378 lines
17 KiB
XML
378 lines
17 KiB
XML
<?xml version="1.0"?>
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<package xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema">
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<metadata>
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<id>OpenSSL.Light</id>
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<title>OpenSSL - The Open Source SSL and TLS toolkit</title>
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<version>1.0.1.20141015</version>
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<authors>Shining Light Productions</authors>
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<owners>Ethan Brown</owners>
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<summary>Open Source SSL v2/v3 and TLS v1 toolkit</summary>
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<description>This is really 1.0.1j, but the Nuget spec doesn't allow such version identifiers, so the file versions are used.
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The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, full-featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL v2/v3) and Transport Layer Security (TLS v1) protocols as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptography library. The project is managed by a worldwide community of volunteers that use the Internet to communicate, plan, and develop the OpenSSL toolkit and its related documentation.
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The Win32 OpenSSL Installation Project is dedicated to providing a simple installation of OpenSSL. It is easy to set up and easy to use through the simple, effective installer. No need to compile anything or jump through any hoops, just click a few times and it is installed, leaving you to doing real work. Download it today! Note that these are default builds of OpenSSL and subject to local and state laws. More information can be found in the legal agreement of the installation.
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</description>
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<projectUrl>http://slproweb.com/products/Win32OpenSSL.html</projectUrl>
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<tags>openssl SSL TLS pfx pem key RSA</tags>
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<licenseUrl>http://www.openssl.org/source/license.html</licenseUrl>
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<requireLicenseAcceptance>false</requireLicenseAcceptance>
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<iconUrl>https://github.com/Iristyle/ChocolateyPackages/raw/master/OpenSSL.Light/OpenSSL.Light.png</iconUrl>
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<releaseNotes>https://www.openssl.org/news/changelog.html
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Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014]
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*) SRTP Memory Leak.
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A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who
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sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail
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to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be
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exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL
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1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of
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whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that
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have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected.
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The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team.
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(CVE-2014-3513)
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[OpenSSL team]
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*) Session Ticket Memory Leak.
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When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the
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integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session
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ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory
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causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session
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tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service
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attack.
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(CVE-2014-3567)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete.
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When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers
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could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be
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configured to send them.
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(CVE-2014-3568)
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[Akamai and the OpenSSL team]
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*) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV.
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Client applications doing fallback retries should call
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SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV).
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(CVE-2014-3566)
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[Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
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*) Add additional DigestInfo checks.
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Reencode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when
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verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded
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DigestInfo structures.
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Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014]
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*) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the
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SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that
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g, A, B < N to SRP code.
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Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC
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Group for discovering this issue.
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(CVE-2014-3512)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate
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TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message
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is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a
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downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a
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higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records.
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Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and
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researching this issue.
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(CVE-2014-3511)
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[David Benjamin]
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*) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject
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to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client
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with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH
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ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages.
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Thanks to Felix Gr<47>bert (Google) for discovering and researching this
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issue.
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(CVE-2014-3510)
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[Emilia K<>sper]
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*) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl
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to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
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Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
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(CVE-2014-3507)
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[Adam Langley]
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*) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst
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processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a
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Denial of Service attack.
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Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue.
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(CVE-2014-3506)
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[Adam Langley]
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*) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash
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whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This
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can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack.
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Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching
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this issue.
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(CVE-2014-3505)
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[Adam Langley]
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*) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed
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session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write
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up to 255 bytes to freed memory.
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Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this
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issue.
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(CVE-2014-3509)
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[Gabor Tyukasz]
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*) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer
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dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not
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properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a
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Denial of Service attack.
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Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietam<61>ki (Codenomicon) for
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discovering and researching this issue.
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(CVE-2014-5139)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as
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X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information
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from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing
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output to the attacker.
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Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue.
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(CVE-2014-3508)
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[Emilia K<>sper, and Steve Henson]
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*) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.)
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for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to
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bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.)
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[Bodo Moeller]
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Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014]
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*) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted
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handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL
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SSL/TLS clients and servers.
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Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and
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researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224)
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[KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson]
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*) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an
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OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing
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in a DoS attack.
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Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue.
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(CVE-2014-0221)
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[Imre Rad, Steve Henson]
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*) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can
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be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS
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client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary
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code on a vulnerable client or server.
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Thanks to J<>ri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195)
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[J<>ri Aedla, Steve Henson]
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*) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites
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are subject to a denial of service attack.
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Thanks to Felix Gr<47>bert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering
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this issue. (CVE-2014-3470)
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[Felix Gr<47>bert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson]
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*) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display
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compilation flags.
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[mancha (mancha1@zoho.com)]
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*) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure
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in i2d_ECPrivateKey.
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[mancha (mancha1@zoho.com)]
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*) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable.
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[mancha (mancha1@zoho.com)]
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Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014]
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*) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension
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can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or
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server.
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Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to
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Adam Langley (agl@chromium.org) and Bodo Moeller (bmoeller@acm.org) for
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preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160)
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[Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller]
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*) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL
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ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack"
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by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from:
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http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140
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Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this
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flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076)
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[Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger]
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*) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03
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Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the
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TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and
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less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it
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is at least 512 bytes long.
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[Adam Langley, Steve Henson]
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Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014]
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*) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid
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handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception.
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Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues.
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(CVE-2013-4353)
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*) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission
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structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need
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to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which
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avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be
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Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for
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several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug
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is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing
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10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer.
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[Rob Stradling, Adam Langley]
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Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]
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*) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI
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supporting platforms or when small records were transferred.
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[Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
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Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013]
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*) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time.
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This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by
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Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found
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at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/
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Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information
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Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London
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(www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and
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Emilia K<>sper for the initial patch.
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(CVE-2013-0169)
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[Emilia K<>sper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson]
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*) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode
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ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack.
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Thanks go to and to Adam Langley (agl@chromium.org) for discovering
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and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger
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(wolfgang.ettlinger@gmail.com) for independently discovering this issue.
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(CVE-2012-2686)
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[Adam Langley]
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*) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL.
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This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Make openssl verify return errors.
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[Chris Palmer (palmer@google.com) and Ben Laurie]
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*) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so
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the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate()
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so it returns the certificate actually sent.
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See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836.
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[Rob Stradling (rob.stradling@comodo.com)]
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*) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys.
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello
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if renegotiating.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]
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*) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS
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1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to avoid DoS attack.
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Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic
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fuzzing as a service testing platform.
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(CVE-2012-2333)
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages.
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Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue.
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[Steve Henson]
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*) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not
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approved.
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[Steve Henson]
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Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]
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*) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and
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1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately
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mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting
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SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disablng
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TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to
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0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against
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OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
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will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in
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inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context,
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in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below].
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[Steve Henson]
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*) In order to ensure interoperabilty SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not
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disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are
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protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means
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that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and
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above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass
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SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to
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client side.
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[Andy Polyakov]
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Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]
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*) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio
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BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer
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in CRYPTO_realloc_clean.
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Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this
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issue and to Adam Langley <agl@chromium.org> for fixing it.
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(CVE-2012-2110)
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[Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team]
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*) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections.
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[Adam Langley]
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*) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello
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record length exceeds 255 bytes:
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1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client
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hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work.
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2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate
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the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be
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set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing:
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-DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure.
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Most broken servers should now work.
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3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable
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TLS 1.2 client support entirely.
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[Steve Henson]
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*) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH.
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[Andy Polyakov]</releaseNotes>
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</metadata>
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||
<files>
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||
<file src="tools\**" target="tools" />
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||
</files>
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||
</package>
|