Use a credential id in the passkey test that typos accepts

Co-authored-by: zUnixorn <77864446+zUnixorn@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: a15355447898a <62456287+a15355447898a@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Sammy ETUR <50653464+samos667@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Zaid Marji <91486926+zaid-marji@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Raphaël Roumezin <94066559+RaphaelRoumezin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Keng <39216134+kengzzzz@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Akhil Babel <335565203+akh1lb@users.noreply.github.com>

.env.template

@@ -642,6 +642,12 @@
 ## In any case, if a code has been used it can not be used again, also codes which predates it will be invalid.
 # AUTHENTICATOR_DISABLE_TIME_DRIFT=false
 
+## Passkey login extra origins
+## Origins that may log in with a passkey besides the vault and the official Chromium extensions (Chrome Web Store,
+## Edge and Opera add-ons), separated by commas. For Bitwarden clients with an origin of their own, such as a
+## self-built browser extension or an app.
+# PASSKEY_LOGIN_EXTRA_ORIGINS=chrome-extension://<extension id>,android:apk-key-hash:<signing certificate hash>
+
 ###########################
 ### SMTP Email settings ###
 ###########################

Cargo.toml

@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ yubico_ng = { version = "1.0.0", default-features = false }
 # WebAuthn libraries
 # danger-allow-state-serialisation is needed to save the state in the db
 # danger-credential-internals is needed to support U2F to Webauthn migration
-webauthn-rs = { version = "0.5.5", features = ["danger-allow-state-serialisation", "danger-credential-internals"] }
+webauthn-rs = { version = "0.5.5", features = ["conditional-ui", "danger-allow-state-serialisation", "danger-credential-internals"] }
 webauthn-rs-proto = "0.5.5"
 webauthn-rs-core = "0.5.5"
 serde_cbor_2 = { version = "0.13.0", optional = true }

migrations/mysql/2026-11-14-120000_add_custom_role_manage_reset_password/down.sql

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
--- Dropping the permission would silently take it away from the Custom members holding it. So while there are any,
--- this fails on the duplicate key below, before anything is dropped: take it away first, or restore the backup
--- taken before the upgrade.
--- A failed attempt leaves the temporary table on this connection. Clear it before retrying.
-DROP TEMPORARY TABLE IF EXISTS custom_role_downgrade;
-CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
-    SELECT 'Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
-    FROM users_organizations WHERE manage_reset_password LIMIT 1;
-DROP TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
-
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_reset_password;

migrations/mysql/2026-11-14-120000_add_custom_role_manage_reset_password/up.sql

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
--- The Manage account recovery permission of the Custom member role. Like the other permissions it only takes
--- effect on a Custom membership (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and nobody starts with it.
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_reset_password BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;

migrations/mysql/2026-11-15-120000_add_webauthn_credentials/down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS webauthn_credentials;

migrations/mysql/2026-11-15-120000_add_webauthn_credentials/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+CREATE TABLE webauthn_credentials (
+    uuid                     CHAR(36)     NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_uuid                CHAR(36)     NOT NULL,
+    name                     TEXT         NOT NULL,
+    credential_id            VARCHAR(256) NOT NULL,
+    credential               TEXT         NOT NULL,
+    supports_prf             BOOLEAN      NOT NULL,
+    encrypted_user_key       TEXT,
+    encrypted_public_key     TEXT,
+    encrypted_private_key    TEXT,
+    last_challenge_issued_at BIGINT,
+    created_at               DATETIME     NOT NULL,
+    updated_at               DATETIME     NOT NULL,
+    UNIQUE (user_uuid, credential_id),
+    FOREIGN KEY (user_uuid) REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE
+);

migrations/postgresql/2026-11-14-120000_add_custom_role_manage_reset_password/down.sql

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
--- Dropping the permission would silently take it away from the Custom members holding it. So while there are any,
--- this fails on the duplicate key below: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade.
--- It needs to run in one transaction, as Diesel does.
-CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
-    SELECT 'Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
-    FROM users_organizations WHERE manage_reset_password LIMIT 1;
-DROP TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
-
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_reset_password;

migrations/postgresql/2026-11-14-120000_add_custom_role_manage_reset_password/up.sql

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
--- The Manage account recovery permission of the Custom member role. Like the other permissions it only takes
--- effect on a Custom membership (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and nobody starts with it.
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_reset_password BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;

migrations/postgresql/2026-11-15-120000_add_webauthn_credentials/down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS webauthn_credentials;

migrations/postgresql/2026-11-15-120000_add_webauthn_credentials/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+CREATE TABLE webauthn_credentials (
+    uuid                     CHAR(36)  NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_uuid                CHAR(36)  NOT NULL REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    name                     TEXT      NOT NULL,
+    credential_id            TEXT      NOT NULL,
+    credential               TEXT      NOT NULL,
+    supports_prf             BOOLEAN   NOT NULL,
+    encrypted_user_key       TEXT,
+    encrypted_public_key     TEXT,
+    encrypted_private_key    TEXT,
+    last_challenge_issued_at BIGINT,
+    created_at               TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
+    updated_at               TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
+    UNIQUE (user_uuid, credential_id)
+);

migrations/sqlite/2026-11-14-120000_add_custom_role_manage_reset_password/down.sql

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
--- Dropping the permission would silently take it away from the Custom members holding it. So while there are any,
--- this fails on the duplicate key below: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade.
--- It needs to run in one transaction, as Diesel does.
-CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
-    SELECT 'Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
-    FROM users_organizations WHERE manage_reset_password LIMIT 1;
-DROP TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
-
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_reset_password;

migrations/sqlite/2026-11-14-120000_add_custom_role_manage_reset_password/up.sql

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
--- The Manage account recovery permission of the Custom member role. Like the other permissions it only takes
--- effect on a Custom membership (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and nobody starts with it.
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_reset_password BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE

migrations/sqlite/2026-11-15-120000_add_webauthn_credentials/down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS webauthn_credentials;

migrations/sqlite/2026-11-15-120000_add_webauthn_credentials/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+CREATE TABLE webauthn_credentials (
+    uuid                     TEXT     NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_uuid                TEXT     NOT NULL REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    name                     TEXT     NOT NULL,
+    credential_id            TEXT     NOT NULL,
+    credential               TEXT     NOT NULL,
+    supports_prf             BOOLEAN  NOT NULL,
+    encrypted_user_key       TEXT,
+    encrypted_public_key     TEXT,
+    encrypted_private_key    TEXT,
+    last_challenge_issued_at BIGINT,
+    created_at               DATETIME NOT NULL,
+    updated_at               DATETIME NOT NULL,
+    UNIQUE (user_uuid, credential_id)
+);

src/api/core/accounts.rs

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use crate::{
             AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, Cipher, CipherId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest,
             EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EventType, Folder, FolderId, Invitation, KeyId, Membership,
             MembershipId, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationId, Send, SendId, SignatureAlgorithm,
-            User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserSignatureKeyPair,
+            User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserSignatureKeyPair, WebauthnCredential,
         },
     },
     mail,
@@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ struct MasterPasswordUnlockData {
     contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }
 
-/// The unlock data of both rotation endpoints; passkey and device keys are ignored, as we support neither.
+/// The unlock data of both rotation endpoints. Device keys are ignored, as we don't support trusted devices.
 ///
 /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/KeyManagement/Models/Requests/CommonUnlockDataRequestModel.cs#L7-L14>
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -1237,8 +1237,7 @@ struct MasterPasswordUnlockData {
 struct CommonUnlockData {
     emergency_access_unlock_data: Vec<UpdateEmergencyAccessData>,
     organization_account_recovery_unlock_data: Vec<UpdateResetPasswordData>,
-    #[expect(dead_code, reason = "Required like upstream, but unused")]
-    passkey_unlock_data: Vec<Value>,
+    passkey_unlock_data: Vec<super::webauthn_login::PasskeyUnlockData>,
     #[expect(dead_code, reason = "Required like upstream, but unused")]
     device_key_unlock_data: Vec<Value>,
     v2_upgrade_token: Option<V2UpgradeTokenData>,
@@ -1481,7 +1480,7 @@ async fn get_key_rotation_data(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
         "organizationPasswordResetKeyData": organization_data,
         "emergencyAccessKeyData": emergency_access_data,
         "trustedDeviceKeyData": [],
-        "passkeyKeyData": [],
+        "passkeyKeyData": super::webauthn_login::rotation_key_data(user_id, &conn).await,
         "object": "keyRotationData",
     })))
 }
@@ -1643,6 +1642,7 @@ async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: No
     // We only rotate the reset password key if it is set.
     existing_memberships.retain(|m| m.reset_password_key.is_some());
     let mut existing_sends = Send::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
+    let existing_passkeys = WebauthnCredential::find_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
 
     validate_rotation_data(
         &data,
@@ -1701,6 +1701,9 @@ async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: No
         }
     }
 
+    let rotated_passkeys =
+        super::webauthn_login::validate_rotation(existing_passkeys, &data.unlock_data.passkey_unlock_data)?;
+
     // Saving's own checks, so that they can't fail halfway
     for cipher_data in data.account_data.ciphers.iter().filter(|c| c.organization_id.is_none()) {
         if let Some(cipher) = existing_ciphers.iter().find(|c| cipher_data.id.as_ref() == Some(&c.uuid)) {
@@ -1745,6 +1748,10 @@ async fn rotate_account(data: RotateData, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: No
         }
     }
 
+    for (passkey, encrypted_user_key, encrypted_public_key) in rotated_passkeys {
+        passkey.rotate_keys(encrypted_user_key, encrypted_public_key, &conn).await?;
+    }
+
     // Update send data
     for send_data in data.account_data.sends {
         if let Some(send) = send_data.id.as_ref().and_then(|id| existing_sends.iter_mut().find(|s| &s.uuid == id)) {

src/api/core/ciphers.rs

@@ -206,6 +206,9 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
     if let Some(v2_upgrade_token) = headers.user.v2_upgrade_token_json() {
         user_decryption["v2UpgradeToken"] = v2_upgrade_token;
     }
+    if let Some(prf_options) = super::webauthn_login::sync_prf_options(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await {
+        user_decryption["webAuthnPrfOptions"] = prf_options;
+    }
 
     Ok(Json(json!({
         "profile": user_json,

src/api/core/mod.rs

@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ mod folders;
 mod organizations;
 mod public;
 mod sends;
+pub mod webauthn_login;
 
 pub use accounts::purge_auth_requests;
 pub use ciphers::{CipherData, CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType, purge_trashed_ciphers};
@@ -37,7 +38,7 @@ use crate::{
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
     let mut eq_domains_routes = routes![get_settings_domains, post_settings_domains, put_settings_domains];
     let mut hibp_routes = routes![hibp_breach];
-    let mut meta_routes = routes![alive, now, version, config, get_api_webauthn];
+    let mut meta_routes = routes![alive, now, version, config];
 
     let mut routes = Vec::new();
     routes.append(&mut accounts::routes());
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
     routes.append(&mut folders::routes());
     routes.append(&mut organizations::routes());
     routes.append(&mut two_factor::routes());
+    routes.append(&mut webauthn_login::routes());
     routes.append(&mut sends::routes());
     routes.append(&mut public::routes());
     routes.append(&mut eq_domains_routes);
@@ -197,18 +199,6 @@ fn version() -> Json<&'static str> {
     Json(crate::VERSION.unwrap_or_default())
 }
 
-#[get("/webauthn")]
-fn get_api_webauthn(_headers: Headers) -> Json<Value> {
-    // Prevent a 404 error, which also causes key-rotation issues
-    // It looks like this is used when login with passkeys is enabled, which Vaultwarden does not (yet) support
-    // An empty list/data also works fine
-    Json(json!({
-        "object": "list",
-        "data": [],
-        "continuationToken": null
-    }))
-}
-
 #[get("/config")]
 fn config() -> Json<Value> {
     let domain = CONFIG.domain();

src/api/core/organizations.rs

@@ -13,9 +13,8 @@ use crate::{
     },
     auth::{
         AccessImportExportHeaders, AdminHeaders, CollectionAction, CollectionDeleteHeaders, CollectionReadHeaders,
-        CollectionUsersReadHeaders, Headers, ManageGroupsHeaders, ManagePoliciesHeaders, ManageResetPasswordHeaders,
-        ManageUsersHeaders, ManagerHeaders, ManagerHeadersLoose, OrgMemberHeaders, OwnerHeaders, custom_member_may,
-        decode_invite,
+        CollectionUsersReadHeaders, Headers, ManageGroupsHeaders, ManagePoliciesHeaders, ManageUsersHeaders,
+        ManagerHeaders, ManagerHeadersLoose, OrgMemberHeaders, OwnerHeaders, custom_member_may, decode_invite,
     },
     db::{
         DbConn,
@@ -1008,18 +1007,13 @@ async fn get_members(
         err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
     }
 
-    // As in Bitwarden, Manage account recovery alone only lists the members whose account it can recover
-    let recovery_only = !headers.membership.has_full_access()
-        && !headers.membership.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::ManageUsers);
-    if recovery_only && !headers.membership.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::ManageResetPassword) {
+    if !headers.membership.has_full_access() && !headers.membership.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::ManageUsers)
+    {
         err_code!("Resource not found.", "User does not have full access", Status::NotFound.code);
     }
 
     let mut users_json = Vec::new();
     for u in Membership::find_by_org(&org_id, &conn).await {
-        if recovery_only && (!u.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed) || u.reset_password_key.is_none()) {
-            continue;
-        }
         // The user can be a manager instead of an admin, but we've checked above that they have full access
         users_json.push(
             u.to_json_details_for_admin(
@@ -1042,7 +1036,7 @@ async fn get_members(
 async fn post_org_keys(
     org_id: OrganizationId,
     data: Json<OrgKeyData>,
-    headers: ManageResetPasswordHeaders,
+    headers: AdminHeaders,
     conn: DbConn,
 ) -> JsonResult {
     if org_id != headers.org_id {
@@ -2889,10 +2883,9 @@ async fn get_groups_data(
             || headers.membership.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::ManageUsers)
             || headers.membership.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::ManageGroups)
     } else {
-        // Reports and account recovery need the basic group list, not group details or management rights.
+        // Reports need the basic group list, not group details or management rights.
         has_full_access
             || headers.membership.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::AccessReports)
-            || headers.membership.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::ManageResetPassword)
             || may_assign_collection_access(&headers.membership, &conn).await
     };
     if !allowed {
@@ -3329,7 +3322,7 @@ async fn get_organization_keys(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: Headers, conn: D
 async fn put_recover_account(
     org_id: OrganizationId,
     member_id: MembershipId,
-    headers: ManageResetPasswordHeaders,
+    headers: AdminHeaders,
     data: Json<OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest>,
     conn: DbConn,
     nt: Notify<'_>,
@@ -3340,7 +3333,7 @@ async fn put_recover_account(
 async fn recover_account(
     org_id: OrganizationId,
     member_id: MembershipId,
-    headers: ManageResetPasswordHeaders,
+    headers: AdminHeaders,
     req: OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest,
     conn: DbConn,
     nt: Notify<'_>,
@@ -3360,7 +3353,7 @@ async fn recover_account(
         err!("User not found")
     };
 
-    check_reset_password_applicable_and_permissions(&org_id, &member_id, &headers.membership, &conn).await?;
+    check_reset_password_applicable_and_permissions(&org_id, &member_id, &headers, &conn).await?;
 
     if member.reset_password_key.is_none() {
         err!("Password reset not or not correctly enrolled");
@@ -3430,14 +3423,12 @@ async fn recover_account(
 
     nt.send_logout(&user, None, &conn).await;
 
-    for (reset, event_type) in [
-        (req.reset_master_password, EventType::OrganizationUserAdminResetPassword),
-        (req.reset_two_factor, EventType::OrganizationUserAdminResetTwoFactor),
-    ] {
-        if reset {
-            log_event(event_type, &member_id, &org_id, &headers.user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
-                .await;
+    if req.reset_master_password {
+        headers.log_event(EventType::OrganizationUserAdminResetPassword, &member_id, &org_id, &conn).await;
     }
+
+    if req.reset_two_factor {
+        headers.log_event(EventType::OrganizationUserAdminResetTwoFactor, &member_id, &org_id, &conn).await;
     }
 
     Ok(())
@@ -3608,7 +3599,7 @@ async fn get_organization_private_key(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: ManageUse
 async fn get_reset_password_details(
     org_id: OrganizationId,
     member_id: MembershipId,
-    headers: ManageResetPasswordHeaders,
+    headers: AdminHeaders,
     conn: DbConn,
 ) -> JsonResult {
     if org_id != headers.org_id {
@@ -3626,7 +3617,7 @@ async fn get_reset_password_details(
         err!("User not found")
     };
 
-    check_reset_password_applicable_and_permissions(&org_id, &member_id, &headers.membership, &conn).await?;
+    check_reset_password_applicable_and_permissions(&org_id, &member_id, &headers, &conn).await?;
 
     // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/AdminConsole/Models/Response/Organizations/OrganizationUserResponseModel.cs#L190
     Ok(Json(json!({
@@ -3645,7 +3636,7 @@ async fn get_reset_password_details(
 async fn check_reset_password_applicable_and_permissions(
     org_id: &OrganizationId,
     member_id: &MembershipId,
-    caller: &Membership,
+    headers: &AdminHeaders,
     conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
     check_reset_password_applicable(org_id, conn).await?;
@@ -3654,25 +3645,11 @@ async fn check_reset_password_applicable_and_permissions(
         err!("Reset target user not found")
     };
 
-    if may_recover_account(caller, &target_user) {
-        Ok(())
-    } else {
-        err!("No permission to reset this user's password")
-    }
-}
-
-/// Whether `caller` may recover the account of `target`, who must not have more authority, as in Bitwarden: Owners
-/// may recover every member, Admins every member but Owners, and Custom members with Manage account recovery Users
-/// and the Custom members whose permissions they all have.
-fn may_recover_account(caller: &Membership, target: &Membership) -> bool {
-    if caller.has_type(MembershipType::Owner) {
-        true
-    } else if caller.has_type(MembershipType::Admin) {
-        target.atype <= MembershipType::Admin
-    } else {
-        caller.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::ManageResetPassword)
-            && custom_member_manages(target.atype)
-            && caller.has_custom_permissions_of(target)
+    // Resetting user must be higher/equal to user to reset
+    match headers.membership_type {
+        MembershipType::Owner => Ok(()),
+        MembershipType::Admin if target_user.atype <= MembershipType::Admin => Ok(()),
+        _ => err!("No permission to reset this user's password"),
     }
 }
 
@@ -4058,54 +4035,4 @@ mod tests {
             }
         });
     }
-
-    #[cfg(sqlite)]
-    #[test]
-    fn account_recovery_authorization() {
-        test_db::run(async |db| {
-            use CustomPermission::{ManageResetPassword, ManageUsers};
-            use MembershipType::*;
-            let conn = db.conn();
-            let org = test_db::organization(&conn).await;
-            let mut members = Vec::new();
-            for (role, permissions) in [
-                (Owner, vec![]),
-                (Admin, vec![]),
-                (Manager, vec![]),
-                (User, vec![]),
-                (Custom, vec![ManageResetPassword]),
-                (Custom, vec![ManageResetPassword, ManageUsers]),
-            ] {
-                members.push(test_db::member(&conn, &org.uuid, role, &permissions).await.1);
-            }
-            // Who may recover whom: a row per caller, a column per target, both in the order above
-            for (caller, row) in members.iter().zip(["111111", "011111", "000000", "000000", "000110", "000111"]) {
-                for (target, allowed) in members.iter().zip(row.chars()) {
-                    assert_eq!(
-                        may_recover_account(caller, target),
-                        allowed == '1',
-                        "{} {}",
-                        caller.atype,
-                        target.atype
-                    );
-                }
-            }
-            // Manage account recovery alone lists only the confirmed members enrolled in account recovery
-            for (i, status) in [(2, MembershipStatus::Accepted), (3, MembershipStatus::Confirmed)] {
-                members[i].status = status as i32;
-                members[i].reset_password_key = Some("key".into());
-                members[i].save(&conn).await.unwrap();
-            }
-            let data = GetOrgUserData {
-                include_collections: None,
-                include_groups: None,
-            };
-            let users = get_members(data, org.uuid.clone(), directory_headers(&members[4], &conn).await, db.conn());
-            assert_eq!(
-                users.await.unwrap().0["data"],
-                json!([members[3].to_json_details_for_admin(false, false, &conn).await])
-            );
-            assert!(get_groups(org.uuid.clone(), directory_headers(&members[4], &conn).await, db.conn()).await.is_ok());
-        });
-    }
 }

src/api/core/two_factor/webauthn.rs

@@ -194,7 +194,7 @@ struct EnableWebauthnData {
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct RegisterPublicKeyCredentialCopy {
+pub struct RegisterPublicKeyCredentialCopy {
     pub id: String,
     pub raw_id: Base64UrlSafeData,
     pub response: AuthenticatorAttestationResponseRawCopy,
@@ -233,6 +233,7 @@ pub struct PublicKeyCredentialCopy {
     pub id: String,
     pub raw_id: Base64UrlSafeData,
     pub response: AuthenticatorAssertionResponseRawCopy,
+    #[serde(default)]
     pub extensions: AuthenticationExtensionsClientOutputs,
     pub r#type: String,
 }

src/api/core/webauthn_login.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,470 @@
+//! Log in with passkey. The login itself is the `webauthn` grant in `identity.rs`.
+//!
+//! The WebAuthn state of each step isn't stored: it goes to the client in a signed token, which comes back with the
+//! next request. `WebauthnCredential::last_challenge_issued_at` makes each assertion single use.
+
+use std::{net::IpAddr, str::FromStr, time::Duration};
+
+use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
+use rocket::{Route, http::Status, serde::json::Json};
+use serde::{Serialize, de::DeserializeOwned};
+use serde_json::Value;
+use url::Url;
+use uuid::Uuid;
+use webauthn_rs::{
+    Webauthn, WebauthnBuilder,
+    prelude::{CredentialID, DiscoverableAuthentication, DiscoverableKey, PasskeyRegistration},
+};
+use webauthn_rs_proto::{
+    AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria, PublicKeyCredential, ResidentKeyRequirement, UserVerificationPolicy,
+};
+
+use crate::{
+    CONFIG,
+    api::{
+        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
+        core::two_factor::webauthn::{PublicKeyCredentialCopy, RegisterPublicKeyCredentialCopy},
+    },
+    auth::{self, Headers, JWT_WEBAUTHN_ISSUER},
+    db::{
+        DbConn,
+        models::{User, UserId, WebauthnCredential, WebauthnCredentialId, WebauthnPrfStatus},
+    },
+    error::MapResult,
+};
+
+pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
+    routes![
+        get_api_webauthn,
+        post_attestation_options,
+        post_assertion_options,
+        post_credential,
+        put_credential,
+        delete_credential
+    ]
+}
+
+const MAX_CREDENTIALS_PER_USER: usize = 5;
+
+/// The origins besides the vault that passkey assertions may come from. Without a trailing `/`: the origin of a request
+/// has none, so they would never match.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/SharedWeb/Utilities/ServiceCollectionExtensions.cs#L644-L651>
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Core/Constants.cs#L112-L118>
+const WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS: [&str; 4] = [
+    // Chrome Web Store, which Brave, Vivaldi and the other Chromium browsers install from too
+    "chrome-extension://nngceckbapebfimnlniiiahkandclblb",
+    // Chrome Web Store, beta
+    "chrome-extension://hccnnhgbibccigepcmlgppchkpfdophk",
+    // Microsoft Edge Add-ons
+    "chrome-extension://jbkfoedolllekgbhcbcoahefnbanhhlh",
+    // Opera add-ons
+    "chrome-extension://ccnckbpmaceehanjmeomladnmlffdjgn",
+];
+
+/// Built for each use, so that a change to `PASSKEY_LOGIN_EXTRA_ORIGINS` in the admin panel applies without a restart.
+fn webauthn_login() -> ApiResult<Webauthn> {
+    let domain = CONFIG.domain();
+    let domain_origin = CONFIG.domain_origin();
+    let rp_id = Url::parse(&domain).map(|u| u.domain().map(str::to_owned)).ok().flatten().unwrap_or_default();
+    let rp_origin = Url::parse(&domain_origin).ok().map_res("Invalid DOMAIN")?;
+
+    let mut webauthn = WebauthnBuilder::new(&rp_id, &rp_origin)?.rp_name(&domain).timeout(Duration::from_mins(1));
+    let configured = CONFIG.passkey_login_extra_origins();
+    let configured = configured.split(',').map(str::trim).filter(|o| !o.is_empty());
+    for origin in WEBAUTHN_ORIGINS.into_iter().chain(configured) {
+        // Invalid ones were refused when the config was loaded
+        if let Ok(origin) = Url::parse(origin.trim_end_matches('/')) {
+            webauthn = webauthn.append_allowed_origin(&origin);
+        }
+    }
+
+    Ok(webauthn.build()?)
+}
+
+/// Passkeys would bypass SSO, so SSO_ONLY refuses them.
+pub fn passkey_login_available() -> bool {
+    CONFIG.is_webauthn_2fa_supported() && !(CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only())
+}
+
+fn check_webauthn_supported() -> EmptyResult {
+    if !CONFIG.is_webauthn_2fa_supported() {
+        err!("Configured `DOMAIN` is not compatible with Webauthn")
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn check_passkey_creation_allowed() -> EmptyResult {
+    check_webauthn_supported()?;
+    if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only() {
+        err!("Passkeys cannot be created for your account. SSO login is required.")
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+enum TokenScope {
+    Authentication,
+    UpdateKeySet,
+    Registration,
+}
+
+impl TokenScope {
+    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Core/Auth/Models/Business/Tokenables/WebAuthnCredentialCreateOptionsTokenable.cs#L11-L12>
+    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Core/Auth/Models/Business/Tokenables/WebAuthnLoginAssertionOptionsTokenable.cs#L10-L14>
+    fn lifetime(self) -> TimeDelta {
+        match self {
+            TokenScope::Registration => TimeDelta::minutes(7),
+            TokenScope::Authentication | TokenScope::UpdateKeySet => TimeDelta::minutes(17),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct StateClaims {
+    nbf: i64,
+    exp: i64,
+    iss: String,
+    scope: TokenScope,
+    /// The only user who may use the token, none for logging in
+    sub: Option<UserId>,
+    /// When the challenge was issued, in milliseconds, see `WebauthnCredential::last_challenge_issued_at`
+    issued_at: i64,
+    /// The webauthn-rs state
+    state: Value,
+}
+
+fn encode_state<T: Serialize>(scope: TokenScope, user: Option<&UserId>, state: &T) -> ApiResult<String> {
+    let now = Utc::now();
+    Ok(auth::encode_jwt(&StateClaims {
+        nbf: now.timestamp(),
+        exp: (now + scope.lifetime()).timestamp(),
+        iss: JWT_WEBAUTHN_ISSUER.to_string(),
+        scope,
+        sub: user.cloned(),
+        issued_at: now.timestamp_millis(),
+        state: serde_json::to_value(state)?,
+    }))
+}
+
+/// The token must be for this scope and this user, where `None` means a login token.
+fn decode_state<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, scope: TokenScope, user: Option<&UserId>) -> ApiResult<(i64, T)> {
+    let claims = match auth::decode_jwt::<StateClaims>(token, JWT_WEBAUTHN_ISSUER.to_string()) {
+        Ok(claims) if claims.scope == scope && claims.sub.as_ref() == user => claims,
+        _ => err!(
+            "The token associated with your request is invalid or has expired. A valid token is required to continue."
+        ),
+    };
+    Ok((claims.issued_at, serde_json::from_value(claims.state)?))
+}
+
+fn assertion_options(scope: TokenScope, user: Option<&UserId>) -> JsonResult {
+    let (challenge, state) = webauthn_login()?.start_discoverable_authentication()?;
+    let token = encode_state(scope, user, &state)?;
+
+    let mut options = serde_json::to_value(challenge.public_key)?;
+    // The clients add the PRF extension themselves
+    options["extensions"] = Value::Null;
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "options": options,
+        "token": token,
+        "object": "webAuthnLoginAssertionOptions",
+    })))
+}
+
+pub fn login_assertion_options() -> JsonResult {
+    assertion_options(TokenScope::Authentication, None)
+}
+
+pub async fn assert_login(
+    token: &str,
+    device_response: &str,
+    ip: &IpAddr,
+    conn: &DbConn,
+) -> ApiResult<(User, WebauthnCredential)> {
+    let (issued_at, state) = decode_state(token, TokenScope::Authentication, None)?;
+    let Ok(response) = serde_json::from_str::<PublicKeyCredentialCopy>(device_response) else {
+        err!("Invalid credential", format!("IP: {ip}."))
+    };
+    assert_credential(issued_at, state, &response.into(), ip, conn).await
+}
+
+/// On success, the token's challenge is marked as answered and the passkey's new counter stored.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Core/Auth/UserFeatures/WebAuthnLogin/Implementations/AssertWebAuthnLoginCredentialCommand.cs#L30-L82>
+async fn assert_credential(
+    issued_at: i64,
+    state: DiscoverableAuthentication,
+    response: &PublicKeyCredential,
+    ip: &IpAddr,
+    conn: &DbConn,
+) -> ApiResult<(User, WebauthnCredential)> {
+    let webauthn = webauthn_login()?;
+    let Ok((user_uuid, credential_id)) = webauthn.identify_discoverable_authentication(response) else {
+        err!("Invalid credential", format!("IP: {ip}."))
+    };
+    let Some(user) = User::find_by_uuid(&UserId::from(user_uuid.to_string()), conn).await else {
+        err!("Invalid credential", format!("IP: {ip}."))
+    };
+    let credential_id = data_encoding::BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(credential_id);
+    let Some(credential) = WebauthnCredential::find_by_user_and_credential_id(&user.uuid, &credential_id, conn).await
+    else {
+        err!("Invalid credential", format!("IP: {ip}."))
+    };
+
+    let mut passkey = credential.passkey()?;
+    let Ok(result) = webauthn.finish_discoverable_authentication(response, state, &[DiscoverableKey::from(&passkey)])
+    else {
+        err!("Invalid credential", format!("IP: {ip}."))
+    };
+    passkey.update_credential(&result);
+
+    if !credential.use_challenge(issued_at, &passkey, conn).await? {
+        err!("Invalid credential", format!("IP: {ip}."))
+    }
+    Ok((user, credential))
+}
+
+/// The user key is wrapped by an RSA key, the other keys by a symmetric one.
+fn validate_prf_key(value: &str, field: &str, user_key: bool) -> EmptyResult {
+    let valid_form = if user_key {
+        crate::util::is_valid_rsa_encrypted_string(value)
+    } else {
+        crate::util::is_valid_symmetric_encrypted_string(value)
+    };
+    if !valid_form || value.len() > 2000 {
+        err!(format!("The field {field} is not a valid encrypted string."))
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[get("/webauthn")]
+async fn get_api_webauthn(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value> {
+    let credentials: Vec<Value> = WebauthnCredential::find_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn)
+        .await
+        .iter()
+        .map(WebauthnCredential::to_json)
+        .collect();
+
+    Json(json!({
+        "object": "list",
+        "data": credentials,
+        "continuationToken": null,
+    }))
+}
+
+#[post("/webauthn/attestation-options", data = "<data>")]
+async fn post_attestation_options(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    check_passkey_creation_allowed()?;
+    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
+    let user = headers.user;
+    data.validate(&user, true, &conn).await?;
+
+    let exclude = WebauthnCredential::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn)
+        .await
+        .iter()
+        .filter_map(|c| data_encoding::BASE64URL_NOPAD.decode(c.credential_id.as_bytes()).ok())
+        .map(CredentialID::from)
+        .collect();
+
+    let (mut challenge, state) = webauthn_login()?.start_passkey_registration(
+        Uuid::from_str(&user.uuid).expect("Failed to parse UUID"),
+        &user.email,
+        user.display_name(),
+        Some(exclude),
+    )?;
+    // Logging in without a username needs a discoverable credential, which webauthn-rs doesn't ask for
+    challenge.public_key.authenticator_selection = Some(AuthenticatorSelectionCriteria {
+        authenticator_attachment: None,
+        resident_key: Some(ResidentKeyRequirement::Required),
+        require_resident_key: true,
+        user_verification: UserVerificationPolicy::Required,
+    });
+    let token = encode_state(TokenScope::Registration, Some(&user.uuid), &state)?;
+
+    let mut options = serde_json::to_value(challenge.public_key)?;
+    // The clients add the PRF extension themselves
+    options["extensions"] = Value::Null;
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "options": options,
+        "token": token,
+        "object": "webauthnCredentialCreateOptions",
+    })))
+}
+
+/// The first step of [`put_credential`].
+#[post("/webauthn/assertion-options", data = "<data>")]
+async fn post_assertion_options(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    check_webauthn_supported()?;
+    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
+    data.validate(&headers.user, true, &conn).await?;
+
+    assertion_options(TokenScope::UpdateKeySet, Some(&headers.user.uuid))
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct CreateCredentialData {
+    device_response: RegisterPublicKeyCredentialCopy,
+    name: String,
+    token: String,
+    supports_prf: bool,
+    encrypted_user_key: Option<String>,
+    encrypted_public_key: Option<String>,
+    encrypted_private_key: Option<String>,
+}
+
+#[post("/webauthn", data = "<data>")]
+async fn post_credential(data: Json<CreateCredentialData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    check_passkey_creation_allowed()?;
+    let data: CreateCredentialData = data.into_inner();
+    let user = headers.user;
+
+    let (_, state): (_, PasskeyRegistration) = decode_state(&data.token, TokenScope::Registration, Some(&user.uuid))?;
+    if data.name.trim().is_empty() || data.name.encode_utf16().count() > 50 {
+        err!("The field Name must be a string with a maximum length of 50.")
+    }
+    for (value, field, user_key) in [
+        (&data.encrypted_user_key, "EncryptedUserKey", true),
+        (&data.encrypted_public_key, "EncryptedPublicKey", false),
+        (&data.encrypted_private_key, "EncryptedPrivateKey", false),
+    ] {
+        if let Some(value) = value {
+            validate_prf_key(value, field, user_key)?;
+        }
+    }
+
+    let existing = WebauthnCredential::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await;
+    if existing.len() >= MAX_CREDENTIALS_PER_USER {
+        err!("Unable to complete WebAuthn registration.")
+    }
+    let Ok(passkey) = webauthn_login()?.finish_passkey_registration(&data.device_response.into(), &state) else {
+        err!("Unable to complete WebAuthn registration.")
+    };
+
+    let credential = WebauthnCredential::new(
+        user.uuid,
+        data.name,
+        &passkey,
+        data.supports_prf,
+        data.encrypted_user_key,
+        data.encrypted_public_key,
+        data.encrypted_private_key,
+    )?;
+    // A credential id is unique per user
+    if credential.credential_id.len() > 256 || existing.iter().any(|c| c.credential_id == credential.credential_id) {
+        err!("Unable to complete WebAuthn registration.")
+    }
+    credential.insert(&conn).await?;
+
+    Ok(Json(credential.to_json()))
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct UpdateCredentialData {
+    device_response: PublicKeyCredentialCopy,
+    token: String,
+    encrypted_user_key: String,
+    encrypted_public_key: String,
+    encrypted_private_key: String,
+}
+
+/// Turns on vault unlock for an existing passkey that supports PRF.
+#[put("/webauthn", data = "<data>")]
+async fn put_credential(data: Json<UpdateCredentialData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+    check_webauthn_supported()?;
+    let data: UpdateCredentialData = data.into_inner();
+
+    validate_prf_key(&data.encrypted_user_key, "EncryptedUserKey", true)?;
+    validate_prf_key(&data.encrypted_public_key, "EncryptedPublicKey", false)?;
+    validate_prf_key(&data.encrypted_private_key, "EncryptedPrivateKey", false)?;
+
+    let (issued_at, state) = decode_state(&data.token, TokenScope::UpdateKeySet, Some(&headers.user.uuid))?;
+    let (user, credential) =
+        assert_credential(issued_at, state, &data.device_response.into(), &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+    // The assertion names its own user, which must be the caller
+    if user.uuid != headers.user.uuid || !credential.supports_prf {
+        err!("Unable to update credential.")
+    }
+
+    credential.set_prf_keys(data.encrypted_user_key, data.encrypted_public_key, data.encrypted_private_key, &conn).await
+}
+
+#[post("/webauthn/<id>/delete", data = "<data>")]
+async fn delete_credential(
+    id: WebauthnCredentialId,
+    data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>,
+    headers: Headers,
+    conn: DbConn,
+) -> EmptyResult {
+    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
+    data.validate(&headers.user, true, &conn).await?;
+
+    if !WebauthnCredential::delete_by_uuid_and_user(&id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await? {
+        err_code!("Credential not found.", Status::NotFound.code)
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// `None` without any, so that the field is left out.
+pub async fn sync_prf_options(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Value> {
+    let options: Vec<Value> = WebauthnCredential::find_by_user(user_uuid, conn)
+        .await
+        .iter()
+        .filter_map(WebauthnCredential::to_sync_prf_option)
+        .collect();
+    (!options.is_empty()).then_some(Value::Array(options))
+}
+
+pub async fn rotation_key_data(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Value> {
+    WebauthnCredential::find_by_user(user_uuid, conn)
+        .await
+        .iter()
+        .filter(|c| c.prf_status() == WebauthnPrfStatus::Enabled)
+        .map(|c| {
+            json!({
+                "id": c.uuid,
+                "encryptedPublicKey": c.encrypted_public_key,
+                "encryptedUserKey": c.encrypted_user_key,
+                "object": "passkeyKeyData",
+            })
+        })
+        .collect()
+}
+
+/// One entry of a rotation's `passkeyUnlockData`.
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct PasskeyUnlockData {
+    id: WebauthnCredentialId,
+    encrypted_user_key: Option<String>,
+    encrypted_public_key: Option<String>,
+}
+
+/// The new user key and public key of every passkey with a PRF key set.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Api/KeyManagement/Validators/WebAuthnLoginKeyRotationValidator.cs#L22-L55>
+pub fn validate_rotation(
+    existing: Vec<WebauthnCredential>,
+    unlock_data: &[PasskeyUnlockData],
+) -> ApiResult<Vec<(WebauthnCredential, String, String)>> {
+    let mut rotated = Vec::new();
+    for credential in existing.into_iter().filter(|c| c.prf_status() == WebauthnPrfStatus::Enabled) {
+        let Some(data) = unlock_data.iter().find(|d| d.id == credential.uuid) else {
+            err!("All existing webauthn prf keys must be included in the rotation.")
+        };
+        let Some(encrypted_user_key) = data.encrypted_user_key.clone() else {
+            err!("WebAuthn prf keys must have user-key during rotation.")
+        };
+        let Some(encrypted_public_key) = data.encrypted_public_key.clone() else {
+            err!("WebAuthn prf keys must have public-key during rotation.")
+        };
+        validate_prf_key(&encrypted_user_key, "EncryptedUserKey", true)?;
+        validate_prf_key(&encrypted_public_key, "EncryptedPublicKey", false)?;
+        rotated.push((credential, encrypted_user_key, encrypted_public_key));
+    }
+    Ok(rotated)
+}

src/api/identity.rs

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ use crate::{
             two_factor::{
                 authenticator, duo_oidc, email, enforce_2fa_policy, is_twofactor_provider_usable, webauthn, yubikey,
             },
+            webauthn_login,
         },
         identity_master_password_policy,
         push::register_push_device,
@@ -49,6 +50,7 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
         register_verification_email_clicked,
         register_finish,
         prevalidate,
+        get_webauthn_login_assertion_options,
         authorize,
         oidcsignin,
         oidcsignin_error
@@ -66,7 +68,7 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
             check_is_some(data.refresh_token.as_ref(), "refresh_token cannot be blank")?;
             refresh_login(data, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
         }
-        "password" if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only() => err!("SSO sign-in is required"),
+        "password" | "webauthn" if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only() => err!("SSO sign-in is required"),
         "password" => {
             check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
             check_is_some(data.password.as_ref(), "password cannot be blank")?;
@@ -98,6 +100,18 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
             sso_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header).await
         }
         "authorization_code" => err!("SSO sign-in is not available"),
+        "webauthn" => {
+            check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
+            check_is_some(data.token.as_ref(), "token cannot be blank")?;
+            check_is_some(data.device_response.as_ref(), "deviceResponse cannot be blank")?;
+            check_is_some(data.scope.as_ref(), "scope cannot be blank")?;
+
+            check_is_some(data.device_identifier.as_ref(), "device_identifier cannot be blank")?;
+            check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
+            check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;
+
+            passkey_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header).await
+        }
         "send_access" => {
             crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&client_header.ip.ip)?;
             check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
@@ -520,6 +534,70 @@ async fn password_login(
     authenticated_response(&user, &mut device, auth_tokens, twofactor_token, conn, ip).await
 }
 
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Identity/IdentityServer/RequestValidators/TwoFactorAuthenticationValidator.cs#L50-L53>
+async fn passkey_login(
+    data: ConnectData,
+    user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
+    conn: &DbConn,
+    client_header: &ClientHeaders,
+) -> JsonResult {
+    let ip = &client_header.ip;
+    AuthMethod::Webauthn.check_scope(data.scope.as_ref())?;
+    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_login(&ip.ip)?;
+    if !webauthn_login::passkey_login_available() {
+        err!("Passkey login is not available")
+    }
+
+    let (user, credential) = webauthn_login::assert_login(
+        data.token.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
+        data.device_response.as_deref().unwrap_or_default(),
+        &ip.ip,
+        conn,
+    )
+    .await?;
+
+    // For the event log, only now that the assertion is verified
+    *user_id = Some(user.uuid.clone());
+    let log_username = user.email.escape_debug();
+
+    if !user.enabled {
+        err!(
+            "This user has been disabled",
+            format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
+            ErrorEvent {
+                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
+            }
+        )
+    }
+
+    check_client_version(&user, client_header)?;
+
+    if user.verified_at.is_none() && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.signups_verify() {
+        err!(
+            "Please verify your email before trying again.",
+            format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
+            ErrorEvent {
+                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
+            }
+        )
+    }
+
+    let mut device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;
+
+    // The authenticator's user verification replaces two-step login, but an organization's two-step login policy still
+    // applies, as for passwords
+    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await.is_empty() {
+        enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await?;
+    }
+
+    let auth_tokens = auth::AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, AuthMethod::Webauthn, data.client_id);
+    let mut result = authenticated_response(&user, &mut device, auth_tokens, None, conn, ip).await?;
+    if let Some(prf_option) = credential.to_login_prf_option() {
+        result.0["UserDecryptionOptions"]["WebAuthnPrfOption"] = prf_option;
+    }
+    Ok(result)
+}
+
 /// Like upstream's `ClientVersionValidator`, every login needs the `Bitwarden-Client-Version` header, and a V2 account
 /// ([`User::has_v2_encryption`]) a client of at least 2026.10.1 (2026.10.2 for the desktop app). Called right after the
 /// credentials are checked, like upstream, so that it doesn't tell anyone else which accounts are V2.
@@ -1260,6 +1338,13 @@ struct ConnectData {
     // Needed for send access
     send_id: Option<SendId>,
     password_hash_b64: Option<String>,
+
+    // Needed for grant_type = "webauthn", with the assertion as JSON
+    #[field(name = uncased("token"))]
+    token: Option<String>,
+    #[field(name = uncased("device_response"))]
+    #[field(name = uncased("deviceresponse"))]
+    device_response: Option<String>,
 }
 fn check_is_some<T>(value: Option<&T>, msg: &str) -> EmptyResult {
     if value.is_none() {
@@ -1268,6 +1353,16 @@ fn check_is_some<T>(value: Option<&T>, msg: &str) -> EmptyResult {
     Ok(())
 }
 
+#[get("/accounts/webauthn/assertion-options")]
+fn get_webauthn_login_assertion_options(ip: ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
+    if !webauthn_login::passkey_login_available() {
+        err!("Passkey login is not available")
+    }
+    // Rate limited: anyone can call it, and each call signs a token
+    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
+    webauthn_login::login_assertion_options()
+}
+
 #[get("/sso/prevalidate")]
 fn prevalidate() -> JsonResult {
     if CONFIG.sso_enabled() {

src/api/web.rs

@@ -99,6 +99,7 @@ fn vaultwarden_css() -> EtagCached<String> {
         "sends_allowed": CONFIG.sends_allowed(),
         "remember_2fa_disabled": CONFIG.disable_2fa_remember(),
         "password_hints_allowed": CONFIG.password_hints_allowed(),
+        "passkey_login_available": crate::api::core::webauthn_login::passkey_login_available(),
         "signup_disabled": CONFIG.is_signup_disabled(),
         "sso_enabled": CONFIG.sso_enabled(),
         "sso_only": CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only(),

src/auth.rs

@@ -27,14 +27,14 @@ use rocket::{
 
 use crate::{
     CONFIG,
-    api::ApiResult,
+    api::{ApiResult, core::log_event},
     config::PathType,
     db::{
         DbConn,
         models::{
             AttachmentId, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, CustomPermission, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType,
-            EmergencyAccessId, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId,
-            SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, custom_roles_enabled,
+            EmergencyAccessId, EventType, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId,
+            OrganizationId, SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, custom_roles_enabled,
         },
     },
     error::Error,
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ static JWT_FILE_DOWNLOAD_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> =
 static JWT_REGISTER_VERIFY_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> =
     LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|register_verify", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
 static JWT_2FA_REMEMBER_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|2faremember", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
+pub static JWT_WEBAUTHN_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|webauthn", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
 
 static PRIVATE_RSA_KEY: OnceLock<EncodingKey> = OnceLock::new();
 static PUBLIC_RSA_KEY: OnceLock<DecodingKey> = OnceLock::new();
@@ -854,6 +855,12 @@ pub struct AdminHeaders {
     pub org_id: OrganizationId,
 }
 
+impl AdminHeaders {
+    pub async fn log_event(&self, event_type: EventType, source_uuid: &str, org_id: &OrganizationId, conn: &DbConn) {
+        log_event(event_type, source_uuid, org_id, &self.user.uuid, self.device.atype, &self.ip.ip, conn).await;
+    }
+}
+
 #[rocket::async_trait]
 impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for AdminHeaders {
     type Error = &'static str;
@@ -941,11 +948,6 @@ permission_headers!(
     AccessImportExportHeaders,
     CustomPermission::AccessImportExport
 );
-permission_headers!(
-    /// For the routes that recover the accounts of the members of an organization.
-    ManageResetPasswordHeaders,
-    CustomPermission::ManageResetPassword
-);
 
 // col_id is usually the fourth path param ("/organizations/<org_id>/collections/<col_id>"),
 // but there could be cases where it is a query value.
@@ -1409,6 +1411,7 @@ pub enum AuthMethod {
     Password,
     Sso,
     UserApiKey,
+    Webauthn,
 }
 
 impl AuthMethod {
@@ -1416,7 +1419,7 @@ impl AuthMethod {
         match self {
             AuthMethod::OrgApiKey => "api.organization".to_owned(),
             AuthMethod::UserApiKey => "api".to_owned(),
-            AuthMethod::Password | AuthMethod::Sso => "api offline_access".to_owned(),
+            AuthMethod::Password | AuthMethod::Sso | AuthMethod::Webauthn => "api offline_access".to_owned(),
         }
     }
 
@@ -1541,8 +1544,10 @@ pub async fn refresh_tokens(
             sso::exchange_refresh_token(&device, &user, client_id, refresh_claims).await?
         }
         AuthMethod::Sso => err!("SSO is now disabled, Login again using email and master password"),
-        AuthMethod::Password if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only() => err!("SSO is now required, Login again"),
-        AuthMethod::Password => AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, refresh_claims.sub, client_id),
+        AuthMethod::Password | AuthMethod::Webauthn if CONFIG.sso_enabled() && CONFIG.sso_only() => {
+            err!("SSO is now required, Login again")
+        }
+        AuthMethod::Password | AuthMethod::Webauthn => AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, refresh_claims.sub, client_id),
         _ => err!("Invalid auth method, cannot refresh token"),
     };
 

src/config.rs

@@ -747,6 +747,11 @@ make_config! {
         /// TOTP codes of the previous and next 30 seconds will be invalid.
         authenticator_disable_time_drift: bool, true, def, false;
 
+        /// Passkey login extra origins |> Origins that may log in with a passkey besides the vault and the official Chromium
+        /// extensions (Chrome Web Store, Edge and Opera add-ons), separated by commas. For Bitwarden clients with an origin
+        /// of their own, such as a self-built extension (`chrome-extension://<id>`) or an app (`android:apk-key-hash:<hash>`).
+        passkey_login_extra_origins:  String, true,   def,    String::new();
+
         /// Customize the enabled feature flags on the clients |> This is a comma separated list of feature flags to enable.
         experimental_client_feature_flags: String, false, def, String::new();
 
@@ -1065,6 +1070,18 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
         err!("`SIGNUPS_DOMAINS_WHITELIST` contains empty tokens");
     }
 
+    for origin in cfg.passkey_login_extra_origins.split(',').map(str::trim).filter(|o| !o.is_empty()) {
+        // A scheme and host (and port), or an opaque one for apps, without a path, query or fragment
+        let valid = Url::parse(origin.trim_end_matches('/')).is_ok_and(|url| {
+            url.query().is_none()
+                && url.fragment().is_none()
+                && (url.cannot_be_a_base() || url.path() == "/" || url.path().is_empty())
+        });
+        if !valid {
+            err!(format!("`PASSKEY_LOGIN_EXTRA_ORIGINS` contains an invalid origin: {origin}"));
+        }
+    }
+
     let org_creation_users = cfg.org_creation_users.trim().to_lowercase();
     if !(org_creation_users.is_empty() || org_creation_users == "all" || org_creation_users == "none")
         && org_creation_users.split(',').any(|u| !u.contains('@'))

src/db/models/mod.rs

@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ mod two_factor_duo_context;
 mod two_factor_incomplete;
 mod user;
 mod user_signature_key_pair;
+mod webauthn_credential;
 
 pub use self::archive::Archive;
 pub use self::attachment::{Attachment, AttachmentId};
@@ -46,3 +47,4 @@ pub use self::two_factor_duo_context::TwoFactorDuoContext;
 pub use self::two_factor_incomplete::TwoFactorIncomplete;
 pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType};
 pub use self::user_signature_key_pair::{SignatureAlgorithm, UserSignatureKeyPair};
+pub use self::webauthn_credential::{WebauthnCredential, WebauthnCredentialId, WebauthnPrfStatus};

src/db/models/organization.rs

@@ -81,7 +81,6 @@ pub struct Membership {
     access_event_logs: bool,
     access_import_export: bool,
     access_reports: bool,
-    manage_reset_password: bool,
 
     /// The user's v2 upgrade token, for the org to unwrap the v2 user key after an upgrade. Opaque to us.
     pub v2_upgrade_token: Option<String>,
@@ -255,7 +254,6 @@ pub enum CustomPermission {
     AccessEventLogs,
     AccessImportExport,
     AccessReports,
-    ManageResetPassword,
 }
 
 /// The permissions this version enforces on every endpoint they open. Only these can be granted, a stored
@@ -271,11 +269,10 @@ const SUPPORTED_CUSTOM_PERMISSIONS: &[CustomPermission] = &[
     CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs,
     CustomPermission::AccessImportExport,
     CustomPermission::AccessReports,
-    CustomPermission::ManageResetPassword,
 ];
 
 impl CustomPermission {
-    pub const ALL: [CustomPermission; 10] = [
+    pub const ALL: [CustomPermission; 9] = [
         CustomPermission::ManageUsers,
         CustomPermission::ManageGroups,
         CustomPermission::ManagePolicies,
@@ -285,7 +282,6 @@ impl CustomPermission {
         CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs,
         CustomPermission::AccessImportExport,
         CustomPermission::AccessReports,
-        CustomPermission::ManageResetPassword,
     ];
 
     /// The key of the permission in the `permissions` object of the Bitwarden clients.
@@ -300,7 +296,6 @@ impl CustomPermission {
             CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs => "accessEventLogs",
             CustomPermission::AccessImportExport => "accessImportExport",
             CustomPermission::AccessReports => "accessReports",
-            CustomPermission::ManageResetPassword => "manageResetPassword",
         }
     }
 
@@ -473,7 +468,6 @@ impl Membership {
             access_event_logs: false,
             access_import_export: false,
             access_reports: false,
-            manage_reset_password: false,
 
             v2_upgrade_token: None,
         }
@@ -490,7 +484,6 @@ impl Membership {
             CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs => &mut self.access_event_logs,
             CustomPermission::AccessImportExport => &mut self.access_import_export,
             CustomPermission::AccessReports => &mut self.access_reports,
-            CustomPermission::ManageResetPassword => &mut self.manage_reset_password,
         }
     }
 
@@ -560,7 +553,6 @@ impl Membership {
             CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs => self.access_event_logs,
             CustomPermission::AccessImportExport => self.access_import_export,
             CustomPermission::AccessReports => self.access_reports,
-            CustomPermission::ManageResetPassword => self.manage_reset_password,
         }
     }
 
@@ -579,12 +571,6 @@ impl Membership {
         self.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed) && self.grants_custom_permission(permission)
     }
 
-    /// Whether this member may act with every Custom role permission stored for `other`, as Bitwarden's
-    /// `Permissions.Includes`.
-    pub fn has_custom_permissions_of(&self, other: &Membership) -> bool {
-        CustomPermission::ALL.into_iter().all(|p| !other.custom_permission(p) || self.has_custom_permission(p))
-    }
-
     /// The permissions the "Manage all collections" a legacy Manager is shown with stands for: their `access_all`.
     pub fn legacy_manager_permissions(&self) -> HashSet<CustomPermission> {
         if self.has_type(MembershipType::Manager) && self.access_all {
@@ -611,6 +597,7 @@ impl Membership {
         let shown = self.shown_custom_permissions();
         let mut permissions = json!({
             "manageSso": false, // Not supported
+            "manageResetPassword": false,
             "manageScim": false, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
         });
         for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
@@ -1733,8 +1720,7 @@ mod tests {
                 DeleteAnyCollection,
                 AccessEventLogs,
                 AccessImportExport,
-                AccessReports,
-                ManageResetPassword
+                AccessReports
             ]
         );
     }

src/db/models/user.rs

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ use macros::UuidFromParam;
 
 use super::{
     AuthRequest, Cipher, Device, EmergencyAccess, Favorite, Folder, Membership, MembershipType, TwoFactor,
-    TwoFactorIncomplete, UserSignatureKeyPair,
+    TwoFactorIncomplete, UserSignatureKeyPair, WebauthnCredential,
 };
 
 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
@@ -502,6 +502,7 @@ impl User {
         TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         TwoFactorIncomplete::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         UserSignatureKeyPair::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
+        WebauthnCredential::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         Invitation::take(&self.email, conn).await; // Delete invitation if any
 
         conn.run(move |conn| {

src/db/models/webauthn_credential.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,340 @@
+use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
+use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
+use diesel::prelude::*;
+use serde_json::Value;
+use webauthn_rs::prelude::Passkey;
+
+use crate::{
+    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult},
+    db::{DbConn, schema::webauthn_credentials},
+    error::MapResult,
+    util::get_uuid,
+};
+use macros::UuidFromParam;
+
+use super::UserId;
+
+#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, Selectable)]
+#[diesel(table_name = webauthn_credentials)]
+#[diesel(primary_key(uuid))]
+pub struct WebauthnCredential {
+    pub uuid: WebauthnCredentialId,
+    pub user_uuid: UserId,
+    pub name: String,
+    /// Base64url without padding, as the clients send it
+    pub credential_id: String,
+    /// The webauthn-rs `Passkey`, as JSON
+    pub credential: String,
+    pub supports_prf: bool,
+    /// The user key, wrapped by the public key of the PRF key pair
+    pub encrypted_user_key: Option<String>,
+    /// The public key of the PRF key pair, wrapped by the user key, so that a key rotation can re-wrap the user key
+    pub encrypted_public_key: Option<String>,
+    /// The private key of the PRF key pair, wrapped by the key the authenticator's PRF output derives
+    pub encrypted_private_key: Option<String>,
+    /// When the newest challenge this credential answered was issued, in milliseconds since the Unix epoch. An assertion
+    /// must answer a newer one, which makes it single use. A server clock that goes backwards (or another instance's
+    /// clock running behind) refuses the passkey's logins until it catches up.
+    pub last_challenge_issued_at: Option<i64>,
+    pub created_at: NaiveDateTime,
+    pub updated_at: NaiveDateTime,
+}
+
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Core/Auth/Enums/WebAuthnPrfStatus.cs#L3-L8>
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum WebauthnPrfStatus {
+    Enabled = 0,
+    Supported = 1,
+    Unsupported = 2,
+}
+
+/// Local methods
+impl WebauthnCredential {
+    pub fn new(
+        user_uuid: UserId,
+        name: String,
+        passkey: &Passkey,
+        supports_prf: bool,
+        encrypted_user_key: Option<String>,
+        encrypted_public_key: Option<String>,
+        encrypted_private_key: Option<String>,
+    ) -> ApiResult<Self> {
+        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+        Ok(Self {
+            uuid: WebauthnCredentialId(get_uuid()),
+            user_uuid,
+            name,
+            credential_id: data_encoding::BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(passkey.cred_id()),
+            credential: serde_json::to_string(passkey)?,
+            supports_prf,
+            encrypted_user_key,
+            encrypted_public_key,
+            encrypted_private_key,
+            last_challenge_issued_at: None,
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn passkey(&self) -> ApiResult<Passkey> {
+        Ok(serde_json::from_str(&self.credential)?)
+    }
+
+    pub fn prf_status(&self) -> WebauthnPrfStatus {
+        if !self.supports_prf {
+            WebauthnPrfStatus::Unsupported
+        } else if self.encrypted_user_key.is_some()
+            && self.encrypted_private_key.is_some()
+            && self.encrypted_public_key.is_some()
+        {
+            WebauthnPrfStatus::Enabled
+        } else {
+            WebauthnPrfStatus::Supported
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn to_json(&self) -> Value {
+        json!({
+            "id": self.uuid,
+            "name": self.name,
+            "prfStatus": self.prf_status() as i32,
+            "encryptedUserKey": self.encrypted_user_key,
+            "encryptedPublicKey": self.encrypted_public_key,
+            "object": "webauthnCredential",
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// The transports are empty, since they aren't stored.
+    ///
+    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Api/Vault/Models/Response/SyncResponseModel.cs#L69-L77>
+    pub fn to_sync_prf_option(&self) -> Option<Value> {
+        (self.prf_status() == WebauthnPrfStatus::Enabled).then(|| {
+            json!({
+                "encryptedPrivateKey": self.encrypted_private_key,
+                "encryptedUserKey": self.encrypted_user_key,
+                "credentialId": self.credential_id,
+                "transports": [],
+            })
+        })
+    }
+
+    /// The same option in the login response, which uses PascalCase.
+    ///
+    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Identity/IdentityServer/UserDecryptionOptionsBuilder.cs#L63-L76>
+    pub fn to_login_prf_option(&self) -> Option<Value> {
+        (self.prf_status() == WebauthnPrfStatus::Enabled).then(|| {
+            json!({
+                "EncryptedPrivateKey": self.encrypted_private_key,
+                "EncryptedUserKey": self.encrypted_user_key,
+                "CredentialId": self.credential_id,
+                "Transports": [],
+            })
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+/// Database methods
+impl WebauthnCredential {
+    pub async fn insert(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            diesel::insert_into(webauthn_credentials::table).values(self).execute(conn).map_res("Error saving passkey")
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+
+    pub async fn find_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            webauthn_credentials::table
+                .filter(webauthn_credentials::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
+                .order(webauthn_credentials::created_at)
+                .load::<Self>(conn)
+                .expect("Error loading passkeys")
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+
+    pub async fn find_by_user_and_credential_id(
+        user_uuid: &UserId,
+        credential_id: &str,
+        conn: &DbConn,
+    ) -> Option<Self> {
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            webauthn_credentials::table
+                .filter(webauthn_credentials::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
+                .filter(webauthn_credentials::credential_id.eq(credential_id))
+                .first::<Self>(conn)
+                .ok()
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+
+    /// `false` when the credential is gone or already answered a challenge issued at the same time or later. A single
+    /// statement, so that two concurrent uses of one assertion can't both pass.
+    pub async fn use_challenge(&self, issued_at: i64, passkey: &Passkey, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<bool> {
+        let credential = serde_json::to_string(passkey)?;
+        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+        let updated: usize = conn
+            .run(move |conn| {
+                diesel::update(
+                    webauthn_credentials::table.filter(webauthn_credentials::uuid.eq(&self.uuid)).filter(
+                        webauthn_credentials::last_challenge_issued_at
+                            .is_null()
+                            .or(webauthn_credentials::last_challenge_issued_at.lt(issued_at)),
+                    ),
+                )
+                .set((
+                    webauthn_credentials::credential.eq(credential),
+                    webauthn_credentials::last_challenge_issued_at.eq(Some(issued_at)),
+                    webauthn_credentials::updated_at.eq(now),
+                ))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .map_res("Error saving passkey")
+            })
+            .await?;
+        Ok(updated == 1)
+    }
+
+    pub async fn set_prf_keys(
+        &self,
+        encrypted_user_key: String,
+        encrypted_public_key: String,
+        encrypted_private_key: String,
+        conn: &DbConn,
+    ) -> EmptyResult {
+        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            diesel::update(webauthn_credentials::table.filter(webauthn_credentials::uuid.eq(&self.uuid)))
+                .set((
+                    webauthn_credentials::encrypted_user_key.eq(Some(encrypted_user_key)),
+                    webauthn_credentials::encrypted_public_key.eq(Some(encrypted_public_key)),
+                    webauthn_credentials::encrypted_private_key.eq(Some(encrypted_private_key)),
+                    webauthn_credentials::updated_at.eq(now),
+                ))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .map_res("Error saving passkey")
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+
+    /// The private key stays: the PRF key wraps it, not the user key.
+    pub async fn rotate_keys(
+        &self,
+        encrypted_user_key: String,
+        encrypted_public_key: String,
+        conn: &DbConn,
+    ) -> EmptyResult {
+        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            diesel::update(webauthn_credentials::table.filter(webauthn_credentials::uuid.eq(&self.uuid)))
+                .set((
+                    webauthn_credentials::encrypted_user_key.eq(Some(encrypted_user_key)),
+                    webauthn_credentials::encrypted_public_key.eq(Some(encrypted_public_key)),
+                    webauthn_credentials::updated_at.eq(now),
+                ))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .map_res("Error saving passkey")
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+
+    /// `false` when the user has no credential with that id.
+    pub async fn delete_by_uuid_and_user(
+        uuid: &WebauthnCredentialId,
+        user_uuid: &UserId,
+        conn: &DbConn,
+    ) -> ApiResult<bool> {
+        let deleted: usize = conn
+            .run(move |conn| {
+                diesel::delete(
+                    webauthn_credentials::table
+                        .filter(webauthn_credentials::uuid.eq(uuid))
+                        .filter(webauthn_credentials::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)),
+                )
+                .execute(conn)
+                .map_res("Error deleting passkey")
+            })
+            .await?;
+        Ok(deleted == 1)
+    }
+
+    pub async fn delete_all_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            diesel::delete(webauthn_credentials::table.filter(webauthn_credentials::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .map_res("Error deleting passkeys")
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(
+    Clone,
+    Debug,
+    AsRef,
+    Deref,
+    DieselNewType,
+    Display,
+    From,
+    FromForm,
+    Hash,
+    PartialEq,
+    Eq,
+    Serialize,
+    Deserialize,
+    UuidFromParam,
+)]
+pub struct WebauthnCredentialId(String);
+
+#[cfg(all(test, sqlite))]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use crate::db::{models::User, test_db};
+
+    /// A passkey as webauthn-rs stores it, with the key from its own test data
+    const PASSKEY: &str = r#"{"cred":{"cred_id":"dmF1bHR3YXJkZW4gdGVzdCBwYXNza2V5","cred":{"type_":"ES256","key":{"EC_EC2":{"curve":"SECP256R1","x":[194,126,127,109,252,23,131,21,252,6,223,99,44,254,140,27,230,17,94,5,133,28,104,41,144,69,171,149,161,26,200,243],"y":[143,123,183,156,24,178,21,248,117,159,162,69,171,52,188,252,26,59,6,47,103,92,19,58,117,103,249,0,219,8,95,196]}}},"counter":2,"user_verified":true,"backup_eligible":false,"backup_state":false,"registration_policy":"required","extensions":{"cred_protect":"NotRequested","hmac_create_secret":"NotRequested"},"attestation":{"data":"None","metadata":"None"},"attestation_format":"None"}}"#;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn assertions_are_single_use_and_key_writes_leave_the_rest() {
+        test_db::run(async |db| {
+            let conn = db.conn();
+            let mut user = User::new("passkey@example.com", None);
+            user.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
+            let passkey: Passkey = serde_json::from_str(PASSKEY).unwrap();
+            let credential = WebauthnCredential::new(
+                user.uuid.clone(),
+                "Key".into(),
+                &passkey,
+                true,
+                Some("4.user".into()),
+                Some("2.public".into()),
+                Some("2.private".into()),
+            )
+            .unwrap();
+            credential.insert(&conn).await.unwrap();
+            let stored = async || {
+                WebauthnCredential::find_by_user_and_credential_id(&user.uuid, &credential.credential_id, &conn)
+                    .await
+                    .unwrap()
+            };
+
+            // A challenge is answered once, and an older one can't follow a newer one
+            assert!(credential.use_challenge(1_000, &passkey, &conn).await.unwrap());
+            assert!(!credential.use_challenge(1_000, &passkey, &conn).await.unwrap());
+            assert!(credential.use_challenge(2_000, &passkey, &conn).await.unwrap());
+            assert!(!credential.use_challenge(1_500, &passkey, &conn).await.unwrap());
+
+            // A rotation keeps the private key, which the PRF key wraps, and the challenge
+            credential.rotate_keys("4.user2".into(), "2.public2".into(), &conn).await.unwrap();
+            let rotated = stored().await;
+            assert_eq!(rotated.encrypted_user_key.as_deref(), Some("4.user2"));
+            assert_eq!(rotated.encrypted_public_key.as_deref(), Some("2.public2"));
+            assert_eq!(rotated.encrypted_private_key.as_deref(), Some("2.private"));
+            assert_eq!(rotated.last_challenge_issued_at, Some(2_000));
+            assert_eq!(rotated.credential, credential.credential);
+
+            // Deleted, it can't answer any challenge
+            assert!(WebauthnCredential::delete_by_uuid_and_user(&credential.uuid, &user.uuid, &conn).await.unwrap());
+            assert!(!credential.use_challenge(3_000, &passkey, &conn).await.unwrap());
+        });
+    }
+}

src/db/schema.rs

@@ -269,7 +269,6 @@ table! {
         access_event_logs -> Bool,
         access_import_export -> Bool,
         access_reports -> Bool,
-        manage_reset_password -> Bool,
         v2_upgrade_token -> Nullable<Text>,
     }
 }
@@ -380,6 +379,23 @@ table! {
     }
 }
 
+table! {
+    webauthn_credentials (uuid) {
+        uuid -> Text,
+        user_uuid -> Text,
+        name -> Text,
+        credential_id -> Text,
+        credential -> Text,
+        supports_prf -> Bool,
+        encrypted_user_key -> Nullable<Text>,
+        encrypted_public_key -> Nullable<Text>,
+        encrypted_private_key -> Nullable<Text>,
+        last_challenge_issued_at -> Nullable<BigInt>,
+        created_at -> Timestamp,
+        updated_at -> Timestamp,
+    }
+}
+
 joinable!(archives -> users (user_uuid));
 joinable!(archives -> ciphers (cipher_uuid));
 joinable!(attachments -> ciphers (cipher_uuid));
@@ -412,6 +428,7 @@ joinable!(event -> users_organizations (uuid));
 joinable!(auth_requests -> users (user_uuid));
 joinable!(sso_users -> users (user_uuid));
 joinable!(user_signature_key_pairs -> users (user_uuid));
+joinable!(webauthn_credentials -> users (user_uuid));
 
 allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
     archives,
@@ -439,4 +456,5 @@ allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
     event,
     auth_requests,
     user_signature_key_pairs,
+    webauthn_credentials,
 );

src/static/templates/scss/vaultwarden.scss.hbs

@@ -48,17 +48,23 @@ a[href$="/settings/sponsored-families"] {
 }
 {{/if}}
 
-/* Hide the `Log in with passkey` settings */
+{{#unless webauthn_2fa_supported}}
+/* Hide the `Log in with passkey` settings when the `DOMAIN` can't use passkeys */
 app-user-layout app-password-settings app-webauthn-login-settings {
   @extend %vw-hide;
 }
-/* Hide Log in with passkey on the login page */
-.vw-passkey-login {
+{{/unless}}
+{{#unless passkey_login_available}}
+/* Hide Log in with passkey on the login page and adding passkeys. SSO_ONLY keeps the list, so that passkeys can still
+   be removed. */
+.vw-passkey-login,
+app-user-layout app-password-settings app-webauthn-login-settings > button {
   @extend %vw-hide;
 }
+{{/unless}}
 
-/* Hide the or text followed by the two buttons hidden above */
-{{#if (or (not sso_enabled) sso_only)}}
+/* Hide the or text when no button follows it */
+{{#if (and (or (not sso_enabled) sso_only) (not passkey_login_available))}}
 .vw-or-text {
   @extend %vw-hide;
 }
@@ -99,8 +105,9 @@ app-security > app-two-factor-setup > form {
 
 /* Hide unsupported Custom Role options */
 {{#if custom_roles_enabled}}
-/* Not supported: Manage SSO */
-:is(bit-dialog, [bit-dialog]) bit-form-control:has(input[formcontrolname="manageSso"]) {
+/* Not supported: Manage SSO and Manage account recovery */
+:is(bit-dialog, [bit-dialog]) bit-form-control:has(input[formcontrolname="manageSso"]),
+:is(bit-dialog, [bit-dialog]) bit-form-control:has(input[formcontrolname="manageResetPassword"]) {
   @extend %vw-hide;
 }
 {{else}}

src/util.rs

@@ -1011,6 +1011,25 @@ pub fn is_valid_rsa_encrypted_string(value: &str) -> bool {
         && parts.iter().all(|part| !part.is_empty() && data_encoding::BASE64.decode(part.as_bytes()).is_ok())
 }
 
+/// Whether `value` has the form of a key wrapped by a symmetric key: AES-CBC-HMAC (type 2, a 16-byte IV, the
+/// ciphertext and a 32-byte MAC) or COSE (type 7, one piece), each piece canonical, padded base64.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Core/Utilities/EncryptedStringAttribute.cs#L19-L29>
+pub fn is_valid_symmetric_encrypted_string(value: &str) -> bool {
+    let (lengths, rest): (&[Option<usize>], &str) = match value.split_once('.') {
+        Some(("2", rest)) => (&[Some(16), None, Some(32)], rest),
+        Some(("7", rest)) => (&[None], rest),
+        _ => return false,
+    };
+    let parts: Vec<&str> = rest.split('|').collect();
+    parts.len() == lengths.len()
+        && parts.iter().zip(lengths).all(|(part, length)| {
+            data_encoding::BASE64
+                .decode(part.as_bytes())
+                .is_ok_and(|bytes| !bytes.is_empty() && length.is_none_or(|length| bytes.len() == length))
+        })
+}
+
 /// These are some tests to check that the implementations match
 /// The IPv4 can be all checked in 30 seconds or so and they are correct as of nightly 2023-07-17
 /// The IPV6 can't be checked in a reasonable time, so we check over a hundred billion random ones, so far correct