elsewhere, and to avoid MySQL's implicit session-timezone
-- conversion and 2038 range limit on TIMESTAMP.
-ALTER TABLE org_policies
-ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
-
-UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = UTC_TIMESTAMP();
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-- Backfill via `now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc'` rather than a DEFAULT of now():
-- assigning timestamptz now() into a naive TIMESTAMP column casts through
-- the server's TimeZone GUC, so a DEFAULT now() would store local wall-clock
-- instead of UTC on non-UTC servers, unlike every other naive-UTC timestamp
-- column in this schema.
-ALTER TABLE org_policies
-ADD COLUMN revision_date TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
-
-UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = (now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc');
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-- SQLite forbids non-constant defaults in ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN, so add
-- the column with a constant placeholder and backfill separately.
-ALTER TABLE org_policies
-ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
-
-UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP;
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@

 This allows running integration tests using [Playwright](https://playwright.dev/).
 \
-It uses its own [test.env](./test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.
+It usse its own [test.env](/test/scenarios/test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.

 ## Install

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker compose --profile playwright --env-file test.env run Pl

 ### Keep services running

-If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak running (states are not impacted by the tests):
+If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak runnning (states are not impacted by the tests):

 ```bash
 PW_KEEP_SERVICE_RUNNING=true npx playwright test
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-import { test, expect, type Page, type TestInfo, Test } from '@playwright/test';
-import { MailDev } from 'maildev';
-
-import * as utils from "../global-utils";
-import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
-import { activateTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
-
-let users = utils.loadEnv();
-let mailserver;
-
-test.beforeAll('Setup', async ({ browser }, testInfo: TestInfo) => {
-    mailserver = new MailDev({
-        port: process.env.MAILDEV_SMTP_PORT,
-        web: { port: process.env.MAILDEV_HTTP_PORT },
-    })
-
-    await mailserver.listen();
-
-    await utils.startVault(browser, testInfo, {
-        SMTP_HOST: process.env.MAILDEV_HOST,
-        SMTP_FROM: process.env.PW_SMTP_FROM,
-    });
-});
-
-test.afterAll('Teardown', async ({}) => {
-    utils.stopVault();
-    if( mailserver ){
-        await mailserver.close();
-    }
-});
-
-async function emergencyAccess(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string }) {
-    await test.step('Navigate', async () => {
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Emergency access' }).click();
-        await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Emergency access', { exact: true })).toBeVisible();
-    });
-}
-
-test('Emergency access', async ({ browser, page }) => {
-    const context2 = await browser.newContext();
-    const page2 = await context2.newPage();
-
-    const mailBuffer = mailserver.buffer(users.user1.email);
-    const mailBuffer2 = mailserver.buffer(users.user2.email);
-
-    await createAccount(test, page, users.user1);
-    await createAccount(test, page2, users.user2);
-
-    await test.step('Add test2', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add emergency contact' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email * (required)' }).fill(users.user2.email);
-        await page.getByRole('radio', { name: 'Takeover Can reset your' }).check();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'User(s) invited');
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Accept', async () => {
-        const email = await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access for " + users.user1.name);
-        const pageE = await context2.newPage();
-        await pageE.setContent(email.html);
-        const link = await pageE.getByTestId("emergency").getAttribute("href");
-        await pageE.close();
-
-        await page2.goto(link);
-        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Invitation accepted');
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Confirm', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Needs confirmation')).toBeVisible();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, users.user2.name + ' confirmed');
-        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access contact for " + users.user1.name + " confirmed");
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Request', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Emergency access requested');
-        await mailBuffer.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request by " + users.user2.name + " initiated");
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Approved', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access approved');
-        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request for " + users.user1.name + " approved");
-    });
-    await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
-
-    let newPassword = "TotoNewPassword";
-    await test.step('Access', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Takeover' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'New master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(newPassword);
-        await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Confirm new master password' }).fill(newPassword);
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Password reset for ' + users.user1.name);
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Changed no 2fa', async () => {
-        users.user1.password = newPassword;
-        await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Reject', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Reject' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access rejected');
-        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request to " + users.user1.name + " rejected");
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Remove', async () => {
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Remove' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Yes' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Removed user ' + users.user2.name);
-        await expect(page.getByText('You have not added any emergency contacts')).toBeVisible();
-    });
-});
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";

 import * as utils from "../global-utils";
 import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
-import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP, recoveryCodes } from './setups/2fa';
+import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP } from './setups/2fa';

 let users = utils.loadEnv();
 let totp;
@@ -31,42 +31,21 @@ test('Authenticator 2fa', async ({ page }) => {

    await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);

-    await logUser(test, page, users.user1, { totp });
-
-    await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
-});
-
-test('Recovery codes', async ({ context, page }) => {
-    await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
-
-    await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
-    let recovery = await recoveryCodes(test, page, users.user1);
-
-    await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
-
    await test.step('login', async () => {
+        let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
+        timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
+
        await page.getByLabel(/Email address/).fill(users.user1.email);
        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(users.user1.password);
        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();

        await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
+        await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate({timestamp}));
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();

        await expect(page).toHaveTitle(/Vaultwarden Web/);
-
-        const newPagePromise = context.waitForEvent('page');
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Use your recovery code' }).click();
-        const newPage = await newPagePromise;
-
-        const tabs = context.pages();
-        await tabs[1].bringToFront();
-        await expect(tabs[1].getByRole('heading', { name: 'Recover account two-step login' })).toBeVisible();
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email address * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.email);
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.password);
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Recovery code * (required)' }).fill(recovery);
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('button', { name: 'Submit' }).click();
-
-        await expect(tabs[1]).toHaveTitle(/Two-step login/);
    });
-});

+    await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
+});
@@ -4,24 +4,6 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";

 import * as utils from '../../global-utils';

-export async function recoveryCodes(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): string {
-    return await test.step('Recovery code', async () => {
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Security' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Two-step login' }).click();
-
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'View recovery code' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
-
-        const recovery = await page.getByRole('code').innerText();
-        await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
-
-        return recovery;
-    })
-}
-
 export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): OTPAuth.TOTP {
    return await test.step('Activate TOTP 2FA', async () => {
        await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
@@ -39,6 +21,7 @@ export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string,
        await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate());
        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Turn on' }).click();
        await page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Turned on', exact: true });
+        await page.getByLabel('Close').click();

        return totp;
    })
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import { expect, type Browser, Page } from '@playwright/test';

 import { type MailBuffer } from 'maildev';

-import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
 import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
 import { retrieveEmailCode } from './2fa';

@@ -44,7 +43,6 @@ export async function logUser(
        mailBuffer ?: MailBuffer,
        mail2fa?: boolean,
        notNewDevice?: boolean,
-        totp?: OTPAuth.TOTP,
    } = {}
 ) {
    await test.step(`Log user ${user.email}`, async () => {
@@ -57,23 +55,11 @@ export async function logUser(
        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();

-        if( options.mail2fa || options.totp ){
-            let code;
-
+        if( options.mail2fa ){
            await test.step('2FA check', async () => {
                await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
-
-                if( options.totp ) {
-                    const totp = options.totp;
-                    let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
-                    timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
-                    code = totp.generate({timestamp});
-                } else if( options.mail2fa ){
-                    code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
-                }
-
+                let code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
                await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(code);
-
                await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
            });
        }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 [toolchain]
-channel = "1.99.1"
+channel = "1.99.0"
 components = [ "rustfmt", "clippy" ]
 profile = "minimal"
@@ -201,15 +201,12 @@ fn post_admin_login(
    // If the token is invalid, redirect to login page
    if validate_token(&data.token) {
        // If the token received is valid, generate JWT and save it as a cookie
-        let claims = match generate_admin_claims() {
-            Ok(claims) => claims,
-            Err(e) => return Err(AdminResponse::Ok(render_admin_login(Some(e.message()), redirect.as_deref()))),
-        };
+        let claims = generate_admin_claims();
        let jwt = encode_jwt(&claims);

        let cookie = Cookie::build((COOKIE_NAME, jwt))
            .path(admin_path())
-            .max_age(time::Duration::minutes(i64::from(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime())))
+            .max_age(time::Duration::minutes(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime()))
            .same_site(SameSite::Strict)
            .http_only(true)
            .secure(secure.https);
@@ -782,8 +779,6 @@ async fn diagnostics(_token: AdminToken, ip_header: IpHeader, conn: DbConn) -> A
    .into_keys()
    .collect();

-    let invalid_env_vars = crate::util::INVALID_ENV_VARS.lock().unwrap().join(", ");
-
    let diagnostics_json = json!({
        "dns_resolved": dns_resolved,
        "current_release": VERSION,
@@ -806,9 +801,7 @@ async fn diagnostics(_token: AdminToken, ip_header: IpHeader, conn: DbConn) -> A
        "db_version": get_sql_server_version(&conn).await,
        "admin_url": format!("{}/diagnostics", admin_url()),
        "overrides": &CONFIG.get_overrides().join(", "),
-        "config_file_status": &CONFIG.get_config_file_status(),
        "template_overrides": check_template_overrides().join(", "),
-        "invalid_env_vars": invalid_env_vars,
        "invalid_feature_flags": invalid_feature_flags,
        "host_arch": env::consts::ARCH,
        "host_os":  env::consts::OS,
@@ -93,15 +93,6 @@ pub struct KDFData {
    kdf_parallelism: Option<i32>,
 }

-impl KDFData {
-    pub(super) fn matches_user(&self, user: &User) -> bool {
-        self.kdf == user.client_kdf_type
-            && self.kdf_iterations == user.client_kdf_iter
-            && self.kdf_memory == user.client_kdf_memory
-            && self.kdf_parallelism == user.client_kdf_parallelism
-    }
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 pub struct RegisterData {
@@ -493,7 +484,8 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<SetPasswordData>, headers: Headers, conn:
        Membership::accept_user_invitations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
    }

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+        .await;

    user.save(&conn).await?;

@@ -639,7 +631,8 @@ async fn post_password(data: Json<ChangePassData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
        err!("Invalid password")
    }

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+        .await;

    let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) =
        if let (Some(unlock_data), Some(authentication_data)) = (data.unlock_data, data.authentication_data) {
@@ -651,6 +644,8 @@ async fn post_password(data: Json<ChangePassData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
                err!("Invalid master password salt")
            }

+            validate_key_id_unchanged(&user, &unlock_data)?;
+
            (authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
        } else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (data.new_master_password_hash, data.key) {
            (new_master_password_hash, new_key)
@@ -724,35 +719,34 @@ fn set_kdf_data(user: &mut User, data: &KDFData) -> EmptyResult {

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-pub(super) struct AuthenticationData {
+struct AuthenticationData {
    #[serde(alias = "Salt")]
    salt: String,
    #[serde(alias = "Kdf")]
-    pub(super) kdf: KDFData,
+    kdf: KDFData,
    #[serde(alias = "MasterPasswordAuthenticationHash")]
-    pub(super) master_password_authentication_hash: String,
-}
-
-impl AuthenticationData {
-    pub(super) fn check(&self, user: &User, unlock: &UnlockData) -> EmptyResult {
-        if self.kdf != unlock.kdf {
-            err!("KDF settings must be equal for authentication and unlock")
-        }
-
-        if self.salt != user.master_password_salt() || self.salt != unlock.salt {
-            err!("Invalid master password salt")
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
+    master_password_authentication_hash: String,
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-pub(super) struct UnlockData {
+struct UnlockData {
    salt: String,
    kdf: KDFData,
-    pub(super) master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
+    master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
+    contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
+}
+
+/// A password or KDF change keeps the user key, so its key id must be the current one, when both are known.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/MasterPasswordUnlockData.cs#L27-L47>
+fn validate_key_id_unchanged(user: &User, unlock_data: &UnlockData) -> EmptyResult {
+    if let (Some(current), Some(contained)) = (&user.key_id, &unlock_data.contained_key_id)
+        && current != contained
+    {
+        err!("Invalid user key sent in master-password unlock data.")
+    }
+    Ok(())
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -771,7 +765,15 @@ async fn post_kdf(data: Json<ChangeKdfData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
        err!("Invalid password")
    }

-    data.authentication_data.check(&headers.user, &data.unlock_data)?;
+    if data.authentication_data.kdf != data.unlock_data.kdf {
+        err!("KDF settings must be equal for authentication and unlock")
+    }
+
+    if headers.user.email != data.authentication_data.salt || headers.user.email != data.unlock_data.salt {
+        err!("Invalid master password salt")
+    }
+
+    validate_key_id_unchanged(&headers.user, &data.unlock_data)?;

    let mut user = headers.user;

@@ -1073,8 +1075,9 @@ struct KeyIdData {
 #[post("/accounts/key-management/user-key-id", data = "<data>")]
 async fn post_user_key(data: Json<KeyIdData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    let mut user = headers.user;
+    // Only a backfill for accounts that have none. Afterwards the id changes with the key, in a rotation.
    if user.key_id.is_some() {
-        err_code!("Unexpected data", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
+        err!("User key id is already set.")
    }

    user.key_id = Some(data.into_inner().user_key_id);
@@ -1694,7 +1697,7 @@ async fn post_auth_request(
    nt.send_auth_request(&user.uuid, &auth_request.uuid, &device, &conn).await;

    log_user_event(
-        EventType::UserRequestedDeviceApproval,
+        EventType::UserRequestedDeviceApproval as i32,
        &user.uuid,
        client_headers.device_type,
        &client_headers.ip.ip,
@@ -1788,7 +1791,7 @@ async fn put_auth_request(
        nt.send_auth_response(&auth_request.user_uuid, &auth_request.uuid, &headers.device, &conn).await;

        log_user_event(
-            EventType::OrganizationUserApprovedAuthRequest,
+            EventType::OrganizationUserApprovedAuthRequest as i32,
            &headers.user.uuid,
            headers.device.atype,
            &headers.ip.ip,
@@ -1799,7 +1802,7 @@ async fn put_auth_request(
        // If denied, there's no reason to keep the request
        auth_request.delete(&conn).await?;
        log_user_event(
-            EventType::OrganizationUserRejectedAuthRequest,
+            EventType::OrganizationUserRejectedAuthRequest as i32,
            &headers.user.uuid,
            headers.device.atype,
            &headers.ip.ip,
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ use crate::{
        models::{
            Archive, Attachment, AttachmentId, Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup,
            CollectionId, CollectionUser, EventType, Favorite, Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId, Group, KeyId,
-            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, UserId,
+            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, User, UserId,
+            is_data_blob_encrypted,
        },
    },
    util::{NumberOrString, deser_opt_nonempty_str, save_temp_file},
@@ -189,12 +190,19 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
            // https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
            "masterKeyEncryptedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
            "masterKeyWrappedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
-            "salt": headers.user.email
+            "salt": headers.user.email,
+            "containedKeyId": headers.user.key_id,
        })
    } else {
        Value::Null
    };

+    // Upstream omits these when unset rather than sending null
+    let mut user_decryption = json!({ "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock });
+    if let Some(key_id) = &headers.user.key_id {
+        user_decryption["userKeyId"] = json!(key_id);
+    }
+
    Ok(Json(json!({
        "profile": user_json,
        "folders": folders_json,
@@ -204,10 +212,7 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
        "ciphers": ciphers_json,
        "domains": domains_json,
        "sends": sends_json,
-        "userDecryption": {
-            "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock,
-            "userKeyId": headers.user.key_id,
-        },
+        "userDecryption": user_decryption,
        "object": "sync"
    })))
 }
@@ -269,7 +274,8 @@ pub struct CipherData {

    key: Option<String>,

-    pub encrypted_for: UserId, // Added in web-v2025.6.0
+    // Added in web-v2025.6.0. Deprecated upstream for `encrypted_by_key_id`, but still checked when sent
+    pub encrypted_for: Option<UserId>,
    // Added in web-v2025.8.1, Optional for compat
    pub encrypted_by_key_id: Option<KeyId>,

@@ -284,7 +290,8 @@ pub struct CipherData {
    Passport = 8
    */
    pub r#type: i32,
-    pub name: String,
+    // Absent on a blob-encrypted cipher, whose name is sealed inside `data`
+    pub name: Option<String>,
    pub notes: Option<String>,
    fields: Option<Value>,

@@ -298,6 +305,9 @@ pub struct CipherData {
    drivers_license: Option<Value>,
    passport: Option<Value>,

+    // The sealed blob of a v2 account's cipher, which replaces all of the fields above
+    data: Option<String>,
+
    favorite: Option<bool>,
    reprompt: Option<i32>,

@@ -319,6 +329,79 @@ pub struct CipherData {
    archived_date: Option<String>,
 }

+/// A field of a [`CipherData`] that fails upstream's model validation.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct CipherValidationError {
+    pub field: &'static str,
+    pub message: String,
+}
+
+impl From<CipherValidationError> for crate::Error {
+    fn from(e: CipherValidationError) -> Self {
+        Self::new_msg(e.message)
+    }
+}
+
+/// The cipher must have been encrypted for the acting user. Only checked when the client sends the field.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1857-L1870>
+fn validate_encrypted_for_user(data: &CipherData, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
+    if data.encrypted_for.as_ref().is_some_and(|encrypted_for| encrypted_for != user_id) {
+        err!("Cipher was not encrypted for the current user. Please try again.")
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// [`validate_encrypted_for_user`], plus the key id of a user-owned cipher, when both ids are known.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1886-L1911>
+fn validate_encrypted_by_user(data: &CipherData, user: &User, is_org_cipher: bool) -> EmptyResult {
+    validate_encrypted_for_user(data, &user.uuid)?;
+
+    if !is_org_cipher
+        && let (Some(cipher_key_id), Some(user_key_id)) = (&data.encrypted_by_key_id, &user.key_id)
+        && cipher_key_id != user_key_id
+    {
+        err!("Cipher was not encrypted with the current user key. Please try again.")
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Upstream's `[StringLength(500000)]` on `CipherRequestModel.Data`
+const MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH: usize = 500_000;
+
+impl CipherData {
+    /// Whether `data` is a blob rather than the per-type fields. Parses `data`, so keep the result.
+    pub fn is_blob(&self) -> bool {
+        self.data.as_deref().is_some_and(is_data_blob_encrypted)
+    }
+
+    /// Upstream's model checks that depend on the format: the size of `data`, and a name unless it's a blob.
+    ///
+    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L76-L77>
+    /// and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L91-L99>
+    pub fn validate_content(&self, is_blob: bool) -> Result<(), CipherValidationError> {
+        if let Some(data) = &self.data
+            && data.len() > MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH
+        {
+            return Err(CipherValidationError {
+                field: "Data",
+                message: format!("The field Data must be a string with a maximum length of {MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH}."),
+            });
+        }
+
+        // A blob carries the name inside it, so only the other formats need one
+        if !is_blob && self.name.as_deref().is_none_or(|n| n.trim().is_empty()) {
+            return Err(CipherValidationError {
+                field: "Name",
+                message: String::from("The Name field is required."),
+            });
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 pub struct PartialCipherData {
@@ -352,16 +435,14 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create(
 ) -> JsonResult {
    let mut data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();

-    if data.cipher.encrypted_for != headers.user.uuid {
-        err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
-    }
+    validate_encrypted_by_user(&data.cipher, &headers.user, data.cipher.organization_id.is_some())?;

    // This check is usually only needed in update_cipher_from_data(), but we
    // need it here as well to avoid creating an empty cipher in the call to
    // cipher.save() below.
    enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data.cipher), &headers, &conn).await?;

-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, data.cipher.name.clone());
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type);
    cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone());
    cipher.save(&conn).await?;

@@ -385,16 +466,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create(
 async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> JsonResult {
    let mut data: CipherData = data.into_inner();

-    if data.encrypted_for != headers.user.uuid {
-        err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
-    }
-
-    if let Some(cipher_key_id) = &data.encrypted_by_key_id
-        && let Some(user_key_id) = &headers.user.key_id
-        && cipher_key_id != user_key_id
-    {
-        err_code!("Invalid key cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
-    }
+    validate_encrypted_by_user(&data, &headers.user, data.organization_id.is_some())?;

    // The web/browser clients set this field to null as expected, but the
    // mobile clients seem to set the invalid value `0001-01-01T00:00:00`,
@@ -402,7 +474,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt
    // needed when creating a new cipher, so just ignore it unconditionally.
    data.last_known_revision_date = None;

-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, data.name.clone());
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type);
    update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate).await?;

    Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -426,6 +498,44 @@ async fn enforce_personal_ownership_policy(data: Option<&CipherData>, headers: &
    Ok(())
 }

+/// The checks of saving a cipher, for callers that run them before writing anything else
+async fn validate_cipher_update(
+    cipher: &Cipher,
+    data: &CipherData,
+    headers: &Headers,
+    conn: &DbConn,
+    ut: UpdateType,
+) -> EmptyResult {
+    // Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data.
+    // And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail.
+    if ut != UpdateType::None
+        && let Some(dt) = &data.last_known_revision_date
+    {
+        match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(dt, "%+") {
+            // ISO 8601 format
+            Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing LastKnownRevisionDate '{dt}': {err}"),
+            Ok(dt) if cipher.updated_at.signed_duration_since(dt).num_seconds() > 1 => {
+                err!("The client copy of this cipher is out of date. Resync the client and try again.")
+            }
+            Ok(_) => (),
+        }
+    }
+
+    if let Some(note) = &data.notes {
+        let max_note_size = CONFIG._max_note_size();
+        if note.len() > max_note_size {
+            err!(format!("The field Notes exceeds the maximum encrypted value length of {max_note_size} characters."))
+        }
+    }
+
+    if let Some(folder_id) = &data.folder_id
+        && Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await.is_none()
+    {
+        err!("Invalid folder", "Folder does not exist or belongs to another user");
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
    cipher: &mut Cipher,
    data: CipherData,
@@ -451,32 +561,14 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(

    enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data), headers, conn).await?;

-    // Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data.
-    // And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail.
-    if ut != UpdateType::None
-        && let Some(dt) = data.last_known_revision_date
-    {
-        match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(&dt, "%+") {
-            // ISO 8601 format
-            Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing LastKnownRevisionDate '{dt}': {err}"),
-            Ok(dt) if cipher.updated_at.signed_duration_since(dt).num_seconds() > 1 => {
-                err!("The client copy of this cipher is out of date. Resync the client and try again.")
-            }
-            Ok(_) => (),
-        }
-    }
+    let is_blob = data.is_blob();
+    data.validate_content(is_blob)?;
+    validate_cipher_update(cipher, &data, headers, conn, ut).await?;

    if cipher.organization_uuid.is_some() && cipher.organization_uuid != data.organization_id {
        err!("Organization mismatch. Please resync the client before updating the cipher")
    }

-    if let Some(note) = &data.notes {
-        let max_note_size = CONFIG._max_note_size();
-        if note.len() > max_note_size {
-            err!(format!("The field Notes exceeds the maximum encrypted value length of {max_note_size} characters."))
-        }
-    }
-
    // Check if this cipher is being transferred from a personal to an organization vault
    let transfer_cipher = cipher.organization_uuid.is_none() && data.organization_id.is_some();

@@ -507,12 +599,6 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
        cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone());
    }

-    if let Some(ref folder_id) = data.folder_id
-        && Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await.is_none()
-    {
-        err!("Invalid folder", "Folder does not exist or belongs to another user");
-    }
-
    // Modify attachments name and keys when rotating
    if let Some(attachments) = data.attachments2 {
        for (id, attachment) in attachments {
@@ -551,26 +637,36 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
        _ => err!("Invalid type"),
    };

-    let type_data = if let Some(mut data) = type_data_opt {
+    if let Some(blob) = data.data.filter(|_| is_blob) {
+        // A blob holds everything, the name included; the column can't be null, so it's left empty
+        // TODO: Make `ciphers.name` nullable and store `None` here instead.
+        cipher.name = String::new();
+        cipher.notes = None;
+        cipher.fields = None;
+        cipher.password_history = None;
+        cipher.data = blob;
+    } else {
+        let Some(mut type_data) = type_data_opt else {
+            err!("Data missing")
+        };
        // Remove the 'Response' key from the base object.
-        if let Some(data_obj) = data.as_object_mut() {
+        if let Some(data_obj) = type_data.as_object_mut() {
            data_obj.remove("response");
        }
        // Remove the 'Response' key from every Uri.
-        if data["uris"].is_array() {
-            data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(data["uris"].clone());
+        if type_data["uris"].is_array() {
+            type_data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(type_data["uris"].clone());
        }
-        data
-    } else {
-        err!("Data missing")
-    };
+
+        // `validate_content` made sure there is a name
+        cipher.name = data.name.unwrap_or_default();
+        cipher.notes = data.notes;
+        cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
+        cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
+        cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
+    }

    cipher.key = data.key;
-    cipher.name = data.name;
-    cipher.notes = data.notes;
-    cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
-    cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
-    cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
    cipher.reprompt = data.reprompt.filter(|r| *r == RepromptType::None as i32 || *r == RepromptType::Password as i32);

    cipher.save(conn).await?;
@@ -667,7 +763,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers_import(data: Json<ImportData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
        let folder_id = relations_map.get(&index).and_then(|i| folders.get(*i).cloned());
        cipher_data.folder_id = folder_id;

-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type);
        update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?;
    }

@@ -735,6 +831,9 @@ async fn put_cipher(
        err!("Cipher is not write accessible")
    }

+    // Against the cipher we hold rather than the organization the client claims, like upstream
+    validate_encrypted_by_user(&data, &headers.user, cipher.organization_uuid.is_some())?;
+
    update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate).await?;

    Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -993,9 +1092,7 @@ async fn post_cipher_share(
    conn: DbConn,
    nt: Notify<'_>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
-    let data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();
-
-    share_cipher_by_uuid(&cipher_id, data, &headers, &conn, &nt, None).await
+    put_cipher_share(cipher_id, data, headers, conn, nt).await
 }

 #[put("/ciphers/<cipher_id>/share", data = "<data>")]
@@ -1008,6 +1105,21 @@ async fn put_cipher_share(
 ) -> JsonResult {
    let data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();

+    // Upstream's `PutShare` checks, before anything is written.
+    // Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L899-L912>
+    // and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L498-L519>
+    if data.cipher.organization_id.is_none() {
+        err!("Cipher OrganizationId is required.")
+    }
+    if data.collection_ids.is_empty() {
+        err!("You must select at least one collection.")
+    }
+    if !Cipher::find_by_uuid(&cipher_id, &conn).await.is_some_and(|c| c.user_uuid.as_ref() == Some(&headers.user.uuid))
+    {
+        err_code!("Cipher doesn't exist", Status::NotFound.code)
+    }
+    validate_encrypted_for_user(&data.cipher, &headers.user.uuid)?;
+
    share_cipher_by_uuid(&cipher_id, data, &headers, &conn, &nt, None).await
 }

@@ -1027,18 +1139,33 @@ async fn put_cipher_share_selected(
 ) -> EmptyResult {
    let mut data: ShareSelectedCipherData = data.into_inner();

+    // Upstream's `PutShareMany` checks, before anything is written.
+    // Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1395-L1421>
+    // and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L560-L604>
    if data.ciphers.is_empty() {
        err!("You must select at least one cipher.")
    }
-
+    if data.ciphers.iter().any(|c| c.id.is_none() || c.organization_id.is_none()) {
+        err!("All Ciphers must have an Id and OrganizationId.")
+    }
+    if data.ciphers.iter().map(|c| &c.organization_id).collect::<HashSet<_>>().len() != 1 {
+        err!("All ciphers must be for the same organization.")
+    }
    if data.collection_ids.is_empty() {
        err!("You must select at least one collection.")
    }
-
    for cipher in &data.ciphers {
-        if cipher.id.is_none() {
-            err!("Request missing ids field")
-        }
+        cipher.validate_content(cipher.is_blob())?;
+    }
+    for cipher in &data.ciphers {
+        validate_encrypted_for_user(cipher, &headers.user.uuid)?;
+    }
+    let owned_ciphers = Cipher::find_owned_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await;
+    for cipher_data in &data.ciphers {
+        let Some(cipher) = owned_ciphers.iter().find(|c| cipher_data.id.as_ref() == Some(&c.uuid)) else {
+            err!("Trying to share ciphers that you do not own.")
+        };
+        validate_cipher_update(cipher, cipher_data, &headers, &conn, UpdateType::None).await?;
    }

    while let Some(cipher) = data.ciphers.pop() {
@@ -1085,6 +1212,20 @@ async fn share_cipher_by_uuid(
        err!("Organization mismatch. Please resync the client before updating the cipher")
    }

+    // When LastKnownRevisionDate is None, it is a new cipher, so send CipherCreate.
+    // If there is an override, like when handling multiple items, we want to prevent a push notification for every single item
+    let ut = if let Some(ut) = override_ut {
+        ut
+    } else if data.cipher.last_known_revision_date.is_some() {
+        UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate
+    } else {
+        UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate
+    };
+
+    // For the same reason, the other checks of saving
+    data.cipher.validate_content(data.cipher.is_blob())?;
+    validate_cipher_update(&cipher, &data.cipher, headers, conn, ut).await?;
+
    let mut shared_to_collections = vec![];

    if let Some(organization_id) = &data.cipher.organization_id {
@@ -1103,16 +1244,6 @@ async fn share_cipher_by_uuid(
        }
    }

-    // When LastKnownRevisionDate is None, it is a new cipher, so send CipherCreate.
-    // If there is an override, like when handling multiple items, we want to prevent a push notification for every single item
-    let ut = if let Some(ut) = override_ut {
-        ut
-    } else if data.cipher.last_known_revision_date.is_some() {
-        UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate
-    } else {
-        UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate
-    };
-
    update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data.cipher, headers, Some(shared_to_collections), conn, nt, ut).await?;

    Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, conn).await?))
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use chrono::Utc;
+use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 use serde_json::Value;

@@ -6,17 +6,14 @@ use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{
        EmptyResult, JsonResult,
-        core::{
-            CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType,
-            accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData},
-        },
+        core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType},
    },
    auth::{Headers, decode_emergency_access_invite},
    db::{
        DbConn, DbPool,
        models::{
-            Cipher, EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus,
-            EmergencyAccessType, Invitation, Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
+            Cipher, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType, Invitation,
+            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
        },
    },
    mail,
@@ -136,21 +133,19 @@ async fn post_emergency_access(

    let data: EmergencyAccessUpdateData = data.into_inner();

-    let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) else {
-        err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
-    };
-
-    if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&data.wait_time_days) {
-        err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
-    }
-
    let Some(mut emergency_access) =
        EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantor_uuid(&emer_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
    else {
        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
    };

-    emergency_access.atype = new_type as i32;
+    let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) {
+        new_type as i32
+    } else {
+        err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
+    };
+
+    emergency_access.atype = new_type;
    emergency_access.wait_time_days = data.wait_time_days;
    if data.key_encrypted.is_some() {
        emergency_access.key_encrypted = data.key_encrypted;
@@ -212,11 +207,11 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
    let email = data.email.to_lowercase();
    let wait_time_days = data.wait_time_days;

-    if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&wait_time_days) {
-        err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
-    }
+    let emergency_access_status = EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32;

-    let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) else {
+    let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) {
+        new_type as i32
+    } else {
        err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
    };

@@ -262,8 +257,6 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
        err!(format!("Grantee user already invited: {}", &grantee_user.email))
    }

-    let new_type = new_type as i32;
-    let emergency_access_status = EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32;
    let mut new_emergency_access =
        EmergencyAccess::new(grantor_user.uuid, grantee_user.email, emergency_access_status, new_type, wait_time_days);
    new_emergency_access.save(&conn).await?;
@@ -296,7 +289,7 @@ async fn resend_invite(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
    };

    if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32 {
-        err!("The grantee user is already accepted or confirmed for emergency access");
+        err!("The grantee user is already accepted or confirmed to the organization");
    }

    let Some(email) = emergency_access.email.clone() else {
@@ -457,24 +450,11 @@ async fn initiate_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
    let Some(mut emergency_access) =
        EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantee_uuid(&emer_id, &initiating_user.uuid, &conn).await
    else {
-        err!(
-            "Emergency access not valid.",
-            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not found for user '{}'.", initiating_user.email)
-        )
+        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
    };

    if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::Confirmed as i32 {
-        err!(
-            "Emergency access not valid.",
-            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not confirmed for user '{}'.", initiating_user.email)
-        )
-    }
-
-    if !EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE.contains(&emergency_access.wait_time_days) {
-        err!(
-            "Emergency access not valid.",
-            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}' timeout range '{}' is invalid", emergency_access.wait_time_days)
-        )
+        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
    }

    let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emergency_access.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
@@ -507,17 +487,11 @@ async fn approve_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
    let Some(mut emergency_access) =
        EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantor_uuid(&emer_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
    else {
-        err!(
-            "Emergency access not valid.",
-            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not found for user '{}'.", headers.user.email)
-        )
+        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
    };

    if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryInitiated as i32 {
-        err!(
-            "Emergency access not valid.",
-            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not initiated for user '{}'.", headers.user.email)
-        )
+        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
    }

    let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await else {
@@ -641,7 +615,6 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
        "kdfMemory": grantor_user.client_kdf_memory,
        "kdfParallelism": grantor_user.client_kdf_parallelism,
        "keyEncrypted": &emergency_access.key_encrypted,
-        "salt": grantor_user.master_password_salt(),
        "object": "emergencyAccessTakeover",
    });

@@ -651,13 +624,8 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct EmergencyAccessPasswordData {
-    // Legacy payload
-    new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
-    key: Option<String>,
-
-    // Current payload
-    authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
-    unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
+    new_master_password_hash: String,
+    key: String,
 }

 #[post("/emergency-access/<emer_id>/password", data = "<data>")]
@@ -670,6 +638,8 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
    check_emergency_access_enabled()?;

    let data: EmergencyAccessPasswordData = data.into_inner();
+    let new_master_password_hash = &data.new_master_password_hash;
+    //let key = &data.Key;

    let requesting_user = headers.user;
    let Some(emergency_access) =
@@ -686,23 +656,8 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
        err!("Grantor user not found.")
    };

-    let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) =
-        if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) = (data.authentication_data, data.unlock_data) {
-            authentication_data.check(&grantor_user, &unlock_data)?;
-
-            if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&grantor_user) {
-                err!("KDF settings do not match the grantor account")
-            }
-
-            (authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
-        } else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (data.new_master_password_hash, data.key) {
-            (new_master_password_hash, new_key)
-        } else {
-            err!("Invalid request!")
-        };
-
    // change grantor_user password
-    grantor_user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
+    grantor_user.set_password(new_master_password_hash, Some(data.key), true, None, &conn).await?;
    grantor_user.save(&conn).await?;

    // Disable TwoFactor providers since they will otherwise block logins
@@ -770,71 +725,52 @@ pub async fn emergency_request_timeout_job(pool: DbPool) {
        return;
    }

-    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
-        error!("Failed to get DB connection for emergency time-outs!");
-        return;
-    };
+    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
+        let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;

-    let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;
-
-    if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
-        debug!("No emergency request timeout to approve");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-    for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
-        match emer.is_recovery_allowed(&now) {
-            Ok(true) => {} // Recovery is allowed
-            Ok(false) => continue,
-            Err(e) => {
-                error!("Failed to check if recovery is allowed for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
-                continue;
-            }
+        if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
+            debug!("No emergency request timeout to approve");
        }

-        // Get grantor user to send Accepted email
-        let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
-            error!("Grantor user '{}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.grantor_uuid, emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
+        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+        for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
+            // The find_all_recoveries_initiated already checks if the recovery_initiated_at is not null (None)
+            let recovery_allowed_at =
+                emer.recovery_initiated_at.unwrap() + TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(emer.wait_time_days)).unwrap();
+            if recovery_allowed_at.le(&now) {
+                // Only update the access status
+                // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_notification_reminder_job is also active
+                emer.update_access_status_and_save(EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryApproved as i32, &now, &conn)
+                    .await
+                    .expect("Unable to update emergency access status");

-        let Some(grantee_uuid) = emer.grantee_uuid.as_ref() else {
-            error!("Missing grantee for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
+                if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+                    // get grantor user to send Accepted email
+                    let grantor_user =
+                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await.expect("Grantor user not found");

-        // Get grantee user to send Accepted email
-        let Some(grantee_user) = User::find_by_uuid(grantee_uuid, &conn).await else {
-            error!("Grantee user '{grantee_uuid}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
+                    // get grantee user to send Accepted email
+                    let grantee_user =
+                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantee_uuid.clone().expect("Grantee user invalid"), &conn)
+                            .await
+                            .expect("Grantee user not found");

-        // Only update the access status
-        // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_notification_reminder_job is also active
-        let status_initiated = EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryInitiated as i32;
-        let status_approved = EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryApproved as i32;
-        if let Err(e) = emer.update_access_status_and_save(status_initiated, status_approved, &now, &conn).await {
-            error!("Unable to update emergency access status for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        }
+                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_timed_out(
+                        &grantor_user.email,
+                        &grantee_user.name,
+                        emer.get_type_as_str(),
+                    )
+                    .await
+                    .expect("Error on sending email");

-        if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
-            if let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_timed_out(
-                &grantor_user.email,
-                &grantee_user.name,
-                emer.get_type_as_str(),
-            )
-            .await
-            {
-                error!("Failed to send emergency access recovery time-out email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
-            }
-
-            if let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_approved(&grantee_user.email, &grantor_user.name).await
-            {
-                error!("Failed to send emergency access recovery approved email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
+                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_approved(&grantee_user.email, &grantor_user.name)
+                        .await
+                        .expect("Error on sending email");
+                }
            }
        }
+    } else {
+        error!("Failed to get DB connection while searching emergency request timed out");
    }
 }

@@ -844,85 +780,55 @@ pub async fn emergency_notification_reminder_job(pool: DbPool) {
        return;
    }

-    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
-        error!("Failed to get DB connection for emergency reminders!");
-        return;
-    };
+    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
+        let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;

-    let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;
-
-    if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
-        debug!("No emergency request reminder notification to send");
-        return;
-    }
-
-    let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-    for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
-        let Ok(deadline_at) = emer.deadline_at() else {
-            error!("Invalid deadline for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
-        let Some(final_reminder_at) = deadline_at.checked_sub_days(chrono::Days::new(1)) else {
-            error!("Cannot calculate reminder date for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
-        // Only send reminders during the last 24 hours, else continue
-        if now < final_reminder_at || now >= deadline_at {
-            continue;
+        if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
+            debug!("No emergency request reminder notification to send");
        }

-        // Check if we did not sent a recovery mail in the past 24h already, else skip it.
-        // In case something goes wrong with the date calculation or `last_notification_at` is None we use now.
-        // This is to prevent possible missed reminders, this might cause an extra reminder,
-        // but that is better then no reminder at all.
-        let next_reminder_at = if let Some(last_notification_at) = emer.last_notification_at {
-            last_notification_at.checked_add_days(chrono::Days::new(1)).unwrap_or(now)
-        } else {
-            now
-        };
+        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+        for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
+            // The find_all_recoveries_initiated already checks if the recovery_initiated_at is not null (None)
+            // Calculate the day before the recovery will become active
+            let final_recovery_reminder_at =
+                emer.recovery_initiated_at.unwrap() + TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(emer.wait_time_days - 1)).unwrap();
+            // Calculate if a day has passed since the previous notification, else no notification has been sent before
+            let next_recovery_reminder_at = if let Some(last_notification_at) = emer.last_notification_at {
+                last_notification_at + TimeDelta::try_days(1).unwrap()
+            } else {
+                now
+            };
+            if final_recovery_reminder_at.le(&now) && next_recovery_reminder_at.le(&now) {
+                // Only update the last notification date
+                // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_request_timeout_job is also active
+                emer.update_last_notification_date_and_save(&now, &conn)
+                    .await
+                    .expect("Unable to update emergency access notification date");

-        // Only send a reminder if the `next_reminder_at` is less then or equal to `now`
-        // Else we can skip the current emergency access this run.
-        if next_reminder_at.gt(&now) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        // Get grantor user to send Reminder email
-        let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
-            error!("Grantor user '{}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.grantor_uuid, emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
-        let Some(grantee_uuid) = emer.grantee_uuid.as_ref() else {
-            error!("Missing grantee for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
-        // Get grantee user to send Reminder email
-        let Some(grantee_user) = User::find_by_uuid(grantee_uuid, &conn).await else {
-            error!("Grantee user '{grantee_uuid}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
-        // Only update the last notification date
-        // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_request_timeout_job is also active
-        if let Err(e) = emer.update_last_notification_date_and_save(&now, &conn).await {
-            error!("Unable to update emergency access reminder date for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
-            && let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_reminder(
-                &grantor_user.email,
-                &grantee_user.name,
-                emer.get_type_as_str(),
-                "1", // This notification is only triggered one day before the activation
-            )
-            .await
-        {
-            error!("Failed to send emergency access reminder email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
+                if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+                    // get grantor user to send Accepted email
+                    let grantor_user =
+                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await.expect("Grantor user not found");
+
+                    // get grantee user to send Accepted email
+                    let grantee_user =
+                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantee_uuid.clone().expect("Grantee user invalid"), &conn)
+                            .await
+                            .expect("Grantee user not found");
+
+                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_reminder(
+                        &grantor_user.email,
+                        &grantee_user.name,
+                        emer.get_type_as_str(),
+                        "1", // This notification is only triggered one day before the activation
+                    )
+                    .await
+                    .expect("Error on sending email");
+                }
+            }
        }
+    } else {
+        error!("Failed to get DB connection while searching emergency notification reminder");
    }
 }
@@ -242,11 +242,11 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
    Ok(())
 }

-pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: EventType, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
+pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: i32, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
    if !CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
        return;
    }
-    log_user_event_impl(event_type as i32, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
+    log_user_event_impl(event_type, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
 }

 async fn log_user_event_impl(
@@ -347,17 +347,14 @@ async fn log_event_impl(

 pub async fn event_cleanup_job(pool: DbPool) {
    debug!("Start events cleanup job");
-    if CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_none_or(|d| d == 0) {
-        debug!("events_days_retain is not configured or set to 0, skipping");
+    if CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_none() {
+        debug!("events_days_retain is not configured, abort");
        return;
    }

-    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
+    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
+        Event::clean_events(&conn).await.ok();
+    } else {
        error!("Failed to get DB connection while trying to cleanup the events table");
-        return;
-    };
-
-    if let Err(e) = Event::clean_events(&conn).await {
-        error!("Failed to cleanup the events table: {e}");
    }
 }
@@ -26,8 +26,6 @@ use crate::{
    util::{NumberOrString, convert_json_key_lcase_first},
 };

-use super::accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData};
-
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
    routes![
        get_organization,
@@ -1831,7 +1829,7 @@ async fn post_org_import(
        cipher_data.folder_id = None;
        // Replace the client-provided, unvalidated organizationId with the real target org
        cipher_data.organization_id = Some(org_id.clone());
-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type);
        update_cipher_from_data(
            &mut cipher,
            cipher_data,
@@ -2753,14 +2751,9 @@ struct OrganizationUserResetPasswordEnrollmentRequest {
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest {
-    // Legacy payload
    new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
    key: Option<String>,

-    // Current payload
-    authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
-    unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
-
    #[serde(default)]
    reset_master_password: bool,
    #[serde(default)]
@@ -2840,34 +2833,11 @@ async fn recover_account(

    let fallback_2fa_email =
        if req.reset_two_factor && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.email_2fa_auto_fallback() && user.verified() {
-            TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await.is_none()
+            TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, &conn).await.is_none()
        } else {
            false
        };

-    // Check the new password before the email below, so that a rejected request doesn't tell the user
-    // their password was reset
-    let new_password = if req.reset_master_password {
-        let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) = if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) =
-            (req.authentication_data, req.unlock_data)
-        {
-            authentication_data.check(&user, &unlock_data)?;
-
-            if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&user) {
-                err!("KDF settings do not match the user account")
-            }
-
-            (authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
-        } else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (req.new_master_password_hash, req.key) {
-            (new_master_password_hash, new_key)
-        } else {
-            err_code!("Unprocessable request", "Missing fields to reset password", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
-        };
-        Some((new_master_password_hash, new_key))
-    } else {
-        None
-    };
-
    // Sending email first ensure working email configuration and the resulting user notification.
    // Also this might add some protection against security flaws and misuse
    if let Err(e) = mail::send_admin_account_recovery(
@@ -2883,8 +2853,14 @@ async fn recover_account(
        err!(format!("Error sending user reset password email: {e:#?}"));
    }

-    if let Some((new_master_password_hash, new_key)) = new_password {
-        user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
+    if req.reset_master_password {
+        if let Some(key) = req.key
+            && let Some(hash) = req.new_master_password_hash
+        {
+            user.set_password(hash.as_str(), Some(key), true, None, &conn).await?;
+        } else {
+            err_code!("Unprocessable request", "Missing fields to reset password", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
+        }
    }

    if req.reset_two_factor {
@@ -2943,7 +2919,6 @@ async fn get_reset_password_details(
        "kdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
        "kdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
        "kdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
-        "masterPasswordSalt": user.master_password_salt(),
        "resetPasswordKey": member.reset_password_key,
        "encryptedPrivateKey": org.private_key,
    })))
@@ -137,13 +137,9 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn

    if CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() {
        for group_data in &data.groups {
-            let group_uuid = if let Some(mut group) =
+            let group_uuid = if let Some(group) =
                Group::find_by_external_id_and_org(&group_data.external_id, &org_id, &conn).await
            {
-                if group.name != group_data.name {
-                    group.name = group_data.name.clone();
-                    group.save(&conn).await?;
-                }
                group.uuid
            } else {
                let mut group =
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};

 use crate::{
    api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event, core::two_factor::generate_recover_code},
-    auth::{ClientIp, Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::{ClientIp, Headers},
    crypto,
    db::{
        DbConn,
-        models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
+        models::{Device, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
    },
    util::NumberOrString,
 };
@@ -20,23 +20,27 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {

 #[post("/two-factor/get-authenticator", data = "<data>")]
 async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
    let user = headers.user;

    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;

-    let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await;
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32;
+    let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await;

    let (enabled, key) = match twofactor {
        Some(tf) => (true, tf.data),
        _ => (false, crypto::encode_random_bytes::<20>(&BASE32)),
    };

+    // Upstream seems to also return `userVerificationToken`, but doesn't seem to be used at all.
+    // It should help prevent TOTP disclosure if someone keeps their vault unlocked.
+    // Since it doesn't seem to be used, and also does not cause any issues, lets leave it out of the response.
+    // See: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Auth/Controllers/TwoFactorController.cs#L94
    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "authenticator": json!({
-            "enabled": enabled,
-            "key": key,
-        }),
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::authenticator_token(user.uuid, key, enabled),
+        "enabled": enabled,
+        "key": key,
+        "object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
    })))
 }

@@ -45,7 +49,8 @@ async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers,
 struct EnableAuthenticatorData {
    key: String,
    token: NumberOrString,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 #[post("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
@@ -56,7 +61,12 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He

    let mut user = headers.user;

-    two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &key, false)?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;

    // Validate key as base32 and 20 bytes length
    let decoded_key: Vec<u8> = if let Ok(decoded) = BASE32.decode(key.as_bytes()) {
@@ -74,13 +84,12 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He

    generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;

    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "authenticator": json!({
-            "enabled": true,
-            "key": key,
-        }),
+        "enabled": true,
+        "key": key,
+        "object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
    })))
 }

@@ -116,7 +125,8 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
        err!("Invalid TOTP secret")
    };

-    let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, conn).await {
+    let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32, conn).await
+    {
        Some(tf) => tf,
        _ => TwoFactor::new(user_id.clone(), TwoFactorType::Authenticator, secret.to_owned()),
    };
@@ -174,25 +184,37 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct DisableAuthenticatorData {
    key: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: String,
+    r#type: NumberOrString,
 }

 #[delete("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
-async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
    let user = headers.user;
+    let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;

-    two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &data.key, true)?;
+    if !user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
+        err!("Invalid password");
+    }

-    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await {
+    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
        if twofactor.data == data.key {
            twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
-            log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+            Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
+            log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+                .await;
        } else {
            err!(format!("TOTP key for user {} does not match recorded value, cannot deactivate", &user.email));
        }
    }

-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
+        super::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+    }

-    Ok(())
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "enabled": false,
+        "keys": type_,
+        "object": "twoFactorProvider"
+    })))
 }
@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ use chrono::Utc;
 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};

 use crate::{
+    CONFIG,
    api::{
-        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::log_user_event,
-        core::two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
+        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event,
+        core::two_factor::generate_recover_code,
    },
-    auth::{Headers, two_factor, two_factor::DuoData},
+    auth::Headers,
    crypto,
    db::{
        DbConn,
@@ -18,7 +18,55 @@ use crate::{
 };

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put, disable_duo,]
+    routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put,]
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct DuoData {
+    host: String, // Duo API hostname
+    ik: String,   // client id
+    sk: String,   // client secret
+}
+
+impl DuoData {
+    fn global() -> Option<Self> {
+        match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
+            (true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
+                host,
+                ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
+                sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
+            }),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+    fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            host: s.into(),
+            ik: s.into(),
+            sk: s.into(),
+        }
+    }
+    fn secret() -> Self {
+        Self::msg("<global_secret>")
+    }
+    fn obscure(self) -> Self {
+        let mut host = self.host;
+        let mut ik = self.ik;
+        let mut sk = self.sk;
+
+        let digits = 4;
+        let replaced = "************";
+
+        host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+        ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+        sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+
+        Self {
+            host,
+            ik,
+            sk,
+        }
+    }
 }

 enum DuoStatus {
@@ -47,19 +95,22 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)

    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;

-    let (enabled, duo) = match get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await {
+    let data = get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await;
+
+    let (enabled, data) = match data {
        DuoStatus::Global(_) => (true, Some(DuoData::secret())),
        DuoStatus::User(data) => (true, Some(data.obscure())),
        DuoStatus::Disabled(true) => (false, Some(DuoData::msg(DISABLED_MESSAGE_DEFAULT))),
        DuoStatus::Disabled(false) => (false, None),
    };

-    let duo_json = if let Some(data) = duo.as_ref() {
+    let json = if let Some(data) = data {
        json!({
            "enabled": enabled,
            "host": data.host,
            "clientSecret": data.sk,
            "clientId": data.ik,
+            "object": "twoFactorDuo"
        })
    } else {
        json!({
@@ -67,13 +118,11 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
            "host": null,
            "clientSecret": null,
            "clientId": null,
+            "object": "twoFactorDuo"
        })
    };

-    Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
-        "duo": duo_json,
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::duo_token(user.uuid, duo, enabled),
-    })))
+    Ok(Json(json))
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -82,7 +131,8 @@ struct EnableDuoData {
    host: String,
    client_secret: String,
    client_id: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 impl From<EnableDuoData> for DuoData {
@@ -109,7 +159,12 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
    let data: EnableDuoData = data.into_inner();
    let mut user = headers.user;

-    two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, None, false)?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
+        otp: data.otp.clone(),
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;

    let (data, data_str) = if check_duo_fields_custom(&data) {
        let data_req: DuoData = data.into();
@@ -126,15 +181,14 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)

    generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;

    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "duo": json!({
-            "enabled": true,
-            "host": data.host,
-            "clientSecret": data.sk,
-            "clientId": data.ik,
-        }),
+        "enabled": true,
+        "host": data.host,
+        "clientSecret": data.sk,
+        "clientId": data.ik,
+        "object": "twoFactorDuo"
    })))
 }

@@ -143,29 +197,6 @@ async fn activate_duo_put(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
    activate_duo(data, headers, conn).await
 }

-#[delete("/two-factor/duo", data = "<data>")]
-async fn disable_duo(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Duo, &conn).await {
-        // Apply the same transformation than in `get_duo` to check we are disabling the correct one
-        let duo = match to_user_duo_data(&twofactor) {
-            DuoStatus::Global(_) => Some(DuoData::secret()),
-            DuoStatus::User(data) => Some(data.obscure()),
-            DuoStatus::Disabled(_) => None,
-        };
-
-        two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, duo.as_ref(), true)?;
-
-        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-    }
-
-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData) -> EmptyResult {
    use reqwest::{Method, header};
    use std::str::FromStr;
@@ -191,15 +222,13 @@ async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData)
 }

 async fn get_user_duo_data(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> DuoStatus {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Duo as i32;
+
    // If the user doesn't have an entry, disabled
-    let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Duo, conn).await else {
+    let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await else {
        return DuoStatus::Disabled(DuoData::global().is_some());
    };

-    to_user_duo_data(&twofactor)
-}
-
-fn to_user_duo_data(twofactor: &TwoFactor) -> DuoStatus {
    // If the user has the required values, we use those
    if let Ok(data) = serde_json::from_str(&twofactor.data) {
        return DuoStatus::User(data);
@@ -5,26 +5,20 @@ use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{
        EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{
-            log_user_event,
-            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
-        },
+        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
    },
-    auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers},
    crypto,
    db::{
        DbConn,
-        models::{
-            AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User,
-            UserId,
-        },
+        models::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, User, UserId},
    },
    error::{Error, MapResult},
    mail,
 };

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email, disable_email]
+    routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email,]
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -97,20 +91,6 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
            {
                err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "Invalid device, IP or code")
            }
-        } else if let Some(device_identifier) = &data.device_identifier {
-            // iOS/Android SSO logins send the email and device id but no password hash,
-            // so accept a device that has a pending 2FA login for this user
-            if TwoFactorIncomplete::find_by_user_and_device(&user.uuid, device_identifier, &conn).await.is_none() {
-                err!(
-                    "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
-                    format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, email.escape_debug())
-                )
-            }
-            debug!(
-                "Email 2FA fallback: pending login. Username: {}. Device: {}.",
-                user.email,
-                device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug()
-            );
        } else {
            err!("No password hash has been submitted.")
        }
@@ -124,7 +104,7 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
        let Some(user) = User::find_by_device_for_email2fa(device_identifier, &conn).await else {
            err!(
                "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
-                format!("IP: {}. Device: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug())
+                format!("IP: {}. Device: {device_identifier}.", client_headers.ip.ip)
            )
        };

@@ -136,8 +116,8 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client

 /// Generate the token, save the data for later verification and send email to user
 pub async fn send_token(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let mut twofactor =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
+    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;

    let generated_token = crypto::generate_email_token(CONFIG.email_token_size());

@@ -160,19 +140,18 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;

    let (enabled, mfa_email) =
-        if let Some(x) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
-            let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
-            (true, Some(twofactor_data.email))
-        } else {
-            (false, None)
+        match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, &conn).await {
+            Some(x) => {
+                let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
+                (true, json!(twofactor_data.email))
+            }
+            _ => (false, serde_json::value::Value::Null),
        };

-    Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
-        "email": rocket::serde::json::json!({
-            "enabled": enabled,
-            "email": mfa_email,
-        }),
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::email_token(user.uuid, mfa_email, enabled),
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "email": mfa_email,
+        "enabled": enabled,
+        "object": "twoFactorEmail"
    })))
 }

@@ -181,22 +160,30 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
 struct SendEmailData {
    /// Email where 2FA codes will be sent to, can be different than user email account.
    email: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 /// Send a verification email to the specified email address to check whether it exists/belongs to user.
 #[post("/two-factor/send-email", data = "<data>")]
-async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    let data: SendEmailData = data.into_inner();
    let user = headers.user;

-    two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email.clone(), false)?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, false, &conn)
+    .await?;

    if !CONFIG._enable_email_2fa() {
        err!("Email 2FA is disabled")
    }

-    if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
+
+    if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
        tf.delete(&conn).await?;
    }

@@ -204,13 +191,12 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
    let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(data.email, Some(generated_token));

    // Uses EmailVerificationChallenge as type to show that it's not verified yet.
-    let twofactor =
-        TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
+    let twofactor = TwoFactor::new(user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
    twofactor.save(&conn).await?;

    mail::send_token(&twofactor_data.email, &twofactor_data.last_token.map_res("Token is empty")?).await?;

-    Ok(Json(json!({})))
+    Ok(())
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)]
@@ -218,7 +204,8 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
 struct EmailData {
    email: String,
    token: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 /// Verify email belongs to user and can be used for 2FA email codes.
@@ -227,11 +214,17 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
    let data: EmailData = data.into_inner();
    let mut user = headers.user;

-    two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email, false)?;
+    // This is the last step in the verification process, delete the otp directly afterwards
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;

-    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, &conn)
-        .await
-        .map_res("Two factor not found")?;
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge as i32;
+    let mut twofactor =
+        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;

    let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;

@@ -250,26 +243,13 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes

    generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;

-    Ok(Json(json!({})))
-}
-
-#[delete("/two-factor/email", data = "<data>")]
-async fn disable_email(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
-        let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
-        two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, twofactor_data.email, true)?;
-
-        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-    }
-
-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-
-    Ok(())
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "email": email_data.email,
+        "enabled": "true",
+        "object": "twoFactorEmail"
+    })))
 }

 /// Validate the email code when used as TwoFactor token mechanism
@@ -281,8 +261,9 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
    conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
    let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(data)?;
-    let mut twofactor =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
+    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, conn)
+        .await
+        .map_res("Two factor not found")?;
    let Some(issued_token) = &email_data.last_token else {
        err!(
            format!("No token available! IP: {ip}"),
@@ -294,7 +275,7 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(

    if !crypto::ct_eq(issued_token, token) {
        email_data.add_attempt();
-        if email_data.attempts >= u64::from(CONFIG.email_attempts_limit()) {
+        if email_data.attempts >= CONFIG.email_attempts_limit() {
            email_data.reset_token();
        }
        twofactor.data = email_data.to_json();
@@ -313,7 +294,7 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
    twofactor.save(conn).await?;

    let dt = DateTime::from_timestamp(email_data.token_sent, 0).expect("Email token timestamp invalid.").naive_utc();
-    let max_time = i64::from(CONFIG.email_expiration_time());
+    let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time().cast_signed();
    if dt + TimeDelta::try_seconds(max_time).unwrap() < Utc::now().naive_utc() {
        err!(
            "Token has expired",
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ use serde_json::Value;

 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
-    api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_event},
+    api::{
+        EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
+        core::{log_event, log_user_event},
+    },
    auth::Headers,
    crypto,
    db::{
@@ -18,6 +21,7 @@ use crate::{
        },
    },
    mail,
+    util::NumberOrString,
 };

 pub mod authenticator;
@@ -65,7 +69,7 @@ pub fn is_twofactor_provider_usable(provider_type: &TwoFactorType, provider_data
 }

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, get_device_verification_settings];
+    let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, disable_twofactor, get_device_verification_settings];

    routes.append(&mut authenticator::routes());
    routes.append(&mut duo::routes());
@@ -77,12 +81,6 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
    routes
 }

-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct VerificationTokenData {
-    user_verification_token: String,
-}
-
 #[get("/two-factor")]
 async fn get_twofactor(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value> {
    let twofactors = TwoFactor::find_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await;
@@ -122,14 +120,45 @@ async fn generate_recover_code(user: &mut User, conn: &DbConn) {
    }
 }

-/// Call after a 2FA provider, or one of its keys, was removed. No remembered device may keep skipping
-/// the providers that are left, and once every provider is gone the 2FA policy applies.
-pub async fn check_2fa_state(user: &User, device_type: i32, ip: &std::net::IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
-    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await.is_empty() {
-        enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device_type, ip, conn).await?;
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct DisableTwoFactorData {
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
+    r#type: NumberOrString,
+}
+
+#[put("/two-factor/disable", data = "<data>")]
+async fn disable_twofactor(data: Json<DisableTwoFactorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let data: DisableTwoFactorData = data.into_inner();
+    let user = headers.user;
+
+    // Delete directly after a valid token has been provided
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
    }
-    Ok(())
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;
+
+    let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
+
+    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
+        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
+        Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
+        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+            .await;
+    }
+
+    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
+        enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "enabled": false,
+        "type": type_,
+        "object": "twoFactorProvider"
+    })))
 }

 pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy(
@@ -196,7 +225,7 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy_for_org(
 pub async fn send_incomplete_2fa_notifications(pool: DbPool) {
    debug!("Sending notifications for incomplete 2FA logins");

-    if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() == 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+    if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() <= 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
        return;
    }

@@ -206,21 +235,11 @@ pub async fn send_incomplete_2fa_notifications(pool: DbPool) {
    };

    let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-    let Some(time_limit) = TimeDelta::try_minutes(i64::from(CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit())) else {
-        error!("Failed to calculate the time limit for sending incomplete 2fa attempts");
-        return;
-    };
-    let Some(time_before) = now.checked_sub_signed(time_limit) else {
-        error!("Failed to calculate the timestamp for sending incomplete 2fa attempts");
-        return;
-    };
-
+    let time_limit = TimeDelta::try_minutes(CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit()).unwrap();
+    let time_before = now - time_limit;
    let incomplete_logins = TwoFactorIncomplete::find_logins_before(&time_before, &conn).await;
    for login in incomplete_logins {
-        let Some(user) = User::find_by_uuid(&login.user_uuid, &conn).await else {
-            error!("User '{}', not found!", login.user_uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
+        let user = User::find_by_uuid(&login.user_uuid, &conn).await.expect("User not found");
        info!(
            "User {} did not complete a 2FA login within the configured time limit. IP: {}",
            user.email, login.ip_address
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ async fn request_otp(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    let user = headers.user;

    // Only one Protected Action per user is allowed to take place, delete the previous one
-    if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, &conn).await {
+    if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, &conn).await
+    {
        let pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
        let elapsed = pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds();
        let delay = 30;
@@ -124,28 +125,27 @@ pub async fn validate_protected_action_otp(
    delete_if_valid: bool,
    conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
-    let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, conn)
+    let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, conn)
        .await
        .map_res("Protected action token not found, try sending the code again or restart the process")?;
    let mut pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
+    pa_data.add_attempt();
+    pa.data = pa_data.to_json();

    // Fail after x attempts if the token has been used too many times.
    // Don't delete it, as we use it to keep track of attempts.
-    if pa_data.attempts >= u64::from(CONFIG.email_attempts_limit()) {
+    if pa_data.attempts >= CONFIG.email_attempts_limit() {
        err!("Token has expired")
    }

    // Check if the token has expired (Using the email 2fa expiration time)
-    let max_time = i64::from(CONFIG.email_expiration_time());
+    let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time().cast_signed();
    if pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds() > max_time {
        pa.delete(conn).await?;
        err!("Token has expired")
    }

    if !crypto::ct_eq(&pa_data.token, otp) {
-        pa_data.add_attempt();
-        pa.data = pa_data.to_json();
-
        pa.save(conn).await?;
        err!("Token is invalid")
    }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use std::{collections::HashSet, str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
+use std::{str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};

 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -18,18 +18,16 @@ use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{
        EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{
-            log_user_event,
-            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
-        },
+        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
    },
-    auth::{Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::Headers,
    crypto::ct_eq,
    db::{
        DbConn,
-        models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
+        models::{Device, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
    },
    error::Error,
+    util::NumberOrString,
 };

 static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
@@ -47,14 +45,7 @@ static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
 });

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![
-        get_webauthn,
-        generate_webauthn_challenge,
-        activate_webauthn,
-        activate_webauthn_put,
-        delete_webauthn,
-        delete_webauthns
-    ]
+    routes![get_webauthn, generate_webauthn_challenge, activate_webauthn, activate_webauthn_put, delete_webauthn,]
 }

 // Some old u2f structs still needed for migrating from u2f to WebAuthn
@@ -128,36 +119,34 @@ async fn get_webauthn(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;

    let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
-    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
    let registrations_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();

    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "webAuthn": json!({
-            "enabled": enabled,
-            "keys": registrations_json,
-        }),
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::webauthn_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
+        "enabled": enabled,
+        "keys": registrations_json,
+        "object": "twoFactorWebAuthn"
    })))
 }

 #[post("/two-factor/get-webauthn-challenge", data = "<data>")]
-async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
    let user = headers.user;

-    let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
-    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
-    let creds = registrations
+    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
+
+    let registrations = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn)
+        .await?
+        .1
        .into_iter()
        .map(|r| r.credential.cred_id().to_owned()) // We return the credentialIds to the clients to avoid double registering
        .collect();

-    two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, enabled)?;
-
    let (mut challenge, state) = WEBAUTHN.start_passkey_registration(
        Uuid::from_str(&user.uuid).expect("Failed to parse UUID"), // Should never fail
        &user.email,
        user.display_name(),
-        Some(creds),
+        Some(registrations),
    )?;

    let mut state = serde_json::to_value(&state)?;
@@ -177,19 +166,17 @@ async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers:
    let mut challenge_value = serde_json::to_value(challenge.public_key)?;
    challenge_value["status"] = "ok".into();
    challenge_value["errorMessage"] = "".into();
-
-    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "options": challenge_value
-    })))
+    Ok(Json(challenge_value))
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct EnableWebauthnData {
-    id: i32,
+    id: NumberOrString, // 1..5
    name: String,
    device_response: RegisterPublicKeyCredentialCopy,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -270,14 +257,16 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
    let data: EnableWebauthnData = data.into_inner();
    let mut user = headers.user;

-    let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
-    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
-    two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, !keys.is_empty())?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;

    // Retrieve and delete the saved challenge state
-    let state = if let Some(tf) =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge, &conn).await
-    {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge as i32;
+    let state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
        let state: PasskeyRegistration = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
        tf.delete(&conn).await?;
        state
@@ -288,9 +277,10 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
    // Verify the credentials with the saved state
    let credential = WEBAUTHN.finish_passkey_registration(&data.device_response.into(), &state)?;

+    let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
    // TODO: Check for repeated ID's
    registrations.push(WebauthnRegistration {
-        id: data.id,
+        id: data.id.into_i32()?,
        name: data.name,
        migrated: false,

@@ -303,13 +293,13 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
        .await?;
    generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;

+    let keys_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "webAuthn": json!({
-            "enabled": true,
-            "keys": registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
-        }),
+        "enabled": true,
+        "keys": keys_json,
+        "object": "twoFactorU2f"
    })))
 }

@@ -320,87 +310,58 @@ async fn activate_webauthn_put(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers,

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct DeleteWebauthnData {
-    id: i32,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+struct DeleteU2FData {
+    id: NumberOrString,
+    master_password_hash: String,
 }

 #[delete("/two-factor/webauthn", data = "<data>")]
-async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |key| key.id != data.id, headers, &conn).await
-}
+async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteU2FData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let id = data.id.into_i32()?;
+    if !headers.user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
+        err!("Invalid password");
+    }

-#[delete("/two-factor/webauthn/all", data = "<data>")]
-async fn delete_webauthns(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |_| false, headers, &conn).await
-}
-
-async fn inner_delete_webauthns(
-    token: &str,
-    retain: impl Fn(&WebauthnRegistration) -> bool,
-    headers: Headers,
-    conn: &DbConn,
-) -> JsonResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    let Some(mut tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await else {
+    let Some(mut tf) =
+        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32, &conn).await
+    else {
        err!("Webauthn data not found!")
    };

-    let mut keys: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
-    let keys_id: Vec<i32> = keys.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
+    let mut data: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;

-    two_factor::validate_webauthn(token, &user.uuid, &keys_id, true)?;
-
-    let mut removed: HashSet<Vec<u8>> = HashSet::new();
-    let mut migrated = false;
-
-    keys.retain(|key| {
-        let retained = retain(key);
-        if !retained {
-            removed.insert(key.credential.cred_id().to_vec());
-            migrated = migrated || key.migrated;
-        }
-        retained
-    });
-
-    if removed.is_empty() {
+    let Some(item_pos) = data.iter().position(|r| r.id == id) else {
        err!("Webauthn entry not found")
-    }
+    };

-    if keys.is_empty() {
-        tf.delete(conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await;
-    } else {
-        tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&keys)?;
-        tf.save(conn).await?;
-        drop(tf);
-    }
+    let removed_item = data.remove(item_pos);
+    tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
+    tf.save(&conn).await?;
+    drop(tf);
+    Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;

    // If entry is migrated from u2f, delete the u2f entry as well
-    if migrated && let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f, conn).await {
-        let Ok(mut data) = serde_json::from_str::<Vec<U2FRegistration>>(&u2f.data) else {
+    if let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f as i32, &conn).await
+    {
+        let mut data: Vec<U2FRegistration> = if let Ok(d) = serde_json::from_str(&u2f.data) {
+            d
+        } else {
            err!("Error parsing U2F data")
        };

-        data.retain(|old| !removed.contains(&old.reg.key_handle));
+        data.retain(|r| r.reg.key_handle != removed_item.credential.cred_id().as_slice());
+        let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;

-        if data.is_empty() {
-            u2f.delete(conn).await?;
-        } else {
-            let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
-            u2f.data = new_data_str;
-            u2f.save(conn).await?;
-        }
+        u2f.data = new_data_str;
+        u2f.save(&conn).await?;
    }

-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await?;
+    let keys_json: Vec<Value> = data.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();

    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "webAuthn": json!({
-            "enabled": !keys.is_empty(),
-            "keys": keys.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
-        }),
+        "enabled": true,
+        "keys": keys_json,
+        "object": "twoFactorU2f"
    })))
 }

@@ -408,7 +369,8 @@ pub async fn get_webauthn_registrations(
    user_id: &UserId,
    conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> Result<(bool, Vec<WebauthnRegistration>), Error> {
-    match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32;
+    match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
        Some(tf) => Ok((tf.enabled, serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?)),
        None => Ok((false, Vec::new())), // If no data, return empty list
    }
@@ -455,9 +417,8 @@ pub async fn generate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> JsonRes
 }

 pub async fn validate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, response: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let mut state = if let Some(tf) =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge, conn).await
-    {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge as i32;
+    let mut state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
        let state: PasskeyAuthentication = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
        tf.delete(conn).await?;
        state
@@ -10,12 +10,9 @@ use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{
        EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{
-            log_user_event,
-            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
-        },
+        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
    },
-    auth::{Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::Headers,
    db::{
        DbConn,
        models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType},
@@ -25,7 +22,7 @@ use crate::{
 };

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put, delete_yubikeys,]
+    routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put,]
 }

 struct HttpClientTransport {
@@ -63,7 +60,8 @@ struct EnableYubikeyData {
    key4: Option<String>,
    key5: Option<String>,
    nfc: bool,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize, Serialize, Debug)]
@@ -127,47 +125,55 @@ async fn generate_yubikey(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn:
    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;

    let user_id = &user.uuid;
+    let yubikey_type = TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32;

-    let (enabled, keys, yubikey_json) =
-        if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
-            let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
-            let enabled = !yubikey_metadata.keys.is_empty();
-            let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys.clone());
-            result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(enabled);
-            result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
-            (enabled, yubikey_metadata.keys, result)
-        } else {
-            (false, Vec::new(), json!({"enabled": false}))
-        };
-    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "yubiKey": yubikey_json,
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::yubikey_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
-    })))
+    let r = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, yubikey_type, &conn).await;
+
+    if let Some(r) = r {
+        let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
+
+        let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
+
+        result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
+        result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
+        result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
+
+        Ok(Json(result))
+    } else {
+        Ok(Json(json!({
+            "enabled": false,
+            "object": "twoFactorU2f",
+        })))
+    }
 }

 #[post("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
 async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
    let data: EnableYubikeyData = data.into_inner();
-    let yubikeys = parse_yubikeys(&data);
    let mut user = headers.user;

+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
+        otp: data.otp.clone(),
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;
+
+    // Check if we already have some data
+    let mut yubikey_data =
+        match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32, &conn).await {
+            Some(data) => data,
+            None => TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new()),
+        };
+
+    let yubikeys = parse_yubikeys(&data);
+
    if yubikeys.is_empty() {
        // Return an error to prevent saving empty keys which would cause users not being able to login anymore.
        // To remove all keys users should click the `Deactivate all keys` button
        err!("A key is required.");
    }

-    // Check if we already have some data
-    let mut yubikey_data =
-        if let Some(yd) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
-            let ym: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&yd.data)?;
-            two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &ym.keys, !ym.keys.is_empty())?;
-            yd
-        } else {
-            two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &Vec::new(), false)?;
-            TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new())
-        };
-
    // Ensure they are valid OTPs
    for yubikey in &yubikeys {
        if yubikey.is_empty() || yubikey.len() == 12 {
@@ -189,12 +195,15 @@ async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn:

    generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;

    let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
+
    result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
    result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
-    Ok(Json(json!({"yubiKey": result})))
+    result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
+
+    Ok(Json(result))
 }

 #[put("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
@@ -202,23 +211,6 @@ async fn activate_yubikey_put(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, c
    activate_yubikey(data, headers, conn).await
 }

-#[delete("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
-async fn delete_yubikeys(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
-        let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
-        two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &yubikey_metadata.keys, true)?;
-
-        r.delete(&conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-    }
-
-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 pub async fn validate_yubikey_login(response: &str, twofactor_data: &str) -> EmptyResult {
    if response.len() != 44 {
        err!("Invalid Yubikey OTP length");
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static CLIENT: LazyLock<Client> = LazyLock::new(|| {
    // Generate the cookie store
    let cookie_store = Arc::new(Jar::default());

-    let icon_download_timeout = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.icon_download_timeout()));
+    let icon_download_timeout = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.icon_download_timeout());
    let pool_idle_timeout = Duration::from_secs(10);
    // Reuse the client between requests
    get_reqwest_client_builder(true)
@@ -193,14 +193,14 @@ async fn get_cached_icon(path: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
    None
 }

-async fn file_is_expired(path: &str, ttl: u32) -> Result<bool, Error> {
+async fn file_is_expired(path: &str, ttl: u64) -> Result<bool, Error> {
    let operator = CONFIG.opendal_operator_for_path_type(&PathType::IconCache)?;
    let meta = operator.stat(path).await?;
    let modified =
        meta.last_modified().ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other(format!("No last modified time for `{path}`")))?;
    let age = SystemTime::now().duration_since(modified.into())?;

-    Ok(ttl > 0 && u64::from(ttl) <= age.as_secs())
+    Ok(ttl > 0 && ttl <= age.as_secs())
 }

 async fn icon_is_negcached(path: &str) -> bool {
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ async fn download_icon(domain: &str) -> Result<(Bytes, Option<&str>), Error> {
                Ok(())
            }) {
                Ok(_) => {
-                    // Also check if the size is at least 67 bytes, which seems to be the smallest png I could create
+                    // Also check if the size is atleast 67 bytes, which seems to be the smallest png i could create
                    if body.len() >= 67 {
                        // Check if the icon type is allowed, else try an icon from the list.
                        icon_type = get_icon_type(&body);
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
        match &login_result {
            Ok(_) => {
                log_user_event(
-                    EventType::UserLoggedIn,
+                    EventType::UserLoggedIn as i32,
                    &user_id,
                    client_header.device_type,
                    &client_header.ip.ip,
@@ -128,7 +128,8 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
            }
            Err(e) => {
                if let Some(ev) = e.get_event() {
-                    log_user_event(ev.event, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+                    log_user_event(ev.event as i32, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn)
+                        .await;
                }
            }
        }
@@ -447,9 +448,9 @@ async fn password_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &
    if user.verified_at.is_none() && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.signups_verify() {
        if user.last_verifying_at.is_none()
            || now.signed_duration_since(user.last_verifying_at.unwrap()).num_seconds()
-                > i64::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_time())
+                > CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_time().cast_signed()
        {
-            let resend_limit = i32::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_limit());
+            let resend_limit = CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_limit().cast_signed();
            if resend_limit == 0 || user.login_verify_count < resend_limit {
                // We want to send another email verification if we require signups to verify
                // their email address, and we haven't sent them a reminder in a while...
@@ -903,7 +904,7 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(

            enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await?;

-            log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
+            log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa as i32, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;

            if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
                && let Err(e) =
@@ -973,7 +974,7 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
            }

            Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::YubiKey) => {
-                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
+                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
                    err!("No YubiKey devices registered")
                };

@@ -985,7 +986,7 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
            }

            Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::Email) => {
-                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
+                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
                    err!("No twofactor email registered")
                };

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ pub type JsonResult = ApiResult<Json<Value>>;
 pub type EmptyResult = ApiResult<()>;

 // Common structs representing JSON data received
-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct PasswordOrOtpData {
    #[serde(alias = "MasterPasswordHash")]
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use std::{
    net::IpAddr,
    sync::{Arc, LazyLock},
-    time::{Duration, Instant},
+    time::Duration,
 };

 use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
@@ -41,14 +41,6 @@ pub static WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS: LazyLock<Arc<AnonymousWebSocketSubscripti
 /// One connection is needed per pending login request, several at once are only expected behind NAT.
 const MAX_ANONYMOUS_CONNECTIONS_PER_IP: u32 = 25;

-/// How often a Ping is sent to the client.
-const WS_PING_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
-
-/// Close the connection if nothing, not even a Pong, was received from the client for this long.
-/// Otherwise half-open connections (client gone without a FIN, e.g. behind a proxy or NAT) are kept forever.
-/// Same as the default `ClientTimeoutInterval` of ASP.NET Core SignalR, which the official server uses.
-const WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
-
 static NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: LazyLock<bool> = LazyLock::new(|| !CONFIG.enable_websocket() && !CONFIG.push_enabled());

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
@@ -164,16 +156,12 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
        rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
            let mut ws = ws;
            let _guard = guard;
-            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
-            let mut last_received = Instant::now();
+            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
            loop {
                tokio::select! {
                    res = ws.next() =>  {
                        match res {
                            Some(Ok(message)) => {
-                                // Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
-                                last_received = Instant::now();
-
                                match message {
                                    // Respond to any pings
                                    Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -207,13 +195,7 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
                        }
                    }

-                    _ = interval.tick() => {
-                        // The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
-                        if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
-                            break;
-                        }
-                        yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
-                    }
+                    _ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
                }
            }
        }}
@@ -247,16 +229,12 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
        rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
            let mut ws = ws;
            let _guard = guard;
-            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
-            let mut last_received = Instant::now();
+            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
            loop {
                tokio::select! {
                    res = ws.next() =>  {
                        match res {
                            Some(Ok(message)) => {
-                                // Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
-                                last_received = Instant::now();
-
                                match message {
                                    // Respond to any pings
                                    Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -290,13 +268,7 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
                        }
                    }

-                    _ = interval.tick() => {
-                        // The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
-                        if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
-                            break;
-                        }
-                        yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
-                    }
+                    _ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
                }
            }
        }}
@@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
-#[path = "auth/two_factor.rs"]
-pub mod two_factor;
-
 #[path = "auth/send.rs"]
 pub mod send;
 pub type SendTokens = send::SendTokens;
@@ -314,17 +311,6 @@ impl LoginJwtClaims {
    }
 }

-fn calculate_invite_expire_hours(now: &DateTime<Utc>) -> Result<DateTime<Utc>, Error> {
-    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
-    let Some(hours_delta) = TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours) else {
-        err!("Unable to calculate time delta for invite expire hours. Check `INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS`.");
-    };
-    let Some(exp) = now.checked_add_signed(hours_delta) else {
-        err!("Unable to calculate invitation expire date. Check `INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS`.");
-    };
-    Ok(exp)
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct InviteJwtClaims {
    // Not before
@@ -348,19 +334,19 @@ pub fn generate_invite_claims(
    org_id: OrganizationId,
    member_id: MembershipId,
    invited_by_email: Option<String>,
-) -> Result<InviteJwtClaims, Error> {
+) -> InviteJwtClaims {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    Ok(InviteJwtClaims {
+    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    InviteJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: exp.timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_INVITE_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: user_id,
        email,
        org_id,
        member_id,
        invited_by_email,
-    })
+    }
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -386,19 +372,19 @@ pub fn generate_emergency_access_invite_claims(
    emer_id: EmergencyAccessId,
    grantor_name: String,
    grantor_email: String,
-) -> Result<EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims, Error> {
+) -> EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    Ok(EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
+    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: exp.timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_EMERGENCY_ACCESS_INVITE_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: user_id,
        email,
        emer_id,
        grantor_name,
        grantor_email,
-    })
+    }
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -532,43 +518,36 @@ impl BasicJwtClaims {
    }
 }

-pub fn generate_delete_claims(uuid: String) -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
+pub fn generate_delete_claims(uuid: String) -> BasicJwtClaims {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
+    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    BasicJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: exp.timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_DELETE_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: uuid,
-    })
+    }
 }

-pub fn generate_verify_email_claims(user_id: &UserId) -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
+pub fn generate_verify_email_claims(user_id: &UserId) -> BasicJwtClaims {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
+    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    BasicJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: exp.timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_VERIFYEMAIL_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: user_id.to_string(),
-    })
+    }
 }

-pub fn generate_admin_claims() -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
+pub fn generate_admin_claims() -> BasicJwtClaims {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let lifetime_minutes = i64::from(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime());
-    let Some(minutes_delta) = TimeDelta::try_minutes(lifetime_minutes) else {
-        err!("Unable to calculate time delta for admin session lifetime. Check `ADMIN_SESSION_LIFETIME`.");
-    };
-    let Some(exp) = time_now.checked_add_signed(minutes_delta) else {
-        err!("Unable to calculate admin session lifetime. Check `ADMIN_SESSION_LIFETIME`.");
-    };
-    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
+    BasicJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: exp.timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime()).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_ADMIN_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: "admin_panel".to_owned(),
-    })
+    }
 }

 pub fn generate_send_claims(send_id: &SendId, file_id: &SendFileId) -> BasicJwtClaims {
@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
-use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, ser::Serialize};
-use std::sync::LazyLock;
-
-use crate::{
-    CONFIG,
-    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult},
-    auth::{decode_jwt, encode_jwt},
-    db::models::UserId,
-};
-
-static JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|api.2fa", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct TwoFactorClaims<T> {
-    // Not before
-    pub nbf: i64,
-    // Expiration time
-    pub exp: i64,
-    // Issuer
-    pub iss: String,
-    // Subject
-    pub sub: UserId,
-
-    pub enabled: bool,
-
-    pub claims: T,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct AuthenticatorClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "authenticator_key")]
-    pub key: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct DuoClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "duo_data")]
-    pub data: Option<DuoData>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct WebauthnClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "webauthn_keys")]
-    pub keys: Vec<i32>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct YubikeyClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "yubi_keys")]
-    pub keys: Vec<String>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
-pub struct DuoData {
-    pub host: String, // Duo API hostname
-    pub ik: String,   // client id
-    pub sk: String,   // client secret
-}
-
-impl DuoData {
-    pub fn global() -> Option<Self> {
-        match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
-            (true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
-                host,
-                ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
-                sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
-            }),
-            _ => None,
-        }
-    }
-    pub fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            host: s.into(),
-            ik: s.into(),
-            sk: s.into(),
-        }
-    }
-    pub fn secret() -> Self {
-        Self::msg("<global_secret>")
-    }
-    pub fn obscure(self) -> Self {
-        let mut host = self.host;
-        let mut ik = self.ik;
-        let mut sk = self.sk;
-
-        let digits = 4;
-        let replaced = "************";
-
-        host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-        ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-        sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-
-        Self {
-            host,
-            ik,
-            sk,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct EmailClaims {
-    pub email: Option<String>,
-}
-
-fn token<T: Serialize>(user_id: UserId, enabled: bool, claims: T) -> String {
-    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let claims = TwoFactorClaims {
-        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap()).timestamp(),
-        iss: JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string(),
-        sub: user_id,
-        enabled,
-        claims,
-    };
-    encode_jwt(&claims)
-}
-
-fn validate<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, enabled: bool) -> ApiResult<T> {
-    match decode_jwt::<TwoFactorClaims<T>>(token, JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string()) {
-        Ok(claims) => {
-            if claims.sub != *user_id {
-                err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid user");
-            }
-            if claims.enabled != enabled {
-                err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid state");
-            }
-            Ok(claims.claims)
-        }
-        Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to decode verification token: {err}")),
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn authenticator_token(user_id: UserId, key: String, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        AuthenticatorClaims {
-            key,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-pub fn validate_authenticator(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, key: &str, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<AuthenticatorClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if claims.key != key {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid key");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn duo_token(user_id: UserId, data: Option<DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        DuoClaims {
-            data,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-// When disabling we check that it's the correct data
-pub fn validate_duo(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, data: Option<&DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<DuoClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if enabled && claims.data.as_ref() != data {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid duo data");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn email_token(user_id: UserId, email: Option<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        EmailClaims {
-            email,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-// When disabling we check that it's the correct `email`
-pub fn validate_email(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, email: String, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<EmailClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if enabled && claims.email != Some(email) {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid email");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn webauthn_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<i32>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        WebauthnClaims {
-            keys,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-pub fn validate_webauthn(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &[i32], enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<WebauthnClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if keys != claims.keys {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn yubikey_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        YubikeyClaims {
-            keys,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-pub fn validate_yubikey(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<YubikeyClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if *keys != claims.keys {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use serde_json::{Value, from_value, to_value};
-
-    fn token<T: Serialize>(claims: T) -> Value {
-        to_value(TwoFactorClaims {
-            nbf: 0,
-            exp: 0,
-            iss: String::new(),
-            sub: UserId::from(String::from("4ff0f0a4-0aa4-4c1d-9d43-1f2bd4d5e8b1")),
-            enabled: false,
-            claims,
-        })
-        .unwrap()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn claims_only_parse_as_their_own_provider() {
-        let tokens = [
-            token(AuthenticatorClaims {
-                key: String::from("JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP"),
-            }),
-            token(DuoClaims {
-                data: None,
-            }),
-            token(WebauthnClaims {
-                keys: vec![1],
-            }),
-            token(YubikeyClaims {
-                keys: Vec::new(),
-            }),
-            token(EmailClaims {
-                email: None,
-            }),
-        ];
-        for (issued, token) in tokens.iter().enumerate() {
-            let parsed = [
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<AuthenticatorClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<DuoClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<WebauthnClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<YubikeyClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<EmailClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-            ];
-            for (checked, ok) in parsed.into_iter().enumerate() {
-                assert_eq!(ok, issued == checked, "token {issued} parsed as {checked}");
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
@@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
            _usr: ConfigBuilder,

            _overrides: Vec<&'static str>,
-            _config_file_status: ConfigFileStatus,
        }

        // Custom Deserialize for ConfigBuilder, mainly based upon https://serde.rs/deserialize-struct.html
@@ -260,18 +259,11 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                builder
            }

-            async fn from_file() -> Result<Option<Self>, Error> {
+            async fn from_file() -> Result<Self, Error> {
                let operator = storage::operator_for_path(&CONFIG_FILE_PARENT_DIR)?;
-                let config_bytes = match operator.read(&CONFIG_FILENAME).await {
-                    Ok(bytes) => bytes,
-                    // No config file is fine, should not return any error
-                    Err(e) if e.kind() == opendal::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
-                    // Any other error might be an issue and should be passed back to the caller
-                    Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
-                };
-                let builder = serde_json::from_slice(&config_bytes.to_vec())?;
+                let config_bytes = operator.read(&CONFIG_FILENAME).await?;
                println!("[INFO] Using saved config from `{}` for configuration.\n", *CONFIG_FILE);
-                Ok(Some(builder))
+                serde_json::from_slice(&config_bytes.to_vec()).map_err(Into::into)
            }

            fn clear_non_editable(&mut self) {
@@ -448,8 +440,6 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                    "domain_origin",
                    "domain_path",
                    "domain",
-                    "duo_ikey",
-                    "duo_host",
                    "helo_name",
                    "org_creation_users",
                    "signups_domains_whitelist",
@@ -461,8 +451,6 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                    "sso_authority",
                    "sso_callback_path",
                    "sso_client_id",
-                    "yubico_client_id",
-                    "yubico_server",
                ];

                let cfg = {
@@ -495,10 +483,6 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                };
                overrides
            }
-
-            pub fn get_config_file_status(&self) -> ConfigFileStatus {
-                self.inner.read().unwrap()._config_file_status
-            }
        }
    };
 }
@@ -555,7 +539,7 @@ make_config! {
    jobs {
        /// Job scheduler poll interval |> How often the job scheduler thread checks for jobs to run.
        /// Set to 0 to globally disable scheduled jobs.
-        job_poll_interval_ms:   u32,    false,  def,    30_000;
+        job_poll_interval_ms:   u64,    false,  def,    30_000;
        /// Send purge schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that checks for Sends past their deletion date.
        /// Defaults to hourly. Set blank to disable this job.
        send_purge_schedule:    String, false,  def,    "0 5 * * * *".to_owned();
@@ -611,19 +595,19 @@ make_config! {
        /// Per-organization attachment storage limit (KB) |> Max kilobytes of attachment storage allowed per org. When this limit is reached, org members will not be allowed to upload further attachments for ciphers owned by that org.
        org_attachment_limit:   i64,    true,   option;
        /// Per-user send storage limit (KB) |> Max kilobytes of sends storage allowed per user. When this limit is reached, the user will not be allowed to upload further sends.
-        user_send_limit:        i64,    true,   option;
+        user_send_limit:   i64,    true,   option;

        /// Trash auto-delete days |> Number of days to wait before auto-deleting a trashed item.
-        /// If unset or 0, trashed items are not auto-deleted. This setting applies globally, so make
+        /// If unset, trashed items are not auto-deleted. This setting applies globally, so make
        /// sure to inform all users of any changes to this setting.
-        trash_auto_delete_days: u16,    true,   option;
+        trash_auto_delete_days: i64,    true,   option;

        /// Incomplete 2FA time limit |> Number of minutes to wait before a 2FA-enabled login is
        /// considered incomplete, resulting in an email notification. An incomplete 2FA login is one
        /// where the correct master password was provided but the required 2FA step was not completed,
        /// which potentially indicates a master password compromise. Set to 0 to disable this check.
        /// This setting applies globally to all users.
-        incomplete_2fa_time_limit: u16, true,   def,    3;
+        incomplete_2fa_time_limit: i64, true,   def,    3;

        /// Disable icon downloads |> Set to true to disable icon downloading in the internal icon service.
        /// This still serves existing icons from $ICON_CACHE_FOLDER, without generating any external
@@ -636,9 +620,9 @@ make_config! {
        /// this will prevent logins from succeeding until the address has been verified
        signups_verify:         bool,   true,   def,    false;
        /// If signups require email verification, automatically re-send verification email if it hasn't been sent for a while (in seconds)
-        signups_verify_resend_time: u32, true,  def,    3_600;
+        signups_verify_resend_time: u64, true,  def,    3_600;
        /// If signups require email verification, limit how many emails are automatically sent when login is attempted (0 means no limit)
-        signups_verify_resend_limit: u16, true, def,    6;
+        signups_verify_resend_limit: u32, true, def,    6;
        /// Email domain whitelist |> Allow signups only from this list of comma-separated domains, even when signups are otherwise disabled
        signups_domains_whitelist: String, true, def,   String::new();
        /// Enable event logging |> Enables event logging for organizations.
@@ -650,7 +634,7 @@ make_config! {
        invitations_allowed:    bool,   true,   def,    true;
        /// Invitation token expiration time (in hours) |> The number of hours after which an organization invite token, emergency access invite token,
        /// email verification token and deletion request token will expire (must be at least 1)
-        invitation_expiration_hours: u16, false, def, 120;
+        invitation_expiration_hours: u32, false, def, 120;
        /// Enable emergency access |> Controls whether users can enable emergency access to their accounts. This setting applies globally to all users.
        emergency_access_allowed:    bool,   true,   def,    true;
        /// Allow email change |> Controls whether users can change their email. This setting applies globally to all users.
@@ -671,8 +655,8 @@ make_config! {
        /// Invitation organization name |> Name shown in the invitation emails that don't come from a specific organization
        invitation_org_name:    String, true,   def,    "Vaultwarden".to_owned();

-        /// Events days retain |> Number of days to retain events stored in the database. If unset or 0, events are kept indefinitely.
-        events_days_retain:     u16,    false,   option;
+        /// Events days retain |> Number of days to retain events stored in the database. If unset, events are kept indefinitely.
+        events_days_retain:     i64,    false,   option;
    },

    client {
@@ -710,13 +694,13 @@ make_config! {
        /// Temporary redirects are useful while testing different icon services, but once a service
        /// has been decided on, consider using permanent redirects for cacheability. The legacy codes
        /// are currently better supported by the Bitwarden clients.
-        icon_redirect_code:     u16,    true,   def,    302;
+        icon_redirect_code:     u32,    true,   def,    302;
        /// Positive icon cache expiry |> Number of seconds to consider that an already cached icon is fresh. After this period, the icon will be refreshed
-        icon_cache_ttl:         u32,    true,   def,    2_592_000;
+        icon_cache_ttl:         u64,    true,   def,    2_592_000;
        /// Negative icon cache expiry |> Number of seconds before trying to download an icon that failed again.
-        icon_cache_negttl:      u32,    true,   def,    259_200;
+        icon_cache_negttl:      u64,    true,   def,    259_200;
        /// Icon download timeout |> Number of seconds when to stop attempting to download an icon.
-        icon_download_timeout:  u16,    true,   def,    10;
+        icon_download_timeout:  u64,    true,   def,    10;

        /// [Deprecated] Icon blacklist Regex |> Use `http_request_block_regex` instead
        icon_blacklist_regex:   String, false,   option;
@@ -767,11 +751,11 @@ make_config! {
        /// Max database connection retries |> Number of times to retry the database connection during startup, with 1 second between each retry, set to 0 to retry indefinitely
        db_connection_retries:  u32,    false,  def,    15;

-        /// Timeout in seconds when acquiring database connection
-        database_timeout:       u32,    false,  def,    30;
+        /// Timeout when acquiring database connection
+        database_timeout:       u64,    false,  def,    30;

        /// Timeout in seconds before idle connections to the database are closed
-        database_idle_timeout:  u32,    false, def,     600;
+        database_idle_timeout:  u64,    false, def,     600;

        /// Database connection max pool size
        database_max_conns:     u32,    false,  def,    10;
@@ -788,26 +772,26 @@ make_config! {
        /// Allowed iframe ancestors (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains to embed the web vault into an iframe, useful for embedding into secure intranets
        allowed_iframe_ancestors: String, true, def,    String::new();

-        /// Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains for URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
+        /// Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains to URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
        allowed_connect_src:      String, true, def,    String::new();

        /// Seconds between login requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between login and 2FA requests from the same IP address before rate limiting kicks in
-        login_ratelimit_seconds:       u16, false, def, 60;
+        login_ratelimit_seconds:       u64, false, def, 60;
        /// Max burst size for login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `login_ratelimit_seconds`. Note that this applies to both the login and the 2FA, so it's recommended to allow a burst size of at least 2
-        login_ratelimit_max_burst:     u16, false, def, 10;
+        login_ratelimit_max_burst:     u32, false, def, 10;

        /// Seconds between unauthenticated requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between requests from the same IP address to any of the rate limited unauthenticated endpoints
-        unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds:   u16, false, def, 60;
+        unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds:   u64, false, def, 60;
        /// Max burst size for unauthenticated requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds`. This is shared between several endpoints, so it needs to be more lenient than the login one
-        unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst: u16, false, def, 50;
+        unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst: u32, false, def, 50;

        /// Seconds between admin login requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between admin requests from the same IP address before rate limiting kicks in
-        admin_ratelimit_seconds:       u16, false, def, 300;
+        admin_ratelimit_seconds:       u64, false, def, 300;
        /// Max burst size for admin login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `admin_ratelimit_seconds`
-        admin_ratelimit_max_burst:     u16, false, def, 3;
+        admin_ratelimit_max_burst:     u32, false, def, 3;

        /// Admin session lifetime |> Set the lifetime of admin sessions to this value (in minutes).
-        admin_session_lifetime:        u32, true,  def, 20;
+        admin_session_lifetime:        i64, true,  def, 20;

        /// Enable groups (BETA!) (Know the risks!) |> Enables groups support for organizations (Currently contains known issues!).
        org_groups_enabled:            bool, false, def, false;
@@ -860,8 +844,8 @@ make_config! {
        sso_master_password_policy:     String, true,  option;
        /// Use SSO only for auth not the session lifecycle |> Use default Vaultwarden session lifecycle (Idle refresh token valid for 30days)
        sso_auth_only_not_session:      bool,   true,   def,    false;
-        /// Client cache for discovery endpoint. |> Duration in seconds (0 to disable). More details: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-SSO-support-using-OpenId-Connect#client-cache
-        sso_client_cache_expiration:    u32,    true,   def,    0;
+        /// Client cache for discovery endpoint. |> Duration in seconds (0 or less to disable). More details: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-SSO-support-using-OpenId-Connect#client-cache
+        sso_client_cache_expiration:    u64,    true,   def,    0;
        /// Log all tokens |> `LOG_LEVEL=debug` or `LOG_LEVEL=info,vaultwarden::sso=debug` is required
        sso_debug_tokens:               bool,   true,   def,    false;
    },
@@ -919,11 +903,11 @@ make_config! {
        /// SMTP Auth mechanism |> Defaults for SSL is "Plain" and "Login" and nothing for Non-SSL connections. Possible values: ["Plain", "Login", "Xoauth2"]. Multiple options need to be separated by a comma ','.
        smtp_auth_mechanism:           String, true,   option;
        /// SMTP connection timeout |> Number of seconds when to stop trying to connect to the SMTP server
-        smtp_timeout:                  u16,    true,   def,     15;
+        smtp_timeout:                  u64,    true,   def,     15;
        /// Server name sent during HELO |> By default this value should be the machine's hostname, but might need to be changed in case it trips some anti-spam filters
        helo_name:                     String, true,   option;
        /// Embed images as email attachments.
-        smtp_embed_images:             bool,   true,   def,     true;
+        smtp_embed_images:             bool, true, def, true;
        /// _smtp_img_src
        _smtp_img_src:                 String, false, generated, |c| generate_smtp_img_src(c.smtp_embed_images, &c.domain);
        /// Enable SMTP debugging (Know the risks!) |> DANGEROUS: Enabling this will output very detailed SMTP messages. This could contain sensitive information like passwords and usernames! Only enable this during troubleshooting!
@@ -941,9 +925,9 @@ make_config! {
        /// Email token size |> Number of digits in an email 2FA token (min: 6, max: 255). Note that the Bitwarden clients are hardcoded to mention 6 digit codes regardless of this setting.
        email_token_size:       u8,     true,   def,      6;
        /// Token expiration time |> Maximum time in seconds a token is valid. The time the user has to open email client and copy token.
-        email_expiration_time:  u32,    true,   def,      600;
+        email_expiration_time:  u64,    true,   def,      600;
        /// Maximum attempts |> Maximum attempts before an email token is reset and a new email will need to be sent
-        email_attempts_limit:   u8,     true,   def,      3;
+        email_attempts_limit:   u64,    true,   def,      3;
        /// Setup email 2FA at signup |> Setup email 2FA provider on registration regardless of any organization policy
        email_2fa_enforce_on_verified_invite: bool,   true,   def,      false;
        /// Auto-enable 2FA (Know the risks!) |> Automatically setup email 2FA as fallback provider when needed
@@ -999,15 +983,7 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
    }

    if cfg.database_min_conns > cfg.database_max_conns {
-        err!("`DATABASE_MIN_CONNS` must be less than or equal to `DATABASE_MAX_CONNS`.");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.database_timeout < 1 {
-        err!("`DATABASE_TIMEOUT` must be at least 1 second");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.database_idle_timeout < 1 {
-        err!("`DATABASE_IDLE_TIMEOUT` must be at least 1 second");
+        err!("`DATABASE_MIN_CONNS` must be smaller than or equal to `DATABASE_MAX_CONNS`.");
    }

    if let Some(log_file) = &cfg.log_file
@@ -1290,38 +1266,6 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
        err!("`AUTH_REQUEST_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
    }

-    if !cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.is_empty() && cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
-        err!("`DUO_CONTEXT_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
-    }
-
-    if !cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.is_empty() && cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
-        err!("`PURGE_INCOMPLETE_SSO_AUTH` is not a valid cron expression")
-    }
-
-    if cfg.login_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
-        err!("`LOGIN_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.login_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
-        err!("`LOGIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.admin_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
-        err!("`ADMIN_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.admin_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
-        err!("`ADMIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
-        err!("`UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
-        err!("`UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
-    }
-
    if !cfg.disable_admin_token {
        match cfg.admin_token.as_ref() {
            Some(t) if t.starts_with("$argon2") => {
@@ -1478,10 +1422,7 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
    "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic",
    "enable-basic-auth-response",
    "ssh-agent-v2",
-    "windows-desktop-autotype",
-    "windows-desktop-autotype-ga",
    // Key Management Team
-    "biometrics-sdk-ipc",
    "windows-native-credential-sync",
    // Mobile Team
    "pm-34171-card-scanner",
@@ -1491,34 +1432,11 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
    "pm-32009-new-item-types",
 ];

-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Serialize)]
-pub enum ConfigFileStatus {
-    NotFound,
-    Loaded,
-    Error,
-}
-
 impl Config {
    pub async fn load() -> Result<Self, Error> {
        // Loading from env and file
        let env = ConfigBuilder::from_env();
-        let (usr, config_file_status) = match ConfigBuilder::from_file().await {
-            Ok(Some(usr)) => (usr, ConfigFileStatus::Loaded),
-            Ok(None) => (ConfigBuilder::default(), ConfigFileStatus::NotFound),
-            Err(e) => {
-                println!(
-                    "[ERROR] Failed to load configuration from `{}`\n\
-                    #####################################################################################\n\
-                    # The file seems to exist but might contain invalid JSON or invalid values.         #\n\
-                    # Check the syntax and make sure every value is valid and within its allowed range. #\n\
-                    # This file is not used until those errors are resolved.                            #\n\
-                    #####################################################################################\n\
-                {e:?}\n",
-                    *CONFIG_FILE
-                );
-                (ConfigBuilder::default(), ConfigFileStatus::Error)
-            }
-        };
+        let usr = ConfigBuilder::from_file().await.unwrap_or_default();

        // Create merged config, config file overwrites env
        let mut overrides = Vec::new();
@@ -1538,7 +1456,6 @@ impl Config {
                _env: env,
                _usr: usr,
                _overrides: overrides,
-                _config_file_status: config_file_status,
            }),
        })
    }
@@ -1572,7 +1489,6 @@ impl Config {
            writer.config = config;
            writer._usr = builder;
            writer._overrides = overrides;
-            writer._config_file_status = ConfigFileStatus::Loaded;
        }

        //Save to file
@@ -1664,7 +1580,6 @@ impl Config {
            writer.config = config;
            writer._usr = usr;
            writer._overrides = Vec::new();
-            writer._config_file_status = ConfigFileStatus::NotFound;
        }

        // Invalidate CSS Cache because several config items might have impact on the rendered CSS
@@ -212,8 +212,8 @@ impl DbPool {
        let pool = Pool::builder()
            .max_size(max_conns)
            .min_idle(Some(CONFIG.database_min_conns()))
-            .idle_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_idle_timeout()))))
-            .connection_timeout(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_timeout())))
+            .idle_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_idle_timeout())))
+            .connection_timeout(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_timeout()))
            .connection_customizer(Box::new(DbConnOptions {
                init_stmts: conn_type.get_init_stmts(),
            }))
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ impl DbPool {

    // Get a connection from the pool
    pub async fn get(&self) -> Result<DbConn, Error> {
-        let duration = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_timeout()));
+        let duration = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_timeout());
        let permit = match timeout(duration, Arc::clone(&self.semaphore).acquire_owned()).await {
            Ok(p) => p.expect("Semaphore should be open"),
            Err(_) => {
@@ -166,15 +166,6 @@ impl AuthRequest {
        .await
    }

-    pub async fn delete_all_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        conn.run(move |conn| {
-            diesel::delete(auth_requests::table.filter(auth_requests::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)))
-                .execute(conn)
-                .map_res("Error deleting auth requests for user")
-        })
-        .await
-    }
-
    /// Marks the request as used to log in. Returns false when it already was, so it only works once.
    pub async fn set_authentication_date(uuid: &AuthRequestId, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<bool> {
        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
@@ -197,7 +188,7 @@ impl AuthRequest {
    pub async fn purge_expired_auth_requests(conn: &DbConn) {
        // delete auth requests older than 15 minutes which is functionally equivalent to upstream:
        // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/f8ee2270409f7a13125cd414c450740af605a175/src/Sql/dbo/Auth/Stored%20Procedures/AuthRequest_DeleteIfExpired.sql
-        let expiry_time = Utc::now().naive_utc() - chrono::TimeDelta::minutes(15);
+        let expiry_time = Utc::now().naive_utc() - chrono::TimeDelta::try_minutes(15).unwrap();
        for auth_request in Self::find_created_before(&expiry_time, conn).await {
            auth_request.delete(conn).await.ok();
        }
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use crate::{
        },
    },
    error::MapResult,
-    util::LowerCase,
+    util::{LowerCase, convert_json_key_lcase_first},
 };
 use macros::UuidFromParam;

@@ -63,6 +63,18 @@ pub struct Cipher {
    pub reprompt: Option<i32>,
 }

+/// Whether `data` is a v2 cipher blob, recognized like upstream by a top-level `format_version` key.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Vault/Entities/Cipher.cs#L36-L41>
+pub fn is_data_blob_encrypted(data: &str) -> bool {
+    serde_json::from_str::<Value>(data).is_ok_and(|d| is_blob_value(&d))
+}
+
+/// [`is_data_blob_encrypted`] for `data` that was already parsed.
+fn is_blob_value(data: &Value) -> bool {
+    data.get("format_version").is_some()
+}
+
 pub enum RepromptType {
    None = 0,
    Password = 1,
@@ -70,7 +82,8 @@ pub enum RepromptType {

 /// Local methods
 impl Cipher {
-    pub fn new(atype: i32, name: String) -> Self {
+    /// The name is set when the data is saved, since a blob-encrypted cipher has it inside `data`
+    pub fn new(atype: i32) -> Self {
        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();

        Self {
@@ -84,7 +97,7 @@ impl Cipher {
            key: None,

            atype,
-            name,
+            name: String::new(),

            notes: None,
            fields: None,
@@ -110,6 +123,11 @@ impl Cipher {
                    .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].Notes"), serde_json::to_value([&max_note_size_msg]).unwrap());
            }

+            if let Err(e) = cipher.validate_content(cipher.is_blob()) {
+                validation_errors
+                    .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].{}", e.field), serde_json::to_value([e.message]).unwrap());
+            }
+
            // Validate the password history if it contains `null` values and if so, return a warning
            if let Some(Value::Array(password_history)) = &cipher.password_history {
                for pwh in password_history {
@@ -154,6 +172,10 @@ impl Cipher {
    ) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
        use crate::util::{format_date, validate_and_format_date};

+        // Parsed once, since `data` can be large and this runs for every cipher in a sync
+        let type_data = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&self.data);
+        let is_blob_encrypted = type_data.as_ref().is_ok_and(is_blob_value);
+
        let mut attachments_json: Value = Value::Null;
        if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
            if let Some(attachments) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_attachments.get(&self.uuid)
@@ -250,63 +272,9 @@ impl Cipher {
            })
            .unwrap_or_default();

-        // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
-        // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
-        let mut type_data_json = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data)
-            .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid))
-            .map_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()), |d| d.data);
-
-        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
-        // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
-        if self.atype == 1 {
-            // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
-            type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
-            if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
-                && !uris.is_empty()
-            {
-                // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
-                // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
-                for uri in &mut *uris {
-                    if uri["match"].is_string() {
-                        let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
-                            Ok(n) => json!(n),
-                            _ => Value::Null,
-                        };
-                        uri["match"] = match_value;
-                    }
-                }
-                type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
-            }
-
-            // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
-            if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
-                type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
-        // This breaks at least the native mobile clients
-        if self.atype == 2 {
-            match type_data_json {
-                Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
-                _ => {
-                    type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Fix invalid SSH Entries
-        // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
-        // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
-        // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
-        if self.atype == 5
-            && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
-                || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
-                || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
-        {
-            warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
-            type_data_json = Value::Null;
-        }
+        // Like upstream, fields and password history stored as NULL are sent as null, not `[]`
+        let fields_json = self.fields.is_some().then_some(fields_json);
+        let password_history_json = self.password_history.is_some().then_some(password_history_json);

        let collection_ids = if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
            if let Some(cipher_collections) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_collections.get(&self.uuid) {
@@ -403,10 +371,84 @@ impl Cipher {
            _ => err!(format!("Cipher {} has an invalid type {}", self.uuid, self.atype)),
        };

-        json_object[key] = type_data_json;
+        if is_blob_encrypted {
+            // Like upstream, sent as-is with the structured fields null
+            json_object["data"] = json!(self.data);
+            json_object["name"] = Value::Null;
+        } else {
+            json_object[key] = self.legacy_type_data_json(type_data);
+        }
        Ok(json_object)
    }

+    /// The per-type data of a legacy cipher, with fixups for values known to break clients.
+    fn legacy_type_data_json(&self, type_data: Result<Value, serde_json::Error>) -> Value {
+        use crate::util::validate_and_format_date;
+
+        // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
+        // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
+        let mut type_data_json = if let Ok(data @ Value::Object(_)) = type_data {
+            convert_json_key_lcase_first(data)
+        } else {
+            warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid);
+            Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new())
+        };
+
+        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
+        // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
+        if self.atype == 1 {
+            // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
+            type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
+            if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
+                && !uris.is_empty()
+            {
+                // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
+                // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
+                for uri in &mut *uris {
+                    if uri["match"].is_string() {
+                        let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
+                            Ok(n) => json!(n),
+                            _ => Value::Null,
+                        };
+                        uri["match"] = match_value;
+                    }
+                }
+                type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
+            }
+
+            // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
+            if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
+                type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
+        // This breaks at least the native mobile clients
+        if self.atype == 2 {
+            match type_data_json {
+                Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
+                _ => {
+                    type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Fix invalid SSH Entries
+        // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
+        // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
+        // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
+        if self.atype == 5
+            && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
+                || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
+                || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
+        {
+            warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
+            type_data_json = Value::Null;
+        }
+
+        type_data_json
+    }
+
    pub async fn update_users_revision(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<UserId> {
        let mut user_uuids = Vec::new();
        match self.user_uuid {
@@ -494,22 +536,12 @@ impl Cipher {

    /// Purge all ciphers that are old enough to be auto-deleted.
    pub async fn purge_trash(conn: &DbConn) {
-        let Some(auto_delete_days) = CONFIG.trash_auto_delete_days().filter(|&d| d != 0) else {
-            debug!("trash_auto_delete_days is not configured or set to 0, skipping");
-            return;
-        };
-
-        let Some(days) = TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(auto_delete_days)) else {
-            error!("Unable to calculate auto delete days!");
-            return;
-        };
-        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-        let Some(dt) = now.checked_sub_signed(days) else {
-            error!("Unable to calculate trash purge date!");
-            return;
-        };
-        for cipher in Self::find_deleted_before(&dt, conn).await {
-            cipher.delete(conn).await.ok();
+        if let Some(auto_delete_days) = CONFIG.trash_auto_delete_days() {
+            let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+            let dt = now - TimeDelta::try_days(auto_delete_days).unwrap();
+            for cipher in Self::find_deleted_before(&dt, conn).await {
+                cipher.delete(conn).await.ok();
+            }
        }
    }

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, TimeDelta, Utc};
+use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
 use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
 use diesel::prelude::*;
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -112,26 +112,8 @@ impl EmergencyAccess {
            "object": "emergencyAccessGranteeDetails",
        }))
    }
-
-    pub fn deadline_at(&self) -> Result<NaiveDateTime, crate::Error> {
-        if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&self.wait_time_days) {
-            err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
-        }
-
-        let initiated_at = self.recovery_initiated_at.map_res("Emergency access initiation date missing!")?;
-
-        TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(self.wait_time_days))
-            .and_then(|w| initiated_at.checked_add_signed(w))
-            .map_res("Emergency access deadline is invalid")
-    }
-
-    pub fn is_recovery_allowed(&self, now: &NaiveDateTime) -> Result<bool, crate::Error> {
-        Ok(self.deadline_at()?.le(now))
-    }
 }

-pub const EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE: std::ops::RangeInclusive<i32> = 1..=90;
-
 #[derive(Copy, Clone)]
 pub enum EmergencyAccessType {
    View = 0,
@@ -187,42 +169,27 @@ impl EmergencyAccess {

    pub async fn update_access_status_and_save(
        &mut self,
-        from_status: i32,
-        to_status: i32,
+        status: i32,
        date: &NaiveDateTime,
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> EmptyResult {
-        let uuid = self.uuid.clone();
-        let updated_at = *date;
-        let res = conn
-            .run(move |conn| {
-                crate::util::retry(
-                    || {
-                        diesel::update(
-                            emergency_access::table
-                                .filter(emergency_access::uuid.eq(&uuid))
-                                .filter(emergency_access::status.eq(from_status)),
-                        )
-                        .set((emergency_access::status.eq(to_status), emergency_access::updated_at.eq(updated_at)))
-                        .execute(conn)
-                    },
-                    10,
-                )
-            })
-            .await;
-
-        match res {
-            Ok(1) => {} // One record updated, which is valid
-            Ok(_) => err!("Emergency access status was changed already"),
-            Err(e) => err!("Error updating emergency access status", format!("{e}")),
-        }
-
-        self.status = to_status;
-        self.updated_at = updated_at;
-
        // Update the grantee so that it will refresh it's status.
        User::update_uuid_revision(self.grantee_uuid.as_ref().expect("Error getting grantee"), conn).await;
-        Ok(())
+        self.status = status;
+        date.clone_into(&mut self.updated_at);
+
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            crate::util::retry(
+                || {
+                    diesel::update(emergency_access::table.filter(emergency_access::uuid.eq(&self.uuid)))
+                        .set((emergency_access::status.eq(status), emergency_access::updated_at.eq(date)))
+                        .execute(conn)
+                },
+                10,
+            )
+            .map_res("Error updating emergency access status")
+        })
+        .await
    }

    pub async fn update_last_notification_date_and_save(&mut self, date: &NaiveDateTime, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
@@ -347,23 +347,17 @@ impl Event {
    }

    pub async fn clean_events(conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        let Some(days_to_retain) = CONFIG.events_days_retain().filter(|&d| d != 0) else {
-            return Ok(());
-        };
-
-        let Some(days_to_retain) = TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(days_to_retain)) else {
-            err!("Unable to calculate the event retention date, check 'EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN'")
-        };
-
-        let Some(dt) = Utc::now().naive_utc().checked_sub_signed(days_to_retain) else {
-            err!("Unable to calculate the event retention date, check 'EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN'")
-        };
-        conn.run(move |conn| {
-            diesel::delete(event::table.filter(event::event_date.lt(dt)))
-                .execute(conn)
-                .map_res("Error cleaning old events")
-        })
-        .await
+        if let Some(days_to_retain) = CONFIG.events_days_retain() {
+            let dt = Utc::now().naive_utc() - TimeDelta::try_days(days_to_retain).unwrap();
+            conn.run(move |conn| {
+                diesel::delete(event::table.filter(event::event_date.lt(dt)))
+                    .execute(conn)
+                    .map_res("Error cleaning old events")
+            })
+            .await
+        } else {
+            Ok(())
+        }
    }
 }

@@ -21,12 +21,10 @@ mod user;
 pub use self::archive::Archive;
 pub use self::attachment::{Attachment, AttachmentId};
 pub use self::auth_request::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId};
-pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType};
+pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType, is_data_blob_encrypted};
 pub use self::collection::{Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionId, CollectionUser};
 pub use self::device::{Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest, PushId};
-pub use self::emergency_access::{
-    EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType,
-};
+pub use self::emergency_access::{EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType};
 pub use self::event::{Event, EventType};
 pub use self::favorite::Favorite;
 pub use self::folder::{Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId};
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
 use derive_more::{AsRef, From};
 use diesel::prelude::*;
 use serde::Deserialize;
@@ -12,7 +11,6 @@ use crate::{
        schema::{org_policies, users_organizations},
    },
    error::MapResult,
-    util::format_date,
 };

 use super::{Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrganizationId, TwoFactor, UserId};
@@ -26,7 +24,6 @@ pub struct OrgPolicy {
    pub atype: i32,
    pub enabled: bool,
    pub data: String,
-    pub revision_date: NaiveDateTime,
 }

 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Core/AdminConsole/Enums/PolicyType.cs
@@ -49,7 +46,7 @@ pub enum OrgPolicyType {
    RemoveUnlockWithPin = 14,
    RestrictedItemTypes = 15,
    UriMatchDefaults = 16,
-    AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17,
+    // AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17, // Not supported yet
    // AutoConfirm = 18, // Not supported (not implemented yet)
    // BlockClaimedDomainAccountCreation = 19, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
    OrganizationUserNotification = 20,
@@ -80,7 +77,6 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
            atype: atype as i32,
            enabled,
            data,
-            revision_date: Utc::now().naive_utc(),
        }
    }

@@ -96,7 +92,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
            "type": self.atype,
            "data": data_json,
            "enabled": self.enabled,
-            "revisionDate": format_date(&self.revision_date),
+            "revisionDate": null,
            "object": "policy",
        });

@@ -114,13 +110,11 @@ impl OrgPolicy {

 /// Database methods
 impl OrgPolicy {
-    pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        self.revision_date = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-
+    pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
        db_run! { conn:
            sqlite, mysql {
                match diesel::replace_into(org_policies::table)
-                    .values(&*self)
+                    .values(self)
                    .execute(conn)
                {
                    Ok(_) => Ok(()),
@@ -128,7 +122,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
                    Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
                        diesel::update(org_policies::table)
                            .filter(org_policies::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
-                            .set(&*self)
+                            .set(self)
                            .execute(conn)
                            .map_res("Error saving org_policy")
                    }
@@ -148,10 +142,10 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
                .map_res("Error deleting org_policy for insert")?;

                diesel::insert_into(org_policies::table)
-                    .values(&*self)
+                    .values(self)
                    .on_conflict(org_policies::uuid)
                    .do_update()
-                    .set(&*self)
+                    .set(self)
                    .execute(conn)
                    .map_res("Error saving org_policy")
            }
@@ -137,11 +137,11 @@ impl TwoFactor {
        .await
    }

-    pub async fn find_by_user_and_type(user_uuid: &UserId, atype: TwoFactorType, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
+    pub async fn find_by_user_and_type(user_uuid: &UserId, atype: i32, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            twofactor::table
                .filter(twofactor::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
-                .filter(twofactor::atype.eq(atype as i32))
+                .filter(twofactor::atype.eq(atype))
                .first::<Self>(conn)
                .ok()
        })
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ impl TwoFactorIncomplete {
        ip: &ClientIp,
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> EmptyResult {
-        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() == 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() <= 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
            return Ok(());
        }

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ impl TwoFactorIncomplete {
    }

    pub async fn mark_complete(user_uuid: &UserId, device_uuid: &DeviceId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() == 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() <= 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
            return Ok(());
        }

@@ -19,8 +19,7 @@ use crate::{
 use macros::UuidFromParam;

 use super::{
-    AuthRequest, Cipher, Device, EmergencyAccess, Favorite, Folder, Membership, MembershipType, TwoFactor,
-    TwoFactorIncomplete,
+    Cipher, Device, EmergencyAccess, Favorite, Folder, Membership, MembershipType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete,
 };

 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
@@ -171,10 +170,6 @@ impl User {
        )
    }

-    pub fn master_password_salt(&self) -> String {
-        self.email.trim().to_lowercase()
-    }
-
    pub fn check_valid_recovery_code(&self, recovery_code: &str) -> bool {
        if let Some(ref totp_recover) = self.totp_recover {
            crypto::ct_eq(recovery_code, totp_recover.to_lowercase())
@@ -378,7 +373,6 @@ impl User {
        Cipher::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        Favorite::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        Folder::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
-        AuthRequest::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        Device::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        TwoFactorIncomplete::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
@@ -116,7 +116,6 @@ table! {
        atype -> Integer,
        enabled -> Bool,
        data -> Text,
-        revision_date -> Timestamp,
    }
 }

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ fn smtp_transport() -> AsyncSmtpTransport<Tokio1Executor> {

    let smtp_client = AsyncSmtpTransport::<Tokio1Executor>::builder_dangerous(host.as_str())
        .port(CONFIG.smtp_port())
-        .timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.smtp_timeout()))));
+        .timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.smtp_timeout())));

    // Determine security
    let smtp_client = if CONFIG.smtp_security() == *"off" {
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ pub async fn send_password_hint(address: &str, hint: Option<String>) -> EmptyRes
 }

 pub async fn send_delete_account(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = generate_delete_claims(user_id.to_string())?;
+    let claims = generate_delete_claims(user_id.to_string());
    let delete_token = encode_jwt(&claims);

    let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ pub async fn send_delete_account(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult
 }

 pub async fn send_verify_email(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id)?;
+    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id);
    let verify_email_token = encode_jwt(&claims);

    let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ pub async fn send_welcome(address: &str) -> EmptyResult {
 }

 pub async fn send_welcome_must_verify(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id)?;
+    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id);
    let verify_email_token = encode_jwt(&claims);

    let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ pub async fn send_invite(
        org_id.clone(),
        member_id.clone(),
        invited_by_email,
-    )?;
+    );
    let invite_token = encode_jwt(&claims);
    let mut query = url::Url::parse("https://query.builder").unwrap();
    {
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ pub async fn send_emergency_access_invite(
        emer_id.clone(),
        String::from(grantor_name),
        String::from(grantor_email),
-    )?;
+    );

    // Build the query here to ensure proper escaping
    let mut query = url::Url::parse("https://query.builder").unwrap();
@@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ fn schedule_jobs(pool: db::DbPool) {
            // Cleanup the event table of records x days old.
            if CONFIG.org_events_enabled()
                && !CONFIG.event_cleanup_schedule().is_empty()
-                && CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_some_and(|d| d != 0)
+                && CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_some()
            {
                sched.add(Job::new(CONFIG.event_cleanup_schedule().parse().unwrap(), || {
                    runtime.spawn(api::event_cleanup_job(pool.clone()));
@@ -754,9 +754,7 @@ fn schedule_jobs(pool: db::DbPool) {
            // tick, the one that was added earlier will run first.
            loop {
                sched.tick();
-                runtime.block_on(tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_millis(u64::from(
-                    CONFIG.job_poll_interval_ms(),
-                ))));
+                runtime.block_on(tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_millis(CONFIG.job_poll_interval_ms())));
            }
        })
        .expect("Error spawning job scheduler thread");
@@ -7,20 +7,20 @@ use crate::{CONFIG, Error};
 type Limiter<T = IpAddr> = RateLimiter<T, DashMapStateStore<T>, DefaultClock>;

 static LIMITER_LOGIN: LazyLock<Limiter> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_seconds()));
-    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(u32::from(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_max_burst())).expect("Non-zero login ratelimit burst");
+    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_seconds());
+    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_max_burst()).expect("Non-zero login ratelimit burst");
    RateLimiter::keyed(Quota::with_period(seconds).expect("Non-zero login ratelimit seconds").allow_burst(burst))
 });

 static LIMITER_ADMIN: LazyLock<Limiter> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_seconds()));
-    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(u32::from(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_max_burst())).expect("Non-zero admin ratelimit burst");
+    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_seconds());
+    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_max_burst()).expect("Non-zero admin ratelimit burst");
    RateLimiter::keyed(Quota::with_period(seconds).expect("Non-zero admin ratelimit seconds").allow_burst(burst))
 });

 static LIMITER_UNAUTHENTICATED: LazyLock<Limiter> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds()));
-    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(u32::from(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst()))
+    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds());
+    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst())
        .expect("Non-zero unauthenticated ratelimit burst");
    RateLimiter::keyed(
        Quota::with_period(seconds).expect("Non-zero unauthenticated ratelimit seconds").allow_burst(burst),
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static CLIENT_CACHE_KEY: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| "sso-client".to_own
 static CLIENT_CACHE: LazyLock<moka::sync::Cache<String, Client>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
    moka::sync::Cache::builder()
        .max_capacity(1)
-        .time_to_live(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.sso_client_cache_expiration())))
+        .time_to_live(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.sso_client_cache_expiration()))
        .build()
 });
 static REFRESH_CACHE: LazyLock<moka::future::Cache<String, Result<RefreshTokenResponse, String>>> =
@@ -93,9 +93,7 @@ async function generateSupportString(event, dj) {
    supportString += `* Running within a container: ${yn(dj.running_within_container)} (Base: ${dj.container_base_image})\n`;
    supportString += `* Database type: ${dj.db_type}\n`;
    supportString += `* Database version: ${dj.db_version}\n`;
-    supportString += `* Uses config.json: ${yn(dj.config_file_status !== "NotFound")}`;
-    supportString += dj.config_file_status !== "NotFound" ? ` (Valid: ${chk(dj.config_file_status === "Loaded")})\n` : "\n";
-    supportString += `* Environment variables are valid: ${chk(dj.invalid_env_vars == "")}\n`;
+    supportString += `* Uses config.json: ${yn(dj.overrides !== "")}\n`;
    supportString += `* Uses custom templates: ${yn(dj.template_overrides !== "")}${template_overrides}\n`;
    supportString += `* Uses a reverse proxy: ${yn(dj.ip_header_exists)}\n`;
    if (dj.ip_header_exists) {
@@ -118,7 +116,7 @@ async function generateSupportString(event, dj) {
    }
    supportString += `* HTTP Response Checks: ${chk(httpResponseCheck)}\n`;
    if (dj.invalid_feature_flags != "") {
-        supportString += "* Invalid feature flags: true :x:\n";
+        supportString += "* Invalid feature flags: true\n";
    }

    const jsonResponse = await fetch(`${BASE_URL}/admin/diagnostics/config`, {
@@ -134,11 +132,6 @@ async function generateSupportString(event, dj) {
    supportString += "\n### Config & Details (Generated via diagnostics page)\n\n";
    supportString += "<details><summary>Show Config & Details</summary>\n";

-    // Show invalid environment variables if they exists
-    if (dj.invalid_env_vars != "") {
-        supportString += `\n**Invalid environment variables:** ${dj.invalid_env_vars}\n`;
-    }
-
    // Add overrides if they exists
    if (dj.overrides != "") {
        supportString += `\n**Environment settings which are overridden:** ${dj.overrides}\n`;
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
 *
 * To rebuild or modify this file with the latest versions of the included
 * software please visit:
- *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.4
+ *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.3
 *
 * Included libraries:
- *   DataTables 3.1.4
+ *   DataTables 3.1.3
 */

 /*! DataTables Bootstrap 5 integration
@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@
 *
 * To rebuild or modify this file with the latest versions of the included
 * software please visit:
- *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.4
+ *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.3
 *
 * Included libraries:
- *   DataTables 3.1.4
+ *   DataTables 3.1.3
 */

-/*! DataTables 3.1.4
+/*! DataTables 3.1.3
 * Copyright (c) SpryMedia Ltd - datatables.net/license
 */

@@ -453,9 +453,6 @@ function assignDeep(out, ...inputs) {
            continue;
        }
        for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(input)) {
-            if (key === '__proto__') {
-                continue;
-            }
            if (Array.isArray(value)) {
                if (!Array.isArray(out[key])) {
                    out[key] = [];
@@ -492,9 +489,6 @@ function assignDeep(out, ...inputs) {
 function assignDeepObjects(out, extender, breakRefs = false) {
    let val;
    for (let prop in extender) {
-        if (prop === '__proto__') {
-            continue;
-        }
        if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(extender, prop)) {
            val = extender[prop];
            if (plainObject(val)) {
@@ -2700,7 +2694,7 @@ class Dom {
     */
    prepend(content) {
        return this.each(el => {
-            if (arrayLike(content) || dom(content)) {
+            if (content instanceof Dom) {
                // Reverse the array, so if there are multiple elements, they
                // end up being added sequentially, just like jQuery
                let itemsReversed = Array.from(content).reverse();
@@ -8720,7 +8714,7 @@ const ext = {
    /**
     * DataTables build type (expanded by the download builder)
     */
-    builder: 'bs5/dt-3.1.4',
+    builder: 'bs5/dt-3.1.3',
    /**
     * Buttons. For use with the Buttons extension for DataTables. This is
     * defined here so other extensions can define buttons regardless of load
@@ -8866,7 +8860,7 @@ const ext = {
     * Software version
     *  @type string
     */
-    version: '3.1.4'
+    version: '3.1.3'
 };
 //
 // Backwards compatibility. Alias to pre 1.10 Hungarian notation counter parts
@@ -9565,7 +9559,7 @@ register('destroy()', function (remove) {
        callbackFire(settings, 'destroy', 'destroy', [settings], true);
        // If not being removed from the document, make all columns visible
        if (!remove) {
-            new Api(settings).columns().visible(true);
+            new Api(settings).columns().visible();
        }
        // Container width change listener
        if (settings.resizeObserver) {
@@ -69,26 +69,12 @@
                    </dd>
                    <dt class="col-sm-5">Uses config.json</dt>
                    <dd class="col-sm-7">
-                    {{#if (eq page_data.config_file_status "Loaded")}}
+                    {{#if page_data.overrides}}
                        <span class="d-inline"><b>Yes</b></span>
-                        {{#if page_data.overrides}}
                        <span class="badge bg-info text-dark abbr-badge" title="Environment variables are overwritten by a config.json.&#013;&#010;{{page_data.overrides}}">Details</span>
-                        {{/if}}
-                    {{~else if (eq page_data.config_file_status "Error")}}
-                        <span class="d-inline"><b>Errors</b></span>
-                        <span class="badge bg-danger abbr-badge" title="Config file could not be loaded and was ignored. Check server logs for details.">Details</span>
-                    {{~else}}
-                        <span class="d-inline"><b>No</b></span>
                    {{/if}}
-                    </dd>
-                    <dt class="col-sm-5">Environment variables are valid</dt>
-                    <dd class="col-sm-7">
-                    {{#if page_data.invalid_env_vars}}
-                        <span class="d-inline"><b>No</b></span>
-                        <span class="badge bg-danger abbr-badge" title="Invalid environment variables are found and defaults are used instead.&#013;&#010;{{page_data.invalid_env_vars}}">Details</span>
-                    {{/if}}
-                    {{#unless page_data.invalid_env_vars}}
-                        <span class="d-block"><b>Yes</b></span>
+                    {{#unless page_data.overrides}}
+                        <span class="d-block"><b>No</b></span>
                    {{/unless}}
                    </dd>
                    <dt class="col-sm-5">Uses custom templates</dt>
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Emergency access for {{{grantor_name}}}
    </tr>
    <tr style="margin: 0; font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; color: #333; line-height: 25px; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none;">
       <td class="content-block" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; color: #333; line-height: 25px; margin: 0; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; padding: 0 0 10px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none; text-align: center;" valign="top" align="center">
-          <a data-testid="emergency" href="{{{url}}}"
+          <a href="{{{url}}}"
             clicktracking=off target="_blank" style="color: #ffffff; text-decoration: none; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; border-radius: 5px; background-color: #3c8dbc; border-color: #3c8dbc; border-style: solid; border-width: 10px 20px; margin: 0; font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; line-height: 25px; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none;">
          Become emergency contact
          </a>
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ impl Fairing for Cors {
 pub struct Cached<R> {
    response: R,
    is_immutable: bool,
-    ttl: u32,
+    ttl: u64,
 }

 impl<R> Cached<R> {
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ impl<R> Cached<R> {
        }
    }

-    pub fn ttl(response: R, ttl: u32, is_immutable: bool) -> Cached<R> {
+    pub fn ttl(response: R, ttl: u64, is_immutable: bool) -> Cached<R> {
        Self {
            response,
            is_immutable,
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ impl<'r, R: 'r + Responder<'r, 'static> + Send> Responder<'r, 'static> for Cache
        res.set_raw_header("Cache-Control", cache_control_header);

        let time_now = Local::now();
-        let expiry_time = time_now + chrono::TimeDelta::try_seconds(self.ttl.into()).unwrap();
+        let expiry_time = time_now + chrono::TimeDelta::try_seconds(self.ttl.try_into().unwrap()).unwrap();
        res.set_raw_header("Expires", format_datetime_http(&expiry_time));
        Ok(res)
    }
@@ -447,34 +447,20 @@ pub fn get_env_str_value(key: &str) -> Option<String> {
    }
 }

-pub static INVALID_ENV_VARS: std::sync::Mutex<Vec<&'static str>> = std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new());
-
-pub fn get_env<V>(key: &'static str) -> Option<V>
+pub fn get_env<V>(key: &str) -> Option<V>
 where
    V: FromStr,
 {
-    let value = get_env_str_value(key);
-    let value_is_some = value.is_some();
-    let parsed: Option<V> = try_parse_string(value);
-    if parsed.is_none() && value_is_some {
-        println!("[ERROR] `{key}` contains an invalid value for its type and is ignored, the default is used instead.");
-        INVALID_ENV_VARS.lock().unwrap().push(key);
-    }
-    parsed
+    try_parse_string(get_env_str_value(key))
 }

-pub fn get_env_bool(key: &'static str) -> Option<bool> {
+pub fn get_env_bool(key: &str) -> Option<bool> {
    const TRUE_VALUES: &[&str] = &["true", "t", "yes", "y", "1"];
    const FALSE_VALUES: &[&str] = &["false", "f", "no", "n", "0"];

    match get_env_str_value(key) {
        Some(val) if TRUE_VALUES.contains(&val.to_lowercase().as_ref()) => Some(true),
        Some(val) if FALSE_VALUES.contains(&val.to_lowercase().as_ref()) => Some(false),
-        Some(_) => {
-            println!("[ERROR] `{key}` contains an invalid boolean value and is ignored, the default is used instead.");
-            INVALID_ENV_VARS.lock().unwrap().push(key);
-            None
-        }
        _ => None,
    }
 }
				`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
				`ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;`
				`@@ -0,0 +1 @@`
				`-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change`