@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@
|
|||||||
<metadata>
|
<metadata>
|
||||||
<id>OpenSSL.Light</id>
|
<id>OpenSSL.Light</id>
|
||||||
<title>OpenSSL - The Open Source SSL and TLS toolkit</title>
|
<title>OpenSSL - The Open Source SSL and TLS toolkit</title>
|
||||||
<version>1.0.1.20140824</version>
|
<version>1.0.1.20141015</version>
|
||||||
<authors>Shining Light Productions</authors>
|
<authors>Shining Light Productions</authors>
|
||||||
<owners>Ethan Brown</owners>
|
<owners>Ethan Brown</owners>
|
||||||
<summary>Open Source SSL v2/v3 and TLS v1 toolkit</summary>
|
<summary>Open Source SSL v2/v3 and TLS v1 toolkit</summary>
|
||||||
<description>This is really 1.0.1i, but the Nuget spec doesn't allow such version identifiers, so the file versions are used.
|
<description>This is really 1.0.1j, but the Nuget spec doesn't allow such version identifiers, so the file versions are used.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library. The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its related documentation.
|
The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library. The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its related documentation.
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@@ -20,308 +20,142 @@
|
|||||||
<iconUrl>https://github.com/Iristyle/ChocolateyPackages/raw/master/OpenSSL.Light/OpenSSL.Light.png</iconUrl>
|
<iconUrl>https://github.com/Iristyle/ChocolateyPackages/raw/master/OpenSSL.Light/OpenSSL.Light.png</iconUrl>
|
||||||
<releaseNotes>https://www.openssl.org/news/changelog.html
|
<releaseNotes>https://www.openssl.org/news/changelog.html
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.2 [xx XXX xxxx]
|
Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
|
*) SRTP Memory Leak.
|
||||||
for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
|
|
||||||
bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
|
A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
|
||||||
[Bodo Moeller]
|
sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
|
||||||
|
to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
|
||||||
*) Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8.
|
exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
|
||||||
This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most
|
1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
|
||||||
common cases are optimized and there still is room for further
|
whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
|
||||||
improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added.
|
have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
|
||||||
[Andy Polyakov]
|
|
||||||
|
The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
|
||||||
*) Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target.
|
(CVE-2014-3513)
|
||||||
[Marcelo Cerri (IBM)]
|
[OpenSSL team]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES,
|
*) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
|
||||||
SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases
|
|
||||||
are optimized and there still is room for further improvements.
|
When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
|
||||||
Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported.
|
integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
|
||||||
[Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)]
|
ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
|
||||||
|
causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
|
||||||
*) Improved ARMv7 NEON support.
|
tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
|
||||||
[Andy Polyakov]
|
attack.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-3567)
|
||||||
*) Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first
|
[Steve Henson]
|
||||||
implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1,
|
|
||||||
SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation.
|
*) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
|
||||||
[Andy Polyakov, David Miller]
|
|
||||||
|
When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
|
||||||
*) Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a.
|
could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
|
||||||
RSAZ.
|
configured to send them.
|
||||||
[Shay Gueron (Intel Corp)]
|
(CVE-2014-3568)
|
||||||
|
[Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
|
||||||
*) Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2,
|
|
||||||
BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched"
|
*) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
|
||||||
implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support
|
Client applications doing fallback retries should call
|
||||||
for TLS encrypt.
|
SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-3566)
|
||||||
This work was sponsored by Intel Corp.
|
[Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
|
||||||
[Andy Polyakov]
|
|
||||||
|
*) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
|
||||||
*) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file():
|
|
||||||
this fixes a limiation in previous versions of OpenSSL.
|
Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
|
||||||
|
DigestInfo structures.
|
||||||
*) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest,
|
|
||||||
MGF1 digest and OAEP label.
|
Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
[Steve Henson]
|
||||||
*) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with
|
|
||||||
existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in
|
Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
|
||||||
the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap
|
|
||||||
algorithms and include tests cases.
|
*) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
|
||||||
|
g, A, B < N to SRP code.
|
||||||
*) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD
|
|
||||||
structure.
|
Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
|
||||||
[Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson]
|
Group for discovering this issue.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-3512)
|
||||||
*) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the
|
[Steve Henson]
|
||||||
difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
*) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
|
||||||
|
TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
|
||||||
*) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters
|
is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
|
||||||
received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated
|
downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
|
||||||
summary of the connection parameters.
|
higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
|
||||||
*) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary
|
researching this issue.
|
||||||
of connection parameters.
|
(CVE-2014-3511)
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
[David Benjamin]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions.
|
*) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
|
||||||
[Trevor Perrin (trevp@trevp.net) and Ben Laurie]
|
to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
|
||||||
|
with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
|
||||||
*) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs
|
ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
|
||||||
from CRLDP extension in certificates.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
Thanks to Felix Gr<47>bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
|
||||||
|
issue.
|
||||||
*) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs.
|
(CVE-2014-3510)
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
[Emilia K<>sper]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference
|
*) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
|
||||||
of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility.
|
to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-3507)
|
||||||
*) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve
|
[Adam Langley]
|
||||||
X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
*) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
|
||||||
|
processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
|
||||||
*) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in
|
Denial of Service attack.
|
||||||
certificates.
|
Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
(CVE-2014-3506)
|
||||||
|
[Adam Langley]
|
||||||
*) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose
|
|
||||||
HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download
|
*) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
|
||||||
CRLs using the OCSP API.
|
whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
|
||||||
|
Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
|
||||||
*) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs.
|
this issue.
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
(CVE-2014-3505)
|
||||||
|
[Adam Langley]
|
||||||
*) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application
|
|
||||||
configuration using configuration files or command lines.
|
*) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
|
||||||
|
up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
|
||||||
*) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the
|
|
||||||
message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option
|
Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
|
||||||
"enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable
|
issue.
|
||||||
tracing.
|
(CVE-2014-3509)
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
[Gabor Tyukasz]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions.
|
*) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
|
||||||
Print out extension in s_server and s_client.
|
dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
|
||||||
|
Denial of Service attack.
|
||||||
*) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature
|
|
||||||
OID NID.
|
Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam<61>ki (Codenomicon) for
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
discovering and researching this issue.
|
||||||
|
(CVE-2014-5139)
|
||||||
*) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a
|
[Steve Henson]
|
||||||
client to OpenSSL.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
*) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
|
||||||
|
X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
|
||||||
*) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements
|
from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
|
||||||
of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and
|
output to the attacker.
|
||||||
only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the
|
|
||||||
strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring.
|
Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
(CVE-2014-3508)
|
||||||
|
[Emilia K<>sper, and Steve Henson]
|
||||||
*) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check
|
|
||||||
algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert.
|
*) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
|
||||||
|
bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
|
||||||
*) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed
|
[Bodo Moeller]
|
||||||
by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client
|
|
||||||
certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name
|
|
||||||
comparison.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer
|
|
||||||
preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable
|
|
||||||
signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not
|
|
||||||
use the certificate.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it
|
|
||||||
possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in
|
|
||||||
the parent SSL_CTX. Include distint stores for certificate chain
|
|
||||||
verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN
|
|
||||||
to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returing
|
|
||||||
an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications
|
|
||||||
to test if a chain is correctly configured.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX
|
|
||||||
store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled
|
|
||||||
mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client
|
|
||||||
hello and checking the requested ciphersuite.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate
|
|
||||||
request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate
|
|
||||||
types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on
|
|
||||||
supported signature algorithms.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate
|
|
||||||
is required by client or server. An application can decide which
|
|
||||||
certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example
|
|
||||||
supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server.
|
|
||||||
This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client
|
|
||||||
certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing
|
|
||||||
certificate and specify the whole chain.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what
|
|
||||||
the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field
|
|
||||||
in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used
|
|
||||||
to have similar checks in it.
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode".
|
|
||||||
This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting
|
|
||||||
certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms
|
|
||||||
extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used
|
|
||||||
with caution as it could cause interoperability issues.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out
|
|
||||||
shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms
|
|
||||||
and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no
|
|
||||||
shared signature algorithms.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms
|
|
||||||
for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server
|
|
||||||
to support them.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates
|
|
||||||
from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added
|
|
||||||
it couldn't be removed.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate
|
|
||||||
verification. New verify options supporting checking in opensl utility.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking
|
|
||||||
functions. Add manual page.
|
|
||||||
[Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a
|
|
||||||
certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against
|
|
||||||
a certificate.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Fix OCSP checking.
|
|
||||||
[Rob Stradling (rob.stradling@comodo.com) and Ben Laurie]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs.
|
|
||||||
OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an
|
|
||||||
intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first
|
|
||||||
setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509
|
|
||||||
utility) or reject.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the
|
|
||||||
trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE,
|
|
||||||
platform support for Linux and Android.
|
|
||||||
[Andy Polyakov]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework.
|
|
||||||
[Andy Polyakov]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL.
|
|
||||||
When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal,
|
|
||||||
when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead.
|
|
||||||
This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the
|
|
||||||
(often lower performance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling
|
|
||||||
PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle
|
|
||||||
the new parameter format automatically.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly
|
|
||||||
to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled
|
|
||||||
the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of
|
|
||||||
hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call:
|
|
||||||
SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically
|
|
||||||
support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use
|
|
||||||
static structures instead of allocation if default values are used.
|
|
||||||
New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves.
|
|
||||||
Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client
|
|
||||||
to set list of supported curves.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and
|
|
||||||
supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility
|
|
||||||
to print out received values.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert
|
|
||||||
between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance
|
|
||||||
ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different
|
|
||||||
chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both
|
|
||||||
server and client use DH certificates with common parameters.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
*) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server
|
|
||||||
certificates.
|
|
||||||
[Steve Henson]
|
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
|
Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
|
@@ -11,8 +11,8 @@ try {
|
|||||||
#InnoSetup - http://unattended.sourceforge.net/InnoSetup_Switches_ExitCodes.html
|
#InnoSetup - http://unattended.sourceforge.net/InnoSetup_Switches_ExitCodes.html
|
||||||
silentArgs = '/silent', '/verysilent', '/sp-', '/suppressmsgboxes',
|
silentArgs = '/silent', '/verysilent', '/sp-', '/suppressmsgboxes',
|
||||||
"/DIR=`"$installDir`"";
|
"/DIR=`"$installDir`"";
|
||||||
url = 'https://slproweb.com/download/Win32OpenSSL_Light-1_0_1i.exe'
|
url = 'https://slproweb.com/download/Win32OpenSSL_Light-1_0_1j.exe'
|
||||||
url64bit = 'https://slproweb.com/download/Win64OpenSSL_Light-1_0_1i.exe'
|
url64bit = 'https://slproweb.com/download/Win64OpenSSL_Light-1_0_1j.exe'
|
||||||
}
|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
Install-ChocolateyPackage @params
|
Install-ChocolateyPackage @params
|
||||||
|
Reference in New Issue
Block a user