Some simplifications

Add typo exception
Implement V2 key rotation support
2026-10-24 22:26:50 +03:00 · 2026-09-23 23:53:12 +02:00 · 2026-09-23 23:30:19 +02:00 · 2026-09-23 23:30:19 +02:00 · 2026-09-23 23:30:18 +02:00 · 2026-09-23 19:44:05 +02:00
33 changed files with 3368 additions and 2719 deletions
@@ -403,6 +403,7 @@
 ## - "cxp-export-mobile": Enable the export via CXP on iOS (Clients >= 2025.9.2)
 ## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins":
 ## - "pm-32009-new-item-types": Enable new item types: Bank Account, Driver's License, and Passport (Clients >= 2026.4.0)
 ## - "pm-34171-card-scanner": Enable the new card scanner feature on mobile (Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.4.1)
 ## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-1": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-2": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-3": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
    steps:
      # Start Docker Buildx
      - name: Setup Docker Buildx
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@37fe631027851001ddb9b187196cc803df7f5f0e # v4.3.0
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@f87e5991a6d7451dcb8d9637bfbc97413f497069 # v4.4.1
        # https://github.com/moby/buildkit/issues/3969
        # Also set max parallelism to 2, the default of 4 breaks GitHub Actions and causes OOMKills
        with:
@@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ jobs:
    steps:
      - name: Initialize QEMU binfmt support
-        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@1f40c72289eff860ee54a304f1438e3cff362e0a # v4.3.0
+        uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@99012661954931238ded8c8b007157a8430204e1 # v4.4.0
        with:
          platforms: "arm64,arm"
      # Start Docker Buildx
      - name: Setup Docker Buildx
-        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@37fe631027851001ddb9b187196cc803df7f5f0e # v4.3.0
+        uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@f87e5991a6d7451dcb8d9637bfbc97413f497069 # v4.4.1
        # https://github.com/moby/buildkit/issues/3969
        # Also set max parallelism to 2, the default of 4 breaks GitHub Actions and causes OOMKills
        with:
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ jobs:
      - name: Bake ${{ matrix.base_image }} containers
        id: bake_vw
-        uses: docker/bake-action@d3418bd7d0e9324001bca92fa8ba175ea7e6dc9b # v7.3.0
+        uses: docker/bake-action@018cb6412ab401ebaa809aa5f85966b74628600f # v7.4.0
        env:
          BASE_TAGS: "${{ steps.determine-version.outputs.BASE_TAGS }}"
          SOURCE_COMMIT: "${{ env.SOURCE_COMMIT }}"
@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ jobs:
          severity: CRITICAL,HIGH
      - name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@cdf488f595d80d6e07e03d4674febd5ab45fa938 # v4.37.9
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@1c5b675653bb5c22dbe9b12b556ec555138e09fd # v4.38.1
        with:
          sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ jobs:
      # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.pre-commit-config.yaml` too
      - name: Spell Check Repo
-        uses: crate-ci/typos@d43b6c087ac471e2ea7b8af622ff15f05c0c365b # v1.50.1
+        uses: crate-ci/typos@512fc24f32f44ab01972217aaaf3dc86ec234d53 # v1.50.2
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ repos:
  # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.github/workflows/typos.yaml` too
  - repo: https://github.com/crate-ci/typos
-    rev: d43b6c087ac471e2ea7b8af622ff15f05c0c365b # v1.50.1
+    rev: 512fc24f32f44ab01972217aaaf3dc86ec234d53 # v1.50.2
    hooks:
      - id: typos
        always_run: true
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ extend-ignore-re = [
    "COSE",
    "COSEKey",
    "COSEAlgorithm",
    "CoseEncrypt0",
    # Ignore this specific string as it's valid
    "Ensure they are valid OTPs",
    # This word is misspelled upstream
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
 "syn 2.0.119",
- "synstructure",
+ "synstructure 0.13.2",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -151,9 +151,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "async-compression"
-version = "0.4.45"
+version = "0.4.48"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "24a8ec73eb862508b7041723c89386365894b4e7d9f6998bf1b8529e5b0ee254"
+checksum = "fb61aea1a7def73ee7c350a184f0e70b32c182344e2e75bf70c9b621b83417fd"
 dependencies = [
 "compression-codecs",
 "compression-core",
@@ -318,18 +318,14 @@ checksum = "82f6aeea286b8eb4dd3431a1be1b59d290ace00f5bfd8e2a159bc2a05e2c1667"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "asyncband"
-version = "0.6.7"
+version = "0.7.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "94a214ba60d6231afd0e805e3c27c45a1626d9debaa5a5061c45a1ea1b2f1ed0"
+checksum = "f2d85fd3d291fabcc40c7232c92c280ec1754fd7b5d7ea769f143222143e179a"
 dependencies = [
 "hashbrown 0.17.1",
 "slab",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "atomic"
@@ -403,9 +399,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-runtime"
-version = "1.9.2"
+version = "1.9.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ef47857a1d4488b528f4a5d5715fa7c3300820897824152234d3fa22b1426657"
+checksum = "25b43ad47adc2517efe3d706559d94b97e50e80e0321b3cadbc9f77cee88adcd"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-credential-types",
 "aws-sigv4",
@@ -428,9 +424,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-sdk-sso"
-version = "1.109.0"
+version = "1.111.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c3cfe74df5d9ad2fedd691973ad3521ebf4f27a3c68c792556686aedb5519bab"
+checksum = "65700d75f6da78c89a61a49f1539979400a4609d3329376b1dc2133d7a1b2b90"
 dependencies = [
 "arc-swap",
 "aws-credential-types",
@@ -454,9 +450,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-sdk-ssooidc"
-version = "1.111.0"
+version = "1.113.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "81b0ec31ed6191bd11350aae4b2004198f2db21350cb0a20c57e0a92e55dd161"
+checksum = "eb1147c254af7b6cee3ace90ae7da6f21366ce9a9b899035fa8a0fdf586eb75a"
 dependencies = [
 "arc-swap",
 "aws-credential-types",
@@ -480,9 +476,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-sdk-sts"
-version = "1.114.0"
+version = "1.116.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ef45745026107ec30c4ef86bd8ae4b002e7e5f6a86e4225240bdf6b06a0b944a"
+checksum = "035c7392e751d20bf1060d625d023587eb14099646110a9cff7c697bfe4b253a"
 dependencies = [
 "arc-swap",
 "aws-credential-types",
@@ -507,9 +503,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-sigv4"
-version = "1.5.1"
+version = "1.5.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "723c2234ad7511ceef63eab016b7ba6ff7c55590fefb96fa8467af014a07309f"
+checksum = "31d955e76ff96acd555bf06fa0fa6d5bf9335fa84ae7c64481b20ae61d231f70"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-credential-types",
 "aws-smithy-http",
@@ -561,9 +557,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-json"
-version = "0.63.0"
+version = "0.63.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3dc65a121adb4b33729919fcfa14fa36fb33c1555a8f06bb0e2188dbfdc1d9ef"
+checksum = "3385d469edbe8b60cc72002784652b5efca39178192aa9cc4b44c9875c6bdc18"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-runtime-api",
 "aws-smithy-schema",
@@ -581,9 +577,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-query"
-version = "0.62.0"
+version = "0.62.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "512346c7212ab7436df2d77a16d976a468ae44a418835511d2a69269810aaf62"
+checksum = "f1d1d71f6562be974caa85442ecd90194c40fdb5df045f182a6c2e872ce95056"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-runtime-api",
 "aws-smithy-schema",
@@ -594,9 +590,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-runtime"
-version = "1.14.0"
+version = "1.14.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b82e438d30e02a825d363bd639a9efaed68a8089d86101054b0081e7e0d3e606"
+checksum = "3296253d3a91b3f938a3f2bcce4daebadcb4aa4228153fcec90f9d23532b4484"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-async",
 "aws-smithy-http",
@@ -619,9 +615,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-runtime-api"
-version = "1.16.0"
+version = "1.16.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9c054752dd9e4dc73d0b75748c99ac2d0feafbf2f25c7b0516f03a3534161223"
+checksum = "6d881a7b7ad179fd6611680c9de89f716fb00ab40299a9a7b8c6913e8f7511a8"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-async",
 "aws-smithy-runtime-api-macros",
@@ -648,9 +644,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-schema"
-version = "0.2.0"
+version = "0.2.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7d56e0a4e53127a632224e43633b0fe045fa9e1e3cfc68b9830f1115e103f910"
+checksum = "e8f395d93304280b64b7632fea798d177e74897fe7f063416ce627cd6fa24829"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-runtime-api",
 "aws-smithy-types",
@@ -659,9 +655,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-types"
-version = "1.6.3"
+version = "1.6.4"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8f94d16e797ec62cd999fc9d5942b48fa7050c3093ddadff48e4d7528d16fcb9"
+checksum = "0b791f3ac597193fe1d08b82366986eb1f5bc31f2ac6c194c0855276116c76cd"
 dependencies = [
 "base64-simd",
 "bytes",
@@ -682,9 +678,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "aws-smithy-xml"
-version = "0.62.0"
+version = "0.62.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "ce84f71c72fee2cbbadde6e7d082f5fb466e3a84733855295fa7aafd1b31b7d8"
+checksum = "0b932c8d6dc127fc980eecd78f8694ae9b9551b69a93a7def2a199c1c0033daf"
 dependencies = [
 "aws-smithy-runtime-api",
 "aws-smithy-schema",
@@ -785,9 +781,9 @@ checksum = "bef38d45163c2f1dde094a7dfd33ccf595c92905c8f8f4fdc18d06fb1037718a"
 [[package]]
 name = "bitflags"
-version = "2.13.1"
+version = "2.13.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b588b76d00fde79687d7646a9b5bdf3cc0f655e0bbd080335a95d7e96f3587da"
+checksum = "3ded4057c258ba199e2d26386d3af3780957ecaee6c4ef4041c6b4b8b97c0b06"
 [[package]]
 name = "blake2"
@@ -930,9 +926,9 @@ checksum = "f5813789573ae815c8b4be58c4428e0e7ae05f0227678ba9de332ded585b9159"
 [[package]]
 name = "cc"
-version = "1.4.5"
+version = "1.4.7"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "005ec2760ca554fae18df7a11195552ec576cd665632a881bc011d5bb2fd4d80"
+checksum = "54413ede23c2daf518f35156dfde027feb2374004d63bd497f983c8db9c0e313"
 dependencies = [
 "find-msvc-tools",
 "jobserver",
@@ -942,9 +938,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "cfg-if"
-version = "1.0.4"
+version = "1.0.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "9330f8b2ff13f34540b44e946ef35111825727b38d33286ef986142615121801"
+checksum = "4e7648175b45a9a48536d676f68d918270699102aa8dab5496df06904c914600"
 [[package]]
 name = "cfg_aliases"
@@ -1011,9 +1007,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "compression-codecs"
-version = "0.4.40"
+version = "0.4.43"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "100590da849306918656ffbb22576bbdfc1382b50ad10d1d50ec177d3b205fb2"
+checksum = "bef16c47ba2797aa6a909cc37d39911f3a6743811fe7408ac0b0cc0276b656e9"
 dependencies = [
 "brotli",
 "compression-core",
@@ -1170,9 +1166,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "crc32fast"
-version = "1.5.1"
+version = "1.5.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "8498c871161e1742aaa9d52551b2d6ebdd4c3d45a3be423e3728f33b955be550"
+checksum = "01a7799fd6b852db0e61728dde9a204c423b44d689dbd432522543614b490e78"
 dependencies = [
 "cfg-if",
 ]
@@ -1360,7 +1356,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
 "strsim",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -1393,7 +1389,7 @@ checksum = "2ac7135c3ef02b2f7833bbeb1be5ba7f966dcde8a87c6b87f65a778d71a02785"
 dependencies = [
 "darling_core 0.24.1",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -1567,7 +1563,7 @@ version = "0.4.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b035a542cf7abf01f2e3c4d5a7acbaebfefe120ae4efc7bde3df98186e4b8af7"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.1",
+ "bitflags 2.13.2",
 "proc-macro2",
 "proc-macro2-diagnostics",
 "quote",
@@ -1581,7 +1577,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e3b934ddbdcb2abb9f9fc9c30bd47bcc5618b615eea1d334cda5fdf8ff9b072a"
 dependencies = [
 "bigdecimal",
- "bitflags 2.13.1",
+ "bitflags 2.13.2",
 "byteorder",
 "chrono",
 "diesel_derives",
@@ -1676,7 +1672,7 @@ checksum = "c6232dd377dcc64799954cbd3a9bb882e9cdc1308ccd87b1c098f1fb2eaf82a8"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -1920,9 +1916,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "find-msvc-tools"
-version = "0.1.12"
+version = "0.1.13"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3e0f1c7c3a72c66fd80abe965175f7523475c0489a87d3ff9d6e8c87d87a9d2d"
+checksum = "ef25905e51abafe4dcea6c15fec58c57b601cdbd0ee53d22ea1d3016c587d39b"
 [[package]]
 name = "flate2"
@@ -2040,7 +2036,7 @@ checksum = "9fb9654ba8355388abeb8dcb4fc62f511300867002afc858860463bdd9fe0c44"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -2311,9 +2307,9 @@ checksum = "7f24254aa9a54b5c858eaee2f5bccdb46aaf0e486a595ed5fd8f86ba55232a70"
 [[package]]
 name = "hickory-net"
-version = "0.26.2"
+version = "0.26.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "084e7bd6a377435d568f652153e571b50970d7ccc1d1eeec0519f834632287e1"
+checksum = "c480823ed7c2c5d0f09c41020cb6b7c28029ce60ec42dc942158dcf22f8e0a4d"
 dependencies = [
 "async-trait",
 "cfg-if",
@@ -2335,9 +2331,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "hickory-proto"
-version = "0.26.2"
+version = "0.26.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7e2da0694c15b44c6f68a6b05e0233617008c54080e31d6eb848d858a9c5b38d"
+checksum = "12b92608f679a6fa515dd1d15c1ff89443026e391200a2c840c7afcba482893d"
 dependencies = [
 "data-encoding",
 "idna",
@@ -2355,9 +2351,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "hickory-resolver"
-version = "0.26.2"
+version = "0.26.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "0e4f9f4603319422d482738f3f6fe5aac03157fdbfed1cd85a3ff45adb09072f"
+checksum = "3f3da5255c95d5a716857d54b5b8f4e8d67c3484d3beaaaae2ce25063b3ba981"
 dependencies = [
 "cfg-if",
 "futures-util",
@@ -2555,7 +2551,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "http 1.5.0",
 "hyper 1.11.1",
 "hyper-util",
- "rustls 0.23.44",
+ "rustls 0.23.45",
 "tokio",
 "tokio-rustls 0.26.5",
 "tower-service",
@@ -2805,9 +2801,9 @@ checksum = "47f142fe24a9c9944451e8349de0a56af5f3e7226dc46f3ed4d4ecc0b85af75e"
 [[package]]
 name = "jiff"
-version = "0.2.35"
+version = "0.2.37"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "668b7183bd07af9a4885f5c35b0cc5c83c4607a913c16b7e17291832910d2dcc"
+checksum = "0ab1baf72f08796de0260609515130699b890ac25f30e610ad894bc5856cafdb"
 dependencies = [
 "defmt",
 "jiff-core",
@@ -2824,18 +2820,19 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "jiff-core"
-version = "0.1.0"
+version = "0.1.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "7feca88439efe53da3754500c1851dedf3cb36c524dd5cf8225cc0794de95d09"
+checksum = "5e52fe76043ccecc9005d2305ebaadf7d7fc0cc89ca6baa10a94d6bc68c7128c"
 dependencies = [
 "defmt",
 "log",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "jiff-static"
-version = "0.2.35"
+version = "0.2.37"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "3a69dcb3a21cfb32ce1cd056169337ca284af0766dd766e7878819b251a49204"
+checksum = "378268a1116ad67ae6228701118ac9f491d78fda38a40a1f1a9e1348de6f7212"
 dependencies = [
 "jiff-core",
 "proc-macro2",
@@ -2941,9 +2938,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "jsonwebtoken"
-version = "11.0.0"
+version = "11.1.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "881733cbc631fc9e472e24447ce32a64bedf2da498d6d8570b08edc87de71f65"
+checksum = "e75fe14a82d81e5f5af639997db37d8b96045938a7ac6ab18cdbe1c7467e05e1"
 dependencies = [
 "base64 0.22.1",
 "ed25519-dalek",
@@ -3011,7 +3008,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "nom 8.0.0",
 "percent-encoding",
 "quoted_printable",
- "rustls 0.23.44",
+ "rustls 0.23.45",
 "rustls-native-certs",
 "serde",
 "socket2 0.6.5",
@@ -3109,7 +3106,7 @@ name = "macros"
 version = "0.1.0"
 dependencies = [
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -3267,7 +3264,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
 "rustversion",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -3299,7 +3296,7 @@ version = "0.31.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "cf20d2fde8ff38632c426f1165ed7436270b44f199fc55284c38276f9db47c3d"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.1",
+ "bitflags 2.13.2",
 "cfg-if",
 "cfg_aliases",
 "libc",
@@ -3379,7 +3376,7 @@ checksum = "e4e98dc3b890f6c23a0f9d3d491a2823d0dea0fa656302a13dd225fa924112a8"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -3485,9 +3482,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "opendal"
-version = "0.59.1"
+version = "0.59.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "f950151f9587a51a7bed70a15fa0cff464eae96e41ae7499f97067bdafdf43eb"
+checksum = "9fe43e16d96bed57937eb7c4a28559bf4c5fc4a3951656505d1fdd4f856349b4"
 dependencies = [
 "opendal-core",
 "opendal-service-fs",
@@ -3496,9 +3493,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "opendal-core"
-version = "0.59.1"
+version = "0.59.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "a43405d217dfdfb543f58847336d3af672897dd1939bb7dcf314b63cf364f1c9"
+checksum = "de4566a412776e3f65d53dd9fceced5b432a0a9c9a1e8d50ccf58823795e5c5b"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "asyncband",
@@ -3522,9 +3519,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "opendal-http-transport-reqwest"
-version = "0.59.1"
+version = "0.59.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "401999057db611e592f883fcf2cbd6754ff37af587deaadd07b8c1398b2b6b06"
+checksum = "f772ce6c137ab43647726116d505a649a88d41928fcd813438eb30b02312bcbb"
 dependencies = [
 "bytes",
 "futures",
@@ -3536,9 +3533,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "opendal-service-fs"
-version = "0.59.1"
+version = "0.59.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "fb9caf04d6d38713299dd4abac984b95ab16ee20e1ff09160f495c5a64644083"
+checksum = "a0e7d8974aebd33be899200c9d0d50b2141fd5fa5c462b29e20653e3ddbfe339"
 dependencies = [
 "bytes",
 "log",
@@ -3550,9 +3547,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "opendal-service-s3"
-version = "0.59.1"
+version = "0.59.2"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "388b1d39b62535c62803754ebef89808859558697366dbedd0299345887ba461"
+checksum = "2942f2d8d3d4953c0e8d07cd1244879628d084948e48ce6b6d808c5938f7858d"
 dependencies = [
 "base64 0.23.1",
 "bytes",
@@ -3606,7 +3603,7 @@ version = "0.10.81"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "77823a27f0babb03091cb9ed9ef80af3b39dbc82f97e8fa530374b7dafd87a45"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.1",
+ "bitflags 2.13.2",
 "cfg-if",
 "foreign-types",
 "libc",
@@ -4060,7 +4057,7 @@ version = "3.5.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "e67ba7e9b2b56446f1d419b1d807906278ffa1a658a8a5d8a39dcb1f5a78614f"
 dependencies = [
- "toml_edit 0.25.13+spec-1.1.0",
+ "toml_edit 0.25.15+spec-1.1.0",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -4252,7 +4249,7 @@ version = "11.6.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "498cd0dc59d73224351ee52a95fee0f1a617a2eae0e7d9d720cc622c73a54186"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.1",
+ "bitflags 2.13.2",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -4261,7 +4258,7 @@ version = "0.5.18"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "ed2bf2547551a7053d6fdfafda3f938979645c44812fbfcda098faae3f1a362d"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.1",
+ "bitflags 2.13.2",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -4281,7 +4278,7 @@ checksum = "92ecd8964f8453721699a1ed72037b0db49ce2f5a5138486ee89bed6f67cdf3a"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -4424,7 +4421,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "mime",
 "percent-encoding",
 "pin-project-lite",
- "rustls 0.23.44",
+ "rustls 0.23.45",
 "rustls-pki-types",
 "rustls-platform-verifier",
 "serde",
@@ -4668,11 +4665,11 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "rustix"
-version = "1.1.4"
+version = "1.1.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b6fe4565b9518b83ef4f91bb47ce29620ca828bd32cb7e408f0062e9930ba190"
+checksum = "891efababe418670775f199f0d233d84843c227a0949a883ce15b37c78d6629d"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.1",
+ "bitflags 2.13.2",
 "errno",
 "libc",
 "linux-raw-sys",
@@ -4693,9 +4690,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "rustls"
-version = "0.23.44"
+version = "0.23.45"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "6725596c3f2c3a0aef021139e145d4eafe314a6623e4680ca83852b2c67ab2ba"
+checksum = "0d41d731c7d2f962d1ccc364cec258de3c0e93b38c2fb3ba97ac74513048d634"
 dependencies = [
 "log",
 "once_cell",
@@ -4747,7 +4744,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "jni",
 "log",
 "once_cell",
- "rustls 0.23.44",
+ "rustls 0.23.45",
 "rustls-native-certs",
 "rustls-platform-verifier-android",
 "rustls-webpki 0.103.15",
@@ -4889,7 +4886,7 @@ version = "3.7.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b7f4bc775c73d9a02cde8bf7b2ec4c9d12743edf609006c7facc23998404cd1d"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.1",
+ "bitflags 2.13.2",
 "core-foundation 0.10.1",
 "core-foundation-sys",
 "libc",
@@ -4959,7 +4956,7 @@ checksum = "e7a5d71263a5a7d47b41f6b3f06ba276f10cc18b0931f1799f710578e2309348"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -5055,7 +5052,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "darling 0.24.1",
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -5195,9 +5192,9 @@ checksum = "0c790de23124f9ab44544d7ac05d60440adc586479ce501c1d6d7da3cd8c9cf5"
 [[package]]
 name = "smallvec"
-version = "1.16.0"
+version = "1.16.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b9be42f50aa861c555654aa3a37f52f4b1074bacf4e48fe0ef7fa584e80f1f0f"
+checksum = "ba467056f1b547ed52077911161fc86985becbc60e8e1857c8a144dab0def891"
 [[package]]
 name = "socket2"
@@ -5324,9 +5321,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "syn"
-version = "3.0.5"
+version = "3.0.6"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "12df2e0110f65b775f769bb17ef989067a1d931b2eb822bd4346631eeada89f9"
+checksum = "8593e8e72159ed2257d083c7a454a85cbf854f37a0966d8d483aff8c8a3ebcee"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
@@ -5353,6 +5350,17 @@ dependencies = [
 "syn 2.0.119",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "synstructure"
 version = "0.14.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "901704edd0dfe137f1987838ee4f259e4e063c31371bdb423f7ae38ec6f77f02"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
 "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "syslog"
 version = "7.0.0"
@@ -5371,7 +5379,7 @@ version = "0.7.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "a13f3d0daba03132c0aa9767f98351b3488edc2c100cda2d2ec2b04f3d8d3c8b"
 dependencies = [
- "bitflags 2.13.1",
+ "bitflags 2.13.2",
 "core-foundation 0.9.4",
 "system-configuration-sys",
 ]
@@ -5442,7 +5450,7 @@ checksum = "bc04cd3e1236dd4a98afca4569f2deb3f120e5422a4023be2cb683f8486292af"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -5507,18 +5515,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "tinyvec"
-version = "1.13.2"
+version = "1.13.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "4cf0ded5c4e56918d8f8a339e1bb67d038d3bc6d144ac407904015ba2e4cde9b"
+checksum = "fd3ca314f692efd6c868f8408f53fe444634a845f96c028b97d35f6a1f79f0ee"
 dependencies = [
 "tinyvec_macros",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "tinyvec_macros"
 version = "0.1.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "1f3ccbac311fea05f86f61904b462b55fb3df8837a366dfc601a0161d0532f20"
 [[package]]
 name = "tokio"
@@ -5545,7 +5544,7 @@ checksum = "78773a2a397f451582ce068015985c33193cf6dea8b74d2a639fe457b2f07b0e"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -5564,7 +5563,7 @@ version = "0.26.5"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "b0c85f2c3ef0b1cd58b36682f4b17aaa995f0e5db534d85692b4903abce21f67"
 dependencies = [
- "rustls 0.23.44",
+ "rustls 0.23.45",
 "tokio",
 ]
@@ -5674,9 +5673,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "toml_edit"
-version = "0.25.13+spec-1.1.0"
+version = "0.25.15+spec-1.1.0"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "6975367e4d2ef766d86af01ffad14b622fecc8d4357a998fbc4deb6e9bacaf9b"
+checksum = "1340ea94a5856333492c9064b02c778b191dd2c853778d9609debdcdfea3a614"
 dependencies = [
 "indexmap 2.14.2",
 "toml_datetime 1.1.1+spec-1.1.0",
@@ -5733,7 +5732,7 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
 checksum = "4cfcf7e2740e6fc6d4d688b4ef00650406bb94adf4731e43c096c3a19fe40840"
 dependencies = [
 "async-compression",
- "bitflags 2.13.1",
+ "bitflags 2.13.2",
 "bytes",
 "futures-core",
 "futures-util",
@@ -5881,9 +5880,9 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-ident"
-version = "1.0.24"
+version = "1.0.26"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "e6e4313cd5fcd3dad5cafa179702e2b244f760991f45397d14d4ebf38247da75"
+checksum = "d245f478577f809a851594d02313b640fb437e0bb33866753cff937863096954"
 [[package]]
 name = "unicode-segmentation"
@@ -5936,9 +5935,9 @@ checksum = "b6c140620e7ffbb22c2dee59cafe6084a59b5ffc27a8859a5f0d494b5d52b6be"
 [[package]]
 name = "uuid"
-version = "1.26.0"
+version = "1.26.1"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b5772d71c9be8a8a6ac2117d949c5b224c1b72241bb611d9a3012edcf8af7812"
+checksum = "2ef6dac1e96601b4fb3acccccff2139741fcb757cb9a36089bf5be91cfb285ce"
 dependencies = [
 "getrandom 0.4.3",
 "js-sys",
@@ -6019,7 +6018,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "rocket",
 "rocket_ws",
 "rpassword",
- "rustls 0.23.44",
+ "rustls 0.23.45",
 "semver",
 "serde",
 "serde_json",
@@ -6134,7 +6133,7 @@ dependencies = [
 "bumpalo",
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 "wasm-bindgen-shared",
 ]
@@ -6612,14 +6611,14 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "yoke-derive"
-version = "0.8.2"
+version = "0.8.3"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "de844c262c8848816172cef550288e7dc6c7b7814b4ee56b3e1553f275f1858e"
+checksum = "33811428bee40dbceb6d545e95754741d17a6aef9a4849f0fd62e2ba4f412a78"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 2.0.119",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
- "synstructure",
+ "synstructure 0.14.0",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -6666,14 +6665,14 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "zerofrom-derive"
-version = "0.1.7"
+version = "0.1.8"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "11532158c46691caf0f2593ea8358fed6bbf68a0315e80aae9bd41fbade684a1"
+checksum = "f75b4683f6c7f45248d4d64056a24298c6281e0993356d7d1b4a1a962ef10d4a"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 2.0.119",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
- "synstructure",
+ "synstructure 0.14.0",
 ]
 [[package]]
@@ -6726,14 +6725,14 @@ checksum = "34df6fc39dbd26ddc9c10e6a2984476e13acce22e64e4487636ef494369225da"
 dependencies = [
 "proc-macro2",
 "quote",
- "syn 3.0.5",
+ "syn 3.0.6",
 ]
 [[package]]
 name = "zlib-rs"
-version = "0.6.7"
+version = "0.6.8"
 source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "34b31d188d9d685a4f9c7b46d6e36631b07058d2cfe190267adce54dc230bf12"
+checksum = "b268e58e7c693d7c271f93ffc4ba3b380412554231c85bf61ca7af91042a4112"
 [[package]]
 name = "zmij"
@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ libsqlite3-sys = { version = "0.38.2", optional = true }
 # Crypto-related libraries
 rand = "0.10.2"
 ring = "0.17.14"
-rustls = { version = "0.23.44", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
+rustls = { version = "0.23.45", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
 subtle = "2.6.1"
 # UUID generation
-uuid = { version = "1.26.0", features = ["v4"] }
+uuid = { version = "1.26.1", features = ["v4"] }
 # Date and time libraries
 chrono = { version = "0.4.45", default-features = false, features = ["clock", "serde"] }
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ job_scheduler_ng = "2.5.0"
 data-encoding = "2.11.1"
 # JWT library
-jsonwebtoken = { version = "11.0.0", default-features = false, features = ["rust_crypto", "use_pem"] }
+jsonwebtoken = { version = "11.1.0", default-features = false, features = ["rust_crypto", "use_pem"] }
 # TOTP library
 totp-lite = "2.0.1"
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ reqwest = { version = "0.13.5", default-features = false, features = [
    "socks",
    "system-proxy",
 ] }
-hickory-resolver = "0.26.2"
+hickory-resolver = "0.26.3"
 # Favicon extraction libraries
 html5gum = "0.8.4"
@@ -257,8 +257,8 @@ rpassword = "7.5.4"
 grass_compiler = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false }
 # File are accessed through Apache OpenDAL
-opendal = { version = "0.59.1", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
+opendal = { version = "0.59.2", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
-opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.1", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
+opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.2", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
 # For retrieving AWS credentials, including temporary SSO credentials
 aws-config = { version = "1.12.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
@@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ aws-config = { version = "1.12.0", optional = true, default-features = false, fe
    "sso",
 ] }
 aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0", optional = true }
-aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.16.0", optional = true }
+aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.16.2", optional = true }
 http = { version = "1.5.0", optional = true }
 reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.3.0", optional = true }
 reqsign-core = { version = "3.3.1", optional = true }
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ proc-macro = true
 [dependencies]
 quote = "1.0.47"
-syn = "3.0.5"
+syn = "3.0.6"
 [lints]
 workspace = true
@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
 ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@ ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
-
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
 CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
    uuid                CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
 ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@ ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
-
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
 CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
    uuid                CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@ ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
 ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -2,8 +2,7 @@ ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
-
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
 DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
 CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
    uuid                TEXT     NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 use std::collections::HashSet;
 use chrono::Utc;
 use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
 use rocket::{
    http::Status,
    request::{FromRequest, Outcome, Request},
@@ -11,7 +12,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{
-        AnonymousNotify, ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
+        AnonymousNotify, ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, LogOutReason, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
        core::{accept_org_invite, log_user_event, two_factor::email},
        master_password_policy, register_push_device, unregister_push_device,
    },
@@ -48,8 +49,10 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<rocket::Route> {
        post_password,
        post_set_password,
        post_kdf,
        get_key_rotation_data,
        post_rotatekey,
        post_user_key,
        post_rotate_user_keys,
        post_sstamp,
        post_email_token,
        post_email,
@@ -173,6 +176,14 @@ impl RegisterDataCompat {
        self.fold(|rdc| &rdc.key, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_unlock.key).to_owned()
    }
    /// The id of the user key, which only the current format carries.
    fn key_id(&self) -> Option<KeyId> {
        match self {
            RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataOld(_) => None,
            RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataCur(rdcu) => rdcu.master_password_unlock.contained_key_id.clone(),
        }
    }
    // When comparing with salt, email need to be normalized:
    //  - https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/web-v2026.5.0/libs/common/src/key-management/master-password/services/master-password.service.ts#L171
    fn unprocessable(&self, email: &str) -> bool {
@@ -274,7 +285,7 @@ impl AccountKeysData {
        let v2 = match (signed_public_key, self.signature_key_pair, self.security_state) {
            (Some(signed_public_key), Some(signature_key_pair), Some(security_state)) => {
-                let Some(signature_algorithm) = SignatureAlgorithm::from_str(&signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm)
+                let Some(signature_algorithm) = SignatureAlgorithm::parse(&signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm)
                else {
                    err!(format!("Unsupported signature algorithm: {}", signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm))
                };
@@ -302,6 +313,23 @@ impl AccountKeysData {
    }
 }
 impl WrappedAccountCryptographicState {
    /// This shape is v2-only: the key pairs and security state were already required by the
    /// deserializer, so a missing signed public key fails the all-or-nothing check in
    /// [`AccountKeysData::validate`] rather than falling back to v1, which would silently turn a
    /// rotation into a downgrade.
    fn validate(self) -> ApiResult<ValidatedAccountKeys> {
        AccountKeysData {
            user_key_encrypted_account_private_key: None,
            account_public_key: None,
            public_key_encryption_key_pair: Some(self.public_key_encryption_key_pair),
            signature_key_pair: Some(self.signature_key_pair),
            security_state: Some(self.security_state),
        }
        .validate()
    }
 }
 impl From<KeysData> for ValidatedAccountKeys {
    fn from(keys: KeysData) -> Self {
        Self {
@@ -313,6 +341,19 @@ impl From<KeysData> for ValidatedAccountKeys {
 }
 impl ValidatedAccountKeys {
    /// The keys of a request that may carry either shape. `accountKeys` supersedes the flat `keys`
    /// object when both are sent.
    fn from_request(account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>, keys: Option<KeysData>) -> ApiResult<Option<Self>> {
        match (account_keys, keys) {
            (Some(account_keys), _) => account_keys.validate().map(Some),
            (None, keys) => Ok(keys.map(Self::from)),
        }
    }
    fn is_v2(&self) -> bool {
        self.v2.is_some()
    }
    /// Writes the parts of the state that live on the user itself. The user still needs saving, and
    /// [`Self::save_signature_key_pair`] still needs calling once it has been.
    ///
@@ -340,7 +381,7 @@ impl ValidatedAccountKeys {
            return Ok(());
        };
-        let mut key_pair = match UserSignatureKeyPair::find_active_by_user(user_id, conn).await {
+        let mut key_pair = match UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(user_id, conn).await {
            Some(mut key_pair) => {
                key_pair.signature_algorithm = v2.signature_algorithm as i32;
                key_pair.signing_key.clone_from(&v2.signing_key);
@@ -376,6 +417,7 @@ pub struct MasterPasswordUnlock {
    #[serde(alias = "masterKeyWrappedUserKey")]
    key: String,
    contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -503,10 +545,11 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, email_verification: bool, conn:
        err!("The field Name must be a string with a maximum length of 50.");
    }
-    // Check against the password hint setting here so if it fails, the user
+    // Check against the password hint setting and the keys here so if they fail,
-    // can retry without losing their invitation below.
+    // the user can retry without losing their invitation below.
    let password_hint = clean_password_hint(data.master_password_hint.as_ref());
    enforce_password_hint_setting(password_hint.as_ref())?;
    let account_keys = ValidatedAccountKeys::from_request(data.account_keys, data.keys)?;
    let mut user = match User::find_by_mail(&email, &conn).await {
        Some(user) => {
@@ -563,13 +606,13 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, email_verification: bool, conn:
        user.name = name;
    }
    let account_keys = match (data.account_keys, data.keys) {
        (Some(account_keys), _) => Some(account_keys.validate()?),
        (None, Some(keys)) => Some(keys.into()),
        (None, None) => None,
    };
    if let Some(ref account_keys) = account_keys {
        account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
        // Like upstream, only a v2 registration records the user key id. A v1 account reports it
        // later, through `user-key-id`.
        if account_keys.is_v2() {
            user.key_id = data.compat.key_id();
        }
    }
    if email_verified {
@@ -628,11 +671,7 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<SetPasswordData>, headers: Headers, conn:
    let password_hint = clean_password_hint(data.master_password_hint.as_ref());
    enforce_password_hint_setting(password_hint.as_ref())?;
-    let account_keys = match (data.account_keys, data.keys) {
+    let account_keys = ValidatedAccountKeys::from_request(data.account_keys, data.keys)?;
        (Some(account_keys), _) => Some(account_keys.validate()?),
        (None, Some(keys)) => Some(keys.into()),
        (None, None) => None,
    };
    set_kdf_data(&mut user, data.compat.kdf())?;
@@ -648,6 +687,10 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<SetPasswordData>, headers: Headers, conn:
    if let Some(ref account_keys) = account_keys {
        account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
        // As in `register`, only a v2 account records the user key id here
        if account_keys.is_v2() {
            user.key_id = data.compat.key_id();
        }
    }
    if let Some(identifier) = data.org_identifier
@@ -791,6 +834,8 @@ struct PostKeysData {
    #[serde(flatten)]
    keys: Option<KeysData>,
    account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>,
    // The id of the user key these account keys belong to, only honored for v2 `accountKeys`
    user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }
 #[post("/accounts/keys", data = "<data>")]
@@ -799,9 +844,25 @@ async fn post_keys(data: Json<PostKeysData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) ->
    let mut user = headers.user;
    // This only sets the keys of an account that has none yet. Replacing existing ones is what a key
    // rotation does, with the checks that go with it.
    if user.private_key.is_some() || user.public_key.is_some() {
        err!("User has existing keypair")
    }
    // `accountKeys` supersedes the flat `keys` object when both are sent.
    let account_keys = match (data.account_keys, data.keys) {
-        (Some(account_keys), _) => account_keys.validate()?,
+        (Some(account_keys), _) => {
            let account_keys = account_keys.validate()?;
            if !account_keys.is_v2() {
                err!("AccountKeys are only supported for V2 encryption.")
            }
            // A client that predates key ids sends none, and reports it later through `user-key-id`
            if data.user_key_id.is_some() {
                user.key_id = data.user_key_id;
            }
            account_keys
        }
        (None, Some(keys)) => keys.into(),
        (None, None) => err!("No account keys provided"),
    };
@@ -854,6 +915,8 @@ async fn post_password(data: Json<ChangePassData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
                err!("Invalid master password salt")
            }
            validate_key_id_unchanged(&user, &unlock_data)?;
            (authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
        } else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (data.new_master_password_hash, data.key) {
            (new_master_password_hash, new_key)
@@ -939,6 +1002,21 @@ struct UnlockData {
    salt: String,
    kdf: KDFData,
    master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
    contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }
 /// A password or KDF change re-wraps the same user key, so a key id sent with it has to be the
 /// current one. Either may be missing: from a client that predates key ids, or a user whose key id
 /// isn't known yet. There is nothing to compare in those cases.
 ///
 /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/MasterPasswordUnlockData.cs>
 fn validate_key_id_unchanged(user: &User, unlock_data: &UnlockData) -> EmptyResult {
    if let (Some(current), Some(contained)) = (&user.key_id, &unlock_data.contained_key_id)
        && current != contained
    {
        err!("Invalid user key sent in master-password unlock data.")
    }
    Ok(())
 }
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -965,6 +1043,8 @@ async fn post_kdf(data: Json<ChangeKdfData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
        err!("Invalid master password salt")
    }
    validate_key_id_unchanged(&headers.user, &data.unlock_data)?;
    let mut user = headers.user;
    set_kdf_data(&mut user, &data.unlock_data.kdf)?;
@@ -1006,43 +1086,62 @@ struct UpdateEmergencyAccessData {
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct UpdateResetPasswordData {
    organization_id: OrganizationId,
-    reset_password_key: String,
+    // Absent in a v1 -> v2 upgrade, which keeps the key the organization already holds
    reset_password_key: Option<String>,
 }
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct KeyData {
    account_unlock_data: RotateAccountUnlockData,
-    account_keys: RotateAccountKeys,
+    account_keys: AccountKeysData,
    account_data: RotateAccountData,
    old_master_key_authentication_hash: String,
    new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct RotateAccountUnlockData {
    emergency_access_unlock_data: Vec<UpdateEmergencyAccessData>,
    master_password_unlock_data: MasterPasswordUnlockData,
-    organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: Vec<UpdateResetPasswordData>,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
    common: CommonUnlockData,
 }
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct MasterPasswordUnlockData {
-    kdf_type: i32,
+    #[serde(flatten)]
-    kdf_iterations: i32,
+    kdf: KDFData,
    kdf_parallelism: Option<i32>,
    kdf_memory: Option<i32>,
    email: String,
    master_key_authentication_hash: String,
    master_key_encrypted_user_key: String,
    contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }
 /// The unlock data both rotation endpoints share. Vaultwarden has neither trusted device encryption
 /// nor passkey login, so `key-rotation-data` reports none of either and these must arrive empty.
 ///
 /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Api/KeyManagement/Models/Requests/CommonUnlockDataRequestModel.cs>
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct RotateAccountKeys {
+struct CommonUnlockData {
-    user_key_encrypted_account_private_key: String,
+    emergency_access_unlock_data: Vec<UpdateEmergencyAccessData>,
-    account_public_key: String,
+    organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: Vec<UpdateResetPasswordData>,
    #[serde(default)]
    passkey_unlock_data: Vec<Value>,
    #[serde(default)]
    device_key_unlock_data: Vec<Value>,
    v2_upgrade_token: Option<V2UpgradeTokenData>,
 }
 /// Lets clients that still hold the v1 user key derive the v2 one after another client upgraded the
 /// account, so a v1 -> v2 upgrade doesn't have to log every other session out. Opaque to us.
 #[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct V2UpgradeTokenData {
    wrapped_user_key1: String,
    wrapped_user_key2: String,
 }
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -1053,31 +1152,148 @@ struct RotateAccountData {
    sends: Vec<SendData>,
 }
-fn validate_keydata(
+/// Body of `rotate-user-keys`, which rotates the keys without touching the master password.
-    data: &KeyData,
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct RotateUserKeysData {
    wrapped_account_cryptographic_state: WrappedAccountCryptographicState,
    unlock_data: CommonUnlockData,
    account_data: RotateAccountData,
    unlock_method_data: UnlockMethodData,
    new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }
 /// The v2-only account cryptographic state, where all three parts are mandatory.
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct WrappedAccountCryptographicState {
    public_key_encryption_key_pair: PublicKeyEncryptionKeyPairData,
    signature_key_pair: SignatureKeyPairData,
    security_state: SecurityStateData,
 }
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct UnlockMethodData {
    unlock_method: i32,
    master_password_unlock_data: Option<RotateMasterPasswordUnlockData>,
    // `keyConnectorKeyWrappedUserKey` is deliberately not read: that unlock method is rejected.
 }
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct RotateMasterPasswordUnlockData {
    kdf: KDFData,
    salt: String,
    master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
    contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }
 /// The user key wrapped in the master password unlock data has to be the new one.
 ///
 /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/MasterPasswordUnlockData.cs>
 fn validate_contained_key_id(contained_key_id: Option<&KeyId>, new_user_key_id: Option<&KeyId>) -> EmptyResult {
    match (contained_key_id, new_user_key_id) {
        // Neither is sent by clients that predate key ids
        (None, None) => Ok(()),
        (Some(contained), Some(new)) if contained == new => Ok(()),
        _ => err!("Invalid user key sent in master-password unlock data."),
    }
 }
 /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Api/KeyManagement/Enums/UnlockMethod.cs>
 #[derive(num_derive::FromPrimitive)]
 enum UnlockMethod {
    Tde = 0,
    MasterPassword = 1,
    KeyConnector = 2,
 }
 /// The rotation-specific checks on the new account keys.
 ///
 /// A rotation re-wraps the existing keys under a new user key; it must not swap the identity the
 /// account presents to others. So the public key never changes, and for an account that is already
 /// v2 the verifying key doesn't either — only the *wrapped* signing key does. A v1 account may gain
 /// a signature key pair, which is the v1 -> v2 upgrade.
 ///
 /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/UserKey/Implementations/RotateUserAccountKeysCommand.cs>
 async fn validate_rotation_account_keys(keys: &ValidatedAccountKeys, user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    if user.public_key.as_ref() != Some(&keys.public_key) {
        err!("Changing the asymmetric keypair is not possible during key rotation")
    }
    let Some(v2) = &keys.v2 else {
        if user.is_v2() {
            err!("Cannot downgrade an account from v2 to v1 encryption during key rotation")
        }
        // A v1 rotation: the private key stays wrapped by an AES-CBC-HMAC user key
        if enc_string_type(&keys.private_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_AES_CBC_256_HMAC_SHA256) {
            err!("The provided account private key was not wrapped with AES-256-CBC-HMAC")
        }
        return Ok(());
    };
    // Both a v2 rotation and the v1 -> v2 upgrade end up with a COSE user key wrapping the private keys
    if enc_string_type(&v2.signing_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0) {
        err!("The provided signing key data is not wrapped with XChaCha20-Poly1305.")
    }
    if enc_string_type(&keys.private_key) != Some(ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0) {
        err!("The provided private key encryption key is not wrapped with XChaCha20-Poly1305.")
    }
    if v2.verifying_key.is_empty() || v2.signed_public_key.is_empty() || v2.security_state.is_empty() {
        err!("The v2 account keys are missing the verifying key, signed public key or security state")
    }
    if !user.is_v2() {
        // The v1 -> v2 upgrade, which is where the signature key pair comes from
        return Ok(());
    }
    let Some(key_pair) = UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await else {
        err!("The account is missing its signature key pair")
    };
    if key_pair.verifying_key != v2.verifying_key {
        err!("Changing the verifying key is not possible during key rotation")
    }
    Ok(())
 }
 /// `AesCbc256_HmacSha256_B64`, the v1 user key
 const ENC_TYPE_AES_CBC_256_HMAC_SHA256: &str = "2";
 /// `CoseEncrypt0B64`, the v2 user key
 const ENC_TYPE_COSE_ENCRYPT0: &str = "7";
 /// The encryption type of an EncString, the number before the first `.`.
 fn enc_string_type(enc_string: &str) -> Option<&str> {
    enc_string.split_once('.').map(|(enc_type, _)| enc_type)
 }
 impl KDFData {
    /// Whether these are the settings the user already has, which a key rotation can't change.
    fn is_unchanged_for(&self, user: &User) -> bool {
        user.client_kdf_type == self.kdf
            && user.client_kdf_iter == self.kdf_iterations
            && user.client_kdf_memory == self.kdf_memory
            && user.client_kdf_parallelism == self.kdf_parallelism
    }
 }
 /// A rotation re-encrypts everything under the new user key, so anything left out would be
 /// unreadable afterwards. Both rotation endpoints require the client to send the complete set.
 fn validate_rotation_data(
    data: &RotateData,
    existing_ciphers: &[Cipher],
    existing_folders: &[Folder],
    existing_emergency_access: &[EmergencyAccess],
    existing_memberships: &[Membership],
    existing_sends: &[Send],
    user: &User,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
-    if user.client_kdf_type != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_type
+    let account_data = &data.account_data;
        || user.client_kdf_iter != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_iterations
        || user.client_kdf_memory != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_memory
        || user.client_kdf_parallelism != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.kdf_parallelism
        || user.email != data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.email
    {
        err!("Changing the kdf variant or email is not supported during key rotation");
    }
    if user.public_key.as_ref() != Some(&data.account_keys.account_public_key) {
        err!("Changing the asymmetric keypair is not possible during key rotation")
    }
    // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's ciphers
    let existing_cipher_ids = existing_ciphers.iter().map(|c| &c.uuid).collect::<HashSet<&CipherId>>();
-    let provided_cipher_ids = data
+    let provided_cipher_ids = account_data
        .account_data
        .ciphers
        .iter()
        .filter(|c| c.organization_id.is_none())
@@ -1089,8 +1305,7 @@ fn validate_keydata(
    // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's folders
    let existing_folder_ids = existing_folders.iter().map(|f| &f.uuid).collect::<HashSet<&FolderId>>();
-    let provided_folder_ids =
+    let provided_folder_ids = account_data.folders.iter().filter_map(|f| f.id.as_ref()).collect::<HashSet<&FolderId>>();
        data.account_data.folders.iter().filter_map(|f| f.id.as_ref()).collect::<HashSet<&FolderId>>();
    if !provided_folder_ids.is_superset(&existing_folder_ids) {
        err!("All existing folders must be included in the rotation")
    }
@@ -1098,12 +1313,8 @@ fn validate_keydata(
    // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's emergency access keys
    let existing_emergency_access_ids =
        existing_emergency_access.iter().map(|ea| &ea.uuid).collect::<HashSet<&EmergencyAccessId>>();
-    let provided_emergency_access_ids = data
+    let provided_emergency_access_ids =
-        .account_unlock_data
+        data.unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data.iter().map(|ea| &ea.id).collect::<HashSet<&EmergencyAccessId>>();
        .emergency_access_unlock_data
        .iter()
        .map(|ea| &ea.id)
        .collect::<HashSet<&EmergencyAccessId>>();
    if !provided_emergency_access_ids.is_superset(&existing_emergency_access_ids) {
        err!("All existing emergency access keys must be included in the rotation")
    }
@@ -1112,7 +1323,7 @@ fn validate_keydata(
    let existing_reset_password_ids =
        existing_memberships.iter().map(|m| &m.org_uuid).collect::<HashSet<&OrganizationId>>();
    let provided_reset_password_ids = data
-        .account_unlock_data
+        .unlock_data
        .organization_account_recovery_unlock_data
        .iter()
        .map(|rp| &rp.organization_id)
@@ -1123,7 +1334,7 @@ fn validate_keydata(
    // Check that we're correctly rotating all the user's sends
    let existing_send_ids = existing_sends.iter().map(|s| &s.uuid).collect::<HashSet<&SendId>>();
-    let provided_send_ids = data.account_data.sends.iter().filter_map(|s| s.id.as_ref()).collect::<HashSet<&SendId>>();
+    let provided_send_ids = account_data.sends.iter().filter_map(|s| s.id.as_ref()).collect::<HashSet<&SendId>>();
    if !provided_send_ids.is_superset(&existing_send_ids) {
        err!("All existing sends must be included in the rotation")
    }
@@ -1131,25 +1342,142 @@ fn validate_keydata(
    Ok(())
 }
 /// The public keys and encrypted keysets that participate in a key rotation, so the client can
 /// re-share the new user key without having to piece this together from several endpoints.
 ///
 /// The four collections must always be present, even when empty: the SDK errors out if any of them
 /// is missing. `trustedDeviceKeyData` and `passkeyKeyData` are always empty here, since vaultwarden
 /// supports neither trusted device encryption nor passkey (PRF) login.
 ///
 /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/UserKey/Queries/KeyRotationDataQuery.cs>
 #[get("/accounts/key-management/key-rotation-data")]
 async fn get_key_rotation_data(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
    let user_id = &headers.user.uuid;
    let mut organization_data = Vec::new();
    for membership in Membership::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await {
        // Only memberships actually enrolled in account recovery take part in the rotation.
        if membership.reset_password_key.is_none() {
            continue;
        }
        let Some(org) = Organization::find_by_uuid(&membership.org_uuid, &conn).await else {
            continue;
        };
        let Some(public_key) = org.public_key else {
            continue;
        };
        organization_data.push(json!({
            "organizationId": org.uuid,
            "organizationName": org.name,
            "organizationPublicKey": public_key,
            "object": "organizationPasswordResetKeyData",
        }));
    }
    let mut emergency_access_data = Vec::new();
    for emergency_access in EmergencyAccess::find_all_confirmed_by_grantor_uuid(user_id, &conn).await {
        // Without a stored key there is nothing to re-share.
        if emergency_access.key_encrypted.is_none() {
            continue;
        }
        let Some(grantee_id) = emergency_access.grantee_uuid.clone() else {
            continue;
        };
        let Some(grantee) = User::find_by_uuid(&grantee_id, &conn).await else {
            continue;
        };
        let Some(public_key) = grantee.public_key.clone() else {
            continue;
        };
        emergency_access_data.push(json!({
            "id": emergency_access.uuid,
            "granteeId": grantee_id,
            "granteeName": grantee.name,
            "granteeEmail": grantee.email,
            "publicKey": public_key,
            "object": "emergencyAccessKeyData",
        }));
    }
    Ok(Json(json!({
        "organizationPasswordResetKeyData": organization_data,
        "emergencyAccessKeyData": emergency_access_data,
        "trustedDeviceKeyData": [],
        "passkeyKeyData": [],
        "object": "keyRotationData",
    })))
 }
 /// Everything a rotation replaces, once each endpoint's wrapper has been peeled off.
 struct RotateData {
    account_keys: ValidatedAccountKeys,
    account_data: RotateAccountData,
    unlock_data: CommonUnlockData,
    /// Only v2 (COSE) user keys have an id, so this is `None` for a v1 -> v1 rotation.
    new_user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
    /// The new user key, wrapped by the master key.
    wrapped_user_key: String,
    /// Only for `rotate-user-account-keys`, where the master password changes along with the keys.
    new_password_hash: Option<String>,
 }
 impl CommonUnlockData {
    /// We advertise no trusted devices or passkeys in `key-rotation-data`, so a client sending
    /// either has produced keys for something that doesn't exist here. Silently dropping them would
    /// leave the client believing an unlock method was rotated when it wasn't.
    fn validate(&self) -> EmptyResult {
        if !self.passkey_unlock_data.is_empty() {
            err!("Passkey unlock is not supported")
        }
        if !self.device_key_unlock_data.is_empty() {
            err!("Trusted device unlock is not supported")
        }
        Ok(())
    }
 }
 #[post("/accounts/key-management/rotate-user-account-keys", data = "<data>")]
 async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json<KeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult {
    // TODO: See if we can wrap everything within a SQL Transaction. If something fails it should revert everything.
    let data: KeyData = data.into_inner();
    if !headers.user.check_valid_password(&data.old_master_key_authentication_hash) {
        err!("Invalid password")
    }
-    // Validate the import before continuing
+    let unlock_data = data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data;
-    // Bitwarden does not process the import if there is one item invalid.
+    if !unlock_data.kdf.is_unchanged_for(&headers.user) || unlock_data.email != headers.user.email {
-    // Since we check for the size of the encrypted note length, we need to do that here to pre-validate it.
+        err!("Changing the kdf variant or email is not supported during key rotation");
-    // TODO: See if we can optimize the whole cipher adding/importing and prevent duplicate code and checks.
+    }
-    Cipher::validate_cipher_data(&data.account_data.ciphers)?;
+    validate_contained_key_id(unlock_data.contained_key_id.as_ref(), data.new_user_key_id.as_ref())?;
    let mut common = data.account_unlock_data.common;
    // This endpoint always logs every session out, so an upgrade token is never kept here. That
    // also clears one left over from an earlier upgrade. Ref: upstream's AccountsKeyManagementController
    common.v2_upgrade_token = None;
    rotate_account(
        RotateData {
            account_keys: data.account_keys.validate()?,
            account_data: data.account_data,
            unlock_data: common,
            new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id,
            wrapped_user_key: unlock_data.master_key_encrypted_user_key,
            new_password_hash: Some(unlock_data.master_key_authentication_hash),
        },
        headers,
        conn,
        nt,
    )
    .await
 }
 /// The body shared by both rotation endpoints: check that the client re-encrypted everything, re-save
 /// it, then swap the account keys and the wrapped user key.
 async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult {
    // TODO: See if we can wrap everything within a SQL Transaction. If something fails it should revert everything.
    data.unlock_data.validate()?;
    let user_id = &headers.user.uuid;
    // TODO: Ideally we'd do everything after this point in a single transaction.
    let mut existing_ciphers = Cipher::find_owned_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
    let mut existing_folders = Folder::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
    let mut existing_emergency_access = EmergencyAccess::find_all_confirmed_by_grantor_uuid(user_id, &conn).await;
@@ -1158,16 +1486,50 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json<KeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
    existing_memberships.retain(|m| m.reset_password_key.is_some());
    let mut existing_sends = Send::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
-    validate_keydata(
+    validate_rotation_data(
        &data,
        &existing_ciphers,
        &existing_folders,
        &existing_emergency_access,
        &existing_memberships,
        &existing_sends,
        &headers.user,
    )?;
    validate_rotation_account_keys(&data.account_keys, &headers.user, &conn).await?;
    // The upgrade token only means anything for a v1 account moving to v2: it lets sessions still
    // holding the v1 user key pick up the v2 one instead of being forced to re-authenticate. For an
    // account that is already v2 it is meaningless, so it gets discarded and the security stamp is
    // reset, as a rotation otherwise would. That ends the refresh tokens, while the access tokens in
    // use run out on their own, as upstream.
    let is_upgrade = data.unlock_data.v2_upgrade_token.is_some() && !headers.user.is_v2();
    let upgrade_token = match &data.unlock_data.v2_upgrade_token {
        Some(token) if is_upgrade => Some(serde_json::to_string(token)?),
        _ => None,
    };
    // An upgrade can't re-wrap the account recovery keys: that needs the organization's public key
    // to be trusted, and an upgrade shows the user no prompt. So the stored keys are kept, and each
    // organization gets the upgrade token instead, to unwrap the v2 user key with.
    // Ref: upstream's OrganizationUserRotationValidator
    for reset_password_data in &data.unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data {
        let has_key = reset_password_data.reset_password_key.as_deref().is_some_and(|k| !k.is_empty());
        if is_upgrade && has_key {
            err!("Account recovery keys cannot be rotated during a V1 to V2 upgrade rotation.")
        }
        if !is_upgrade && !has_key {
            err!("Account recovery keys cannot be null or empty during rotation.")
        }
    }
    // Validate the import before continuing
    // Bitwarden does not process the import if there is one item invalid.
    // Since we check for the size of the encrypted note length, we need to do that here to pre-validate it.
    // TODO: See if we can optimize the whole cipher adding/importing and prevent duplicate code and checks.
    Cipher::validate_cipher_data(&data.account_data.ciphers)?;
    // TODO: Ideally we'd do everything after this point in a single transaction.
    // Update folder data
    for folder_data in data.account_data.folders {
        // Skip `null` folder id entries.
@@ -1183,7 +1545,7 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json<KeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
    }
    // Update emergency access data
-    for emergency_access_data in data.account_unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data {
+    for emergency_access_data in data.unlock_data.emergency_access_unlock_data {
        let Some(saved_emergency_access) =
            existing_emergency_access.iter_mut().find(|ea| ea.uuid == emergency_access_data.id)
        else {
@@ -1195,14 +1557,17 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json<KeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
    }
    // Update reset password data
-    for reset_password_data in data.account_unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data {
+    for reset_password_data in data.unlock_data.organization_account_recovery_unlock_data {
        let Some(membership) =
            existing_memberships.iter_mut().find(|m| m.org_uuid == reset_password_data.organization_id)
        else {
            err!("Reset password doesn't exist")
        };
-        membership.reset_password_key = Some(reset_password_data.reset_password_key);
+        if !is_upgrade {
            membership.reset_password_key = reset_password_data.reset_password_key;
        }
        membership.v2_upgrade_token.clone_from(&upgrade_token);
        membership.save(&conn).await?;
    }
@@ -1224,33 +1589,95 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json<KeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
            };
            // Prevent triggering cipher updates via WebSockets by settings UpdateType::None
-            // The user sessions are invalidated because all the ciphers were re-encrypted and thus triggering an update could cause issues.
+            // Other sessions still hold the old user key, so an update to a re-encrypted cipher could cause issues.
-            // We force the users to logout after the user has been saved to try and prevent these issues.
+            // After the user is saved they are logged out, or on an upgrade, told to sync the new key.
            update_cipher_from_data(saved_cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?;
        }
    }
    // Update user data
    let mut user = headers.user;
    user.v2_upgrade_token = upgrade_token;
-    user.private_key = Some(data.account_keys.user_key_encrypted_account_private_key);
+    data.account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
-    user.set_password(
+    // The old id names a key that no longer exists, so it is replaced even when the new key has none.
-        &data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.master_key_authentication_hash,
+    user.key_id = data.new_user_key_id;
        Some(data.account_unlock_data.master_password_unlock_data.master_key_encrypted_user_key),
        true,
        None,
        &conn,
    )
    .await?;
-    let save_result = user.save(&conn).await;
+    user.akey = data.wrapped_user_key;
    if let Some(new_password_hash) = data.new_password_hash {
        user.set_password(&new_password_hash, None, false, None, &conn).await?;
    }
    // An upgrade keeps the sessions alive, see `is_upgrade` above
    if !is_upgrade {
        user.reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&conn).await?;
    }
    // The key pair goes first: if saving the user then fails during an upgrade, the account is still
    // v1 and the key pair unused, instead of a v2 account without one, which no client could unlock.
    // A failure between the two writes of a v2 rotation still needs a transaction to undo.
    data.account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
    user.save(&conn).await?;
    // Prevent logging out the client where the user requested this endpoint from.
    // If you do logout the user it will causes issues at the client side.
    // Adding the device uuid will prevent this.
-    nt.send_logout(&user, Some(&headers.device), &conn).await;
+    // When the sessions were kept alive, the reason lets the other clients sync the new keys (through
    // the upgrade token) instead of logging out, if they have `pm-31050-no-logout-key-upgrade-rotation`.
    let reason = is_upgrade.then_some(LogOutReason::KeyRotation);
    nt.send_logout_with_reason(&user, Some(&headers.device), reason, &conn).await;
-    save_result
+    Ok(())
 }
 /// Rotates the account keys without changing the master password.
 ///
 /// Unlike `rotate-user-account-keys` this carries no proof of the master password: the request is
 /// authorized by the session alone, which is how upstream defines it, and the client has to be
 /// unlocked to produce the payload in the first place.
 ///
 /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Api/KeyManagement/Controllers/AccountsKeyManagementController.cs>
 #[post("/accounts/key-management/rotate-user-keys", data = "<data>")]
 async fn post_rotate_user_keys(
    data: Json<RotateUserKeysData>,
    headers: Headers,
    conn: DbConn,
    nt: Notify<'_>,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
    let data: RotateUserKeysData = data.into_inner();
    let wrapped_user_key = match UnlockMethod::from_i32(data.unlock_method_data.unlock_method) {
        Some(UnlockMethod::MasterPassword) => {
            let Some(unlock_data) = data.unlock_method_data.master_password_unlock_data else {
                err!("Missing master password unlock data")
            };
            if !unlock_data.kdf.is_unchanged_for(&headers.user) {
                err!("Changing the kdf variant is not supported during key rotation")
            }
            if unlock_data.salt != headers.user.email {
                err!("Invalid master password salt")
            }
            validate_contained_key_id(unlock_data.contained_key_id.as_ref(), data.new_user_key_id.as_ref())?;
            unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key
        }
        Some(UnlockMethod::Tde) => err!("Trusted device encryption is not supported"),
        Some(UnlockMethod::KeyConnector) => err!("Key connector is not supported"),
        None => err!("Unrecognized unlock method"),
    };
    rotate_account(
        RotateData {
            account_keys: data.wrapped_account_cryptographic_state.validate()?,
            account_data: data.account_data,
            unlock_data: data.unlock_data,
            new_user_key_id: data.new_user_key_id,
            wrapped_user_key,
            new_password_hash: None,
        },
        headers,
        conn,
        nt,
    )
    .await
 }
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -1262,8 +1689,9 @@ struct KeyIdData {
 #[post("/accounts/key-management/user-key-id", data = "<data>")]
 async fn post_user_key(data: Json<KeyIdData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    let mut user = headers.user;
    // Only a backfill for accounts that have none. Afterwards the id changes with the key, in a rotation.
    if user.key_id.is_some() {
-        err_code!("Unexpected data", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
+        err!("User key id is already set.")
    }
    user.key_id = Some(data.into_inner().user_key_id);
@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ use crate::{
        models::{
            Archive, Attachment, AttachmentId, Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup,
            CollectionId, CollectionUser, EventType, Favorite, Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId, Group, KeyId,
-            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, UserId,
+            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, User, UserId,
            is_data_blob_encrypted,
        },
    },
    util::{NumberOrString, deser_opt_nonempty_str, save_temp_file},
@@ -189,12 +190,22 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
            // https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
            "masterKeyEncryptedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
            "masterKeyWrappedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
-            "salt": headers.user.email
+            "salt": headers.user.email,
            "containedKeyId": headers.user.key_id,
        })
    } else {
        Value::Null
    };
    // Upstream omits these two when unset rather than sending null.
    let mut user_decryption = json!({ "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock });
    if let Some(key_id) = &headers.user.key_id {
        user_decryption["userKeyId"] = json!(key_id);
    }
    if let Some(v2_upgrade_token) = headers.user.v2_upgrade_token_json() {
        user_decryption["v2UpgradeToken"] = v2_upgrade_token;
    }
    Ok(Json(json!({
        "profile": user_json,
        "folders": folders_json,
@@ -204,11 +215,7 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
        "ciphers": ciphers_json,
        "domains": domains_json,
        "sends": sends_json,
-        "userDecryption": {
+        "userDecryption": user_decryption,
            "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock,
            "userKeyId": headers.user.key_id,
            "v2UpgradeToken": headers.user.v2_upgrade_token_json(),
        },
        "object": "sync"
    })))
 }
@@ -285,7 +292,8 @@ pub struct CipherData {
    Passport = 8
    */
    pub r#type: i32,
-    pub name: String,
+    // Absent on a blob-encrypted cipher, whose name is sealed inside `data`
    pub name: Option<String>,
    pub notes: Option<String>,
    fields: Option<Value>,
@@ -299,6 +307,9 @@ pub struct CipherData {
    drivers_license: Option<Value>,
    passport: Option<Value>,
    // The sealed blob of a v2 account's cipher, which replaces all of the fields above
    data: Option<String>,
    favorite: Option<bool>,
    reprompt: Option<i32>,
@@ -320,6 +331,70 @@ pub struct CipherData {
    archived_date: Option<String>,
 }
 /// A field of a [`CipherData`] that fails upstream's model validation.
 #[derive(Debug)]
 pub struct CipherValidationError {
    pub field: &'static str,
    pub message: String,
 }
 impl From<CipherValidationError> for crate::Error {
    fn from(e: CipherValidationError) -> Self {
        Self::new_msg(e.message)
    }
 }
 /// A user-owned cipher must be encrypted with the user's current key. Organization ciphers use the
 /// organization key, which has no id yet, and either id may be missing: from a client that predates
 /// the field, or a user whose key id isn't known yet. There is nothing to compare in those cases.
 ///
 /// Ref: upstream's `CiphersController.ValidateCipherEncryptedByUser`
 fn validate_encrypted_by_user_key(data: &CipherData, user: &User, is_org_cipher: bool) -> EmptyResult {
    if !is_org_cipher
        && let (Some(cipher_key_id), Some(user_key_id)) = (&data.encrypted_by_key_id, &user.key_id)
        && cipher_key_id != user_key_id
    {
        err!("Cipher was not encrypted with the current user key. Please try again.")
    }
    Ok(())
 }
 /// Upstream's `[StringLength(500000)]` on `CipherRequestModel.Data`
 const MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH: usize = 500_000;
 impl CipherData {
    /// Whether the content is a single blob rather than the per-type fields. This parses `data`, so
    /// callers that need the answer more than once should keep it.
    pub fn is_blob(&self) -> bool {
        self.data.as_deref().is_some_and(is_data_blob_encrypted)
    }
    /// Checks the content the way upstream's model validation does, before anything is saved.
    /// `is_blob` is [`Self::is_blob`].
    ///
    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs>
    pub fn validate_content(&self, is_blob: bool) -> Result<(), CipherValidationError> {
        if let Some(data) = &self.data
            && data.len() > MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH
        {
            return Err(CipherValidationError {
                field: "Data",
                message: format!("The field Data must be a string with a maximum length of {MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH}."),
            });
        }
        // A blob carries the name inside it, so only the other formats need one
        if !is_blob && self.name.as_deref().is_none_or(|n| n.trim().is_empty()) {
            return Err(CipherValidationError {
                field: "Name",
                message: String::from("The Name field is required."),
            });
        }
        Ok(())
    }
 }
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 pub struct PartialCipherData {
@@ -356,13 +431,14 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create(
    if data.cipher.encrypted_for != headers.user.uuid {
        err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
    }
    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data.cipher, &headers.user, data.cipher.organization_id.is_some())?;
    // This check is usually only needed in update_cipher_from_data(), but we
    // need it here as well to avoid creating an empty cipher in the call to
    // cipher.save() below.
    enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data.cipher), &headers, &conn).await?;
-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, data.cipher.name.clone());
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, String::new());
    cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone());
    cipher.save(&conn).await?;
@@ -390,12 +466,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt
        err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
    }
-    if let Some(cipher_key_id) = &data.encrypted_by_key_id
+    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data, &headers.user, data.organization_id.is_some())?;
        && let Some(user_key_id) = &headers.user.key_id
        && cipher_key_id != user_key_id
    {
        err_code!("Invalid key cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
    }
    // The web/browser clients set this field to null as expected, but the
    // mobile clients seem to set the invalid value `0001-01-01T00:00:00`,
@@ -403,7 +474,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt
    // needed when creating a new cipher, so just ignore it unconditionally.
    data.last_known_revision_date = None;
-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, data.name.clone());
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, String::new());
    update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate).await?;
    Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -452,6 +523,9 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
    enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data), headers, conn).await?;
    let is_blob = data.is_blob();
    data.validate_content(is_blob)?;
    // Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data.
    // And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail.
    if ut != UpdateType::None
@@ -551,24 +625,35 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
        _ => err!("Invalid type"),
    };
-    let type_data = if let Some(mut data) = type_data_opt {
+    if let Some(blob) = data.data.filter(|_| is_blob) {
-        // Remove the 'Response' key from the base object.
+        // A blob holds all of the content, the name included, so nothing is kept outside it. The name
-        data.as_object_mut().unwrap().remove("response");
+        // column can't be null, so it's left empty; `to_json` reports it as null, as upstream does.
-        // Remove the 'Response' key from every Uri.
+        // TODO: Make `ciphers.name` nullable and store `None` here instead.
-        if data["uris"].is_array() {
+        cipher.name = String::new();
-            data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(data["uris"].clone());
+        cipher.notes = None;
-        }
+        cipher.fields = None;
-        data
+        cipher.password_history = None;
        cipher.data = blob;
    } else {
-        err!("Data missing")
+        let Some(mut type_data) = type_data_opt else {
-    };
+            err!("Data missing")
        };
        // Remove the 'Response' key from the base object.
        type_data.as_object_mut().unwrap().remove("response");
        // Remove the 'Response' key from every Uri.
        if type_data["uris"].is_array() {
            type_data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(type_data["uris"].clone());
        }
        // `validate_content` made sure there is a name
        cipher.name = data.name.unwrap_or_default();
        cipher.notes = data.notes;
        cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
        cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
        cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
    }
    cipher.key = data.key;
    cipher.name = data.name;
    cipher.notes = data.notes;
    cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
    cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
    cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
    cipher.reprompt = data.reprompt.filter(|r| *r == RepromptType::None as i32 || *r == RepromptType::Password as i32);
    cipher.save(conn).await?;
@@ -665,7 +750,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers_import(data: Json<ImportData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
        let folder_id = relations_map.get(&index).and_then(|i| folders.get(*i).cloned());
        cipher_data.folder_id = folder_id;
-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, String::new());
        update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?;
    }
@@ -733,6 +818,8 @@ async fn put_cipher(
        err!("Cipher is not write accessible")
    }
    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data, &headers.user, cipher.organization_uuid.is_some())?;
    update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate).await?;
    Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -1075,7 +1075,7 @@ async fn send_invite(
            && data.permissions.get("deleteAnyCollection") == Some(&json!(true))
            && data.permissions.get("createNewCollections") == Some(&json!(true)));
-    let mut user_created: bool = false;
+    let mut user_created: bool;
    for email in &data.emails {
        let mut member_status = MembershipStatus::Invited as i32;
        let user = match User::find_by_mail(email, &conn).await {
@@ -1110,6 +1110,7 @@ async fn send_invite(
                        member_status = MembershipStatus::Accepted as i32;
                    }
                }
                user_created = false;
                user
            }
        };
@@ -1884,7 +1885,7 @@ async fn post_org_import(
        cipher_data.folder_id = None;
        // Replace the client-provided, unvalidated organizationId with the real target org
        cipher_data.organization_id = Some(org_id.clone());
-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, String::new());
        update_cipher_from_data(
            &mut cipher,
            cipher_data,
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ pub use crate::api::{
    icons::routes as icons_routes,
    identity::routes as identity_routes,
    notifications::routes as notifications_routes,
-    notifications::{AnonymousNotify, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS},
+    notifications::{AnonymousNotify, LogOutReason, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS},
    push::{
        push_cipher_update, push_folder_update, push_logout, push_send_update, push_user_update, register_push_device,
        unregister_push_device,
@@ -383,23 +383,36 @@ impl WebSocketUsers {
    }
    pub async fn send_logout(&self, user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) {
        self.send_logout_with_reason(user, acting_device, None, conn).await;
    }
    /// A logout that clients may handle differently depending on `reason`, e.g. syncing instead of
    /// logging out after a key rotation that kept the sessions alive.
    pub async fn send_logout_with_reason(
        &self,
        user: &User,
        acting_device: Option<&Device>,
        reason: Option<LogOutReason>,
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) {
        // Skip any processing if both WebSockets and Push are not active
        if *NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED {
            return;
        }
        let acting_device_id = acting_device.map(|d| d.uuid.clone());
-        let data = create_update(
+        let mut payload =
-            vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))],
+            vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))];
-            UpdateType::LogOut,
+        if let Some(reason) = reason {
-            acting_device_id,
+            payload.push(("Reason".into(), (reason as i32).into()));
-        );
+        }
        let data = create_update(payload, UpdateType::LogOut, acting_device_id);
        if CONFIG.enable_websocket() {
            self.send_update(&user.uuid, &data).await;
        }
        if CONFIG.push_enabled() {
-            push_logout(user, acting_device, conn).await;
+            push_logout(user, acting_device, reason, conn).await;
        }
    }
@@ -667,6 +680,15 @@ fn create_ping() -> Vec<u8> {
    serialize(&Value::Array(vec![6.into()]))
 }
 /// Why a logout was pushed. Absent for a plain logout.
 ///
 /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/Enums/PushNotificationLogOutReason.cs>
 /// (`KdfChange = 0` is not sent by vaultwarden yet.)
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
 pub enum LogOutReason {
    KeyRotation = 1,
 }
 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/375af7c43b10d9da03525d41452f95de3f921541/src/Core/Enums/PushType.cs
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
 pub enum UpdateType {
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use tokio::sync::RwLock;
 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
-    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, UpdateType},
+    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, LogOutReason, UpdateType},
    db::{
        DbConn,
        models::{AuthRequestId, Cipher, Device, Folder, PushId, Send, User, UserId},
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ pub async fn push_cipher_update(ut: UpdateType, cipher: &Cipher, device: &Device
    }
 }
-pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) {
+pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, reason: Option<LogOutReason>, conn: &DbConn) {
    if Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, conn).await {
        tokio::task::spawn(send_to_push_relay(json!({
            "userId": user.uuid,
@@ -198,7 +198,8 @@ pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbC
            "type": UpdateType::LogOut as i32,
            "payload": {
                "userId": user.uuid,
-                "date": format_date(&user.updated_at)
+                "date": format_date(&user.updated_at),
                "reason": reason.map(|r| r as i32),
            },
            "clientType": null,
            "installationId": null
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ use crate::{
        models::{
            AttachmentId, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, EmergencyAccessId,
            EventType, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId,
-            SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, UserStampException,
+            SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId,
        },
    },
    error::Error,
@@ -667,31 +667,13 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for Headers {
        };
        if user.security_stamp != claims.sstamp {
-            if let Some(stamp_exception) =
+            let Some(current_route) = request.route().and_then(|r| r.name.as_deref()) else {
-                user.stamp_exception.as_deref().and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str::<UserStampException>(s).ok())
+                err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception")
-            {
+            };
                let Some(current_route) = request.route().and_then(|r| r.name.as_deref()) else {
                    err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception")
                };
-                // Check if the stamp exception has expired first.
+            // Expired exceptions are dropped the next time the stamp is reset, not here: writing them
-                // Then, check if the current route matches any of the allowed routes.
+            // back from this request could undo a reset made since the user was read.
-                // After that check the stamp in exception matches the one in the claims.
+            if !user.stamp_exceptions().iter().any(|e| e.allows(&claims.sstamp, current_route)) {
                if Utc::now().timestamp() > stamp_exception.expire {
                    // If the stamp exception has been expired remove it from the database.
                    // This prevents checking this stamp exception for new requests.
                    let mut user = user;
                    user.reset_stamp_exception();
                    if let Err(e) = user.save(&conn).await {
                        error!("Error updating user: {e:#?}");
                    }
                    err_handler!("Stamp exception is expired")
                } else if !stamp_exception.routes.contains(&current_route.to_owned()) {
                    err_handler!("Invalid security stamp: Current route and exception route do not match")
                } else if stamp_exception.security_stamp != claims.sstamp {
                    err_handler!("Invalid security stamp for matched stamp exception")
                }
            } else {
                err_handler!("Invalid security stamp")
            }
        }
@@ -1434,12 +1434,18 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
    "ssh-key-vault-item",
    "pm-25373-windows-biometrics-v2",
    "pm-26340-linux-biometrics-v2",
    "pm-31050-no-logout-key-upgrade-rotation",
    "pm-27278-v2-password-registration",
    "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
    "pm-30144-sdk-key-rotation",
    "force-upgrade-v2-encryption",
    // Mobile Team
    "anon-addy-self-host-alias",
    "simple-login-self-host-alias",
    "mutual-tls",
    "cxp-import-mobile",
    "cxp-export-mobile",
    "pm-34171-card-scanner",
    // Platform Team
    "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins",
    // Vault Team
@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ pub struct Cipher {
    pub reprompt: Option<i32>,
 }
 /// Whether `data` is a sealed cipher blob rather than the legacy per-type JSON.
 ///
 /// Ciphers of v2 accounts are encrypted as a single blob that carries everything, name included,
 /// and is opaque to us. It is recognized the same way upstream does, by a top-level
 /// `format_version` key that the legacy JSON never has.
 ///
 /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/Vault/Entities/Cipher.cs>
 pub fn is_data_blob_encrypted(data: &str) -> bool {
    serde_json::from_str::<Value>(data).is_ok_and(|d| is_blob_value(&d))
 }
 /// [`is_data_blob_encrypted`] for `data` that was already parsed.
 fn is_blob_value(data: &Value) -> bool {
    data.get("format_version").is_some()
 }
 pub enum RepromptType {
    None = 0,
    Password = 1,
@@ -110,6 +126,11 @@ impl Cipher {
                    .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].Notes"), serde_json::to_value([&max_note_size_msg]).unwrap());
            }
            if let Err(e) = cipher.validate_content(cipher.is_blob()) {
                validation_errors
                    .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].{}", e.field), serde_json::to_value([e.message]).unwrap());
            }
            // Validate the password history if it contains `null` values and if so, return a warning
            if let Some(Value::Array(password_history)) = &cipher.password_history {
                for pwh in password_history {
@@ -154,6 +175,11 @@ impl Cipher {
    ) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
        use crate::util::{format_date, validate_and_format_date};
        // Parsed once here, since `data` can be large and this runs for every cipher in a sync.
        // `LowerCase` only lowercases the first letter of each key, so it keeps `format_version`.
        let type_data = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data).map(|d| d.data);
        let is_blob_encrypted = type_data.as_ref().is_ok_and(is_blob_value);
        let mut attachments_json: Value = Value::Null;
        if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
            if let Some(attachments) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_attachments.get(&self.uuid)
@@ -189,124 +215,62 @@ impl Cipher {
            (false, false, false)
        };
-        let fields_json: Vec<_> = self
+        // Like upstream, a cipher that was stored without fields or password history reports them as
-            .fields
+        // null rather than as an empty list; clients keep the two apart.
-            .as_ref()
+        let fields_json: Option<Vec<_>> = self.fields.as_ref().map(|s| {
-            .and_then(|s| {
+            serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
-                serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
+                .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing fields {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
-                    .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing fields {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
+                .ok()
-                    .ok()
+                .map(|d| {
-            })
+                    d.into_iter()
-            .map(|d| {
+                        .map(|mut f| {
-                d.into_iter()
+                            // Check if the `type` key is a number, strings break some clients
-                    .map(|mut f| {
+                            // The fallback type is the hidden type `1`. this should prevent accidental data disclosure
-                        // Check if the `type` key is a number, strings break some clients
+                            // If not try to convert the string value to a number and fallback to `1`
-                        // The fallback type is the hidden type `1`. this should prevent accidental data disclosure
+                            // If it is both not a number and not a string, fallback to `1`
-                        // If not try to convert the string value to a number and fallback to `1`
+                            match f.data.get("type") {
-                        // If it is both not a number and not a string, fallback to `1`
+                                Some(t) if t.is_number() => {}
-                        match f.data.get("type") {
+                                Some(t) if t.is_string() => {
-                            Some(t) if t.is_number() => {}
+                                    let type_num = &t.as_str().unwrap_or("1").parse::<u8>().unwrap_or(1);
-                            Some(t) if t.is_string() => {
+                                    f.data["type"] = json!(type_num);
-                                let type_num = &t.as_str().unwrap_or("1").parse::<u8>().unwrap_or(1);
+                                }
-                                f.data["type"] = json!(type_num);
+                                _ => {
                                    f.data["type"] = json!(1);
                                }
                            }
-                            _ => {
+                            f.data
-                                f.data["type"] = json!(1);
+                        })
-                            }
+                        .collect()
-                        }
+                })
-                        f.data
+                .unwrap_or_default()
-                    })
+        });
                    .collect()
            })
            .unwrap_or_default();
-        let password_history_json: Vec<_> = self
+        let password_history_json: Option<Vec<_>> = self.password_history.as_ref().map(|s| {
-            .password_history
+            serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
-            .as_ref()
+                .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing password history {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
-            .and_then(|s| {
+                .ok()
-                serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
+                .map(|d| {
-                    .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing password history {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
+                    // Check every password history item if they are valid and return it.
-                    .ok()
+                    // If a password field has the type `null` skip it, it breaks newer Bitwarden clients
-            })
+                    // A second check is done to verify the lastUsedDate exists and is a valid DateTime string, if not the epoch start time will be used
-            .map(|d| {
+                    d.into_iter()
-                // Check every password history item if they are valid and return it.
+                        .filter_map(|d| match d.data.get("password") {
-                // If a password field has the type `null` skip it, it breaks newer Bitwarden clients
+                            Some(p) if p.is_string() => Some(d.data),
-                // A second check is done to verify the lastUsedDate exists and is a valid DateTime string, if not the epoch start time will be used
+                            _ => None,
-                d.into_iter()
+                        })
-                    .filter_map(|d| match d.data.get("password") {
+                        .map(|mut d| {
-                        Some(p) if p.is_string() => Some(d.data),
+                            let lud = if let Some(l) = d.get("lastUsedDate").and_then(|l| l.as_str()) {
-                        _ => None,
+                                validate_and_format_date(l)
-                    })
+                            } else {
-                    .map(|mut d| {
+                                "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z".to_owned()
-                        let lud = if let Some(l) = d.get("lastUsedDate").and_then(|l| l.as_str()) {
+                            };
-                            validate_and_format_date(l)
+                            d["lastUsedDate"] = json!(lud);
-                        } else {
+                            d
-                            "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z".to_owned()
+                        })
-                        };
+                        .collect()
-                        d["lastUsedDate"] = json!(lud);
+                })
-                        d
+                .unwrap_or_default()
-                    })
+        });
                    .collect()
            })
            .unwrap_or_default();
        // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
        // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
        let mut type_data_json = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data)
            .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid))
            .map_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()), |d| d.data);
        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
        // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
        if self.atype == 1 {
            // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
            type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
            if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
                && !uris.is_empty()
            {
                // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
                // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
                for uri in &mut *uris {
                    if uri["match"].is_string() {
                        let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
                            Ok(n) => json!(n),
                            _ => Value::Null,
                        };
                        uri["match"] = match_value;
                    }
                }
                type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
            }
            // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
            if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
                type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
            }
        }
        // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
        // This breaks at least the native mobile clients
        if self.atype == 2 {
            match type_data_json {
                Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
                _ => {
                    type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
                }
            }
        }
        // Fix invalid SSH Entries
        // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
        // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
        // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
        if self.atype == 5
            && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
                || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
                || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
        {
            warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
            type_data_json = Value::Null;
        }
        let collection_ids = if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
            if let Some(cipher_collections) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_collections.get(&self.uuid) {
@@ -403,10 +367,83 @@ impl Cipher {
            _ => err!(format!("Cipher {} has an invalid type {}", self.uuid, self.atype)),
        };
-        json_object[key] = type_data_json;
+        if is_blob_encrypted {
            // The blob holds all of the content, so it is sent back as-is and the structured fields
            // stay null, as upstream does. Only the name needs clearing, the others are never stored.
            json_object["data"] = json!(self.data);
            json_object["name"] = Value::Null;
        } else {
            json_object[key] = self.legacy_type_data_json(type_data);
        }
        Ok(json_object)
    }
    /// The per-type data (`login`, `card`, …) of a legacy cipher, from `type_data` as parsed from
    /// `self.data`, with fixups for values that are known to break clients.
    fn legacy_type_data_json(&self, type_data: Result<Value, serde_json::Error>) -> Value {
        use crate::util::validate_and_format_date;
        // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
        // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
        let mut type_data_json = type_data
            .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid))
            .unwrap_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()));
        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
        // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
        if self.atype == 1 {
            // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
            type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
            if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
                && !uris.is_empty()
            {
                // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
                // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
                for uri in &mut *uris {
                    if uri["match"].is_string() {
                        let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
                            Ok(n) => json!(n),
                            _ => Value::Null,
                        };
                        uri["match"] = match_value;
                    }
                }
                type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
            }
            // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
            if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
                type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
            }
        }
        // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
        // This breaks at least the native mobile clients
        if self.atype == 2 {
            match type_data_json {
                Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
                _ => {
                    type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
                }
            }
        }
        // Fix invalid SSH Entries
        // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
        // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
        // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
        if self.atype == 5
            && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
                || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
                || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
        {
            warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
            type_data_json = Value::Null;
        }
        type_data_json
    }
    pub async fn update_users_revision(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<UserId> {
        let mut user_uuids = Vec::new();
        match self.user_uuid {
@@ -657,16 +694,27 @@ impl Cipher {
    }
    async fn get_user_collections_access_flags(&self, user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<(bool, bool, bool)> {
        let user_uuid = user_uuid.to_string();
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            // Check whether this cipher is in any collections accessible to the
            // user. If so, retrieve the access flags for each collection.
            // The user must have a confirmed membership in the cipher's
            // organization, since users_collections rows are kept when a
            // membership is revoked or not confirmed yet.
            ciphers::table
                .filter(ciphers::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
                .inner_join(ciphers_collections::table.on(ciphers::uuid.eq(ciphers_collections::cipher_uuid)))
                .inner_join(
                    users_organizations::table.on(ciphers::organization_uuid
                        .eq(users_organizations::org_uuid.nullable())
                        .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
                        .and(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))),
                )
                .inner_join(
                    users_collections::table.on(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid
                        .eq(users_collections::collection_uuid)
-                        .and(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))),
+                        // Only allow collection access via the confirmed membership.
                        .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(users_collections::user_uuid))),
                )
                .select((users_collections::read_only, users_collections::hide_passwords, users_collections::manage))
                .load::<(bool, bool, bool)>(conn)
@@ -697,6 +745,9 @@ impl Cipher {
                        .and(groups::organizations_uuid.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid))),
                )
                .filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
                // Only allow group access via a confirmed membership, since
                // groups_users rows are kept when a membership is revoked.
                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .select((collections_groups::read_only, collections_groups::hide_passwords, collections_groups::manage))
                .load::<(bool, bool, bool)>(conn)
                .expect("Error getting group access restrictions")
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use crate::{
 };
 use macros::UuidFromParam;
-use super::{CollectionId, Membership, MembershipId, OrganizationId, User, UserId};
+use super::{CollectionId, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, OrganizationId, User, UserId};
 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
 #[diesel(table_name = groups)]
@@ -268,6 +268,9 @@ impl Group {
                        .and(users_organizations::org_uuid.eq(groups::organizations_uuid))),
                )
                .filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
                // Only allow full access via a confirmed membership, since
                // groups_users rows are kept when a membership is revoked.
                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .filter(groups::organizations_uuid.eq(org_uuid))
                .filter(groups::access_all.eq(true))
                .select(groups::access_all)
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ mod user_signature_key_pair;
 pub use self::archive::Archive;
 pub use self::attachment::{Attachment, AttachmentId};
 pub use self::auth_request::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId};
-pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType};
+pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType, is_data_blob_encrypted};
 pub use self::collection::{Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionId, CollectionUser};
 pub use self::device::{Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest, PushId};
 pub use self::emergency_access::{EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType};
@@ -40,5 +40,5 @@ pub use self::sso_auth::{OIDCAuthenticatedUser, OIDCCodeResponseError, SsoAuth};
 pub use self::two_factor::{TwoFactor, TwoFactorType};
 pub use self::two_factor_duo_context::TwoFactorDuoContext;
 pub use self::two_factor_incomplete::TwoFactorIncomplete;
-pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserStampException};
+pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType};
 pub use self::user_signature_key_pair::{SignatureAlgorithm, UserSignatureKeyPair};
@@ -57,6 +57,10 @@ pub struct Membership {
    pub atype: i32,
    pub reset_password_key: Option<String>,
    pub external_id: Option<String>,
    /// A copy of the user's v2 upgrade token, kept when a v1 -> v2 upgrade leaves the account
    /// recovery key (`reset_password_key`) wrapped by the v1 user key. It lets the organization
    /// unwrap the v2 user key from it. Opaque to us, like `User::v2_upgrade_token`.
    pub v2_upgrade_token: Option<String>,
 }
 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
@@ -274,6 +278,7 @@ impl Membership {
            atype: MembershipType::User as i32,
            reset_password_key: None,
            external_id: None,
            v2_upgrade_token: None,
        }
    }
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::EmptyResult,
    auth::DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY,
    crypto,
    db::{
        DbConn,
@@ -109,13 +110,28 @@ enum UserStatus {
    _Disabled = 2,
 }
 /// A previous security stamp that is still accepted, until `expire`.
 #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct UserStampException {
-    pub routes: Vec<String>,
+    /// The routes the stamp is still accepted on, or `None` for any route.
    pub routes: Option<Vec<String>>,
    pub security_stamp: String,
    pub expire: i64,
 }
 impl UserStampException {
    pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool {
        Utc::now().timestamp() > self.expire
    }
    /// Whether this exception lets a token carrying `security_stamp` through on `route`.
    pub fn allows(&self, security_stamp: &str, route: &str) -> bool {
        !self.is_expired()
            && self.security_stamp == security_stamp
            && self.routes.as_ref().is_none_or(|routes| routes.iter().any(|r| r == route))
    }
 }
 /// Local methods
 impl User {
    pub const CLIENT_KDF_TYPE_DEFAULT: i32 = UserKdfType::Pbkdf2 as i32;
@@ -239,10 +255,41 @@ impl User {
    pub async fn reset_security_stamp(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
        self.security_stamp = get_uuid();
        // A reset is meant to end the other sessions, which a key rotation's grace would undo. The
        // route exceptions stay, since they are set right before a reset, for the stamp it replaces.
        // This is also where expired exceptions get dropped.
        let mut exceptions = self.stamp_exceptions();
        exceptions.retain(|e| e.routes.is_some() && !e.is_expired());
        self.set_stamp_exceptions(&exceptions);
        Device::rotate_refresh_tokens_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        Ok(())
    }
    /// Resets the security stamp after a key rotation, while letting the access tokens already
    /// issued keep working until they expire.
    ///
    /// This is what upstream does: there the stamp is only checked when a token is refreshed, so a
    /// rotation invalidates refresh tokens but not the access tokens in use. Clients rely on it to
    /// keep a session going across a rotation. Chained rotations keep every earlier stamp that is
    /// still within its window.
    pub async fn reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
        let previous_stamp = self.security_stamp.clone();
        let mut grace: Vec<UserStampException> =
            self.stamp_exceptions().into_iter().filter(|e| e.routes.is_none() && !e.is_expired()).collect();
        self.reset_security_stamp(conn).await?;
        grace.push(UserStampException {
            routes: None,
            security_stamp: previous_stamp,
            expire: (Utc::now() + *DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY).timestamp(),
        });
        let mut exceptions = self.stamp_exceptions();
        exceptions.extend(grace);
        self.set_stamp_exceptions(&exceptions);
        Ok(())
    }
    /// Set the stamp_exception to only allow a subsequent request matching a specific route using the current security-stamp.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
@@ -251,17 +298,30 @@ impl User {
    ///   After these 2 minutes this stamp will expire.
    ///
    pub fn set_stamp_exception(&mut self, route_exception: Vec<String>) {
-        let stamp_exception = UserStampException {
+        self.set_stamp_exceptions(&[UserStampException {
-            routes: route_exception,
+            routes: Some(route_exception),
            security_stamp: self.security_stamp.clone(),
            expire: (Utc::now() + TimeDelta::try_minutes(2).unwrap()).timestamp(),
-        };
+        }]);
        self.stamp_exception = Some(serde_json::to_string(&stamp_exception).unwrap_or_default());
    }
-    /// Resets the stamp_exception to prevent re-use of the previous security-stamp
+    /// The previous security stamps that are still accepted, expired ones included.
-    pub fn reset_stamp_exception(&mut self) {
+    pub fn stamp_exceptions(&self) -> Vec<UserStampException> {
-        self.stamp_exception = None;
+        let Some(stored) = self.stamp_exception.as_deref() else {
            return Vec::new();
        };
        // Before key rotations kept sessions alive, only a single route exception was stored.
        serde_json::from_str::<Vec<UserStampException>>(stored)
            .or_else(|_| serde_json::from_str::<UserStampException>(stored).map(|e| vec![e]))
            .unwrap_or_default()
    }
    fn set_stamp_exceptions(&mut self, exceptions: &[UserStampException]) {
        self.stamp_exception = if exceptions.is_empty() {
            None
        } else {
            Some(serde_json::to_string(&exceptions).unwrap_or_default())
        };
    }
    pub fn display_name(&self) -> &str {
@@ -280,7 +340,7 @@ impl User {
        if !self.is_v2() {
            return None;
        }
-        UserSignatureKeyPair::find_active_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await
+        UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await
    }
    pub async fn account_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
@@ -327,8 +387,8 @@ impl User {
        })
    }
-    pub fn v2_upgrade_token_json(&self) -> Value {
+    pub fn v2_upgrade_token_json(&self) -> Option<Value> {
-        self.v2_upgrade_token.as_ref().and_then(|token| serde_json::from_str(token).ok()).unwrap_or(Value::Null)
+        self.v2_upgrade_token.as_ref().and_then(|token| serde_json::from_str(token).ok())
    }
    pub async fn to_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
@@ -616,7 +676,18 @@ pub struct UserId(String);
 )]
 #[deref(forward)]
 #[from(forward)]
-pub struct KeyId(String);
+pub struct KeyId(#[serde(deserialize_with = "deserialize_key_id")] String);
 /// Rejects a key id from a request that isn't 16 bytes as lowercase hex, as upstream's `[KeyId]` does.
 ///
 /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/KeyId.cs>
 fn deserialize_key_id<'de, D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> Result<String, D::Error> {
    let key_id = <String as serde::Deserialize>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
    if key_id.len() != 32 || !key_id.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) {
        return Err(serde::de::Error::custom("Key id must be a 32 character lowercase hex-encoded string."));
    }
    Ok(key_id)
 }
 impl SsoUser {
    pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ use crate::{
    error::MapResult,
    util::get_uuid,
 };
 use macros::UuidFromParam;
 use super::UserId;
@@ -47,28 +46,13 @@ pub enum SignatureAlgorithm {
 }
 impl SignatureAlgorithm {
-    pub fn from_str(algorithm: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+    pub fn parse(algorithm: &str) -> Option<Self> {
        match algorithm {
            "ed25519" => Some(Self::Ed25519),
            "mldsa44" => Some(Self::MlDsa44),
            _ => None,
        }
    }
    pub fn from_i32(algorithm: i32) -> Option<Self> {
        match algorithm {
            0 => Some(Self::Ed25519),
            1 => Some(Self::MlDsa44),
            _ => None,
        }
    }
    pub fn as_str(self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::Ed25519 => "ed25519",
            Self::MlDsa44 => "mldsa44",
        }
    }
 }
 /// Local methods
@@ -128,9 +112,8 @@ impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
        }
    }
-    /// The key pair currently in use by the user. There is at most one today, enforced by a unique
+    /// The user's key pair. There is at most one, enforced by a unique index on `user_uuid`.
-    /// index on `user_uuid`.
+    pub async fn find_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
    pub async fn find_active_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            user_signature_key_pairs::table
                .filter(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
@@ -150,20 +133,5 @@ impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
    }
 }
-#[derive(
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, AsRef, Deref, DieselNewType, Display, From, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
    Clone,
    Debug,
    AsRef,
    Deref,
    DieselNewType,
    Display,
    From,
    FromForm,
    Hash,
    PartialEq,
    Eq,
    Serialize,
    Deserialize,
    UuidFromParam,
 )]
 pub struct UserSignatureKeyPairId(String);
@@ -259,6 +259,7 @@ table! {
        atype -> Integer,
        reset_password_key -> Nullable<Text>,
        external_id -> Nullable<Text>,
        v2_upgrade_token -> Nullable<Text>,
    }
 }
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
 *
 * To rebuild or modify this file with the latest versions of the included
 * software please visit:
- *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.0.3
+ *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.0.4
 *
 * Included libraries:
- *   DataTables 3.0.3
+ *   DataTables 3.0.4
 */
 /*! DataTables Bootstrap 5 integration
@@ -636,6 +636,18 @@ table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-type-date .dt-column-order,
 table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-type-numeric .dt-column-order {
  left: 0.25rem;
 }
 table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr th.dt-left .dt-column-order, table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr th.dt-head-left .dt-column-order,
 table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-left .dt-column-order,
 table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-head-left .dt-column-order {
  left: auto;
  right: 0.25rem;
 }
 table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr th.dt-right .dt-column-order, table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr th.dt-head-right .dt-column-order,
 table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-right .dt-column-order,
 table.dataTable.table-sm > thead > tr td.dt-head-right .dt-column-order {
  left: 0.25rem;
  right: auto;
 }
 div.dt-scroll-head table.table-bordered {
  border-bottom-width: 0;
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Daniel García	d01db37e75	Some simplifications	2026-09-23 23:53:12 +02:00
Daniel García	fe212a425f	Add typo exception	2026-09-23 23:30:19 +02:00
Daniel García	72a39ae90b	Implement V2 key rotation support	2026-09-23 23:30:19 +02:00
Daniel García	fd7e1be788	Implement V2 registration support Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>	2026-09-23 23:30:18 +02:00
Abhi ShandilyaandDaniel García	d2660324e6	Fix revoked org members retaining access to org ciphers (#7554 ) The cipher access restriction queries (direct collection access, group collection access, and full access via groups) never checked the organization membership status. Since users_collections and groups_users rows are kept when a membership is revoked, revoked (and not yet confirmed) members kept read, write, delete, attachment and collection-move access to org ciphers via the direct-by-UUID endpoints. Require a confirmed membership in the cipher's organization in all three queries, matching the behavior of the sync queries. Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-09-23 19:44:05 +02:00
Stefan Melmuk	cc67d644f6	set user_created bool for each separate invitation (#7753 )	2026-09-18 20:35:11 +02:00
Berk D. Demir	3347698712	Add `pm-34171-card-scanner` feature flag (#7477 ) Introduced in 2026.4.1 Mobile releases (Android and iOS), enables use of device camera to autofill a card type item. N.B. This feature relies on Google ML Kit. F-Droid policy disallows Google ML Kit. Because of this, F-Droid builds do not ship with card scanner feature. (See https://github.com/bitwarden/android/pull/6890)	2026-09-18 20:34:41 +02:00
Mathijs van Veluw	a24683636a	Update Crates, GHA and JS (#7751 ) Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>	2026-09-18 18:44:50 +02:00