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55 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Daniel García 274ee69db3 Implement V2 registration support 2026-10-07 23:38:51 +02:00
Daniel García 46f4ec83df Support blob-encrypted ciphers and match upstream's key id checks 2026-10-07 23:38:50 +02:00
Pier Carlo Cadoppi df2cd3c869 Add biometrics-sdk-ipc feature flag (#7813) 2026-10-07 19:20:23 +02:00
Tom 0e93d15b73 Add Windows desktop autotype support (#7808) 2026-10-07 19:20:04 +02:00
will-lottkowitz-prismandDaniel García d1cbd027cd Add revision_date to org policies (#7571)
* Add revision_date to org policies

Org policy JSON responses never included a revisionDate field, unlike
every other synced entity. The official Bitwarden server always sets
it, and current official clients (recently migrated to the WASM SDK's
typed PolicyView) now assume it is always a valid date string. Its
absence deserializes to undefined client-side, which then throws
(RangeError: Invalid time value) when the client formats it, breaking
the whole policy sync pipeline and silently emptying the vault view in
the browser and desktop apps.

Adds a revision_date column (mirroring the existing pattern used by
Send), stamped on creation and bumped on every save.

* Fix migration correctness for org policy revision_date

Caught by review: SQLite rejects non-constant defaults in ALTER TABLE
ADD COLUMN, so the sqlite migration would fail outright on every
existing installation (vaultwarden's default backend) rather than the
postgresql setup this was developed against.

- sqlite/mysql: add the column with a constant placeholder default,
  then backfill via UPDATE, since neither allows a volatile default
  in ALTER TABLE ADD COLUMN (mysql does allow it, but a constant
  keeps the three backends' migrations symmetric).
- mysql: use DATETIME instead of TIMESTAMP, matching this repo's
  existing revision_date columns, and backfill with UTC_TIMESTAMP()
  instead of a session-timezone-dependent CURRENT_TIMESTAMP.
- postgresql: backfill with `now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc'` instead of a
  DEFAULT now(), since assigning timestamptz now() into this naive
  TIMESTAMP column would otherwise cast through the server's TimeZone
  GUC and store local wall-clock instead of UTC on non-UTC servers.
- mysql/postgresql: add a real down.sql (DROP COLUMN) instead of
  leaving it empty.

* Move org policy revision_date migration after the latest one

---------

Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-07 19:19:26 +02:00
Daniel García 1f802f8e6a Update web-vault to v2026.8.0 (#7828) 2026-10-07 00:56:01 +02:00
a2efadc650 Fix email 2FA for SSO logins on iOS and Android (#7827)
* Allow email-only /api/two-factor/send-email-login for mobile clients

Mobile clients (iOS) may call /api/two-factor/send-email-login with only the user's email and without a MasterPasswordHash or an AuthRequest. Permit email-only requests so the server will send the email 2FA token in that flow.\n\nModified: src/api/core/two_factor/email.rs

Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* fix(email-2fa): use device-identifier fallback when no password hash submitted

iOS clients call /api/two-factor/send-email-login with an email and
DeviceIdentifier but without masterPasswordHash or authRequestId after
receiving a 2FA-required response from the token endpoint. The previous
empty else-block allowed any caller to trigger a 2FA email for any
account knowing only the email address.

Replace the empty block with a device-identifier-based fallback:
- Look up the most-recently-active device via find_by_device_for_email2fa.
- Verify the device's associated user email matches the submitted email.
- Log (debug) when the fallback path is exercised for operator visibility.
- Reject with the original error when no device identifier is provided or
  when the device maps to a different account.

Fixes #7568

* Check the pending 2FA login for this user and device

Look up the pending 2FA login for the user and device instead of the
latest one on the device, answer a failed check with the same error and
IP/username log detail as a wrong password, and escape the device id in
the logs.

---------

Co-authored-by: Arunabha-Mukhopadhyay <dkarunabha2006@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot <223556219+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-07 00:16:01 +02:00
acbf49018f [web-v2026.7.1] 2FA userVerificationToken for Authenticator, Email and Duo (#7563)
* 2FA using userVerificationToken

* Fix 2FA Yubikeys

* TwoFactor.find_by_user_and_type take enum parameter not i32

* log_user_event take enum parameter not i32

* Fix 2fa webauthn

* Prevent 2FA claims reuse

* 2fa webauthn return keys when deleting

* 2fa reset twofactor_remember

* Reject 2FA verification tokens issued for another provider

The Email and Duo claims only have optional fields, so a userVerificationToken minted for another
provider deserialized into them and was accepted. Each provider's claims now reject unknown fields,
with a test that every token only parses as its own provider.

Also fix the email 2FA login in the Playwright user setup, which used an undefined `mailBuffer`.

---------

Co-authored-by: Timshel <timshel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-06 23:45:55 +02:00
TomandDaniel García b8089e31c2 [Web 2026.9.0] Support new account recovery password payload (#7747)
* Support new account recovery password payload

* Address account recovery review feedback

* Check the account recovery password before sending the recovery email

---------

Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-06 20:45:12 +02:00
Tom 8647af8f89 [Web 2026.9.0] Support new Emergency Access password payload (#7746)
* Support new emergency access password payload

* Apply PR 7747 review changes to emergency access

* Add Playwright test for emergency access takeover
2026-10-06 20:28:51 +02:00
JogiusandDaniel García c687cacb6b Fix group import to update groups on data change (#7671)
Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-06 19:29:58 +02:00
Wu ShuwenandDaniel García 8b56926077 docs: fix Playwright test env link (#7739)
Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-06 19:26:09 +02:00
ump45noseandDaniel García de6d2066b3 docs: fix "runnning" typo in playwright README (#7787)
Signed-off-by: yuwk <1729065730@qq.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-06 19:25:51 +02:00
IainandDaniel García 415df400f4 Validate the Duo and SSO purge schedules on startup (#7819)
Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-06 19:21:46 +02:00
42aa3ee1c7 Close WebSocket connections that stop responding (#7807)
Both notification hubs send a Ping every 15 seconds but ignore the
Pong, so the loop only ends on a Close frame, EOF or a socket error.
When a client disappears without the TCP connection being closed, for
example behind a reverse proxy or CDN that keeps the upstream
connection open, none of these ever happens. The connection, its file
descriptor and its map entry are then kept forever, until the process
runs out of file descriptors and stops accepting connections and
opening the database.

Keep track of when something was last received from the client, Pongs
included, and close the connection when nothing was received for 30
seconds. This is the default ClientTimeoutInterval of ASP.NET Core
SignalR, which the official server uses.

Fixes #7805

Co-authored-by: Cassian433 <262026629+Cassian433@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-10-06 19:10:49 +02:00
Mathijs van Veluw 7c188967e7 Update crates, Rust and other dependencies (#7814)
- Update Rust to v1.99.0
- Updated GitHub Actions
- Updated DataTables

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>
2026-10-05 14:39:21 +02:00
Daniel García 895ec2b1e7 Align API behaviour with upstream and return errors on malformed input (#7810)
- Attachments: reject a declared v2 attachment size above the upload limit,
  keep display sizes within the largest unit, and make download links valid
  for 1 minute like upstream.
- Ciphers: moving a personal cipher into an organization needs collection
  write access or full access, like upstream.
- Events: /events/collect only accepts the client event types upstream accepts.
- Client IP: for list headers like X-Forwarded-For, use the rightmost address
  that isn't in IP_HEADER_TRUSTED_PROXIES, reading every occurrence.
- Prelogin: unknown emails get stable KDF settings from upstream's list.
- Login with device: an auth request can be used for one login, like upstream.
- Directory Connector import: never revokes, restores or removes Owners,
  like upstream.
- SSO: check the PKCE verifier again when the code exchange is reused during
  2FA, and accept the same redirect URIs as upstream (desktop localhost
  callback for AppImage and dev builds, CLI on ports 8065-8070).
- Identity: send the merged master password policy in the 2FA response and
  use PascalCase policy keys in identity responses, like upstream.
  Organization API key login no longer needs device fields. Recovery code
  login normalises the code, uses upstream's error message, logs a failed 2FA
  event and sends a "two-step login recovered" email.
- Add GET /api/accounts/keys.
- Return errors instead of panicking on malformed event dates, cipher data,
  key rotation cipher ids, bulk confirm entries and YubiKey OTPs.
2026-10-05 14:38:01 +02:00
Daniel García 1f99d9d276 Remove legacy API endpoints and compatibility code dropped upstream (#7809)
Remove endpoints, response fields, feature flags and compatibility code
that upstream Bitwarden has removed and that no current client uses:

- Legacy POST /identity/accounts/register and POST /api/accounts/prelogin;
  register/finish is rate limited like the other unauthenticated endpoints.
- Legacy organization routes: PUT groups/{id}/users, PUT policies/{type}/vnext,
  PUT users/{id}/reset-password, GET billing/metadata, and the POST aliases of
  the organization, collection, group and member PUT/DELETE routes.
- POST /two-factor/disable (PUT stays).
- ResetMasterPassword, captchaBypassToken, the legacy registration name field,
  userIsManagedByOrganization/managedByOrganization and accessAll.
- The automatic email 2FA code for clients older than 2025.5.0.
- DUO_USE_IFRAME and the Duo Traditional Prompt code.
- Experimental client feature flags that no client reads anymore.
- Web vault CSS selectors for web vaults older than 2025.5.1.

Also accept the PascalCase fields Android 2026.9.0+ sends on registration
and password change, and align a few account, login/2FA and organization
checks with upstream.

Adds tests for the registration body formats.
2026-10-04 22:16:55 +02:00
Daniel García f4f1a8e105 Send API cleanup: remove legacy endpoints and align access with upstream (#7806) 2026-10-03 23:05:56 +02:00
1c89e1772b 2fa email fallback need a verified email (#7770)
Co-authored-by: Timshel <timshel@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Mathijs van Veluw <black.dex@gmail.com>
2026-10-03 14:01:26 +02:00
Tom 3714b504f6 Fix Clippy warnings across all targets (#7782) 2026-10-03 13:50:29 +02:00
Tom f9f011d50c Hide the whole change-email section when EMAIL_CHANGE_ALLOWED is false (#7759) 2026-10-03 13:49:53 +02:00
Julian Speckmann cb89088bc3 Add Windows native credential sync to supported feature flags (#7798) 2026-10-03 13:49:44 +02:00
Pier Carlo Cadoppi 4444442075 Add undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic feature flag (#7802)
Introduced in Browser 2026.2.0 via bitwarden/clients#18395. Rewrites the
post-submit add/update login notification triggering logic, deferring
cipher-type inference until the vault is unlocked. Client-side only.
2026-10-03 13:49:37 +02:00
Mathijs van Veluw 061694d0cb Fix cortex-a53 build issues when using xx-cargo (#7774)
When using xx-cargo it uses a different linker then the default one.
This causes some default fixes Debian/Ubuntu add for the Cortex-A53
architectures to not be included.

This commit fixes that by checking if the target architecture is arm64
and if so, will add the needed fix argument. This should prevent issues
reported here #7754.

We can not say this with 100% certainty since this bug sometimes appears
and sometimes it does not.

Fixes #7754

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>
2026-09-25 21:53:06 +02:00
Daniel García 32098ca7d1 Require confirmed membership for user access checks, not for admin views (#7763) 2026-09-23 23:22:43 +02:00
Abhi ShandilyaandDaniel García d2660324e6 Fix revoked org members retaining access to org ciphers (#7554)
The cipher access restriction queries (direct collection access, group
collection access, and full access via groups) never checked the
organization membership status. Since users_collections and groups_users
rows are kept when a membership is revoked, revoked (and not yet
confirmed) members kept read, write, delete, attachment and
collection-move access to org ciphers via the direct-by-UUID endpoints.

Require a confirmed membership in the cipher's organization in all
three queries, matching the behavior of the sync queries.

Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-23 19:44:05 +02:00
Stefan Melmuk cc67d644f6 set user_created bool for each separate invitation (#7753) 2026-09-18 20:35:11 +02:00
Berk D. Demir 3347698712 Add pm-34171-card-scanner feature flag (#7477)
Introduced in 2026.4.1 Mobile releases (Android and iOS), enables use of
device camera to autofill a card type item.

N.B. This feature relies on Google ML Kit. F-Droid policy disallows
Google ML Kit. Because of this, F-Droid builds do not ship with card
scanner feature. (See https://github.com/bitwarden/android/pull/6890)
2026-09-18 20:34:41 +02:00
Mathijs van Veluw a24683636a Update Crates, GHA and JS (#7751)
Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>
2026-09-18 18:44:50 +02:00
Berk D. Demir 64c56411f6 Add pm-32009-new-item-types feature flag (#7478)
Introduced in 2026.4.0 for all clients, enables new item types bank
account, driver's license, and passport.
2026-09-18 16:53:27 +02:00
Tom c3f5477525 Add accepted organization data to sync response (#7666) 2026-09-18 16:53:17 +02:00
TimshelandTimshel 9c8aa2359f User key id (#7693)
Co-authored-by: Timshel <timshel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-18 16:53:06 +02:00
Tom 8719f86fcf Add basic auth response client feature flag (#7745) 2026-09-18 16:52:57 +02:00
Tom fddc8e71be Support the vault banner policy (#7748) 2026-09-18 16:52:49 +02:00
Mathijs van Veluw eb212e23fa Fix archiveDate update (#7722)
When `archiveDate` is set to `null` it should unarchive it for that
specific user, which is what Bitwarden does.

This should fix this by checking and validating if it is `null`

Fixes #7581

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>
2026-09-09 18:24:33 +02:00
TimshelandTimshel 25dfedafd7 Use insert_into when possible (#6437)
Co-authored-by: Timshel <timshel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-09 16:43:47 +02:00
Tom e992cbb4f5 Fix iOS registration token response (#7714)
* Return registration token as text/plain for Accept: */*

* fix register verification response content negotiation
2026-09-09 14:31:03 +02:00
Chase DouglasandBlackDex 5b51b60f94 Route service clients through shared HTTP setup (#7639)
* storage: route OpenDAL through HTTP client

OpenDAL 0.58 requires applications to provide an HTTP transport. Its
default installer creates a standalone client, bypassing Vaultwarden
DNS, redirect, proxy, timeout, and request configuration.

Build the client through the internal HTTP interface and inject it into
OpenDAL's public reqwest transport.

* http: honor block setting on redirects

Clients can disable host blocking for administrator-configured private
services. DNS resolution honors this setting, but the redirect policy
still performs config-backed host checks.

Capture the setting in the redirect policy and skip those checks when
blocking is disabled. This also avoids re-entering CONFIG when a remote
configuration request is redirected during startup.

* http: make DNS setup bootstrap-safe

Remote configuration can require an HTTP client while CONFIG is still
initializing. Building the DNS resolver currently reads
CONFIG.dns_prefer_ipv6(), so loading an S3-backed config can deadlock.

Build one resolver without consulting CONFIG. Order addresses for each
lookup using the merged setting when available, falling back to the
environment and then IPv4-first during bootstrap.

* aws: use internal HTTP client

The AWS SDK connector builds a raw reqwest client, bypassing
Vaultwarden TLS, DNS, redirect, proxy, timeout, and request setup.

Construct it through the internal HTTP client interface and retain the
standard ten-second request deadline. Permit private AWS metadata and
service endpoints by disabling non-global IP blocking.

Preserve timeout errors when adapting reqwest failures to the AWS SDK so
the runtime receives the correct connector error category.

* Added comment for the prefer IPv function

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>
2026-09-09 14:30:25 +02:00
Mathijs van Veluw de7abaaafa Update Rust and adjust DockerSettings (#7690)
- Update Rust to v1.98.1 which resolves a build issues with strange
  outcomes
- Adjusted the DockerSettings and render_template to extract the
  `rust_version` from the `rust-toolchain.toml` file. This should
  prevent mismatches and forgetting to update DockerSettings.
- Updated typos in GHA and Pre-Commit
- Updated all possible crates including hickory which has several CVE's
  fixed.

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>
2026-09-09 11:51:23 +02:00
niniconi b7667e27bf fix: Correct invalid comment syntax in .dockerignore (#7274)
Docker only recognizes `#` as a valid comment indicator in .dockerignore files. 
Using `//` causes the lines to be incorrectly parsed as glob patterns rather than comments. 
While this may not cause fatal errors if no matching files exist, it is syntactically invalid and could lead to unexpected behavior. Corrected the syntax to use `#`.
2026-09-08 13:42:58 +02:00
Bryan f1c36b8c1d fix(security): rate limit prelogin and auth request endpoints (#7681) 2026-09-08 12:14:16 +02:00
Bryan f1ff613008 fix(security): revoke 2FA remember tokens when credentials or 2FA change (#7682) 2026-09-08 12:14:07 +02:00
TimshelandTimshel 57fbed1bed Support admin reset 2fa (#7435)
* Support admin reset 2fa

* Fix recovery email

---------

Co-authored-by: Timshel <timshel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-09-08 12:14:01 +02:00
The CRahn 277e1536eb Log IP/username on two-factor email-login credential failures (#7654)
The three "Username or password is incorrect" errors in
send_email_login() (email.rs) don't log the client IP or submitted
identifier, unlike the equivalent wrong-password error in
password_login() (identity.rs), which logs both via
format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip).

This makes the two code paths inconsistent for the same underlying
error, and means log-based tooling that keys on the identity.rs
error's "IP: x.x.x.x" pattern can't do the same for this endpoint.
Bring email.rs's three call sites in line with identity.rs's existing
format. The two email-present branches log IP+Username (the email
submitted); the device-identifier-only branch (SSO path, no email in
scope) logs IP+Device instead of fabricating a username.

Verified: cargo build/test/clippy/fmt all pass with the sqlite feature
(matching one leg of this repo's own CI matrix), including the two
existing unit tests in this file.
2026-09-08 12:13:51 +02:00
Tom 2ffad8775d Add pm-32413-multi-client-password-management feature flag (#7677) 2026-09-08 12:13:40 +02:00
Tom 32d85d03bb Fix organization import failing with missing field groups (#7699) 2026-09-08 12:13:32 +02:00
Daniel García a6c3bd6d18 Update rust docker version (#7689) 2026-09-03 21:17:50 +02:00
Mathijs van Veluw 6729e83521 Misc Updates (#7676)
* Misc Updates

- Update Rust to v1.98.0
- Update all the crates and adjusted code where needed
- Updated JavaScript libraries
  Removed jquery as this isn't needed anymore, adjusted code where needed
- Updated all GitHub Actions
- Fixed nightly clippy lint warnings

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

* Adjust email validation as suggested

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>
2026-09-03 00:07:00 +02:00
TimshelandTimshel fdc156b247 log_event take enum parameter not i32 (#7656)
Co-authored-by: Timshel <timshel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-29 17:02:26 +02:00
TimshelandTimshel 2073c03092 Add SSO_SIGNUPS_ALLOWED (#7272)
* Add SSO_SIGNUPS_ALLOWED

* Fix regression with domain_allowed in SSO onboarding

---------

Co-authored-by: Timshel <timshel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-29 17:02:22 +02:00
TimshelandTimshel 923f5d0b5e Fix migration for MariaDB 12.2.2 (#7265)
Co-authored-by: Timshel <timshel@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-29 17:02:01 +02:00
xhon-pelushi 83724b301e Ignore reset-password auto-enroll when mail is disabled (#7585)
Account recovery requires SMTP. When mail is off, treat the organization
reset-password auto-enroll policy as inactive so invite/accept flows are
not forced to supply a reset-password key.

Fixes #7459
2026-08-29 17:01:51 +02:00
Matt Van HornandMatt Van Horn 10e044f563 chore: remove duplicate "the" in ciphers.rs comment (#7254)
`src/api/core/ciphers.rs:170` comment said "similar to the the
userDecryptionOptions" -> "similar to the userDecryptionOptions".

Comment-only.

Co-authored-by: Matt Van Horn <455140+mvanhorn@users.noreply.github.com>
2026-08-29 17:01:45 +02:00
Mathijs van Veluw fa2566d14f Fix password change with newer web-vault (#7634) 2026-08-24 19:38:23 +02:00
117 changed files with 17299 additions and 23991 deletions

No files matched your search

+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
// Ignore everything
# Ignore everything
*
// Allow what is needed
# Allow what is needed
!.git
!docker/healthcheck.sh
!docker/start.sh
+15 -19
View File
@@ -180,7 +180,7 @@
## Defaults to every minute. Set blank to disable this job.
# AUTH_REQUEST_PURGE_SCHEDULE="30 * * * * *"
##
## Cron schedule of the job that cleans expired Duo contexts from the database. Does nothing if Duo MFA is disabled or set to use the legacy iframe prompt.
## Cron schedule of the job that cleans expired Duo contexts from the database. Does nothing if Duo MFA is disabled.
## Defaults to every minute. Set blank to disable this job.
# DUO_CONTEXT_PURGE_SCHEDULE="30 * * * * *"
#
@@ -338,6 +338,8 @@
## "local" accepts it from any non global address, which covers a reverse proxy running on the same
## host or container network. Use "all" to accept it from anywhere, or list the addresses of your
## proxy as IPs and CIDR ranges if it connects from a public address.
## For a list header like X-Forwarded-For, the client IP is the rightmost address that isn't one of
## these proxies, so with several proxies in a row (a CDN in front of nginx, for example) list all of them.
# IP_HEADER_TRUSTED_PROXIES=local
## Icon service
@@ -390,21 +392,17 @@
##
## The following flags are available:
## - "pm-5594-safari-account-switching": Enable account switching in Safari. (Safari >= 2026.2.0)
## - "ssh-agent": Enable SSH agent support on Desktop. (Desktop >= 2024.12.0)
## - "pm-32413-multi-client-password-management": Enable changing the master password directly in the client. (Desktop/Extension >= 2026.4.0)
## - "ssh-agent-v2": Enable newer SSH agent support. (Desktop >= 2026.2.1)
## - "ssh-key-vault-item": Enable the creation and use of SSH key vault items. (Clients >= 2024.12.0)
## - "pm-25373-windows-biometrics-v2": Enable the new implementation of biometrics on Windows. (Desktop >= 2025.11.0)
## - "pm-26340-linux-biometrics-v2": Enable the new implementation of biometrics on Linux. (Desktop >= 2025.11.0)
## - "anon-addy-self-host-alias": Enable configuring self-hosted Anon Addy alias generator. (Android >= 2025.3.0, iOS >= 2025.4.0)
## - "simple-login-self-host-alias": Enable configuring self-hosted Simple Login alias generator. (Android >= 2025.3.0, iOS >= 2025.4.0)
## - "mutual-tls": Enable the use of mutual TLS on Android (Clients >= 2025.2.0)
## - "cxp-import-mobile": Enable the import via CXP on iOS (Clients >= 2025.9.2)
## - "cxp-export-mobile": Enable the export via CXP on iOS (Clients >= 2025.9.2)
## - "windows-desktop-autotype": Enable the autotype feature preview on Windows. (Desktop >= 2025.8.0)
## - "windows-desktop-autotype-ga": Enable the new, still in development, autotype implementation on Windows. (Desktop >= 2026.9.1)
## Only enable one of the two autotype flags, the clients disable autotype completely when both are enabled.
## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins":
## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-1": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-2": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-3": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-4": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
## - "pm-32009-new-item-types": Enable new item types: Bank Account, Driver's License, and Passport (Clients >= 2026.4.0)
## - "pm-34171-card-scanner": Enable the new card scanner feature on mobile (Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.4.1)
## - "enable-basic-auth-response": Enable HTTP Basic Auth autofill in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.9.0)
## - "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic": Enable the rewritten add/update login notification triggering logic in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.2.0)
## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
# EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=
## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.
@@ -518,6 +516,9 @@
## Prevent users from logging in directly without going through SSO
# SSO_ONLY=false
## Allow SSO flow to create account. You probably want to disable it when using a public provider.
# SSO_SIGNUPS_ALLOWED=true
## On SSO Signup if a user with a matching email already exists make the association
# SSO_SIGNUPS_MATCH_EMAIL=true
@@ -580,11 +581,6 @@
# DUO_HOST=<API Hostname>
## After that, you should be able to follow the rest of the guide linked above,
## ignoring the fields that ask for the values that you already configured beforehand.
##
## If you want to attempt to use Duo's 'Traditional Prompt' (deprecated, iframe based) set DUO_USE_IFRAME to 'true'.
## Duo no longer supports this, but it still works for some integrations.
## If you aren't sure, leave this alone.
# DUO_USE_IFRAME=false
## Email 2FA settings
## Email token size
+1 -1
View File
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ jobs:
# Enable Rust Caching
- name: Rust Caching
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@c19371144df3bb44fab255c43d04cbc2ab54d1c4 # v2.9.1
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@6323deb102c322ba6fcbdcafc7e3dddab59af2b6 # v2.9.2
with:
# Use a custom prefix-key to force a fresh start. This is sometimes needed with bigger changes.
# Like changing the build host from Ubuntu 20.04 to 22.04 for example.
+3 -3
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ jobs:
steps:
# Start Docker Buildx
- name: Setup Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@bb05f3f5519dd87d3ba754cc423b652a5edd6d2c # v4.2.0
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@f87e5991a6d7451dcb8d9637bfbc97413f497069 # v4.4.1
# https://github.com/moby/buildkit/issues/3969
# Also set max parallelism to 2, the default of 4 breaks GitHub Actions and causes OOMKills
with:
@@ -41,12 +41,12 @@ jobs:
# Uses the Docker-based action (hadolint pre-bundled in ghcr.io/hadolint/hadolint:v2.14.0-debian)
# so no binary is downloaded at runtime. Pinned by commit SHA for supply-chain safety.
- name: Run hadolint on Dockerfile.debian
uses: hadolint/hadolint-action@2a66e89f53d0771bb131a7fa31f3136336094aa6 # v3.4.0
uses: hadolint/hadolint-action@06be81baf89a55ffd0e24b8f04a4185738dd3387 # v3.5.0
with:
dockerfile: docker/Dockerfile.debian
- name: Run hadolint on Dockerfile.alpine
uses: hadolint/hadolint-action@2a66e89f53d0771bb131a7fa31f3136336094aa6 # v3.4.0
uses: hadolint/hadolint-action@06be81baf89a55ffd0e24b8f04a4185738dd3387 # v3.5.0
with:
dockerfile: docker/Dockerfile.alpine
# End Test Dockerfiles with hadolint
+3 -3
View File
@@ -58,13 +58,13 @@ jobs:
steps:
- name: Initialize QEMU binfmt support
uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@96fe6ef7f33517b61c61be40b68a1882f3264fb8 # v4.2.0
uses: docker/setup-qemu-action@99012661954931238ded8c8b007157a8430204e1 # v4.4.0
with:
platforms: "arm64,arm"
# Start Docker Buildx
- name: Setup Docker Buildx
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@bb05f3f5519dd87d3ba754cc423b652a5edd6d2c # v4.2.0
uses: docker/setup-buildx-action@f87e5991a6d7451dcb8d9637bfbc97413f497069 # v4.4.1
# https://github.com/moby/buildkit/issues/3969
# Also set max parallelism to 2, the default of 4 breaks GitHub Actions and causes OOMKills
with:
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ jobs:
- name: Bake ${{ matrix.base_image }} containers
id: bake_vw
uses: docker/bake-action@d3418bd7d0e9324001bca92fa8ba175ea7e6dc9b # v7.3.0
uses: docker/bake-action@018cb6412ab401ebaa809aa5f85966b74628600f # v7.4.0
env:
BASE_TAGS: "${{ steps.determine-version.outputs.BASE_TAGS }}"
SOURCE_COMMIT: "${{ env.SOURCE_COMMIT }}"
+1 -1
View File
@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ jobs:
severity: CRITICAL,HIGH
- name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@5595ccaf912efad79be6eef63a5619ff05969be3 # v4.37.6
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@2892aa5e19bbd11bc0cff5427e3b750a04d9e3c2 # v4.38.2
with:
sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
+1 -1
View File
@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ jobs:
# When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.pre-commit-config.yaml` too
- name: Spell Check Repo
uses: crate-ci/typos@8a48f81b6c64dcfea44b3633223084c4be58ac5f # v1.49.0
uses: crate-ci/typos@00f422f3b19c57bc6338715ebfe3316d38768461 # v1.50.3
+1 -1
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
persist-credentials: false
- name: Run zizmor
uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@3dc1ecc9bcb9e94e9b2c709687979e1298497054 # v0.6.2
uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@cc914d7f3750a2d13d75c7f184a1060aa0e9d482 # v0.6.4
with:
# intentionally not scanning the entire repository,
# since it contains integration tests.
+1 -1
View File
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ repos:
# When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.github/workflows/typos.yaml` too
- repo: https://github.com/crate-ci/typos
rev: 8a48f81b6c64dcfea44b3633223084c4be58ac5f # v1.49.0
rev: 00f422f3b19c57bc6338715ebfe3316d38768461 # v1.50.3
hooks:
- id: typos
always_run: true
+2 -3
View File
@@ -14,9 +14,8 @@ extend-ignore-re = [
# In SMTP it's called HELO, so ignore it
"(?i)helo_name",
"Server name sent during.+HELO",
# COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption, ignore these specific items
"COSEKey",
"COSEAlgorithm",
# COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
"(?i)cose",
# Ignore this specific string as it's valid
"Ensure they are valid OTPs",
# This word is misspelled upstream
Generated
+537 -453
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+28 -27
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
[workspace.package]
edition = "2024"
rust-version = "1.95.0"
rust-version = "1.97.1"
license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
repository = "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden"
publish = false
@@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ members = ["macros"]
name = "vaultwarden"
version = "1.0.0"
authors = ["Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>"]
readme = "README.md"
build = "build.rs"
repository.workspace = true
edition.workspace = true
@@ -41,6 +40,7 @@ vendored_openssl = ["openssl/vendored"]
enable_mimalloc = ["dep:mimalloc"]
s3 = [
"opendal/services-s3",
"dep:opendal-http-transport-reqwest",
"dep:aws-config",
"dep:aws-credential-types",
"dep:aws-smithy-runtime-api",
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ syslog = "7.0.0"
macros = { path = "./macros" }
# Logging
log = "0.4.33"
log = "0.4.34"
fern = { version = "0.7.1", features = ["syslog-7", "reopen-1"] }
# We need the `log` feature for `tracing` to enable logging for several crates to work, like lettre or webauthn-rs
tracing = { version = "0.1.44", features = ["log"] }
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ dotenvy = { version = "0.15.7", default-features = false }
# Numerical libraries
num-traits = "0.2.19"
num-derive = "0.5.1"
bigdecimal = "0.4.10"
bigdecimal = "0.4.11"
# Web framework
rocket = { version = "0.5.1", default-features = false, features = ["json", "tls"] }
@@ -90,8 +90,8 @@ rmpv = "1.3.1" # MessagePack library
dashmap = "6.2.1"
# Async futures
futures = "0.3.33"
tokio = { version = "1.53.1", features = [
futures = "0.3.34"
tokio = { version = "1.53.2", features = [
"fs",
"io-util",
"net",
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
serde_json = "1.0.151"
# A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
diesel = { version = "2.3.11", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
diesel = { version = "2.3.13", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric", "64-column-tables"] }
diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"
derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
@@ -120,16 +120,16 @@ derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
diesel-derive-newtype = "2.1.3"
# SQLite, statically bundled unless the `sqlite_system` feature is enabled
libsqlite3-sys = { version = "0.37.0", optional = true }
libsqlite3-sys = { version = "0.38.2", optional = true }
# Crypto-related libraries
rand = "0.10.2"
rand = "0.10.3"
ring = "0.17.14"
rustls = { version = "0.23.43", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
rustls = { version = "0.23.45", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
subtle = "2.6.1"
# UUID generation
uuid = { version = "1.24.0", features = ["v4"] }
uuid = { version = "1.27.0", features = ["v4"] }
# Date and time libraries
chrono = { version = "0.4.45", default-features = false, features = ["clock", "serde"] }
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ job_scheduler_ng = "2.5.0"
data-encoding = "2.11.1"
# JWT library
jsonwebtoken = { version = "11.0.0", default-features = false, features = ["rust_crypto", "use_pem"] }
jsonwebtoken = { version = "11.1.0", default-features = false, features = ["rust_crypto", "use_pem"] }
# TOTP library
totp-lite = "2.0.1"
@@ -180,10 +180,10 @@ percent-encoding = "2.3.2" # URL encoding library used for URL's in the emails
email_address = "0.2.9"
# HTML Template library
handlebars = { version = "6.4.3", features = ["dir_source"] }
handlebars = { version = "6.4.4", features = ["dir_source"] }
# HTTP client (Used for favicons, version check, DUO and HIBP API)
reqwest = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false, features = [
reqwest = { version = "0.13.5", default-features = false, features = [
# Misc
"charset",
"cookies",
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ reqwest = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false, features = [
"socks",
"system-proxy",
] }
hickory-resolver = "0.26.1"
hickory-resolver = "0.26.3"
# Favicon extraction libraries
html5gum = "0.8.4"
@@ -212,13 +212,13 @@ regex = { version = "1.13.1", default-features = false, features = [
] }
data-url = "0.3.2"
bytes = "1.12.1"
svg-hush = "0.9.6"
svg-hush = "0.9.7"
# Cache function results (Used for version check and favicon fetching)
cached = { version = "2.0.2", features = ["async"] }
cached = { version = "4.0.1", features = ["async"] }
# Used for custom short lived cookie jar during favicon extraction
cookie = "0.18.1"
cookie = "0.18.2"
cookie_store = "0.22.1"
# Used by U2F, JWT and PostgreSQL
@@ -232,11 +232,11 @@ pastey = "0.2.3"
governor = "0.10.4"
# CIDR parsing for the trusted proxies of the client IP header
ipnet = "2.12.1"
ipnet = "2.12.2"
# OIDC for SSO
openidconnect = { version = "4.0.1", default-features = false }
moka = { version = "0.12.15", features = ["future"] }
moka = { version = "0.12.16", features = ["future"] }
# Check client versions for specific features.
semver = "1.0.28"
@@ -245,10 +245,10 @@ semver = "1.0.28"
# Mainly used for the musl builds, since the default musl malloc is very slow
mimalloc = { version = "0.1.52", optional = true, default-features = false, features = ["secure"] }
which = "8.0.5"
which = "8.0.6"
# Argon2 library with support for the PHC format
argon2 = "0.5.3"
argon2 = "0.6.0"
# Reading a password from the cli for generating the Argon2id ADMIN_TOKEN
rpassword = "7.5.4"
@@ -257,20 +257,21 @@ rpassword = "7.5.4"
grass_compiler = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false }
# File are accessed through Apache OpenDAL
opendal = { version = "0.58.1", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
opendal = { version = "0.59.4", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.4", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
# For retrieving AWS credentials, including temporary SSO credentials
aws-config = { version = "1.10.1", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
aws-config = { version = "1.12.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
"behavior-version-latest",
"credentials-process",
"rt-tokio",
"sso",
] }
aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0", optional = true }
aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.14.0", optional = true }
aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.19.0", optional = true }
http = { version = "1.5.0", optional = true }
reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.1.0", optional = true }
reqsign-core = { version = "3.2.1", optional = true }
reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.3.1", optional = true }
reqsign-core = { version = "3.3.2", optional = true }
# Strip debuginfo from the release builds
# The debug symbols are to provide better panic traces
+4 -3
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@
---
vault_version: "v2026.7.0"
vault_image_digest: "sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c"
vault_version: "v2026.8.0"
vault_image_digest: "sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a"
# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.9.0
# We use the linux/amd64 platform shell scripts since there is no difference between the different platform scripts
# https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx | https://hub.docker.com/r/tonistiigi/xx/tags
xx_image_digest: "sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707"
rust_version: 1.97.1 # Rust version to be used
# The `rust_version` variable is extracted from `rust-toolchain.toml`
# rust_version: x.yy.z # Rust version to be used
debian_version: trixie # Debian release name to be used
alpine_version: "3.24" # Alpine version to be used
# For which platforms/architectures will we try to build images
+10 -10
View File
@@ -19,23 +19,23 @@
# - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
# click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
# - From the command line:
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
#
# - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
#
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
########################## ALPINE BUILD IMAGES ##########################
## NOTE: The Alpine Base Images do not support other platforms then linux/amd64 and linux/arm64
## And for Alpine we define all build images here, they will only be loaded when actually used
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.97.1 AS build_amd64
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.97.1 AS build_arm64
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.97.1 AS build_armv7
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.97.1 AS build_armv6
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.99.0 AS build_amd64
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.99.0 AS build_arm64
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.99.0 AS build_armv7
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.99.0 AS build_armv6
########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
# hadolint ignore=DL3006
+27 -11
View File
@@ -19,15 +19,15 @@
# - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
# click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
# - From the command line:
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
#
# - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
#
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
########################## Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts ##########################
## We use the linux/amd64 no matter which Build Platform, since these are all bash scripts
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f
########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
# hadolint ignore=DL3006
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.97.1-slim-trixie AS build
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.99.0-slim-trixie AS build
# hadolint ignore=DL3067
COPY --from=xx / /
ARG TARGETARCH
@@ -101,9 +101,17 @@ RUN . /env-cargo && \
# https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx/pull/108#issuecomment-3700635977
# https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/discussions/7522
if xx-info is-cross; then \
XX_RUSTFLAGS="-C link-arg=-Wl,-rpath-link,/usr/lib/$(xx-info triple)"; \
export XX_RUSTFLAGS; \
XX_RUSTFLAGS="-Clink-arg=-Wl,-rpath-link,/usr/lib/$(xx-info triple)"; \
fi && \
# Debian's GCC adds a special fix for cortex-a53 arch's which gets losts when using xx-cargo, which uses clang
# Checking if the arch is arm64 and adding this extra link-arg should cause this fix to be applied
# This should fix issues reported when running on a RPi3 which is a Cortex-A35 chip
# See: https://salsa.debian.org/toolchain-team/gcc/-/blob/master/debian/rules2?pow_referer=#L543-548
# See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/7754
if [ "$(xx-info arch)" = "arm64" ]; then \
XX_RUSTFLAGS="${XX_RUSTFLAGS} -Clink-arg=-Wl,--fix-cortex-a53-843419"; \
fi && \
export XX_RUSTFLAGS && \
PKG_CONFIG="$(command -v "$(xx-info)-pkg-config")" xx-cargo build --features ${DB} --profile "${CARGO_PROFILE}" && \
find . -not -path "./target*" -delete
@@ -123,9 +131,17 @@ RUN . /env-cargo && \
# https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx/pull/108#issuecomment-3700635977
# https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/discussions/7522
if xx-info is-cross; then \
XX_RUSTFLAGS="-C link-arg=-Wl,-rpath-link,/usr/lib/$(xx-info triple)"; \
export XX_RUSTFLAGS; \
XX_RUSTFLAGS="-Clink-arg=-Wl,-rpath-link,/usr/lib/$(xx-info triple)"; \
fi && \
# Debian's GCC adds a special fix for cortex-a53 arch's which gets losts when using xx-cargo, which uses clang
# Checking if the arch is arm64 and adding this extra link-arg should cause this fix to be applied
# This should fix issues reported when running on a RPi3 which is a Cortex-A35 chip
# See: https://salsa.debian.org/toolchain-team/gcc/-/blob/master/debian/rules2?pow_referer=#L543-548
# See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/7754
if [ "$(xx-info arch)" = "arm64" ]; then \
XX_RUSTFLAGS="${XX_RUSTFLAGS} -Clink-arg=-Wl,--fix-cortex-a53-843419"; \
fi && \
export XX_RUSTFLAGS && \
PKG_CONFIG="$(command -v "$(xx-info)-pkg-config")" xx-cargo build --features ${DB} --profile "${CARGO_PROFILE}" && \
if [ "${CARGO_PROFILE}" = "dev" ] ; then \
ln -vfsr "/app/target/${CARGO_TARGET}/debug" /app/target/final ; \
+10 -2
View File
@@ -32,9 +32,17 @@
# https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx/pull/108#issuecomment-3700635977
# https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/discussions/7522
if xx-info is-cross; then \
XX_RUSTFLAGS="-C link-arg=-Wl,-rpath-link,/usr/lib/$(xx-info triple)"; \
export XX_RUSTFLAGS; \
XX_RUSTFLAGS="-Clink-arg=-Wl,-rpath-link,/usr/lib/$(xx-info triple)"; \
fi && \
# Debian's GCC adds a special fix for cortex-a53 arch's which gets losts when using xx-cargo, which uses clang
# Checking if the arch is arm64 and adding this extra link-arg should cause this fix to be applied
# This should fix issues reported when running on a RPi3 which is a Cortex-A35 chip
# See: https://salsa.debian.org/toolchain-team/gcc/-/blob/master/debian/rules2?pow_referer=#L543-548
# See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/7754
if [ "$(xx-info arch)" = "arm64" ]; then \
XX_RUSTFLAGS="${XX_RUSTFLAGS} -Clink-arg=-Wl,--fix-cortex-a53-843419"; \
fi && \
export XX_RUSTFLAGS && \
PKG_CONFIG="$(command -v "$(xx-info)-pkg-config")" xx-cargo build --features ${DB} --profile "${CARGO_PROFILE}"
{%- endmacro %}
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@{{ vault_image_digest }} AS vault
+8 -2
View File
@@ -3,17 +3,23 @@
import os
import argparse
import json
import tomllib
import yaml
import jinja2
# Load settings file
with open("DockerSettings.yaml", 'r') as yaml_file:
with open('DockerSettings.yaml', 'r', encoding='utf-8') as yaml_file:
yaml_data = yaml.safe_load(yaml_file)
# Extract the rust_version from the rust-toolchain.toml file
script_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
with open(os.path.join(script_dir, '..', 'rust-toolchain.toml'), 'rb') as toolchain_file:
yaml_data["rust_version"] = tomllib.load(toolchain_file)["toolchain"]["channel"]
settings_env = jinja2.Environment(
loader=jinja2.FileSystemLoader(os.getcwd()),
)
settings_yaml = yaml.safe_load(settings_env.get_template("DockerSettings.yaml").render(yaml_data))
settings_yaml = yaml.safe_load(settings_env.get_template('DockerSettings.yaml').render(yaml_data))
args_parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
args_parser.add_argument('template_file', help='Jinja2 template file to render.')
+1 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ proc-macro = true
[dependencies]
quote = "1.0.47"
syn = "3.0.3"
syn = "3.0.6"
[lints]
workspace = true
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN key_id TEXT;
@@ -1,15 +1,31 @@
-- Dynamically create DROP FOREIGN KEY
-- Some versions of MySQL or MariaDB might fail if the key doesn't exists
-- This checks if the key exists, and if so, will drop it.
SET @drop_sso_fk = IF((SELECT true FROM information_schema.TABLE_CONSTRAINTS WHERE
CONSTRAINT_SCHEMA = DATABASE() AND
TABLE_NAME = 'sso_users' AND
CONSTRAINT_NAME = 'sso_users_ibfk_1' AND
CONSTRAINT_TYPE = 'FOREIGN KEY') = true,
'ALTER TABLE sso_users DROP FOREIGN KEY sso_users_ibfk_1',
'SELECT 1');
PREPARE stmt FROM @drop_sso_fk;
EXECUTE stmt;
DEALLOCATE PREPARE stmt;
SELECT if (
EXISTS(
SELECT CONSTRAINT_NAME FROM information_schema.table_constraints
WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
AND TABLE_NAME = 'sso_users'
AND CONSTRAINT_TYPE = 'FOREIGN KEY'
AND CONSTRAINT_NAME = 'sso_users_ibfk_1'
)
,'ALTER TABLE sso_users DROP FOREIGN KEY `sso_users_ibfk_1`'
,'SELECT "info: FK sso_users_ibfk_1 does not exist."'
) INTO @drop_stmt;
PREPARE drop_stmt FROM @drop_stmt;
EXECUTE drop_stmt;
SELECT if (
EXISTS(
SELECT CONSTRAINT_NAME FROM information_schema.table_constraints
WHERE TABLE_SCHEMA = DATABASE()
AND TABLE_NAME = 'sso_users'
AND CONSTRAINT_TYPE = 'FOREIGN KEY'
AND CONSTRAINT_NAME = '1'
)
,'ALTER TABLE sso_users DROP FOREIGN KEY `1`'
,'SELECT "info: FK sso_users 1 does not exist."'
) INTO @drop_stmt;
PREPARE drop_stmt FROM @drop_stmt;
EXECUTE drop_stmt;
DEALLOCATE PREPARE drop_stmt;
ALTER TABLE sso_users ADD FOREIGN KEY(user_uuid) REFERENCES users(uuid) ON UPDATE CASCADE ON DELETE CASCADE;
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN key_id TEXT;
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
-- DATETIME (not TIMESTAMP) to match this repo's convention for revision_date
-- columns elsewhere, and to avoid MySQL's implicit session-timezone
-- conversion and 2038 range limit on TIMESTAMP.
ALTER TABLE org_policies
ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = UTC_TIMESTAMP();
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
-- A blob-encrypted cipher keeps all of its content in `data`, up to 500,000 characters, so the
-- 64 KiB of TEXT is too small. Like upstream, which uses LONGTEXT.
ALTER TABLE ciphers MODIFY data LONGTEXT NOT NULL;
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
FOREIGN KEY (user_uuid) REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE
);
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN key_id TEXT;
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
-- Backfill via `now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc'` rather than a DEFAULT of now():
-- assigning timestamptz now() into a naive TIMESTAMP column casts through
-- the server's TimeZone GUC, so a DEFAULT now() would store local wall-clock
-- instead of UTC on non-UTC servers, unlike every other naive-UTC timestamp
-- column in this schema.
ALTER TABLE org_policies
ADD COLUMN revision_date TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = (now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc');
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
updated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL
);
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN key_id TEXT;
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
-- SQLite forbids non-constant defaults in ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN, so add
-- the column with a constant placeholder and backfill separately.
ALTER TABLE org_policies
ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP;
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
uuid TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
user_uuid TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL
);
+2 -2
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
This allows running integration tests using [Playwright](https://playwright.dev/).
\
It usse its own [test.env](/test/scenarios/test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.
It uses its own [test.env](./test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.
## Install
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker compose --profile playwright --env-file test.env run Pl
### Keep services running
If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak runnning (states are not impacted by the tests):
If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak running (states are not impacted by the tests):
```bash
PW_KEEP_SERVICE_RUNNING=true npx playwright test
+1 -1
View File
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ services:
Mariadb:
profiles: ["playwright"]
container_name: playwright_mariadb
image: mariadb:11.2.4
image: mariadb:12.2.2
env_file: test.env
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD", "healthcheck.sh", "--connect", "--innodb_initialized"]
+131
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
import { test, expect, type Page, type TestInfo, Test } from '@playwright/test';
import { MailDev } from 'maildev';
import * as utils from "../global-utils";
import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
import { activateTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
let users = utils.loadEnv();
let mailserver;
test.beforeAll('Setup', async ({ browser }, testInfo: TestInfo) => {
mailserver = new MailDev({
port: process.env.MAILDEV_SMTP_PORT,
web: { port: process.env.MAILDEV_HTTP_PORT },
})
await mailserver.listen();
await utils.startVault(browser, testInfo, {
SMTP_HOST: process.env.MAILDEV_HOST,
SMTP_FROM: process.env.PW_SMTP_FROM,
});
});
test.afterAll('Teardown', async ({}) => {
utils.stopVault();
if( mailserver ){
await mailserver.close();
}
});
async function emergencyAccess(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string }) {
await test.step('Navigate', async () => {
await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Emergency access' }).click();
await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Emergency access', { exact: true })).toBeVisible();
});
}
test('Emergency access', async ({ browser, page }) => {
const context2 = await browser.newContext();
const page2 = await context2.newPage();
const mailBuffer = mailserver.buffer(users.user1.email);
const mailBuffer2 = mailserver.buffer(users.user2.email);
await createAccount(test, page, users.user1);
await createAccount(test, page2, users.user2);
await test.step('Add test2', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add emergency contact' }).click();
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email * (required)' }).fill(users.user2.email);
await page.getByRole('radio', { name: 'Takeover Can reset your' }).check();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'User(s) invited');
});
await test.step('Accept', async () => {
const email = await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access for " + users.user1.name);
const pageE = await context2.newPage();
await pageE.setContent(email.html);
const link = await pageE.getByTestId("emergency").getAttribute("href");
await pageE.close();
await page2.goto(link);
await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Invitation accepted');
});
await test.step('Confirm', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Needs confirmation')).toBeVisible();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page, users.user2.name + ' confirmed');
await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access contact for " + users.user1.name + " confirmed");
});
await test.step('Request', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Emergency access requested');
await mailBuffer.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request by " + users.user2.name + " initiated");
});
await test.step('Approved', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access approved');
await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request for " + users.user1.name + " approved");
});
await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
let newPassword = "TotoNewPassword";
await test.step('Access', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Takeover' }).click();
await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'New master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(newPassword);
await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Confirm new master password' }).fill(newPassword);
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Password reset for ' + users.user1.name);
});
await test.step('Changed no 2fa', async () => {
users.user1.password = newPassword;
await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
});
await test.step('Reject', async () => {
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Reject' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access rejected');
await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request to " + users.user1.name + " rejected");
});
await test.step('Remove', async () => {
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Remove' }).click();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Yes' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Removed user ' + users.user2.name);
await expect(page.getByText('You have not added any emergency contacts')).toBeVisible();
});
});
+29 -8
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
import * as utils from "../global-utils";
import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP, recoveryCodes } from './setups/2fa';
let users = utils.loadEnv();
let totp;
@@ -31,21 +31,42 @@ test('Authenticator 2fa', async ({ page }) => {
await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
await test.step('login', async () => {
let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
await logUser(test, page, users.user1, { totp });
await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
});
test('Recovery codes', async ({ context, page }) => {
await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
let recovery = await recoveryCodes(test, page, users.user1);
await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
await test.step('login', async () => {
await page.getByLabel(/Email address/).fill(users.user1.email);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(users.user1.password);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate({timestamp}));
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
await expect(page).toHaveTitle(/Vaultwarden Web/);
});
await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
const newPagePromise = context.waitForEvent('page');
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Use your recovery code' }).click();
const newPage = await newPagePromise;
const tabs = context.pages();
await tabs[1].bringToFront();
await expect(tabs[1].getByRole('heading', { name: 'Recover account two-step login' })).toBeVisible();
await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email address * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.email);
await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.password);
await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Recovery code * (required)' }).fill(recovery);
await tabs[1].getByRole('button', { name: 'Submit' }).click();
await expect(tabs[1]).toHaveTitle(/Two-step login/);
});
});
+6 -1
View File
@@ -127,6 +127,9 @@ test('Organization is visible', async ({ page }) => {
});
test('Recover user password', async ({ page }) => {
await logUser(test, page, users.user2, { mailBuffer: mail2Buffer });
await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user2);
await logUser(test, page, users.user1, { mailBuffer: mail1Buffer });
let newPassword = "TotoNewPassword";
@@ -138,9 +141,10 @@ test('Recover user password', async ({ page }) => {
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Recover account' }).click();
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'New master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(newPassword);
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Confirm new master password * (' }).fill(newPassword);
await page.getByRole('checkbox', { name: 'Reset two-step login' }).check();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Account recovery success');
await mail2Buffer.expect((m) => m.subject.includes('Master Password Has Been Changed'));
await mail2Buffer.expect((m) => m.subject.includes('Admin account recovery from Test organization'));
});
let user2 = {
@@ -150,6 +154,7 @@ test('Recover user password', async ({ page }) => {
};
await logUser(test, page, user2, {
mailBuffer: mail2Buffer,
mail2fa: true,
notNewDevice: true,
});
});
+18 -1
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,24 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
export async function recoveryCodes(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): string {
return await test.step('Recovery code', async () => {
await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Security' }).click();
await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Two-step login' }).click();
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'View recovery code' }).click();
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
const recovery = await page.getByRole('code').innerText();
await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
return recovery;
})
}
export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): OTPAuth.TOTP {
return await test.step('Activate TOTP 2FA', async () => {
await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
@@ -21,7 +39,6 @@ export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string,
await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate());
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Turn on' }).click();
await page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Turned on', exact: true });
await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
return totp;
})
+16 -2
View File
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { expect, type Browser, Page } from '@playwright/test';
import { type MailBuffer } from 'maildev';
import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
import { retrieveEmailCode } from './2fa';
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ export async function logUser(
mailBuffer ?: MailBuffer,
mail2fa?: boolean,
notNewDevice?: boolean,
totp?: OTPAuth.TOTP,
} = {}
) {
await test.step(`Log user ${user.email}`, async () => {
@@ -55,11 +57,23 @@ export async function logUser(
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();
if( options.mail2fa ){
if( options.mail2fa || options.totp ){
let code;
await test.step('2FA check', async () => {
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
let code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
if( options.totp ) {
const totp = options.totp;
let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
code = totp.generate({timestamp});
} else if( options.mail2fa ){
code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
}
await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(code);
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
});
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
[toolchain]
channel = "1.97.1"
channel = "1.99.0"
components = [ "rustfmt", "clippy" ]
profile = "minimal"
+19 -18
View File
@@ -231,7 +231,7 @@ fn validate_token(token: &str) -> bool {
None => false,
Some(t) if t.starts_with("$argon2") => {
use argon2::password_hash::PasswordVerifier;
match argon2::password_hash::PasswordHash::new(t) {
match argon2::password_hash::phc::PasswordHash::new(t) {
Ok(h) => {
// NOTE: hash params from `ADMIN_TOKEN` are used instead of what is configured in the `Argon2` instance.
argon2::Argon2::default().verify_password(token.trim().as_ref(), &h).is_ok()
@@ -425,7 +425,7 @@ async fn delete_user(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyR
for membership in memberships {
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserDeleted as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserDeleted,
&membership.uuid,
&membership.org_uuid,
&ACTING_ADMIN_USER.into(),
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ async fn delete_sso_user(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> Em
for membership in memberships {
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserUnlinkedSso as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserUnlinkedSso,
&membership.uuid,
&membership.org_uuid,
&ACTING_ADMIN_USER.into(),
@@ -508,6 +508,7 @@ async fn enable_user(user_id: UserId, _token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> Empty
async fn remove_2fa(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let mut user = get_user_or_404(&user_id, &conn).await?;
TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
two_factor::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &ACTING_ADMIN_USER.into(), 14, &token.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
user.totp_recover = None;
user.save(&conn).await
@@ -571,7 +572,7 @@ async fn update_membership_type(data: Json<MembershipTypeData>, token: AdminToke
OrgPolicy::check_user_allowed(&member_to_edit, "modify", &conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserUpdated as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserUpdated,
&member_to_edit.uuid,
&data.org_uuid,
&ACTING_ADMIN_USER.into(),
@@ -647,7 +648,7 @@ use cached::macros::cached;
/// Cache this function to prevent API call rate limit. Github only allows 60 requests per hour, and we use 3 here already
/// It will cache this function for 600 seconds (10 minutes) which should prevent the exhaustion of the rate limit
/// Any cache will be lost if Vaultwarden is restarted
#[cached(ttl = 600, sync_writes = "default")]
#[cached(ttl_secs = 600, sync_writes = "default")]
async fn get_release_info(has_http_access: bool) -> (String, String, String) {
// If the HTTP Check failed, do not even attempt to check for new versions since we were not able to connect with github.com anyway.
if has_http_access {
@@ -905,23 +906,23 @@ mod tests {
fn validate_web_vault_compare() {
// web_vault_compare(active, latest)
// Test normal versions
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0", "2025.12.1") == -1);
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1", "2025.12.1") == 0);
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2", "2025.12.1") == 1);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0", "2025.12.1"), -1);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1", "2025.12.1"), 0);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2", "2025.12.1"), 1);
// Test patched/+build.n versions
// Newer latest version
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0+build.1", "2025.12.1") == -1);
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1", "2025.12.1+build.1") == -1);
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1") == -1);
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.2") == -1);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0+build.1", "2025.12.1"), -1);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1", "2025.12.1+build.1"), -1);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1"), -1);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.2"), -1);
// Equal versions
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1") == 0);
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2+build.2", "2025.12.2+build.2") == 0);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1"), 0);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2+build.2", "2025.12.2+build.2"), 0);
// Newer active version
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1") == 1);
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2", "2025.12.1+build.1") == 1);
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1") == 1);
assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.3", "2025.12.1+build.2") == 1);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1"), 1);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2", "2025.12.1+build.1"), 1);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1"), 1);
assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.3", "2025.12.1+build.2"), 1);
}
}
+666 -164
View File
File diff suppressed because it is too large. Load diff
+275 -107
View File
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use rocket::{
Route,
form::{Form, FromForm},
fs::TempFile,
http::Status,
serde::json::Json,
};
use serde_json::Value;
@@ -21,14 +22,15 @@ use crate::{
DbConn, DbPool,
models::{
Archive, Attachment, AttachmentId, Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup,
CollectionId, CollectionUser, EventType, Favorite, Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId, Group, Membership,
MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, UserId,
CollectionId, CollectionUser, EventType, Favorite, Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId, Group, KeyId,
Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, User, UserId,
is_data_blob_encrypted,
},
},
util::{NumberOrString, deser_opt_nonempty_str, save_temp_file},
};
use super::folders::FolderData;
use super::{folders::FolderData, sends::SIZE_525_MB};
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
// Note that many routes have an `admin` variant; this seems to be
@@ -161,13 +163,19 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
let policies_json: Vec<Value> =
OrgPolicy::find_confirmed_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await.iter().map(OrgPolicy::to_json).collect();
let policies_new_json: Vec<Value> = OrgPolicy::find_accepted_and_confirmed_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn)
.await
.iter()
.map(OrgPolicy::to_json)
.collect();
let domains_json = if data.exclude_domains {
Value::Null
} else {
api::core::get_eq_domains(&headers, true).into_inner()
};
// This is very similar to the the userDecryptionOptions sent in connect/token,
// This is very similar to the userDecryptionOptions sent in connect/token,
// but as of 2025-12-19 they're both using different casing conventions.
let has_master_password = !headers.user.password_hash.is_empty();
let master_password_unlock = if has_master_password {
@@ -182,23 +190,29 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
// https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
"masterKeyEncryptedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
"masterKeyWrappedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
"salt": headers.user.email
"salt": headers.user.email,
"containedKeyId": headers.user.key_id,
})
} else {
Value::Null
};
// Upstream omits these when unset rather than sending null
let mut user_decryption = json!({ "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock });
if let Some(key_id) = &headers.user.key_id {
user_decryption["userKeyId"] = json!(key_id);
}
Ok(Json(json!({
"profile": user_json,
"folders": folders_json,
"collections": collections_json,
"policies": policies_json,
"policiesNew": policies_new_json,
"ciphers": ciphers_json,
"domains": domains_json,
"sends": sends_json,
"userDecryption": {
"masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock,
},
"userDecryption": user_decryption,
"object": "sync"
})))
}
@@ -260,15 +274,24 @@ pub struct CipherData {
key: Option<String>,
// Added in web-v2025.6.0. Deprecated upstream for `encrypted_by_key_id`, but still checked when sent
pub encrypted_for: Option<UserId>,
// Added in web-v2025.8.1, Optional for compat
pub encrypted_by_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
/*
Login = 1,
SecureNote = 2,
Card = 3,
Identity = 4,
SshKey = 5
BankAccount = 6
DriversLicense = 7
Passport = 8
*/
pub r#type: i32,
pub name: String,
// Absent on a blob-encrypted cipher, whose name is sealed inside `data`
pub name: Option<String>,
pub notes: Option<String>,
fields: Option<Value>,
@@ -278,6 +301,12 @@ pub struct CipherData {
card: Option<Value>,
identity: Option<Value>,
ssh_key: Option<Value>,
bank_account: Option<Value>,
drivers_license: Option<Value>,
passport: Option<Value>,
// The sealed blob of a v2 account's cipher, which replaces all of the fields above
data: Option<String>,
favorite: Option<bool>,
reprompt: Option<i32>,
@@ -300,6 +329,79 @@ pub struct CipherData {
archived_date: Option<String>,
}
/// A field of a [`CipherData`] that fails upstream's model validation.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct CipherValidationError {
pub field: &'static str,
pub message: String,
}
impl From<CipherValidationError> for crate::Error {
fn from(e: CipherValidationError) -> Self {
Self::new_msg(e.message)
}
}
/// The cipher must have been encrypted for the acting user. Only checked when the client sends the field.
///
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1857-L1870>
fn validate_encrypted_for_user(data: &CipherData, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
if data.encrypted_for.as_ref().is_some_and(|encrypted_for| encrypted_for != user_id) {
err!("Cipher was not encrypted for the current user. Please try again.")
}
Ok(())
}
/// [`validate_encrypted_for_user`], plus the key id of a user-owned cipher, when both ids are known.
///
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1886-L1911>
fn validate_encrypted_by_user(data: &CipherData, user: &User, is_org_cipher: bool) -> EmptyResult {
validate_encrypted_for_user(data, &user.uuid)?;
if !is_org_cipher
&& let (Some(cipher_key_id), Some(user_key_id)) = (&data.encrypted_by_key_id, &user.key_id)
&& cipher_key_id != user_key_id
{
err!("Cipher was not encrypted with the current user key. Please try again.")
}
Ok(())
}
/// Upstream's `[StringLength(500000)]` on `CipherRequestModel.Data`
const MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH: usize = 500_000;
impl CipherData {
/// Whether `data` is a blob rather than the per-type fields. Parses `data`, so keep the result.
pub fn is_blob(&self) -> bool {
self.data.as_deref().is_some_and(is_data_blob_encrypted)
}
/// Upstream's model checks that depend on the format: the size of `data`, and a name unless it's a blob.
///
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L76-L77>
/// and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L91-L99>
pub fn validate_content(&self, is_blob: bool) -> Result<(), CipherValidationError> {
if let Some(data) = &self.data
&& data.len() > MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH
{
return Err(CipherValidationError {
field: "Data",
message: format!("The field Data must be a string with a maximum length of {MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH}."),
});
}
// A blob carries the name inside it, so only the other formats need one
if !is_blob && self.name.as_deref().is_none_or(|n| n.trim().is_empty()) {
return Err(CipherValidationError {
field: "Name",
message: String::from("The Name field is required."),
});
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct PartialCipherData {
@@ -333,12 +435,14 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create(
) -> JsonResult {
let mut data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();
validate_encrypted_by_user(&data.cipher, &headers.user, data.cipher.organization_id.is_some())?;
// This check is usually only needed in update_cipher_from_data(), but we
// need it here as well to avoid creating an empty cipher in the call to
// cipher.save() below.
enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data.cipher), &headers, &conn).await?;
let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, data.cipher.name.clone());
let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type);
cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone());
cipher.save(&conn).await?;
@@ -362,13 +466,15 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create(
async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> JsonResult {
let mut data: CipherData = data.into_inner();
validate_encrypted_by_user(&data, &headers.user, data.organization_id.is_some())?;
// The web/browser clients set this field to null as expected, but the
// mobile clients seem to set the invalid value `0001-01-01T00:00:00`,
// which results in a warning message being logged. This field isn't
// needed when creating a new cipher, so just ignore it unconditionally.
data.last_known_revision_date = None;
let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, data.name.clone());
let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type);
update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate).await?;
Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -392,6 +498,44 @@ async fn enforce_personal_ownership_policy(data: Option<&CipherData>, headers: &
Ok(())
}
/// The checks of saving a cipher, for callers that run them before writing anything else
async fn validate_cipher_update(
cipher: &Cipher,
data: &CipherData,
headers: &Headers,
conn: &DbConn,
ut: UpdateType,
) -> EmptyResult {
// Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data.
// And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail.
if ut != UpdateType::None
&& let Some(dt) = &data.last_known_revision_date
{
match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(dt, "%+") {
// ISO 8601 format
Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing LastKnownRevisionDate '{dt}': {err}"),
Ok(dt) if cipher.updated_at.signed_duration_since(dt).num_seconds() > 1 => {
err!("The client copy of this cipher is out of date. Resync the client and try again.")
}
Ok(_) => (),
}
}
if let Some(note) = &data.notes {
let max_note_size = CONFIG._max_note_size();
if note.len() > max_note_size {
err!(format!("The field Notes exceeds the maximum encrypted value length of {max_note_size} characters."))
}
}
if let Some(folder_id) = &data.folder_id
&& Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await.is_none()
{
err!("Invalid folder", "Folder does not exist or belongs to another user");
}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
cipher: &mut Cipher,
data: CipherData,
@@ -407,42 +551,24 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
// We do not mind which data is in it, the keep our model more flexible when there are upstream changes.
// But, we at least know we do not need to store and return this specific key.
fn clean_cipher_data(mut json_data: Value) -> Value {
if json_data.is_array() {
json_data.as_array_mut().unwrap().iter_mut().for_each(|ref mut f| {
f.as_object_mut().unwrap().remove("response");
});
if let Some(items) = json_data.as_array_mut() {
for item in items.iter_mut().filter_map(Value::as_object_mut) {
item.remove("response");
}
}
json_data
}
enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data), headers, conn).await?;
// Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data.
// And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail.
if ut != UpdateType::None
&& let Some(dt) = data.last_known_revision_date
{
match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(&dt, "%+") {
// ISO 8601 format
Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing LastKnownRevisionDate '{dt}': {err}"),
Ok(dt) if cipher.updated_at.signed_duration_since(dt).num_seconds() > 1 => {
err!("The client copy of this cipher is out of date. Resync the client and try again.")
}
Ok(_) => (),
}
}
let is_blob = data.is_blob();
data.validate_content(is_blob)?;
validate_cipher_update(cipher, &data, headers, conn, ut).await?;
if cipher.organization_uuid.is_some() && cipher.organization_uuid != data.organization_id {
err!("Organization mismatch. Please resync the client before updating the cipher")
}
if let Some(note) = &data.notes {
let max_note_size = CONFIG._max_note_size();
if note.len() > max_note_size {
err!(format!("The field Notes exceeds the maximum encrypted value length of {max_note_size} characters."))
}
}
// Check if this cipher is being transferred from a personal to an organization vault
let transfer_cipher = cipher.organization_uuid.is_none() && data.organization_id.is_some();
@@ -452,9 +578,10 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
Some(member) => {
// A non-empty list of collections implies the caller already validated the user's write
// access to them, so we can move the cipher into the organization on that basis.
// Write access to the cipher itself only counts when it already belongs to this organization.
if shared_to_collections.as_ref().is_some_and(|cols| !cols.is_empty())
|| member.has_full_access()
|| cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, conn).await
|| (!transfer_cipher && cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, conn).await)
{
cipher.organization_uuid = Some(org_id);
// After some discussion in PR #1329 re-added the user_uuid = None again.
@@ -472,12 +599,6 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone());
}
if let Some(ref folder_id) = data.folder_id
&& Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await.is_none()
{
err!("Invalid folder", "Folder does not exist or belongs to another user");
}
// Modify attachments name and keys when rotating
if let Some(attachments) = data.attachments2 {
for (id, attachment) in attachments {
@@ -510,38 +631,54 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
3 => data.card,
4 => data.identity,
5 => data.ssh_key,
6 => data.bank_account,
7 => data.drivers_license,
8 => data.passport,
_ => err!("Invalid type"),
};
let type_data = if let Some(mut data) = type_data_opt {
// Remove the 'Response' key from the base object.
data.as_object_mut().unwrap().remove("response");
// Remove the 'Response' key from every Uri.
if data["uris"].is_array() {
data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(data["uris"].clone());
}
data
if let Some(blob) = data.data.filter(|_| is_blob) {
// A blob holds everything, the name included; the column can't be null, so it's left empty
// TODO: Make `ciphers.name` nullable and store `None` here instead.
cipher.name = String::new();
cipher.notes = None;
cipher.fields = None;
cipher.password_history = None;
cipher.data = blob;
} else {
err!("Data missing")
};
let Some(mut type_data) = type_data_opt else {
err!("Data missing")
};
// Remove the 'Response' key from the base object.
if let Some(data_obj) = type_data.as_object_mut() {
data_obj.remove("response");
}
// Remove the 'Response' key from every Uri.
if type_data["uris"].is_array() {
type_data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(type_data["uris"].clone());
}
// `validate_content` made sure there is a name
cipher.name = data.name.unwrap_or_default();
cipher.notes = data.notes;
cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
}
cipher.key = data.key;
cipher.name = data.name;
cipher.notes = data.notes;
cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
cipher.reprompt = data.reprompt.filter(|r| *r == RepromptType::None as i32 || *r == RepromptType::Password as i32);
cipher.save(conn).await?;
cipher.move_to_folder(data.folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await?;
cipher.set_favorite(data.favorite, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await?;
if let Some(dt_str) = data.archived_date {
match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(&dt_str, "%+") {
match data.archived_date {
Some(dt_str) => match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(&dt_str, "%+") {
Ok(dt) => cipher.set_archived_at(dt, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await?,
Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing ArchivedDate '{dt_str}': {err}"),
}
},
None => cipher.unarchive(&headers.user.uuid, conn).await?,
}
if ut != UpdateType::None {
@@ -553,16 +690,8 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
(_, _) => EventType::CipherUpdated,
};
log_event(
event_type as i32,
&cipher.uuid,
org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
headers.device.atype,
&headers.ip.ip,
conn,
)
.await;
log_event(event_type, &cipher.uuid, org_id, &headers.user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn)
.await;
}
nt.send_cipher_update(
ut,
@@ -634,7 +763,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers_import(data: Json<ImportData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
let folder_id = relations_map.get(&index).and_then(|i| folders.get(*i).cloned());
cipher_data.folder_id = folder_id;
let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type);
update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?;
}
@@ -702,6 +831,9 @@ async fn put_cipher(
err!("Cipher is not write accessible")
}
// Against the cipher we hold rather than the organization the client claims, like upstream
validate_encrypted_by_user(&data, &headers.user, cipher.organization_uuid.is_some())?;
update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate).await?;
Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -850,7 +982,7 @@ async fn post_collections_update(
.await;
log_event(
EventType::CipherUpdatedCollections as i32,
EventType::CipherUpdatedCollections,
&cipher.uuid,
org_uuid,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -930,7 +1062,7 @@ async fn post_collections_admin(
.await;
log_event(
EventType::CipherUpdatedCollections as i32,
EventType::CipherUpdatedCollections,
&cipher.uuid,
org_uuid,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -960,9 +1092,7 @@ async fn post_cipher_share(
conn: DbConn,
nt: Notify<'_>,
) -> JsonResult {
let data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();
share_cipher_by_uuid(&cipher_id, data, &headers, &conn, &nt, None).await
put_cipher_share(cipher_id, data, headers, conn, nt).await
}
#[put("/ciphers/<cipher_id>/share", data = "<data>")]
@@ -975,6 +1105,21 @@ async fn put_cipher_share(
) -> JsonResult {
let data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();
// Upstream's `PutShare` checks, before anything is written.
// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L899-L912>
// and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L498-L519>
if data.cipher.organization_id.is_none() {
err!("Cipher OrganizationId is required.")
}
if data.collection_ids.is_empty() {
err!("You must select at least one collection.")
}
if !Cipher::find_by_uuid(&cipher_id, &conn).await.is_some_and(|c| c.user_uuid.as_ref() == Some(&headers.user.uuid))
{
err_code!("Cipher doesn't exist", Status::NotFound.code)
}
validate_encrypted_for_user(&data.cipher, &headers.user.uuid)?;
share_cipher_by_uuid(&cipher_id, data, &headers, &conn, &nt, None).await
}
@@ -994,18 +1139,33 @@ async fn put_cipher_share_selected(
) -> EmptyResult {
let mut data: ShareSelectedCipherData = data.into_inner();
// Upstream's `PutShareMany` checks, before anything is written.
// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1395-L1421>
// and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L560-L604>
if data.ciphers.is_empty() {
err!("You must select at least one cipher.")
}
if data.ciphers.iter().any(|c| c.id.is_none() || c.organization_id.is_none()) {
err!("All Ciphers must have an Id and OrganizationId.")
}
if data.ciphers.iter().map(|c| &c.organization_id).collect::<HashSet<_>>().len() != 1 {
err!("All ciphers must be for the same organization.")
}
if data.collection_ids.is_empty() {
err!("You must select at least one collection.")
}
for cipher in &data.ciphers {
if cipher.id.is_none() {
err!("Request missing ids field")
}
cipher.validate_content(cipher.is_blob())?;
}
for cipher in &data.ciphers {
validate_encrypted_for_user(cipher, &headers.user.uuid)?;
}
let owned_ciphers = Cipher::find_owned_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await;
for cipher_data in &data.ciphers {
let Some(cipher) = owned_ciphers.iter().find(|c| cipher_data.id.as_ref() == Some(&c.uuid)) else {
err!("Trying to share ciphers that you do not own.")
};
validate_cipher_update(cipher, cipher_data, &headers, &conn, UpdateType::None).await?;
}
while let Some(cipher) = data.ciphers.pop() {
@@ -1052,6 +1212,20 @@ async fn share_cipher_by_uuid(
err!("Organization mismatch. Please resync the client before updating the cipher")
}
// When LastKnownRevisionDate is None, it is a new cipher, so send CipherCreate.
// If there is an override, like when handling multiple items, we want to prevent a push notification for every single item
let ut = if let Some(ut) = override_ut {
ut
} else if data.cipher.last_known_revision_date.is_some() {
UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate
} else {
UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate
};
// For the same reason, the other checks of saving
data.cipher.validate_content(data.cipher.is_blob())?;
validate_cipher_update(&cipher, &data.cipher, headers, conn, ut).await?;
let mut shared_to_collections = vec![];
if let Some(organization_id) = &data.cipher.organization_id {
@@ -1070,16 +1244,6 @@ async fn share_cipher_by_uuid(
}
}
// When LastKnownRevisionDate is None, it is a new cipher, so send CipherCreate.
// If there is an override, like when handling multiple items, we want to prevent a push notification for every single item
let ut = if let Some(ut) = override_ut {
ut
} else if data.cipher.last_known_revision_date.is_some() {
UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate
} else {
UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate
};
update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data.cipher, headers, Some(shared_to_collections), conn, nt, ut).await?;
Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, conn).await?))
@@ -1152,6 +1316,10 @@ async fn post_attachment_v2(
if file_size < 0 {
err!("Attachment size can't be negative")
}
// Matches the "file" upload limit in main.rs, nothing larger can be uploaded
if file_size > SIZE_525_MB {
err!("Max file size is 525 MB.")
}
let attachment_id = crypto::generate_attachment_id();
let attachment =
Attachment::new(attachment_id.clone(), cipher.uuid.clone(), data.file_name, file_size, Some(data.key));
@@ -1335,7 +1503,7 @@ async fn save_attachment(
if let Some(org_id) = &cipher.organization_uuid {
log_event(
EventType::CipherAttachmentCreated as i32,
EventType::CipherAttachmentCreated,
&cipher.uuid,
org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -1696,7 +1864,7 @@ async fn purge_org_vault(
nt.send_user_update(UpdateType::SyncVault, &user, headers.device.push_uuid.as_ref(), &conn).await;
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationPurgedVault as i32,
EventType::OrganizationPurgedVault,
&organization.org_id,
&organization.org_id,
&user.uuid,
@@ -1824,9 +1992,9 @@ async fn delete_cipher_by_uuid(
let event_type = if *delete_options == CipherDeleteOptions::SoftSingle
|| *delete_options == CipherDeleteOptions::SoftMulti
{
EventType::CipherSoftDeleted as i32
EventType::CipherSoftDeleted
} else {
EventType::CipherDeleted as i32
EventType::CipherDeleted
};
log_event(event_type, &cipher.uuid, &org_id, &headers.user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn)
@@ -1839,7 +2007,7 @@ async fn delete_cipher_by_uuid(
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct CipherIdsData {
ids: Vec<CipherId>,
ids: HashSet<CipherId>,
}
async fn delete_multiple_ciphers(
@@ -1895,7 +2063,7 @@ async fn restore_cipher_by_uuid(
if let Some(org_id) = &cipher.organization_uuid {
log_event(
EventType::CipherRestored as i32,
EventType::CipherRestored,
&cipher.uuid.clone(),
org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -1972,7 +2140,7 @@ async fn delete_cipher_attachment_by_id(
if let Some(ref org_id) = cipher.organization_uuid {
log_event(
EventType::CipherAttachmentDeleted as i32,
EventType::CipherAttachmentDeleted,
&cipher.uuid,
org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -2150,8 +2318,15 @@ impl CipherSyncData {
}
}
// Generate a HashMap with the Organization UUID as key and the Membership record
let members: HashMap<OrganizationId, Membership> = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(user_id, conn)
.await
.into_iter()
.map(|m| (m.org_uuid.clone(), m))
.collect();
// Generate a list of Cipher UUID's containing a Vec with one or more Attachment records
let orgs = Membership::get_orgs_by_user(user_id, conn).await;
let orgs: Vec<OrganizationId> = members.keys().cloned().collect();
let attachments = Attachment::find_all_by_user_and_orgs(user_id, &orgs, conn).await;
let mut cipher_attachments: HashMap<CipherId, Vec<Attachment>> = HashMap::with_capacity(attachments.len());
for attachment in attachments {
@@ -2166,13 +2341,6 @@ impl CipherSyncData {
cipher_collections.entry(cipher).or_default().push(collection);
}
// Generate a HashMap with the Organization UUID as key and the Membership record
let members: HashMap<OrganizationId, Membership> = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(user_id, conn)
.await
.into_iter()
.map(|m| (m.org_uuid.clone(), m))
.collect();
// Generate a HashMap with the User_Collections UUID as key and the CollectionUser record
let user_collections: HashMap<CollectionId, CollectionUser> = CollectionUser::find_by_user(user_id, conn)
.await
+29 -7
View File
@@ -6,7 +6,10 @@ use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult,
core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType},
core::{
CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType,
accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData},
},
},
auth::{Headers, decode_emergency_access_invite},
db::{
@@ -225,7 +228,7 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
let (grantee_user, new_user) = match User::find_by_mail(&email, &conn).await {
None => {
if !CONFIG.invitations_allowed() {
err!(format!("Grantee user does not exist: {email}"))
err!(format!("Grantee user does not exist: {}", email.escape_debug()))
}
if !CONFIG.is_email_domain_allowed(&email) {
@@ -615,6 +618,7 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
"kdfMemory": grantor_user.client_kdf_memory,
"kdfParallelism": grantor_user.client_kdf_parallelism,
"keyEncrypted": &emergency_access.key_encrypted,
"salt": grantor_user.master_password_salt(),
"object": "emergencyAccessTakeover",
});
@@ -624,8 +628,13 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct EmergencyAccessPasswordData {
new_master_password_hash: String,
key: String,
// Legacy payload
new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
key: Option<String>,
// Current payload
authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
}
#[post("/emergency-access/<emer_id>/password", data = "<data>")]
@@ -638,8 +647,6 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
check_emergency_access_enabled()?;
let data: EmergencyAccessPasswordData = data.into_inner();
let new_master_password_hash = &data.new_master_password_hash;
//let key = &data.Key;
let requesting_user = headers.user;
let Some(emergency_access) =
@@ -656,8 +663,23 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
err!("Grantor user not found.")
};
let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) =
if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) = (data.authentication_data, data.unlock_data) {
authentication_data.check(&grantor_user, &unlock_data)?;
if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&grantor_user) {
err!("KDF settings do not match the grantor account")
}
(authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
} else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (data.new_master_password_hash, data.key) {
(new_master_password_hash, new_key)
} else {
err!("Invalid request!")
};
// change grantor_user password
grantor_user.set_password(new_master_password_hash, Some(data.key), true, None, &conn).await?;
grantor_user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
grantor_user.save(&conn).await?;
// Disable TwoFactor providers since they will otherwise block logins
+45 -28
View File
@@ -6,12 +6,13 @@ use serde_json::Value;
use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult},
api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult},
auth::{AdminHeaders, Headers},
db::{
DbConn, DbPool,
models::{Cipher, CipherId, Event, Membership, MembershipId, OrganizationId, UserId},
models::{Cipher, CipherId, Event, EventType, Membership, MembershipId, OrganizationId, UserId},
},
error::MapResult,
util::parse_date,
};
@@ -29,6 +30,14 @@ struct EventRange {
continuation_token: Option<String>,
}
impl EventRange {
fn date_range(&self) -> ApiResult<(NaiveDateTime, NaiveDateTime)> {
let start_date = parse_date(&self.start).map_res("Invalid start date")?;
let end_date = parse_date(self.continuation_token.as_ref().unwrap_or(&self.end)).map_res("Invalid end date")?;
Ok((start_date, end_date))
}
}
// Upstream: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/AdminConsole/Controllers/EventsController.cs#L87
#[get("/organizations/<org_id>/events?<data..>")]
async fn get_org_events(org_id: OrganizationId, data: EventRange, headers: AdminHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
@@ -39,12 +48,7 @@ async fn get_org_events(org_id: OrganizationId, data: EventRange, headers: Admin
// Return an empty vec when we org events are disabled.
// This prevents client errors
let events_json: Vec<Value> = if CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
let start_date = parse_date(&data.start);
let end_date = if let Some(before_date) = &data.continuation_token {
parse_date(before_date)
} else {
parse_date(&data.end)
};
let (start_date, end_date) = data.date_range()?;
Event::find_by_organization_uuid(&org_id, &start_date, &end_date, &conn)
.await
@@ -69,12 +73,7 @@ async fn get_cipher_events(cipher_id: CipherId, data: EventRange, headers: Heade
let events_json: Vec<Value> = if CONFIG.org_events_enabled()
&& Membership::user_has_ge_admin_access_to_cipher(&headers.user.uuid, &cipher_id, &conn).await
{
let start_date = parse_date(&data.start);
let end_date = if let Some(before_date) = &data.continuation_token {
parse_date(before_date)
} else {
parse_date(&data.end)
};
let (start_date, end_date) = data.date_range()?;
Event::find_by_cipher_uuid(&cipher_id, &start_date, &end_date, &conn).await.iter().map(Event::to_json).collect()
} else {
@@ -102,12 +101,7 @@ async fn get_user_events(
// Return an empty vec when we org events are disabled.
// This prevents client errors
let events_json: Vec<Value> = if CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
let start_date = parse_date(&data.start);
let end_date = if let Some(before_date) = &data.continuation_token {
parse_date(before_date)
} else {
parse_date(&data.end)
};
let (start_date, end_date) = data.date_range()?;
Event::find_by_org_and_member(&org_id, &member_id, &start_date, &end_date, &conn)
.await
@@ -168,9 +162,10 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
}
for event in data.iter() {
let event_date = parse_date(&event.date);
let event_date = parse_date(&event.date).map_res("Invalid event date")?;
// Only the event types upstream accepts from clients, the rest are written server-side.
match event.r#type {
1000..=1099 => {
t if t == EventType::UserClientExportedVault as i32 => {
log_user_event_impl(
event.r#type,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -181,7 +176,7 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
)
.await;
}
1600..=1699 => {
t if t == EventType::OrganizationClientExportedVault as i32 => {
// Only allow logging events for an organization the user is actually a member of.
if let Some(org_id) = &event.organization_id
&& Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(&headers.user.uuid, org_id, &conn).await.is_some()
@@ -199,7 +194,28 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
.await;
}
}
_ => {
// Only the vault notification banner click is accepted from clients. The rest of
// the 1500..=1599 range is written server-side and must not be forgeable by a client.
t if t == EventType::OrganizationUserNotificationBannerActionClicked as i32 => {
if let Some(org_id) = &event.organization_id
&& let Some(membership) =
Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(&headers.user.uuid, org_id, &conn).await
{
log_event_impl(
event.r#type,
&membership.uuid,
org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
headers.device.atype,
Some(event_date),
&headers.ip.ip,
&conn,
)
.await;
}
}
// Client-side cipher events (viewed, copied, toggled, autofilled).
1107..=1114 | 1117 | 1119..=1132 => {
// The cipher determines the organization the event is logged to, so make sure the
// user can actually access it instead of trusting the provided cipher uuid.
if let Some(cipher_uuid) = &event.cipher_id
@@ -220,16 +236,17 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
.await;
}
}
_ => {}
}
}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: i32, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: EventType, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
if !CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
return;
}
log_user_event_impl(event_type, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
log_user_event_impl(event_type as i32, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
}
async fn log_user_event_impl(
@@ -267,7 +284,7 @@ async fn log_user_event_impl(
}
pub async fn log_event(
event_type: i32,
event_type: EventType,
source_uuid: &str,
org_id: &OrganizationId,
act_user_id: &UserId,
@@ -278,7 +295,7 @@ pub async fn log_event(
if !CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
return;
}
log_event_impl(event_type, source_uuid, org_id, act_user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
log_event_impl(event_type as i32, source_uuid, org_id, act_user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
}
#[expect(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
+185 -288
View File
@@ -1,23 +1,24 @@
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
use rocket::{Route, http::Status, serde::json::Json};
use serde_json::Value;
use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::admin::FAKE_ADMIN_UUID,
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType, accept_org_invite, log_event, two_factor},
},
auth::{AdminHeaders, Headers, ManagerHeaders, ManagerHeadersLoose, OrgMemberHeaders, OwnerHeaders, decode_invite},
db::{
DbConn,
models::{
Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup, CollectionId, CollectionUser, EventType,
Group, GroupId, GroupUser, Invitation, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType,
OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationApiKey, OrganizationId, User, UserId,
Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup, CollectionId, CollectionUser, Device,
EventType, Group, GroupId, GroupUser, Invitation, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus,
MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationApiKey, OrganizationId, TwoFactor,
TwoFactorType, User, UserId,
},
},
mail,
@@ -25,12 +26,13 @@ use crate::{
util::{NumberOrString, convert_json_key_lcase_first},
};
use super::accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData};
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![
get_organization,
create_organization,
delete_organization,
post_delete_organization,
leave_organization,
get_user_collections,
get_org_collections,
@@ -38,13 +40,10 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
get_org_collection_detail,
get_collection_users,
put_organization,
post_organization,
post_organization_collections,
post_bulk_access_collections,
post_organization_collection_update,
put_organization_collection_update,
delete_organization_collection,
post_organization_collection_delete,
bulk_delete_organization_collections,
post_bulk_collections,
get_org_details,
@@ -59,7 +58,6 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
get_org_user_mini_details,
get_user,
edit_member,
put_member,
delete_member,
bulk_delete_member,
post_org_import,
@@ -69,7 +67,6 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
get_master_password_policy,
get_policy,
put_policy,
put_policy_vnext,
get_plans,
post_org_keys,
get_organization_keys,
@@ -85,22 +82,16 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
post_groups,
get_group,
put_group,
post_group,
get_group_details,
delete_group,
post_delete_group,
bulk_delete_groups,
get_group_members,
put_group_members,
post_delete_group_member,
put_reset_password_enrollment,
get_reset_password_details,
put_reset_password,
put_recover_account,
get_org_export,
post_api_key,
rotate_api_key,
get_billing_metadata,
get_billing_warnings,
get_auto_enroll_status,
get_self_host_billing_metadata,
@@ -132,7 +123,6 @@ struct FullCollectionData {
name: String,
groups: Vec<CollectionGroupData>,
users: Vec<CollectionMembershipData>,
id: Option<CollectionId>,
external_id: Option<String>,
}
@@ -245,16 +235,6 @@ async fn delete_organization(
}
}
#[post("/organizations/<org_id>/delete", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_delete_organization(
org_id: OrganizationId,
data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>,
headers: OwnerHeaders,
conn: DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
delete_organization(org_id, data, headers, conn).await
}
#[post("/organizations/<org_id>/leave")]
async fn leave_organization(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
if headers.membership.status != MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32 {
@@ -269,7 +249,7 @@ async fn leave_organization(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberHeaders, c
}
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserLeft as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserLeft,
&membership.uuid,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -300,16 +280,6 @@ async fn put_organization(
headers: OwnerHeaders,
data: Json<OrganizationUpdateData>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
post_organization(org_id, headers, data, conn).await
}
#[post("/organizations/<org_id>", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_organization(
org_id: OrganizationId,
headers: OwnerHeaders,
data: Json<OrganizationUpdateData>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
if org_id != headers.org_id {
err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
@@ -327,7 +297,7 @@ async fn post_organization(
org.save(&conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUpdated as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUpdated,
org_id.as_ref(),
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -391,7 +361,7 @@ async fn get_org_collections(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: ManagerHeadersLoos
}
if !headers.membership.has_full_access() {
err_code!("Resource not found.", "User does not have full access", rocket::http::Status::NotFound.code);
err_code!("Resource not found.", "User does not have full access", Status::NotFound.code);
}
Ok(Json(json!({
@@ -415,8 +385,9 @@ async fn get_org_collections_details(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: ManagerHea
let col_users = CollectionUser::find_by_organization_swap_user_uuid_with_member_uuid(&org_id, &conn).await;
// Generate a HashMap to get the correct MembershipType per user to determine the manage permission
// We use the uuid instead of the user_uuid here, since that is what is used in CollectionUser
// This lists other members for admins, so it must not depend on the membership status
let membership_type: HashMap<MembershipId, i32> =
Membership::find_confirmed_by_org(&org_id, &conn).await.into_iter().map(|m| (m.uuid, m.atype)).collect();
Membership::find_by_org(&org_id, &conn).await.into_iter().map(|m| (m.uuid, m.atype)).collect();
// check if current user has full access to the organization (either directly or via any group)
let has_full_access_to_org = member.has_full_access()
@@ -514,7 +485,7 @@ async fn post_organization_collections(
collection.save(&conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::CollectionCreated as i32,
EventType::CollectionCreated,
&collection.uuid,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -597,7 +568,7 @@ async fn post_bulk_access_collections(
collection.save(&conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::CollectionUpdated as i32,
EventType::CollectionUpdated,
&collection.uuid,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -639,17 +610,6 @@ async fn put_organization_collection_update(
headers: ManagerHeaders,
data: Json<FullCollectionData>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
post_organization_collection_update(org_id, col_id, headers, data, conn).await
}
#[post("/organizations/<org_id>/collections/<col_id>", data = "<data>", rank = 2)]
async fn post_organization_collection_update(
org_id: OrganizationId,
col_id: CollectionId,
headers: ManagerHeaders,
data: Json<FullCollectionData>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
if org_id != headers.org_id {
err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
@@ -674,7 +634,7 @@ async fn post_organization_collection_update(
collection.save(&conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::CollectionUpdated as i32,
EventType::CollectionUpdated,
&collection.uuid,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -723,7 +683,7 @@ async fn delete_organization_collection_impl(
err!("Collection not found", "Collection does not exist or does not belong to this organization")
};
log_event(
EventType::CollectionDeleted as i32,
EventType::CollectionDeleted,
&collection.uuid,
org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -745,16 +705,6 @@ async fn delete_organization_collection(
delete_organization_collection_impl(&org_id, &col_id, &headers, &conn).await
}
#[post("/organizations/<org_id>/collections/<col_id>/delete")]
async fn post_organization_collection_delete(
org_id: OrganizationId,
col_id: CollectionId,
headers: ManagerHeaders,
conn: DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
delete_organization_collection_impl(&org_id, &col_id, &headers, &conn).await
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct BulkCollectionIds {
@@ -818,11 +768,9 @@ async fn get_org_collection_detail(
// Generate a HashMap to get the correct MembershipType per user to determine the manage permission
// We use the uuid instead of the user_uuid here, since that is what is used in CollectionUser
let membership_type: HashMap<MembershipId, i32> = Membership::find_confirmed_by_org(&org_id, &conn)
.await
.into_iter()
.map(|m| (m.uuid, m.atype))
.collect();
// This lists other members for admins, so it must not depend on the membership status
let membership_type: HashMap<MembershipId, i32> =
Membership::find_by_org(&org_id, &conn).await.into_iter().map(|m| (m.uuid, m.atype)).collect();
let users: Vec<Value> =
CollectionUser::find_by_org_and_coll_swap_user_uuid_with_member_uuid(&org_id, &collection.uuid, &conn)
@@ -887,11 +835,11 @@ struct OrgIdData {
#[get("/ciphers/organization-details?<data..>")]
async fn get_org_details(data: OrgIdData, headers: ManagerHeadersLoose, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
if data.organization_id != headers.membership.org_uuid {
err_code!("Resource not found.", "Organization id's do not match", rocket::http::Status::NotFound.code);
err_code!("Resource not found.", "Organization id's do not match", Status::NotFound.code);
}
if !headers.membership.has_full_access() {
err_code!("Resource not found.", "User does not have full access", rocket::http::Status::NotFound.code);
err_code!("Resource not found.", "User does not have full access", Status::NotFound.code);
}
Ok(Json(json!({
@@ -955,13 +903,14 @@ async fn get_members(
}
if !headers.membership.has_full_access() {
err_code!("Resource not found.", "User does not have full access", rocket::http::Status::NotFound.code);
err_code!("Resource not found.", "User does not have full access", Status::NotFound.code);
}
let mut users_json = Vec::new();
for u in Membership::find_by_org(&org_id, &conn).await {
// The user can be a manager instead of an admin, but we've checked above that they have full access
users_json.push(
u.to_json_user_details(
u.to_json_details_for_admin(
data.include_collections.unwrap_or(false),
data.include_groups.unwrap_or(false),
&conn,
@@ -1075,13 +1024,13 @@ async fn send_invite(
&& data.permissions.get("deleteAnyCollection") == Some(&json!(true))
&& data.permissions.get("createNewCollections") == Some(&json!(true)));
let mut user_created: bool = false;
let mut user_created: bool;
for email in &data.emails {
let mut member_status = MembershipStatus::Invited as i32;
let user = match User::find_by_mail(email, &conn).await {
None => {
if !CONFIG.invitations_allowed() {
err!(format!("User does not exist: {email}"))
err!(format!("User does not exist: {}", email.escape_debug()))
}
if !CONFIG.is_email_domain_allowed(email) {
@@ -1099,7 +1048,7 @@ async fn send_invite(
}
Some(user) => {
if Membership::find_by_user_and_org(&user.uuid, &org_id, &conn).await.is_some() {
err!(format!("User already in organization: {email}"))
err!(format!("User already in organization: {}", email.escape_debug()))
}
if !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
@@ -1110,6 +1059,7 @@ async fn send_invite(
member_status = MembershipStatus::Accepted as i32;
}
}
user_created = false;
user
}
};
@@ -1148,7 +1098,7 @@ async fn send_invite(
}
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserInvited as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserInvited,
&new_member.uuid,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -1373,7 +1323,9 @@ async fn bulk_confirm_invite(
match data.keys {
Some(keys) => {
for invite in keys {
let member_id = invite.id.unwrap();
let Some(member_id) = invite.id else {
err!("Member id is required")
};
let user_key = invite.key.unwrap_or_default();
let err_msg = match confirm_invite_impl(&org_id, &member_id, &user_key, &headers, &conn, &nt).await {
Ok(()) => String::new(),
@@ -1447,7 +1399,7 @@ async fn confirm_invite_impl(
OrgPolicy::check_user_allowed(&member_to_confirm, "confirm", conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserConfirmed as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserConfirmed,
&member_to_confirm.uuid,
org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -1515,7 +1467,9 @@ async fn get_user(
// In this case, when groups are requested we also need to include collections.
// Else these will not be shown in the interface, and could lead to missing collections when saved.
let include_groups = data.include_groups.unwrap_or(false);
Ok(Json(user.to_json_user_details(data.include_collections.unwrap_or(include_groups), include_groups, &conn).await))
Ok(Json(
user.to_json_details_for_admin(data.include_collections.unwrap_or(include_groups), include_groups, &conn).await,
))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -1529,17 +1483,6 @@ struct EditUserData {
}
#[put("/organizations/<org_id>/users/<member_id>", data = "<data>", rank = 1)]
async fn put_member(
org_id: OrganizationId,
member_id: MembershipId,
data: Json<EditUserData>,
headers: AdminHeaders,
conn: DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
edit_member(org_id, member_id, data, headers, conn).await
}
#[post("/organizations/<org_id>/users/<member_id>", data = "<data>", rank = 1)]
async fn edit_member(
org_id: OrganizationId,
member_id: MembershipId,
@@ -1637,7 +1580,7 @@ async fn edit_member(
}
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserUpdated as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserUpdated,
&member_to_edit.uuid,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -1724,7 +1667,7 @@ async fn delete_member_impl(
}
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserRemoved as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserRemoved,
&member_to_delete.uuid,
org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -1793,11 +1736,22 @@ async fn bulk_public_keys(
use super::ciphers::CipherData;
use super::ciphers::update_cipher_from_data;
// The import endpoint only ever uses the name/id/external_id of a collection.
// Bitwarden's own server ignores `groups`/`users` here too, so do not make them
// mandatory: clients are free to leave them out.
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct ImportCollectionData {
name: String,
id: Option<CollectionId>,
external_id: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct ImportData {
ciphers: Vec<CipherData>,
collections: Vec<FullCollectionData>,
collections: Vec<ImportCollectionData>,
collection_relationships: Vec<RelationsData>,
}
@@ -1823,6 +1777,10 @@ async fn post_org_import(
if org_id != headers.membership.org_uuid {
err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
}
// OrgMemberHeaders also allows invited and accepted members, which are not allowed to import
if headers.membership.status != MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32 {
err!("You need to be a Member of the Organization to call this endpoint")
}
let data: ImportData = data.into_inner();
// Validate the import before continuing
@@ -1873,7 +1831,7 @@ async fn post_org_import(
cipher_data.folder_id = None;
// Replace the client-provided, unvalidated organizationId with the real target org
cipher_data.organization_id = Some(org_id.clone());
let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type);
update_cipher_from_data(
&mut cipher,
cipher_data,
@@ -1904,7 +1862,7 @@ async fn post_org_import(
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct BulkCollectionsData {
organization_id: OrganizationId,
cipher_ids: Vec<CipherId>,
cipher_ids: HashSet<CipherId>,
collection_ids: HashSet<CollectionId>,
remove_collections: bool,
}
@@ -2144,7 +2102,7 @@ async fn put_policy(
}
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserRemoved as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserRemoved,
&member.uuid,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -2170,7 +2128,7 @@ async fn put_policy(
policy.save(&conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::PolicyUpdated as i32,
EventType::PolicyUpdated,
policy.uuid.as_ref(),
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -2183,18 +2141,6 @@ async fn put_policy(
Ok(Json(policy.to_json()))
}
// Deprecated with client v2026.5.0
#[put("/organizations/<org_id>/policies/<pol_type>/vnext", data = "<data>")]
async fn put_policy_vnext(
org_id: OrganizationId,
pol_type: i32,
data: Json<PutPolicy>,
headers: AdminHeaders,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
put_policy(org_id, pol_type, data, headers, conn).await
}
#[get("/plans")]
fn get_plans() -> Json<Value> {
// Respond with a minimal json just enough to allow the creation of an new organization.
@@ -2223,12 +2169,6 @@ fn get_plans() -> Json<Value> {
}))
}
#[get("/organizations/<_org_id>/billing/metadata")]
fn get_billing_metadata(_org_id: OrganizationId, _headers: OrgMemberHeaders) -> Json<Value> {
// Prevent a 404 error, which also causes Javascript errors.
Json(empty_data_json())
}
#[get("/organizations/<_org_id>/billing/vnext/warnings")]
fn get_billing_warnings(_org_id: OrganizationId, _headers: OrgMemberHeaders) -> Json<Value> {
Json(json!({
@@ -2248,14 +2188,6 @@ fn get_self_host_billing_metadata(_org_id: OrganizationId, _headers: OrgMemberHe
}))
}
fn empty_data_json() -> Value {
json!({
"object": "list",
"data": [],
"continuationToken": null
})
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Debug)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct BulkRevokeMembershipIds {
@@ -2339,7 +2271,7 @@ async fn revoke_member_impl(
member.save(conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked,
&member.uuid,
org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -2437,7 +2369,7 @@ async fn restore_member_impl(
member.save(conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserRestored as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserRestored,
&member.uuid,
org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -2476,7 +2408,7 @@ async fn get_groups_data(
|| Collection::has_manageable_collection_by_user(&org_id, &headers.membership.user_uuid, &conn).await
};
if !allowed {
err_code!("Resource not found.", "User does not have access", rocket::http::Status::NotFound.code);
err_code!("Resource not found.", "User does not have access", Status::NotFound.code);
}
let groups: Vec<Value> = if CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() {
@@ -2574,17 +2506,6 @@ impl CollectionData {
}
}
#[post("/organizations/<org_id>/groups/<group_id>", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_group(
org_id: OrganizationId,
group_id: GroupId,
data: Json<GroupRequest>,
headers: AdminHeaders,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
put_group(org_id, group_id, data, headers, conn).await
}
#[post("/organizations/<org_id>/groups", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_groups(
org_id: OrganizationId,
@@ -2605,7 +2526,7 @@ async fn post_groups(
let group = group_request.to_group(&org_id);
log_event(
EventType::GroupCreated as i32,
EventType::GroupCreated,
&group.uuid,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -2646,7 +2567,7 @@ async fn put_group(
GroupUser::delete_all_by_group(&group_id, &org_id, &conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::GroupUpdated as i32,
EventType::GroupUpdated,
&updated_group.uuid,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -2679,7 +2600,7 @@ async fn add_update_group(
user_entry.save(conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserUpdatedGroups as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserUpdatedGroups,
&assigned_member,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -2694,7 +2615,6 @@ async fn add_update_group(
"id": group.uuid,
"organizationId": group.organizations_uuid,
"name": group.name,
"accessAll": group.access_all,
"externalId": group.external_id,
"object": "group"
})))
@@ -2721,16 +2641,6 @@ async fn get_group_details(
Ok(Json(group.to_json_details(&conn).await))
}
#[post("/organizations/<org_id>/groups/<group_id>/delete")]
async fn post_delete_group(
org_id: OrganizationId,
group_id: GroupId,
headers: AdminHeaders,
conn: DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
delete_group_impl(&org_id, &group_id, &headers, &conn).await
}
#[delete("/organizations/<org_id>/groups/<group_id>")]
async fn delete_group(org_id: OrganizationId, group_id: GroupId, headers: AdminHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
delete_group_impl(&org_id, &group_id, &headers, &conn).await
@@ -2754,7 +2664,7 @@ async fn delete_group_impl(
};
log_event(
EventType::GroupDeleted as i32,
EventType::GroupDeleted,
&group.uuid,
org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
@@ -2832,90 +2742,6 @@ async fn get_group_members(
Ok(Json(json!(group_members)))
}
#[put("/organizations/<org_id>/groups/<group_id>/users", data = "<data>")]
async fn put_group_members(
org_id: OrganizationId,
group_id: GroupId,
headers: AdminHeaders,
data: Json<Vec<MembershipId>>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
if org_id != headers.org_id {
err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
}
if !CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() {
err!("Group support is disabled");
}
if Group::find_by_uuid_and_org(&group_id, &org_id, &conn).await.is_none() {
err!("Group could not be found!", "Group uuid is invalid or does not belong to the organization")
}
let assigned_members = data.into_inner();
let org_memberships = Membership::find_by_org(&org_id, &conn).await;
let org_membership_ids: HashSet<&MembershipId> = org_memberships.iter().map(|m| &m.uuid).collect();
if let Some(e) = assigned_members.iter().find(|m| !org_membership_ids.contains(m)) {
err!("Invalid member", format!("Member {} does not belong to organization {}!", e, org_id))
}
GroupUser::delete_all_by_group(&group_id, &org_id, &conn).await?;
for assigned_member in assigned_members {
let mut user_entry = GroupUser::new(group_id.clone(), assigned_member.clone());
user_entry.save(&conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserUpdatedGroups as i32,
&assigned_member,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
headers.device.atype,
&headers.ip.ip,
&conn,
)
.await;
}
Ok(())
}
#[post("/organizations/<org_id>/groups/<group_id>/delete-user/<member_id>")]
async fn post_delete_group_member(
org_id: OrganizationId,
group_id: GroupId,
member_id: MembershipId,
headers: AdminHeaders,
conn: DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
if org_id != headers.org_id {
err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
}
if !CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() {
err!("Group support is disabled");
}
if Membership::find_by_uuid_and_org(&member_id, &org_id, &conn).await.is_none() {
err!("User could not be found or does not belong to the organization.");
}
if Group::find_by_uuid_and_org(&group_id, &org_id, &conn).await.is_none() {
err!("Group could not be found or does not belong to the organization.");
}
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserUpdatedGroups as i32,
&member_id,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
headers.device.atype,
&headers.ip.ip,
&conn,
)
.await;
GroupUser::delete_by_group_and_member(&group_id, &member_id, &conn).await
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct OrganizationUserResetPasswordEnrollmentRequest {
@@ -2927,8 +2753,13 @@ struct OrganizationUserResetPasswordEnrollmentRequest {
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest {
new_master_password_hash: String,
key: String,
// Legacy payload
new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
key: Option<String>,
// Current payload
authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
#[serde(default)]
reset_master_password: bool,
@@ -2940,8 +2771,26 @@ struct OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest {
// But the clients do not seem to use this at all
// Just add it here in case they will
#[get("/organizations/<org_id>/public-key")]
async fn get_organization_public_key(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
if org_id != headers.membership.org_uuid {
async fn get_organization_public_key(
org_id: OrganizationId,
headers: Headers,
member: Result<OrgMemberHeaders, &'static str>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
// SSO users without an org get the fake one, whose key the v2 JIT password flow fetches anyway
if org_id.eq_ignore_ascii_case(FAKE_SSO_IDENTIFIER) && headers.user.private_key.is_none() {
return Ok(Json(json!({
"object": "organizationPublicKey",
"publicKey": fake_sso_org_public_key().await?,
})));
}
let member = match member {
Ok(member) => member,
// The guard already logged it
Err(e) => return Err(crate::error::Error::new_msg(e).with_code(Status::Unauthorized.code)),
};
if org_id != member.membership.org_uuid {
err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
}
let Some(org) = Organization::find_by_uuid(&org_id, &conn).await else {
@@ -2954,11 +2803,30 @@ async fn get_organization_public_key(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberH
})))
}
/// The SDK only uses this key to wrap an account recovery key that it never sends for the fake org,
/// so it is made once and its private half dropped.
async fn fake_sso_org_public_key() -> ApiResult<String> {
static PUBLIC_KEY: std::sync::LazyLock<Option<String>> = std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
let der = openssl::rsa::Rsa::generate(2048).and_then(|rsa| rsa.public_key_to_der()).ok()?;
Some(data_encoding::BASE64.encode(&der))
});
let Ok(Some(public_key)) = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(|| PUBLIC_KEY.clone()).await else {
err!("Failed to generate the organization key")
};
Ok(public_key)
}
// Obsolete - Renamed to public-key (2023.8), left for backwards compatibility with older clients
// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/AdminConsole/Controllers/OrganizationsController.cs#L487-L492
#[get("/organizations/<org_id>/keys")]
async fn get_organization_keys(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
get_organization_public_key(org_id, headers, conn).await
async fn get_organization_keys(
org_id: OrganizationId,
headers: Headers,
member: Result<OrgMemberHeaders, &'static str>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
get_organization_public_key(org_id, headers, member, conn).await
}
// Will allow to reset 2FA too
@@ -2971,24 +2839,6 @@ async fn put_recover_account(
data: Json<OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest>,
conn: DbConn,
nt: Notify<'_>,
) -> EmptyResult {
let req = data.into_inner();
if req.reset_master_password && !req.reset_two_factor {
recover_account(org_id, member_id, headers, req, conn, nt).await
} else {
err!("Unsupported operation")
}
}
// Deprecated since `v2026.4.2`
#[put("/organizations/<org_id>/users/<member_id>/reset-password", data = "<data>")]
async fn put_reset_password(
org_id: OrganizationId,
member_id: MembershipId,
headers: AdminHeaders,
data: Json<OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest>,
conn: DbConn,
nt: Notify<'_>,
) -> EmptyResult {
recover_account(org_id, member_id, headers, data.into_inner(), conn, nt).await
}
@@ -2997,7 +2847,7 @@ async fn recover_account(
org_id: OrganizationId,
member_id: MembershipId,
headers: AdminHeaders,
reset_request: OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest,
req: OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest,
conn: DbConn,
nt: Notify<'_>,
) -> EmptyResult {
@@ -3012,7 +2862,7 @@ async fn recover_account(
err!("User to reset isn't member of required organization")
};
let Some(user) = User::find_by_uuid(&member.user_uuid, &conn).await else {
let Some(mut user) = User::find_by_uuid(&member.user_uuid, &conn).await else {
err!("User not found")
};
@@ -3025,29 +2875,75 @@ async fn recover_account(
err!("Organization user must be confirmed for password reset functionality");
}
// Sending email before resetting password to ensure working email configuration and the resulting
// user notification. Also this might add some protection against security flaws and misuse
if let Err(e) = mail::send_admin_reset_password(&user.email, user.display_name(), &org.name).await {
let fallback_2fa_email =
if req.reset_two_factor && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.email_2fa_auto_fallback() && user.verified() {
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await.is_none()
} else {
false
};
// Check the new password before the email below, so that a rejected request doesn't tell the user
// their password was reset
let new_password = if req.reset_master_password {
let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) = if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) =
(req.authentication_data, req.unlock_data)
{
authentication_data.check(&user, &unlock_data)?;
if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&user) {
err!("KDF settings do not match the user account")
}
(authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
} else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (req.new_master_password_hash, req.key) {
(new_master_password_hash, new_key)
} else {
err_code!("Unprocessable request", "Missing fields to reset password", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
};
Some((new_master_password_hash, new_key))
} else {
None
};
// Sending email first ensure working email configuration and the resulting user notification.
// Also this might add some protection against security flaws and misuse
if let Err(e) = mail::send_admin_account_recovery(
&user.email,
user.display_name(),
&org.name,
req.reset_master_password,
req.reset_two_factor,
fallback_2fa_email,
)
.await
{
err!(format!("Error sending user reset password email: {e:#?}"));
}
let mut user = user;
user.set_password(reset_request.new_master_password_hash.as_str(), Some(reset_request.key), true, None, &conn)
.await?;
if let Some((new_master_password_hash, new_key)) = new_password {
user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
}
if req.reset_two_factor {
TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
if !fallback_2fa_email || two_factor::email::find_and_activate_email_2fa(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_err() {
two_factor::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &headers.user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
.await?;
}
}
user.save(&conn).await?;
nt.send_logout(&user, None, &conn).await;
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserAdminResetPassword as i32,
&member_id,
&org_id,
&headers.user.uuid,
headers.device.atype,
&headers.ip.ip,
&conn,
)
.await;
if req.reset_master_password {
headers.log_event(EventType::OrganizationUserAdminResetPassword, &member_id, &org_id, &conn).await;
}
if req.reset_two_factor {
headers.log_event(EventType::OrganizationUserAdminResetTwoFactor, &member_id, &org_id, &conn).await;
}
Ok(())
}
@@ -3084,6 +2980,7 @@ async fn get_reset_password_details(
"kdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
"kdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
"kdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
"masterPasswordSalt": user.master_password_salt(),
"resetPasswordKey": member.reset_password_key,
"encryptedPrivateKey": org.private_key,
})))
@@ -3166,9 +3063,9 @@ async fn put_reset_password_enrollment(
membership.save(&conn).await?;
let event_type = if membership.reset_password_key.is_some() {
EventType::OrganizationUserResetPasswordEnroll as i32
EventType::OrganizationUserResetPasswordEnroll
} else {
EventType::OrganizationUserResetPasswordWithdraw as i32
EventType::OrganizationUserResetPasswordWithdraw
};
log_event(event_type, &membership.uuid, &org_id, &headers.user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
@@ -3199,7 +3096,7 @@ async fn api_key(
org_id: &OrganizationId,
data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>,
rotate: bool,
headers: AdminHeaders,
headers: OwnerHeaders,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
if org_id != &headers.org_id {
@@ -3208,7 +3105,7 @@ async fn api_key(
let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
let user = headers.user;
// Validate the admin users password/otp
// Validate the owner users password/otp
data.validate(&user, true, &conn).await?;
let org_api_key = if let Some(mut org_api_key) = OrganizationApiKey::find_by_org_uuid(org_id, &conn).await {
@@ -3236,7 +3133,7 @@ async fn api_key(
async fn post_api_key(
org_id: OrganizationId,
data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>,
headers: AdminHeaders,
headers: OwnerHeaders,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
api_key(&org_id, data, false, headers, conn).await
@@ -3246,7 +3143,7 @@ async fn post_api_key(
async fn rotate_api_key(
org_id: OrganizationId,
data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>,
headers: AdminHeaders,
headers: OwnerHeaders,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
api_key(&org_id, data, true, headers, conn).await
+9 -23
View File
@@ -58,25 +58,13 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
let org_id = token.0;
let data = data.into_inner();
// Like upstream, the import never removes Owners, so it doesn't revoke or restore them either.
for user_data in &data.members {
let mut user_created: bool = false;
if user_data.deleted {
// If user is marked for deletion and it exists, revoke it
if let Some(mut member) = Membership::find_by_email_and_org(&user_data.email, &org_id, &conn).await {
// Only revoke a user if it is not the last confirmed owner
let revoked = if member.atype == MembershipType::Owner
&& member.status == MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32
{
if Membership::count_confirmed_by_org_and_type(&org_id, MembershipType::Owner, &conn).await <= 1 {
warn!("Can't revoke the last owner");
false
} else {
member.revoke()
}
} else {
member.revoke()
};
let revoked = member.atype != MembershipType::Owner && member.revoke();
let ext_modified = member.set_external_id(Some(user_data.external_id.clone()));
if revoked || ext_modified {
member.save(&conn).await?;
@@ -84,7 +72,7 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
}
// If user is part of the organization, restore it
} else if let Some(mut member) = Membership::find_by_email_and_org(&user_data.email, &org_id, &conn).await {
let mut restored = member.restore();
let mut restored = member.atype != MembershipType::Owner && member.restore();
let ext_modified = member.set_external_id(Some(user_data.external_id.clone()));
// Enforce org policies as every other restore path does.
// If the user is not allowed, we revoke again and continue so the external_id is still updated.
@@ -149,9 +137,13 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
if CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() {
for group_data in &data.groups {
let group_uuid = if let Some(group) =
let group_uuid = if let Some(mut group) =
Group::find_by_external_id_and_org(&group_data.external_id, &org_id, &conn).await
{
if group.name != group_data.name {
group.name = group_data.name.clone();
group.save(&conn).await?;
}
group.uuid
} else {
let mut group =
@@ -180,14 +172,8 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
for member in Membership::find_by_org(&org_id, &conn).await {
if let Some(ref user_external_id) = member.external_id
&& !sync_members.contains(user_external_id)
&& member.atype != MembershipType::Owner
{
if member.atype == MembershipType::Owner && member.status == MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32 {
// Removing owner, check that there is at least one other confirmed owner
if Membership::count_confirmed_by_org_and_type(&org_id, MembershipType::Owner, &conn).await <= 1 {
warn!("Can't delete the last owner");
continue;
}
}
member.delete(&conn).await?;
}
}
+22 -182
View File
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;
use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, UpdateType},
auth::{ClientIp, Headers, Host, SendHeaders},
auth::{Headers, Host, SendHeaders},
config::PathType,
db::{
DbConn, DbPool,
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use crate::{
const SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG: &str = "Send does not exist or is no longer available";
static ANON_PUSH_DEVICE: LazyLock<Device> = LazyLock::new(|| {
let dt = crate::util::parse_date("1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z");
let dt = DateTime::UNIX_EPOCH.naive_utc();
Device {
uuid: String::from("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000").into(),
created_at: dt,
@@ -39,18 +39,15 @@ static ANON_PUSH_DEVICE: LazyLock<Device> = LazyLock::new(|| {
});
// The max file size allowed by Bitwarden clients and add an extra 5% to avoid issues
const SIZE_525_MB: i64 = 550_502_400;
pub(crate) const SIZE_525_MB: i64 = 550_502_400;
pub fn routes() -> Vec<rocket::Route> {
routes![
get_sends,
get_send,
post_send,
post_send_file,
post_access,
post_access_legacy,
post_access_file,
post_access_file_legacy,
put_send,
delete_send,
put_remove_password,
@@ -73,7 +70,7 @@ pub async fn purge_sends(pool: DbPool) {
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct SendData {
r#type: i32,
key: String,
pub key: String,
password: Option<String>,
max_access_count: Option<NumberOrString>,
expiration_date: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
@@ -201,7 +198,7 @@ async fn post_send(data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Not
enforce_disable_hide_email_policy(&data, &headers, &conn).await?;
if data.r#type == SendType::File as i32 {
err!("File sends should use /api/sends/file")
err!("File sends should use /api/sends/file/v2")
}
let mut send = create_send(data, headers.user.uuid)?;
@@ -218,93 +215,11 @@ async fn post_send(data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Not
Ok(Json(send.to_json()))
}
#[derive(FromForm)]
struct UploadData<'f> {
model: Json<SendData>,
data: TempFile<'f>,
}
#[derive(FromForm)]
struct UploadDataV2<'f> {
data: TempFile<'f>,
}
// @deprecated Mar 25 2021: This method has been deprecated in favor of direct uploads (v2).
// This method still exists to support older clients, probably need to remove it sometime.
// Upstream: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/d0c793c95181dfb1b447eb450f85ba0bfd7ef643/src/Api/Controllers/SendsController.cs#L164-L167
// 2025: This endpoint doesn't seem to exists anymore in the latest version
// See: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Tools/Controllers/SendsController.cs
#[post("/sends/file", format = "multipart/form-data", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_send_file(data: Form<UploadData<'_>>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> JsonResult {
enforce_disable_send_policy(&headers, &conn).await?;
let UploadData {
model,
data,
} = data.into_inner();
let model = model.into_inner();
let Some(size) = data.len().to_i64() else {
err!("Invalid send size");
};
if size < 0 {
err!("Send size can't be negative")
}
enforce_disable_hide_email_policy(&model, &headers, &conn).await?;
let size_limit = match CONFIG.user_send_limit() {
Some(0) => err!("File uploads are disabled"),
Some(limit_kb) => {
let Some(already_used) = Send::size_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await else {
err!("Existing sends overflow")
};
let Some(left) = limit_kb.checked_mul(1024).and_then(|l| l.checked_sub(already_used)) else {
err!("Send size overflow");
};
if left <= 0 {
err!("Send storage limit reached! Delete some sends to free up space")
}
i64::clamp(left, 0, SIZE_525_MB)
}
None => SIZE_525_MB,
};
if size > size_limit {
err!("Send storage limit exceeded with this file");
}
let mut send = create_send(model, headers.user.uuid)?;
if send.atype != SendType::File as i32 {
err!("Send content is not a file");
}
let file_id = crate::crypto::generate_send_file_id();
save_temp_file(&PathType::Sends, &format!("{}/{file_id}", send.uuid), data, true).await?;
let mut data_value: Value = serde_json::from_str(&send.data)?;
if let Some(o) = data_value.as_object_mut() {
o.insert(String::from("id"), Value::String(file_id));
o.insert(String::from("size"), Value::Number(size.into()));
o.insert(String::from("sizeName"), Value::String(crate::util::get_display_size(size)));
}
send.data = serde_json::to_string(&data_value)?;
// Save the changes in the database
send.save(&conn).await?;
nt.send_send_update(
UpdateType::SyncSendCreate,
&send,
&send.update_users_revision(&conn).await,
&headers.device,
&conn,
)
.await;
Ok(Json(send.to_json()))
}
// Upstream: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Tools/Controllers/SendsController.cs#L165
#[post("/sends/file/v2", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_send_file_v2(data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
@@ -413,8 +328,8 @@ async fn post_send_file_v2_data(
"Send file name does not match.",
format!(
"Expected file name '{}' got '{}'",
send_data.fileName,
raw_file_name.dangerous_unsafe_unsanitized_raw()
send_data.fileName.escape_debug(),
raw_file_name.dangerous_unsafe_unsanitized_raw().as_str().escape_debug()
)
),
_ => err!("Send file name does not match or is not provided."),
@@ -450,63 +365,16 @@ async fn post_send_file_v2_data(
#[post("/sends/access")]
async fn post_access(headers: SendHeaders, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> JsonResult {
let Some(send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&headers.send_id, &conn).await else {
let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&headers.send_id, &conn).await else {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
};
if !send.is_accessible() {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
}
process_access(send, conn, nt).await
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
pub struct SendAccessData {
pub password: Option<String>,
}
// Legacy since web-2026.6.0
#[post("/sends/access/<access_id>", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_access_legacy(
access_id: &str,
data: Json<SendAccessData>,
conn: DbConn,
ip: ClientIp,
nt: Notify<'_>,
) -> JsonResult {
crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_access_id(access_id, &conn).await else {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
};
if let Some(max_access_count) = send.max_access_count
&& send.access_count >= max_access_count
{
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404);
}
if !send.is_accessible() {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
}
if send.password_hash.is_some() {
match data.into_inner().password {
Some(ref p) if send.check_password(p) => { /* Nothing to do here */ }
Some(_) => err!("Invalid password", format!("IP: {}.", ip.ip)),
None => err_code!("Password not provided", format!("IP: {}.", ip.ip), 401),
}
}
// Files are incremented during the download
if send.atype == SendType::Text as i32 {
if !send.register_access(&conn).await? {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
}
} else {
send.save(&conn).await?;
if send.atype == SendType::Text as i32 && !send.register_access(&conn).await? {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
}
process_access(send, conn, nt).await
}
@@ -531,55 +399,27 @@ async fn post_access_file(
conn: DbConn,
nt: Notify<'_>,
) -> JsonResult {
let Some(send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&headers.send_id, &conn).await else {
let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&headers.send_id, &conn).await else {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
};
if !send.is_accessible() {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
}
check_send_file_id(&send, &file_id)?;
if !send.register_access(&conn).await? {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
}
process_access_file(send, file_id, host, conn, nt).await
}
// Legacy since web-2026.6.0
#[post("/sends/<send_id>/access/file/<file_id>", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_access_file_legacy(
send_id: SendId,
file_id: SendFileId,
data: Json<SendAccessData>,
host: Host,
conn: DbConn,
ip: ClientIp,
nt: Notify<'_>,
) -> JsonResult {
crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&send_id, &conn).await else {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
};
if let Some(max_access_count) = send.max_access_count
&& send.access_count >= max_access_count
{
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
fn check_send_file_id(send: &Send, file_id: &SendFileId) -> EmptyResult {
if send.atype != SendType::File as i32 {
err!("Send is not a file type send.");
}
if !send.is_accessible() {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
match serde_json::from_str::<SendFileData>(&send.data) {
Ok(data) if &data.id == file_id => Ok(()),
_ => err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404),
}
if send.password_hash.is_some() {
match data.into_inner().password {
Some(ref p) if send.check_password(p) => { /* Nothing to do here */ }
Some(_) => err!("Invalid password."),
None => err_code!("Password not provided", 401),
}
}
if !send.register_access(&conn).await? {
err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
}
process_access_file(send, file_id, host, conn, nt).await
}
async fn process_access_file(send: Send, file_id: SendFileId, host: Host, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> JsonResult {
@@ -642,7 +482,7 @@ async fn put_send(send_id: SendId, data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn:
Ok(Json(send.to_json()))
}
pub async fn update_send_from_data(
async fn update_send_from_data(
send: &mut Send,
data: SendData,
headers: &Headers,
+22 -43
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
use crate::{
api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event, core::two_factor::generate_recover_code},
auth::{ClientIp, Headers},
auth::{ClientIp, Headers, two_factor},
crypto,
db::{
DbConn,
@@ -20,27 +20,23 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
#[post("/two-factor/get-authenticator", data = "<data>")]
async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
let user = headers.user;
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32;
let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await;
let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await;
let (enabled, key) = match twofactor {
Some(tf) => (true, tf.data),
_ => (false, crypto::encode_random_bytes::<20>(&BASE32)),
};
// Upstream seems to also return `userVerificationToken`, but doesn't seem to be used at all.
// It should help prevent TOTP disclosure if someone keeps their vault unlocked.
// Since it doesn't seem to be used, and also does not cause any issues, lets leave it out of the response.
// See: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Auth/Controllers/TwoFactorController.cs#L94
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": enabled,
"key": key,
"object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
"authenticator": json!({
"enabled": enabled,
"key": key,
}),
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::authenticator_token(user.uuid, key, enabled),
})))
}
@@ -49,8 +45,7 @@ async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers,
struct EnableAuthenticatorData {
key: String,
token: NumberOrString,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
user_verification_token: String,
}
#[post("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
@@ -61,12 +56,7 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He
let mut user = headers.user;
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
otp: data.otp,
}
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &key, false)?;
// Validate key as base32 and 20 bytes length
let decoded_key: Vec<u8> = if let Ok(decoded) = BASE32.decode(key.as_bytes()) {
@@ -84,12 +74,13 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": true,
"key": key,
"object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
"authenticator": json!({
"enabled": true,
"key": key,
}),
})))
}
@@ -125,8 +116,7 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
err!("Invalid TOTP secret")
};
let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32, conn).await
{
let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, conn).await {
Some(tf) => tf,
_ => TwoFactor::new(user_id.clone(), TwoFactorType::Authenticator, secret.to_owned()),
};
@@ -184,36 +174,25 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct DisableAuthenticatorData {
key: String,
master_password_hash: String,
r#type: NumberOrString,
user_verification_token: String,
}
#[delete("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let user = headers.user;
let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
if !user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
err!("Invalid password");
}
two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &data.key, true)?;
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await {
if twofactor.data == data.key {
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
.await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
} else {
err!(format!("TOTP key for user {} does not match recorded value, cannot deactivate", &user.email));
}
}
if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
super::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
}
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": false,
"keys": type_,
"object": "twoFactorProvider"
})))
Ok(())
}
+51 -193
View File
@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
use chrono::Utc;
use data_encoding::BASE64;
use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{
ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event,
core::two_factor::generate_recover_code,
ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
core::log_user_event,
core::two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
},
auth::Headers,
auth::{Headers, two_factor, two_factor::DuoData},
crypto,
db::{
DbConn,
@@ -19,55 +18,7 @@ use crate::{
};
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put,]
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
struct DuoData {
host: String, // Duo API hostname
ik: String, // client id
sk: String, // client secret
}
impl DuoData {
fn global() -> Option<Self> {
match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
(true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
host,
ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
}),
_ => None,
}
}
fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
Self {
host: s.into(),
ik: s.into(),
sk: s.into(),
}
}
fn secret() -> Self {
Self::msg("<global_secret>")
}
fn obscure(self) -> Self {
let mut host = self.host;
let mut ik = self.ik;
let mut sk = self.sk;
let digits = 4;
let replaced = "************";
host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
Self {
host,
ik,
sk,
}
}
routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put, disable_duo,]
}
enum DuoStatus {
@@ -96,22 +47,19 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let data = get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await;
let (enabled, data) = match data {
let (enabled, duo) = match get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await {
DuoStatus::Global(_) => (true, Some(DuoData::secret())),
DuoStatus::User(data) => (true, Some(data.obscure())),
DuoStatus::Disabled(true) => (false, Some(DuoData::msg(DISABLED_MESSAGE_DEFAULT))),
DuoStatus::Disabled(false) => (false, None),
};
let json = if let Some(data) = data {
let duo_json = if let Some(data) = duo.as_ref() {
json!({
"enabled": enabled,
"host": data.host,
"clientSecret": data.sk,
"clientId": data.ik,
"object": "twoFactorDuo"
})
} else {
json!({
@@ -119,11 +67,13 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
"host": null,
"clientSecret": null,
"clientId": null,
"object": "twoFactorDuo"
})
};
Ok(Json(json))
Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
"duo": duo_json,
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::duo_token(user.uuid, duo, enabled),
})))
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -132,8 +82,7 @@ struct EnableDuoData {
host: String,
client_secret: String,
client_id: String,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
user_verification_token: String,
}
impl From<EnableDuoData> for DuoData {
@@ -160,12 +109,7 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
let data: EnableDuoData = data.into_inner();
let mut user = headers.user;
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
otp: data.otp.clone(),
}
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, None, false)?;
let (data, data_str) = if check_duo_fields_custom(&data) {
let data_req: DuoData = data.into();
@@ -182,14 +126,15 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": true,
"host": data.host,
"clientSecret": data.sk,
"clientId": data.ik,
"object": "twoFactorDuo"
"duo": json!({
"enabled": true,
"host": data.host,
"clientSecret": data.sk,
"clientId": data.ik,
}),
})))
}
@@ -198,6 +143,29 @@ async fn activate_duo_put(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
activate_duo(data, headers, conn).await
}
#[delete("/two-factor/duo", data = "<data>")]
async fn disable_duo(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let user = headers.user;
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Duo, &conn).await {
// Apply the same transformation than in `get_duo` to check we are disabling the correct one
let duo = match to_user_duo_data(&twofactor) {
DuoStatus::Global(_) => Some(DuoData::secret()),
DuoStatus::User(data) => Some(data.obscure()),
DuoStatus::Disabled(_) => None,
};
two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, duo.as_ref(), true)?;
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
}
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
Ok(())
}
async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData) -> EmptyResult {
use reqwest::{Method, header};
use std::str::FromStr;
@@ -222,21 +190,16 @@ async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData)
Ok(())
}
const DUO_EXPIRE: i64 = 300;
const APP_EXPIRE: i64 = 3600;
const AUTH_PREFIX: &str = "AUTH";
const DUO_PREFIX: &str = "TX";
const APP_PREFIX: &str = "APP";
async fn get_user_duo_data(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> DuoStatus {
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Duo as i32;
// If the user doesn't have an entry, disabled
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await else {
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Duo, conn).await else {
return DuoStatus::Disabled(DuoData::global().is_some());
};
to_user_duo_data(&twofactor)
}
fn to_user_duo_data(twofactor: &TwoFactor) -> DuoStatus {
// If the user has the required values, we use those
if let Ok(data) = serde_json::from_str(&twofactor.data) {
return DuoStatus::User(data);
@@ -251,118 +214,13 @@ async fn get_user_duo_data(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> DuoStatus {
DuoStatus::Disabled(false)
}
// let (ik, sk, ak, host) = get_duo_keys();
pub(crate) async fn get_duo_keys_email(email: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<(String, String, String, String)> {
// let (ik, sk, host) = get_duo_keys_email();
pub(crate) async fn get_duo_keys_email(email: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<(String, String, String)> {
let data = match User::find_by_mail(email, conn).await {
Some(u) => get_user_duo_data(&u.uuid, conn).await.data(),
_ => DuoData::global(),
}
.map_res("Can't fetch Duo Keys")?;
Ok((data.ik, data.sk, CONFIG.get_duo_akey().await, data.host))
}
pub async fn generate_duo_signature(email: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<(String, String)> {
let now = Utc::now().timestamp();
let (ik, sk, ak, host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;
let duo_sign = sign_duo_values(&sk, email, &ik, DUO_PREFIX, now + DUO_EXPIRE);
let app_sign = sign_duo_values(&ak, email, &ik, APP_PREFIX, now + APP_EXPIRE);
Ok((format!("{duo_sign}:{app_sign}"), host))
}
fn sign_duo_values(key: &str, email: &str, ikey: &str, prefix: &str, expire: i64) -> String {
let val = format!("{email}|{ikey}|{expire}");
let cookie = format!("{prefix}|{}", BASE64.encode(val.as_bytes()));
format!("{cookie}|{}", crypto::hmac_sign(key, &cookie))
}
pub async fn validate_duo_login(email: &str, response: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let split: Vec<&str> = response.split(':').collect();
if split.len() != 2 {
err!(
"Invalid response length",
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn2fa
}
);
}
let auth_sig = split[0];
let app_sig = split[1];
let now = Utc::now().timestamp();
let (ik, sk, ak, _host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;
let auth_user = parse_duo_values(&sk, auth_sig, &ik, AUTH_PREFIX, now)?;
let app_user = parse_duo_values(&ak, app_sig, &ik, APP_PREFIX, now)?;
if !crypto::ct_eq(&auth_user, app_user) || !crypto::ct_eq(&auth_user, email) {
err!(
"Error validating duo authentication",
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn2fa
}
)
}
Ok(())
}
fn parse_duo_values(key: &str, val: &str, ikey: &str, prefix: &str, time: i64) -> ApiResult<String> {
let split: Vec<&str> = val.split('|').collect();
if split.len() != 3 {
err!("Invalid value length")
}
let u_prefix = split[0];
let u_b64 = split[1];
let u_sig = split[2];
let sig = crypto::hmac_sign(key, &format!("{u_prefix}|{u_b64}"));
if !crypto::ct_eq(crypto::hmac_sign(key, &sig), crypto::hmac_sign(key, u_sig)) {
err!("Duo signatures don't match")
}
if u_prefix != prefix {
err!("Prefixes don't match")
}
let Ok(cookie_vec) = BASE64.decode(u_b64.as_bytes()) else {
err!("Invalid Duo cookie encoding")
};
let Ok(cookie) = String::from_utf8(cookie_vec) else {
err!("Invalid Duo cookie encoding")
};
let cookie_split: Vec<&str> = cookie.split('|').collect();
if cookie_split.len() != 3 {
err!("Invalid cookie length")
}
let username = cookie_split[0];
let u_ikey = cookie_split[1];
let expire = cookie_split[2];
if !crypto::ct_eq(ikey, u_ikey) {
err!("Invalid ikey")
}
let expire: i64 = if let Ok(e) = expire.parse() {
e
} else {
err!("Invalid expire time")
};
if time >= expire {
err!("Expired authorization")
}
Ok(username.into())
Ok((data.ik, data.sk, data.host))
}
+2 -2
View File
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ pub async fn get_duo_auth_url(
device_identifier: &DeviceId,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> Result<String, Error> {
let (ik, sk, _, host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;
let (ik, sk, host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;
let callback_url = match make_callback_url(client_id) {
Ok(url) => url,
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ pub async fn validate_duo_login(
let code = split[0];
let state = split[1];
let (ik, sk, _, host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;
let (ik, sk, host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;
// Get the context by the state reported by the client. If we don't have one,
// it means the context is either missing or expired.
+87 -58
View File
@@ -5,20 +5,26 @@ use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
core::{
log_user_event,
two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
},
},
auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers},
auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers, two_factor},
crypto,
db::{
DbConn,
models::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, User, UserId},
models::{
AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User,
UserId,
},
},
error::{Error, MapResult},
mail,
};
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email,]
routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email, disable_email]
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -63,13 +69,19 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
let user = if let Some(email) = email {
let Some(user) = User::find_by_mail(email, &conn).await else {
err!("Username or password is incorrect. Try again.")
err!(
"Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, email.escape_debug())
)
};
if let Some(master_password_hash) = master_password_hash {
// Check password
if !user.check_valid_password(master_password_hash) {
err!("Username or password is incorrect. Try again.")
err!(
"Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, email.escape_debug())
)
}
} else if let Some(auth_request_id) = auth_request_id {
let Some(auth_request) = AuthRequest::find_by_uuid(auth_request_id, &conn).await else {
@@ -85,6 +97,20 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
{
err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "Invalid device, IP or code")
}
} else if let Some(device_identifier) = &data.device_identifier {
// iOS/Android SSO logins send the email and device id but no password hash,
// so accept a device that has a pending 2FA login for this user
if TwoFactorIncomplete::find_by_user_and_device(&user.uuid, device_identifier, &conn).await.is_none() {
err!(
"Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, email.escape_debug())
)
}
debug!(
"Email 2FA fallback: pending login. Username: {}. Device: {}.",
user.email,
device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug()
);
} else {
err!("No password hash has been submitted.")
}
@@ -96,7 +122,10 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
};
// SSO login only sends device id, so we get the user by the most recently used device
let Some(user) = User::find_by_device_for_email2fa(device_identifier, &conn).await else {
err!("Username or password is incorrect. Try again.")
err!(
"Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
format!("IP: {}. Device: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug())
)
};
user
@@ -107,8 +136,8 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
/// Generate the token, save the data for later verification and send email to user
pub async fn send_token(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let mut twofactor =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let generated_token = crypto::generate_email_token(CONFIG.email_token_size());
@@ -131,18 +160,19 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let (enabled, mfa_email) =
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, &conn).await {
Some(x) => {
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
(true, json!(twofactor_data.email))
}
_ => (false, serde_json::value::Value::Null),
if let Some(x) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
(true, Some(twofactor_data.email))
} else {
(false, None)
};
Ok(Json(json!({
"email": mfa_email,
"enabled": enabled,
"object": "twoFactorEmail"
Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
"email": rocket::serde::json::json!({
"enabled": enabled,
"email": mfa_email,
}),
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::email_token(user.uuid, mfa_email, enabled),
})))
}
@@ -151,43 +181,36 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
struct SendEmailData {
/// Email where 2FA codes will be sent to, can be different than user email account.
email: String,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
user_verification_token: String,
}
/// Send a verification email to the specified email address to check whether it exists/belongs to user.
#[post("/two-factor/send-email", data = "<data>")]
async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: SendEmailData = data.into_inner();
let user = headers.user;
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
otp: data.otp,
}
.validate(&user, false, &conn)
.await?;
two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email.clone(), false)?;
if !CONFIG._enable_email_2fa() {
err!("Email 2FA is disabled")
}
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
tf.delete(&conn).await?;
}
let generated_token = crypto::generate_email_token(CONFIG.email_token_size());
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(data.email, generated_token);
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(data.email, Some(generated_token));
// Uses EmailVerificationChallenge as type to show that it's not verified yet.
let twofactor = TwoFactor::new(user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
let twofactor =
TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
twofactor.save(&conn).await?;
mail::send_token(&twofactor_data.email, &twofactor_data.last_token.map_res("Token is empty")?).await?;
Ok(())
Ok(Json(json!({})))
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)]
@@ -195,8 +218,7 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
struct EmailData {
email: String,
token: String,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
user_verification_token: String,
}
/// Verify email belongs to user and can be used for 2FA email codes.
@@ -205,17 +227,11 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
let data: EmailData = data.into_inner();
let mut user = headers.user;
// This is the last step in the verification process, delete the otp directly afterwards
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
otp: data.otp,
}
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email, false)?;
let type_ = TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge as i32;
let mut twofactor =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, &conn)
.await
.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
@@ -234,13 +250,26 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
Ok(Json(json!({
"email": email_data.email,
"enabled": "true",
"object": "twoFactorEmail"
})))
Ok(Json(json!({})))
}
#[delete("/two-factor/email", data = "<data>")]
async fn disable_email(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let user = headers.user;
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, twofactor_data.email, true)?;
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
}
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Validate the email code when used as TwoFactor token mechanism
@@ -252,9 +281,8 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
conn: &DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(data)?;
let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, conn)
.await
.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let mut twofactor =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
let Some(issued_token) = &email_data.last_token else {
err!(
format!("No token available! IP: {ip}"),
@@ -313,10 +341,10 @@ pub struct EmailTokenData {
}
impl EmailTokenData {
pub fn new(email: String, token: String) -> EmailTokenData {
pub fn new(email: String, token: Option<String>) -> EmailTokenData {
EmailTokenData {
email,
last_token: Some(token),
last_token: token,
token_sent: Utc::now().timestamp(),
attempts: 0,
}
@@ -354,7 +382,8 @@ pub async fn activate_email_2fa(user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
if user.verified_at.is_none() {
err!("Auto-enabling of email 2FA failed because the users email address has not been verified!");
}
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(user.email.clone(), String::new());
// The token is set when the first code is sent
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(user.email.clone(), None);
let twofactor = TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::Email, twofactor_data.to_json());
twofactor.save(conn).await
}
+20 -67
View File
@@ -7,21 +7,17 @@ use serde_json::Value;
use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
core::{log_event, log_user_event},
},
api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_event},
auth::Headers,
crypto,
db::{
DbConn, DbPool,
models::{
DeviceType, EventType, Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationId, TwoFactor,
TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User, UserId,
Device, DeviceType, EventType, Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationId,
TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User, UserId,
},
},
mail,
util::NumberOrString,
};
pub mod authenticator;
@@ -69,13 +65,7 @@ pub fn is_twofactor_provider_usable(provider_type: &TwoFactorType, provider_data
}
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
let mut routes = routes![
get_twofactor,
get_recover,
disable_twofactor,
disable_twofactor_put,
get_device_verification_settings,
];
let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, get_device_verification_settings];
routes.append(&mut authenticator::routes());
routes.append(&mut duo::routes());
@@ -87,6 +77,12 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct VerificationTokenData {
user_verification_token: String,
}
#[get("/two-factor")]
async fn get_twofactor(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value> {
let twofactors = TwoFactor::find_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await;
@@ -126,49 +122,14 @@ async fn generate_recover_code(user: &mut User, conn: &DbConn) {
}
}
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct DisableTwoFactorData {
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
r#type: NumberOrString,
}
#[post("/two-factor/disable", data = "<data>")]
async fn disable_twofactor(data: Json<DisableTwoFactorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: DisableTwoFactorData = data.into_inner();
let user = headers.user;
// Delete directly after a valid token has been provided
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
otp: data.otp,
/// Call after a 2FA provider, or one of its keys, was removed. No remembered device may keep skipping
/// the providers that are left, and once every provider is gone the 2FA policy applies.
pub async fn check_2fa_state(user: &User, device_type: i32, ip: &std::net::IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await.is_empty() {
enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device_type, ip, conn).await?;
}
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
.await;
}
if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
}
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": false,
"type": type_,
"object": "twoFactorProvider"
})))
}
#[put("/two-factor/disable", data = "<data>")]
async fn disable_twofactor_put(data: Json<DisableTwoFactorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
disable_twofactor(data, headers, conn).await
Ok(())
}
pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy(
@@ -190,7 +151,7 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy(
member.save(conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked as i32,
EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked,
&member.uuid,
&member.org_uuid,
act_user_id,
@@ -224,16 +185,8 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy_for_org(
member.revoke();
member.save(conn).await?;
log_event(
EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked as i32,
&member.uuid,
org_id,
act_user_id,
device_type,
ip,
conn,
)
.await;
log_event(EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked, &member.uuid, org_id, act_user_id, device_type, ip, conn)
.await;
}
}
+2 -3
View File
@@ -72,8 +72,7 @@ async fn request_otp(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let user = headers.user;
// Only one Protected Action per user is allowed to take place, delete the previous one
if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, &conn).await
{
if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, &conn).await {
let pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
let elapsed = pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds();
let delay = 30;
@@ -125,7 +124,7 @@ pub async fn validate_protected_action_otp(
delete_if_valid: bool,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, conn)
let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, conn)
.await
.map_res("Protected action token not found, try sending the code again or restart the process")?;
let mut pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
+110 -70
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
use std::{str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
use std::{collections::HashSet, str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
use serde_json::Value;
@@ -18,16 +18,18 @@ use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
core::{
log_user_event,
two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
},
},
auth::Headers,
auth::{Headers, two_factor},
crypto::ct_eq,
db::{
DbConn,
models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
},
error::Error,
util::NumberOrString,
};
static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
@@ -45,7 +47,14 @@ static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
});
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![get_webauthn, generate_webauthn_challenge, activate_webauthn, activate_webauthn_put, delete_webauthn,]
routes![
get_webauthn,
generate_webauthn_challenge,
activate_webauthn,
activate_webauthn_put,
delete_webauthn,
delete_webauthns
]
}
// Some old u2f structs still needed for migrating from u2f to WebAuthn
@@ -119,34 +128,36 @@ async fn get_webauthn(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
let registrations_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": enabled,
"keys": registrations_json,
"object": "twoFactorWebAuthn"
"webAuthn": json!({
"enabled": enabled,
"keys": registrations_json,
}),
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::webauthn_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
})))
}
#[post("/two-factor/get-webauthn-challenge", data = "<data>")]
async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let user = headers.user;
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let registrations = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn)
.await?
.1
let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
let creds = registrations
.into_iter()
.map(|r| r.credential.cred_id().to_owned()) // We return the credentialIds to the clients to avoid double registering
.collect();
two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, enabled)?;
let (mut challenge, state) = WEBAUTHN.start_passkey_registration(
Uuid::from_str(&user.uuid).expect("Failed to parse UUID"), // Should never fail
&user.email,
user.display_name(),
Some(registrations),
Some(creds),
)?;
let mut state = serde_json::to_value(&state)?;
@@ -166,17 +177,19 @@ async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Hea
let mut challenge_value = serde_json::to_value(challenge.public_key)?;
challenge_value["status"] = "ok".into();
challenge_value["errorMessage"] = "".into();
Ok(Json(challenge_value))
Ok(Json(json!({
"options": challenge_value
})))
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct EnableWebauthnData {
id: NumberOrString, // 1..5
id: i32,
name: String,
device_response: RegisterPublicKeyCredentialCopy,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
user_verification_token: String,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -257,16 +270,14 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
let data: EnableWebauthnData = data.into_inner();
let mut user = headers.user;
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
otp: data.otp,
}
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, !keys.is_empty())?;
// Retrieve and delete the saved challenge state
let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge as i32;
let state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
let state = if let Some(tf) =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge, &conn).await
{
let state: PasskeyRegistration = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
tf.delete(&conn).await?;
state
@@ -277,10 +288,9 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
// Verify the credentials with the saved state
let credential = WEBAUTHN.finish_passkey_registration(&data.device_response.into(), &state)?;
let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
// TODO: Check for repeated ID's
registrations.push(WebauthnRegistration {
id: data.id.into_i32()?,
id: data.id,
name: data.name,
migrated: false,
@@ -293,13 +303,13 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
.await?;
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
let keys_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": true,
"keys": keys_json,
"object": "twoFactorU2f"
"webAuthn": json!({
"enabled": true,
"keys": registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
}),
})))
}
@@ -310,57 +320,87 @@ async fn activate_webauthn_put(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers,
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct DeleteU2FData {
id: NumberOrString,
master_password_hash: String,
struct DeleteWebauthnData {
id: i32,
user_verification_token: String,
}
#[delete("/two-factor/webauthn", data = "<data>")]
async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteU2FData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let id = data.id.into_i32()?;
if !headers.user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
err!("Invalid password");
}
async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |key| key.id != data.id, headers, &conn).await
}
let Some(mut tf) =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32, &conn).await
else {
#[delete("/two-factor/webauthn/all", data = "<data>")]
async fn delete_webauthns(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |_| false, headers, &conn).await
}
async fn inner_delete_webauthns(
token: &str,
retain: impl Fn(&WebauthnRegistration) -> bool,
headers: Headers,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
let user = headers.user;
let Some(mut tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await else {
err!("Webauthn data not found!")
};
let mut data: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
let mut keys: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
let keys_id: Vec<i32> = keys.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
let Some(item_pos) = data.iter().position(|r| r.id == id) else {
two_factor::validate_webauthn(token, &user.uuid, &keys_id, true)?;
let mut removed: HashSet<Vec<u8>> = HashSet::new();
let mut migrated = false;
keys.retain(|key| {
let retained = retain(key);
if !retained {
removed.insert(key.credential.cred_id().to_vec());
migrated = migrated || key.migrated;
}
retained
});
if removed.is_empty() {
err!("Webauthn entry not found")
};
}
let removed_item = data.remove(item_pos);
tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
tf.save(&conn).await?;
drop(tf);
if keys.is_empty() {
tf.delete(conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await;
} else {
tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&keys)?;
tf.save(conn).await?;
drop(tf);
}
// If entry is migrated from u2f, delete the u2f entry as well
if let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f as i32, &conn).await
{
let mut data: Vec<U2FRegistration> = if let Ok(d) = serde_json::from_str(&u2f.data) {
d
} else {
if migrated && let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f, conn).await {
let Ok(mut data) = serde_json::from_str::<Vec<U2FRegistration>>(&u2f.data) else {
err!("Error parsing U2F data")
};
data.retain(|r| r.reg.key_handle != removed_item.credential.cred_id().as_slice());
let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
data.retain(|old| !removed.contains(&old.reg.key_handle));
u2f.data = new_data_str;
u2f.save(&conn).await?;
if data.is_empty() {
u2f.delete(conn).await?;
} else {
let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
u2f.data = new_data_str;
u2f.save(conn).await?;
}
}
let keys_json: Vec<Value> = data.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await?;
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": true,
"keys": keys_json,
"object": "twoFactorU2f"
"webAuthn": json!({
"enabled": !keys.is_empty(),
"keys": keys.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
}),
})))
}
@@ -368,8 +408,7 @@ pub async fn get_webauthn_registrations(
user_id: &UserId,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> Result<(bool, Vec<WebauthnRegistration>), Error> {
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32;
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await {
Some(tf) => Ok((tf.enabled, serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?)),
None => Ok((false, Vec::new())), // If no data, return empty list
}
@@ -416,8 +455,9 @@ pub async fn generate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> JsonRes
}
pub async fn validate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, response: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge as i32;
let mut state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
let mut state = if let Some(tf) =
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge, conn).await
{
let state: PasskeyAuthentication = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
tf.delete(conn).await?;
state
+56 -46
View File
@@ -10,9 +10,12 @@ use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
core::{
log_user_event,
two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
},
},
auth::Headers,
auth::{Headers, two_factor},
db::{
DbConn,
models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType},
@@ -22,7 +25,7 @@ use crate::{
};
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put,]
routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put, delete_yubikeys,]
}
struct HttpClientTransport {
@@ -60,8 +63,7 @@ struct EnableYubikeyData {
key4: Option<String>,
key5: Option<String>,
nfc: bool,
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
otp: Option<String>,
user_verification_token: String,
}
#[derive(Deserialize, Serialize, Debug)]
@@ -125,48 +127,29 @@ async fn generate_yubikey(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn:
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
let user_id = &user.uuid;
let yubikey_type = TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32;
let r = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, yubikey_type, &conn).await;
if let Some(r) = r {
let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
Ok(Json(result))
} else {
Ok(Json(json!({
"enabled": false,
"object": "twoFactorU2f",
})))
}
let (enabled, keys, yubikey_json) =
if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
let enabled = !yubikey_metadata.keys.is_empty();
let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys.clone());
result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(enabled);
result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
(enabled, yubikey_metadata.keys, result)
} else {
(false, Vec::new(), json!({"enabled": false}))
};
Ok(Json(json!({
"yubiKey": yubikey_json,
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::yubikey_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
})))
}
#[post("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: EnableYubikeyData = data.into_inner();
let mut user = headers.user;
PasswordOrOtpData {
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
otp: data.otp.clone(),
}
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
.await?;
// Check if we already have some data
let mut yubikey_data =
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32, &conn).await {
Some(data) => data,
None => TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new()),
};
let yubikeys = parse_yubikeys(&data);
let mut user = headers.user;
if yubikeys.is_empty() {
// Return an error to prevent saving empty keys which would cause users not being able to login anymore.
@@ -174,6 +157,17 @@ async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn:
err!("A key is required.");
}
// Check if we already have some data
let mut yubikey_data =
if let Some(yd) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
let ym: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&yd.data)?;
two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &ym.keys, !ym.keys.is_empty())?;
yd
} else {
two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &Vec::new(), false)?;
TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new())
};
// Ensure they are valid OTPs
for yubikey in &yubikeys {
if yubikey.is_empty() || yubikey.len() == 12 {
@@ -195,15 +189,12 @@ async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn:
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
Ok(Json(result))
Ok(Json(json!({"yubiKey": result})))
}
#[put("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
@@ -211,13 +202,32 @@ async fn activate_yubikey_put(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, c
activate_yubikey(data, headers, conn).await
}
#[delete("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
async fn delete_yubikeys(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let user = headers.user;
if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &yubikey_metadata.keys, true)?;
r.delete(&conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
}
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
Ok(())
}
pub async fn validate_yubikey_login(response: &str, twofactor_data: &str) -> EmptyResult {
if response.len() != 44 {
err!("Invalid Yubikey OTP length");
}
let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(twofactor_data).expect("Can't parse Yubikey Metadata");
let response_id = &response[..12];
let Some(response_id) = response.get(..12) else {
err!("Invalid Yubikey OTP");
};
if !yubikey_metadata.keys.contains(&response_id.to_owned()) {
err!("Given Yubikey is not registered");
+2 -2
View File
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static ICON_SIZE_REGEX: LazyLock<Regex> = LazyLock::new(|| Regex::new(r"(?x)(\d+
#[get("/<host>/icon.png")]
fn icon_external(host: &str) -> Cached<Option<Redirect>> {
let Ok(host) = get_valid_host(host) else {
warn!("Invalid host: {host}");
warn!("Invalid host: {}", host.escape_debug());
return Cached::ttl(None, CONFIG.icon_cache_negttl(), true);
};
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ async fn icon_internal(host: &str) -> Cached<(ContentType, Vec<u8>)> {
const FALLBACK_ICON: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../static/images/fallback-icon.png");
let Ok(host) = get_valid_host(host) else {
warn!("Invalid host: {host}");
warn!("Invalid host: {}", host.escape_debug());
return Cached::ttl(
(ContentType::new("image", "png"), FALLBACK_ICON.to_vec()),
CONFIG.icon_cache_negttl(),
+154 -176
View File
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
use rocket::{
Route,
form::{Form, FromForm},
http::{Cookie, CookieJar, SameSite},
http::{Accept, Cookie, CookieJar, MediaType, SameSite},
response::Redirect,
serde::json::Json,
};
@@ -17,15 +17,14 @@ use crate::{
accounts::{PreloginData, RegisterData, kdf_upgrade, prelogin, register},
log_user_event,
two_factor::{
authenticator, duo, duo_oidc, email, enforce_2fa_policy, is_twofactor_provider_usable, webauthn,
yubikey,
authenticator, duo_oidc, email, enforce_2fa_policy, is_twofactor_provider_usable, webauthn, yubikey,
},
},
master_password_policy,
identity_master_password_policy,
push::register_push_device,
},
auth,
auth::{AuthMethod, ClientHeaders, ClientIp, ClientVersion, Secure, generate_organization_api_key_login_claims},
auth::{AuthMethod, ClientHeaders, ClientIp, Secure, generate_organization_api_key_login_claims},
crypto,
db::{
DbConn,
@@ -46,7 +45,6 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
login,
post_prelogin,
prelogin_password,
identity_register,
register_verification_email,
register_finish,
prevalidate,
@@ -57,12 +55,7 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
}
#[post("/connect/token", data = "<data>")]
async fn login(
data: Form<ConnectData>,
client_header: ClientHeaders,
client_version: Option<ClientVersion>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> JsonResult {
async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
let data: ConnectData = data.into_inner();
let mut user_id: Option<UserId> = None;
@@ -83,17 +76,13 @@ async fn login(
check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;
password_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip, client_version.as_ref()).await
password_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
}
"client_credentials" => {
check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
check_is_some(data.client_secret.as_ref(), "client_secret cannot be blank")?;
check_is_some(data.scope.as_ref(), "scope cannot be blank")?;
check_is_some(data.device_identifier.as_ref(), "device_identifier cannot be blank")?;
check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;
api_key_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
}
"authorization_code" if CONFIG.sso_enabled() => {
@@ -105,7 +94,7 @@ async fn login(
check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;
sso_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip, client_version.as_ref()).await
sso_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
}
"authorization_code" => err!("SSO sign-in is not available"),
"send_access" => {
@@ -129,7 +118,7 @@ async fn login(
match &login_result {
Ok(_) => {
log_user_event(
EventType::UserLoggedIn as i32,
EventType::UserLoggedIn,
&user_id,
client_header.device_type,
&client_header.ip.ip,
@@ -139,8 +128,7 @@ async fn login(
}
Err(e) => {
if let Some(ev) = e.get_event() {
log_user_event(ev.event as i32, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn)
.await;
log_user_event(ev.event, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn).await;
}
}
}
@@ -190,13 +178,7 @@ async fn refresh_login(data: ConnectData, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonR
}
// After exchanging the code we need to check first if 2FA is needed before continuing
async fn sso_login(
data: ConnectData,
user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
conn: &DbConn,
ip: &ClientIp,
client_version: Option<&ClientVersion>,
) -> JsonResult {
async fn sso_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
AuthMethod::Sso.check_scope(data.scope.as_ref())?;
// Ratelimit the login
@@ -234,6 +216,24 @@ async fn sso_login(
}
)
}
Some((user, None))
if user.private_key.is_none()
&& !CONFIG.sso_signups_allowed()
&& !CONFIG.is_email_domain_allowed(&user.email)
&& !CONFIG.mail_enabled()
&& Invitation::find_by_mail(&user.email, conn).await.is_none() =>
{
error!(
"Login failure ({}), no invitation with email ({}) was found",
user_infos.identifier, user.email
);
err_silent!(
"Missing invitation",
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
}
)
}
Some((user, None)) if user.private_key.is_some() && !CONFIG.sso_signups_match_email() => {
error!(
"Login failure ({}), existing non SSO user ({}) with same email ({}) and association is disabled",
@@ -281,7 +281,15 @@ async fn sso_login(
// Will trigger 2FA flow if needed
let (user, mut device, twofactor_token, sso_user) = match user_with_sso {
None => {
if !CONFIG.is_email_domain_allowed(&user_infos.email) {
if !CONFIG.is_sso_signup_allowed(&user_infos.email) {
if CONFIG.signups_domains_whitelist().is_empty() {
err!(
"Signups are disabled. You will need an invitation",
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
}
);
}
err!(
"Email domain not allowed",
ErrorEvent {
@@ -327,7 +335,7 @@ async fn sso_login(
Some((mut user, sso_user)) => {
let mut device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;
let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&mut user, &data, &mut device, ip, client_version, conn).await?;
let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&mut user, &data, &mut device, ip, conn).await?;
if user.private_key.is_none() {
// User was invited a stub was created
@@ -359,13 +367,7 @@ async fn sso_login(
authenticated_response(&user, &mut device, auth_tokens, twofactor_token, conn, ip).await
}
async fn password_login(
data: ConnectData,
user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
conn: &DbConn,
ip: &ClientIp,
client_version: Option<&ClientVersion>,
) -> JsonResult {
async fn password_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
// Validate scope
AuthMethod::Password.check_scope(data.scope.as_ref())?;
@@ -374,24 +376,14 @@ async fn password_login(
// Get the user
let username = data.username.as_ref().unwrap().trim();
let log_username = username.escape_debug();
let Some(mut user) = User::find_by_mail(username, conn).await else {
err!("Username or password is incorrect. Try again", format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip))
err!("Username or password is incorrect. Try again", format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip))
};
// Set the user_id here to be passed back used for event logging.
*user_id = Some(user.uuid.clone());
// Check if the user is disabled
if !user.enabled {
err!(
"This user has been disabled",
format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip),
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
}
)
}
let password = data.password.as_ref().unwrap();
// If we get an auth request, we don't check the user's password, but the access code of the auth request
@@ -399,7 +391,7 @@ async fn password_login(
let Some(auth_request) = AuthRequest::find_by_uuid_and_user(auth_request_id, &user.uuid, conn).await else {
err!(
"Auth request not found. Try again.",
format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip),
format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
}
@@ -411,13 +403,14 @@ async fn password_login(
if auth_request.user_uuid != user.uuid
|| !auth_request.approved.unwrap_or(false)
|| auth_request.authentication_date.is_some()
|| request_expired
|| ip.ip.to_string() != auth_request.request_ip
|| !auth_request.check_access_code(password)
{
err!(
"Username or access code is incorrect. Try again",
format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip),
format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
}
@@ -426,13 +419,24 @@ async fn password_login(
} else if !user.check_valid_password(password) {
err!(
"Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip),
format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
}
)
}
// Check if the user is disabled
if !user.enabled {
err!(
"This user has been disabled",
format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
}
)
}
// Change the KDF Iterations (only when not logging in with an auth request)
if data.auth_request.is_none() {
kdf_upgrade(&mut user, password, conn).await?;
@@ -465,7 +469,7 @@ async fn password_login(
// We still want the login to fail until they actually verified the email address
err!(
"Please verify your email before trying again.",
format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip),
format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
}
@@ -474,7 +478,20 @@ async fn password_login(
let mut device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;
let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&mut user, &data, &mut device, ip, client_version, conn).await?;
let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&mut user, &data, &mut device, ip, conn).await?;
// Like upstream, an auth request can be used for one login only. Marked after 2FA so a 2FA prompt doesn't use it up.
if let Some(ref auth_request_id) = data.auth_request
&& !AuthRequest::set_authentication_date(auth_request_id, conn).await?
{
err!(
"Username or access code is incorrect. Try again",
format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
}
)
}
let auth_tokens = auth::AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, AuthMethod::Password, data.client_id);
@@ -513,7 +530,7 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
// Save to update `device.updated_at` to track usage and toggle new status
device.save(true, conn).await?;
let master_password_policy = master_password_policy(user, conn).await;
let master_password_policy = identity_master_password_policy(user, conn).await;
let has_master_password = !user.password_hash.is_empty();
let master_password_unlock = if has_master_password {
@@ -534,18 +551,7 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
Value::Null
};
let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
json!({
"publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
"wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
"publicKey": user.public_key,
"Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
},
"Object": "privateKeys"
})
} else {
Value::Null
};
let account_keys = user.account_keys_json(conn).await;
let mut result = json!({
"access_token": auth_tokens.access_token(),
@@ -557,7 +563,6 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
"KdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
"KdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
"KdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
"ResetMasterPassword": false, // TODO: Same as above
"ForcePasswordReset": false,
"MasterPasswordPolicy": master_password_policy,
"scope": auth_tokens.scope(),
@@ -587,7 +592,14 @@ async fn api_key_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &D
// Validate scope
match data.scope.as_ref() {
Some(scope) if scope == &AuthMethod::UserApiKey.scope() => user_api_key_login(data, user_id, conn, ip).await,
Some(scope) if scope == &AuthMethod::UserApiKey.scope() => {
// Like upstream, only the user API key logs in a device
check_is_some(data.device_identifier.as_ref(), "device_identifier cannot be blank")?;
check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;
user_api_key_login(data, user_id, conn, ip).await
}
Some(scope) if scope == &AuthMethod::OrgApiKey.scope() => organization_api_key_login(data, conn, ip).await,
_ => err!("Scope not supported"),
}
@@ -685,18 +697,7 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
Value::Null
};
let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
json!({
"publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
"wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
"publicKey": user.public_key,
"Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
},
"Object": "privateKeys"
})
} else {
Value::Null
};
let account_keys = user.account_keys_json(conn).await;
// Note: No refresh_token is returned. The CLI just repeats the
// client_credentials login flow when the existing token expires.
@@ -711,7 +712,6 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
"KdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
"KdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
"KdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
"ResetMasterPassword": false, // TODO: according to official server seems something like: user.password_hash.is_empty(), but would need testing
"ForcePasswordReset": false,
"scope": AuthMethod::UserApiKey.scope(),
"AccountKeys": account_keys,
@@ -777,7 +777,6 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
data: &ConnectData,
device: &mut Device,
ip: &ClientIp,
client_version: Option<&ClientVersion>,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> ApiResult<Option<String>> {
let twofactors = TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await;
@@ -806,17 +805,12 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
if ![TwoFactorType::Remember as i32, TwoFactorType::RecoveryCode as i32].contains(&selected_id)
&& !twofactor_ids.contains(&selected_id)
{
err_json!(
json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, &user.uuid, data, client_version, conn).await?,
"Invalid two factor provider"
)
err_json!(json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, user, data, conn).await?, "Invalid two factor provider")
}
let Some(ref twofactor_code) = data.two_factor_token else {
err_json!(
json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, &user.uuid, data, client_version, conn).await?,
"2FA token not provided"
)
// Like upstream, a blank token counts as not provided
let Some(twofactor_code) = data.two_factor_token.as_deref().filter(|t| !t.trim().is_empty()) else {
err_json!(json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, user, data, conn).await?, "2FA token not provided")
};
let selected_twofactor = twofactors.into_iter().find(|tf| tf.atype == selected_id && tf.enabled);
@@ -830,20 +824,14 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
Some(TwoFactorType::Webauthn) => webauthn::validate_webauthn_login(&user.uuid, twofactor_code, conn).await?,
Some(TwoFactorType::YubiKey) => yubikey::validate_yubikey_login(twofactor_code, &selected_data?).await?,
Some(TwoFactorType::Duo) => {
if CONFIG.duo_use_iframe() {
// Legacy iframe prompt flow
duo::validate_duo_login(&user.email, twofactor_code, conn).await?;
} else {
// OIDC based flow
duo_oidc::validate_duo_login(
&user.email,
twofactor_code,
data.client_id.as_ref().unwrap(),
data.device_identifier.as_ref().unwrap(),
conn,
)
.await?;
}
duo_oidc::validate_duo_login(
&user.email,
twofactor_code,
data.client_id.as_ref().unwrap(),
data.device_identifier.as_ref().unwrap(),
conn,
)
.await?;
}
Some(TwoFactorType::Email) => {
email::validate_email_code_str(&user.uuid, twofactor_code, &selected_data?, &ip.ip, conn).await?;
@@ -865,23 +853,42 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
device.save(true, conn).await?;
}
err_json!(
json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, &user.uuid, data, client_version, conn).await?,
json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, user, data, conn).await?,
"2FA Remember token not provided or expired"
)
}
}
}
Some(TwoFactorType::RecoveryCode) => {
// Check if recovery code is correct
if !user.check_valid_recovery_code(twofactor_code) {
err!("Recovery code is incorrect. Try again.")
// Like upstream, spaces and case don't matter
let recovery_code = twofactor_code.replace(' ', "").trim().to_lowercase();
if !user.check_valid_recovery_code(&recovery_code) {
err!(
"Two-step token is invalid. Try again.",
ErrorEvent {
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn2fa
}
)
}
// Remove all twofactors from the user
TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
// No device may keep skipping 2FA once every second factor is gone.
// `device` is cleared in memory too, since saving it later would restore its token.
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
device.delete_twofactor_remember();
enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await?;
log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa as i32, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
&& let Err(e) =
mail::send_recover_twofactor(&user.email, &ip.ip.to_string(), &Utc::now().naive_utc()).await
{
error!("Error sending two-step login recovered email: {e:#?}");
}
// Remove the recovery code, not needed without twofactors
user.totp_recover = None;
@@ -910,21 +917,14 @@ fn selected_data(tf: Option<TwoFactor>) -> ApiResult<String> {
tf.map(|t| t.data).map_res("Two factor doesn't exist")
}
async fn json_err_twofactor(
providers: &[i32],
user_id: &UserId,
data: &ConnectData,
client_version: Option<&ClientVersion>,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> ApiResult<Value> {
async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<Value> {
let user_id = &user.uuid;
let mut result = json!({
"error" : "invalid_grant",
"error_description" : "Two factor required.",
"TwoFactorProviders" : providers.iter().map(ToString::to_string).collect::<Vec<String>>(),
"TwoFactorProviders2" : {}, // { "0" : null }
"MasterPasswordPolicy": {
"Object": "masterPasswordPolicy"
}
"MasterPasswordPolicy": identity_master_password_policy(user, conn).await,
});
for provider in providers {
@@ -937,37 +937,21 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(
}
Some(TwoFactorType::Duo) => {
let email = if let Some(u) = User::find_by_uuid(user_id, conn).await {
u.email
} else {
err!("User does not exist")
};
let auth_url = duo_oidc::get_duo_auth_url(
&user.email,
data.client_id.as_ref().unwrap(),
data.device_identifier.as_ref().unwrap(),
conn,
)
.await?;
if CONFIG.duo_use_iframe() {
// Legacy iframe prompt flow
let (signature, host) = duo::generate_duo_signature(&email, conn).await?;
result["TwoFactorProviders2"][provider.to_string()] = json!({
"Host": host,
"Signature": signature,
});
} else {
// OIDC based flow
let auth_url = duo_oidc::get_duo_auth_url(
&email,
data.client_id.as_ref().unwrap(),
data.device_identifier.as_ref().unwrap(),
conn,
)
.await?;
result["TwoFactorProviders2"][provider.to_string()] = json!({
"AuthUrl": auth_url,
});
}
result["TwoFactorProviders2"][provider.to_string()] = json!({
"AuthUrl": auth_url,
});
}
Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::YubiKey) => {
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
err!("No YubiKey devices registered")
};
@@ -979,23 +963,10 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(
}
Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::Email) => {
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
err!("No twofactor email registered")
};
// Starting with version 2025.5.0 the client will call `/api/two-factor/send-email-login`.
let disabled_send = if let Some(cv) = client_version {
let ver_match = semver::VersionReq::parse(">=2025.5.0").unwrap();
ver_match.matches(&cv.0)
} else {
false
};
// Send email immediately if email is the only 2FA option.
if providers.len() == 1 && !disabled_send {
email::send_token(user_id, conn).await?;
}
let email_data = email::EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
result["TwoFactorProviders2"][provider.to_string()] = json!({
"Email": email::obscure_email(&email_data.email),
@@ -1024,18 +995,13 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(
}
#[post("/accounts/prelogin", data = "<data>")]
async fn post_prelogin(data: Json<PreloginData>, conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value> {
prelogin(data, conn).await
async fn post_prelogin(data: Json<PreloginData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
prelogin(data, ip, conn).await
}
#[post("/accounts/prelogin/password", data = "<data>")]
async fn prelogin_password(data: Json<PreloginData>, conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value> {
prelogin(data, conn).await
}
#[post("/accounts/register", data = "<data>")]
async fn identity_register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
register(data, false, conn).await
async fn prelogin_password(data: Json<PreloginData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
prelogin(data, ip, conn).await
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -1051,11 +1017,18 @@ enum RegisterVerificationResponse {
#[response(status = 204)]
NoContent(()),
Token(Json<String>),
PlainToken(String),
}
// Return JSON only when the client explicitly requests it, otherwise return plain text.
fn accepts_json(accept: Option<&Accept>) -> bool {
accept.is_some_and(|accept| accept.preferred().media_type() == &MediaType::JSON)
}
#[post("/accounts/register/send-verification-email", data = "<data>")]
async fn register_verification_email(
data: Json<RegisterVerificationData>,
accept: Option<&Accept>,
ip: ClientIp,
conn: DbConn,
) -> ApiResult<RegisterVerificationResponse> {
@@ -1093,13 +1066,18 @@ async fn register_verification_email(
} else {
// If email verification is not required, return the token directly
// the clients will use this token to finish the registration
Ok(RegisterVerificationResponse::Token(Json(token)))
Ok(if accepts_json(accept) {
RegisterVerificationResponse::Token(Json(token))
} else {
RegisterVerificationResponse::PlainToken(token)
})
}
}
#[post("/accounts/register/finish", data = "<data>")]
async fn register_finish(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
register(data, true, conn).await
async fn register_finish(data: Json<RegisterData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
register(data, conn).await
}
// https://github.com/bitwarden/jslib/blob/master/common/src/models/request/tokenRequest.ts
@@ -1229,7 +1207,7 @@ async fn oidcsignin_redirect(
let state = sso::decode_state(&base64_state)?;
let Some(mut sso_auth) = SsoAuth::find(&state, conn).await else {
err!(format!("Cannot retrieve sso_auth for {state}"))
err!(format!("Cannot retrieve sso_auth for {}", state.escape_debug()))
};
// Browser-binding check
@@ -1238,7 +1216,7 @@ async fn oidcsignin_redirect(
let provided_hash = cookie_value.as_deref().map(|v| crypto::sha256_hex(v.as_bytes()));
match (sso_auth.binding_hash.as_deref(), provided_hash.as_deref()) {
(Some(expected), Some(actual)) if crypto::ct_eq(expected, actual) => {}
_ => err!(format!("SSO session binding mismatch for {state}")),
_ => err!(format!("SSO session binding mismatch for {}", state.escape_debug())),
}
cookies
.remove(Cookie::build(SSO_BINDING_COOKIE).path(format!("{}/identity/connect/", CONFIG.domain_path())).build());
+19 -1
View File
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ pub type JsonResult = ApiResult<Json<Value>>;
pub type EmptyResult = ApiResult<()>;
// Common structs representing JSON data received
#[derive(Deserialize)]
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
struct PasswordOrOtpData {
#[serde(alias = "MasterPasswordHash")]
@@ -124,3 +124,21 @@ async fn master_password_policy(user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
mpp_json["Object"] = json!("masterPasswordPolicy");
mpp_json
}
// Identity responses use PascalCase keys like upstream, some clients (Android) only read those
async fn identity_master_password_policy(user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
match master_password_policy(user, conn).await {
Value::Object(policy) => Value::Object(
policy
.into_iter()
.map(|(mut key, value)| {
if let Some(first) = key.get_mut(..1) {
first.make_ascii_uppercase();
}
(key, value)
})
.collect(),
),
policy => policy,
}
}
+33 -5
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
use std::{
net::IpAddr,
sync::{Arc, LazyLock},
time::Duration,
time::{Duration, Instant},
};
use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
@@ -41,6 +41,14 @@ pub static WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS: LazyLock<Arc<AnonymousWebSocketSubscripti
/// One connection is needed per pending login request, several at once are only expected behind NAT.
const MAX_ANONYMOUS_CONNECTIONS_PER_IP: u32 = 25;
/// How often a Ping is sent to the client.
const WS_PING_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
/// Close the connection if nothing, not even a Pong, was received from the client for this long.
/// Otherwise half-open connections (client gone without a FIN, e.g. behind a proxy or NAT) are kept forever.
/// Same as the default `ClientTimeoutInterval` of ASP.NET Core SignalR, which the official server uses.
const WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
static NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: LazyLock<bool> = LazyLock::new(|| !CONFIG.enable_websocket() && !CONFIG.push_enabled());
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
@@ -156,12 +164,16 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
let mut ws = ws;
let _guard = guard;
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
let mut last_received = Instant::now();
loop {
tokio::select! {
res = ws.next() => {
match res {
Some(Ok(message)) => {
// Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
last_received = Instant::now();
match message {
// Respond to any pings
Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -195,7 +207,13 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
}
}
_ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
_ = interval.tick() => {
// The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
break;
}
yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
}
}
}
}}
@@ -229,12 +247,16 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
let mut ws = ws;
let _guard = guard;
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
let mut last_received = Instant::now();
loop {
tokio::select! {
res = ws.next() => {
match res {
Some(Ok(message)) => {
// Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
last_received = Instant::now();
match message {
// Respond to any pings
Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -268,7 +290,13 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
}
}
_ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
_ = interval.tick() => {
// The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
break;
}
yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
}
}
}
}}
+1 -3
View File
@@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ fn vaultwarden_css() -> EtagCached<Css<String>> {
// Else, there is either no cache, or reload_templates is true and we need to rebuild the CSS
let css_options = json!({
"email_change_allowed": CONFIG.email_change_allowed(),
"emergency_access_allowed": CONFIG.emergency_access_allowed(),
"load_user_scss": true,
"mail_2fa_enabled": CONFIG._enable_email_2fa(),
@@ -301,9 +302,6 @@ pub fn static_files(filename: &str) -> Result<(ContentType, &'static [u8]), Erro
"jdenticon-3.3.0.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/jdenticon-3.3.0.js"))),
"datatables.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.js"))),
"datatables.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.css"))),
"jquery-4.0.0.slim.js" => {
Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/jquery-4.0.0.slim.js")))
}
_ => err!(format!("Static file not found: {filename}")),
}
}
+105 -15
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
#[path = "auth/two_factor.rs"]
pub mod two_factor;
#[path = "auth/send.rs"]
pub mod send;
pub type SendTokens = send::SendTokens;
@@ -14,6 +17,7 @@ use ipnet::IpNet;
use jsonwebtoken::{Algorithm, DecodingKey, EncodingKey, Header, errors::ErrorKind};
use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
use openssl::rsa::Rsa;
use ring::hmac;
use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, ser::Serialize};
use rocket::{
@@ -23,14 +27,14 @@ use rocket::{
use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::ApiResult,
api::{ApiResult, core::log_event},
config::PathType,
db::{
DbConn,
models::{
AttachmentId, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, EmergencyAccessId,
Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId, SendFileId,
SendId, User, UserId, UserStampException,
EventType, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId,
SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, UserStampException,
},
},
error::Error,
@@ -65,6 +69,7 @@ static JWT_2FA_REMEMBER_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|
static PRIVATE_RSA_KEY: OnceLock<EncodingKey> = OnceLock::new();
static PUBLIC_RSA_KEY: OnceLock<DecodingKey> = OnceLock::new();
static PRELOGIN_KDF_KEY: OnceLock<hmac::Key> = OnceLock::new();
pub async fn initialize_keys() -> Result<(), Error> {
use std::io::Error as IoError;
@@ -99,9 +104,22 @@ pub async fn initialize_keys() -> Result<(), Error> {
if PUBLIC_RSA_KEY.set(dec).is_err() {
err!("PUBLIC_RSA_KEY must only be initialized once")
}
// Derived from the RSA key, so it stays the same across restarts without storing another secret
let prelogin_kdf_key = hmac::sign(&hmac::Key::new(hmac::HMAC_SHA256, &priv_key_buffer), b"prelogin-kdf");
if PRELOGIN_KDF_KEY.set(hmac::Key::new(hmac::HMAC_SHA256, prelogin_kdf_key.as_ref())).is_err() {
err!("PRELOGIN_KDF_KEY must only be initialized once")
}
Ok(())
}
/// Returns an index in `0..len` derived from the email, the same for every request
pub fn prelogin_kdf_index(email: &str, len: usize) -> usize {
let tag = hmac::sign(PRELOGIN_KDF_KEY.wait(), email.as_bytes());
let tag = tag.as_ref();
usize::from(u16::from_be_bytes([tag[0], tag[1]])) % len
}
pub fn encode_jwt<T: Serialize>(claims: &T) -> String {
match jsonwebtoken::encode(&JWT_HEADER, claims, PRIVATE_RSA_KEY.wait()) {
Ok(token) => token,
@@ -253,7 +271,7 @@ impl LoginJwtClaims {
premium: true,
name: user.name.clone(),
email: user.email.clone(),
email_verified: !CONFIG.mail_enabled() || user.verified_at.is_some(),
email_verified: user.verified(),
// ---
// Disabled these keys to be added to the JWT since they could cause the JWT to get too large
@@ -422,7 +440,7 @@ pub fn generate_file_download_claims(cipher_id: CipherId, file_id: AttachmentId)
let time_now = Utc::now();
FileDownloadClaims {
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap()).timestamp(),
exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(1).unwrap()).timestamp(),
iss: JWT_FILE_DOWNLOAD_ISSUER.to_string(),
sub: cipher_id,
file_id,
@@ -822,6 +840,12 @@ pub struct AdminHeaders {
pub org_id: OrganizationId,
}
impl AdminHeaders {
pub async fn log_event(&self, event_type: EventType, source_uuid: &str, org_id: &OrganizationId, conn: &DbConn) {
log_event(event_type, source_uuid, org_id, &self.user.uuid, self.device.atype, &self.ip.ip, conn).await;
}
}
#[rocket::async_trait]
impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for AdminHeaders {
type Error = &'static str;
@@ -1085,6 +1109,31 @@ fn ip_header_is_trusted(remote: Option<IpAddr>) -> bool {
trusted.split(',').filter_map(parse_trusted_proxy).any(|net| net.contains(&remote))
}
/// Each proxy appends the address it received the request from to a list header (`X-Forwarded-For: client, proxy1`).
/// Like ASP.NET's ForwardedHeaders, walk the entries of every occurrence of the header from the right and take the
/// first one that isn't a trusted proxy. If they all are, the leftmost one is the client.
fn client_ip_from_header(req: &Request<'_>, header: &str, is_trusted: impl Fn(IpAddr) -> bool) -> Option<IpAddr> {
let values: Vec<&str> = req.headers().get(header).collect();
client_ip_from_header_values(&values, header, is_trusted)
}
fn client_ip_from_header_values(values: &[&str], header: &str, is_trusted: impl Fn(IpAddr) -> bool) -> Option<IpAddr> {
let entries: Vec<&str> = values.iter().flat_map(|value| value.split(',')).map(str::trim).collect();
let mut client_ip = None;
for entry in entries.into_iter().rev() {
let Ok(ip) = entry.parse() else {
warn!("'{header}' header is malformed: {entry}");
break;
};
client_ip = Some(ip);
if !is_trusted(ip) {
break;
}
}
client_ip
}
#[rocket::async_trait]
impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientIp {
type Error = ();
@@ -1093,15 +1142,7 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientIp {
let remote = req.remote().map(|r| r.ip());
let ip = if CONFIG._ip_header_enabled() && ip_header_is_trusted(remote) {
req.headers().get_one(&CONFIG.ip_header()).and_then(|ip| {
match ip.find(',') {
Some(idx) => &ip[..idx],
None => ip,
}
.parse()
.map_err(|_| warn!("'{}' header is malformed: {ip}", CONFIG.ip_header()))
.ok()
})
client_ip_from_header(req, &CONFIG.ip_header(), |ip| ip_header_is_trusted(Some(ip)))
} else {
if CONFIG._ip_header_enabled() && req.headers().get_one(&CONFIG.ip_header()).is_some() {
// Log the canonical IP, which is what the user filter will need to match against
@@ -1220,7 +1261,7 @@ impl AuthMethod {
match scope {
None => err!("Missing scope"),
Some(scope) if scope == &method_scope => Ok(method_scope),
Some(scope) => err!(format!("Scope ({scope}) not supported")),
Some(scope) => err!(format!("Scope ({}) not supported", scope.escape_debug())),
}
}
}
@@ -1339,3 +1380,52 @@ pub async fn refresh_tokens(
Ok((device, auth_tokens))
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn client_ip(values: &[&str]) -> Option<IpAddr> {
let is_trusted = |ip: IpAddr| match ip {
IpAddr::V4(v4) => v4.is_private() || v4.is_loopback(),
IpAddr::V6(v6) => v6.is_loopback(),
};
client_ip_from_header_values(values, "X-Forwarded-For", is_trusted)
}
fn ip(s: &str) -> Option<IpAddr> {
Some(s.parse().unwrap())
}
#[test]
fn ip_header_single_value() {
assert_eq!(client_ip(&["203.0.113.5"]), ip("203.0.113.5"));
assert_eq!(client_ip(&["10.0.0.7"]), ip("10.0.0.7"));
assert_eq!(client_ip(&["2001:db8::1"]), ip("2001:db8::1"));
}
#[test]
fn ip_header_uses_rightmost_untrusted_entry() {
// Entries already in the request come before the one the proxy appended
assert_eq!(client_ip(&["198.51.100.1, 203.0.113.5"]), ip("203.0.113.5"));
// Trusted proxies on the right are skipped
assert_eq!(client_ip(&["198.51.100.1, 203.0.113.5, 10.0.0.2, 127.0.0.1"]), ip("203.0.113.5"));
// All trusted, so the leftmost entry is the client
assert_eq!(client_ip(&["192.168.1.10, 10.0.0.2"]), ip("192.168.1.10"));
}
#[test]
fn ip_header_reads_every_occurrence() {
assert_eq!(client_ip(&["198.51.100.1", "203.0.113.5"]), ip("203.0.113.5"));
assert_eq!(client_ip(&["198.51.100.1", "203.0.113.5, 10.0.0.2"]), ip("203.0.113.5"));
}
#[test]
fn ip_header_malformed_entries() {
assert_eq!(client_ip(&[]), None);
assert_eq!(client_ip(&[""]), None);
assert_eq!(client_ip(&["203.0.113.5, not-an-ip"]), None);
// Stops at the malformed entry and keeps the closest proxy
assert_eq!(client_ip(&["not-an-ip, 10.0.0.2"]), ip("10.0.0.2"));
}
}
+1 -5
View File
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ impl SendTokens {
return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Can't convert {access_id}"), "send_id_invalid", false);
};
let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&send_id, conn).await else {
let Some(send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&send_id, conn).await else {
return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Can't find {send_id}"), "send_id_invalid", false);
};
@@ -103,10 +103,6 @@ impl SendTokens {
}
}
if !send.register_access(conn).await? {
return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Send {send_id}, max access reached"), "send_id_invalid", true);
}
Ok(Self {
access_claims: generate_send_access_claims(&send_id),
})
+281
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, ser::Serialize};
use std::sync::LazyLock;
use crate::{
CONFIG,
api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult},
auth::{decode_jwt, encode_jwt},
db::models::UserId,
};
static JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|api.2fa", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct TwoFactorClaims<T> {
// Not before
pub nbf: i64,
// Expiration time
pub exp: i64,
// Issuer
pub iss: String,
// Subject
pub sub: UserId,
pub enabled: bool,
pub claims: T,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct AuthenticatorClaims {
#[serde(rename = "authenticator_key")]
pub key: String,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct DuoClaims {
#[serde(rename = "duo_data")]
pub data: Option<DuoData>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct WebauthnClaims {
#[serde(rename = "webauthn_keys")]
pub keys: Vec<i32>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct YubikeyClaims {
#[serde(rename = "yubi_keys")]
pub keys: Vec<String>,
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
pub struct DuoData {
pub host: String, // Duo API hostname
pub ik: String, // client id
pub sk: String, // client secret
}
impl DuoData {
pub fn global() -> Option<Self> {
match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
(true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
host,
ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
}),
_ => None,
}
}
pub fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
Self {
host: s.into(),
ik: s.into(),
sk: s.into(),
}
}
pub fn secret() -> Self {
Self::msg("<global_secret>")
}
pub fn obscure(self) -> Self {
let mut host = self.host;
let mut ik = self.ik;
let mut sk = self.sk;
let digits = 4;
let replaced = "************";
host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
Self {
host,
ik,
sk,
}
}
}
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct EmailClaims {
pub email: Option<String>,
}
fn token<T: Serialize>(user_id: UserId, enabled: bool, claims: T) -> String {
let time_now = Utc::now();
let claims = TwoFactorClaims {
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap()).timestamp(),
iss: JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string(),
sub: user_id,
enabled,
claims,
};
encode_jwt(&claims)
}
fn validate<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, enabled: bool) -> ApiResult<T> {
match decode_jwt::<TwoFactorClaims<T>>(token, JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string()) {
Ok(claims) => {
if claims.sub != *user_id {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid user");
}
if claims.enabled != enabled {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid state");
}
Ok(claims.claims)
}
Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to decode verification token: {err}")),
}
}
pub fn authenticator_token(user_id: UserId, key: String, enabled: bool) -> String {
token(
user_id,
enabled,
AuthenticatorClaims {
key,
},
)
}
pub fn validate_authenticator(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, key: &str, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
let claims = validate::<AuthenticatorClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
if claims.key != key {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid key");
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn duo_token(user_id: UserId, data: Option<DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> String {
token(
user_id,
enabled,
DuoClaims {
data,
},
)
}
// When disabling we check that it's the correct data
pub fn validate_duo(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, data: Option<&DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
let claims = validate::<DuoClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
if enabled && claims.data.as_ref() != data {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid duo data");
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn email_token(user_id: UserId, email: Option<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
token(
user_id,
enabled,
EmailClaims {
email,
},
)
}
// When disabling we check that it's the correct `email`
pub fn validate_email(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, email: String, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
let claims = validate::<EmailClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
if enabled && claims.email != Some(email) {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid email");
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn webauthn_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<i32>, enabled: bool) -> String {
token(
user_id,
enabled,
WebauthnClaims {
keys,
},
)
}
pub fn validate_webauthn(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &[i32], enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
let claims = validate::<WebauthnClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
if keys != claims.keys {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn yubikey_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
token(
user_id,
enabled,
YubikeyClaims {
keys,
},
)
}
pub fn validate_yubikey(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
let claims = validate::<YubikeyClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
if *keys != claims.keys {
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
use serde_json::{Value, from_value, to_value};
fn token<T: Serialize>(claims: T) -> Value {
to_value(TwoFactorClaims {
nbf: 0,
exp: 0,
iss: String::new(),
sub: UserId::from(String::from("4ff0f0a4-0aa4-4c1d-9d43-1f2bd4d5e8b1")),
enabled: false,
claims,
})
.unwrap()
}
#[test]
fn claims_only_parse_as_their_own_provider() {
let tokens = [
token(AuthenticatorClaims {
key: String::from("JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP"),
}),
token(DuoClaims {
data: None,
}),
token(WebauthnClaims {
keys: vec![1],
}),
token(YubikeyClaims {
keys: Vec::new(),
}),
token(EmailClaims {
email: None,
}),
];
for (issued, token) in tokens.iter().enumerate() {
let parsed = [
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<AuthenticatorClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<DuoClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<WebauthnClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<YubikeyClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<EmailClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
];
for (checked, ok) in parsed.into_iter().enumerate() {
assert_eq!(ok, issued == checked, "token {issued} parsed as {checked}");
}
}
}
}
+39 -48
View File
@@ -561,7 +561,7 @@ make_config! {
/// Auth Request cleanup schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that cleans old auth requests from the auth request.
/// Defaults to every minute. Set blank to disable this job.
auth_request_purge_schedule: String, false, def, "30 * * * * *".to_owned();
/// Duo Auth context cleanup schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that cleans expired Duo contexts from the database. Does nothing if Duo MFA is disabled or set to use the legacy iframe prompt.
/// Duo Auth context cleanup schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that cleans expired Duo contexts from the database. Does nothing if Duo MFA is disabled.
/// Defaults to once every minute. Set blank to disable this job.
duo_context_purge_schedule: String, false, def, "30 * * * * *".to_owned();
/// Purge incomplete SSO auth. |> Cron schedule of the job that cleans leftover auth in db due to incomplete SSO login.
@@ -675,7 +675,8 @@ make_config! {
/// other address use the remote IP instead, so a client can't spoof the header.
/// Either the string "local" (the default, any non-global address, which covers a reverse proxy
/// running on the same host or container network), the string "all" to accept it from anywhere,
/// or a comma separated list of IPs and CIDR ranges.
/// or a comma separated list of IPs and CIDR ranges. For a list header like X-Forwarded-For, the
/// client IP is the rightmost address that isn't a trusted proxy, so list every proxy in the chain.
ip_header_trusted_proxies: String, true, def, "local".to_owned();
/// Icon service |> The predefined icon services are: internal, bitwarden, duckduckgo, google.
/// To specify a custom icon service, set a URL template with exactly one instance of `{}`,
@@ -817,6 +818,8 @@ make_config! {
sso_enabled: bool, true, def, false;
/// Only SSO login |> Disable Email+Master Password login
sso_only: bool, true, def, false;
/// Allow SSO flow to create account |> You probably want to disable it when using a public provider
sso_signups_allowed: bool, true, def, true;
/// Allow email association |> Associate existing non-SSO user based on email
sso_signups_match_email: bool, true, def, true;
/// Allow unknown email verification status |> Allowing this with `SSO_SIGNUPS_MATCH_EMAIL=true` open potential account takeover.
@@ -863,16 +866,12 @@ make_config! {
duo: _enable_duo {
/// Enabled
_enable_duo: bool, true, def, true;
/// Attempt to use deprecated iframe-based Traditional Prompt (Duo WebSDK 2)
duo_use_iframe: bool, false, def, false;
/// Client Id
duo_ikey: String, true, option;
/// Client Secret
duo_skey: Pass, true, option;
/// Host
duo_host: String, true, option;
/// Application Key (generated automatically)
_duo_akey: Pass, false, option;
},
/// SMTP Email Settings
@@ -1267,10 +1266,18 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
err!("`AUTH_REQUEST_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
}
if !cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.is_empty() && cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
err!("`DUO_CONTEXT_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
}
if !cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.is_empty() && cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
err!("`PURGE_INCOMPLETE_SSO_AUTH` is not a valid cron expression")
}
if !cfg.disable_admin_token {
match cfg.admin_token.as_ref() {
Some(t) if t.starts_with("$argon2") => {
if let Err(e) = argon2::password_hash::PasswordHash::new(t) {
if let Err(e) = argon2::password_hash::phc::PasswordHash::new(t) {
err!(format!("The configured Argon2 PHC in `ADMIN_TOKEN` is invalid: '{e}'"))
}
}
@@ -1416,28 +1423,26 @@ pub enum PathType {
// Android (v2026.2.1): https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/6902c19c0093fa476bbf74ccaa70c9f14afbb82f/core/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/core/data/manager/model/FlagKey.kt#L31
// iOS (v2026.2.1): https://github.com/bitwarden/ios/blob/cdd9ba1770ca2ffc098d02d12cc3208e3a830454/BitwardenShared/Core/Platform/Models/Enum/FeatureFlag.swift#L7
pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
// Architecture
"desktop-ui-migration-milestone-1",
"desktop-ui-migration-milestone-2",
"desktop-ui-migration-milestone-3",
"desktop-ui-migration-milestone-4",
// Auth Team
"pm-5594-safari-account-switching",
"pm-32413-multi-client-password-management",
// Autofill Team
"ssh-agent",
"undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic",
"enable-basic-auth-response",
"ssh-agent-v2",
"windows-desktop-autotype",
"windows-desktop-autotype-ga",
// Key Management Team
"ssh-key-vault-item",
"pm-25373-windows-biometrics-v2",
"pm-26340-linux-biometrics-v2",
"biometrics-sdk-ipc",
"windows-native-credential-sync",
"enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
"pm-27278-v2-password-registration",
// Mobile Team
"anon-addy-self-host-alias",
"simple-login-self-host-alias",
"mutual-tls",
"cxp-import-mobile",
"cxp-export-mobile",
"pm-34171-card-scanner",
// Platform Team
"pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins",
// Vault Team
"pm-32009-new-item-types",
];
impl Config {
@@ -1509,15 +1514,6 @@ impl Config {
Ok(())
}
async fn update_config_partial(&self, other: ConfigBuilder) -> Result<(), Error> {
let builder = {
let usr = &self.inner.read().unwrap()._usr;
let mut overrides = Vec::new();
usr.merge(&other, false, &mut overrides)
};
self.update_config(builder, false).await
}
/// Tests whether an email's domain is allowed. A domain is allowed if it
/// is in signups_domains_whitelist, or if no whitelist is set (so there
/// are no domain restrictions in effect).
@@ -1544,6 +1540,17 @@ impl Config {
}
}
/// Tests whether SSO signup is allowed for an email address, taking into
/// account the sso_signups_allowed and signups_domains_whitelist settings.
pub fn is_sso_signup_allowed(&self, email: &str) -> bool {
if self.signups_domains_whitelist().is_empty() {
self.sso_signups_allowed()
} else {
// The whitelist setting overrides the signups_allowed setting.
self.is_email_domain_allowed(email)
}
}
// The registration link should be hidden if
// - Signup is not allowed and email whitelist is empty unless mail is disabled and invitations are allowed
// - The SSO is activated and password login is disabled.
@@ -1602,23 +1609,6 @@ impl Config {
inner._enable_smtp && (inner.smtp_host.is_some() || inner.use_sendmail)
}
pub async fn get_duo_akey(&self) -> String {
if let Some(akey) = self._duo_akey() {
akey
} else {
let akey_s = crate::crypto::encode_random_bytes::<64>(&data_encoding::BASE64);
// Save the new value
let builder = ConfigBuilder {
_duo_akey: Some(akey_s.clone()),
..Default::default()
};
self.update_config_partial(builder).await.ok();
akey_s
}
}
pub fn is_webauthn_2fa_supported(&self) -> bool {
Url::parse(&self.domain()).expect("DOMAIN not a valid URL").domain().is_some()
}
@@ -1731,7 +1721,7 @@ where
reg!("email/email_footer");
reg!("email/email_footer_text");
reg!("email/admin_reset_password", ".html");
reg!("email/admin_account_recovery", ".html");
reg!("email/change_email_existing", ".html");
reg!("email/change_email_invited", ".html");
reg!("email/change_email", ".html");
@@ -1750,6 +1740,7 @@ where
reg!("email/protected_action", ".html");
reg!("email/pw_hint_none", ".html");
reg!("email/pw_hint_some", ".html");
reg!("email/recover_twofactor", ".html");
reg!("email/register_verify_email", ".html");
reg!("email/send_2fa_removed_from_org", ".html");
reg!("email/send_emergency_access_invite", ".html");
+6 -3
View File
@@ -41,17 +41,20 @@ impl Archive {
) -> EmptyResult {
User::update_uuid_revision(user_uuid, conn).await;
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
diesel::replace_into(archives::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(archives::table)
.values((
archives::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid),
archives::cipher_uuid.eq(cipher_uuid),
archives::archived_at.eq(archived_at),
))
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(archives::archived_at.eq(archived_at))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving archive")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(archives::table)
.values((
archives::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid),
+8 -16
View File
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ impl Attachment {
let token = encode_jwt(&generate_file_download_claims(self.cipher_uuid.clone(), self.id.clone()));
Ok(format!("{host}/attachments/{}/{}?token={token}", self.cipher_uuid, self.id))
} else {
Ok(operator.presign_read(&self.get_file_path(), Duration::from_mins(5)).await?.uri().to_string())
Ok(operator.presign_read(&self.get_file_path(), Duration::from_mins(1)).await?.uri().to_string())
}
}
@@ -82,24 +82,16 @@ impl Attachment {
impl Attachment {
pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(attachments::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(attachments::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(attachments::table)
.filter(attachments::id.eq(&self.id))
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving attachment")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error saving attachment")
.map_res("Error saving attachment")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(attachments::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(attachments::id)
+29 -22
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use diesel::prelude::*;
use serde_json::Value;
use crate::{
api::EmptyResult,
api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult},
crypto::ct_eq,
db::{DbConn, schema::auth_requests},
error::MapResult,
@@ -82,31 +82,23 @@ impl AuthRequest {
}
impl AuthRequest {
pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(auth_requests::table)
.values(&*self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(auth_requests::table)
.filter(auth_requests::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error auth_request")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error auth_request")
}
postgresql {
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(auth_requests::table)
.values(&*self)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving auth_request")
}
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(auth_requests::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(auth_requests::uuid)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving auth_request")
}
@@ -174,6 +166,21 @@ impl AuthRequest {
.await
}
/// Marks the request as used to log in. Returns false when it already was, so it only works once.
pub async fn set_authentication_date(uuid: &AuthRequestId, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<bool> {
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
conn.run(move |conn| {
diesel::update(auth_requests::table)
.filter(auth_requests::uuid.eq(uuid))
.filter(auth_requests::authentication_date.is_null())
.set(auth_requests::authentication_date.eq(now))
.execute(conn)
.map(|updated| updated == 1)
.map_res("Error updating auth request")
})
.await
}
pub fn check_access_code(&self, access_code: &str) -> bool {
ct_eq(&self.access_code, access_code)
}
+131 -77
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use crate::{
},
},
error::MapResult,
util::LowerCase,
util::{LowerCase, convert_json_key_lcase_first},
};
use macros::UuidFromParam;
@@ -63,6 +63,18 @@ pub struct Cipher {
pub reprompt: Option<i32>,
}
/// Whether `data` is a v2 cipher blob, recognized like upstream by a top-level `format_version` key.
///
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Vault/Entities/Cipher.cs#L36-L41>
pub fn is_data_blob_encrypted(data: &str) -> bool {
serde_json::from_str::<Value>(data).is_ok_and(|d| is_blob_value(&d))
}
/// [`is_data_blob_encrypted`] for `data` that was already parsed.
fn is_blob_value(data: &Value) -> bool {
data.get("format_version").is_some()
}
pub enum RepromptType {
None = 0,
Password = 1,
@@ -70,7 +82,8 @@ pub enum RepromptType {
/// Local methods
impl Cipher {
pub fn new(atype: i32, name: String) -> Self {
/// The name is set when the data is saved, since a blob-encrypted cipher has it inside `data`
pub fn new(atype: i32) -> Self {
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
Self {
@@ -84,7 +97,7 @@ impl Cipher {
key: None,
atype,
name,
name: String::new(),
notes: None,
fields: None,
@@ -110,6 +123,11 @@ impl Cipher {
.insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].Notes"), serde_json::to_value([&max_note_size_msg]).unwrap());
}
if let Err(e) = cipher.validate_content(cipher.is_blob()) {
validation_errors
.insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].{}", e.field), serde_json::to_value([e.message]).unwrap());
}
// Validate the password history if it contains `null` values and if so, return a warning
if let Some(Value::Array(password_history)) = &cipher.password_history {
for pwh in password_history {
@@ -154,6 +172,10 @@ impl Cipher {
) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
use crate::util::{format_date, validate_and_format_date};
// Parsed once, since `data` can be large and this runs for every cipher in a sync
let type_data = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&self.data);
let is_blob_encrypted = type_data.as_ref().is_ok_and(is_blob_value);
let mut attachments_json: Value = Value::Null;
if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
if let Some(attachments) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_attachments.get(&self.uuid)
@@ -250,63 +272,9 @@ impl Cipher {
})
.unwrap_or_default();
// Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
// If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
let mut type_data_json = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data)
.inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid))
.map_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()), |d| d.data);
// NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
// Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
if self.atype == 1 {
// Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
&& !uris.is_empty()
{
// Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
// If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
for uri in &mut *uris {
if uri["match"].is_string() {
let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
Ok(n) => json!(n),
_ => Value::Null,
};
uri["match"] = match_value;
}
}
type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
}
// Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
}
}
// Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
// This breaks at least the native mobile clients
if self.atype == 2 {
match type_data_json {
Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
_ => {
type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
}
}
}
// Fix invalid SSH Entries
// This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
// The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
// Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
if self.atype == 5
&& (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
|| type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
|| type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
{
warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
type_data_json = Value::Null;
}
// Like upstream, fields and password history stored as NULL are sent as null, not `[]`
let fields_json = self.fields.is_some().then_some(fields_json);
let password_history_json = self.password_history.is_some().then_some(password_history_json);
let collection_ids = if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
if let Some(cipher_collections) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_collections.get(&self.uuid) {
@@ -403,10 +371,84 @@ impl Cipher {
_ => err!(format!("Cipher {} has an invalid type {}", self.uuid, self.atype)),
};
json_object[key] = type_data_json;
if is_blob_encrypted {
// Like upstream, sent as-is with the structured fields null
json_object["data"] = json!(self.data);
json_object["name"] = Value::Null;
} else {
json_object[key] = self.legacy_type_data_json(type_data);
}
Ok(json_object)
}
/// The per-type data of a legacy cipher, with fixups for values known to break clients.
fn legacy_type_data_json(&self, type_data: Result<Value, serde_json::Error>) -> Value {
use crate::util::validate_and_format_date;
// Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
// If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
let mut type_data_json = if let Ok(data @ Value::Object(_)) = type_data {
convert_json_key_lcase_first(data)
} else {
warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid);
Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new())
};
// NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
// Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
if self.atype == 1 {
// Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
&& !uris.is_empty()
{
// Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
// If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
for uri in &mut *uris {
if uri["match"].is_string() {
let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
Ok(n) => json!(n),
_ => Value::Null,
};
uri["match"] = match_value;
}
}
type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
}
// Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
}
}
// Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
// This breaks at least the native mobile clients
if self.atype == 2 {
match type_data_json {
Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
_ => {
type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
}
}
}
// Fix invalid SSH Entries
// This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
// The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
// Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
if self.atype == 5
&& (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
|| type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
|| type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
{
warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
type_data_json = Value::Null;
}
type_data_json
}
pub async fn update_users_revision(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<UserId> {
let mut user_uuids = Vec::new();
match self.user_uuid {
@@ -440,24 +482,16 @@ impl Cipher {
self.updated_at = Utc::now().naive_utc();
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(ciphers::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(ciphers::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(ciphers::table)
.filter(ciphers::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving cipher")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error saving cipher")
.map_res("Error saving cipher")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(ciphers::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(ciphers::uuid)
@@ -665,16 +699,27 @@ impl Cipher {
}
async fn get_user_collections_access_flags(&self, user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<(bool, bool, bool)> {
let user_uuid = user_uuid.to_string();
conn.run(move |conn| {
// Check whether this cipher is in any collections accessible to the
// user. If so, retrieve the access flags for each collection.
// The user must have a confirmed membership in the cipher's
// organization, since users_collections rows are kept when a
// membership is revoked or not confirmed yet.
ciphers::table
.filter(ciphers::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.inner_join(ciphers_collections::table.on(ciphers::uuid.eq(ciphers_collections::cipher_uuid)))
.inner_join(
users_organizations::table.on(ciphers::organization_uuid
.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid.nullable())
.and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.and(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))),
)
.inner_join(
users_collections::table.on(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid
.eq(users_collections::collection_uuid)
.and(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))),
// Only allow collection access via the confirmed membership.
.and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(users_collections::user_uuid))),
)
.select((users_collections::read_only, users_collections::hide_passwords, users_collections::manage))
.load::<(bool, bool, bool)>(conn)
@@ -705,6 +750,10 @@ impl Cipher {
.and(groups::organizations_uuid.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid))),
)
.filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
// Only allow group access via a confirmed membership, since
// groups_users rows are kept when a membership is revoked.
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(ciphers::organization_uuid.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid.nullable()))
.select((collections_groups::read_only, collections_groups::hide_passwords, collections_groups::manage))
.load::<(bool, bool, bool)>(conn)
.expect("Error getting group access restrictions")
@@ -997,6 +1046,7 @@ impl Cipher {
.eq(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
.and(collections_groups::groups_uuid.eq(groups::uuid))),
)
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(
users_organizations::access_all
.eq(true) // User has access all
@@ -1028,6 +1078,7 @@ impl Cipher {
.eq(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
.and(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))),
)
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(
users_organizations::access_all
.eq(true) // User has access all
@@ -1072,6 +1123,7 @@ impl Cipher {
.eq(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
.and(collections_groups::groups_uuid.eq(groups::uuid))),
)
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(
users_organizations::access_all
.eq(true) // User has access all
@@ -1104,6 +1156,7 @@ impl Cipher {
.eq(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
.and(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))),
)
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(
users_organizations::access_all
.eq(true) // User has access all
@@ -1155,6 +1208,7 @@ impl Cipher {
.or_filter(users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32)) // User is admin or owner
.or_filter(groups::access_all.eq(true)) //Access via group
.or_filter(collections_groups::collections_uuid.is_not_null()) //Access via group
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.select(ciphers_collections::all_columns)
.distinct()
.load::<(CipherId, CollectionId)>(conn)
+49 -66
View File
@@ -168,24 +168,16 @@ impl Collection {
self.update_users_revision(conn).await;
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(collections::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(collections::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(collections::table)
.filter(collections::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving collection")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error saving collection")
.map_res("Error saving collection")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(collections::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(collections::uuid)
@@ -375,6 +367,7 @@ impl Collection {
.and(collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(collections::uuid))),
)
.filter(collections::uuid.eq(uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(
users_collections::collection_uuid
.eq(uuid)
@@ -414,6 +407,7 @@ impl Collection {
.and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))),
)
.filter(collections::uuid.eq(uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(users_collections::collection_uuid.eq(uuid).or(
// Directly accessed collection
users_organizations::access_all.eq(true).or(
@@ -438,7 +432,8 @@ impl Collection {
.inner_join(
users_organizations::table.on(collections::org_uuid
.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid)
.and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))),
.and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))
.and(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))),
)
.left_join(
users_collections::table.on(users_collections::collection_uuid
@@ -484,7 +479,8 @@ impl Collection {
.inner_join(
users_organizations::table.on(collections::org_uuid
.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid)
.and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))),
.and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))
.and(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))),
)
.left_join(
users_collections::table.on(users_collections::collection_uuid
@@ -535,6 +531,7 @@ impl Collection {
.and(collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(collections::uuid))),
)
.filter(collections::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(
users_collections::collection_uuid
.eq(&self.uuid)
@@ -594,6 +591,7 @@ impl Collection {
.and(collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(collections::uuid))),
)
.filter(collections::uuid.eq(&uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(
users_collections::collection_uuid
.eq(&uuid)
@@ -658,6 +656,7 @@ impl Collection {
.and(collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(collections::uuid))),
)
.filter(collections::org_uuid.eq(&org_uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(
// Manage permission on a collection assigned directly or via a group.
users_collections::manage.eq(true).or(collections_groups::manage.eq(true)),
@@ -728,53 +727,30 @@ impl CollectionUser {
) -> EmptyResult {
User::update_uuid_revision(user_uuid, conn).await;
let values = (
users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid),
users_collections::collection_uuid.eq(collection_uuid),
users_collections::read_only.eq(read_only),
users_collections::hide_passwords.eq(hide_passwords),
users_collections::manage.eq(manage),
);
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(users_collections::table)
.values((
users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid),
users_collections::collection_uuid.eq(collection_uuid),
users_collections::read_only.eq(read_only),
users_collections::hide_passwords.eq(hide_passwords),
users_collections::manage.eq(manage),
))
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(users_collections::table)
.filter(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.filter(users_collections::collection_uuid.eq(collection_uuid))
.set((
users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid),
users_collections::collection_uuid.eq(collection_uuid),
users_collections::read_only.eq(read_only),
users_collections::hide_passwords.eq(hide_passwords),
users_collections::manage.eq(manage),
))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding user to collection")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error adding user to collection")
}
postgresql {
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(users_collections::table)
.values((
users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid),
users_collections::collection_uuid.eq(collection_uuid),
users_collections::read_only.eq(read_only),
users_collections::hide_passwords.eq(hide_passwords),
users_collections::manage.eq(manage),
))
.values(values)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(values)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding user to collection")
}
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(users_collections::table)
.values(values)
.on_conflict((users_collections::user_uuid, users_collections::collection_uuid))
.do_update()
.set((
users_collections::read_only.eq(read_only),
users_collections::hide_passwords.eq(hide_passwords),
users_collections::manage.eq(manage),
))
.set(values)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding user to collection")
}
@@ -850,10 +826,18 @@ impl CollectionUser {
.await
}
// Only returns the collections of organizations the user is a confirmed member of
pub async fn find_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
conn.run(move |conn| {
users_collections::table
.inner_join(collections::table.on(collections::uuid.eq(users_collections::collection_uuid)))
.inner_join(
users_organizations::table.on(users_organizations::org_uuid
.eq(collections::org_uuid)
.and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(users_collections::user_uuid))),
)
.filter(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.select(users_collections::all_columns)
.load::<Self>(conn)
.expect("Error loading users_collections")
@@ -909,19 +893,18 @@ impl CollectionCipher {
Self::update_users_revision(collection_uuid, conn).await;
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
// Not checking for ForeignKey Constraints here.
// Table ciphers_collections does not have ForeignKey Constraints which would cause conflicts.
// This table has no constraints pointing to itself, but only to others.
diesel::replace_into(ciphers_collections::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(ciphers_collections::table)
.values((
ciphers_collections::cipher_uuid.eq(cipher_uuid),
ciphers_collections::collection_uuid.eq(collection_uuid),
))
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding cipher to collection")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(ciphers_collections::table)
.values((
ciphers_collections::cipher_uuid.eq(cipher_uuid),
+18 -3
View File
@@ -146,15 +146,18 @@ impl Device {
}
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
mysql {
crate::util::retry(||
diesel::replace_into(devices::table)
diesel::insert_into(devices::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn),
10,
).map_res("Error saving device")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
crate::util::retry(||
diesel::insert_into(devices::table)
.values(&*self)
@@ -266,10 +269,22 @@ impl Device {
let devices = Self::find_by_user(user_uuid, conn).await;
for mut device in devices {
device.refresh_token = Device::generate_refresh_token();
device.twofactor_remember = None;
device.save(false, conn).await?;
}
Ok(())
}
pub async fn clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
conn.run(move |conn| {
diesel::update(devices::table)
.filter(devices::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.set(devices::twofactor_remember.eq::<Option<String>>(None))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error removing two factor remember tokens")
})
.await
}
}
#[derive(Display)]
+7 -15
View File
@@ -146,24 +146,16 @@ impl EmergencyAccess {
self.updated_at = Utc::now().naive_utc();
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(emergency_access::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(emergency_access::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(emergency_access::table)
.filter(emergency_access::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error updating emergency access")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error saving emergency access")
.map_res("Error saving emergency access")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(emergency_access::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(emergency_access::uuid)
+23 -14
View File
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ pub struct Event {
pub provider_org_uuid: Option<String>,
}
// Upstream enum: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Core/AdminConsole/Enums/EventType.cs
// Upstream enum: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/v2026.6.2/src/Core/Dirt/Enums/EventType.cs
#[derive(Debug, Copy, Clone)]
pub enum EventType {
// User
@@ -108,6 +108,12 @@ pub enum EventType {
OrganizationUserRejectedAuthRequest = 1514,
OrganizationUserDeleted = 1515, // Both user and organization user data were deleted
OrganizationUserLeft = 1516, // User voluntarily left the organization
// OrganizationUserAutomaticallyConfirmed = 1517,
// OrganizationUserSelfRevoked = 1518, // User self-revoked due to declining organization data ownership policy
OrganizationUserAdminResetTwoFactor = 1519,
// OrganizationUserRevoked_TwoFactorNonCompliance = 1520,
// OrganizationUserRevoked_SingleOrganizationNonCompliance = 1521,
OrganizationUserNotificationBannerActionClicked = 1522,
// Organization
OrganizationUpdated = 1600,
@@ -202,20 +208,23 @@ impl Event {
/// Basic Queries
pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
diesel::replace_into(event::table)
.values(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving event")
}
postgresql {
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(event::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(event::uuid)
.do_update()
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving event")
.values(self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving event")
}
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(event::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(event::uuid)
.do_update()
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving event")
}
}
}
+12 -21
View File
@@ -77,24 +77,16 @@ impl Folder {
self.updated_at = Utc::now().naive_utc();
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(folders::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(folders::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(folders::table)
.filter(folders::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving folder")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error saving folder")
.map_res("Error saving folder")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(folders::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(folders::uuid)
@@ -147,16 +139,15 @@ impl Folder {
impl FolderCipher {
pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
// Not checking for ForeignKey Constraints here.
// Table folders_ciphers does not have ForeignKey Constraints which would cause conflicts.
// This table has no constraints pointing to itself, but only to others.
diesel::replace_into(folders_ciphers::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(folders_ciphers::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding cipher to folder")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(folders_ciphers::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict((folders_ciphers::cipher_uuid, folders_ciphers::folder_uuid))
+49 -114
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use crate::{
};
use macros::UuidFromParam;
use super::{CollectionId, Membership, MembershipId, OrganizationId, User, UserId};
use super::{CollectionId, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, OrganizationId, User, UserId};
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
#[diesel(table_name = groups)]
@@ -104,7 +104,6 @@ impl Group {
"id": self.uuid,
"organizationId": self.organizations_uuid,
"name": self.name,
"accessAll": self.access_all,
"externalId": self.external_id,
"collections": collections_groups,
"object": "groupDetails"
@@ -166,24 +165,16 @@ impl Group {
self.revision_date = Utc::now().naive_utc();
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(groups::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(groups::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(groups::table)
.filter(groups::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving group")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error saving group")
.map_res("Error saving group")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(groups::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(groups::uuid)
@@ -257,6 +248,7 @@ impl Group {
.and(groups::organizations_uuid.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid))),
)
.filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(groups::access_all.eq(true))
.select(groups::organizations_uuid)
.distinct()
@@ -276,6 +268,9 @@ impl Group {
.and(users_organizations::org_uuid.eq(groups::organizations_uuid))),
)
.filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
// Only allow full access via a confirmed membership, since
// groups_users rows are kept when a membership is revoked.
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(groups::organizations_uuid.eq(org_uuid))
.filter(groups::access_all.eq(true))
.select(groups::access_all)
@@ -326,53 +321,30 @@ impl CollectionGroup {
group_user.update_user_revision(conn).await;
}
let values = (
collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(&self.collections_uuid),
collections_groups::groups_uuid.eq(&self.groups_uuid),
collections_groups::read_only.eq(&self.read_only),
collections_groups::hide_passwords.eq(&self.hide_passwords),
collections_groups::manage.eq(&self.manage),
);
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(collections_groups::table)
.values((
collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(&self.collections_uuid),
collections_groups::groups_uuid.eq(&self.groups_uuid),
collections_groups::read_only.eq(&self.read_only),
collections_groups::hide_passwords.eq(&self.hide_passwords),
collections_groups::manage.eq(&self.manage),
))
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(collections_groups::table)
.filter(collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(&self.collections_uuid))
.filter(collections_groups::groups_uuid.eq(&self.groups_uuid))
.set((
collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(&self.collections_uuid),
collections_groups::groups_uuid.eq(&self.groups_uuid),
collections_groups::read_only.eq(&self.read_only),
collections_groups::hide_passwords.eq(&self.hide_passwords),
collections_groups::manage.eq(&self.manage),
))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding group to collection")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error adding group to collection")
}
postgresql {
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(collections_groups::table)
.values((
collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(&self.collections_uuid),
collections_groups::groups_uuid.eq(&self.groups_uuid),
collections_groups::read_only.eq(self.read_only),
collections_groups::hide_passwords.eq(self.hide_passwords),
collections_groups::manage.eq(self.manage),
))
.values(values)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(values)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding group to collection")
}
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(collections_groups::table)
.values(values)
.on_conflict((collections_groups::collections_uuid, collections_groups::groups_uuid))
.do_update()
.set((
collections_groups::read_only.eq(self.read_only),
collections_groups::hide_passwords.eq(self.hide_passwords),
collections_groups::manage.eq(self.manage),
))
.set(values)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding group to collection")
}
@@ -415,6 +387,7 @@ impl CollectionGroup {
.and(collections::org_uuid.eq(groups::organizations_uuid))),
)
.filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.select(collections_groups::all_columns)
.load::<Self>(conn)
.expect("Error loading user collection groups")
@@ -497,43 +470,25 @@ impl GroupUser {
pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
self.update_user_revision(conn).await;
let values = (
groups_users::users_organizations_uuid.eq(&self.users_organizations_uuid),
groups_users::groups_uuid.eq(&self.groups_uuid),
);
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(groups_users::table)
.values((
groups_users::users_organizations_uuid.eq(&self.users_organizations_uuid),
groups_users::groups_uuid.eq(&self.groups_uuid),
))
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(groups_users::table)
.filter(groups_users::users_organizations_uuid.eq(&self.users_organizations_uuid))
.filter(groups_users::groups_uuid.eq(&self.groups_uuid))
.set((
groups_users::users_organizations_uuid.eq(&self.users_organizations_uuid),
groups_users::groups_uuid.eq(&self.groups_uuid),
))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding user to group")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error adding user to group")
}
postgresql {
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(groups_users::table)
.values((
groups_users::users_organizations_uuid.eq(&self.users_organizations_uuid),
groups_users::groups_uuid.eq(&self.groups_uuid),
))
.values(values)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding user to group")
}
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(groups_users::table)
.values(values)
.on_conflict((groups_users::users_organizations_uuid, groups_users::groups_uuid))
.do_update()
.set((
groups_users::users_organizations_uuid.eq(&self.users_organizations_uuid),
groups_users::groups_uuid.eq(&self.groups_uuid),
))
.do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding user to group")
}
@@ -618,26 +573,6 @@ impl GroupUser {
}
}
pub async fn delete_by_group_and_member(
group_uuid: &GroupId,
member_uuid: &MembershipId,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
match Membership::find_by_uuid(member_uuid, conn).await {
Some(member) => User::update_uuid_revision(&member.user_uuid, conn).await,
None => warn!("Member could not be found!"),
}
conn.run(move |conn| {
diesel::delete(groups_users::table)
.filter(groups_users::groups_uuid.eq(group_uuid))
.filter(groups_users::users_organizations_uuid.eq(member_uuid))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error deleting group users")
})
.await
}
pub async fn delete_all_by_group(group_uuid: &GroupId, org_uuid: &OrganizationId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
let group_users = GroupUser::find_by_group(group_uuid, org_uuid, conn).await;
for group_user in group_users {
+4 -2
View File
@@ -17,11 +17,12 @@ mod two_factor;
mod two_factor_duo_context;
mod two_factor_incomplete;
mod user;
mod user_signature_key_pair;
pub use self::archive::Archive;
pub use self::attachment::{Attachment, AttachmentId};
pub use self::auth_request::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId};
pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType};
pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType, is_data_blob_encrypted};
pub use self::collection::{Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionId, CollectionUser};
pub use self::device::{Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest, PushId};
pub use self::emergency_access::{EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType};
@@ -39,4 +40,5 @@ pub use self::sso_auth::{OIDCAuthenticatedUser, OIDCCodeResponseError, SsoAuth};
pub use self::two_factor::{TwoFactor, TwoFactorType};
pub use self::two_factor_duo_context::TwoFactorDuoContext;
pub use self::two_factor_incomplete::TwoFactorIncomplete;
pub use self::user::{Invitation, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserStampException};
pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserStampException};
pub use self::user_signature_key_pair::{SignatureAlgorithm, UserSignatureKeyPair};
+41 -7
View File
@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
use derive_more::{AsRef, From};
use diesel::prelude::*;
use serde::Deserialize;
@@ -11,6 +12,7 @@ use crate::{
schema::{org_policies, users_organizations},
},
error::MapResult,
util::format_date,
};
use super::{Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrganizationId, TwoFactor, UserId};
@@ -24,6 +26,7 @@ pub struct OrgPolicy {
pub atype: i32,
pub enabled: bool,
pub data: String,
pub revision_date: NaiveDateTime,
}
// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Core/AdminConsole/Enums/PolicyType.cs
@@ -46,9 +49,10 @@ pub enum OrgPolicyType {
RemoveUnlockWithPin = 14,
RestrictedItemTypes = 15,
UriMatchDefaults = 16,
// AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17, // Not supported yet
AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17,
// AutoConfirm = 18, // Not supported (not implemented yet)
// BlockClaimedDomainAccountCreation = 19, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
OrganizationUserNotification = 20,
}
// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Core/AdminConsole/Models/Data/Organizations/Policies/SendOptionsPolicyData.cs#L5
@@ -76,6 +80,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
atype: atype as i32,
enabled,
data,
revision_date: Utc::now().naive_utc(),
}
}
@@ -91,7 +96,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
"type": self.atype,
"data": data_json,
"enabled": self.enabled,
"revisionDate": null,
"revisionDate": format_date(&self.revision_date),
"object": "policy",
});
@@ -109,11 +114,13 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
/// Database methods
impl OrgPolicy {
pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
self.revision_date = Utc::now().naive_utc();
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(org_policies::table)
.values(self)
.values(&*self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
@@ -121,7 +128,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(org_policies::table)
.filter(org_policies::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(self)
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving org_policy")
}
@@ -141,10 +148,10 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
.map_res("Error deleting org_policy for insert")?;
diesel::insert_into(org_policies::table)
.values(self)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(org_policies::uuid)
.do_update()
.set(self)
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving org_policy")
}
@@ -186,6 +193,26 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
.await
}
pub async fn find_accepted_and_confirmed_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
conn.run(move |conn| {
org_policies::table
.inner_join(
users_organizations::table.on(users_organizations::org_uuid
.eq(org_policies::org_uuid)
.and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))),
)
.filter(
users_organizations::status
.eq(MembershipStatus::Accepted as i32)
.or(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32)),
)
.select(org_policies::all_columns)
.load::<Self>(conn)
.expect("Error loading org_policy")
})
.await
}
pub async fn find_by_org_and_type(
org_uuid: &OrganizationId,
policy_type: OrgPolicyType,
@@ -318,6 +345,13 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
}
pub async fn org_is_reset_password_auto_enroll(org_uuid: &OrganizationId, conn: &DbConn) -> bool {
// Account recovery depends on outbound mail. When SMTP is disabled, treat the
// auto-enroll policy as inactive so invites/registration are not forced to
// supply a reset-password key (see check_reset_password_applicable).
if !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
return false;
}
match OrgPolicy::find_by_org_and_type(org_uuid, OrgPolicyType::ResetPassword, conn).await {
Some(policy) => match serde_json::from_str::<ResetPasswordDataModel>(&policy.data) {
Ok(opts) => {
+62 -111
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,4 @@
use std::{
cmp::Ordering,
collections::{HashMap, HashSet},
};
use std::cmp::Ordering;
use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
@@ -24,8 +21,8 @@ use crate::{
use macros::UuidFromParam;
use super::{
Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionGroup, CollectionId, CollectionUser, Group, GroupId, GroupUser, OrgPolicy,
OrgPolicyType, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, CollectionUser, Group, GroupId, GroupUser, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType,
TwoFactor, User, UserId,
};
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
@@ -345,7 +342,7 @@ impl OrganizationApiKey {
impl Organization {
pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
if !crate::util::is_valid_email(&self.billing_email) {
err!(format!("BillingEmail {} is not a valid email address", self.billing_email))
err!(format!("BillingEmail {} is not a valid email address", self.billing_email.escape_debug()))
}
for member in &Membership::find_by_org(&self.uuid, conn).await {
@@ -353,25 +350,16 @@ impl Organization {
}
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(organizations::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(organizations::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(organizations::table)
.filter(organizations::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving organization")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error saving organization")
.map_res("Error saving organization")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(organizations::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(organizations::uuid)
@@ -527,8 +515,7 @@ impl Membership {
"limitCollectionDeletion": true,
"limitItemDeletion": false,
"allowAdminAccessToAllCollectionItems": true,
"userIsManagedByOrganization": false, // Means not managed via the Members UI, like SSO
"userIsClaimedByOrganization": false, // The new key instead of the obsolete userIsManagedByOrganization
"userIsClaimedByOrganization": false, // Means not managed via the Members UI, like SSO
"permissions": permissions,
@@ -545,7 +532,13 @@ impl Membership {
})
}
pub async fn to_json_user_details(&self, include_collections: bool, include_groups: bool, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
// Used by admins to view other members, so nothing here may depend on this member's status
pub async fn to_json_details_for_admin(
&self,
include_collections: bool,
include_groups: bool,
conn: &DbConn,
) -> Value {
let user = User::find_by_uuid(&self.user_uuid, conn).await.unwrap();
// Because BitWarden want the status to be -1 for revoked users we need to catch that here.
@@ -568,52 +561,23 @@ impl Membership {
// Check if a user is in a group which has access to all collections
// If that is the case, we should not return individual collections!
// This is used by admins to view other members, so it must not depend on the membership status
let full_access_group =
CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() && Group::is_in_full_access_group(&self.user_uuid, &self.org_uuid, conn).await;
CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() && GroupUser::has_full_access_by_member(&self.org_uuid, &self.uuid, conn).await;
// If collections are to be included, only include them if the user does not have full access via a group or defined to the user it self
// Only the collections assigned directly are returned, the ones assigned via a group are returned via a special group endpoint
let collections: Vec<Value> = if include_collections && !(full_access_group || self.access_all) {
// Get all collections for the user here already to prevent more queries
let cu: HashMap<CollectionId, CollectionUser> =
CollectionUser::find_by_organization_and_user_uuid(&self.org_uuid, &self.user_uuid, conn)
.await
.into_iter()
.map(|cu| (cu.collection_uuid.clone(), cu))
.collect();
// Get all collection groups for this user to prevent there inclusion
let cg: HashSet<CollectionId> = CollectionGroup::find_by_user(&self.user_uuid, conn)
CollectionUser::find_by_organization_and_user_uuid(&self.org_uuid, &self.user_uuid, conn)
.await
.into_iter()
.map(|cg| cg.collections_uuid)
.collect();
Collection::find_by_organization_and_user_uuid(&self.org_uuid, &self.user_uuid, conn)
.await
.into_iter()
.filter_map(|c| {
let (read_only, hide_passwords, manage) = if self.has_full_access() {
(false, false, self.atype >= MembershipType::Manager)
} else if let Some(cu) = cu.get(&c.uuid) {
(
cu.read_only,
cu.hide_passwords,
cu.manage || (self.atype == MembershipType::Manager && !cu.read_only && !cu.hide_passwords),
)
// If previous checks failed it might be that this user has access via a group, but we should not return those elements here
// Those are returned via a special group endpoint
} else if cg.contains(&c.uuid) {
return None;
} else {
(true, true, false)
};
Some(json!({
"id": c.uuid,
"readOnly": read_only,
"hidePasswords": hide_passwords,
"manage": manage,
}))
.map(|cu| {
json!({
"id": cu.collection_uuid,
"readOnly": cu.read_only,
"hidePasswords": cu.hide_passwords,
"manage": cu.manage || (self.atype == MembershipType::Manager && !cu.read_only && !cu.hide_passwords),
})
})
.collect()
} else {
@@ -661,7 +625,6 @@ impl Membership {
"status": status,
"type": membership_type,
"accessAll": self.access_all,
"twoFactorEnabled": twofactor_enabled,
"resetPasswordEnrolled": self.reset_password_key.is_some(),
"hasMasterPassword": !user.password_hash.is_empty(),
@@ -669,7 +632,6 @@ impl Membership {
"permissions": permissions,
"ssoBound": false, // Not supported
"managedByOrganization": false, // This key is obsolete replaced by claimedByOrganization
"claimedByOrganization": false, // Means not managed via the Members UI, like SSO
"usesKeyConnector": false, // Not supported
"accessSecretsManager": false, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
@@ -720,7 +682,6 @@ impl Membership {
"status": status,
"type": self.atype,
"accessAll": self.access_all,
"collections": coll_uuids,
"object": "organizationUserDetails",
@@ -753,24 +714,16 @@ impl Membership {
User::update_uuid_revision(&self.user_uuid, conn).await;
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(users_organizations::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(users_organizations::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(users_organizations::table)
.filter(users_organizations::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error adding user to organization")
},
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error adding user to organization")
.map_res("Error adding user to organization")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(users_organizations::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(users_organizations::uuid)
@@ -861,6 +814,21 @@ impl Membership {
.await
}
pub async fn find_accepted_and_confirmed_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
conn.run(move |conn| {
users_organizations::table
.filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.filter(
users_organizations::status
.eq(MembershipStatus::Accepted as i32)
.or(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32)),
)
.load::<Self>(conn)
.unwrap_or_default()
})
.await
}
pub async fn find_invited_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
conn.run(move |conn| {
users_organizations::table
@@ -1034,17 +1002,6 @@ impl Membership {
.await
}
pub async fn get_orgs_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<OrganizationId> {
conn.run(move |conn| {
users_organizations::table
.filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.select(users_organizations::org_uuid)
.load::<OrganizationId>(conn)
.unwrap_or_default()
})
.await
}
pub async fn find_by_user_and_policy(user_uuid: &UserId, policy_type: OrgPolicyType, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
conn.run(move |conn| {
users_organizations::table
@@ -1067,6 +1024,7 @@ impl Membership {
conn.run(move |conn| {
users_organizations::table
.filter(users_organizations::org_uuid.eq(org_uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.left_join(users_collections::table.on(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(users_organizations::user_uuid)))
.left_join(
ciphers_collections::table.on(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid
@@ -1093,6 +1051,7 @@ impl Membership {
conn.run(move |conn| {
users_organizations::table
.filter(users_organizations::org_uuid.eq(org_uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.inner_join(
groups_users::table.on(groups_users::users_organizations_uuid.eq(users_organizations::uuid)),
)
@@ -1128,6 +1087,7 @@ impl Membership {
.and(ciphers::organization_uuid.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid.nullable()))),
)
.filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
.filter(
users_organizations::atype.eq_any(vec![MembershipType::Owner as i32, MembershipType::Admin as i32]),
)
@@ -1186,25 +1146,16 @@ impl Membership {
impl OrganizationApiKey {
pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(organization_api_key::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(organization_api_key::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(organization_api_key::table)
.filter(organization_api_key::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving organization")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error saving organization")
.map_res("Error saving organization")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(organization_api_key::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict((organization_api_key::uuid, organization_api_key::org_uuid))
+14 -38
View File
@@ -140,6 +140,10 @@ impl Send {
None
}
fn access_id(&self) -> String {
BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(Uuid::parse_str(&self.uuid).unwrap_or_default().as_bytes())
}
pub fn to_json(&self) -> Value {
let mut data = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data).map(|d| d.data).unwrap_or_default();
@@ -150,7 +154,7 @@ impl Send {
json!({
"id": self.uuid,
"accessId": BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(Uuid::parse_str(&self.uuid).unwrap_or_default().as_bytes()),
"accessId": self.access_id(),
"type": self.atype,
"name": self.name,
@@ -182,7 +186,7 @@ impl Send {
}
json!({
"id": self.uuid,
"id": self.access_id(),
"type": self.atype,
"name": self.name,
@@ -202,24 +206,16 @@ impl Send {
self.revision_date = Utc::now().naive_utc();
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
match diesel::replace_into(sends::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(sends::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
{
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
// Record already exists and causes a Foreign Key Violation because replace_into() wants to delete the record first.
Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
diesel::update(sends::table)
.filter(sends::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving send")
}
Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
}.map_res("Error saving send")
.map_res("Error saving send")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(sends::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(sends::uuid)
@@ -264,7 +260,7 @@ impl Send {
/// Whether the Send is currently within its validity window: not disabled, not past its
/// expiration date, and not past its deletion date. Does not consider `max_access_count`
/// (consumed at token issuance) or the password.
/// (counted on each access) or the password.
pub fn is_accessible(&self) -> bool {
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
if self.disabled {
@@ -317,19 +313,6 @@ impl Send {
Ok(())
}
pub async fn find_by_access_id(access_id: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
let Ok(uuid_vec) = BASE64URL_NOPAD.decode(access_id.as_bytes()) else {
return None;
};
let uuid = match Uuid::from_slice(&uuid_vec) {
Ok(u) => SendId::from(u.to_string()),
Err(_) => return None,
};
Self::find_by_uuid(&uuid, conn).await
}
pub async fn find_by_uuid(uuid: &SendId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
conn.run(move |conn| sends::table.filter(sends::uuid.eq(uuid)).first::<Self>(conn).ok()).await
}
@@ -369,13 +352,6 @@ impl Send {
Some(total)
}
pub async fn find_by_org(org_uuid: &OrganizationId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
conn.run(move |conn| {
sends::table.filter(sends::organization_uuid.eq(org_uuid)).load::<Self>(conn).expect("Error loading sends")
})
.await
}
pub async fn find_by_past_deletion_date(conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
conn.run(move |conn| {
+2 -2
View File
@@ -137,11 +137,11 @@ impl TwoFactor {
.await
}
pub async fn find_by_user_and_type(user_uuid: &UserId, atype: i32, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
pub async fn find_by_user_and_type(user_uuid: &UserId, atype: TwoFactorType, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
conn.run(move |conn| {
twofactor::table
.filter(twofactor::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.filter(twofactor::atype.eq(atype))
.filter(twofactor::atype.eq(atype as i32))
.first::<Self>(conn)
.ok()
})
+119 -26
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ use macros::UuidFromParam;
use super::{
Cipher, Device, EmergencyAccess, Favorite, Folder, Membership, MembershipType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete,
UserSignatureKeyPair,
};
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
@@ -69,6 +70,13 @@ pub struct User {
pub avatar_color: Option<String>,
pub external_id: Option<String>, // Todo: Needs to be removed in the future, this is not used anymore.
pub key_id: Option<KeyId>,
// The v2 state: all set, with a `user_signature_key_pairs` row, or none, see `User::is_v2`
pub signed_public_key: Option<String>,
pub security_state: Option<String>,
pub security_version: Option<i32>,
}
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable)]
@@ -154,9 +162,19 @@ impl User {
avatar_color: None,
external_id: None, // Todo: Needs to be removed in the future, this is not used anymore.
key_id: None,
signed_public_key: None,
security_state: None,
security_version: None,
}
}
pub fn is_v2(&self) -> bool {
self.signed_public_key.is_some() && self.security_state.is_some() && self.security_version.is_some()
}
pub fn check_valid_password(&self, password: &str) -> bool {
crypto::verify_password_hash(
password.as_bytes(),
@@ -166,6 +184,10 @@ impl User {
)
}
pub fn master_password_salt(&self) -> String {
self.email.trim().to_lowercase()
}
pub fn check_valid_recovery_code(&self, recovery_code: &str) -> bool {
if let Some(ref totp_recover) = self.totp_recover {
crypto::ct_eq(recovery_code, totp_recover.to_lowercase())
@@ -253,12 +275,73 @@ impl User {
/// Database methods
impl User {
pub fn verified(&self) -> bool {
!CONFIG.mail_enabled() || self.verified_at.is_some()
}
async fn v2_signature_key_pair(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<UserSignatureKeyPair> {
if !self.is_v2() {
return None;
}
UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await
}
/// The `accountKeys` object (upstream's `PrivateKeysResponseModel`), null without a key pair
pub async fn account_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
if self.private_key.is_some() {
let (signed_public_key, signature_key_pair, security_state) = match self.v2_signature_key_pair(conn).await {
Some(key_pair) => (
json!(self.signed_public_key),
key_pair.to_json(),
json!({
"securityState": self.security_state,
"securityVersion": self.security_version,
}),
),
None => (Value::Null, Value::Null, Value::Null),
};
json!({
"publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
"wrappedPrivateKey": self.private_key,
"publicKey": self.public_key,
"signedPublicKey": signed_public_key,
"object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair",
},
"securityState": security_state,
"signatureKeyPair": signature_key_pair,
"object": "privateKeys"
})
} else {
Value::Null
}
}
pub async fn public_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
let (signed_public_key, verifying_key) = match self.v2_signature_key_pair(conn).await {
Some(key_pair) => (json!(self.signed_public_key), json!(key_pair.verifying_key)),
None => (Value::Null, Value::Null),
};
json!({
"publicKey": self.public_key,
"signedPublicKey": signed_public_key,
"verifyingKey": verifying_key,
"object": "publicKeys"
})
}
pub async fn to_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
let mut orgs_json = Vec::new();
for c in Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await {
orgs_json.push(c.to_json(conn).await);
}
let mut orgs_new_json = Vec::new();
for c in Membership::find_accepted_and_confirmed_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await {
orgs_new_json.push(c.to_json(conn).await);
}
let twofactor_enabled = !TwoFactor::find_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await.is_empty();
// TODO: Might want to save the status field in the DB
@@ -268,21 +351,7 @@ impl User {
UserStatus::Enabled
};
let account_keys = if self.private_key.is_some() {
json!({
"publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
"wrappedPrivateKey": self.private_key,
"publicKey": self.public_key,
"signedPublicKey": null,
"object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair",
},
"securityState": null,
"signatureKeyPair": null,
"object": "privateKeys"
})
} else {
Value::Null
};
let account_keys = self.account_keys_json(conn).await;
json!({
"_status": status as i32,
@@ -290,7 +359,7 @@ impl User {
"id": self.uuid,
"name": self.name,
"email": self.email,
"emailVerified": !CONFIG.mail_enabled() || self.verified_at.is_some(),
"emailVerified": self.verified(),
"premium": true,
"premiumFromOrganization": false,
"culture": "en-US",
@@ -299,6 +368,7 @@ impl User {
"privateKey": self.private_key,
"securityStamp": self.security_stamp,
"organizations": orgs_json,
"organizationsNew": orgs_new_json,
"providers": [],
"providerOrganizations": [],
"forcePasswordReset": false,
@@ -311,7 +381,7 @@ impl User {
pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
if !crate::util::is_valid_email(&self.email) {
err!(format!("User email {} is not a valid email address", self.email))
err!(format!("User email {} is not a valid email address", self.email.escape_debug()))
}
self.updated_at = Utc::now().naive_utc();
@@ -357,6 +427,7 @@ impl User {
Device::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
TwoFactorIncomplete::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
UserSignatureKeyPair::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
Invitation::take(&self.email, conn).await; // Delete invitation if any
conn.run(move |conn| {
@@ -459,19 +530,21 @@ impl Invitation {
pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
if !crate::util::is_valid_email(&self.email) {
err!(format!("Invitation email {} is not a valid email address", self.email))
err!(format!("Invitation email {} is not a valid email address", self.email.escape_debug()))
}
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
// Not checking for ForeignKey Constraints here
// Table invitations does not have any ForeignKey Constraints.
diesel::replace_into(invitations::table)
// Not checking for ForeignKey Constraints here
// Table invitations does not have any ForeignKey Constraints.
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(invitations::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_nothing()
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving invitation")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(invitations::table)
.values(self)
.on_conflict(invitations::email)
@@ -525,16 +598,36 @@ impl Invitation {
#[from(forward)]
pub struct UserId(String);
#[derive(
Clone,
Debug,
DieselNewType,
FromForm,
PartialEq,
Eq,
Hash,
Serialize,
Deserialize,
AsRef,
Deref,
Display,
From,
UuidFromParam,
)]
#[deref(forward)]
#[from(forward)]
pub struct KeyId(String);
impl SsoUser {
pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
db_run! { conn:
sqlite, mysql {
diesel::replace_into(sso_users::table)
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(sso_users::table)
.values(self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving SSO user")
}
postgresql {
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(sso_users::table)
.values(self)
.execute(conn)
+132
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
use diesel::prelude::*;
use serde_json::Value;
use crate::{
api::EmptyResult,
db::{DbConn, schema::user_signature_key_pairs},
error::MapResult,
util::get_uuid,
};
use super::UserId;
/// A user's signature key pair, part of the v2 state, in its own table like upstream.
///
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Sql/dbo/KeyManagement/Tables/UserSignatureKeyPair.sql#L1-L15>
#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
#[diesel(table_name = user_signature_key_pairs)]
#[diesel(treat_none_as_null = true)]
#[diesel(primary_key(uuid))]
pub struct UserSignatureKeyPair {
pub uuid: UserSignatureKeyPairId,
pub user_uuid: UserId,
pub signature_algorithm: i32,
/// The signing (private) key, wrapped by the user key.
pub signing_key: String,
/// The COSE-encoded public verifying key.
pub verifying_key: String,
pub created_at: NaiveDateTime,
pub updated_at: NaiveDateTime,
}
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/KeyManagement/Enums/SignatureAlgorithm.cs#L6-L10>
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SignatureAlgorithm {
Ed25519 = 0,
MlDsa44 = 1,
}
impl SignatureAlgorithm {
pub fn parse(algorithm: &str) -> Option<Self> {
match algorithm {
"ed25519" => Some(Self::Ed25519),
"mldsa44" => Some(Self::MlDsa44),
_ => None,
}
}
}
/// Local methods
impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
pub fn new(
user_uuid: UserId,
signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
signing_key: String,
verifying_key: String,
) -> Self {
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
Self {
uuid: UserSignatureKeyPairId(get_uuid()),
user_uuid,
signature_algorithm: signature_algorithm as i32,
signing_key,
verifying_key,
created_at: now,
updated_at: now,
}
}
pub fn to_json(&self) -> Value {
json!({
"wrappedSigningKey": self.signing_key,
"verifyingKey": self.verifying_key,
"object": "signatureKeyPair",
})
}
}
/// Database methods
impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
self.updated_at = Utc::now().naive_utc();
db_run! { conn:
mysql {
diesel::insert_into(user_signature_key_pairs::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving user signature key pair")
}
postgresql, sqlite {
diesel::insert_into(user_signature_key_pairs::table)
.values(&*self)
.on_conflict(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid)
.do_update()
.set(&*self)
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error saving user signature key pair")
}
}
}
/// The user's key pair. There is at most one, enforced by a unique index on `user_uuid`.
pub async fn find_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
conn.run(move |conn| {
user_signature_key_pairs::table
.filter(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
.first::<Self>(conn)
.ok()
})
.await
}
pub async fn delete_all_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
conn.run(move |conn| {
diesel::delete(user_signature_key_pairs::table.filter(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)))
.execute(conn)
.map_res("Error deleting user signature key pairs")
})
.await
}
}
#[derive(Clone, Debug, AsRef, Deref, DieselNewType, Display, From, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct UserSignatureKeyPairId(String);
+19
View File
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ table! {
atype -> Integer,
enabled -> Bool,
data -> Text,
revision_date -> Timestamp,
}
}
@@ -217,6 +218,22 @@ table! {
api_key -> Nullable<Text>,
avatar_color -> Nullable<Text>,
external_id -> Nullable<Text>,
key_id -> Nullable<Text>,
signed_public_key -> Nullable<Text>,
security_state -> Nullable<Text>,
security_version -> Nullable<Integer>,
}
}
table! {
user_signature_key_pairs (uuid) {
uuid -> Text,
user_uuid -> Text,
signature_algorithm -> Integer,
signing_key -> Text,
verifying_key -> Text,
created_at -> Timestamp,
updated_at -> Timestamp,
}
}
@@ -382,6 +399,7 @@ joinable!(collections_groups -> groups (groups_uuid));
joinable!(event -> users_organizations (uuid));
joinable!(auth_requests -> users (user_uuid));
joinable!(sso_users -> users (user_uuid));
joinable!(user_signature_key_pairs -> users (user_uuid));
allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
archives,
@@ -408,4 +426,5 @@ allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
collections_groups,
event,
auth_requests,
user_signature_key_pairs,
);
+82 -23
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,10 @@ use reqwest::{
};
use url::Host;
use crate::{CONFIG, util::is_global};
use crate::{
CONFIG,
util::{get_env_bool, is_global},
};
pub fn make_http_request(method: reqwest::Method, url: &str) -> Result<reqwest::RequestBuilder, crate::Error> {
static INSTANCE: LazyLock<Client> =
@@ -36,7 +39,7 @@ pub fn get_reqwest_client_builder(enforce_block: bool) -> ClientBuilder {
let mut headers = header::HeaderMap::new();
headers.insert(header::USER_AGENT, header::HeaderValue::from_static("Vaultwarden"));
let redirect_policy = reqwest::redirect::Policy::custom(|attempt| {
let redirect_policy = reqwest::redirect::Policy::custom(move |attempt| {
if attempt.previous().len() >= 5 {
return attempt.error("Too many redirects");
}
@@ -45,7 +48,7 @@ pub fn get_reqwest_client_builder(enforce_block: bool) -> ClientBuilder {
return attempt.error("Invalid host");
};
if let Err(e) = should_block_host(&host) {
if enforce_block && let Err(e) = should_block_host(&host) {
return attempt.error(e);
}
@@ -59,6 +62,14 @@ pub fn get_reqwest_client_builder(enforce_block: bool) -> ClientBuilder {
.timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))
}
fn dns_prefer_ipv6() -> bool {
// CONFIG may require DNS to initialize, so avoid forcing it during bootstrap.
match LazyLock::get(&CONFIG) {
Some(config) => config.dns_prefer_ipv6(),
None => get_env_bool("DNS_PREFER_IPV6").unwrap_or(false),
}
}
fn should_block_ip(ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
if !CONFIG.http_request_block_non_global_ips() {
return false;
@@ -258,12 +269,8 @@ impl CustomDnsResolver {
fn new() -> Arc<Self> {
TokioResolver::builder(TokioRuntimeProvider::default())
.and_then(|mut builder| {
// Hickory's default since v0.26 is `Ipv6AndIpv4`, which sorts IPv6 first
// This might cause issues on IPv4 only systems or containers
// Unless someone enabled DNS_PREFER_IPV6, use Ipv4AndIpv6, which returns IPv4 first which was our previous default
if !CONFIG.dns_prefer_ipv6() {
builder.options_mut().ip_strategy = hickory_resolver::config::LookupIpStrategy::Ipv4AndIpv6;
}
// Query both families; the preferred order is applied per lookup below.
builder.options_mut().ip_strategy = hickory_resolver::config::LookupIpStrategy::Ipv4AndIpv6;
builder.build()
})
.inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error creating Hickory resolver, falling back to default: {e:?}"))
@@ -289,6 +296,17 @@ impl CustomDnsResolver {
}
}
fn sort_addresses(addresses: &mut [SocketAddr], prefer_ipv6: bool) {
// `sort_by_key` orders `false` before `true`.
// When IPv6 is preferred, IPv6 addresses return `false` for `is_ipv4()` and sort first.
// When IPv4 is preferred, IPv4 addresses return `false` for `is_ipv6()` and sort first.
if prefer_ipv6 {
addresses.sort_by_key(SocketAddr::is_ipv4);
} else {
addresses.sort_by_key(SocketAddr::is_ipv6);
}
}
fn pre_resolve(name: &str, enforce_block: bool) -> Result<(), CustomHttpClientError> {
let Ok(host) = get_valid_host(name) else {
return Err(CustomHttpClientError::Invalid {
@@ -320,7 +338,9 @@ impl Resolve for CustomDns {
let this = Arc::clone(&self.resolver);
Box::pin(async move {
let name = name.as_str();
let results = this.resolve_domain(name, enforce_block).await?;
let mut results = this.resolve_domain(name, enforce_block).await?;
// Recheck after bootstrap so long-lived clients adopt the loaded config.
sort_addresses(&mut results, dns_prefer_ipv6());
if results.is_empty() {
warn!("Unable to resolve {name} to any valid IP address");
}
@@ -339,10 +359,29 @@ pub(crate) mod aws {
};
use reqwest::Client;
use super::get_reqwest_client_builder;
// Adapter that wraps reqwest to be compatible with the AWS SDK
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(crate) struct AwsReqwestConnector {
pub(crate) client: Client,
client: Client,
}
impl AwsReqwestConnector {
pub(crate) fn new() -> Self {
let client = get_reqwest_client_builder(false).build().expect("Failed to build AWS HTTP client");
Self {
client,
}
}
}
fn connector_error(error: reqwest::Error) -> ConnectorError {
if error.is_timeout() {
ConnectorError::timeout(Box::new(error))
} else {
ConnectorError::io(Box::new(error))
}
}
impl HttpConnector for AwsReqwestConnector {
@@ -362,10 +401,10 @@ pub(crate) mod aws {
req_builder = req_builder.body(body_bytes.to_vec());
}
let response = req_builder.send().await.map_err(|e| ConnectorError::io(Box::new(e)))?;
let response = req_builder.send().await.map_err(connector_error)?;
let status = response.status().into();
let bytes = response.bytes().await.map_err(|e| ConnectorError::io(Box::new(e)))?;
let bytes = response.bytes().await.map_err(connector_error)?;
Ok(HttpResponse::new(status, bytes.into()))
};
@@ -391,7 +430,7 @@ pub(crate) mod aws {
mod tests {
use super::*;
use crate::util::is_global_hardcoded;
use std::net::Ipv4Addr;
use std::net::{Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr};
use url::Host;
// ===
@@ -404,10 +443,30 @@ mod tests {
}
}
#[test]
fn dns_setup_does_not_initialize_config() {
assert!(LazyLock::get(&CONFIG).is_none());
drop(CustomDns::instance(false));
assert!(LazyLock::get(&CONFIG).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn dns_preference_orders_addresses() {
let ipv4 = SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST), 0);
let ipv6 = SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V6(Ipv6Addr::LOCALHOST), 0);
let mut addresses = [ipv6, ipv4];
sort_addresses(&mut addresses, false);
assert_eq!(addresses, [ipv4, ipv6]);
sort_addresses(&mut addresses, true);
assert_eq!(addresses, [ipv6, ipv4]);
}
#[test]
fn dotted_decimal_loopback_normalizes() {
let ip = parse_to_ip("127.0.0.1").unwrap();
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)));
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST));
assert!(!is_global_hardcoded(ip));
}
@@ -415,21 +474,21 @@ mod tests {
fn single_decimal_loopback_normalizes() {
// 127.0.0.1 == 2130706433
let ip = parse_to_ip("2130706433").unwrap();
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)));
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST));
assert!(!is_global_hardcoded(ip));
}
#[test]
fn hex_loopback_normalizes() {
let ip = parse_to_ip("0x7f000001").unwrap();
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)));
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST));
assert!(!is_global_hardcoded(ip));
}
#[test]
fn dotted_hex_loopback_normalizes() {
let ip = parse_to_ip("0x7f.0.0.1").unwrap();
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)));
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST));
assert!(!is_global_hardcoded(ip));
}
@@ -437,14 +496,14 @@ mod tests {
fn octal_loopback_normalizes() {
// 017700000001 == 127.0.0.1
let ip = parse_to_ip("017700000001").unwrap();
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)));
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST));
assert!(!is_global_hardcoded(ip));
}
#[test]
fn dotted_octal_loopback_normalizes() {
let ip = parse_to_ip("0177.0.0.01").unwrap();
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)));
assert_eq!(ip, IpAddr::V4(Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST));
assert!(!is_global_hardcoded(ip));
}
@@ -476,19 +535,19 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn get_valid_host_normalizes_decimal_int() {
let h = get_valid_host("2130706433").expect("valid");
assert!(matches!(h, Host::Ipv4(ip) if ip == Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)));
assert!(matches!(h, Host::Ipv4(ip) if ip == Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST));
}
#[test]
fn get_valid_host_normalizes_hex() {
let h = get_valid_host("0x7f000001").expect("valid");
assert!(matches!(h, Host::Ipv4(ip) if ip == Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)));
assert!(matches!(h, Host::Ipv4(ip) if ip == Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST));
}
#[test]
fn get_valid_host_normalizes_octal() {
let h = get_valid_host("017700000001").expect("valid");
assert!(matches!(h, Host::Ipv4(ip) if ip == Ipv4Addr::new(127, 0, 0, 1)));
assert!(matches!(h, Host::Ipv4(ip) if ip == Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST));
}
// ===
+27 -2
View File
@@ -531,6 +531,21 @@ pub async fn send_new_device_logged_in(address: &str, ip: &str, dt: &NaiveDateTi
send_email(address, &subject, body_html, body_text).await
}
pub async fn send_recover_twofactor(address: &str, ip: &str, dt: &NaiveDateTime) -> EmptyResult {
let fmt = "%A, %B %_d, %Y at %r %Z";
let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
"email/recover_twofactor",
json!({
"url": CONFIG.domain(),
"img_src": CONFIG._smtp_img_src(),
"ip": ip,
"datetime": crate::util::format_naive_datetime_local(dt, fmt),
}),
)?;
send_email(address, &subject, body_html, body_text).await
}
pub async fn send_incomplete_2fa_login(
address: &str,
ip: &str,
@@ -633,14 +648,24 @@ pub async fn send_test(address: &str) -> EmptyResult {
send_email(address, &subject, body_html, body_text).await
}
pub async fn send_admin_reset_password(address: &str, user_name: &str, org_name: &str) -> EmptyResult {
pub async fn send_admin_account_recovery(
address: &str,
user_name: &str,
org_name: &str,
reset_password: bool,
reset_2fa: bool,
fallback_2fa_email: bool,
) -> EmptyResult {
let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
"email/admin_reset_password",
"email/admin_account_recovery",
json!({
"url": CONFIG.domain(),
"img_src": CONFIG._smtp_img_src(),
"user_name": user_name,
"org_name": org_name,
"reset_password": reset_password,
"reset_2fa": reset_2fa,
"fallback_2fa_email": fallback_2fa_email,
}),
)?;
send_email(address, &subject, body_html, body_text).await
+4 -6
View File
@@ -137,9 +137,7 @@ fn parse_args() {
if let Some(command) = pargs.subcommand().unwrap_or_default() {
if command == "hash" {
use argon2::{
Algorithm::Argon2id, Argon2, ParamsBuilder, PasswordHasher, Version::V0x13, password_hash::SaltString,
};
use argon2::{Algorithm::Argon2id, Argon2, ParamsBuilder, PasswordHasher, Version::V0x13};
let mut argon2_params = ParamsBuilder::new();
let preset: Option<String> = pargs.opt_value_from_str(["-p", "--preset"]).unwrap_or_default();
@@ -172,10 +170,10 @@ fn parse_args() {
}
let argon2 = Argon2::new(Argon2id, V0x13, argon2_params.build().unwrap());
let salt = SaltString::encode_b64(&crypto::get_random_bytes::<32>()).unwrap();
let salt = crypto::get_random_bytes::<32>();
let argon2_timer = tokio::time::Instant::now();
if let Ok(password_hash) = argon2.hash_password(password.as_bytes(), &salt) {
if let Ok(password_hash) = argon2.hash_password_with_salt(password.as_bytes(), &salt) {
println!(
"\n\
ADMIN_TOKEN='{password_hash}'\n\n\
@@ -722,7 +720,7 @@ fn schedule_jobs(pool: db::DbPool) {
}
// Clean unused, expired Duo authentication contexts.
if !CONFIG.duo_context_purge_schedule().is_empty() && CONFIG._enable_duo() && !CONFIG.duo_use_iframe() {
if !CONFIG.duo_context_purge_schedule().is_empty() && CONFIG._enable_duo() {
sched.add(Job::new(CONFIG.duo_context_purge_schedule().parse().unwrap(), || {
runtime.spawn(purge_duo_contexts(pool.clone()));
}));
+17 -15
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ use std::{sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
use chrono::Utc;
use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From, Into};
use regex::Regex;
use url::Url;
use crate::{
@@ -175,16 +174,16 @@ pub fn decode_state(base64_state: &str) -> ApiResult<OIDCState> {
if let Ok(valid) = String::from_utf8(vec) {
OIDCState(valid)
} else {
err!(format!("Invalid utf8 chars in {base64_state} after base64 decoding"))
err!(format!("Invalid utf8 chars in {} after base64 decoding", base64_state.escape_debug()))
}
} else {
err!(format!("Failed to decode {base64_state} using base64"))
err!(format!("Failed to decode {} using base64", base64_state.escape_debug()))
};
Ok(state)
}
// redirect_uri from: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Identity/IdentityServer/ApiClient.cs
// redirect_uri from: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Identity/IdentityServer/StaticClientStore.cs
pub async fn authorize_url(
state: OIDCState,
client_challenge: OIDCCodeChallenge,
@@ -193,20 +192,21 @@ pub async fn authorize_url(
binding_hash: Option<String>,
conn: DbConn,
) -> ApiResult<Url> {
// The desktop app uses the localhost callback when it can't register the custom scheme (AppImage, dev builds)
let localhost_redirect_uri =
(8065..=8070).map(|port| format!("http://localhost:{port}")).find(|uri| uri == raw_redirect_uri);
let redirect_uri = match client_id {
"web" | "browser" => format!("{}/sso-connector.html", CONFIG.domain()),
"desktop" | "mobile" => "bitwarden://sso-callback".to_owned(),
"desktop" => localhost_redirect_uri.unwrap_or_else(|| "bitwarden://sso-callback".to_owned()),
"mobile" => "bitwarden://sso-callback".to_owned(),
"cli" => {
let port_regex = Regex::new(r"^http://localhost:([0-9]{4})$").unwrap();
if let Some(port) =
port_regex.captures(raw_redirect_uri).and_then(|captures| captures.get(1).map(|c| c.as_str()))
{
format!("http://localhost:{port}")
} else {
err!("Failed to extract port number")
}
let Some(uri) = localhost_redirect_uri else {
err!(format!("Unsupported redirect uri {}", raw_redirect_uri.escape_debug()))
};
uri
}
_ => err!(format!("Unsupported client {client_id}")),
_ => err!(format!("Unsupported client {}", client_id.escape_debug())),
};
let (auth_url, sso_auth) = Client::authorize_url(state, client_challenge, redirect_uri, binding_hash).await?;
@@ -242,7 +242,8 @@ impl OIDCIdentifier {
// During the 2FA flow we will
// - retrieve the user information and then only discover he needs 2FA.
// - second time we will rely on `SsoAuth.auth_response` since the `code` has already been exchanged.
// - second time we will rely on `SsoAuth.auth_response` since the `code` has already been exchanged,
// after checking the PKCE verifier again like upstream does on every redemption.
// The `SsoAuth` will ensure that the user is authorized only once.
pub async fn exchange_code(
code: &OIDCCode,
@@ -256,6 +257,7 @@ pub async fn exchange_code(
};
if let Some(authenticated_user) = sso_auth.auth_response.clone() {
Client::check_client_verifier(&client_verifier, &sso_auth)?;
return Ok((sso_auth, authenticated_user));
}
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