Trusted proxy support, unauthenticated rate limit & other fixes (#7472 )

* Trusted proxies, unauthenticated rate limits and various fixes * Fix get_groups_data * Fix get_groups_data when not using full_access * Fmt * Fix org import * deduplicate send validation
Update API response, crates and GHA (#7470 )
2026-07-28 19:45:05 +03:00 · 2026-07-24 18:27:32 +02:00 · 2026-07-24 17:33:10 +02:00 · 2026-07-24 16:40:34 +02:00 · 2026-07-21 22:06:45 +02:00 · 2026-07-21 21:54:10 +02:00
40 changed files with 873 additions and 582 deletions
@@ -324,6 +324,14 @@
 ## Set to the string "none" (without quotes), to disable any headers and just use the remote IP
 # IP_HEADER=X-Real-IP

+## Which addresses the header above is accepted from, defaults to "local".
+## Anyone able to reach Vaultwarden can set the header, and the client IP is used for the login and
+## admin rate limits, so it is only trusted when the request comes from a proxy listed here.
+## "local" accepts it from any non global address, which covers a reverse proxy running on the same
+## host or container network. Use "all" to accept it from anywhere, or list the addresses of your
+## proxy as IPs and CIDR ranges if it connects from a public address.
+# IP_HEADER_TRUSTED_PROXIES=local
+
 ## Icon service
 ## The predefined icon services are: internal, bitwarden, duckduckgo, google.
 ## To specify a custom icon service, set a URL template with exactly one instance of `{}`,
@@ -461,6 +469,13 @@
 ## Note that this applies to both the login and the 2FA, so it's recommended to allow a burst size of at least 2.
 # LOGIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST=10

+## Number of seconds, on average, between requests from the same IP address to one of the rate limited
+## unauthenticated endpoints, like the password hint, the account recovery mails or accessing a Send.
+# UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_SECONDS=60
+## Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_SECONDS`.
+## This budget is shared between all of those endpoints, so it is more lenient than the login one.
+# UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST=50
+
 ## BETA FEATURE: Groups
 ## Controls whether group support is enabled for organizations
 ## This setting applies to organizations.
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ jobs:

      # Checkout the repo
      - name: "Checkout"
-        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
          fetch-depth: 0
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
    steps:
      # Checkout the repo
      - name: "Checkout"
-        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      # End Checkout the repo
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ jobs:

      # Checkout the repo
      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      # End Checkout the repo
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ jobs:

      # Checkout the repo
      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        # We need fetch-depth of 0 so we also get all the tag metadata
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Docker Hub
      - name: Login to Docker Hub
-        uses: docker/login-action@af1e73f918a031802d376d3c8bbc3fe56130a9b0 # v4.4.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4.5.1
        with:
          username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
          password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to GitHub Container Registry
      - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@af1e73f918a031802d376d3c8bbc3fe56130a9b0 # v4.4.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4.5.1
        with:
          registry: ghcr.io
          username: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Quay.io
      - name: Login to Quay.io
-        uses: docker/login-action@af1e73f918a031802d376d3c8bbc3fe56130a9b0 # v4.4.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4.5.1
        with:
          registry: quay.io
          username: ${{ secrets.QUAY_USERNAME }}
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ jobs:

      # Upload artifacts to Github Actions and Attest the binaries
      - name: Attest binaries
-        uses: actions/attest@a1948c3f048ba23858d222213b7c278aabede763 # v4.1.1
+        uses: actions/attest@f7c74d28b9d84cb8768d0b8ca14a4bac6ef463e6 # v4.2.0
        with:
          subject-path: vaultwarden-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}

@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Docker Hub
      - name: Login to Docker Hub
-        uses: docker/login-action@af1e73f918a031802d376d3c8bbc3fe56130a9b0 # v4.4.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4.5.1
        with:
          username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
          password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to GitHub Container Registry
      - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@af1e73f918a031802d376d3c8bbc3fe56130a9b0 # v4.4.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4.5.1
        with:
          registry: ghcr.io
          username: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Quay.io
      - name: Login to Quay.io
-        uses: docker/login-action@af1e73f918a031802d376d3c8bbc3fe56130a9b0 # v4.4.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@abd2ef45e78c5afb21d64d4ca52ee8550d9572c7 # v4.5.1
        with:
          registry: quay.io
          username: ${{ secrets.QUAY_USERNAME }}
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ jobs:
      # Attest container images
      - name: Attest - docker.io - ${{ matrix.base_image }}
        if: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_REPO != '' && env.DIGEST_SHA != ''}}
-        uses: actions/attest@a1948c3f048ba23858d222213b7c278aabede763 # v4.1.1
+        uses: actions/attest@f7c74d28b9d84cb8768d0b8ca14a4bac6ef463e6 # v4.2.0
        with:
          subject-name: ${{ vars.DOCKERHUB_REPO }}
          subject-digest: ${{ env.DIGEST_SHA }}
@@ -373,7 +373,7 @@ jobs:

      - name: Attest - ghcr.io - ${{ matrix.base_image }}
        if: ${{ vars.GHCR_REPO != '' && env.DIGEST_SHA != ''}}
-        uses: actions/attest@a1948c3f048ba23858d222213b7c278aabede763 # v4.1.1
+        uses: actions/attest@f7c74d28b9d84cb8768d0b8ca14a4bac6ef463e6 # v4.2.0
        with:
          subject-name: ${{ vars.GHCR_REPO }}
          subject-digest: ${{ env.DIGEST_SHA }}
@@ -381,7 +381,7 @@ jobs:

      - name: Attest - quay.io - ${{ matrix.base_image }}
        if: ${{ vars.QUAY_REPO != '' && env.DIGEST_SHA != ''}}
-        uses: actions/attest@a1948c3f048ba23858d222213b7c278aabede763 # v4.1.1
+        uses: actions/attest@f7c74d28b9d84cb8768d0b8ca14a4bac6ef463e6 # v4.2.0
        with:
          subject-name: ${{ vars.QUAY_REPO }}
          subject-digest: ${{ env.DIGEST_SHA }}
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ jobs:

    steps:
      - name: Checkout code
-        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false

@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ jobs:
          severity: CRITICAL,HIGH

      - name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@99df26d4f13ea111d4ec1a7dddef6063f76b97e9 # v4.37.0
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@e4fba868fa4b1b91e1fdab776edc8cfbe6e9fb81 # v4.37.3
        with:
          sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ jobs:
    steps:
      # Checkout the repo
      - name: Checkout
-        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false
      # End Checkout the repo
@@ -19,12 +19,12 @@ jobs:
      security-events: write # To write the security report
    steps:
      - name: Checkout repository
-        uses: actions/checkout@9c091bb21b7c1c1d1991bb908d89e4e9dddfe3e0 # v7.0.0
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
        with:
          persist-credentials: false

      - name: Run zizmor
-        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@192e21d79ab29983730a13d1382995c2307fbcaa # v0.5.7
+        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@6fc4b006235f201fdab3722e17240ab420d580e5 # v0.6.1
        with:
          # intentionally not scanning the entire repository,
          # since it contains integration tests.
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [workspace.package]
 edition = "2024"
-rust-version = "1.94.1"
+rust-version = "1.95.0"
 license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
 repository = "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden"
 publish = false
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ dotenvy = { version = "0.15.7", default-features = false }

 # Numerical libraries
 num-traits = "0.2.19"
-num-derive = "0.4.2"
+num-derive = "0.5.1"
 bigdecimal = "0.4.10"

 # Web framework
@@ -89,8 +89,8 @@ rmpv = "1.3.1" # MessagePack library
 dashmap = "6.2.1"

 # Async futures
-futures = "0.3.32"
-tokio = { version = "1.52.3", features = [
+futures = "0.3.33"
+tokio = { version = "1.53.1", features = [
    "fs",
    "io-util",
    "net",
@@ -99,14 +99,14 @@ tokio = { version = "1.52.3", features = [
    "signal",
    "time",
 ] }
-tokio-util = { version = "0.7.18", features = ["compat"] }
+tokio-util = { version = "0.7.19", features = ["compat"] }

 # A generic serialization/deserialization framework
-serde = { version = "1.0.228", features = ["derive"] }
-serde_json = "1.0.150"
+serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
+serde_json = "1.0.151"

 # A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
-diesel = { version = "2.3.10", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
+diesel = { version = "2.3.11", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
 diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"

 derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
@@ -124,16 +124,16 @@ libsqlite3-sys = { version = "0.37.0", optional = true }
 # Crypto-related libraries
 rand = "0.10.2"
 ring = "0.17.14"
-rustls = { version = "0.23.41", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
+rustls = { version = "0.23.42", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
 subtle = "2.6.1"

 # UUID generation
-uuid = { version = "1.23.4", features = ["v4"] }
+uuid = { version = "1.24.0", features = ["v4"] }

 # Date and time libraries
 chrono = { version = "0.4.45", default-features = false, features = ["clock", "serde"] }
 chrono-tz = "0.10.4"
-time = "0.3.53"
+time = "0.3.54"

 # Job scheduler
 job_scheduler_ng = "2.4.0"
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ job_scheduler_ng = "2.4.0"
 data-encoding = "2.11.0"

 # JWT library
-jsonwebtoken = { version = "10.4.0", default-features = false, features = ["rust_crypto", "use_pem"] }
+jsonwebtoken = { version = "11.0.0", default-features = false, features = ["rust_crypto", "use_pem"] }

 # TOTP library
 totp-lite = "2.0.1"
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ percent-encoding = "2.3.2" # URL encoding library used for URL's in the emails
 email_address = "0.2.9"

 # HTML Template library
-handlebars = { version = "6.4.2", features = ["dir_source"] }
+handlebars = { version = "6.4.3", features = ["dir_source"] }

 # HTTP client (Used for favicons, version check, DUO and HIBP API)
 reqwest = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false, features = [
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ hickory-resolver = "0.26.1"

 # Favicon extraction libraries
 html5gum = "0.8.4"
-regex = { version = "1.12.4", default-features = false, features = [
+regex = { version = "1.13.1", default-features = false, features = [
    "perf",
    "std",
    "unicode-perl",
@@ -230,6 +230,9 @@ pico-args = "0.5.0"
 pastey = "0.2.3"
 governor = "0.10.4"

+# CIDR parsing for the trusted proxies of the client IP header
+ipnet = "2.12.0"
+
 # OIDC for SSO
 openidconnect = { version = "4.0.1", default-features = false }
 moka = { version = "0.12.15", features = ["future"] }
@@ -241,7 +244,7 @@ semver = "1.0.28"
 # Mainly used for the musl builds, since the default musl malloc is very slow
 mimalloc = { version = "0.1.52", optional = true, default-features = false, features = ["secure"] }

-which = "8.0.4"
+which = "8.0.5"

 # Argon2 library with support for the PHC format
 argon2 = "0.5.3"
@@ -256,17 +259,17 @@ grass_compiler = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false }
 opendal = { version = "0.57.0", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }

 # For retrieving AWS credentials, including temporary SSO credentials
-aws-config = { version = "1.8.18", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
+aws-config = { version = "1.10.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
    "behavior-version-latest",
    "credentials-process",
    "rt-tokio",
    "sso",
 ] }
-aws-credential-types = { version = "1.2.14", optional = true }
-aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.13.0", optional = true }
+aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0", optional = true }
+aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.14.0", optional = true }
 http = { version = "1.4.2", optional = true }
-reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.0.1", optional = true }
-reqsign-core = { version = "3.0.1", optional = true }
+reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.0.2", optional = true }
+reqsign-core = { version = "3.1.0", optional = true }

 # Strip debuginfo from the release builds
 # The debug symbols are to provide better panic traces
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
 ---
-vault_version: "v2026.6.2"
-vault_image_digest: "sha256:f004f72a5d357b87483839500a517da3d1b4ea0a57b9731989d298cccea7d02a"
+vault_version: "v2026.6.4"
+vault_image_digest: "sha256:e7d3b31ec6a991a6bf447721ea341b4192ce5d3b920929211672fd4f3f891427"
 # Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.9.0
 # We use the linux/amd64 platform shell scripts since there is no difference between the different platform scripts
 # https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx | https://hub.docker.com/r/tonistiigi/xx/tags
 xx_image_digest: "sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707"
-rust_version: 1.96.1 # Rust version to be used
+rust_version: 1.97.1 # Rust version to be used
 debian_version: trixie # Debian release name to be used
 alpine_version: "3.24" # Alpine version to be used
 # For which platforms/architectures will we try to build images
@@ -19,23 +19,23 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.2
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.2
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:f004f72a5d357b87483839500a517da3d1b4ea0a57b9731989d298cccea7d02a]
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.4
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.4
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:e7d3b31ec6a991a6bf447721ea341b4192ce5d3b920929211672fd4f3f891427]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:f004f72a5d357b87483839500a517da3d1b4ea0a57b9731989d298cccea7d02a
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.2]
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:e7d3b31ec6a991a6bf447721ea341b4192ce5d3b920929211672fd4f3f891427
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.4]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:f004f72a5d357b87483839500a517da3d1b4ea0a57b9731989d298cccea7d02a AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:e7d3b31ec6a991a6bf447721ea341b4192ce5d3b920929211672fd4f3f891427 AS vault

 ########################## ALPINE BUILD IMAGES ##########################
 ## NOTE: The Alpine Base Images do not support other platforms then linux/amd64 and linux/arm64
 ## And for Alpine we define all build images here, they will only be loaded when actually used
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.96.1 AS build_amd64
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.96.1 AS build_arm64
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.96.1 AS build_armv7
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.96.1 AS build_armv6
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.97.1 AS build_amd64
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.97.1 AS build_arm64
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.97.1 AS build_armv7
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.97.1 AS build_armv6

 ########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
 # hadolint ignore=DL3006
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ RUN USER=root cargo new --bin /app
 WORKDIR /app

 # Environment variables for Cargo on Alpine based builds
-RUN echo "export CARGO_TARGET=${RUST_MUSL_CROSS_TARGET}" >> /env-cargo && \
+RUN echo "export CARGO_TARGET=${CARGO_BUILD_TARGET}" >> /env-cargo && \
    # Output the current contents of the file
    cat /env-cargo

@@ -19,15 +19,15 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.2
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.2
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:f004f72a5d357b87483839500a517da3d1b4ea0a57b9731989d298cccea7d02a]
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.4
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.4
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:e7d3b31ec6a991a6bf447721ea341b4192ce5d3b920929211672fd4f3f891427]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:f004f72a5d357b87483839500a517da3d1b4ea0a57b9731989d298cccea7d02a
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.2]
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:e7d3b31ec6a991a6bf447721ea341b4192ce5d3b920929211672fd4f3f891427
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.6.4]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:f004f72a5d357b87483839500a517da3d1b4ea0a57b9731989d298cccea7d02a AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:e7d3b31ec6a991a6bf447721ea341b4192ce5d3b920929211672fd4f3f891427 AS vault

 ########################## Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts ##########################
 ## We use the linux/amd64 no matter which Build Platform, since these are all bash scripts
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f

 ########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
 # hadolint ignore=DL3006
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.96.1-slim-trixie AS build
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.97.1-slim-trixie AS build
 COPY --from=xx / /
 ARG TARGETARCH
 ARG TARGETVARIANT
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ WORKDIR /app

 {% if base == "alpine" %}
 # Environment variables for Cargo on Alpine based builds
-RUN echo "export CARGO_TARGET=${RUST_MUSL_CROSS_TARGET}" >> /env-cargo && \
+RUN echo "export CARGO_TARGET=${CARGO_BUILD_TARGET}" >> /env-cargo && \
    # Output the current contents of the file
    cat /env-cargo

@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ path = "src/lib.rs"
 proc-macro = true

 [dependencies]
-quote = "1.0.46"
-syn = "2.0.118"
+quote = "1.0.47"
+syn = "3.0.3"

 [lints]
 workspace = true
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 [toolchain]
-channel = "1.96.1"
+channel = "1.97.1"
 components = [ "rustfmt", "clippy" ]
 profile = "minimal"
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ use crate::{
        core::{accept_org_invite, log_user_event, two_factor::email},
        master_password_policy, register_push_device, unregister_push_device,
    },
-    auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers, decode_delete, decode_invite, decode_verify_email},
+    auth::{ClientHeaders, ClientIp, Headers, decode_delete, decode_invite, decode_verify_email},
    crypto,
    db::{
        DbConn, DbPool,
@@ -693,10 +693,6 @@ struct UnlockData {
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct ChangeKdfData {
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
-    new_master_password_hash: String,
-    #[allow(dead_code)]
-    key: String,
    authentication_data: AuthenticationData,
    unlock_data: UnlockData,
    master_password_hash: String,
@@ -1197,7 +1193,9 @@ struct DeleteRecoverData {
 }

 #[post("/accounts/delete-recover", data = "<data>")]
-async fn post_delete_recover(data: Json<DeleteRecoverData>, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+async fn post_delete_recover(data: Json<DeleteRecoverData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
+
    let data: DeleteRecoverData = data.into_inner();

    if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
@@ -1270,9 +1268,11 @@ struct PasswordHintData {
 }

 #[post("/accounts/password-hint", data = "<data>")]
-async fn password_hint(data: Json<PasswordHintData>, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+async fn password_hint(data: Json<PasswordHintData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    const NO_HINT: &str = "Sorry, you have no password hint...";

+    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
+
    if !CONFIG.password_hints_allowed() || (!CONFIG.mail_enabled() && !CONFIG.show_password_hint()) {
        err!("This server is not configured to provide password hints.");
    }
@@ -1334,6 +1334,13 @@ pub async fn prelogin(data: Json<PreloginData>, conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value> {
        "kdfIterations": kdf_iter,
        "kdfMemory": kdf_mem,
        "kdfParallelism": kdf_para,
+        "kdfSettings": {
+            "iterations": kdf_iter,
+            "kdfType": kdf_type,
+            "memory": kdf_mem,
+            "parallelism": kdf_para
+        },
+        "salt": null,
    }))
 }

@@ -1510,7 +1517,9 @@ async fn put_device_token(device_id: DeviceId, data: Json<PushToken>, headers: H
 }

 #[put("/devices/identifier/<device_id>/clear-token")]
-async fn put_clear_device_token(device_id: DeviceId, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+async fn put_clear_device_token(device_id: DeviceId, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
+
    // This only clears push token
    // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Controllers/DevicesController.cs#L215
    // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Core/Services/Implementations/DeviceService.cs#L37
@@ -1532,8 +1541,8 @@ async fn put_clear_device_token(device_id: DeviceId, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResul

 // On upstream server, both PUT and POST are declared. Implementing the POST method in case it would be useful somewhere
 #[post("/devices/identifier/<device_id>/clear-token")]
-async fn post_clear_device_token(device_id: DeviceId, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    put_clear_device_token(device_id, conn).await
+async fn post_clear_device_token(device_id: DeviceId, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+    put_clear_device_token(device_id, ip, conn).await
 }

 #[get("/tasks")]
@@ -450,7 +450,9 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
        match Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(&headers.user.uuid, &org_id, conn).await {
            None => err!("You don't have permission to add item to organization"),
            Some(member) => {
-                if shared_to_collections.is_some()
+                // A non-empty list of collections implies the caller already validated the user's write
+                // access to them, so we can move the cipher into the organization on that basis.
+                if shared_to_collections.as_ref().is_some_and(|cols| !cols.is_empty())
                    || member.has_full_access()
                    || cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, conn).await
                {
@@ -629,7 +631,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers_import(data: Json<ImportData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC

    // Read and create the ciphers
    for (index, mut cipher_data) in data.ciphers.into_iter().enumerate() {
-        let folder_id = relations_map.get(&index).map(|i| folders[*i].clone());
+        let folder_id = relations_map.get(&index).and_then(|i| folders.get(*i).cloned());
        cipher_data.folder_id = folder_id;

        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
@@ -1043,6 +1045,13 @@ async fn share_cipher_by_uuid(
        err!("Cipher doesn't exist")
    };

+    // `update_cipher_from_data()` rejects this too, but only after the collections below were
+    // already linked. There are no transactions, so that would leave the cipher linked to a
+    // collection of another organization.
+    if cipher.organization_uuid.is_some() && cipher.organization_uuid != data.cipher.organization_id {
+        err!("Organization mismatch. Please resync the client before updating the cipher")
+    }
+
    let mut shared_to_collections = vec![];

    if let Some(organization_id) = &data.cipher.organization_id {
@@ -182,7 +182,10 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
                .await;
            }
            1600..=1699 => {
-                if let Some(org_id) = &event.organization_id {
+                // Only allow logging events for an organization the user is actually a member of.
+                if let Some(org_id) = &event.organization_id
+                    && Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(&headers.user.uuid, org_id, &conn).await.is_some()
+                {
                    log_event_impl(
                        event.r#type,
                        org_id,
@@ -197,8 +200,11 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
                }
            }
            _ => {
+                // The cipher determines the organization the event is logged to, so make sure the
+                // user can actually access it instead of trusting the provided cipher uuid.
                if let Some(cipher_uuid) = &event.cipher_id
                    && let Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(cipher_uuid, &conn).await
+                    && cipher.is_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
                    && let Some(org_id) = cipher.organization_uuid
                {
                    log_event_impl(
@@ -228,14 +228,17 @@ fn config() -> Json<Value> {
        // Version history:
        // - Individual cipher key encryption: 2024.2.0
        // - Mobile app support for MasterPasswordUnlockData: 2025.8.0
-        "version": "2025.12.0",
+        "version": "2026.6.0",
        "gitHash": option_env!("GIT_REV"),
        "server": {
          "name": "Vaultwarden",
          "url": "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden"
        },
        "settings": {
-            "disableUserRegistration": CONFIG.is_signup_disabled()
+            "disableUserRegistration": CONFIG.is_signup_disabled(),
+            // When enabled, this setting signals to clients that onboarding interstitials
+            // (post-login welcome dialogs, extension install prompts, setup extension redirects, and premium upsell modals) should be suppressed
+            "suppressOnboardingInterstitials": false
        },
        "environment": {
          "vault": domain,
@@ -251,6 +254,10 @@ fn config() -> Json<Value> {
          "vapidPublicKey": null
        },
        "featureStates": feature_states,
+        // Not supported right now
+        // Used for by clients to learn if the server requires extra work to establish a connection.
+        // See: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/pull/6892 | https://github.com/bitwarden/server/commit/52955d1860b4dfb905f67bbe39d9b10bbd61ded0
+        "communication": null,
        "object": "config",
    }))
 }
@@ -577,6 +577,13 @@ async fn post_bulk_access_collections(
        err!("Can't find organization details")
    }

+    // The collections and members are checked below, the groups only here.
+    let org_groups = Group::find_by_organization(&org_id, &conn).await;
+    let org_group_ids: HashSet<&GroupId> = org_groups.iter().map(|g| &g.uuid).collect();
+    if let Some(g) = data.groups.iter().find(|g| !org_group_ids.contains(&g.id)) {
+        err!("Invalid group", format!("Group {} does not belong to organization {}!", g.id, org_id))
+    }
+
    for col_id in data.collection_ids {
        let Some(collection) = Collection::find_by_uuid_and_org(&col_id, &org_id, &conn).await else {
            err!("Collection not found")
@@ -946,6 +953,11 @@ async fn get_members(
    if org_id != headers.membership.org_uuid {
        err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
    }
+
+    if !headers.membership.has_full_access() {
+        err_code!("Resource not found.", "User does not have full access", rocket::http::Status::NotFound.code);
+    }
+
    let mut users_json = Vec::new();
    for u in Membership::find_by_org(&org_id, &conn).await {
        users_json.push(
@@ -1167,6 +1179,9 @@ async fn send_invite(
        }

        for group_id in &data.groups {
+            if Group::find_by_uuid_and_org(group_id, &org_id, &conn).await.is_none() {
+                err!("Group not found in Organization")
+            }
            let mut group_entry = GroupUser::new(group_id.clone(), new_member.uuid.clone());
            group_entry.save(&conn).await?;
        }
@@ -1614,6 +1629,9 @@ async fn edit_member(
    GroupUser::delete_all_by_member(&member_to_edit.uuid, &conn).await?;

    for group_id in data.groups.iter().flatten() {
+        if Group::find_by_uuid_and_org(group_id, &org_id, &conn).await.is_none() {
+            err!("Group not found in Organization")
+        }
        let mut group_entry = GroupUser::new(group_id.clone(), member_to_edit.uuid.clone());
        group_entry.save(&conn).await?;
    }
@@ -1813,19 +1831,19 @@ async fn post_org_import(
    // TODO: See if we can optimize the whole cipher adding/importing and prevent duplicate code and checks.
    Cipher::validate_cipher_data(&data.ciphers)?;

-    let existing_collections: HashSet<Option<CollectionId>> =
-        Collection::find_by_organization(&org_id, &conn).await.into_iter().map(|c| Some(c.uuid)).collect();
+    let existing_collections: HashMap<CollectionId, Collection> =
+        Collection::find_by_organization(&org_id, &conn).await.into_iter().map(|c| (c.uuid.clone(), c)).collect();
    let mut collections: Vec<CollectionId> = Vec::with_capacity(data.collections.len());
    for col in data.collections {
-        let collection_uuid = if existing_collections.contains(&col.id) {
-            let col_id = col.id.unwrap();
-            // When not an Owner or Admin, check if the member is allowed to access the collection.
+        let existing = col.id.as_ref().and_then(|col_id| existing_collections.get(col_id));
+        let collection_uuid = if let Some(collection) = existing {
+            // When not an Owner or Admin, check if the member is allowed to write to the collection.
            if headers.membership.atype < MembershipType::Admin
-                && !Collection::can_access_collection(&headers.membership, &col_id, &conn).await
+                && !collection.is_writable_by_user(&headers.membership.user_uuid, &conn).await
            {
                err!(Compact, "The current user isn't allowed to manage this collection")
            }
-            col_id
+            collection.uuid.clone()
        } else {
            // We do not allow users or managers which can not manage all collections to create new collections
            // If there is any collection other than an existing import collection, abort the import.
@@ -1853,6 +1871,8 @@ async fn post_org_import(
    for mut cipher_data in data.ciphers {
        // Always clear folder_id's via an organization import
        cipher_data.folder_id = None;
+        // Replace the client-provided, unvalidated organizationId with the real target org
+        cipher_data.organization_id = Some(org_id.clone());
        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
        update_cipher_from_data(
            &mut cipher,
@@ -1870,8 +1890,9 @@ async fn post_org_import(

    // Assign the collections
    for (cipher_index, col_index) in relations {
-        let cipher_id = &ciphers[cipher_index];
-        let col_id = &collections[col_index];
+        let (Some(cipher_id), Some(col_id)) = (ciphers.get(cipher_index), collections.get(col_index)) else {
+            err!(Compact, "Invalid collection relationship")
+        };
        CollectionCipher::save(cipher_id, col_id, &conn).await?;
    }

@@ -2441,6 +2462,23 @@ async fn get_groups_data(
    if org_id != headers.membership.org_uuid {
        err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
    }
+
+    // The details view (group→collection/user mappings) needs full org access; the plain list only
+    // needs manage access to a collection, so a manager of a collection (directly or via a group)
+    // can load it to assign groups.
+    let has_full_access = headers.membership.has_full_access()
+        || (CONFIG.org_groups_enabled()
+            && GroupUser::has_full_access_by_member(&org_id, &headers.membership.uuid, &conn).await);
+    let allowed = if details {
+        has_full_access
+    } else {
+        has_full_access
+            || Collection::has_manageable_collection_by_user(&org_id, &headers.membership.user_uuid, &conn).await
+    };
+    if !allowed {
+        err_code!("Resource not found.", "User does not have access", rocket::http::Status::NotFound.code);
+    }
+
    let groups: Vec<Value> = if CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() {
        let groups = Group::find_by_organization(&org_id, &conn).await;
        let mut groups_json = Vec::with_capacity(groups.len());
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ use crate::{
    db::{
        DbConn,
        models::{
-            Group, GroupUser, Invitation, Membership, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, Organization,
+            Group, GroupUser, Invitation, Membership, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, Organization,
            OrganizationApiKey, OrganizationId, User,
        },
    },
@@ -84,8 +84,15 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
            }
        // If user is part of the organization, restore it
        } else if let Some(mut member) = Membership::find_by_email_and_org(&user_data.email, &org_id, &conn).await {
-            let restored = member.restore();
+            let mut restored = member.restore();
            let ext_modified = member.set_external_id(Some(user_data.external_id.clone()));
+            // Enforce org policies as every other restore path does.
+            // If the user is not allowed, we revoke again and continue so the external_id is still updated.
+            if restored && let Err(e) = OrgPolicy::check_user_allowed(&member, "restore", &conn).await {
+                warn!("Not restoring {}: {e:?}", user_data.email);
+                member.revoke();
+                restored = false;
+            }
            if restored || ext_modified {
                member.save(&conn).await?;
            }
@@ -453,6 +453,9 @@ async fn post_access(headers: SendHeaders, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> Json
    let Some(send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&headers.send_id, &conn).await else {
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    };
+    if !send.is_accessible() {
+        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
+    }
    process_access(send, conn, nt).await
 }

@@ -471,6 +474,8 @@ async fn post_access_legacy(
    ip: ClientIp,
    nt: Notify<'_>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
+    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
+
    let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_access_id(access_id, &conn).await else {
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    };
@@ -481,17 +486,7 @@ async fn post_access_legacy(
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404);
    }

-    if let Some(expiration) = send.expiration_date
-        && Utc::now().naive_utc() >= expiration
-    {
-        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
-    }
-
-    if Utc::now().naive_utc() >= send.deletion_date {
-        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
-    }
-
-    if send.disabled {
+    if !send.is_accessible() {
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    }

@@ -505,11 +500,13 @@ async fn post_access_legacy(

    // Files are incremented during the download
    if send.atype == SendType::Text as i32 {
-        send.access_count += 1;
+        if !send.register_access(&conn).await? {
+            err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
+        }
+    } else {
+        send.save(&conn).await?;
    }

-    send.save(&conn).await?;
-
    process_access(send, conn, nt).await
 }

@@ -537,6 +534,9 @@ async fn post_access_file(
    let Some(send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&headers.send_id, &conn).await else {
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    };
+    if !send.is_accessible() {
+        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
+    }
    process_access_file(send, file_id, host, conn, nt).await
 }

@@ -548,8 +548,11 @@ async fn post_access_file_legacy(
    data: Json<SendAccessData>,
    host: Host,
    conn: DbConn,
+    ip: ClientIp,
    nt: Notify<'_>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
+    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
+
    let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&send_id, &conn).await else {
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    };
@@ -560,17 +563,7 @@ async fn post_access_file_legacy(
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    }

-    if let Some(expiration) = send.expiration_date
-        && Utc::now().naive_utc() >= expiration
-    {
-        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
-    }
-
-    if Utc::now().naive_utc() >= send.deletion_date {
-        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
-    }
-
-    if send.disabled {
+    if !send.is_accessible() {
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    }

@@ -582,9 +575,9 @@ async fn post_access_file_legacy(
        }
    }

-    send.access_count += 1;
-
-    send.save(&conn).await?;
+    if !send.register_access(&conn).await? {
+        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
+    }

    process_access_file(send, file_id, host, conn, nt).await
 }
@@ -405,6 +405,22 @@ async fn get_page(url: &str) -> Result<Response, Error> {
 }

 async fn get_page_with_referer(url: &str, referer: &str) -> Result<Response, Error> {
+    // The resolver only sees hosts needing name resolution, so IP-literal hrefs from
+    // attacker-controlled HTML never reach `post_resolve()`. Check them here.
+    let Ok(parsed_url) = url::Url::parse(url) else {
+        err_silent!("Invalid URL", url)
+    };
+
+    if !matches!(parsed_url.scheme(), "http" | "https") {
+        err_silent!("Invalid scheme", url)
+    }
+
+    let Some(host) = parsed_url.host() else {
+        err_silent!("Invalid host", url)
+    };
+
+    should_block_host(&host)?;
+
    let mut client = CLIENT.get(url);
    if !referer.is_empty() {
        client = client.header("Referer", referer);
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ async fn login(
        }
        "authorization_code" => err!("SSO sign-in is not available"),
        "send_access" => {
+            crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&client_header.ip.ip)?;
            check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.send_id.as_ref(), "send_id cannot be blank")?;

@@ -1055,8 +1056,11 @@ enum RegisterVerificationResponse {
 #[post("/accounts/register/send-verification-email", data = "<data>")]
 async fn register_verification_email(
    data: Json<RegisterVerificationData>,
+    ip: ClientIp,
    conn: DbConn,
 ) -> ApiResult<RegisterVerificationResponse> {
+    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
+
    let data = data.into_inner();

    // the registration can only continue if signup is allowed or there exists an invitation
@@ -33,9 +33,14 @@ pub static WS_USERS: LazyLock<Arc<WebSocketUsers>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
 pub static WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS: LazyLock<Arc<AnonymousWebSocketSubscriptions>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
    Arc::new(AnonymousWebSocketSubscriptions {
        map: Arc::new(dashmap::DashMap::new()),
+        connections: Arc::new(dashmap::DashMap::new()),
    })
 });

+/// The anonymous hub needs no authentication, so bound how much a single client can hold open.
+/// One connection is needed per pending login request, several at once are only expected behind NAT.
+const MAX_ANONYMOUS_CONNECTIONS_PER_IP: u32 = 25;
+
 static NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: LazyLock<bool> = LazyLock::new(|| !CONFIG.enable_websocket() && !CONFIG.push_enabled());

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
@@ -82,14 +87,21 @@ impl Drop for WSEntryMapGuard {
 struct WSAnonymousEntryMapGuard {
    subscriptions: Arc<AnonymousWebSocketSubscriptions>,
    token: String,
+    entry_uuid: uuid::Uuid,
    addr: IpAddr,
 }

 impl WSAnonymousEntryMapGuard {
-    fn new(subscriptions: Arc<AnonymousWebSocketSubscriptions>, token: String, addr: IpAddr) -> Self {
+    fn new(
+        subscriptions: Arc<AnonymousWebSocketSubscriptions>,
+        token: String,
+        entry_uuid: uuid::Uuid,
+        addr: IpAddr,
+    ) -> Self {
        Self {
            subscriptions,
            token,
+            entry_uuid,
            addr,
        }
    }
@@ -98,7 +110,11 @@ impl WSAnonymousEntryMapGuard {
 impl Drop for WSAnonymousEntryMapGuard {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        info!("Closing WS connection from {}", self.addr);
-        self.subscriptions.map.remove(&self.token);
+        if let Some(mut entry) = self.subscriptions.map.get_mut(&self.token) {
+            entry.retain(|(uuid, _)| uuid != &self.entry_uuid);
+        }
+        self.subscriptions.map.remove_if(&self.token, |_, senders| senders.is_empty());
+        self.subscriptions.release(self.addr);
    }
 }

@@ -194,12 +210,19 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
    let (mut rx, guard) = {
        let subscriptions = Arc::clone(&WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS);

-        // Add a channel to send messages to this client to the map
+        if !subscriptions.try_reserve(ip.ip) {
+            err_code!("Too many connections", 429)
+        }
+
+        // Add a channel to send messages to this client to the map.
+        // Clients reconnect with the same token while a login request is still pending, so keep
+        // every subscriber instead of replacing, otherwise the older one takes the newer one down.
        let (tx, rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel::<Message>(100);
-        subscriptions.map.insert(token.clone(), tx);
+        let entry_uuid = uuid::Uuid::new_v4();
+        subscriptions.map.entry(token.clone()).or_default().push((entry_uuid, tx));

        // Once the guard goes out of scope, the connection will have been closed and the entry will be deleted from the map
-        (rx, WSAnonymousEntryMapGuard::new(subscriptions, token, ip.ip))
+        (rx, WSAnonymousEntryMapGuard::new(subscriptions, token, entry_uuid, ip.ip))
    };

    Ok({
@@ -534,15 +557,42 @@ impl WebSocketUsers {

 #[derive(Clone)]
 pub struct AnonymousWebSocketSubscriptions {
-    map: Arc<dashmap::DashMap<String, Sender<Message>>>,
+    map: Arc<dashmap::DashMap<String, Vec<UserSenders>>>,
+    connections: Arc<dashmap::DashMap<IpAddr, u32>>,
 }

 impl AnonymousWebSocketSubscriptions {
+    /// Takes a connection slot for this address, returns false when it already reached the limit.
+    fn try_reserve(&self, addr: IpAddr) -> bool {
+        let mut count = self.connections.entry(addr).or_insert(0);
+        if *count >= MAX_ANONYMOUS_CONNECTIONS_PER_IP {
+            return false;
+        }
+        *count += 1;
+        true
+    }
+
+    /// Releases a slot taken by `try_reserve`.
+    fn release(&self, addr: IpAddr) {
+        let empty = if let Some(mut count) = self.connections.get_mut(&addr) {
+            *count = count.saturating_sub(1);
+            *count == 0
+        } else {
+            false
+        };
+        // Only remove once the guard above is dropped, otherwise this deadlocks.
+        if empty {
+            self.connections.remove_if(&addr, |_, count| *count == 0);
+        }
+    }
+
    async fn send_update(&self, token: &str, data: &[u8]) {
-        if let Some(sender) = self.map.get(token).map(|v| v.clone())
-            && let Err(e) = sender.send(Message::binary(data)).await
-        {
-            error!("Error sending WS update {e}");
+        // Clone the senders so the map isn't kept locked while sending.
+        let senders = self.map.get(token).map(|v| v.clone()).unwrap_or_default();
+        for (_, sender) in senders {
+            if let Err(e) = sender.send(Message::binary(data)).await {
+                error!("Error sending WS update {e}");
+            }
        }
    }

@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ use std::{
 };

 use chrono::{DateTime, TimeDelta, Utc};
+use ipnet::IpNet;
 use jsonwebtoken::{Algorithm, DecodingKey, EncodingKey, Header, errors::ErrorKind};
 use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
 use openssl::rsa::Rsa;
@@ -1054,12 +1055,44 @@ pub struct ClientIp {
    pub ip: IpAddr,
 }

+/// Parses a single entry of `ip_header_trusted_proxies`, which can be a CIDR range or a plain IP.
+pub fn parse_trusted_proxy(entry: &str) -> Option<IpNet> {
+    let entry = entry.trim();
+    match entry.parse::<IpNet>() {
+        Ok(net) => Some(net),
+        // Without a prefix length it is a single address, which is a valid way to write this.
+        Err(_) => entry.parse::<IpAddr>().ok().map(IpNet::from),
+    }
+}
+
+/// The client IP header can be set by anyone able to reach us, so only accept it from a proxy we trust.
+fn ip_header_is_trusted(remote: Option<IpAddr>) -> bool {
+    let trusted = CONFIG.ip_header_trusted_proxies();
+    let trusted = trusted.trim();
+    if trusted.eq_ignore_ascii_case("all") {
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    let Some(remote) = remote else {
+        return false;
+    };
+    // A dual stack listener reports IPv4 clients as IPv4-mapped IPv6, which `is_global()` reports as
+    // non global. That is what we want when blocking outgoing requests, but here it would trust them.
+    let remote = remote.to_canonical();
+    if trusted.eq_ignore_ascii_case("local") {
+        return !crate::util::is_global(remote);
+    }
+    trusted.split(',').filter_map(parse_trusted_proxy).any(|net| net.contains(&remote))
+}
+
 #[rocket::async_trait]
 impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientIp {
    type Error = ();

    async fn from_request(req: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let ip = if CONFIG._ip_header_enabled() {
+        let remote = req.remote().map(|r| r.ip());
+
+        let ip = if CONFIG._ip_header_enabled() && ip_header_is_trusted(remote) {
            req.headers().get_one(&CONFIG.ip_header()).and_then(|ip| {
                match ip.find(',') {
                    Some(idx) => &ip[..idx],
@@ -1070,10 +1103,15 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientIp {
                .ok()
            })
        } else {
+            if CONFIG._ip_header_enabled() && req.headers().get_one(&CONFIG.ip_header()).is_some() {
+                // Log the canonical IP, which is what the user filter will need to match against
+                let remote = remote.map(|ip| ip.to_canonical());
+                debug!("Ignoring the '{}' header, {remote:?} is not a trusted proxy", CONFIG.ip_header());
+            }
            None
        };

-        let ip = ip.or_else(|| req.remote().map(|r| r.ip())).unwrap_or_else(|| "0.0.0.0".parse().unwrap());
+        let ip = ip.or(remote).unwrap_or_else(|| "0.0.0.0".parse().unwrap());

        Outcome::Success(ClientIp {
            ip,
@@ -1268,20 +1306,8 @@ pub async fn refresh_tokens(
 ) -> ApiResult<(Device, AuthTokens)> {
    let refresh_claims = match decode_refresh(refresh_token) {
        Err(err) => {
-            error!("Failed to decode {} refresh_token: {refresh_token}: {err:?}", ip.ip);
-            //err_silent!(format!("Impossible to read refresh_token: {}", err.message()))
-
-            // If the token failed to decode, it was probably one of the old style tokens that was just a Base64 string.
-            // We can generate a claim for them for backwards compatibility. Note that the password refresh claims don't
-            // check expiration or issuer, so they're not included here.
-            RefreshJwtClaims {
-                nbf: 0,
-                exp: 0,
-                iss: String::new(),
-                sub: AuthMethod::Password,
-                device_token: refresh_token.into(),
-                token: None,
-            }
+            error!("Failed to decode refresh_token from {}: {err:?}", ip.ip);
+            err_silent!("Invalid refresh token")
        }
        Ok(claims) => claims,
    };
@@ -85,18 +85,8 @@ impl SendTokens {
            return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Send {send_id}, max access reached"), "send_id_invalid", true);
        }

-        if let Some(expiration) = send.expiration_date
-            && Utc::now().naive_utc() >= expiration
-        {
-            return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Send {send_id}, expired"), "send_id_invalid", true);
-        }
-
-        if Utc::now().naive_utc() >= send.deletion_date {
-            return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Send {send_id}, past deletion"), "send_id_invalid", true);
-        }
-
-        if send.disabled {
-            return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Send {send_id}, disabled"), "send_id_invalid", true);
+        if !send.is_accessible() {
+            return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Send {send_id}, not accessible"), "send_id_invalid", true);
        }

        if send.password_hash.is_some() {
@@ -113,8 +103,9 @@ impl SendTokens {
            }
        }

-        send.access_count += 1;
-        send.save(conn).await?;
+        if !send.register_access(conn).await? {
+            return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Send {send_id}, max access reached"), "send_id_invalid", true);
+        }

        Ok(Self {
            access_claims: generate_send_access_claims(&send_id),
@@ -666,6 +666,12 @@ make_config! {
        ip_header:              String, true,   def,    "X-Real-IP".to_owned();
        /// Internal IP header property, used to avoid recomputing each time
        _ip_header_enabled:     bool,   false,  generated,    |c| &c.ip_header.trim().to_lowercase() != "none";
+        /// Trusted proxies |> Which addresses the client IP header is accepted from. Requests from any
+        /// other address use the remote IP instead, so a client can't spoof the header.
+        /// Either the string "local" (the default, any non-global address, which covers a reverse proxy
+        /// running on the same host or container network), the string "all" to accept it from anywhere,
+        /// or a comma separated list of IPs and CIDR ranges.
+        ip_header_trusted_proxies: String, true, def,    "local".to_owned();
        /// Icon service |> The predefined icon services are: internal, bitwarden, duckduckgo, google.
        /// To specify a custom icon service, set a URL template with exactly one instance of `{}`,
        /// which is replaced with the domain. For example: `https://icon.example.com/domain/{}`.
@@ -768,6 +774,11 @@ make_config! {
        /// Max burst size for login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `login_ratelimit_seconds`. Note that this applies to both the login and the 2FA, so it's recommended to allow a burst size of at least 2
        login_ratelimit_max_burst:     u32, false, def, 10;

+        /// Seconds between unauthenticated requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between requests from the same IP address to any of the rate limited unauthenticated endpoints
+        unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds:   u64, false, def, 60;
+        /// Max burst size for unauthenticated requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds`. This is shared between several endpoints, so it needs to be more lenient than the login one
+        unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst: u32, false, def, 50;
+
        /// Seconds between admin login requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between admin requests from the same IP address before rate limiting kicks in
        admin_ratelimit_seconds:       u64, false, def, 300;
        /// Max burst size for admin login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `admin_ratelimit_seconds`
@@ -942,6 +953,18 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
        }
    }

+    let trusted_proxies = cfg.ip_header_trusted_proxies.trim();
+    if !trusted_proxies.eq_ignore_ascii_case("all") && !trusted_proxies.eq_ignore_ascii_case("local") {
+        for entry in trusted_proxies.split(',').filter(|e| !e.trim().is_empty()) {
+            if crate::auth::parse_trusted_proxy(entry).is_none() {
+                err!(format!(
+                    "Invalid IP_HEADER_TRUSTED_PROXIES entry `{}`, expected an IP or CIDR range",
+                    entry.trim()
+                ));
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
    if cfg.password_iterations < 100_000 {
        err!("PASSWORD_ITERATIONS should be at least 100000 or higher. The default is 600000!");
    }
@@ -42,13 +42,15 @@ pub struct Cipher {

    pub key: Option<String>,

-    /*
-    Login = 1,
-    SecureNote = 2,
-    Card = 3,
-    Identity = 4,
-    SshKey = 5
-    */
+    // See (v2026.7.0): https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/5d4461aa42cadbacfef8fe2166c5453a5c52773a/src/Core/Vault/Enums/CipherType.cs
+    // Login = 1,
+    // SecureNote = 2,
+    // Card = 3,
+    // Identity = 4,
+    // SSHKey = 5
+    // BankAccount = 6,
+    // DriversLicense = 7,
+    // Passport = 8,
    pub atype: i32,
    pub name: String,
    pub notes: Option<String>,
@@ -306,16 +308,6 @@ impl Cipher {
            type_data_json = Value::Null;
        }

-        // Clone the type_data and add some default value.
-        let mut data_json = type_data_json.clone();
-
-        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
-        // data_json should always contain the following keys with every atype
-        data_json["fields"] = json!(fields_json);
-        data_json["name"] = json!(self.name);
-        data_json["notes"] = json!(self.notes);
-        data_json["passwordHistory"] = Value::Array(password_history_json.clone());
-
        let collection_ids = if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
            if let Some(cipher_collections) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_collections.get(&self.uuid) {
                Cow::from(cipher_collections)
@@ -355,8 +347,6 @@ impl Cipher {
            "notes": self.notes,
            "fields": fields_json,

-            "data": data_json,
-
            "passwordHistory": password_history_json,

            // All Cipher types are included by default as null, but only the matching one will be populated
@@ -365,6 +355,9 @@ impl Cipher {
            "card": null,
            "identity": null,
            "sshKey": null,
+            "bankAccount": null,
+            "driversLicense": null,
+            "passport": null,
        });

        // These values are only needed for user/default syncs
@@ -404,6 +397,9 @@ impl Cipher {
            3 => "card",
            4 => "identity",
            5 => "sshKey",
+            6 => "bankAccount",
+            7 => "driversLicense",
+            8 => "passport",
            _ => err!(format!("Cipher {} has an invalid type {}", self.uuid, self.atype)),
        };

@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ use super::{
    User, UserId,
 };

+// See (v2026.7.0): https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/5d4461aa42cadbacfef8fe2166c5453a5c52773a/src/Core/AdminConsole/Entities/Collection.cs
 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
 #[diesel(table_name = collections)]
 #[diesel(treat_none_as_null = true)]
@@ -71,6 +72,11 @@ impl Collection {
            "id": self.uuid,
            "organizationId": self.org_uuid,
            "name": self.name,
+            // Collection types are either 0: SharedCollection or 1: DefaultUserCollection, of which we do not yet support DefaultUserCollection.
+            // See (v2026.7.0): https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/5d4461aa42cadbacfef8fe2166c5453a5c52773a/src/Core/AdminConsole/Enums/CollectionType.cs
+            "type": 0,
+            // This is only used together with MyItems/DefaultUserCollection, which we do not yet support.
+            "defaultUserCollectionEmail": null,
            "object": "collection",
        })
    }
@@ -623,6 +629,47 @@ impl Collection {
    pub async fn is_manageable_by_user(&self, user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> bool {
        Self::is_coll_manageable_by_user(&self.uuid, user_uuid, conn).await
    }
+
+    // Whether the user has manage access to at least one collection in the org, directly or via a
+    // group. Org-scoped counterpart of is_coll_manageable_by_user.
+    pub async fn has_manageable_collection_by_user(
+        org_uuid: &OrganizationId,
+        user_uuid: &UserId,
+        conn: &DbConn,
+    ) -> bool {
+        let org_uuid = org_uuid.to_string();
+        let user_uuid = user_uuid.to_string();
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            collections::table
+                .left_join(
+                    users_collections::table.on(users_collections::collection_uuid
+                        .eq(collections::uuid)
+                        .and(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))),
+                )
+                .left_join(
+                    users_organizations::table.on(collections::org_uuid
+                        .eq(users_organizations::org_uuid)
+                        .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))),
+                )
+                .left_join(groups_users::table.on(groups_users::users_organizations_uuid.eq(users_organizations::uuid)))
+                .left_join(
+                    collections_groups::table.on(collections_groups::groups_uuid
+                        .eq(groups_users::groups_uuid)
+                        .and(collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(collections::uuid))),
+                )
+                .filter(collections::org_uuid.eq(&org_uuid))
+                .filter(
+                    // Manage permission on a collection assigned directly or via a group.
+                    users_collections::manage.eq(true).or(collections_groups::manage.eq(true)),
+                )
+                .count()
+                .first::<i64>(conn)
+                .ok()
+                .unwrap_or(0)
+                != 0
+        })
+        .await
+    }
 }

 /// Database methods
@@ -271,7 +271,9 @@ impl Group {
            groups::table
                .inner_join(groups_users::table.on(groups_users::groups_uuid.eq(groups::uuid)))
                .inner_join(
-                    users_organizations::table.on(users_organizations::uuid.eq(groups_users::users_organizations_uuid)),
+                    users_organizations::table.on(users_organizations::uuid
+                        .eq(groups_users::users_organizations_uuid)
+                        .and(users_organizations::org_uuid.eq(groups::organizations_uuid))),
                )
                .filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
                .filter(groups::organizations_uuid.eq(org_uuid))
@@ -217,11 +217,18 @@ impl Organization {
            "useSecretsManager": false, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
            "selfHost": true,
            "useApi": true,
+            "useDisableSMAdsForUsers": true, // Hide Secrets Manager ads
+            "useInviteLinks": false, // Not (yet) supported
+            "useMyItems": false, // Not (yet) supported
+            "useOrganizationDomains": false, // Not supported (Linked to SSO)
+            "usePam": false, // Not supported
+            "usePhishingBlocker": false,
            "hasPublicAndPrivateKeys": self.private_key.is_some() && self.public_key.is_some(),
            "useResetPassword": CONFIG.mail_enabled(),
            "allowAdminAccessToAllCollectionItems": true,
            "limitCollectionCreation": true,
            "limitCollectionDeletion": true,
+            "limitItemDeletion": false,

            "businessName": self.name,
            "businessAddress1": null,
@@ -495,6 +502,12 @@ impl Membership {
            "useActivateAutofillPolicy": false,
            "useAdminSponsoredFamilies": false,
            "useRiskInsights": false, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
+            "useDisableSMAdsForUsers": true, // Hide Secrets Manager ads
+            "useInviteLinks": false, // Not (yet) supported
+            "useMyItems": false, // Not (yet) supported
+            "useOrganizationDomains": false, // Not supported (Linked to SSO)
+            "usePam": false, // Not supported
+            "usePhishingBlocker": false,

            "organizationUserId": self.uuid,
            "providerId": null,
@@ -231,6 +231,53 @@ impl Send {
        }
    }

+    /// Registers an access, incrementing `access_count` only while below `max_access_count`.
+    /// Returns false when the limit was already reached. The check and the increment are a single
+    /// statement, otherwise concurrent accesses can both pass the check and exceed the limit.
+    pub async fn register_access(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> Result<bool, crate::Error> {
+        self.update_users_revision(conn).await;
+
+        let revision_date = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+        let uuid = self.uuid.clone();
+        let updated = conn
+            .run(move |conn| {
+                diesel::update(sends::table)
+                    .filter(sends::uuid.eq(uuid))
+                    .filter(
+                        sends::max_access_count
+                            .is_null()
+                            .or(sends::access_count.nullable().lt(sends::max_access_count)),
+                    )
+                    .set((sends::access_count.eq(sends::access_count + 1), sends::revision_date.eq(revision_date)))
+                    .execute(conn)
+            })
+            .await?;
+
+        if updated == 0 {
+            return Ok(false);
+        }
+
+        self.access_count += 1;
+        self.revision_date = revision_date;
+        Ok(true)
+    }
+
+    /// Whether the Send is currently within its validity window: not disabled, not past its
+    /// expiration date, and not past its deletion date. Does not consider `max_access_count`
+    /// (consumed at token issuance) or the password.
+    pub fn is_accessible(&self) -> bool {
+        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+        if self.disabled {
+            return false;
+        }
+        if let Some(expiration) = self.expiration_date
+            && now >= expiration
+        {
+            return false;
+        }
+        now < self.deletion_date
+    }
+
    pub async fn delete(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
        self.update_users_revision(conn).await;

@@ -268,8 +268,25 @@ impl User {
            UserStatus::Enabled
        };

+        let account_keys = if self.private_key.is_some() {
+            json!({
+                "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
+                    "wrappedPrivateKey": self.private_key,
+                    "publicKey": self.public_key,
+                    "signedPublicKey": null,
+                    "object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair",
+                },
+                "securityState": null,
+                "signatureKeyPair": null,
+                "object": "privateKeys"
+            })
+        } else {
+            Value::Null
+        };
+
        json!({
            "_status": status as i32,
+            "accountKeys": account_keys,
            "id": self.uuid,
            "name": self.name,
            "email": self.email,
@@ -174,6 +174,27 @@ pub enum CustomHttpClientError {
 }

 impl CustomHttpClientError {
+    /// Attach the domain that resolved to this address, which `should_block_host()` can't know.
+    fn with_domain(self, name: &str) -> Self {
+        match self {
+            Self::NonGlobalIp {
+                ip,
+                ..
+            } => Self::NonGlobalIp {
+                domain: Some(name.to_owned()),
+                ip,
+            },
+            Self::Blocked {
+                domain,
+            } => Self::Blocked {
+                domain: format!("{name} ({domain})"),
+            },
+            other @ Self::Invalid {
+                ..
+            } => other,
+        }
+    }
+
    pub fn downcast_ref(e: &dyn std::error::Error) -> Option<&Self> {
        let mut source = e.source();

@@ -285,14 +306,12 @@ fn pre_resolve(name: &str, enforce_block: bool) -> Result<(), CustomHttpClientEr
 }

 fn post_resolve(name: &str, ip: IpAddr) -> Result<(), CustomHttpClientError> {
-    if should_block_ip(ip) {
-        Err(CustomHttpClientError::NonGlobalIp {
-            domain: Some(name.to_owned()),
-            ip,
-        })
-    } else {
-        Ok(())
-    }
+    let host: Host<&str> = match ip {
+        IpAddr::V4(ip) => Host::Ipv4(ip),
+        IpAddr::V6(ip) => Host::Ipv6(ip),
+    };
+
+    should_block_host(&host).map_err(|e| e.with_domain(name))
 }

 impl Resolve for CustomDns {
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 // The recursion_limit is mainly triggered by the json!() macro.
 // The more key/value pairs there are the more recursion occurs.
 // We want to keep this as low as possible!
-#![recursion_limit = "165"]
+#![recursion_limit = "192"]

 // When enabled use MiMalloc as malloc instead of the default malloc
 #[cfg(feature = "enable_mimalloc")]
@@ -18,6 +18,24 @@ static LIMITER_ADMIN: LazyLock<Limiter> = LazyLock::new(|| {
    RateLimiter::keyed(Quota::with_period(seconds).expect("Non-zero admin ratelimit seconds").allow_burst(burst))
 });

+static LIMITER_UNAUTHENTICATED: LazyLock<Limiter> = LazyLock::new(|| {
+    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds());
+    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst())
+        .expect("Non-zero unauthenticated ratelimit burst");
+    RateLimiter::keyed(
+        Quota::with_period(seconds).expect("Non-zero unauthenticated ratelimit seconds").allow_burst(burst),
+    )
+});
+
+pub fn check_limit_unauthenticated(ip: &IpAddr) -> Result<(), Error> {
+    match LIMITER_UNAUTHENTICATED.check_key(ip) {
+        Ok(()) => Ok(()),
+        Err(_e) => {
+            err_code!("Too many requests", 429);
+        }
+    }
+}
+
 pub fn check_limit_login(ip: &IpAddr) -> Result<(), Error> {
    match LIMITER_LOGIN.check_key(ip) {
        Ok(()) => Ok(()),
@@ -95,7 +95,9 @@ impl<'c> AsyncHttpClient<'c> for OidcHttpClient {
            }

            let body = response.bytes().await.map_err(Box::new)?;
-            debug!("Response body {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&body));
+            if CONFIG.sso_debug_tokens() {
+                debug!("Response body {}", String::from_utf8_lossy(&body));
+            }
            builder.body(body.to_vec()).map_err(HttpClientError::Http)
        })
    }
@@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ app-security > app-two-factor-setup > form {
 }

 /* Hide unsupported Custom Role options */
-bit-dialog div.tw-ml-4:has(bit-form-control input),
-bit-dialog div.tw-col-span-4:has(input[formcontrolname*="access"], input[formcontrolname*="manage"]) {
+:is(bit-dialog, [bit-dialog]) div.tw-ml-4:has(bit-form-control input),
+:is(bit-dialog, [bit-dialog]) div.tw-col-span-4:has(input[formcontrolname*="access"], input[formcontrolname*="manage"]) {
  @extend %vw-hide;
 }
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Daniel GarcíaandGitHub	46ae59eaf4	Trusted proxy support, unauthenticated rate limit & other fixes (#7472 ) * Trusted proxies, unauthenticated rate limits and various fixes * Fix get_groups_data * Fix get_groups_data when not using full_access * Fmt * Fix org import * deduplicate send validation	2026-07-24 18:27:32 +02:00
Mathijs van VeluwandGitHub	a6a88e7929	Update API response, crates and GHA (#7470 ) - Updated API response to more closely match v2026.6.0+ server versions. - Updated all the crates - Updated Rust to v1.97.1 - Updated the web-vault to v2026.6.4 - Updated GitHub Actions Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>	2026-07-24 17:33:10 +02:00
Timshel GitHub Timshel	5040bcb7c0	Remove unused fields (#7458 ) Co-authored-by: Timshel <timshel@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-24 16:40:34 +02:00
TomandGitHub	660faee68e	Fix custom role dialog selectors (#7442 )	2026-07-21 22:06:45 +02:00
DanielandGitHub	683a23e43c	Fix compilation with newer `rust-musl` version (#7453 )	2026-07-21 21:54:10 +02:00
Timshel GitHub Timshel	4a9bcb0694	Remove old compatibility code (#7434 ) Co-authored-by: Timshel <timshel@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-07-21 19:59:40 +02:00