Misc fixes regarding jobs and config (#7858)

* Fix several scheduled job issues

Several jobs could cause a panic, or stop without running through all
items because of this panic. This could cause missed items until that
panic somehow resolved it self, and probably would never work fully
again.

This could cause emergency access for example to never work again.
Besides this, emergency access was also able to be panic if the
wait-time was out-of-bounds and date/time calculation might fail.
This is also fixed now by using `checked` functions and continue upon
those issues so all awaiting items will be handled.

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

* Fix several possible panics and overflows

Adjust several integer types to be a lower or unsigned type.
Most types were too large, only because the function which used this
value needed that specific type. But, this allowed too large values
which either caused panics or might cause a DoS.

This does however might possible cause configurations which have larger
values, which are probably way too large anyway to be not loaded or use
their defaults. During the config loading, either via env or json, it
will show error logs regarding these items.

Also fixed an issue with protected actions via OTP, it increased the
attempt before it validated if the attempt limit was reached. This could
cause an issue when set to `1`, that way it was never allowed, and `3`
times would actually be `2`.

Also added several config validation checks which otherwise would have
prevent Vaultwarden to start, or login, so these will probably not cause
issues, else users would already have issues.

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

* Show config errors on diagnostics page

With the previous commits it is now possible to add a warning if their
rare issues with loading of the config, either environment variables
which we were not able to parse correctly, or if loading the
`config.json` failed instead of just showing it wasn't used, while it
does exists, which might be confusing.

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

.env.template

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
 # DB_CONNECTION_RETRIES=15
 
 ## Database timeout
-## Timeout when acquiring database connection
+## Timeout in seconds when acquiring database connection
 # DATABASE_TIMEOUT=30
 
 ## Database idle timeout
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@
 ## Defaults to daily. Set blank to disable this job. Also without EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN set, this job will not start.
 # EVENT_CLEANUP_SCHEDULE="0 10 0 * * *"
 ## Number of days to retain events stored in the database.
-## If unset (the default), events are kept indefinitely and the scheduled job is disabled!
+## If unset (the default) or 0, events are kept indefinitely and the scheduled job is disabled!
 # EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN=
 ##
 ## Cron schedule of the job that cleans old auth requests from the auth request.
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@
 # USER_SEND_LIMIT=
 
 ## Number of days to wait before auto-deleting a trashed item.
-## If unset (the default), trashed items are not auto-deleted.
+## If unset (the default) or 0, trashed items are not auto-deleted.
 ## This setting applies globally, so make sure to inform all users of any changes to this setting.
 # TRASH_AUTO_DELETE_DAYS=
 
@@ -394,11 +394,15 @@
 ## - "pm-5594-safari-account-switching": Enable account switching in Safari. (Safari >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "pm-32413-multi-client-password-management": Enable changing the master password directly in the client. (Desktop/Extension >= 2026.4.0)
 ## - "ssh-agent-v2": Enable newer SSH agent support. (Desktop >= 2026.2.1)
+## - "windows-desktop-autotype": Enable the autotype feature preview on Windows. (Desktop >= 2025.8.0)
+## - "windows-desktop-autotype-ga": Enable the new, still in development, autotype implementation on Windows. (Desktop >= 2026.9.1)
+##   Only enable one of the two autotype flags, the clients disable autotype completely when both are enabled.
 ## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins":
 ## - "pm-32009-new-item-types": Enable new item types: Bank Account, Driver's License, and Passport (Clients >= 2026.4.0)
 ## - "pm-34171-card-scanner": Enable the new card scanner feature on mobile (Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.4.1)
 ## - "enable-basic-auth-response": Enable HTTP Basic Auth autofill in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.9.0)
 ## - "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic": Enable the rewritten add/update login notification triggering logic in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.2.0)
+## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
 # EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=
 
 ## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.
@@ -459,7 +463,7 @@
 
 ## Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!)
 ## https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/connect-src
-## Allows other domains to URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
+## Allows other domains for URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
 ## This adds the configured value to the 'Content-Security-Policy' headers 'connect-src' value.
 ## Multiple values must be separated with a whitespace. And only HTTPS values are allowed.
 ## Example: "https://my-addy-io.domain.tld https://my-simplelogin.domain.tld"

.github/workflows/build.yml

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ jobs:
 
       # Enable Rust Caching
       - name: Rust Caching
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@6323deb102c322ba6fcbdcafc7e3dddab59af2b6 # v2.9.2
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3
         with:
           # Use a custom prefix-key to force a fresh start. This is sometimes needed with bigger changes.
           # Like changing the build host from Ubuntu 20.04 to 22.04 for example.

.github/workflows/release.yml

@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ jobs:
 
       - name: Bake ${{ matrix.base_image }} containers
         id: bake_vw
-        uses: docker/bake-action@018cb6412ab401ebaa809aa5f85966b74628600f # v7.4.0
+        uses: docker/bake-action@59cb1203cd42bcefd40a1b6d73b589e48c86040e # v7.5.0
         env:
           BASE_TAGS: "${{ steps.determine-version.outputs.BASE_TAGS }}"
           SOURCE_COMMIT: "${{ env.SOURCE_COMMIT }}"
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ jobs:
           touch "${RUNNER_TEMP}/digests/${digest#sha256:}"
 
       - name: Upload digest
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
         with:
           name: digests-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}-${{ matrix.base_image }}
           path: ${{ runner.temp }}/digests/*
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ jobs:
           subject-path: vaultwarden-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}
 
       - name: Upload binaries as artifacts
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
         with:
           name: vaultwarden-${{ env.SOURCE_VERSION }}-linux-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}-${{ matrix.base_image }}
           path: vaultwarden-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ jobs:
 
     steps:
       - name: Download digests
-        uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@9000827ccba6bdab643e8b6fd33ac0654aef8333 # v8.0.2
         with:
           path: ${{ runner.temp }}/digests
           pattern: digests-*-${{ matrix.base_image }}

.github/workflows/trivy.yml

@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ jobs:
           severity: CRITICAL,HIGH
 
       - name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@2892aa5e19bbd11bc0cff5427e3b750a04d9e3c2 # v4.38.2
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 # v4.39.1
         with:
           sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'

.github/workflows/typos.yml

@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ jobs:
 
       # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.pre-commit-config.yaml` too
       - name: Spell Check Repo
-        uses: crate-ci/typos@00f422f3b19c57bc6338715ebfe3316d38768461 # v1.50.3
+        uses: crate-ci/typos@7f9d0819ca1c008ade73f4b41fa9d258d48f605b # v1.51.1

.github/workflows/zizmor.yml

@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
           persist-credentials: false
 
       - name: Run zizmor
-        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@cc914d7f3750a2d13d75c7f184a1060aa0e9d482 # v0.6.4
+        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@85b2b9fb8e3325e7a23d7d0a9d7ba5ae0f999e3e # v0.7.1
         with:
           # intentionally not scanning the entire repository,
           # since it contains integration tests.

.pre-commit-config.yaml

@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ repos:
 
   # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.github/workflows/typos.yaml` too
   - repo: https://github.com/crate-ci/typos
-    rev: 00f422f3b19c57bc6338715ebfe3316d38768461 # v1.50.3
+    rev: 7f9d0819ca1c008ade73f4b41fa9d258d48f605b # v1.51.1
     hooks:
       - id: typos
         always_run: true

.typos.toml

@@ -14,8 +14,9 @@ extend-ignore-re = [
     # In SMTP it's called HELO, so ignore it
     "(?i)helo_name",
     "Server name sent during.+HELO",
-    # COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
+    # COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption, ignore these specific items
-    "(?i)cose",
+    "COSEKey",
+    "COSEAlgorithm",
     # Ignore this specific string as it's valid
     "Ensure they are valid OTPs",
     # This word is misspelled upstream

Cargo.toml

@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ dashmap = "6.2.1"
 
 # Async futures
 futures = "0.3.34"
-tokio = { version = "1.53.2", features = [
+tokio = { version = "1.54.1", features = [
     "fs",
     "io-util",
     "net",
@@ -100,14 +100,14 @@ tokio = { version = "1.53.2", features = [
     "signal",
     "time",
 ] }
-tokio-util = { version = "0.7.19", features = ["compat"] }
+tokio-util = { version = "0.7.20", features = ["compat"] }
 
 # A generic serialization/deserialization framework
 serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
-serde_json = "1.0.151"
+serde_json = "1.0.154"
 
 # A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
-diesel = { version = "2.3.13", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric", "64-column-tables"] }
+diesel = { version = "2.3.14", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
 diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"
 
 derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ libsqlite3-sys = { version = "0.38.2", optional = true }
 # Crypto-related libraries
 rand = "0.10.3"
 ring = "0.17.14"
-rustls = { version = "0.23.45", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
+rustls = { version = "0.23.46", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
 subtle = "2.6.1"
 
 # UUID generation
-uuid = { version = "1.27.0", features = ["v4"] }
+uuid = { version = "1.28.0", features = ["v4"] }
 
 # Date and time libraries
 chrono = { version = "0.4.45", default-features = false, features = ["clock", "serde"] }
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ bytes = "1.12.1"
 svg-hush = "0.9.7"
 
 # Cache function results (Used for version check and favicon fetching)
-cached = { version = "4.0.1", features = ["async"] }
+cached = { version = "4.0.3", features = ["async"] }
 
 # Used for custom short lived cookie jar during favicon extraction
 cookie = "0.18.2"
@@ -257,18 +257,18 @@ rpassword = "7.5.4"
 grass_compiler = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false }
 
 # File are accessed through Apache OpenDAL
-opendal = { version = "0.59.4", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
+opendal = { version = "0.59.5", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
-opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.4", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
+opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.5", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
 
 # For retrieving AWS credentials, including temporary SSO credentials
-aws-config = { version = "1.12.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
+aws-config = { version = "1.13.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
     "behavior-version-latest",
     "credentials-process",
     "rt-tokio",
     "sso",
 ] }
-aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0", optional = true }
+aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.1", optional = true }
-aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.19.0", optional = true }
+aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.19.1", optional = true }
 http = { version = "1.5.0", optional = true }
 reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.3.1", optional = true }
 reqsign-core = { version = "3.3.2", optional = true }

docker/DockerSettings.yaml

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ---
-vault_version: "v2026.7.0"
+vault_version: "v2026.8.0"
-vault_image_digest: "sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c"
+vault_image_digest: "sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a"
-# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.9.0
+# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.10.0
 # We use the linux/amd64 platform shell scripts since there is no difference between the different platform scripts
 # https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx | https://hub.docker.com/r/tonistiigi/xx/tags
-xx_image_digest: "sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707"
+xx_image_digest: "sha256:40fe21f44bb8cddf1eb1226db190d0a984118f62ee02a91b77d99448d28264a6"
 # The `rust_version` variable is extracted from `rust-toolchain.toml`
 # rust_version: x.yy.z # Rust version to be used
 debian_version: trixie # Debian release name to be used

docker/Dockerfile.alpine

@@ -19,23 +19,23 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
 
 ########################## ALPINE BUILD IMAGES ##########################
 ## NOTE: The Alpine Base Images do not support other platforms then linux/amd64 and linux/arm64
 ## And for Alpine we define all build images here, they will only be loaded when actually used
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.99.0 AS build_amd64
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.99.1 AS build_amd64
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.99.0 AS build_arm64
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.99.1 AS build_arm64
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.99.0 AS build_armv7
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.99.1 AS build_armv7
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.99.0 AS build_armv6
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.99.1 AS build_armv6
 
 ########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
 # hadolint ignore=DL3006

docker/Dockerfile.debian

@@ -19,24 +19,24 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
 
 ########################## Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts ##########################
 ## We use the linux/amd64 no matter which Build Platform, since these are all bash scripts
 ## And these bash scripts do not have any significant difference if at all
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707 AS xx
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:40fe21f44bb8cddf1eb1226db190d0a984118f62ee02a91b77d99448d28264a6 AS xx
 
 ########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
 # hadolint ignore=DL3006
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.99.0-slim-trixie AS build
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.99.1-slim-trixie AS build
 # hadolint ignore=DL3067
 COPY --from=xx / /
 ARG TARGETARCH

docker/README.md

@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ Some unsupported platforms for Debian based images. These are not built and test
 - 386     (linux/386)
 - ppc64le (linux/ppc64le)
 - s390x   (linux/s390x)
+- riscv64 (linux/riscv64)
 
 To build these containers you need to enable QEMU binfmt support to be able to run/emulate architectures which are different then your host.<br>
 This ensures the container build process can run binaries from other architectures.<br>

docker/docker-bake.hcl

@@ -148,6 +148,12 @@ target "debian-s390x" {
   platforms = ["linux/s390x"]
   tags = generate_tags("", "-s390x")
 }
+
+target "debian-riscv64" {
+  inherits = ["debian"]
+  platforms = ["linux/riscv64"]
+  tags = generate_tags("", "-riscv64")
+}
 // ==== End of unsupported Debian architecture targets ===
 
 // A Group to build all platforms individually for local testing

macros/Cargo.toml

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ proc-macro = true
 
 [dependencies]
 quote = "1.0.47"
-syn = "3.0.6"
+syn = "3.0.9"
 
 [lints]
 workspace = true

migrations/mysql/2026-09-19-120000_cipher_data_longtext/up.sql

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
--- A blob-encrypted cipher keeps all of its content in `data`, up to 500,000 characters, so the
--- 64 KiB of TEXT is too small. Like upstream, which uses LONGTEXT.
-ALTER TABLE ciphers MODIFY data LONGTEXT NOT NULL;

migrations/mysql/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/down.sql

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
-
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;

migrations/mysql/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/up.sql

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
-
-CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
-    uuid                CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
-    user_uuid           CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
-    signature_algorithm INTEGER  NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
-    signing_key         TEXT     NOT NULL,
-    verifying_key       TEXT     NOT NULL,
-    created_at          DATETIME NOT NULL,
-    updated_at          DATETIME NOT NULL,
-    FOREIGN KEY (user_uuid) REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE
-);

migrations/mysql/2026-10-07-120000_add_org_policy_revision_date/down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;

migrations/mysql/2026-10-07-120000_add_org_policy_revision_date/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+-- DATETIME (not TIMESTAMP) to match this repo's convention for revision_date
+-- columns elsewhere, and to avoid MySQL's implicit session-timezone
+-- conversion and 2038 range limit on TIMESTAMP.
+ALTER TABLE org_policies
+ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
+
+UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = UTC_TIMESTAMP();

migrations/postgresql/2026-09-19-120000_cipher_data_longtext/up.sql

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
--- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change

migrations/postgresql/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/down.sql

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
-
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;

migrations/postgresql/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/up.sql

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
-
-CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
-    uuid                CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
-    user_uuid           CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
-    signature_algorithm INTEGER  NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
-    signing_key         TEXT     NOT NULL,
-    verifying_key       TEXT     NOT NULL,
-    created_at          TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
-    updated_at          TIMESTAMP NOT NULL
-);

migrations/postgresql/2026-10-07-120000_add_org_policy_revision_date/down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;

migrations/postgresql/2026-10-07-120000_add_org_policy_revision_date/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+-- Backfill via `now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc'` rather than a DEFAULT of now():
+-- assigning timestamptz now() into a naive TIMESTAMP column casts through
+-- the server's TimeZone GUC, so a DEFAULT now() would store local wall-clock
+-- instead of UTC on non-UTC servers, unlike every other naive-UTC timestamp
+-- column in this schema.
+ALTER TABLE org_policies
+ADD COLUMN revision_date TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
+
+UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = (now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc');

migrations/sqlite/2026-09-19-120000_cipher_data_longtext/up.sql

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
--- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change

migrations/sqlite/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/down.sql

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
-
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;

migrations/sqlite/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/up.sql

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
-
-CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
-    uuid                TEXT     NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
-    user_uuid           TEXT     NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
-    signature_algorithm INTEGER  NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
-    signing_key         TEXT     NOT NULL,
-    verifying_key       TEXT     NOT NULL,
-    created_at          DATETIME NOT NULL,
-    updated_at          DATETIME NOT NULL
-);

migrations/sqlite/2026-10-07-120000_add_org_policy_revision_date/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+-- SQLite forbids non-constant defaults in ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN, so add
+-- the column with a constant placeholder and backfill separately.
+ALTER TABLE org_policies
+ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
+
+UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP;

playwright/README.md

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 This allows running integration tests using [Playwright](https://playwright.dev/).
 \
-It usse its own [test.env](/test/scenarios/test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.
+It uses its own [test.env](./test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.
 
 ## Install
 
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker compose --profile playwright --env-file test.env run Pl
 
 ### Keep services running
 
-If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak runnning (states are not impacted by the tests):
+If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak running (states are not impacted by the tests):
 
 ```bash
 PW_KEEP_SERVICE_RUNNING=true npx playwright test

playwright/tests/emergency.spec.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+import { test, expect, type Page, type TestInfo, Test } from '@playwright/test';
+import { MailDev } from 'maildev';
+
+import * as utils from "../global-utils";
+import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
+import { activateTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
+
+let users = utils.loadEnv();
+let mailserver;
+
+test.beforeAll('Setup', async ({ browser }, testInfo: TestInfo) => {
+    mailserver = new MailDev({
+        port: process.env.MAILDEV_SMTP_PORT,
+        web: { port: process.env.MAILDEV_HTTP_PORT },
+    })
+
+    await mailserver.listen();
+
+    await utils.startVault(browser, testInfo, {
+        SMTP_HOST: process.env.MAILDEV_HOST,
+        SMTP_FROM: process.env.PW_SMTP_FROM,
+    });
+});
+
+test.afterAll('Teardown', async ({}) => {
+    utils.stopVault();
+    if( mailserver ){
+        await mailserver.close();
+    }
+});
+
+async function emergencyAccess(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string }) {
+    await test.step('Navigate', async () => {
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Emergency access' }).click();
+        await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Emergency access', { exact: true })).toBeVisible();
+    });
+}
+
+test('Emergency access', async ({ browser, page }) => {
+    const context2 = await browser.newContext();
+    const page2 = await context2.newPage();
+
+    const mailBuffer = mailserver.buffer(users.user1.email);
+    const mailBuffer2 = mailserver.buffer(users.user2.email);
+
+    await createAccount(test, page, users.user1);
+    await createAccount(test, page2, users.user2);
+
+    await test.step('Add test2', async () => {
+        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add emergency contact' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email * (required)' }).fill(users.user2.email);
+        await page.getByRole('radio', { name: 'Takeover Can reset your' }).check();
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
+        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'User(s) invited');
+    });
+
+    await test.step('Accept', async () => {
+        const email = await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access for " + users.user1.name);
+        const pageE = await context2.newPage();
+        await pageE.setContent(email.html);
+        const link = await pageE.getByTestId("emergency").getAttribute("href");
+        await pageE.close();
+
+        await page2.goto(link);
+        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Invitation accepted');
+    });
+
+    await test.step('Confirm', async () => {
+        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
+        await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Needs confirmation')).toBeVisible();
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
+        await utils.checkNotification(page, users.user2.name + ' confirmed');
+        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access contact for " + users.user1.name + " confirmed");
+    });
+
+    await test.step('Request', async () => {
+        await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
+        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
+        await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
+        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
+        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Emergency access requested');
+        await mailBuffer.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request by " + users.user2.name + " initiated");
+    });
+
+    await test.step('Approved', async () => {
+        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
+        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access approved');
+        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request for " + users.user1.name + " approved");
+    });
+    await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
+
+    let newPassword = "TotoNewPassword";
+    await test.step('Access', async () => {
+        await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
+        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
+        await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Takeover' }).click();
+        await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'New master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(newPassword);
+        await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Confirm new master password' }).fill(newPassword);
+        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
+        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Password reset for ' + users.user1.name);
+    });
+
+    await test.step('Changed no 2fa', async () => {
+        users.user1.password = newPassword;
+        await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
+    });
+
+    await test.step('Reject', async () => {
+        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Reject' }).click();
+        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access rejected');
+        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request to " + users.user1.name + " rejected");
+    });
+
+    await test.step('Remove', async () => {
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Remove' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Yes' }).click();
+        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Removed user ' + users.user2.name);
+        await expect(page.getByText('You have not added any emergency contacts')).toBeVisible();
+    });
+});

playwright/tests/login.spec.ts

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
 
 import * as utils from "../global-utils";
 import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
-import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
+import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP, recoveryCodes } from './setups/2fa';
 
 let users = utils.loadEnv();
 let totp;
@@ -31,21 +31,42 @@ test('Authenticator 2fa', async ({ page }) => {
 
     await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
 
-    await test.step('login', async () => {
+    await logUser(test, page, users.user1, { totp });
-        let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
-        timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
 
+    await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
+});
+
+test('Recovery codes', async ({ context, page }) => {
+    await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
+
+    await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
+    let recovery = await recoveryCodes(test, page, users.user1);
+
+    await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
+
+    await test.step('login', async () => {
         await page.getByLabel(/Email address/).fill(users.user1.email);
         await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
         await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(users.user1.password);
         await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();
 
         await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
-        await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate({timestamp}));
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
 
         await expect(page).toHaveTitle(/Vaultwarden Web/);
-    });
 
-    await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
+        const newPagePromise = context.waitForEvent('page');
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Use your recovery code' }).click();
+        const newPage = await newPagePromise;
+
+        const tabs = context.pages();
+        await tabs[1].bringToFront();
+        await expect(tabs[1].getByRole('heading', { name: 'Recover account two-step login' })).toBeVisible();
+        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email address * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.email);
+        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.password);
+        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Recovery code * (required)' }).fill(recovery);
+        await tabs[1].getByRole('button', { name: 'Submit' }).click();
+
+        await expect(tabs[1]).toHaveTitle(/Two-step login/);
+    });
 });
+

playwright/tests/setups/2fa.ts

@@ -4,6 +4,24 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
 
 import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
 
+export async function recoveryCodes(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): string {
+    return await test.step('Recovery code', async () => {
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Security' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Two-step login' }).click();
+
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'View recovery code' }).click();
+        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
+
+        const recovery = await page.getByRole('code').innerText();
+        await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
+
+        return recovery;
+    })
+}
+
 export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): OTPAuth.TOTP {
     return await test.step('Activate TOTP 2FA', async () => {
         await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
@@ -21,7 +39,6 @@ export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string,
         await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate());
         await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Turn on' }).click();
         await page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Turned on', exact: true });
-        await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
 
         return totp;
     })

playwright/tests/setups/user.ts

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { expect, type Browser, Page } from '@playwright/test';
 
 import { type MailBuffer } from 'maildev';
 
+import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
 import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
 import { retrieveEmailCode } from './2fa';
 
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ export async function logUser(
         mailBuffer ?: MailBuffer,
         mail2fa?: boolean,
         notNewDevice?: boolean,
+        totp?: OTPAuth.TOTP,
     } = {}
 ) {
     await test.step(`Log user ${user.email}`, async () => {
@@ -55,11 +57,23 @@ export async function logUser(
         await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
         await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();
 
-        if( options.mail2fa ){
+        if( options.mail2fa || options.totp ){
+            let code;
+
             await test.step('2FA check', async () => {
                 await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
-                let code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
+
+                if( options.totp ) {
+                    const totp = options.totp;
+                    let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
+                    timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
+                    code = totp.generate({timestamp});
+                } else if( options.mail2fa ){
+                    code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
+                }
+
                 await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(code);
+
                 await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
             });
         }

rust-toolchain.toml

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 [toolchain]
-channel = "1.99.0"
+channel = "1.99.1"
 components = [ "rustfmt", "clippy" ]
 profile = "minimal"

src/api/admin.rs

@@ -201,12 +201,15 @@ fn post_admin_login(
     // If the token is invalid, redirect to login page
     if validate_token(&data.token) {
         // If the token received is valid, generate JWT and save it as a cookie
-        let claims = generate_admin_claims();
+        let claims = match generate_admin_claims() {
+            Ok(claims) => claims,
+            Err(e) => return Err(AdminResponse::Ok(render_admin_login(Some(e.message()), redirect.as_deref()))),
+        };
         let jwt = encode_jwt(&claims);
 
         let cookie = Cookie::build((COOKIE_NAME, jwt))
             .path(admin_path())
-            .max_age(time::Duration::minutes(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime()))
+            .max_age(time::Duration::minutes(i64::from(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime())))
             .same_site(SameSite::Strict)
             .http_only(true)
             .secure(secure.https);
@@ -779,6 +782,8 @@ async fn diagnostics(_token: AdminToken, ip_header: IpHeader, conn: DbConn) -> A
     .into_keys()
     .collect();
 
+    let invalid_env_vars = crate::util::INVALID_ENV_VARS.lock().unwrap().join(", ");
+
     let diagnostics_json = json!({
         "dns_resolved": dns_resolved,
         "current_release": VERSION,
@@ -801,7 +806,9 @@ async fn diagnostics(_token: AdminToken, ip_header: IpHeader, conn: DbConn) -> A
         "db_version": get_sql_server_version(&conn).await,
         "admin_url": format!("{}/diagnostics", admin_url()),
         "overrides": &CONFIG.get_overrides().join(", "),
+        "config_file_status": &CONFIG.get_config_file_status(),
         "template_overrides": check_template_overrides().join(", "),
+        "invalid_env_vars": invalid_env_vars,
         "invalid_feature_flags": invalid_feature_flags,
         "host_arch": env::consts::ARCH,
         "host_os":  env::consts::OS,

src/api/core/accounts.rs

@@ -22,8 +22,8 @@ use crate::{
         models::{
             AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, Cipher, CipherId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest,
             EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EventType, Folder, FolderId, Invitation, KeyId, Membership,
-            MembershipId, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationId, Send, SendId, SignatureAlgorithm,
+            MembershipId, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationId, Send, SendId, User, UserId,
-            User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserSignatureKeyPair,
+            UserKdfType,
         },
     },
     mail,
@@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<rocket::Route> {
         post_profile,
         put_avatar,
         get_public_keys,
-        get_account_public_keys,
         get_keys,
         post_keys,
         post_password,
@@ -94,6 +93,15 @@ pub struct KDFData {
     kdf_parallelism: Option<i32>,
 }
 
+impl KDFData {
+    pub(super) fn matches_user(&self, user: &User) -> bool {
+        self.kdf == user.client_kdf_type
+            && self.kdf_iterations == user.client_kdf_iter
+            && self.kdf_memory == user.client_kdf_memory
+            && self.kdf_parallelism == user.client_kdf_parallelism
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 pub struct RegisterData {
@@ -105,9 +113,6 @@ pub struct RegisterData {
     #[serde(alias = "userAsymmetricKeys")]
     keys: Option<KeysData>,
 
-    // Supersedes `keys`, and the only way a v2 account can be registered.
-    account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>,
-
     master_password_hint: Option<String>,
 
     organization_user_id: Option<MembershipId>,
@@ -119,6 +124,36 @@ pub struct RegisterData {
     org_invite_token: Option<String>,
 }
 
+impl RegisterData {
+    fn hash(&self) -> String {
+        self.compat.fold(|rdc| &rdc.master_password_hash, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_authentication.hash).to_owned()
+    }
+
+    fn kdf(&self) -> &KDFData {
+        self.compat.fold(|rdc| &rdc.kdf, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_authentication.kdf)
+    }
+
+    fn key(&self) -> String {
+        self.compat.fold(|rdc| &rdc.key, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_unlock.key).to_owned()
+    }
+
+    // When comparing with salt, email need to be normalized:
+    //  - https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/web-v2026.5.0/libs/common/src/key-management/master-password/services/master-password.service.ts#L171
+    fn unprocessable(&self) -> bool {
+        let mut unprocessable = false;
+        *self.compat.fold(
+            |_| &false,
+            |rdcu| {
+                let email = self.email.trim().to_lowercase();
+                unprocessable = rdcu.master_password_authentication.kdf != rdcu.master_password_unlock.kdf
+                    || rdcu.master_password_authentication.salt != email
+                    || rdcu.master_password_unlock.salt != email;
+                &unprocessable
+            },
+        )
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 struct RegisterDataOld {
     #[serde(flatten)]
@@ -158,42 +193,6 @@ impl RegisterDataCompat {
             RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataCur(rdcu) => fcu(rdcu),
         }
     }
-
-    fn hash(&self) -> String {
-        self.fold(|rdc| &rdc.master_password_hash, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_authentication.hash).to_owned()
-    }
-
-    fn kdf(&self) -> &KDFData {
-        self.fold(|rdc| &rdc.kdf, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_authentication.kdf)
-    }
-
-    fn key(&self) -> String {
-        self.fold(|rdc| &rdc.key, |rdcu| &rdcu.master_password_unlock.key).to_owned()
-    }
-
-    /// The id of the user key, which only the current format carries.
-    fn key_id(&self) -> Option<KeyId> {
-        match self {
-            RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataOld(_) => None,
-            RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataCur(rdcu) => rdcu.master_password_unlock.contained_key_id.clone(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    // When comparing with salt, email need to be normalized:
-    //  - https://github.com/bitwarden/clients/blob/web-v2026.5.0/libs/common/src/key-management/master-password/services/master-password.service.ts#L171
-    fn unprocessable(&self, email: &str) -> bool {
-        let mut unprocessable = false;
-        *self.fold(
-            |_| &false,
-            |rdcu| {
-                let email = email.trim().to_lowercase();
-                unprocessable = rdcu.master_password_authentication.kdf != rdcu.master_password_unlock.kdf
-                    || rdcu.master_password_authentication.salt != email
-                    || rdcu.master_password_unlock.salt != email;
-                &unprocessable
-            },
-        )
-    }
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -203,198 +202,6 @@ struct KeysData {
     public_key: String,
 }
 
-/// Upstream's implicit `[Required]` on a non-nullable string: present and not blank.
-fn required(value: Option<String>, field: &str) -> ApiResult<String> {
-    match value {
-        Some(value) if !value.trim().is_empty() => Ok(value),
-        _ => err!(format!("The {field} field is required.")),
-    }
-}
-
-/// The `accountKeys` payload: a v1 key pair, or v2 with a signature key pair and security state.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Api/Request/AccountKeysRequestModel.cs#L6-L50>
-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct AccountKeysData {
-    // Required like upstream, but only used without `public_key_encryption_key_pair`
-    user_key_encrypted_account_private_key: Option<String>,
-    account_public_key: Option<String>,
-
-    public_key_encryption_key_pair: Option<PublicKeyEncryptionKeyPairData>,
-    signature_key_pair: Option<SignatureKeyPairData>,
-    security_state: Option<SecurityStateData>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct PublicKeyEncryptionKeyPairData {
-    wrapped_private_key: String,
-    public_key: String,
-    signed_public_key: Option<String>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct SignatureKeyPairData {
-    signature_algorithm: String,
-    wrapped_signing_key: String,
-    verifying_key: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct SecurityStateData {
-    security_state: String,
-    security_version: i32,
-}
-
-struct ValidatedAccountKeys {
-    private_key: String,
-    public_key: String,
-    v2: Option<ValidatedV2AccountKeys>,
-}
-
-struct ValidatedV2AccountKeys {
-    signed_public_key: String,
-    signing_key: String,
-    verifying_key: String,
-    signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
-    security_state: String,
-    security_version: i32,
-}
-
-impl AccountKeysData {
-    /// Upstream's model checks, plus the v2 fields all or none: no client can unlock a partial v2 state.
-    fn validate(self) -> ApiResult<ValidatedAccountKeys> {
-        let top_private_key =
-            required(self.user_key_encrypted_account_private_key, "UserKeyEncryptedAccountPrivateKey")?;
-        let top_public_key = required(self.account_public_key, "AccountPublicKey")?;
-        let (private_key, public_key, signed_public_key) = match self.public_key_encryption_key_pair {
-            Some(key_pair) => (
-                required(Some(key_pair.wrapped_private_key), "WrappedPrivateKey")?,
-                required(Some(key_pair.public_key), "PublicKey")?,
-                key_pair.signed_public_key,
-            ),
-            // Older clients only send the top-level fields, which are always v1
-            None => (top_private_key, top_public_key, None),
-        };
-
-        if let Some(signature_key_pair) = &self.signature_key_pair {
-            required(Some(signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm.clone()), "SignatureAlgorithm")?;
-            required(Some(signature_key_pair.wrapped_signing_key.clone()), "WrappedSigningKey")?;
-            required(Some(signature_key_pair.verifying_key.clone()), "VerifyingKey")?;
-        }
-        if let Some(security_state) = &self.security_state {
-            required(Some(security_state.security_state.clone()), "SecurityState")?;
-            if security_state.security_state.encode_utf16().count() > 10_000 {
-                err!("The field SecurityState must be a string with a maximum length of 10000.")
-            }
-        }
-
-        let v2 = match (signed_public_key, self.signature_key_pair, self.security_state) {
-            (Some(signed_public_key), Some(signature_key_pair), Some(security_state)) => {
-                // Upstream fails on a null one, but takes an empty one that no client can unlock with
-                let signed_public_key = required(Some(signed_public_key), "SignedPublicKey")?;
-                let Some(signature_algorithm) = SignatureAlgorithm::parse(&signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm)
-                else {
-                    err!(format!(
-                        "Unsupported signature algorithm: {}",
-                        signature_key_pair.signature_algorithm.escape_debug()
-                    ))
-                };
-
-                Some(ValidatedV2AccountKeys {
-                    signed_public_key,
-                    signing_key: signature_key_pair.wrapped_signing_key,
-                    verifying_key: signature_key_pair.verifying_key,
-                    signature_algorithm,
-                    security_state: security_state.security_state,
-                    security_version: security_state.security_version,
-                })
-            }
-            (None, None, None) => None,
-            _ => err!(
-                "Invalid account keys: the signed public key, signature key pair and security state must either all be present or all be absent"
-            ),
-        };
-
-        Ok(ValidatedAccountKeys {
-            private_key,
-            public_key,
-            v2,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-impl From<KeysData> for ValidatedAccountKeys {
-    fn from(keys: KeysData) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            private_key: keys.encrypted_private_key,
-            public_key: keys.public_key,
-            v2: None,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-impl ValidatedAccountKeys {
-    /// The keys of a registration: `accountKeys` only for a v2 account, like upstream.
-    ///
-    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Auth/Models/Api/Request/Accounts/RegisterFinishRequestModel.cs#L77-L100>
-    fn for_registration(account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>, keys: Option<KeysData>) -> ApiResult<Self> {
-        if let Some(account_keys) = account_keys {
-            let account_keys = account_keys.validate()?;
-            if account_keys.is_v2() {
-                return Ok(account_keys);
-            }
-        }
-        let Some(keys) = keys else {
-            err!("PublicKey and WrappedPrivateKey not found in RequestModel")
-        };
-        Ok(keys.into())
-    }
-
-    fn is_v2(&self) -> bool {
-        self.v2.is_some()
-    }
-
-    /// Sets the keys on the user, which then needs saving before [`Self::save_signature_key_pair`].
-    fn apply(&self, user: &mut User) -> EmptyResult {
-        user.private_key = Some(self.private_key.clone());
-        user.public_key = Some(self.public_key.clone());
-
-        user.signed_public_key = self.v2.as_ref().map(|v2| v2.signed_public_key.clone());
-        user.security_state = self.v2.as_ref().map(|v2| v2.security_state.clone());
-        user.security_version = self.v2.as_ref().map(|v2| v2.security_version);
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-
-    /// Saves the signature key pair, which needs the user to exist for its foreign key.
-    async fn save_signature_key_pair(&self, user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        // Skip if the account is v1, since v1 accounts don't have a signature key pair.
-        let Some(v2) = &self.v2 else {
-            return Ok(());
-        };
-
-        let mut key_pair = match UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(user_id, conn).await {
-            Some(mut key_pair) => {
-                key_pair.signature_algorithm = v2.signature_algorithm as i32;
-                key_pair.signing_key.clone_from(&v2.signing_key);
-                key_pair.verifying_key.clone_from(&v2.verifying_key);
-                key_pair
-            }
-            None => UserSignatureKeyPair::new(
-                user_id.clone(),
-                v2.signature_algorithm,
-                v2.signing_key.clone(),
-                v2.verifying_key.clone(),
-            ),
-        };
-        key_pair.save(conn).await
-    }
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 pub struct MasterPasswordAuthentication {
@@ -415,19 +222,17 @@ pub struct MasterPasswordUnlock {
 
     #[serde(alias = "masterKeyWrappedUserKey")]
     key: String,
-    contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 pub struct SetPasswordData {
     #[serde(flatten)]
-    compat: RegisterDataCompat,
+    kdf: KDFData,
 
+    key: String,
     keys: Option<KeysData>,
-    // Supersedes `keys`, and the only way a v2 account can be initialized here.
+    master_password_hash: String,
-    account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>,
-
     master_password_hint: Option<String>,
     org_identifier: Option<String>,
 }
@@ -469,7 +274,7 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
     let mut name = None;
     let mut pending_emergency_access = None;
 
-    if data.compat.unprocessable(&data.email) {
+    if data.unprocessable() {
         err_code!("Unexpected RegisterData format", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
     }
 
@@ -538,11 +343,10 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
         err!("The field Name must be a string with a maximum length of 50.");
     }
 
-    // Check against the password hint setting and the keys here so if they fail,
+    // Check against the password hint setting here so if it fails, the user
-    // the user can retry without losing their invitation below.
+    // can retry without losing their invitation below.
     let password_hint = clean_password_hint(data.master_password_hint.as_ref());
     enforce_password_hint_setting(password_hint.as_ref())?;
-    let account_keys = ValidatedAccountKeys::for_registration(data.account_keys, data.keys)?;
 
     let mut user = match User::find_by_mail(&email, &conn).await {
         Some(user) => {
@@ -589,9 +393,9 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
     // Make sure we don't leave a lingering invitation.
     Invitation::take(&email, &conn).await;
 
-    set_kdf_data(&mut user, data.compat.kdf())?;
+    set_kdf_data(&mut user, data.kdf())?;
 
-    user.set_password(&data.compat.hash(), Some(data.compat.key()), true, None, &conn).await?;
+    user.set_password(&data.hash(), Some(data.key()), true, None, &conn).await?;
     user.password_hint = password_hint;
 
     // Add extra fields if present
@@ -599,10 +403,9 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
         user.name = name;
     }
 
-    account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
+    if let Some(keys) = data.keys {
-    // Like upstream, only a v2 registration records the key id; v1 accounts report it through `user-key-id`
+        user.private_key = Some(keys.encrypted_private_key);
-    if account_keys.is_v2() {
+        user.public_key = Some(keys.public_key);
-        user.key_id = data.compat.key_id();
     }
 
     if email_verified {
@@ -625,7 +428,6 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
     }
 
     user.save(&conn).await?;
-    account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
 
     // accept any open emergency access invitations
     if !CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.emergency_access_allowed() {
@@ -639,81 +441,25 @@ pub async fn register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
     })))
 }
 
-/// Upstream's shape checks of the set-password body, on the raw JSON that the untagged compat would hide.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Auth/Models/Request/Accounts/SetInitialPasswordRequestModel.cs#L75-L106>
-fn validate_set_password_shape(body: &Value) -> EmptyResult {
-    let has = |name: &str| {
-        body.as_object().is_some_and(|o| o.iter().any(|(k, v)| k.eq_ignore_ascii_case(name) && !v.is_null()))
-    };
-
-    if has("accountKeys") && has("keys") {
-        err!("Cannot specify both AccountKeys and Keys. Provide exactly one keypair.")
-    }
-    let (authentication, unlock) = (has("masterPasswordAuthentication"), has("masterPasswordUnlock"));
-    if authentication != unlock {
-        err!(
-            "Must provide both MasterPasswordAuthentication and MasterPasswordUnlock together. Cannot provide one without the other."
-        )
-    }
-    if authentication && (has("masterPasswordHash") || has("key") || has("kdf")) {
-        err!(
-            "Cannot mix modern (MasterPasswordAuthentication/MasterPasswordUnlock) and legacy (MasterPasswordHash/Key/Kdf) fields. Provide one shape or the other."
-        )
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 #[post("/accounts/set-password", data = "<data>")]
-async fn post_set_password(data: Json<Value>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn post_set_password(data: Json<SetPasswordData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let data = data.into_inner();
+    let data: SetPasswordData = data.into_inner();
-    validate_set_password_shape(&data)?;
-    let Ok(data) = serde_json::from_value::<SetPasswordData>(data) else {
-        err_code!("Unexpected SetPasswordData format", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code)
-    };
-    if data.master_password_hint.as_ref().is_some_and(|h| h.encode_utf16().count() > 50) {
-        err!("The field MasterPasswordHint must be a string with a maximum length of 50.")
-    }
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
     if user.private_key.is_some() || !user.password_hash.is_empty() {
         err!("Account already initialized, cannot set password")
     }
 
-    if data.compat.unprocessable(&user.email) {
-        err_code!("Unexpected SetPasswordData format", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
-    }
-
     // Check against the password hint setting here so if it fails,
     // the user can retry without losing their invitation below.
     let password_hint = clean_password_hint(data.master_password_hint.as_ref());
     enforce_password_hint_setting(password_hint.as_ref())?;
 
-    // Like upstream, `accountKeys` only through the v2 JIT flow
+    set_kdf_data(&mut user, &data.kdf)?;
-    // Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Auth/Controllers/AccountsController.cs#L314-L359>
-    let account_keys = match data.account_keys {
-        Some(account_keys) => {
-            if !matches!(data.compat, RegisterDataCompat::RegisterDataCur(_))
-                || !crate::util::is_client_feature_flag_enabled(
-                    "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
-                )
-            {
-                err!("Request includes V2 AccountKeys but V2 encryption is not enabled.")
-            }
-            let account_keys = account_keys.validate()?;
-            if !account_keys.is_v2() {
-                err!("AccountKeys are only supported for V2 encryption.")
-            }
-            Some(account_keys)
-        }
-        None => data.keys.map(ValidatedAccountKeys::from),
-    };
-
-    set_kdf_data(&mut user, data.compat.kdf())?;
 
     user.set_password(
-        &data.compat.hash(),
+        &data.master_password_hash,
-        Some(data.compat.key()),
+        Some(data.key),
         false,
         Some(vec![String::from("revision_date")]), // We need to allow revision-date to use the old security_timestamp
         &conn,
@@ -721,12 +467,9 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<Value>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) ->
     .await?;
     user.password_hint = password_hint;
 
-    if let Some(ref account_keys) = account_keys {
+    if let Some(keys) = data.keys {
-        account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
+        user.private_key = Some(keys.encrypted_private_key);
-        // As in `register`, only a v2 account records the user key id here
+        user.public_key = Some(keys.public_key);
-        if account_keys.is_v2() {
-            user.key_id = data.compat.key_id();
-        }
     }
 
     if let Some(identifier) = data.org_identifier
@@ -750,15 +493,10 @@ async fn post_set_password(data: Json<Value>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) ->
         Membership::accept_user_invitations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
     }
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-        .await;
 
     user.save(&conn).await?;
 
-    if let Some(account_keys) = account_keys {
-        account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
-    }
-
     Ok(Json(json!({
       "object": "set-password",
     })))
@@ -839,19 +577,8 @@ async fn get_public_keys(user_id: UserId, _headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> Js
     })))
 }
 
-#[get("/users/<user_id>/keys")]
-async fn get_account_public_keys(user_id: UserId, _headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let user = match User::find_by_uuid(&user_id, &conn).await {
-        Some(user) if user.public_key.is_some() => user,
-        Some(_) => err_code!("User has no public_key", Status::NotFound.code),
-        None => err_code!("User doesn't exist", Status::NotFound.code),
-    };
-
-    Ok(Json(user.public_keys_json(&conn).await))
-}
-
 #[get("/accounts/keys")]
-async fn get_keys(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+fn get_keys(headers: Headers) -> JsonResult {
     let user = headers.user;
 
     // The SDK reads a 404 as the user having no key pair yet
@@ -863,66 +590,29 @@ async fn get_keys(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
         "key": (!user.akey.is_empty()).then_some(&user.akey),
         "publicKey": user.public_key,
         "privateKey": user.private_key,
-        "accountKeys": user.account_keys_json(&conn).await,
+        "accountKeys": user.account_keys_json(),
         "object": "keys",
     })))
 }
 
-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct PostKeysData {
-    // Required like upstream, even next to `accountKeys`
-    public_key: Option<String>,
-    encrypted_private_key: Option<String>,
-    account_keys: Option<AccountKeysData>,
-    // The id of the user key these account keys belong to, only honored for v2 `accountKeys`
-    user_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
-}
-
 #[post("/accounts/keys", data = "<data>")]
-async fn post_keys(data: Json<PostKeysData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn post_keys(data: Json<KeysData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let data: PostKeysData = data.into_inner();
+    let data: KeysData = data.into_inner();
 
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
-    // Only for an account without keys, replacing them is what a key rotation does
     if user.private_key.is_some() || user.public_key.is_some() {
         err!("User has existing keypair")
     }
 
-    // Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Auth/Models/Api/Request/Accounts/KeysRequestModel.cs#L11-L19>
+    user.private_key = Some(data.encrypted_private_key);
-    let public_key = required(data.public_key, "PublicKey")?;
+    user.public_key = Some(data.public_key);
-    let encrypted_private_key = required(data.encrypted_private_key, "EncryptedPrivateKey")?;
 
-    // `accountKeys` supersedes the flat keys when both are sent
-    let account_keys = match data.account_keys {
-        Some(account_keys) => {
-            let account_keys = account_keys.validate()?;
-            if !account_keys.is_v2() {
-                err!("AccountKeys are only supported for V2 encryption.")
-            }
-            // A client that predates key ids sends none, and reports it later through `user-key-id`
-            if data.user_key_id.is_some() {
-                user.key_id = data.user_key_id;
-            }
-            account_keys
-        }
-        None => KeysData {
-            encrypted_private_key,
-            public_key,
-        }
-        .into(),
-    };
-
-    account_keys.apply(&mut user)?;
     user.save(&conn).await?;
-    account_keys.save_signature_key_pair(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
 
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "key": (!user.akey.is_empty()).then_some(&user.akey),
         "privateKey": user.private_key,
         "publicKey": user.public_key,
-        "accountKeys": user.account_keys_json(&conn).await,
         "object":"keys"
     })))
 }
@@ -949,8 +639,7 @@ async fn post_password(data: Json<ChangePassData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
         err!("Invalid password")
     }
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserChangedPassword, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-        .await;
 
     let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) =
         if let (Some(unlock_data), Some(authentication_data)) = (data.unlock_data, data.authentication_data) {
@@ -962,8 +651,6 @@ async fn post_password(data: Json<ChangePassData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
                 err!("Invalid master password salt")
             }
 
-            validate_key_id_unchanged(&user, &unlock_data)?;
-
             (authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
         } else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (data.new_master_password_hash, data.key) {
             (new_master_password_hash, new_key)
@@ -1037,34 +724,35 @@ fn set_kdf_data(user: &mut User, data: &KDFData) -> EmptyResult {
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct AuthenticationData {
+pub(super) struct AuthenticationData {
     #[serde(alias = "Salt")]
     salt: String,
     #[serde(alias = "Kdf")]
-    kdf: KDFData,
+    pub(super) kdf: KDFData,
     #[serde(alias = "MasterPasswordAuthenticationHash")]
-    master_password_authentication_hash: String,
+    pub(super) master_password_authentication_hash: String,
+}
+
+impl AuthenticationData {
+    pub(super) fn check(&self, user: &User, unlock: &UnlockData) -> EmptyResult {
+        if self.kdf != unlock.kdf {
+            err!("KDF settings must be equal for authentication and unlock")
+        }
+
+        if self.salt != user.master_password_salt() || self.salt != unlock.salt {
+            err!("Invalid master password salt")
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct UnlockData {
+pub(super) struct UnlockData {
     salt: String,
     kdf: KDFData,
-    master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
+    pub(super) master_key_wrapped_user_key: String,
-    contained_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
-}
-
-/// A password or KDF change keeps the user key, so its key id must be the current one, when both are known.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/MasterPasswordUnlockData.cs#L27-L47>
-fn validate_key_id_unchanged(user: &User, unlock_data: &UnlockData) -> EmptyResult {
-    if let (Some(current), Some(contained)) = (&user.key_id, &unlock_data.contained_key_id)
-        && current != contained
-    {
-        err!("Invalid user key sent in master-password unlock data.")
-    }
-    Ok(())
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -1083,15 +771,7 @@ async fn post_kdf(data: Json<ChangeKdfData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
         err!("Invalid password")
     }
 
-    if data.authentication_data.kdf != data.unlock_data.kdf {
+    data.authentication_data.check(&headers.user, &data.unlock_data)?;
-        err!("KDF settings must be equal for authentication and unlock")
-    }
-
-    if headers.user.email != data.authentication_data.salt || headers.user.email != data.unlock_data.salt {
-        err!("Invalid master password salt")
-    }
-
-    validate_key_id_unchanged(&headers.user, &data.unlock_data)?;
 
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
@@ -1268,14 +948,6 @@ async fn post_rotatekey(data: Json<KeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt:
         err!("Invalid password")
     }
 
-    // Rotating v2 keys, or upgrading to them, would leave an account that can't be unlocked here
-    if headers.user.is_v2() {
-        err!("Key rotation is not supported for v2 accounts")
-    }
-    if !data.account_keys.user_key_encrypted_account_private_key.starts_with("2.") {
-        err!("The provided account private key was not wrapped with AES-256-CBC-HMAC")
-    }
-
     // Validate the import before continuing
     // Bitwarden does not process the import if there is one item invalid.
     // Since we check for the size of the encrypted note length, we need to do that here to pre-validate it.
@@ -1401,9 +1073,8 @@ struct KeyIdData {
 #[post("/accounts/key-management/user-key-id", data = "<data>")]
 async fn post_user_key(data: Json<KeyIdData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
     let mut user = headers.user;
-    // Only a backfill for accounts that have none. Afterwards the id changes with the key, in a rotation.
     if user.key_id.is_some() {
-        err!("User key id is already set.")
+        err_code!("Unexpected data", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
     }
 
     user.key_id = Some(data.into_inner().user_key_id);
@@ -2023,7 +1694,7 @@ async fn post_auth_request(
     nt.send_auth_request(&user.uuid, &auth_request.uuid, &device, &conn).await;
 
     log_user_event(
-        EventType::UserRequestedDeviceApproval as i32,
+        EventType::UserRequestedDeviceApproval,
         &user.uuid,
         client_headers.device_type,
         &client_headers.ip.ip,
@@ -2117,7 +1788,7 @@ async fn put_auth_request(
         nt.send_auth_response(&auth_request.user_uuid, &auth_request.uuid, &headers.device, &conn).await;
 
         log_user_event(
-            EventType::OrganizationUserApprovedAuthRequest as i32,
+            EventType::OrganizationUserApprovedAuthRequest,
             &headers.user.uuid,
             headers.device.atype,
             &headers.ip.ip,
@@ -2128,7 +1799,7 @@ async fn put_auth_request(
         // If denied, there's no reason to keep the request
         auth_request.delete(&conn).await?;
         log_user_event(
-            EventType::OrganizationUserRejectedAuthRequest as i32,
+            EventType::OrganizationUserRejectedAuthRequest,
             &headers.user.uuid,
             headers.device.atype,
             &headers.ip.ip,
@@ -2261,10 +1932,10 @@ mod tests {
         )
         .unwrap();
 
-        assert!(!data.compat.unprocessable(&data.email));
+        assert!(!data.unprocessable());
-        assert_eq!(data.compat.hash(), "hash");
+        assert_eq!(data.hash(), "hash");
-        assert_eq!(data.compat.key(), "key");
+        assert_eq!(data.key(), "key");
-        assert_eq!(data.compat.kdf().kdf_iterations, 600_000);
+        assert_eq!(data.kdf().kdf_iterations, 600_000);
         assert!(data.keys.is_some());
         assert_eq!(data.email_verification_token.as_deref(), Some("token"));
     }
@@ -2286,10 +1957,10 @@ mod tests {
         )
         .unwrap();
 
-        assert!(!data.compat.unprocessable(&data.email));
+        assert!(!data.unprocessable());
-        assert_eq!(data.compat.hash(), "hash");
+        assert_eq!(data.hash(), "hash");
-        assert_eq!(data.compat.key(), "key");
+        assert_eq!(data.key(), "key");
-        assert_eq!(data.compat.kdf().kdf_iterations, 600_000);
+        assert_eq!(data.kdf().kdf_iterations, 600_000);
         assert!(data.keys.is_some());
     }
 }

src/api/core/ciphers.rs

@@ -23,8 +23,7 @@ use crate::{
         models::{
             Archive, Attachment, AttachmentId, Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup,
             CollectionId, CollectionUser, EventType, Favorite, Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId, Group, KeyId,
-            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, User, UserId,
+            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, UserId,
-            is_data_blob_encrypted,
         },
     },
     util::{NumberOrString, deser_opt_nonempty_str, save_temp_file},
@@ -190,19 +189,12 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
             // https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
             "masterKeyEncryptedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
             "masterKeyWrappedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
-            "salt": headers.user.email,
+            "salt": headers.user.email
-            "containedKeyId": headers.user.key_id,
         })
     } else {
         Value::Null
     };
 
-    // Upstream omits these when unset rather than sending null
-    let mut user_decryption = json!({ "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock });
-    if let Some(key_id) = &headers.user.key_id {
-        user_decryption["userKeyId"] = json!(key_id);
-    }
-
     Ok(Json(json!({
         "profile": user_json,
         "folders": folders_json,
@@ -212,7 +204,10 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
         "ciphers": ciphers_json,
         "domains": domains_json,
         "sends": sends_json,
-        "userDecryption": user_decryption,
+        "userDecryption": {
+            "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock,
+            "userKeyId": headers.user.key_id,
+        },
         "object": "sync"
     })))
 }
@@ -274,8 +269,7 @@ pub struct CipherData {
 
     key: Option<String>,
 
-    // Added in web-v2025.6.0. Deprecated upstream for `encrypted_by_key_id`, but still checked when sent
+    pub encrypted_for: UserId, // Added in web-v2025.6.0
-    pub encrypted_for: Option<UserId>,
     // Added in web-v2025.8.1, Optional for compat
     pub encrypted_by_key_id: Option<KeyId>,
 
@@ -290,8 +284,7 @@ pub struct CipherData {
     Passport = 8
     */
     pub r#type: i32,
-    // Absent on a blob-encrypted cipher, whose name is sealed inside `data`
+    pub name: String,
-    pub name: Option<String>,
     pub notes: Option<String>,
     fields: Option<Value>,
 
@@ -305,9 +298,6 @@ pub struct CipherData {
     drivers_license: Option<Value>,
     passport: Option<Value>,
 
-    // The sealed blob of a v2 account's cipher, which replaces all of the fields above
-    data: Option<String>,
-
     favorite: Option<bool>,
     reprompt: Option<i32>,
 
@@ -329,79 +319,6 @@ pub struct CipherData {
     archived_date: Option<String>,
 }
 
-/// A field of a [`CipherData`] that fails upstream's model validation.
-#[derive(Debug)]
-pub struct CipherValidationError {
-    pub field: &'static str,
-    pub message: String,
-}
-
-impl From<CipherValidationError> for crate::Error {
-    fn from(e: CipherValidationError) -> Self {
-        Self::new_msg(e.message)
-    }
-}
-
-/// The cipher must have been encrypted for the acting user. Only checked when the client sends the field.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1857-L1870>
-fn validate_encrypted_for_user(data: &CipherData, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
-    if data.encrypted_for.as_ref().is_some_and(|encrypted_for| encrypted_for != user_id) {
-        err!("Cipher was not encrypted for the current user. Please try again.")
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// [`validate_encrypted_for_user`], plus the key id of a user-owned cipher, when both ids are known.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1886-L1911>
-fn validate_encrypted_by_user(data: &CipherData, user: &User, is_org_cipher: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    validate_encrypted_for_user(data, &user.uuid)?;
-
-    if !is_org_cipher
-        && let (Some(cipher_key_id), Some(user_key_id)) = (&data.encrypted_by_key_id, &user.key_id)
-        && cipher_key_id != user_key_id
-    {
-        err!("Cipher was not encrypted with the current user key. Please try again.")
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// Upstream's `[StringLength(500000)]` on `CipherRequestModel.Data`
-const MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH: usize = 500_000;
-
-impl CipherData {
-    /// Whether `data` is a blob rather than the per-type fields. Parses `data`, so keep the result.
-    pub fn is_blob(&self) -> bool {
-        self.data.as_deref().is_some_and(is_data_blob_encrypted)
-    }
-
-    /// Upstream's model checks that depend on the format: the size of `data`, and a name unless it's a blob.
-    ///
-    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L76-L77>
-    /// and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L91-L99>
-    pub fn validate_content(&self, is_blob: bool) -> Result<(), CipherValidationError> {
-        if let Some(data) = &self.data
-            && data.len() > MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH
-        {
-            return Err(CipherValidationError {
-                field: "Data",
-                message: format!("The field Data must be a string with a maximum length of {MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH}."),
-            });
-        }
-
-        // A blob carries the name inside it, so only the other formats need one
-        if !is_blob && self.name.as_deref().is_none_or(|n| n.trim().is_empty()) {
-            return Err(CipherValidationError {
-                field: "Name",
-                message: String::from("The Name field is required."),
-            });
-        }
-
-        Ok(())
-    }
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 pub struct PartialCipherData {
@@ -435,14 +352,16 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create(
 ) -> JsonResult {
     let mut data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();
 
-    validate_encrypted_by_user(&data.cipher, &headers.user, data.cipher.organization_id.is_some())?;
+    if data.cipher.encrypted_for != headers.user.uuid {
+        err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
+    }
 
     // This check is usually only needed in update_cipher_from_data(), but we
     // need it here as well to avoid creating an empty cipher in the call to
     // cipher.save() below.
     enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data.cipher), &headers, &conn).await?;
 
-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type);
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, data.cipher.name.clone());
     cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone());
     cipher.save(&conn).await?;
 
@@ -466,7 +385,16 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create(
 async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> JsonResult {
     let mut data: CipherData = data.into_inner();
 
-    validate_encrypted_by_user(&data, &headers.user, data.organization_id.is_some())?;
+    if data.encrypted_for != headers.user.uuid {
+        err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
+    }
+
+    if let Some(cipher_key_id) = &data.encrypted_by_key_id
+        && let Some(user_key_id) = &headers.user.key_id
+        && cipher_key_id != user_key_id
+    {
+        err_code!("Invalid key cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
+    }
 
     // The web/browser clients set this field to null as expected, but the
     // mobile clients seem to set the invalid value `0001-01-01T00:00:00`,
@@ -474,7 +402,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt
     // needed when creating a new cipher, so just ignore it unconditionally.
     data.last_known_revision_date = None;
 
-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type);
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, data.name.clone());
     update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate).await?;
 
     Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -498,44 +426,6 @@ async fn enforce_personal_ownership_policy(data: Option<&CipherData>, headers: &
     Ok(())
 }
 
-/// The checks of saving a cipher, for callers that run them before writing anything else
-async fn validate_cipher_update(
-    cipher: &Cipher,
-    data: &CipherData,
-    headers: &Headers,
-    conn: &DbConn,
-    ut: UpdateType,
-) -> EmptyResult {
-    // Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data.
-    // And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail.
-    if ut != UpdateType::None
-        && let Some(dt) = &data.last_known_revision_date
-    {
-        match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(dt, "%+") {
-            // ISO 8601 format
-            Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing LastKnownRevisionDate '{dt}': {err}"),
-            Ok(dt) if cipher.updated_at.signed_duration_since(dt).num_seconds() > 1 => {
-                err!("The client copy of this cipher is out of date. Resync the client and try again.")
-            }
-            Ok(_) => (),
-        }
-    }
-
-    if let Some(note) = &data.notes {
-        let max_note_size = CONFIG._max_note_size();
-        if note.len() > max_note_size {
-            err!(format!("The field Notes exceeds the maximum encrypted value length of {max_note_size} characters."))
-        }
-    }
-
-    if let Some(folder_id) = &data.folder_id
-        && Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await.is_none()
-    {
-        err!("Invalid folder", "Folder does not exist or belongs to another user");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
     cipher: &mut Cipher,
     data: CipherData,
@@ -561,14 +451,32 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
 
     enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data), headers, conn).await?;
 
-    let is_blob = data.is_blob();
+    // Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data.
-    data.validate_content(is_blob)?;
+    // And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail.
-    validate_cipher_update(cipher, &data, headers, conn, ut).await?;
+    if ut != UpdateType::None
+        && let Some(dt) = data.last_known_revision_date
+    {
+        match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(&dt, "%+") {
+            // ISO 8601 format
+            Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing LastKnownRevisionDate '{dt}': {err}"),
+            Ok(dt) if cipher.updated_at.signed_duration_since(dt).num_seconds() > 1 => {
+                err!("The client copy of this cipher is out of date. Resync the client and try again.")
+            }
+            Ok(_) => (),
+        }
+    }
 
     if cipher.organization_uuid.is_some() && cipher.organization_uuid != data.organization_id {
         err!("Organization mismatch. Please resync the client before updating the cipher")
     }
 
+    if let Some(note) = &data.notes {
+        let max_note_size = CONFIG._max_note_size();
+        if note.len() > max_note_size {
+            err!(format!("The field Notes exceeds the maximum encrypted value length of {max_note_size} characters."))
+        }
+    }
+
     // Check if this cipher is being transferred from a personal to an organization vault
     let transfer_cipher = cipher.organization_uuid.is_none() && data.organization_id.is_some();
 
@@ -599,6 +507,12 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
         cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone());
     }
 
+    if let Some(ref folder_id) = data.folder_id
+        && Folder::find_by_uuid_and_user(folder_id, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await.is_none()
+    {
+        err!("Invalid folder", "Folder does not exist or belongs to another user");
+    }
+
     // Modify attachments name and keys when rotating
     if let Some(attachments) = data.attachments2 {
         for (id, attachment) in attachments {
@@ -637,36 +551,26 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
         _ => err!("Invalid type"),
     };
 
-    if let Some(blob) = data.data.filter(|_| is_blob) {
+    let type_data = if let Some(mut data) = type_data_opt {
-        // A blob holds everything, the name included; the column can't be null, so it's left empty
-        // TODO: Make `ciphers.name` nullable and store `None` here instead.
-        cipher.name = String::new();
-        cipher.notes = None;
-        cipher.fields = None;
-        cipher.password_history = None;
-        cipher.data = blob;
-    } else {
-        let Some(mut type_data) = type_data_opt else {
-            err!("Data missing")
-        };
         // Remove the 'Response' key from the base object.
-        if let Some(data_obj) = type_data.as_object_mut() {
+        if let Some(data_obj) = data.as_object_mut() {
             data_obj.remove("response");
         }
         // Remove the 'Response' key from every Uri.
-        if type_data["uris"].is_array() {
+        if data["uris"].is_array() {
-            type_data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(type_data["uris"].clone());
+            data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(data["uris"].clone());
         }
-
+        data
-        // `validate_content` made sure there is a name
+    } else {
-        cipher.name = data.name.unwrap_or_default();
+        err!("Data missing")
-        cipher.notes = data.notes;
+    };
-        cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
-        cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
-        cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
-    }
 
     cipher.key = data.key;
+    cipher.name = data.name;
+    cipher.notes = data.notes;
+    cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
+    cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
+    cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
     cipher.reprompt = data.reprompt.filter(|r| *r == RepromptType::None as i32 || *r == RepromptType::Password as i32);
 
     cipher.save(conn).await?;
@@ -763,7 +667,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers_import(data: Json<ImportData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
         let folder_id = relations_map.get(&index).and_then(|i| folders.get(*i).cloned());
         cipher_data.folder_id = folder_id;
 
-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type);
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
         update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?;
     }
 
@@ -831,9 +735,6 @@ async fn put_cipher(
         err!("Cipher is not write accessible")
     }
 
-    // Against the cipher we hold rather than the organization the client claims, like upstream
-    validate_encrypted_by_user(&data, &headers.user, cipher.organization_uuid.is_some())?;
-
     update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate).await?;
 
     Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -1092,7 +993,9 @@ async fn post_cipher_share(
     conn: DbConn,
     nt: Notify<'_>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
-    put_cipher_share(cipher_id, data, headers, conn, nt).await
+    let data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();
+
+    share_cipher_by_uuid(&cipher_id, data, &headers, &conn, &nt, None).await
 }
 
 #[put("/ciphers/<cipher_id>/share", data = "<data>")]
@@ -1105,21 +1008,6 @@ async fn put_cipher_share(
 ) -> JsonResult {
     let data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();
 
-    // Upstream's `PutShare` checks, before anything is written.
-    // Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L899-L912>
-    // and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L498-L519>
-    if data.cipher.organization_id.is_none() {
-        err!("Cipher OrganizationId is required.")
-    }
-    if data.collection_ids.is_empty() {
-        err!("You must select at least one collection.")
-    }
-    if !Cipher::find_by_uuid(&cipher_id, &conn).await.is_some_and(|c| c.user_uuid.as_ref() == Some(&headers.user.uuid))
-    {
-        err_code!("Cipher doesn't exist", Status::NotFound.code)
-    }
-    validate_encrypted_for_user(&data.cipher, &headers.user.uuid)?;
-
     share_cipher_by_uuid(&cipher_id, data, &headers, &conn, &nt, None).await
 }
 
@@ -1139,33 +1027,18 @@ async fn put_cipher_share_selected(
 ) -> EmptyResult {
     let mut data: ShareSelectedCipherData = data.into_inner();
 
-    // Upstream's `PutShareMany` checks, before anything is written.
-    // Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1395-L1421>
-    // and <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs#L560-L604>
     if data.ciphers.is_empty() {
         err!("You must select at least one cipher.")
     }
-    if data.ciphers.iter().any(|c| c.id.is_none() || c.organization_id.is_none()) {
+
-        err!("All Ciphers must have an Id and OrganizationId.")
-    }
-    if data.ciphers.iter().map(|c| &c.organization_id).collect::<HashSet<_>>().len() != 1 {
-        err!("All ciphers must be for the same organization.")
-    }
     if data.collection_ids.is_empty() {
         err!("You must select at least one collection.")
     }
+
     for cipher in &data.ciphers {
-        cipher.validate_content(cipher.is_blob())?;
+        if cipher.id.is_none() {
-    }
+            err!("Request missing ids field")
-    for cipher in &data.ciphers {
+        }
-        validate_encrypted_for_user(cipher, &headers.user.uuid)?;
-    }
-    let owned_ciphers = Cipher::find_owned_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await;
-    for cipher_data in &data.ciphers {
-        let Some(cipher) = owned_ciphers.iter().find(|c| cipher_data.id.as_ref() == Some(&c.uuid)) else {
-            err!("Trying to share ciphers that you do not own.")
-        };
-        validate_cipher_update(cipher, cipher_data, &headers, &conn, UpdateType::None).await?;
     }
 
     while let Some(cipher) = data.ciphers.pop() {
@@ -1212,20 +1085,6 @@ async fn share_cipher_by_uuid(
         err!("Organization mismatch. Please resync the client before updating the cipher")
     }
 
-    // When LastKnownRevisionDate is None, it is a new cipher, so send CipherCreate.
-    // If there is an override, like when handling multiple items, we want to prevent a push notification for every single item
-    let ut = if let Some(ut) = override_ut {
-        ut
-    } else if data.cipher.last_known_revision_date.is_some() {
-        UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate
-    } else {
-        UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate
-    };
-
-    // For the same reason, the other checks of saving
-    data.cipher.validate_content(data.cipher.is_blob())?;
-    validate_cipher_update(&cipher, &data.cipher, headers, conn, ut).await?;
-
     let mut shared_to_collections = vec![];
 
     if let Some(organization_id) = &data.cipher.organization_id {
@@ -1244,6 +1103,16 @@ async fn share_cipher_by_uuid(
         }
     }
 
+    // When LastKnownRevisionDate is None, it is a new cipher, so send CipherCreate.
+    // If there is an override, like when handling multiple items, we want to prevent a push notification for every single item
+    let ut = if let Some(ut) = override_ut {
+        ut
+    } else if data.cipher.last_known_revision_date.is_some() {
+        UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate
+    } else {
+        UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate
+    };
+
     update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data.cipher, headers, Some(shared_to_collections), conn, nt, ut).await?;
 
     Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, conn).await?))

src/api/core/emergency_access.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
+use chrono::Utc;
 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 use serde_json::Value;
 
@@ -6,14 +6,17 @@ use crate::{
     CONFIG,
     api::{
         EmptyResult, JsonResult,
-        core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType},
+        core::{
+            CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType,
+            accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData},
+        },
     },
     auth::{Headers, decode_emergency_access_invite},
     db::{
         DbConn, DbPool,
         models::{
-            Cipher, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType, Invitation,
+            Cipher, EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus,
-            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
+            EmergencyAccessType, Invitation, Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
         },
     },
     mail,
@@ -133,19 +136,21 @@ async fn post_emergency_access(
 
     let data: EmergencyAccessUpdateData = data.into_inner();
 
+    let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) else {
+        err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
+    };
+
+    if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&data.wait_time_days) {
+        err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
+    }
+
     let Some(mut emergency_access) =
         EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantor_uuid(&emer_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
     else {
         err!("Emergency access not valid.")
     };
 
-    let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) {
+    emergency_access.atype = new_type as i32;
-        new_type as i32
-    } else {
-        err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
-    };
-
-    emergency_access.atype = new_type;
     emergency_access.wait_time_days = data.wait_time_days;
     if data.key_encrypted.is_some() {
         emergency_access.key_encrypted = data.key_encrypted;
@@ -207,11 +212,11 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
     let email = data.email.to_lowercase();
     let wait_time_days = data.wait_time_days;
 
-    let emergency_access_status = EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32;
+    if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&wait_time_days) {
+        err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
+    }
 
-    let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) {
+    let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) else {
-        new_type as i32
-    } else {
         err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
     };
 
@@ -257,6 +262,8 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
         err!(format!("Grantee user already invited: {}", &grantee_user.email))
     }
 
+    let new_type = new_type as i32;
+    let emergency_access_status = EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32;
     let mut new_emergency_access =
         EmergencyAccess::new(grantor_user.uuid, grantee_user.email, emergency_access_status, new_type, wait_time_days);
     new_emergency_access.save(&conn).await?;
@@ -289,7 +296,7 @@ async fn resend_invite(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
     };
 
     if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32 {
-        err!("The grantee user is already accepted or confirmed to the organization");
+        err!("The grantee user is already accepted or confirmed for emergency access");
     }
 
     let Some(email) = emergency_access.email.clone() else {
@@ -450,11 +457,24 @@ async fn initiate_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
     let Some(mut emergency_access) =
         EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantee_uuid(&emer_id, &initiating_user.uuid, &conn).await
     else {
-        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
+        err!(
+            "Emergency access not valid.",
+            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not found for user '{}'.", initiating_user.email)
+        )
     };
 
     if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::Confirmed as i32 {
-        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
+        err!(
+            "Emergency access not valid.",
+            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not confirmed for user '{}'.", initiating_user.email)
+        )
+    }
+
+    if !EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE.contains(&emergency_access.wait_time_days) {
+        err!(
+            "Emergency access not valid.",
+            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}' timeout range '{}' is invalid", emergency_access.wait_time_days)
+        )
     }
 
     let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emergency_access.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
@@ -487,11 +507,17 @@ async fn approve_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
     let Some(mut emergency_access) =
         EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantor_uuid(&emer_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
     else {
-        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
+        err!(
+            "Emergency access not valid.",
+            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not found for user '{}'.", headers.user.email)
+        )
     };
 
     if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryInitiated as i32 {
-        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
+        err!(
+            "Emergency access not valid.",
+            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not initiated for user '{}'.", headers.user.email)
+        )
     }
 
     let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await else {
@@ -615,6 +641,7 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
         "kdfMemory": grantor_user.client_kdf_memory,
         "kdfParallelism": grantor_user.client_kdf_parallelism,
         "keyEncrypted": &emergency_access.key_encrypted,
+        "salt": grantor_user.master_password_salt(),
         "object": "emergencyAccessTakeover",
     });
 
@@ -624,8 +651,13 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct EmergencyAccessPasswordData {
-    new_master_password_hash: String,
+    // Legacy payload
-    key: String,
+    new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    key: Option<String>,
+
+    // Current payload
+    authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
+    unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
 }
 
 #[post("/emergency-access/<emer_id>/password", data = "<data>")]
@@ -638,8 +670,6 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
     check_emergency_access_enabled()?;
 
     let data: EmergencyAccessPasswordData = data.into_inner();
-    let new_master_password_hash = &data.new_master_password_hash;
-    //let key = &data.Key;
 
     let requesting_user = headers.user;
     let Some(emergency_access) =
@@ -656,8 +686,23 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
         err!("Grantor user not found.")
     };
 
+    let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) =
+        if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) = (data.authentication_data, data.unlock_data) {
+            authentication_data.check(&grantor_user, &unlock_data)?;
+
+            if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&grantor_user) {
+                err!("KDF settings do not match the grantor account")
+            }
+
+            (authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
+        } else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (data.new_master_password_hash, data.key) {
+            (new_master_password_hash, new_key)
+        } else {
+            err!("Invalid request!")
+        };
+
     // change grantor_user password
-    grantor_user.set_password(new_master_password_hash, Some(data.key), true, None, &conn).await?;
+    grantor_user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
     grantor_user.save(&conn).await?;
 
     // Disable TwoFactor providers since they will otherwise block logins
@@ -725,52 +770,71 @@ pub async fn emergency_request_timeout_job(pool: DbPool) {
         return;
     }
 
-    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
+    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
-        let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;
+        error!("Failed to get DB connection for emergency time-outs!");
+        return;
+    };
 
-        if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
+    let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;
-            debug!("No emergency request timeout to approve");
-        }
 
-        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+    if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
-        for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
+        debug!("No emergency request timeout to approve");
-            // The find_all_recoveries_initiated already checks if the recovery_initiated_at is not null (None)
+        return;
-            let recovery_allowed_at =
+    }
-                emer.recovery_initiated_at.unwrap() + TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(emer.wait_time_days)).unwrap();
-            if recovery_allowed_at.le(&now) {
-                // Only update the access status
-                // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_notification_reminder_job is also active
-                emer.update_access_status_and_save(EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryApproved as i32, &now, &conn)
-                    .await
-                    .expect("Unable to update emergency access status");
 
-                if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+    let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-                    // get grantor user to send Accepted email
+    for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
-                    let grantor_user =
+        match emer.is_recovery_allowed(&now) {
-                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await.expect("Grantor user not found");
+            Ok(true) => {} // Recovery is allowed
-
+            Ok(false) => continue,
-                    // get grantee user to send Accepted email
+            Err(e) => {
-                    let grantee_user =
+                error!("Failed to check if recovery is allowed for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
-                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantee_uuid.clone().expect("Grantee user invalid"), &conn)
+                continue;
-                            .await
+            }
-                            .expect("Grantee user not found");
+        }
-
+
-                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_timed_out(
+        // Get grantor user to send Accepted email
-                        &grantor_user.email,
+        let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
-                        &grantee_user.name,
+            error!("Grantor user '{}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.grantor_uuid, emer.uuid);
-                        emer.get_type_as_str(),
+            continue;
-                    )
+        };
-                    .await
+
-                    .expect("Error on sending email");
+        let Some(grantee_uuid) = emer.grantee_uuid.as_ref() else {
-
+            error!("Missing grantee for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_approved(&grantee_user.email, &grantor_user.name)
+            continue;
-                        .await
+        };
-                        .expect("Error on sending email");
+
-                }
+        // Get grantee user to send Accepted email
+        let Some(grantee_user) = User::find_by_uuid(grantee_uuid, &conn).await else {
+            error!("Grantee user '{grantee_uuid}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        // Only update the access status
+        // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_notification_reminder_job is also active
+        let status_initiated = EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryInitiated as i32;
+        let status_approved = EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryApproved as i32;
+        if let Err(e) = emer.update_access_status_and_save(status_initiated, status_approved, &now, &conn).await {
+            error!("Unable to update emergency access status for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+            if let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_timed_out(
+                &grantor_user.email,
+                &grantee_user.name,
+                emer.get_type_as_str(),
+            )
+            .await
+            {
+                error!("Failed to send emergency access recovery time-out email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
+            }
+
+            if let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_approved(&grantee_user.email, &grantor_user.name).await
+            {
+                error!("Failed to send emergency access recovery approved email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
             }
         }
-    } else {
-        error!("Failed to get DB connection while searching emergency request timed out");
     }
 }
 
@@ -780,55 +844,85 @@ pub async fn emergency_notification_reminder_job(pool: DbPool) {
         return;
     }
 
-    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
+    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
-        let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;
+        error!("Failed to get DB connection for emergency reminders!");
+        return;
+    };
 
-        if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
+    let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;
-            debug!("No emergency request reminder notification to send");
+
+    if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
+        debug!("No emergency request reminder notification to send");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+    for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
+        let Ok(deadline_at) = emer.deadline_at() else {
+            error!("Invalid deadline for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        let Some(final_reminder_at) = deadline_at.checked_sub_days(chrono::Days::new(1)) else {
+            error!("Cannot calculate reminder date for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        // Only send reminders during the last 24 hours, else continue
+        if now < final_reminder_at || now >= deadline_at {
+            continue;
         }
 
-        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+        // Check if we did not sent a recovery mail in the past 24h already, else skip it.
-        for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
+        // In case something goes wrong with the date calculation or `last_notification_at` is None we use now.
-            // The find_all_recoveries_initiated already checks if the recovery_initiated_at is not null (None)
+        // This is to prevent possible missed reminders, this might cause an extra reminder,
-            // Calculate the day before the recovery will become active
+        // but that is better then no reminder at all.
-            let final_recovery_reminder_at =
+        let next_reminder_at = if let Some(last_notification_at) = emer.last_notification_at {
-                emer.recovery_initiated_at.unwrap() + TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(emer.wait_time_days - 1)).unwrap();
+            last_notification_at.checked_add_days(chrono::Days::new(1)).unwrap_or(now)
-            // Calculate if a day has passed since the previous notification, else no notification has been sent before
+        } else {
-            let next_recovery_reminder_at = if let Some(last_notification_at) = emer.last_notification_at {
+            now
-                last_notification_at + TimeDelta::try_days(1).unwrap()
+        };
-            } else {
-                now
-            };
-            if final_recovery_reminder_at.le(&now) && next_recovery_reminder_at.le(&now) {
-                // Only update the last notification date
-                // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_request_timeout_job is also active
-                emer.update_last_notification_date_and_save(&now, &conn)
-                    .await
-                    .expect("Unable to update emergency access notification date");
 
-                if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+        // Only send a reminder if the `next_reminder_at` is less then or equal to `now`
-                    // get grantor user to send Accepted email
+        // Else we can skip the current emergency access this run.
-                    let grantor_user =
+        if next_reminder_at.gt(&now) {
-                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await.expect("Grantor user not found");
+            continue;
-
+        }
-                    // get grantee user to send Accepted email
+
-                    let grantee_user =
+        // Get grantor user to send Reminder email
-                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantee_uuid.clone().expect("Grantee user invalid"), &conn)
+        let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
-                            .await
+            error!("Grantor user '{}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.grantor_uuid, emer.uuid);
-                            .expect("Grantee user not found");
+            continue;
-
+        };
-                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_reminder(
+
-                        &grantor_user.email,
+        let Some(grantee_uuid) = emer.grantee_uuid.as_ref() else {
-                        &grantee_user.name,
+            error!("Missing grantee for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-                        emer.get_type_as_str(),
+            continue;
-                        "1", // This notification is only triggered one day before the activation
+        };
-                    )
+
-                    .await
+        // Get grantee user to send Reminder email
-                    .expect("Error on sending email");
+        let Some(grantee_user) = User::find_by_uuid(grantee_uuid, &conn).await else {
-                }
+            error!("Grantee user '{grantee_uuid}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            }
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        // Only update the last notification date
+        // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_request_timeout_job is also active
+        if let Err(e) = emer.update_last_notification_date_and_save(&now, &conn).await {
+            error!("Unable to update emergency access reminder date for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
+            && let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_reminder(
+                &grantor_user.email,
+                &grantee_user.name,
+                emer.get_type_as_str(),
+                "1", // This notification is only triggered one day before the activation
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            error!("Failed to send emergency access reminder email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
         }
-    } else {
-        error!("Failed to get DB connection while searching emergency notification reminder");
     }
 }

src/api/core/events.rs

@@ -242,11 +242,11 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
     Ok(())
 }
 
-pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: i32, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
+pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: EventType, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
     if !CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
         return;
     }
-    log_user_event_impl(event_type, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
+    log_user_event_impl(event_type as i32, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
 }
 
 async fn log_user_event_impl(
@@ -347,14 +347,17 @@ async fn log_event_impl(
 
 pub async fn event_cleanup_job(pool: DbPool) {
     debug!("Start events cleanup job");
-    if CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_none() {
+    if CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_none_or(|d| d == 0) {
-        debug!("events_days_retain is not configured, abort");
+        debug!("events_days_retain is not configured or set to 0, skipping");
         return;
     }
 
-    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
+    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
-        Event::clean_events(&conn).await.ok();
-    } else {
         error!("Failed to get DB connection while trying to cleanup the events table");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    if let Err(e) = Event::clean_events(&conn).await {
+        error!("Failed to cleanup the events table: {e}");
     }
 }

src/api/core/organizations.rs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use crate::{
     CONFIG,
     api::admin::FAKE_ADMIN_UUID,
     api::{
-        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
+        EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
         core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType, accept_org_invite, log_event, two_factor},
     },
     auth::{AdminHeaders, Headers, ManagerHeaders, ManagerHeadersLoose, OrgMemberHeaders, OwnerHeaders, decode_invite},
@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ use crate::{
     util::{NumberOrString, convert_json_key_lcase_first},
 };
 
+use super::accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData};
+
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
     routes![
         get_organization,
@@ -1829,7 +1831,7 @@ async fn post_org_import(
         cipher_data.folder_id = None;
         // Replace the client-provided, unvalidated organizationId with the real target org
         cipher_data.organization_id = Some(org_id.clone());
-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type);
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
         update_cipher_from_data(
             &mut cipher,
             cipher_data,
@@ -2751,9 +2753,14 @@ struct OrganizationUserResetPasswordEnrollmentRequest {
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest {
+    // Legacy payload
     new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
     key: Option<String>,
 
+    // Current payload
+    authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
+    unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
+
     #[serde(default)]
     reset_master_password: bool,
     #[serde(default)]
@@ -2764,26 +2771,8 @@ struct OrganizationUserRecoverAccountRequest {
 // But the clients do not seem to use this at all
 // Just add it here in case they will
 #[get("/organizations/<org_id>/public-key")]
-async fn get_organization_public_key(
+async fn get_organization_public_key(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    org_id: OrganizationId,
+    if org_id != headers.membership.org_uuid {
-    headers: Headers,
-    member: Result<OrgMemberHeaders, &'static str>,
-    conn: DbConn,
-) -> JsonResult {
-    // SSO users without an org get the fake one, whose key the v2 JIT password flow fetches anyway
-    if org_id.eq_ignore_ascii_case(FAKE_SSO_IDENTIFIER) && headers.user.private_key.is_none() {
-        return Ok(Json(json!({
-            "object": "organizationPublicKey",
-            "publicKey": fake_sso_org_public_key().await?,
-        })));
-    }
-    let member = match member {
-        Ok(member) => member,
-        // The guard already logged it
-        Err(e) => return Err(crate::error::Error::new_msg(e).with_code(Status::Unauthorized.code)),
-    };
-
-    if org_id != member.membership.org_uuid {
         err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
     }
     let Some(org) = Organization::find_by_uuid(&org_id, &conn).await else {
@@ -2796,30 +2785,11 @@ async fn get_organization_public_key(
     })))
 }
 
-/// The SDK only uses this key to wrap an account recovery key that it never sends for the fake org,
-/// so it is made once and its private half dropped.
-async fn fake_sso_org_public_key() -> ApiResult<String> {
-    static PUBLIC_KEY: std::sync::LazyLock<Option<String>> = std::sync::LazyLock::new(|| {
-        let der = openssl::rsa::Rsa::generate(2048).and_then(|rsa| rsa.public_key_to_der()).ok()?;
-        Some(data_encoding::BASE64.encode(&der))
-    });
-
-    let Ok(Some(public_key)) = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(|| PUBLIC_KEY.clone()).await else {
-        err!("Failed to generate the organization key")
-    };
-    Ok(public_key)
-}
-
 // Obsolete - Renamed to public-key (2023.8), left for backwards compatibility with older clients
 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/AdminConsole/Controllers/OrganizationsController.cs#L487-L492
 #[get("/organizations/<org_id>/keys")]
-async fn get_organization_keys(
+async fn get_organization_keys(org_id: OrganizationId, headers: OrgMemberHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    org_id: OrganizationId,
+    get_organization_public_key(org_id, headers, conn).await
-    headers: Headers,
-    member: Result<OrgMemberHeaders, &'static str>,
-    conn: DbConn,
-) -> JsonResult {
-    get_organization_public_key(org_id, headers, member, conn).await
 }
 
 // Will allow to reset 2FA too
@@ -2870,11 +2840,34 @@ async fn recover_account(
 
     let fallback_2fa_email =
         if req.reset_two_factor && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.email_2fa_auto_fallback() && user.verified() {
-            TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, &conn).await.is_none()
+            TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await.is_none()
         } else {
             false
         };
 
+    // Check the new password before the email below, so that a rejected request doesn't tell the user
+    // their password was reset
+    let new_password = if req.reset_master_password {
+        let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) = if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) =
+            (req.authentication_data, req.unlock_data)
+        {
+            authentication_data.check(&user, &unlock_data)?;
+
+            if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&user) {
+                err!("KDF settings do not match the user account")
+            }
+
+            (authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
+        } else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (req.new_master_password_hash, req.key) {
+            (new_master_password_hash, new_key)
+        } else {
+            err_code!("Unprocessable request", "Missing fields to reset password", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
+        };
+        Some((new_master_password_hash, new_key))
+    } else {
+        None
+    };
+
     // Sending email first ensure working email configuration and the resulting user notification.
     // Also this might add some protection against security flaws and misuse
     if let Err(e) = mail::send_admin_account_recovery(
@@ -2890,14 +2883,8 @@ async fn recover_account(
         err!(format!("Error sending user reset password email: {e:#?}"));
     }
 
-    if req.reset_master_password {
+    if let Some((new_master_password_hash, new_key)) = new_password {
-        if let Some(key) = req.key
+        user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
-            && let Some(hash) = req.new_master_password_hash
-        {
-            user.set_password(hash.as_str(), Some(key), true, None, &conn).await?;
-        } else {
-            err_code!("Unprocessable request", "Missing fields to reset password", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
-        }
     }
 
     if req.reset_two_factor {
@@ -2956,6 +2943,7 @@ async fn get_reset_password_details(
         "kdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
         "kdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
         "kdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
+        "masterPasswordSalt": user.master_password_salt(),
         "resetPasswordKey": member.reset_password_key,
         "encryptedPrivateKey": org.private_key,
     })))

src/api/core/public.rs

@@ -137,9 +137,13 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
 
     if CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() {
         for group_data in &data.groups {
-            let group_uuid = if let Some(group) =
+            let group_uuid = if let Some(mut group) =
                 Group::find_by_external_id_and_org(&group_data.external_id, &org_id, &conn).await
             {
+                if group.name != group_data.name {
+                    group.name = group_data.name.clone();
+                    group.save(&conn).await?;
+                }
                 group.uuid
             } else {
                 let mut group =

src/api/core/two_factor/authenticator.rs

@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 
 use crate::{
     api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event, core::two_factor::generate_recover_code},
-    auth::{ClientIp, Headers},
+    auth::{ClientIp, Headers, two_factor},
     crypto,
     db::{
         DbConn,
-        models::{Device, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
+        models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
     },
     util::NumberOrString,
 };
@@ -20,27 +20,23 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
 
 #[post("/two-factor/get-authenticator", data = "<data>")]
 async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
     let user = headers.user;
 
     data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
 
-    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32;
+    let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await;
-    let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await;
 
     let (enabled, key) = match twofactor {
         Some(tf) => (true, tf.data),
         _ => (false, crypto::encode_random_bytes::<20>(&BASE32)),
     };
 
-    // Upstream seems to also return `userVerificationToken`, but doesn't seem to be used at all.
-    // It should help prevent TOTP disclosure if someone keeps their vault unlocked.
-    // Since it doesn't seem to be used, and also does not cause any issues, lets leave it out of the response.
-    // See: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Auth/Controllers/TwoFactorController.cs#L94
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "enabled": enabled,
+        "authenticator": json!({
-        "key": key,
+            "enabled": enabled,
-        "object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
+            "key": key,
+        }),
+        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::authenticator_token(user.uuid, key, enabled),
     })))
 }
 
@@ -49,8 +45,7 @@ async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers,
 struct EnableAuthenticatorData {
     key: String,
     token: NumberOrString,
-    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    user_verification_token: String,
-    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[post("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
@@ -61,12 +56,7 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He
 
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
-    PasswordOrOtpData {
+    two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &key, false)?;
-        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
-        otp: data.otp,
-    }
-    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
-    .await?;
 
     // Validate key as base32 and 20 bytes length
     let decoded_key: Vec<u8> = if let Ok(decoded) = BASE32.decode(key.as_bytes()) {
@@ -84,12 +74,13 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He
 
     generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
 
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "enabled": true,
+        "authenticator": json!({
-        "key": key,
+            "enabled": true,
-        "object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
+            "key": key,
+        }),
     })))
 }
 
@@ -125,8 +116,7 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
         err!("Invalid TOTP secret")
     };
 
-    let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32, conn).await
+    let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, conn).await {
-    {
         Some(tf) => tf,
         _ => TwoFactor::new(user_id.clone(), TwoFactorType::Authenticator, secret.to_owned()),
     };
@@ -184,37 +174,25 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct DisableAuthenticatorData {
     key: String,
-    master_password_hash: String,
+    user_verification_token: String,
-    r#type: NumberOrString,
 }
 
 #[delete("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
-async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
     let user = headers.user;
-    let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
 
-    if !user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
+    two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &data.key, true)?;
-        err!("Invalid password");
-    }
 
-    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
+    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await {
         if twofactor.data == data.key {
             twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
-            Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
+            log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-            log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
-                .await;
         } else {
             err!(format!("TOTP key for user {} does not match recorded value, cannot deactivate", &user.email));
         }
     }
 
-    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
+    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-        super::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-    }
 
-    Ok(Json(json!({
+    Ok(())
-        "enabled": false,
-        "keys": type_,
-        "object": "twoFactorProvider"
-    })))
 }

src/api/core/two_factor/duo.rs

@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ use chrono::Utc;
 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 
 use crate::{
-    CONFIG,
     api::{
-        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event,
+        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::two_factor::generate_recover_code,
+        core::log_user_event,
+        core::two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
     },
-    auth::Headers,
+    auth::{Headers, two_factor, two_factor::DuoData},
     crypto,
     db::{
         DbConn,
@@ -18,55 +18,7 @@ use crate::{
 };
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put,]
+    routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put, disable_duo,]
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-struct DuoData {
-    host: String, // Duo API hostname
-    ik: String,   // client id
-    sk: String,   // client secret
-}
-
-impl DuoData {
-    fn global() -> Option<Self> {
-        match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
-            (true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
-                host,
-                ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
-                sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
-            }),
-            _ => None,
-        }
-    }
-    fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            host: s.into(),
-            ik: s.into(),
-            sk: s.into(),
-        }
-    }
-    fn secret() -> Self {
-        Self::msg("<global_secret>")
-    }
-    fn obscure(self) -> Self {
-        let mut host = self.host;
-        let mut ik = self.ik;
-        let mut sk = self.sk;
-
-        let digits = 4;
-        let replaced = "************";
-
-        host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-        ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-        sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-
-        Self {
-            host,
-            ik,
-            sk,
-        }
-    }
 }
 
 enum DuoStatus {
@@ -95,22 +47,19 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
 
     data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
 
-    let data = get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await;
+    let (enabled, duo) = match get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await {
-
-    let (enabled, data) = match data {
         DuoStatus::Global(_) => (true, Some(DuoData::secret())),
         DuoStatus::User(data) => (true, Some(data.obscure())),
         DuoStatus::Disabled(true) => (false, Some(DuoData::msg(DISABLED_MESSAGE_DEFAULT))),
         DuoStatus::Disabled(false) => (false, None),
     };
 
-    let json = if let Some(data) = data {
+    let duo_json = if let Some(data) = duo.as_ref() {
         json!({
             "enabled": enabled,
             "host": data.host,
             "clientSecret": data.sk,
             "clientId": data.ik,
-            "object": "twoFactorDuo"
         })
     } else {
         json!({
@@ -118,11 +67,13 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
             "host": null,
             "clientSecret": null,
             "clientId": null,
-            "object": "twoFactorDuo"
         })
     };
 
-    Ok(Json(json))
+    Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
+        "duo": duo_json,
+        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::duo_token(user.uuid, duo, enabled),
+    })))
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -131,8 +82,7 @@ struct EnableDuoData {
     host: String,
     client_secret: String,
     client_id: String,
-    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    user_verification_token: String,
-    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 impl From<EnableDuoData> for DuoData {
@@ -159,12 +109,7 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
     let data: EnableDuoData = data.into_inner();
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
-    PasswordOrOtpData {
+    two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, None, false)?;
-        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
-        otp: data.otp.clone(),
-    }
-    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
-    .await?;
 
     let (data, data_str) = if check_duo_fields_custom(&data) {
         let data_req: DuoData = data.into();
@@ -181,14 +126,15 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
 
     generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
 
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "enabled": true,
+        "duo": json!({
-        "host": data.host,
+            "enabled": true,
-        "clientSecret": data.sk,
+            "host": data.host,
-        "clientId": data.ik,
+            "clientSecret": data.sk,
-        "object": "twoFactorDuo"
+            "clientId": data.ik,
+        }),
     })))
 }
 
@@ -197,6 +143,29 @@ async fn activate_duo_put(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
     activate_duo(data, headers, conn).await
 }
 
+#[delete("/two-factor/duo", data = "<data>")]
+async fn disable_duo(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+    let user = headers.user;
+
+    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Duo, &conn).await {
+        // Apply the same transformation than in `get_duo` to check we are disabling the correct one
+        let duo = match to_user_duo_data(&twofactor) {
+            DuoStatus::Global(_) => Some(DuoData::secret()),
+            DuoStatus::User(data) => Some(data.obscure()),
+            DuoStatus::Disabled(_) => None,
+        };
+
+        two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, duo.as_ref(), true)?;
+
+        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
+        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    }
+
+    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData) -> EmptyResult {
     use reqwest::{Method, header};
     use std::str::FromStr;
@@ -222,13 +191,15 @@ async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData)
 }
 
 async fn get_user_duo_data(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> DuoStatus {
-    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Duo as i32;
-
     // If the user doesn't have an entry, disabled
-    let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await else {
+    let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Duo, conn).await else {
         return DuoStatus::Disabled(DuoData::global().is_some());
     };
 
+    to_user_duo_data(&twofactor)
+}
+
+fn to_user_duo_data(twofactor: &TwoFactor) -> DuoStatus {
     // If the user has the required values, we use those
     if let Ok(data) = serde_json::from_str(&twofactor.data) {
         return DuoStatus::User(data);

src/api/core/two_factor/email.rs

@@ -5,20 +5,26 @@ use crate::{
     CONFIG,
     api::{
         EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
+        core::{
+            log_user_event,
+            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
+        },
     },
-    auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers},
+    auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers, two_factor},
     crypto,
     db::{
         DbConn,
-        models::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, User, UserId},
+        models::{
+            AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User,
+            UserId,
+        },
     },
     error::{Error, MapResult},
     mail,
 };
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email,]
+    routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email, disable_email]
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -91,6 +97,20 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
             {
                 err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "Invalid device, IP or code")
             }
+        } else if let Some(device_identifier) = &data.device_identifier {
+            // iOS/Android SSO logins send the email and device id but no password hash,
+            // so accept a device that has a pending 2FA login for this user
+            if TwoFactorIncomplete::find_by_user_and_device(&user.uuid, device_identifier, &conn).await.is_none() {
+                err!(
+                    "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
+                    format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, email.escape_debug())
+                )
+            }
+            debug!(
+                "Email 2FA fallback: pending login. Username: {}. Device: {}.",
+                user.email,
+                device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug()
+            );
         } else {
             err!("No password hash has been submitted.")
         }
@@ -104,7 +124,7 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
         let Some(user) = User::find_by_device_for_email2fa(device_identifier, &conn).await else {
             err!(
                 "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
-                format!("IP: {}. Device: {device_identifier}.", client_headers.ip.ip)
+                format!("IP: {}. Device: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug())
             )
         };
 
@@ -116,8 +136,8 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
 
 /// Generate the token, save the data for later verification and send email to user
 pub async fn send_token(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
+    let mut twofactor =
-    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
+        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
 
     let generated_token = crypto::generate_email_token(CONFIG.email_token_size());
 
@@ -140,18 +160,19 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
     data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
 
     let (enabled, mfa_email) =
-        match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, &conn).await {
+        if let Some(x) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
-            Some(x) => {
+            let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
-                let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
+            (true, Some(twofactor_data.email))
-                (true, json!(twofactor_data.email))
+        } else {
-            }
+            (false, None)
-            _ => (false, serde_json::value::Value::Null),
         };
 
-    Ok(Json(json!({
+    Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
-        "email": mfa_email,
+        "email": rocket::serde::json::json!({
-        "enabled": enabled,
+            "enabled": enabled,
-        "object": "twoFactorEmail"
+            "email": mfa_email,
+        }),
+        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::email_token(user.uuid, mfa_email, enabled),
     })))
 }
 
@@ -160,30 +181,22 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
 struct SendEmailData {
     /// Email where 2FA codes will be sent to, can be different than user email account.
     email: String,
-    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    user_verification_token: String,
-    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 /// Send a verification email to the specified email address to check whether it exists/belongs to user.
 #[post("/two-factor/send-email", data = "<data>")]
-async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
     let data: SendEmailData = data.into_inner();
     let user = headers.user;
 
-    PasswordOrOtpData {
+    two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email.clone(), false)?;
-        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
-        otp: data.otp,
-    }
-    .validate(&user, false, &conn)
-    .await?;
 
     if !CONFIG._enable_email_2fa() {
         err!("Email 2FA is disabled")
     }
 
-    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
+    if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
-
-    if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
         tf.delete(&conn).await?;
     }
 
@@ -191,12 +204,13 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
     let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(data.email, Some(generated_token));
 
     // Uses EmailVerificationChallenge as type to show that it's not verified yet.
-    let twofactor = TwoFactor::new(user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
+    let twofactor =
+        TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
     twofactor.save(&conn).await?;
 
     mail::send_token(&twofactor_data.email, &twofactor_data.last_token.map_res("Token is empty")?).await?;
 
-    Ok(())
+    Ok(Json(json!({})))
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)]
@@ -204,8 +218,7 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
 struct EmailData {
     email: String,
     token: String,
-    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    user_verification_token: String,
-    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 /// Verify email belongs to user and can be used for 2FA email codes.
@@ -214,17 +227,11 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
     let data: EmailData = data.into_inner();
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
-    // This is the last step in the verification process, delete the otp directly afterwards
+    two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email, false)?;
-    PasswordOrOtpData {
-        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
-        otp: data.otp,
-    }
-    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
-    .await?;
 
-    let type_ = TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge as i32;
+    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, &conn)
-    let mut twofactor =
+        .await
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
+        .map_res("Two factor not found")?;
 
     let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
 
@@ -243,13 +250,26 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
 
     generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
 
-    Ok(Json(json!({
+    Ok(Json(json!({})))
-        "email": email_data.email,
+}
-        "enabled": "true",
+
-        "object": "twoFactorEmail"
+#[delete("/two-factor/email", data = "<data>")]
-    })))
+async fn disable_email(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+    let user = headers.user;
+
+    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
+        let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
+        two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, twofactor_data.email, true)?;
+
+        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
+        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    }
+
+    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+
+    Ok(())
 }
 
 /// Validate the email code when used as TwoFactor token mechanism
@@ -261,9 +281,8 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
     conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
     let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(data)?;
-    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, conn)
+    let mut twofactor =
-        .await
+        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
-        .map_res("Two factor not found")?;
     let Some(issued_token) = &email_data.last_token else {
         err!(
             format!("No token available! IP: {ip}"),
@@ -275,7 +294,7 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
 
     if !crypto::ct_eq(issued_token, token) {
         email_data.add_attempt();
-        if email_data.attempts >= CONFIG.email_attempts_limit() {
+        if email_data.attempts >= u64::from(CONFIG.email_attempts_limit()) {
             email_data.reset_token();
         }
         twofactor.data = email_data.to_json();
@@ -294,7 +313,7 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
     twofactor.save(conn).await?;
 
     let dt = DateTime::from_timestamp(email_data.token_sent, 0).expect("Email token timestamp invalid.").naive_utc();
-    let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time().cast_signed();
+    let max_time = i64::from(CONFIG.email_expiration_time());
     if dt + TimeDelta::try_seconds(max_time).unwrap() < Utc::now().naive_utc() {
         err!(
             "Token has expired",

src/api/core/two_factor/mod.rs

@@ -7,10 +7,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 
 use crate::{
     CONFIG,
-    api::{
+    api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_event},
-        EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{log_event, log_user_event},
-    },
     auth::Headers,
     crypto,
     db::{
@@ -21,7 +18,6 @@ use crate::{
         },
     },
     mail,
-    util::NumberOrString,
 };
 
 pub mod authenticator;
@@ -69,7 +65,7 @@ pub fn is_twofactor_provider_usable(provider_type: &TwoFactorType, provider_data
 }
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, disable_twofactor, get_device_verification_settings];
+    let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, get_device_verification_settings];
 
     routes.append(&mut authenticator::routes());
     routes.append(&mut duo::routes());
@@ -81,6 +77,12 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
     routes
 }
 
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct VerificationTokenData {
+    user_verification_token: String,
+}
+
 #[get("/two-factor")]
 async fn get_twofactor(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value> {
     let twofactors = TwoFactor::find_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await;
@@ -120,45 +122,14 @@ async fn generate_recover_code(user: &mut User, conn: &DbConn) {
     }
 }
 
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
+/// Call after a 2FA provider, or one of its keys, was removed. No remembered device may keep skipping
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+/// the providers that are left, and once every provider is gone the 2FA policy applies.
-struct DisableTwoFactorData {
+pub async fn check_2fa_state(user: &User, device_type: i32, ip: &std::net::IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
-    otp: Option<String>,
+    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await.is_empty() {
-    r#type: NumberOrString,
+        enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device_type, ip, conn).await?;
-}
-
-#[put("/two-factor/disable", data = "<data>")]
-async fn disable_twofactor(data: Json<DisableTwoFactorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let data: DisableTwoFactorData = data.into_inner();
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    // Delete directly after a valid token has been provided
-    PasswordOrOtpData {
-        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
-        otp: data.otp,
     }
-    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    Ok(())
-    .await?;
-
-    let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
-
-    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
-        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
-        Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
-            .await;
-    }
-
-    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
-        enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-    }
-
-    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "enabled": false,
-        "type": type_,
-        "object": "twoFactorProvider"
-    })))
 }
 
 pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy(
@@ -225,7 +196,7 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy_for_org(
 pub async fn send_incomplete_2fa_notifications(pool: DbPool) {
     debug!("Sending notifications for incomplete 2FA logins");
 
-    if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() <= 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+    if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() == 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
         return;
     }
 
@@ -235,11 +206,21 @@ pub async fn send_incomplete_2fa_notifications(pool: DbPool) {
     };
 
     let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-    let time_limit = TimeDelta::try_minutes(CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit()).unwrap();
+    let Some(time_limit) = TimeDelta::try_minutes(i64::from(CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit())) else {
-    let time_before = now - time_limit;
+        error!("Failed to calculate the time limit for sending incomplete 2fa attempts");
+        return;
+    };
+    let Some(time_before) = now.checked_sub_signed(time_limit) else {
+        error!("Failed to calculate the timestamp for sending incomplete 2fa attempts");
+        return;
+    };
+
     let incomplete_logins = TwoFactorIncomplete::find_logins_before(&time_before, &conn).await;
     for login in incomplete_logins {
-        let user = User::find_by_uuid(&login.user_uuid, &conn).await.expect("User not found");
+        let Some(user) = User::find_by_uuid(&login.user_uuid, &conn).await else {
+            error!("User '{}', not found!", login.user_uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
         info!(
             "User {} did not complete a 2FA login within the configured time limit. IP: {}",
             user.email, login.ip_address

src/api/core/two_factor/protected_actions.rs

@@ -72,8 +72,7 @@ async fn request_otp(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
     let user = headers.user;
 
     // Only one Protected Action per user is allowed to take place, delete the previous one
-    if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, &conn).await
+    if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, &conn).await {
-    {
         let pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
         let elapsed = pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds();
         let delay = 30;
@@ -125,27 +124,28 @@ pub async fn validate_protected_action_otp(
     delete_if_valid: bool,
     conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
-    let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, conn)
+    let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, conn)
         .await
         .map_res("Protected action token not found, try sending the code again or restart the process")?;
     let mut pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
-    pa_data.add_attempt();
-    pa.data = pa_data.to_json();
 
     // Fail after x attempts if the token has been used too many times.
     // Don't delete it, as we use it to keep track of attempts.
-    if pa_data.attempts >= CONFIG.email_attempts_limit() {
+    if pa_data.attempts >= u64::from(CONFIG.email_attempts_limit()) {
         err!("Token has expired")
     }
 
     // Check if the token has expired (Using the email 2fa expiration time)
-    let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time().cast_signed();
+    let max_time = i64::from(CONFIG.email_expiration_time());
     if pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds() > max_time {
         pa.delete(conn).await?;
         err!("Token has expired")
     }
 
     if !crypto::ct_eq(&pa_data.token, otp) {
+        pa_data.add_attempt();
+        pa.data = pa_data.to_json();
+
         pa.save(conn).await?;
         err!("Token is invalid")
     }

src/api/core/two_factor/webauthn.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use std::{str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
+use std::{collections::HashSet, str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
 
 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -18,16 +18,18 @@ use crate::{
     CONFIG,
     api::{
         EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
+        core::{
+            log_user_event,
+            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
+        },
     },
-    auth::Headers,
+    auth::{Headers, two_factor},
     crypto::ct_eq,
     db::{
         DbConn,
-        models::{Device, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
+        models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
     },
     error::Error,
-    util::NumberOrString,
 };
 
 static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
@@ -45,7 +47,14 @@ static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
 });
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![get_webauthn, generate_webauthn_challenge, activate_webauthn, activate_webauthn_put, delete_webauthn,]
+    routes![
+        get_webauthn,
+        generate_webauthn_challenge,
+        activate_webauthn,
+        activate_webauthn_put,
+        delete_webauthn,
+        delete_webauthns
+    ]
 }
 
 // Some old u2f structs still needed for migrating from u2f to WebAuthn
@@ -119,34 +128,36 @@ async fn get_webauthn(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
     data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
 
     let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
+    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
     let registrations_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
 
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "enabled": enabled,
+        "webAuthn": json!({
-        "keys": registrations_json,
+            "enabled": enabled,
-        "object": "twoFactorWebAuthn"
+            "keys": registrations_json,
+        }),
+        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::webauthn_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
     })))
 }
 
 #[post("/two-factor/get-webauthn-challenge", data = "<data>")]
-async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
     let user = headers.user;
 
-    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
+    let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
-
+    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
-    let registrations = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn)
+    let creds = registrations
-        .await?
-        .1
         .into_iter()
         .map(|r| r.credential.cred_id().to_owned()) // We return the credentialIds to the clients to avoid double registering
         .collect();
 
+    two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, enabled)?;
+
     let (mut challenge, state) = WEBAUTHN.start_passkey_registration(
         Uuid::from_str(&user.uuid).expect("Failed to parse UUID"), // Should never fail
         &user.email,
         user.display_name(),
-        Some(registrations),
+        Some(creds),
     )?;
 
     let mut state = serde_json::to_value(&state)?;
@@ -166,17 +177,19 @@ async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Hea
     let mut challenge_value = serde_json::to_value(challenge.public_key)?;
     challenge_value["status"] = "ok".into();
     challenge_value["errorMessage"] = "".into();
-    Ok(Json(challenge_value))
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "options": challenge_value
+    })))
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct EnableWebauthnData {
-    id: NumberOrString, // 1..5
+    id: i32,
     name: String,
     device_response: RegisterPublicKeyCredentialCopy,
-    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    user_verification_token: String,
-    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -257,16 +270,14 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
     let data: EnableWebauthnData = data.into_inner();
     let mut user = headers.user;
 
-    PasswordOrOtpData {
+    let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
-        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
-        otp: data.otp,
+    two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, !keys.is_empty())?;
-    }
-    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
-    .await?;
 
     // Retrieve and delete the saved challenge state
-    let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge as i32;
+    let state = if let Some(tf) =
-    let state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
+        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge, &conn).await
+    {
         let state: PasskeyRegistration = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
         tf.delete(&conn).await?;
         state
@@ -277,10 +288,9 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
     // Verify the credentials with the saved state
     let credential = WEBAUTHN.finish_passkey_registration(&data.device_response.into(), &state)?;
 
-    let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
     // TODO: Check for repeated ID's
     registrations.push(WebauthnRegistration {
-        id: data.id.into_i32()?,
+        id: data.id,
         name: data.name,
         migrated: false,
 
@@ -293,13 +303,13 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
         .await?;
     generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
 
-    let keys_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "enabled": true,
+        "webAuthn": json!({
-        "keys": keys_json,
+            "enabled": true,
-        "object": "twoFactorU2f"
+            "keys": registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
+        }),
     })))
 }
 
@@ -310,58 +320,87 @@ async fn activate_webauthn_put(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers,
 
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct DeleteU2FData {
+struct DeleteWebauthnData {
-    id: NumberOrString,
+    id: i32,
-    master_password_hash: String,
+    user_verification_token: String,
 }
 
 #[delete("/two-factor/webauthn", data = "<data>")]
-async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteU2FData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let id = data.id.into_i32()?;
+    inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |key| key.id != data.id, headers, &conn).await
-    if !headers.user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
+}
-        err!("Invalid password");
-    }
 
-    let Some(mut tf) =
+#[delete("/two-factor/webauthn/all", data = "<data>")]
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32, &conn).await
+async fn delete_webauthns(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    else {
+    inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |_| false, headers, &conn).await
+}
+
+async fn inner_delete_webauthns(
+    token: &str,
+    retain: impl Fn(&WebauthnRegistration) -> bool,
+    headers: Headers,
+    conn: &DbConn,
+) -> JsonResult {
+    let user = headers.user;
+
+    let Some(mut tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await else {
         err!("Webauthn data not found!")
     };
 
-    let mut data: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
+    let mut keys: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
+    let keys_id: Vec<i32> = keys.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
 
-    let Some(item_pos) = data.iter().position(|r| r.id == id) else {
+    two_factor::validate_webauthn(token, &user.uuid, &keys_id, true)?;
+
+    let mut removed: HashSet<Vec<u8>> = HashSet::new();
+    let mut migrated = false;
+
+    keys.retain(|key| {
+        let retained = retain(key);
+        if !retained {
+            removed.insert(key.credential.cred_id().to_vec());
+            migrated = migrated || key.migrated;
+        }
+        retained
+    });
+
+    if removed.is_empty() {
         err!("Webauthn entry not found")
-    };
+    }
 
-    let removed_item = data.remove(item_pos);
+    if keys.is_empty() {
-    tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
+        tf.delete(conn).await?;
-    tf.save(&conn).await?;
+        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await;
-    drop(tf);
+    } else {
-    Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;
+        tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&keys)?;
+        tf.save(conn).await?;
+        drop(tf);
+    }
 
     // If entry is migrated from u2f, delete the u2f entry as well
-    if let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f as i32, &conn).await
+    if migrated && let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f, conn).await {
-    {
+        let Ok(mut data) = serde_json::from_str::<Vec<U2FRegistration>>(&u2f.data) else {
-        let mut data: Vec<U2FRegistration> = if let Ok(d) = serde_json::from_str(&u2f.data) {
-            d
-        } else {
             err!("Error parsing U2F data")
         };
 
-        data.retain(|r| r.reg.key_handle != removed_item.credential.cred_id().as_slice());
+        data.retain(|old| !removed.contains(&old.reg.key_handle));
-        let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
 
-        u2f.data = new_data_str;
+        if data.is_empty() {
-        u2f.save(&conn).await?;
+            u2f.delete(conn).await?;
+        } else {
+            let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
+            u2f.data = new_data_str;
+            u2f.save(conn).await?;
+        }
     }
 
-    let keys_json: Vec<Value> = data.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
+    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await?;
 
     Ok(Json(json!({
-        "enabled": true,
+        "webAuthn": json!({
-        "keys": keys_json,
+            "enabled": !keys.is_empty(),
-        "object": "twoFactorU2f"
+            "keys": keys.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
+        }),
     })))
 }
 
@@ -369,8 +408,7 @@ pub async fn get_webauthn_registrations(
     user_id: &UserId,
     conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> Result<(bool, Vec<WebauthnRegistration>), Error> {
-    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32;
+    match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await {
-    match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
         Some(tf) => Ok((tf.enabled, serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?)),
         None => Ok((false, Vec::new())), // If no data, return empty list
     }
@@ -417,8 +455,9 @@ pub async fn generate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> JsonRes
 }
 
 pub async fn validate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, response: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge as i32;
+    let mut state = if let Some(tf) =
-    let mut state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
+        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge, conn).await
+    {
         let state: PasskeyAuthentication = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
         tf.delete(conn).await?;
         state

src/api/core/two_factor/yubikey.rs

@@ -10,9 +10,12 @@ use crate::{
     CONFIG,
     api::{
         EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
+        core::{
+            log_user_event,
+            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
+        },
     },
-    auth::Headers,
+    auth::{Headers, two_factor},
     db::{
         DbConn,
         models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType},
@@ -22,7 +25,7 @@ use crate::{
 };
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put,]
+    routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put, delete_yubikeys,]
 }
 
 struct HttpClientTransport {
@@ -60,8 +63,7 @@ struct EnableYubikeyData {
     key4: Option<String>,
     key5: Option<String>,
     nfc: bool,
-    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    user_verification_token: String,
-    otp: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Deserialize, Serialize, Debug)]
@@ -125,48 +127,29 @@ async fn generate_yubikey(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn:
     data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
 
     let user_id = &user.uuid;
-    let yubikey_type = TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32;
 
-    let r = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, yubikey_type, &conn).await;
+    let (enabled, keys, yubikey_json) =
-
+        if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
-    if let Some(r) = r {
+            let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
-        let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
+            let enabled = !yubikey_metadata.keys.is_empty();
-
+            let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys.clone());
-        let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
+            result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(enabled);
-
+            result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
-        result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
+            (enabled, yubikey_metadata.keys, result)
-        result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
+        } else {
-        result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
+            (false, Vec::new(), json!({"enabled": false}))
-
+        };
-        Ok(Json(result))
+    Ok(Json(json!({
-    } else {
+        "yubiKey": yubikey_json,
-        Ok(Json(json!({
+        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::yubikey_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
-            "enabled": false,
+    })))
-            "object": "twoFactorU2f",
-        })))
-    }
 }
 
 #[post("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
 async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
     let data: EnableYubikeyData = data.into_inner();
-    let mut user = headers.user;
-
-    PasswordOrOtpData {
-        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
-        otp: data.otp.clone(),
-    }
-    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
-    .await?;
-
-    // Check if we already have some data
-    let mut yubikey_data =
-        match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32, &conn).await {
-            Some(data) => data,
-            None => TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new()),
-        };
-
     let yubikeys = parse_yubikeys(&data);
+    let mut user = headers.user;
 
     if yubikeys.is_empty() {
         // Return an error to prevent saving empty keys which would cause users not being able to login anymore.
@@ -174,6 +157,17 @@ async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn:
         err!("A key is required.");
     }
 
+    // Check if we already have some data
+    let mut yubikey_data =
+        if let Some(yd) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
+            let ym: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&yd.data)?;
+            two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &ym.keys, !ym.keys.is_empty())?;
+            yd
+        } else {
+            two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &Vec::new(), false)?;
+            TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new())
+        };
+
     // Ensure they are valid OTPs
     for yubikey in &yubikeys {
         if yubikey.is_empty() || yubikey.len() == 12 {
@@ -195,15 +189,12 @@ async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn:
 
     generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
 
-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
 
     let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
-
     result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
     result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
-    result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
+    Ok(Json(json!({"yubiKey": result})))
-
-    Ok(Json(result))
 }
 
 #[put("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
@@ -211,6 +202,23 @@ async fn activate_yubikey_put(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, c
     activate_yubikey(data, headers, conn).await
 }
 
+#[delete("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
+async fn delete_yubikeys(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+    let user = headers.user;
+
+    if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
+        let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
+        two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &yubikey_metadata.keys, true)?;
+
+        r.delete(&conn).await?;
+        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    }
+
+    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 pub async fn validate_yubikey_login(response: &str, twofactor_data: &str) -> EmptyResult {
     if response.len() != 44 {
         err!("Invalid Yubikey OTP length");

src/api/icons.rs

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static CLIENT: LazyLock<Client> = LazyLock::new(|| {
     // Generate the cookie store
     let cookie_store = Arc::new(Jar::default());
 
-    let icon_download_timeout = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.icon_download_timeout());
+    let icon_download_timeout = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.icon_download_timeout()));
     let pool_idle_timeout = Duration::from_secs(10);
     // Reuse the client between requests
     get_reqwest_client_builder(true)
@@ -193,14 +193,14 @@ async fn get_cached_icon(path: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
     None
 }
 
-async fn file_is_expired(path: &str, ttl: u64) -> Result<bool, Error> {
+async fn file_is_expired(path: &str, ttl: u32) -> Result<bool, Error> {
     let operator = CONFIG.opendal_operator_for_path_type(&PathType::IconCache)?;
     let meta = operator.stat(path).await?;
     let modified =
         meta.last_modified().ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other(format!("No last modified time for `{path}`")))?;
     let age = SystemTime::now().duration_since(modified.into())?;
 
-    Ok(ttl > 0 && ttl <= age.as_secs())
+    Ok(ttl > 0 && u64::from(ttl) <= age.as_secs())
 }
 
 async fn icon_is_negcached(path: &str) -> bool {
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ async fn download_icon(domain: &str) -> Result<(Bytes, Option<&str>), Error> {
                 Ok(())
             }) {
                 Ok(_) => {
-                    // Also check if the size is atleast 67 bytes, which seems to be the smallest png i could create
+                    // Also check if the size is at least 67 bytes, which seems to be the smallest png I could create
                     if body.len() >= 67 {
                         // Check if the icon type is allowed, else try an icon from the list.
                         icon_type = get_icon_type(&body);

src/api/identity.rs

@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
         match &login_result {
             Ok(_) => {
                 log_user_event(
-                    EventType::UserLoggedIn as i32,
+                    EventType::UserLoggedIn,
                     &user_id,
                     client_header.device_type,
                     &client_header.ip.ip,
@@ -128,8 +128,7 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
             }
             Err(e) => {
                 if let Some(ev) = e.get_event() {
-                    log_user_event(ev.event as i32, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn)
+                    log_user_event(ev.event, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-                        .await;
                 }
             }
         }
@@ -448,9 +447,9 @@ async fn password_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &
     if user.verified_at.is_none() && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.signups_verify() {
         if user.last_verifying_at.is_none()
             || now.signed_duration_since(user.last_verifying_at.unwrap()).num_seconds()
-                > CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_time().cast_signed()
+                > i64::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_time())
         {
-            let resend_limit = CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_limit().cast_signed();
+            let resend_limit = i32::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_limit());
             if resend_limit == 0 || user.login_verify_count < resend_limit {
                 // We want to send another email verification if we require signups to verify
                 // their email address, and we haven't sent them a reminder in a while...
@@ -552,7 +551,18 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
         Value::Null
     };
 
-    let account_keys = user.account_keys_json(conn).await;
+    let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
+        json!({
+            "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
+                "wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
+                "publicKey": user.public_key,
+                "Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
+            },
+            "Object": "privateKeys"
+        })
+    } else {
+        Value::Null
+    };
 
     let mut result = json!({
         "access_token": auth_tokens.access_token(),
@@ -698,7 +708,18 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
         Value::Null
     };
 
-    let account_keys = user.account_keys_json(conn).await;
+    let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
+        json!({
+            "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
+                "wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
+                "publicKey": user.public_key,
+                "Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
+            },
+            "Object": "privateKeys"
+        })
+    } else {
+        Value::Null
+    };
 
     // Note: No refresh_token is returned. The CLI just repeats the
     // client_credentials login flow when the existing token expires.
@@ -882,7 +903,7 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
 
             enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await?;
 
-            log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa as i32, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
+            log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
 
             if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
                 && let Err(e) =
@@ -952,7 +973,7 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
             }
 
             Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::YubiKey) => {
-                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
+                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
                     err!("No YubiKey devices registered")
                 };
 
@@ -964,7 +985,7 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
             }
 
             Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::Email) => {
-                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
+                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
                     err!("No twofactor email registered")
                 };
 

src/api/mod.rs

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ pub type JsonResult = ApiResult<Json<Value>>;
 pub type EmptyResult = ApiResult<()>;
 
 // Common structs representing JSON data received
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct PasswordOrOtpData {
     #[serde(alias = "MasterPasswordHash")]

src/api/notifications.rs

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use std::{
     net::IpAddr,
     sync::{Arc, LazyLock},
-    time::Duration,
+    time::{Duration, Instant},
 };
 
 use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
@@ -41,6 +41,14 @@ pub static WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS: LazyLock<Arc<AnonymousWebSocketSubscripti
 /// One connection is needed per pending login request, several at once are only expected behind NAT.
 const MAX_ANONYMOUS_CONNECTIONS_PER_IP: u32 = 25;
 
+/// How often a Ping is sent to the client.
+const WS_PING_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
+
+/// Close the connection if nothing, not even a Pong, was received from the client for this long.
+/// Otherwise half-open connections (client gone without a FIN, e.g. behind a proxy or NAT) are kept forever.
+/// Same as the default `ClientTimeoutInterval` of ASP.NET Core SignalR, which the official server uses.
+const WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
+
 static NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: LazyLock<bool> = LazyLock::new(|| !CONFIG.enable_websocket() && !CONFIG.push_enabled());
 
 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
@@ -156,12 +164,16 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
         rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
             let mut ws = ws;
             let _guard = guard;
-            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
+            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
+            let mut last_received = Instant::now();
             loop {
                 tokio::select! {
                     res = ws.next() =>  {
                         match res {
                             Some(Ok(message)) => {
+                                // Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
+                                last_received = Instant::now();
+
                                 match message {
                                     // Respond to any pings
                                     Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -195,7 +207,13 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
                         }
                     }
 
-                    _ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
+                    _ = interval.tick() => {
+                        // The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
+                        if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
+                            break;
+                        }
+                        yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
+                    }
                 }
             }
         }}
@@ -229,12 +247,16 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
         rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
             let mut ws = ws;
             let _guard = guard;
-            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
+            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
+            let mut last_received = Instant::now();
             loop {
                 tokio::select! {
                     res = ws.next() =>  {
                         match res {
                             Some(Ok(message)) => {
+                                // Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
+                                last_received = Instant::now();
+
                                 match message {
                                     // Respond to any pings
                                     Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -268,7 +290,13 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
                         }
                     }
 
-                    _ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
+                    _ = interval.tick() => {
+                        // The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
+                        if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
+                            break;
+                        }
+                        yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
+                    }
                 }
             }
         }}

src/auth.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
+#[path = "auth/two_factor.rs"]
+pub mod two_factor;
+
 #[path = "auth/send.rs"]
 pub mod send;
 pub type SendTokens = send::SendTokens;
@@ -311,6 +314,17 @@ impl LoginJwtClaims {
     }
 }
 
+fn calculate_invite_expire_hours(now: &DateTime<Utc>) -> Result<DateTime<Utc>, Error> {
+    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    let Some(hours_delta) = TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours) else {
+        err!("Unable to calculate time delta for invite expire hours. Check `INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS`.");
+    };
+    let Some(exp) = now.checked_add_signed(hours_delta) else {
+        err!("Unable to calculate invitation expire date. Check `INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS`.");
+    };
+    Ok(exp)
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct InviteJwtClaims {
     // Not before
@@ -334,19 +348,19 @@ pub fn generate_invite_claims(
     org_id: OrganizationId,
     member_id: MembershipId,
     invited_by_email: Option<String>,
-) -> InviteJwtClaims {
+) -> Result<InviteJwtClaims, Error> {
     let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    InviteJwtClaims {
+    Ok(InviteJwtClaims {
         nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: exp.timestamp(),
         iss: JWT_INVITE_ISSUER.to_string(),
         sub: user_id,
         email,
         org_id,
         member_id,
         invited_by_email,
-    }
+    })
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -372,19 +386,19 @@ pub fn generate_emergency_access_invite_claims(
     emer_id: EmergencyAccessId,
     grantor_name: String,
     grantor_email: String,
-) -> EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
+) -> Result<EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims, Error> {
     let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
+    Ok(EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
         nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: exp.timestamp(),
         iss: JWT_EMERGENCY_ACCESS_INVITE_ISSUER.to_string(),
         sub: user_id,
         email,
         emer_id,
         grantor_name,
         grantor_email,
-    }
+    })
 }
 
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -518,36 +532,43 @@ impl BasicJwtClaims {
     }
 }
 
-pub fn generate_delete_claims(uuid: String) -> BasicJwtClaims {
+pub fn generate_delete_claims(uuid: String) -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
     let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    BasicJwtClaims {
+    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
         nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: exp.timestamp(),
         iss: JWT_DELETE_ISSUER.to_string(),
         sub: uuid,
-    }
+    })
 }
 
-pub fn generate_verify_email_claims(user_id: &UserId) -> BasicJwtClaims {
+pub fn generate_verify_email_claims(user_id: &UserId) -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
     let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    BasicJwtClaims {
+    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
         nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: exp.timestamp(),
         iss: JWT_VERIFYEMAIL_ISSUER.to_string(),
         sub: user_id.to_string(),
-    }
+    })
 }
 
-pub fn generate_admin_claims() -> BasicJwtClaims {
+pub fn generate_admin_claims() -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
     let time_now = Utc::now();
-    BasicJwtClaims {
+    let lifetime_minutes = i64::from(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime());
+    let Some(minutes_delta) = TimeDelta::try_minutes(lifetime_minutes) else {
+        err!("Unable to calculate time delta for admin session lifetime. Check `ADMIN_SESSION_LIFETIME`.");
+    };
+    let Some(exp) = time_now.checked_add_signed(minutes_delta) else {
+        err!("Unable to calculate admin session lifetime. Check `ADMIN_SESSION_LIFETIME`.");
+    };
+    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
         nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime()).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: exp.timestamp(),
         iss: JWT_ADMIN_ISSUER.to_string(),
         sub: "admin_panel".to_owned(),
-    }
+    })
 }
 
 pub fn generate_send_claims(send_id: &SendId, file_id: &SendFileId) -> BasicJwtClaims {

src/auth/two_factor.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
+use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
+use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, ser::Serialize};
+use std::sync::LazyLock;
+
+use crate::{
+    CONFIG,
+    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult},
+    auth::{decode_jwt, encode_jwt},
+    db::models::UserId,
+};
+
+static JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|api.2fa", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct TwoFactorClaims<T> {
+    // Not before
+    pub nbf: i64,
+    // Expiration time
+    pub exp: i64,
+    // Issuer
+    pub iss: String,
+    // Subject
+    pub sub: UserId,
+
+    pub enabled: bool,
+
+    pub claims: T,
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
+pub struct AuthenticatorClaims {
+    #[serde(rename = "authenticator_key")]
+    pub key: String,
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
+pub struct DuoClaims {
+    #[serde(rename = "duo_data")]
+    pub data: Option<DuoData>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
+pub struct WebauthnClaims {
+    #[serde(rename = "webauthn_keys")]
+    pub keys: Vec<i32>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
+pub struct YubikeyClaims {
+    #[serde(rename = "yubi_keys")]
+    pub keys: Vec<String>,
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
+pub struct DuoData {
+    pub host: String, // Duo API hostname
+    pub ik: String,   // client id
+    pub sk: String,   // client secret
+}
+
+impl DuoData {
+    pub fn global() -> Option<Self> {
+        match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
+            (true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
+                host,
+                ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
+                sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
+            }),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+    pub fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            host: s.into(),
+            ik: s.into(),
+            sk: s.into(),
+        }
+    }
+    pub fn secret() -> Self {
+        Self::msg("<global_secret>")
+    }
+    pub fn obscure(self) -> Self {
+        let mut host = self.host;
+        let mut ik = self.ik;
+        let mut sk = self.sk;
+
+        let digits = 4;
+        let replaced = "************";
+
+        host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+        ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+        sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+
+        Self {
+            host,
+            ik,
+            sk,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
+pub struct EmailClaims {
+    pub email: Option<String>,
+}
+
+fn token<T: Serialize>(user_id: UserId, enabled: bool, claims: T) -> String {
+    let time_now = Utc::now();
+    let claims = TwoFactorClaims {
+        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        iss: JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string(),
+        sub: user_id,
+        enabled,
+        claims,
+    };
+    encode_jwt(&claims)
+}
+
+fn validate<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, enabled: bool) -> ApiResult<T> {
+    match decode_jwt::<TwoFactorClaims<T>>(token, JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string()) {
+        Ok(claims) => {
+            if claims.sub != *user_id {
+                err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid user");
+            }
+            if claims.enabled != enabled {
+                err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid state");
+            }
+            Ok(claims.claims)
+        }
+        Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to decode verification token: {err}")),
+    }
+}
+
+pub fn authenticator_token(user_id: UserId, key: String, enabled: bool) -> String {
+    token(
+        user_id,
+        enabled,
+        AuthenticatorClaims {
+            key,
+        },
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn validate_authenticator(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, key: &str, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
+    let claims = validate::<AuthenticatorClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
+    if claims.key != key {
+        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid key");
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub fn duo_token(user_id: UserId, data: Option<DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> String {
+    token(
+        user_id,
+        enabled,
+        DuoClaims {
+            data,
+        },
+    )
+}
+
+// When disabling we check that it's the correct data
+pub fn validate_duo(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, data: Option<&DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
+    let claims = validate::<DuoClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
+    if enabled && claims.data.as_ref() != data {
+        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid duo data");
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub fn email_token(user_id: UserId, email: Option<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
+    token(
+        user_id,
+        enabled,
+        EmailClaims {
+            email,
+        },
+    )
+}
+
+// When disabling we check that it's the correct `email`
+pub fn validate_email(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, email: String, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
+    let claims = validate::<EmailClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
+    if enabled && claims.email != Some(email) {
+        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid email");
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub fn webauthn_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<i32>, enabled: bool) -> String {
+    token(
+        user_id,
+        enabled,
+        WebauthnClaims {
+            keys,
+        },
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn validate_webauthn(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &[i32], enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
+    let claims = validate::<WebauthnClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
+    if keys != claims.keys {
+        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+pub fn yubikey_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
+    token(
+        user_id,
+        enabled,
+        YubikeyClaims {
+            keys,
+        },
+    )
+}
+
+pub fn validate_yubikey(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
+    let claims = validate::<YubikeyClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
+    if *keys != claims.keys {
+        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+    use super::*;
+    use serde_json::{Value, from_value, to_value};
+
+    fn token<T: Serialize>(claims: T) -> Value {
+        to_value(TwoFactorClaims {
+            nbf: 0,
+            exp: 0,
+            iss: String::new(),
+            sub: UserId::from(String::from("4ff0f0a4-0aa4-4c1d-9d43-1f2bd4d5e8b1")),
+            enabled: false,
+            claims,
+        })
+        .unwrap()
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn claims_only_parse_as_their_own_provider() {
+        let tokens = [
+            token(AuthenticatorClaims {
+                key: String::from("JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP"),
+            }),
+            token(DuoClaims {
+                data: None,
+            }),
+            token(WebauthnClaims {
+                keys: vec![1],
+            }),
+            token(YubikeyClaims {
+                keys: Vec::new(),
+            }),
+            token(EmailClaims {
+                email: None,
+            }),
+        ];
+        for (issued, token) in tokens.iter().enumerate() {
+            let parsed = [
+                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<AuthenticatorClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
+                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<DuoClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
+                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<WebauthnClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
+                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<YubikeyClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
+                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<EmailClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
+            ];
+            for (checked, ok) in parsed.into_iter().enumerate() {
+                assert_eq!(ok, issued == checked, "token {issued} parsed as {checked}");
+            }
+        }
+    }
+}

src/config.rs

@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
             _usr: ConfigBuilder,
 
             _overrides: Vec<&'static str>,
+            _config_file_status: ConfigFileStatus,
         }
 
         // Custom Deserialize for ConfigBuilder, mainly based upon https://serde.rs/deserialize-struct.html
@@ -259,11 +260,18 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                 builder
             }
 
-            async fn from_file() -> Result<Self, Error> {
+            async fn from_file() -> Result<Option<Self>, Error> {
                 let operator = storage::operator_for_path(&CONFIG_FILE_PARENT_DIR)?;
-                let config_bytes = operator.read(&CONFIG_FILENAME).await?;
+                let config_bytes = match operator.read(&CONFIG_FILENAME).await {
+                    Ok(bytes) => bytes,
+                    // No config file is fine, should not return any error
+                    Err(e) if e.kind() == opendal::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
+                    // Any other error might be an issue and should be passed back to the caller
+                    Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
+                };
+                let builder = serde_json::from_slice(&config_bytes.to_vec())?;
                 println!("[INFO] Using saved config from `{}` for configuration.\n", *CONFIG_FILE);
-                serde_json::from_slice(&config_bytes.to_vec()).map_err(Into::into)
+                Ok(Some(builder))
             }
 
             fn clear_non_editable(&mut self) {
@@ -440,6 +448,8 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                     "domain_origin",
                     "domain_path",
                     "domain",
+                    "duo_ikey",
+                    "duo_host",
                     "helo_name",
                     "org_creation_users",
                     "signups_domains_whitelist",
@@ -451,6 +461,8 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                     "sso_authority",
                     "sso_callback_path",
                     "sso_client_id",
+                    "yubico_client_id",
+                    "yubico_server",
                 ];
 
                 let cfg = {
@@ -483,6 +495,10 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                 };
                 overrides
             }
+
+            pub fn get_config_file_status(&self) -> ConfigFileStatus {
+                self.inner.read().unwrap()._config_file_status
+            }
         }
     };
 }
@@ -539,7 +555,7 @@ make_config! {
     jobs {
         /// Job scheduler poll interval |> How often the job scheduler thread checks for jobs to run.
         /// Set to 0 to globally disable scheduled jobs.
-        job_poll_interval_ms:   u64,    false,  def,    30_000;
+        job_poll_interval_ms:   u32,    false,  def,    30_000;
         /// Send purge schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that checks for Sends past their deletion date.
         /// Defaults to hourly. Set blank to disable this job.
         send_purge_schedule:    String, false,  def,    "0 5 * * * *".to_owned();
@@ -595,19 +611,19 @@ make_config! {
         /// Per-organization attachment storage limit (KB) |> Max kilobytes of attachment storage allowed per org. When this limit is reached, org members will not be allowed to upload further attachments for ciphers owned by that org.
         org_attachment_limit:   i64,    true,   option;
         /// Per-user send storage limit (KB) |> Max kilobytes of sends storage allowed per user. When this limit is reached, the user will not be allowed to upload further sends.
-        user_send_limit:   i64,    true,   option;
+        user_send_limit:        i64,    true,   option;
 
         /// Trash auto-delete days |> Number of days to wait before auto-deleting a trashed item.
-        /// If unset, trashed items are not auto-deleted. This setting applies globally, so make
+        /// If unset or 0, trashed items are not auto-deleted. This setting applies globally, so make
         /// sure to inform all users of any changes to this setting.
-        trash_auto_delete_days: i64,    true,   option;
+        trash_auto_delete_days: u16,    true,   option;
 
         /// Incomplete 2FA time limit |> Number of minutes to wait before a 2FA-enabled login is
         /// considered incomplete, resulting in an email notification. An incomplete 2FA login is one
         /// where the correct master password was provided but the required 2FA step was not completed,
         /// which potentially indicates a master password compromise. Set to 0 to disable this check.
         /// This setting applies globally to all users.
-        incomplete_2fa_time_limit: i64, true,   def,    3;
+        incomplete_2fa_time_limit: u16, true,   def,    3;
 
         /// Disable icon downloads |> Set to true to disable icon downloading in the internal icon service.
         /// This still serves existing icons from $ICON_CACHE_FOLDER, without generating any external
@@ -620,9 +636,9 @@ make_config! {
         /// this will prevent logins from succeeding until the address has been verified
         signups_verify:         bool,   true,   def,    false;
         /// If signups require email verification, automatically re-send verification email if it hasn't been sent for a while (in seconds)
-        signups_verify_resend_time: u64, true,  def,    3_600;
+        signups_verify_resend_time: u32, true,  def,    3_600;
         /// If signups require email verification, limit how many emails are automatically sent when login is attempted (0 means no limit)
-        signups_verify_resend_limit: u32, true, def,    6;
+        signups_verify_resend_limit: u16, true, def,    6;
         /// Email domain whitelist |> Allow signups only from this list of comma-separated domains, even when signups are otherwise disabled
         signups_domains_whitelist: String, true, def,   String::new();
         /// Enable event logging |> Enables event logging for organizations.
@@ -634,7 +650,7 @@ make_config! {
         invitations_allowed:    bool,   true,   def,    true;
         /// Invitation token expiration time (in hours) |> The number of hours after which an organization invite token, emergency access invite token,
         /// email verification token and deletion request token will expire (must be at least 1)
-        invitation_expiration_hours: u32, false, def, 120;
+        invitation_expiration_hours: u16, false, def, 120;
         /// Enable emergency access |> Controls whether users can enable emergency access to their accounts. This setting applies globally to all users.
         emergency_access_allowed:    bool,   true,   def,    true;
         /// Allow email change |> Controls whether users can change their email. This setting applies globally to all users.
@@ -655,8 +671,8 @@ make_config! {
         /// Invitation organization name |> Name shown in the invitation emails that don't come from a specific organization
         invitation_org_name:    String, true,   def,    "Vaultwarden".to_owned();
 
-        /// Events days retain |> Number of days to retain events stored in the database. If unset, events are kept indefinitely.
+        /// Events days retain |> Number of days to retain events stored in the database. If unset or 0, events are kept indefinitely.
-        events_days_retain:     i64,    false,   option;
+        events_days_retain:     u16,    false,   option;
     },
 
     client {
@@ -694,13 +710,13 @@ make_config! {
         /// Temporary redirects are useful while testing different icon services, but once a service
         /// has been decided on, consider using permanent redirects for cacheability. The legacy codes
         /// are currently better supported by the Bitwarden clients.
-        icon_redirect_code:     u32,    true,   def,    302;
+        icon_redirect_code:     u16,    true,   def,    302;
         /// Positive icon cache expiry |> Number of seconds to consider that an already cached icon is fresh. After this period, the icon will be refreshed
-        icon_cache_ttl:         u64,    true,   def,    2_592_000;
+        icon_cache_ttl:         u32,    true,   def,    2_592_000;
         /// Negative icon cache expiry |> Number of seconds before trying to download an icon that failed again.
-        icon_cache_negttl:      u64,    true,   def,    259_200;
+        icon_cache_negttl:      u32,    true,   def,    259_200;
         /// Icon download timeout |> Number of seconds when to stop attempting to download an icon.
-        icon_download_timeout:  u64,    true,   def,    10;
+        icon_download_timeout:  u16,    true,   def,    10;
 
         /// [Deprecated] Icon blacklist Regex |> Use `http_request_block_regex` instead
         icon_blacklist_regex:   String, false,   option;
@@ -751,11 +767,11 @@ make_config! {
         /// Max database connection retries |> Number of times to retry the database connection during startup, with 1 second between each retry, set to 0 to retry indefinitely
         db_connection_retries:  u32,    false,  def,    15;
 
-        /// Timeout when acquiring database connection
+        /// Timeout in seconds when acquiring database connection
-        database_timeout:       u64,    false,  def,    30;
+        database_timeout:       u32,    false,  def,    30;
 
         /// Timeout in seconds before idle connections to the database are closed
-        database_idle_timeout:  u64,    false, def,     600;
+        database_idle_timeout:  u32,    false, def,     600;
 
         /// Database connection max pool size
         database_max_conns:     u32,    false,  def,    10;
@@ -772,26 +788,26 @@ make_config! {
         /// Allowed iframe ancestors (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains to embed the web vault into an iframe, useful for embedding into secure intranets
         allowed_iframe_ancestors: String, true, def,    String::new();
 
-        /// Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains to URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
+        /// Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains for URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
         allowed_connect_src:      String, true, def,    String::new();
 
         /// Seconds between login requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between login and 2FA requests from the same IP address before rate limiting kicks in
-        login_ratelimit_seconds:       u64, false, def, 60;
+        login_ratelimit_seconds:       u16, false, def, 60;
         /// Max burst size for login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `login_ratelimit_seconds`. Note that this applies to both the login and the 2FA, so it's recommended to allow a burst size of at least 2
-        login_ratelimit_max_burst:     u32, false, def, 10;
+        login_ratelimit_max_burst:     u16, false, def, 10;
 
         /// Seconds between unauthenticated requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between requests from the same IP address to any of the rate limited unauthenticated endpoints
-        unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds:   u64, false, def, 60;
+        unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds:   u16, false, def, 60;
         /// Max burst size for unauthenticated requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds`. This is shared between several endpoints, so it needs to be more lenient than the login one
-        unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst: u32, false, def, 50;
+        unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst: u16, false, def, 50;
 
         /// Seconds between admin login requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between admin requests from the same IP address before rate limiting kicks in
-        admin_ratelimit_seconds:       u64, false, def, 300;
+        admin_ratelimit_seconds:       u16, false, def, 300;
         /// Max burst size for admin login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `admin_ratelimit_seconds`
-        admin_ratelimit_max_burst:     u32, false, def, 3;
+        admin_ratelimit_max_burst:     u16, false, def, 3;
 
         /// Admin session lifetime |> Set the lifetime of admin sessions to this value (in minutes).
-        admin_session_lifetime:        i64, true,  def, 20;
+        admin_session_lifetime:        u32, true,  def, 20;
 
         /// Enable groups (BETA!) (Know the risks!) |> Enables groups support for organizations (Currently contains known issues!).
         org_groups_enabled:            bool, false, def, false;
@@ -844,8 +860,8 @@ make_config! {
         sso_master_password_policy:     String, true,  option;
         /// Use SSO only for auth not the session lifecycle |> Use default Vaultwarden session lifecycle (Idle refresh token valid for 30days)
         sso_auth_only_not_session:      bool,   true,   def,    false;
-        /// Client cache for discovery endpoint. |> Duration in seconds (0 or less to disable). More details: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-SSO-support-using-OpenId-Connect#client-cache
+        /// Client cache for discovery endpoint. |> Duration in seconds (0 to disable). More details: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-SSO-support-using-OpenId-Connect#client-cache
-        sso_client_cache_expiration:    u64,    true,   def,    0;
+        sso_client_cache_expiration:    u32,    true,   def,    0;
         /// Log all tokens |> `LOG_LEVEL=debug` or `LOG_LEVEL=info,vaultwarden::sso=debug` is required
         sso_debug_tokens:               bool,   true,   def,    false;
     },
@@ -903,11 +919,11 @@ make_config! {
         /// SMTP Auth mechanism |> Defaults for SSL is "Plain" and "Login" and nothing for Non-SSL connections. Possible values: ["Plain", "Login", "Xoauth2"]. Multiple options need to be separated by a comma ','.
         smtp_auth_mechanism:           String, true,   option;
         /// SMTP connection timeout |> Number of seconds when to stop trying to connect to the SMTP server
-        smtp_timeout:                  u64,    true,   def,     15;
+        smtp_timeout:                  u16,    true,   def,     15;
         /// Server name sent during HELO |> By default this value should be the machine's hostname, but might need to be changed in case it trips some anti-spam filters
         helo_name:                     String, true,   option;
         /// Embed images as email attachments.
-        smtp_embed_images:             bool, true, def, true;
+        smtp_embed_images:             bool,   true,   def,     true;
         /// _smtp_img_src
         _smtp_img_src:                 String, false, generated, |c| generate_smtp_img_src(c.smtp_embed_images, &c.domain);
         /// Enable SMTP debugging (Know the risks!) |> DANGEROUS: Enabling this will output very detailed SMTP messages. This could contain sensitive information like passwords and usernames! Only enable this during troubleshooting!
@@ -925,9 +941,9 @@ make_config! {
         /// Email token size |> Number of digits in an email 2FA token (min: 6, max: 255). Note that the Bitwarden clients are hardcoded to mention 6 digit codes regardless of this setting.
         email_token_size:       u8,     true,   def,      6;
         /// Token expiration time |> Maximum time in seconds a token is valid. The time the user has to open email client and copy token.
-        email_expiration_time:  u64,    true,   def,      600;
+        email_expiration_time:  u32,    true,   def,      600;
         /// Maximum attempts |> Maximum attempts before an email token is reset and a new email will need to be sent
-        email_attempts_limit:   u64,    true,   def,      3;
+        email_attempts_limit:   u8,     true,   def,      3;
         /// Setup email 2FA at signup |> Setup email 2FA provider on registration regardless of any organization policy
         email_2fa_enforce_on_verified_invite: bool,   true,   def,      false;
         /// Auto-enable 2FA (Know the risks!) |> Automatically setup email 2FA as fallback provider when needed
@@ -983,7 +999,15 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
     }
 
     if cfg.database_min_conns > cfg.database_max_conns {
-        err!("`DATABASE_MIN_CONNS` must be smaller than or equal to `DATABASE_MAX_CONNS`.");
+        err!("`DATABASE_MIN_CONNS` must be less than or equal to `DATABASE_MAX_CONNS`.");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.database_timeout < 1 {
+        err!("`DATABASE_TIMEOUT` must be at least 1 second");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.database_idle_timeout < 1 {
+        err!("`DATABASE_IDLE_TIMEOUT` must be at least 1 second");
     }
 
     if let Some(log_file) = &cfg.log_file
@@ -1266,6 +1290,38 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
         err!("`AUTH_REQUEST_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
     }
 
+    if !cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.is_empty() && cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
+        err!("`DUO_CONTEXT_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
+    }
+
+    if !cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.is_empty() && cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
+        err!("`PURGE_INCOMPLETE_SSO_AUTH` is not a valid cron expression")
+    }
+
+    if cfg.login_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
+        err!("`LOGIN_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.login_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
+        err!("`LOGIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.admin_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
+        err!("`ADMIN_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.admin_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
+        err!("`ADMIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
+        err!("`UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
+        err!("`UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
+    }
+
     if !cfg.disable_admin_token {
         match cfg.admin_token.as_ref() {
             Some(t) if t.starts_with("$argon2") => {
@@ -1422,10 +1478,11 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
     "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic",
     "enable-basic-auth-response",
     "ssh-agent-v2",
+    "windows-desktop-autotype",
+    "windows-desktop-autotype-ga",
     // Key Management Team
+    "biometrics-sdk-ipc",
     "windows-native-credential-sync",
-    "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
-    "pm-27278-v2-password-registration",
     // Mobile Team
     "pm-34171-card-scanner",
     // Platform Team
@@ -1434,11 +1491,34 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
     "pm-32009-new-item-types",
 ];
 
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Serialize)]
+pub enum ConfigFileStatus {
+    NotFound,
+    Loaded,
+    Error,
+}
+
 impl Config {
     pub async fn load() -> Result<Self, Error> {
         // Loading from env and file
         let env = ConfigBuilder::from_env();
-        let usr = ConfigBuilder::from_file().await.unwrap_or_default();
+        let (usr, config_file_status) = match ConfigBuilder::from_file().await {
+            Ok(Some(usr)) => (usr, ConfigFileStatus::Loaded),
+            Ok(None) => (ConfigBuilder::default(), ConfigFileStatus::NotFound),
+            Err(e) => {
+                println!(
+                    "[ERROR] Failed to load configuration from `{}`\n\
+                    #####################################################################################\n\
+                    # The file seems to exist but might contain invalid JSON or invalid values.         #\n\
+                    # Check the syntax and make sure every value is valid and within its allowed range. #\n\
+                    # This file is not used until those errors are resolved.                            #\n\
+                    #####################################################################################\n\
+                {e:?}\n",
+                    *CONFIG_FILE
+                );
+                (ConfigBuilder::default(), ConfigFileStatus::Error)
+            }
+        };
 
         // Create merged config, config file overwrites env
         let mut overrides = Vec::new();
@@ -1458,6 +1538,7 @@ impl Config {
                 _env: env,
                 _usr: usr,
                 _overrides: overrides,
+                _config_file_status: config_file_status,
             }),
         })
     }
@@ -1491,6 +1572,7 @@ impl Config {
             writer.config = config;
             writer._usr = builder;
             writer._overrides = overrides;
+            writer._config_file_status = ConfigFileStatus::Loaded;
         }
 
         //Save to file
@@ -1582,6 +1664,7 @@ impl Config {
             writer.config = config;
             writer._usr = usr;
             writer._overrides = Vec::new();
+            writer._config_file_status = ConfigFileStatus::NotFound;
         }
 
         // Invalidate CSS Cache because several config items might have impact on the rendered CSS

src/db/mod.rs

@@ -212,8 +212,8 @@ impl DbPool {
         let pool = Pool::builder()
             .max_size(max_conns)
             .min_idle(Some(CONFIG.database_min_conns()))
-            .idle_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_idle_timeout())))
+            .idle_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_idle_timeout()))))
-            .connection_timeout(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_timeout()))
+            .connection_timeout(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_timeout())))
             .connection_customizer(Box::new(DbConnOptions {
                 init_stmts: conn_type.get_init_stmts(),
             }))
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ impl DbPool {
 
     // Get a connection from the pool
     pub async fn get(&self) -> Result<DbConn, Error> {
-        let duration = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_timeout());
+        let duration = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_timeout()));
         let permit = match timeout(duration, Arc::clone(&self.semaphore).acquire_owned()).await {
             Ok(p) => p.expect("Semaphore should be open"),
             Err(_) => {

src/db/models/auth_request.rs

@@ -166,6 +166,15 @@ impl AuthRequest {
         .await
     }
 
+    pub async fn delete_all_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            diesel::delete(auth_requests::table.filter(auth_requests::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .map_res("Error deleting auth requests for user")
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+
     /// Marks the request as used to log in. Returns false when it already was, so it only works once.
     pub async fn set_authentication_date(uuid: &AuthRequestId, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<bool> {
         let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
@@ -188,7 +197,7 @@ impl AuthRequest {
     pub async fn purge_expired_auth_requests(conn: &DbConn) {
         // delete auth requests older than 15 minutes which is functionally equivalent to upstream:
         // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/f8ee2270409f7a13125cd414c450740af605a175/src/Sql/dbo/Auth/Stored%20Procedures/AuthRequest_DeleteIfExpired.sql
-        let expiry_time = Utc::now().naive_utc() - chrono::TimeDelta::try_minutes(15).unwrap();
+        let expiry_time = Utc::now().naive_utc() - chrono::TimeDelta::minutes(15);
         for auth_request in Self::find_created_before(&expiry_time, conn).await {
             auth_request.delete(conn).await.ok();
         }

src/db/models/cipher.rs

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ use crate::{
         },
     },
     error::MapResult,
-    util::{LowerCase, convert_json_key_lcase_first},
+    util::LowerCase,
 };
 use macros::UuidFromParam;
 
@@ -63,18 +63,6 @@ pub struct Cipher {
     pub reprompt: Option<i32>,
 }
 
-/// Whether `data` is a v2 cipher blob, recognized like upstream by a top-level `format_version` key.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Vault/Entities/Cipher.cs#L36-L41>
-pub fn is_data_blob_encrypted(data: &str) -> bool {
-    serde_json::from_str::<Value>(data).is_ok_and(|d| is_blob_value(&d))
-}
-
-/// [`is_data_blob_encrypted`] for `data` that was already parsed.
-fn is_blob_value(data: &Value) -> bool {
-    data.get("format_version").is_some()
-}
-
 pub enum RepromptType {
     None = 0,
     Password = 1,
@@ -82,8 +70,7 @@ pub enum RepromptType {
 
 /// Local methods
 impl Cipher {
-    /// The name is set when the data is saved, since a blob-encrypted cipher has it inside `data`
+    pub fn new(atype: i32, name: String) -> Self {
-    pub fn new(atype: i32) -> Self {
         let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
 
         Self {
@@ -97,7 +84,7 @@ impl Cipher {
             key: None,
 
             atype,
-            name: String::new(),
+            name,
 
             notes: None,
             fields: None,
@@ -123,11 +110,6 @@ impl Cipher {
                     .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].Notes"), serde_json::to_value([&max_note_size_msg]).unwrap());
             }
 
-            if let Err(e) = cipher.validate_content(cipher.is_blob()) {
-                validation_errors
-                    .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].{}", e.field), serde_json::to_value([e.message]).unwrap());
-            }
-
             // Validate the password history if it contains `null` values and if so, return a warning
             if let Some(Value::Array(password_history)) = &cipher.password_history {
                 for pwh in password_history {
@@ -172,10 +154,6 @@ impl Cipher {
     ) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
         use crate::util::{format_date, validate_and_format_date};
 
-        // Parsed once, since `data` can be large and this runs for every cipher in a sync
-        let type_data = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&self.data);
-        let is_blob_encrypted = type_data.as_ref().is_ok_and(is_blob_value);
-
         let mut attachments_json: Value = Value::Null;
         if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
             if let Some(attachments) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_attachments.get(&self.uuid)
@@ -272,9 +250,63 @@ impl Cipher {
             })
             .unwrap_or_default();
 
-        // Like upstream, fields and password history stored as NULL are sent as null, not `[]`
+        // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
-        let fields_json = self.fields.is_some().then_some(fields_json);
+        // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
-        let password_history_json = self.password_history.is_some().then_some(password_history_json);
+        let mut type_data_json = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data)
+            .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid))
+            .map_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()), |d| d.data);
+
+        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
+        // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
+        if self.atype == 1 {
+            // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
+            type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
+            if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
+                && !uris.is_empty()
+            {
+                // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
+                // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
+                for uri in &mut *uris {
+                    if uri["match"].is_string() {
+                        let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
+                            Ok(n) => json!(n),
+                            _ => Value::Null,
+                        };
+                        uri["match"] = match_value;
+                    }
+                }
+                type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
+            }
+
+            // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
+            if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
+                type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
+        // This breaks at least the native mobile clients
+        if self.atype == 2 {
+            match type_data_json {
+                Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
+                _ => {
+                    type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Fix invalid SSH Entries
+        // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
+        // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
+        // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
+        if self.atype == 5
+            && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
+                || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
+                || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
+        {
+            warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
+            type_data_json = Value::Null;
+        }
 
         let collection_ids = if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
             if let Some(cipher_collections) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_collections.get(&self.uuid) {
@@ -371,84 +403,10 @@ impl Cipher {
             _ => err!(format!("Cipher {} has an invalid type {}", self.uuid, self.atype)),
         };
 
-        if is_blob_encrypted {
+        json_object[key] = type_data_json;
-            // Like upstream, sent as-is with the structured fields null
-            json_object["data"] = json!(self.data);
-            json_object["name"] = Value::Null;
-        } else {
-            json_object[key] = self.legacy_type_data_json(type_data);
-        }
         Ok(json_object)
     }
 
-    /// The per-type data of a legacy cipher, with fixups for values known to break clients.
-    fn legacy_type_data_json(&self, type_data: Result<Value, serde_json::Error>) -> Value {
-        use crate::util::validate_and_format_date;
-
-        // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
-        // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
-        let mut type_data_json = if let Ok(data @ Value::Object(_)) = type_data {
-            convert_json_key_lcase_first(data)
-        } else {
-            warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid);
-            Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new())
-        };
-
-        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
-        // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
-        if self.atype == 1 {
-            // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
-            type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
-            if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
-                && !uris.is_empty()
-            {
-                // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
-                // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
-                for uri in &mut *uris {
-                    if uri["match"].is_string() {
-                        let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
-                            Ok(n) => json!(n),
-                            _ => Value::Null,
-                        };
-                        uri["match"] = match_value;
-                    }
-                }
-                type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
-            }
-
-            // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
-            if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
-                type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
-        // This breaks at least the native mobile clients
-        if self.atype == 2 {
-            match type_data_json {
-                Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
-                _ => {
-                    type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Fix invalid SSH Entries
-        // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
-        // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
-        // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
-        if self.atype == 5
-            && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
-                || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
-                || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
-        {
-            warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
-            type_data_json = Value::Null;
-        }
-
-        type_data_json
-    }
-
     pub async fn update_users_revision(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<UserId> {
         let mut user_uuids = Vec::new();
         match self.user_uuid {
@@ -536,12 +494,22 @@ impl Cipher {
 
     /// Purge all ciphers that are old enough to be auto-deleted.
     pub async fn purge_trash(conn: &DbConn) {
-        if let Some(auto_delete_days) = CONFIG.trash_auto_delete_days() {
+        let Some(auto_delete_days) = CONFIG.trash_auto_delete_days().filter(|&d| d != 0) else {
-            let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+            debug!("trash_auto_delete_days is not configured or set to 0, skipping");
-            let dt = now - TimeDelta::try_days(auto_delete_days).unwrap();
+            return;
-            for cipher in Self::find_deleted_before(&dt, conn).await {
+        };
-                cipher.delete(conn).await.ok();
+
-            }
+        let Some(days) = TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(auto_delete_days)) else {
+            error!("Unable to calculate auto delete days!");
+            return;
+        };
+        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+        let Some(dt) = now.checked_sub_signed(days) else {
+            error!("Unable to calculate trash purge date!");
+            return;
+        };
+        for cipher in Self::find_deleted_before(&dt, conn).await {
+            cipher.delete(conn).await.ok();
         }
     }
 

src/db/models/emergency_access.rs

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
+use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, TimeDelta, Utc};
 use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
 use diesel::prelude::*;
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -112,8 +112,26 @@ impl EmergencyAccess {
             "object": "emergencyAccessGranteeDetails",
         }))
     }
+
+    pub fn deadline_at(&self) -> Result<NaiveDateTime, crate::Error> {
+        if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&self.wait_time_days) {
+            err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
+        }
+
+        let initiated_at = self.recovery_initiated_at.map_res("Emergency access initiation date missing!")?;
+
+        TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(self.wait_time_days))
+            .and_then(|w| initiated_at.checked_add_signed(w))
+            .map_res("Emergency access deadline is invalid")
+    }
+
+    pub fn is_recovery_allowed(&self, now: &NaiveDateTime) -> Result<bool, crate::Error> {
+        Ok(self.deadline_at()?.le(now))
+    }
 }
 
+pub const EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE: std::ops::RangeInclusive<i32> = 1..=90;
+
 #[derive(Copy, Clone)]
 pub enum EmergencyAccessType {
     View = 0,
@@ -169,27 +187,42 @@ impl EmergencyAccess {
 
     pub async fn update_access_status_and_save(
         &mut self,
-        status: i32,
+        from_status: i32,
+        to_status: i32,
         date: &NaiveDateTime,
         conn: &DbConn,
     ) -> EmptyResult {
+        let uuid = self.uuid.clone();
+        let updated_at = *date;
+        let res = conn
+            .run(move |conn| {
+                crate::util::retry(
+                    || {
+                        diesel::update(
+                            emergency_access::table
+                                .filter(emergency_access::uuid.eq(&uuid))
+                                .filter(emergency_access::status.eq(from_status)),
+                        )
+                        .set((emergency_access::status.eq(to_status), emergency_access::updated_at.eq(updated_at)))
+                        .execute(conn)
+                    },
+                    10,
+                )
+            })
+            .await;
+
+        match res {
+            Ok(1) => {} // One record updated, which is valid
+            Ok(_) => err!("Emergency access status was changed already"),
+            Err(e) => err!("Error updating emergency access status", format!("{e}")),
+        }
+
+        self.status = to_status;
+        self.updated_at = updated_at;
+
         // Update the grantee so that it will refresh it's status.
         User::update_uuid_revision(self.grantee_uuid.as_ref().expect("Error getting grantee"), conn).await;
-        self.status = status;
+        Ok(())
-        date.clone_into(&mut self.updated_at);
-
-        conn.run(move |conn| {
-            crate::util::retry(
-                || {
-                    diesel::update(emergency_access::table.filter(emergency_access::uuid.eq(&self.uuid)))
-                        .set((emergency_access::status.eq(status), emergency_access::updated_at.eq(date)))
-                        .execute(conn)
-                },
-                10,
-            )
-            .map_res("Error updating emergency access status")
-        })
-        .await
     }
 
     pub async fn update_last_notification_date_and_save(&mut self, date: &NaiveDateTime, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {

src/db/models/event.rs

@@ -347,17 +347,23 @@ impl Event {
     }
 
     pub async fn clean_events(conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        if let Some(days_to_retain) = CONFIG.events_days_retain() {
+        let Some(days_to_retain) = CONFIG.events_days_retain().filter(|&d| d != 0) else {
-            let dt = Utc::now().naive_utc() - TimeDelta::try_days(days_to_retain).unwrap();
+            return Ok(());
-            conn.run(move |conn| {
+        };
-                diesel::delete(event::table.filter(event::event_date.lt(dt)))
+
-                    .execute(conn)
+        let Some(days_to_retain) = TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(days_to_retain)) else {
-                    .map_res("Error cleaning old events")
+            err!("Unable to calculate the event retention date, check 'EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN'")
-            })
+        };
-            .await
+
-        } else {
+        let Some(dt) = Utc::now().naive_utc().checked_sub_signed(days_to_retain) else {
-            Ok(())
+            err!("Unable to calculate the event retention date, check 'EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN'")
-        }
+        };
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            diesel::delete(event::table.filter(event::event_date.lt(dt)))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .map_res("Error cleaning old events")
+        })
+        .await
     }
 }
 

src/db/models/mod.rs

@@ -17,15 +17,16 @@ mod two_factor;
 mod two_factor_duo_context;
 mod two_factor_incomplete;
 mod user;
-mod user_signature_key_pair;
 
 pub use self::archive::Archive;
 pub use self::attachment::{Attachment, AttachmentId};
 pub use self::auth_request::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId};
-pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType, is_data_blob_encrypted};
+pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType};
 pub use self::collection::{Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionId, CollectionUser};
 pub use self::device::{Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest, PushId};
-pub use self::emergency_access::{EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType};
+pub use self::emergency_access::{
+    EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType,
+};
 pub use self::event::{Event, EventType};
 pub use self::favorite::Favorite;
 pub use self::folder::{Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId};
@@ -41,4 +42,3 @@ pub use self::two_factor::{TwoFactor, TwoFactorType};
 pub use self::two_factor_duo_context::TwoFactorDuoContext;
 pub use self::two_factor_incomplete::TwoFactorIncomplete;
 pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserStampException};
-pub use self::user_signature_key_pair::{SignatureAlgorithm, UserSignatureKeyPair};

src/db/models/org_policy.rs

@@ -1,3 +1,4 @@
+use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
 use derive_more::{AsRef, From};
 use diesel::prelude::*;
 use serde::Deserialize;
@@ -11,6 +12,7 @@ use crate::{
         schema::{org_policies, users_organizations},
     },
     error::MapResult,
+    util::format_date,
 };
 
 use super::{Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrganizationId, TwoFactor, UserId};
@@ -24,6 +26,7 @@ pub struct OrgPolicy {
     pub atype: i32,
     pub enabled: bool,
     pub data: String,
+    pub revision_date: NaiveDateTime,
 }
 
 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Core/AdminConsole/Enums/PolicyType.cs
@@ -46,7 +49,7 @@ pub enum OrgPolicyType {
     RemoveUnlockWithPin = 14,
     RestrictedItemTypes = 15,
     UriMatchDefaults = 16,
-    // AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17, // Not supported yet
+    AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17,
     // AutoConfirm = 18, // Not supported (not implemented yet)
     // BlockClaimedDomainAccountCreation = 19, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
     OrganizationUserNotification = 20,
@@ -77,6 +80,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
             atype: atype as i32,
             enabled,
             data,
+            revision_date: Utc::now().naive_utc(),
         }
     }
 
@@ -92,7 +96,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
             "type": self.atype,
             "data": data_json,
             "enabled": self.enabled,
-            "revisionDate": null,
+            "revisionDate": format_date(&self.revision_date),
             "object": "policy",
         });
 
@@ -110,11 +114,13 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
 
 /// Database methods
 impl OrgPolicy {
-    pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+    pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+        self.revision_date = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+
         db_run! { conn:
             sqlite, mysql {
                 match diesel::replace_into(org_policies::table)
-                    .values(self)
+                    .values(&*self)
                     .execute(conn)
                 {
                     Ok(_) => Ok(()),
@@ -122,7 +128,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
                     Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
                         diesel::update(org_policies::table)
                             .filter(org_policies::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
-                            .set(self)
+                            .set(&*self)
                             .execute(conn)
                             .map_res("Error saving org_policy")
                     }
@@ -142,10 +148,10 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
                 .map_res("Error deleting org_policy for insert")?;
 
                 diesel::insert_into(org_policies::table)
-                    .values(self)
+                    .values(&*self)
                     .on_conflict(org_policies::uuid)
                     .do_update()
-                    .set(self)
+                    .set(&*self)
                     .execute(conn)
                     .map_res("Error saving org_policy")
             }

src/db/models/two_factor.rs

@@ -137,11 +137,11 @@ impl TwoFactor {
         .await
     }
 
-    pub async fn find_by_user_and_type(user_uuid: &UserId, atype: i32, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
+    pub async fn find_by_user_and_type(user_uuid: &UserId, atype: TwoFactorType, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
         conn.run(move |conn| {
             twofactor::table
                 .filter(twofactor::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
-                .filter(twofactor::atype.eq(atype))
+                .filter(twofactor::atype.eq(atype as i32))
                 .first::<Self>(conn)
                 .ok()
         })

src/db/models/two_factor_incomplete.rs

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ impl TwoFactorIncomplete {
         ip: &ClientIp,
         conn: &DbConn,
     ) -> EmptyResult {
-        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() <= 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() == 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
             return Ok(());
         }
 
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ impl TwoFactorIncomplete {
     }
 
     pub async fn mark_complete(user_uuid: &UserId, device_uuid: &DeviceId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() <= 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() == 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
             return Ok(());
         }
 

src/db/models/user.rs

@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ use crate::{
 use macros::UuidFromParam;
 
 use super::{
-    Cipher, Device, EmergencyAccess, Favorite, Folder, Membership, MembershipType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete,
+    AuthRequest, Cipher, Device, EmergencyAccess, Favorite, Folder, Membership, MembershipType, TwoFactor,
-    UserSignatureKeyPair,
+    TwoFactorIncomplete,
 };
 
 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
@@ -72,11 +72,6 @@ pub struct User {
     pub external_id: Option<String>, // Todo: Needs to be removed in the future, this is not used anymore.
 
     pub key_id: Option<KeyId>,
-
-    // The v2 state: all set, with a `user_signature_key_pairs` row, or none, see `User::is_v2`
-    pub signed_public_key: Option<String>,
-    pub security_state: Option<String>,
-    pub security_version: Option<i32>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable)]
@@ -164,17 +159,9 @@ impl User {
             external_id: None, // Todo: Needs to be removed in the future, this is not used anymore.
 
             key_id: None,
-
-            signed_public_key: None,
-            security_state: None,
-            security_version: None,
         }
     }
 
-    pub fn is_v2(&self) -> bool {
-        self.signed_public_key.is_some() && self.security_state.is_some() && self.security_version.is_some()
-    }
-
     pub fn check_valid_password(&self, password: &str) -> bool {
         crypto::verify_password_hash(
             password.as_bytes(),
@@ -184,6 +171,10 @@ impl User {
         )
     }
 
+    pub fn master_password_salt(&self) -> String {
+        self.email.trim().to_lowercase()
+    }
+
     pub fn check_valid_recovery_code(&self, recovery_code: &str) -> bool {
         if let Some(ref totp_recover) = self.totp_recover {
             crypto::ct_eq(recovery_code, totp_recover.to_lowercase())
@@ -275,37 +266,18 @@ impl User {
         !CONFIG.mail_enabled() || self.verified_at.is_some()
     }
 
-    async fn v2_signature_key_pair(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<UserSignatureKeyPair> {
-        if !self.is_v2() {
-            return None;
-        }
-        UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await
-    }
-
     /// The `accountKeys` object (upstream's `PrivateKeysResponseModel`), null without a key pair
-    pub async fn account_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
+    pub fn account_keys_json(&self) -> Value {
         if self.private_key.is_some() {
-            let (signed_public_key, signature_key_pair, security_state) = match self.v2_signature_key_pair(conn).await {
-                Some(key_pair) => (
-                    json!(self.signed_public_key),
-                    key_pair.to_json(),
-                    json!({
-                        "securityState": self.security_state,
-                        "securityVersion": self.security_version,
-                    }),
-                ),
-                None => (Value::Null, Value::Null, Value::Null),
-            };
-
             json!({
                 "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
                     "wrappedPrivateKey": self.private_key,
                     "publicKey": self.public_key,
-                    "signedPublicKey": signed_public_key,
+                    "signedPublicKey": null,
                     "object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair",
                 },
-                "securityState": security_state,
+                "securityState": null,
-                "signatureKeyPair": signature_key_pair,
+                "signatureKeyPair": null,
                 "object": "privateKeys"
             })
         } else {
@@ -313,20 +285,6 @@ impl User {
         }
     }
 
-    pub async fn public_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
-        let (signed_public_key, verifying_key) = match self.v2_signature_key_pair(conn).await {
-            Some(key_pair) => (json!(self.signed_public_key), json!(key_pair.verifying_key)),
-            None => (Value::Null, Value::Null),
-        };
-
-        json!({
-            "publicKey": self.public_key,
-            "signedPublicKey": signed_public_key,
-            "verifyingKey": verifying_key,
-            "object": "publicKeys"
-        })
-    }
-
     pub async fn to_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
         let mut orgs_json = Vec::new();
         for c in Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await {
@@ -347,7 +305,7 @@ impl User {
             UserStatus::Enabled
         };
 
-        let account_keys = self.account_keys_json(conn).await;
+        let account_keys = self.account_keys_json();
 
         json!({
             "_status": status as i32,
@@ -420,10 +378,10 @@ impl User {
         Cipher::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         Favorite::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         Folder::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
+        AuthRequest::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         Device::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         TwoFactorIncomplete::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
-        UserSignatureKeyPair::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         Invitation::take(&self.email, conn).await; // Delete invitation if any
 
         conn.run(move |conn| {

src/db/models/user_signature_key_pair.rs

@@ -1,132 +0,0 @@
-use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
-use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
-use diesel::prelude::*;
-use serde_json::Value;
-
-use crate::{
-    api::EmptyResult,
-    db::{DbConn, schema::user_signature_key_pairs},
-    error::MapResult,
-    util::get_uuid,
-};
-
-use super::UserId;
-
-/// A user's signature key pair, part of the v2 state, in its own table like upstream.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Sql/dbo/KeyManagement/Tables/UserSignatureKeyPair.sql#L1-L15>
-#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
-#[diesel(table_name = user_signature_key_pairs)]
-#[diesel(treat_none_as_null = true)]
-#[diesel(primary_key(uuid))]
-pub struct UserSignatureKeyPair {
-    pub uuid: UserSignatureKeyPairId,
-    pub user_uuid: UserId,
-
-    pub signature_algorithm: i32,
-    /// The signing (private) key, wrapped by the user key.
-    pub signing_key: String,
-    /// The COSE-encoded public verifying key.
-    pub verifying_key: String,
-
-    pub created_at: NaiveDateTime,
-    pub updated_at: NaiveDateTime,
-}
-
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/KeyManagement/Enums/SignatureAlgorithm.cs#L6-L10>
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
-pub enum SignatureAlgorithm {
-    Ed25519 = 0,
-    MlDsa44 = 1,
-}
-
-impl SignatureAlgorithm {
-    pub fn parse(algorithm: &str) -> Option<Self> {
-        match algorithm {
-            "ed25519" => Some(Self::Ed25519),
-            "mldsa44" => Some(Self::MlDsa44),
-            _ => None,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Local methods
-impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
-    pub fn new(
-        user_uuid: UserId,
-        signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
-        signing_key: String,
-        verifying_key: String,
-    ) -> Self {
-        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-
-        Self {
-            uuid: UserSignatureKeyPairId(get_uuid()),
-            user_uuid,
-            signature_algorithm: signature_algorithm as i32,
-            signing_key,
-            verifying_key,
-            created_at: now,
-            updated_at: now,
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn to_json(&self) -> Value {
-        json!({
-            "wrappedSigningKey": self.signing_key,
-            "verifyingKey": self.verifying_key,
-            "object": "signatureKeyPair",
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-/// Database methods
-impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
-    pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        self.updated_at = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-
-        db_run! { conn:
-            mysql {
-                diesel::insert_into(user_signature_key_pairs::table)
-                    .values(&*self)
-                    .on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
-                    .do_update()
-                    .set(&*self)
-                    .execute(conn)
-                    .map_res("Error saving user signature key pair")
-            }
-            postgresql, sqlite {
-                diesel::insert_into(user_signature_key_pairs::table)
-                    .values(&*self)
-                    .on_conflict(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid)
-                    .do_update()
-                    .set(&*self)
-                    .execute(conn)
-                    .map_res("Error saving user signature key pair")
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The user's key pair. There is at most one, enforced by a unique index on `user_uuid`.
-    pub async fn find_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
-        conn.run(move |conn| {
-            user_signature_key_pairs::table
-                .filter(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
-                .first::<Self>(conn)
-                .ok()
-        })
-        .await
-    }
-
-    pub async fn delete_all_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        conn.run(move |conn| {
-            diesel::delete(user_signature_key_pairs::table.filter(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)))
-                .execute(conn)
-                .map_res("Error deleting user signature key pairs")
-        })
-        .await
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Clone, Debug, AsRef, Deref, DieselNewType, Display, From, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct UserSignatureKeyPairId(String);

src/db/schema.rs

@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ table! {
         atype -> Integer,
         enabled -> Bool,
         data -> Text,
+        revision_date -> Timestamp,
     }
 }
 
@@ -218,21 +219,6 @@ table! {
         avatar_color -> Nullable<Text>,
         external_id -> Nullable<Text>,
         key_id -> Nullable<Text>,
-        signed_public_key -> Nullable<Text>,
-        security_state -> Nullable<Text>,
-        security_version -> Nullable<Integer>,
-    }
-}
-
-table! {
-    user_signature_key_pairs (uuid) {
-        uuid -> Text,
-        user_uuid -> Text,
-        signature_algorithm -> Integer,
-        signing_key -> Text,
-        verifying_key -> Text,
-        created_at -> Timestamp,
-        updated_at -> Timestamp,
     }
 }
 
@@ -398,7 +384,6 @@ joinable!(collections_groups -> groups (groups_uuid));
 joinable!(event -> users_organizations (uuid));
 joinable!(auth_requests -> users (user_uuid));
 joinable!(sso_users -> users (user_uuid));
-joinable!(user_signature_key_pairs -> users (user_uuid));
 
 allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
     archives,
@@ -425,5 +410,4 @@ allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
     collections_groups,
     event,
     auth_requests,
-    user_signature_key_pairs,
 );

src/mail.rs

@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ fn smtp_transport() -> AsyncSmtpTransport<Tokio1Executor> {
 
     let smtp_client = AsyncSmtpTransport::<Tokio1Executor>::builder_dangerous(host.as_str())
         .port(CONFIG.smtp_port())
-        .timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.smtp_timeout())));
+        .timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.smtp_timeout()))));
 
     // Determine security
     let smtp_client = if CONFIG.smtp_security() == *"off" {
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ pub async fn send_password_hint(address: &str, hint: Option<String>) -> EmptyRes
 }
 
 pub async fn send_delete_account(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = generate_delete_claims(user_id.to_string());
+    let claims = generate_delete_claims(user_id.to_string())?;
     let delete_token = encode_jwt(&claims);
 
     let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ pub async fn send_delete_account(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult
 }
 
 pub async fn send_verify_email(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id);
+    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id)?;
     let verify_email_token = encode_jwt(&claims);
 
     let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ pub async fn send_welcome(address: &str) -> EmptyResult {
 }
 
 pub async fn send_welcome_must_verify(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id);
+    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id)?;
     let verify_email_token = encode_jwt(&claims);
 
     let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ pub async fn send_invite(
         org_id.clone(),
         member_id.clone(),
         invited_by_email,
-    );
+    )?;
     let invite_token = encode_jwt(&claims);
     let mut query = url::Url::parse("https://query.builder").unwrap();
     {
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ pub async fn send_emergency_access_invite(
         emer_id.clone(),
         String::from(grantor_name),
         String::from(grantor_email),
-    );
+    )?;
 
     // Build the query here to ensure proper escaping
     let mut query = url::Url::parse("https://query.builder").unwrap();

src/main.rs

@@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ fn schedule_jobs(pool: db::DbPool) {
             // Cleanup the event table of records x days old.
             if CONFIG.org_events_enabled()
                 && !CONFIG.event_cleanup_schedule().is_empty()
-                && CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_some()
+                && CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_some_and(|d| d != 0)
             {
                 sched.add(Job::new(CONFIG.event_cleanup_schedule().parse().unwrap(), || {
                     runtime.spawn(api::event_cleanup_job(pool.clone()));
@@ -754,7 +754,9 @@ fn schedule_jobs(pool: db::DbPool) {
             // tick, the one that was added earlier will run first.
             loop {
                 sched.tick();
-                runtime.block_on(tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_millis(CONFIG.job_poll_interval_ms())));
+                runtime.block_on(tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_millis(u64::from(
+                    CONFIG.job_poll_interval_ms(),
+                ))));
             }
         })
         .expect("Error spawning job scheduler thread");

src/ratelimit.rs

@@ -7,20 +7,20 @@ use crate::{CONFIG, Error};
 type Limiter<T = IpAddr> = RateLimiter<T, DashMapStateStore<T>, DefaultClock>;
 
 static LIMITER_LOGIN: LazyLock<Limiter> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_seconds());
+    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_seconds()));
-    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_max_burst()).expect("Non-zero login ratelimit burst");
+    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(u32::from(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_max_burst())).expect("Non-zero login ratelimit burst");
     RateLimiter::keyed(Quota::with_period(seconds).expect("Non-zero login ratelimit seconds").allow_burst(burst))
 });
 
 static LIMITER_ADMIN: LazyLock<Limiter> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_seconds());
+    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_seconds()));
-    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_max_burst()).expect("Non-zero admin ratelimit burst");
+    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(u32::from(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_max_burst())).expect("Non-zero admin ratelimit burst");
     RateLimiter::keyed(Quota::with_period(seconds).expect("Non-zero admin ratelimit seconds").allow_burst(burst))
 });
 
 static LIMITER_UNAUTHENTICATED: LazyLock<Limiter> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds());
+    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds()));
-    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst())
+    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(u32::from(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst()))
         .expect("Non-zero unauthenticated ratelimit burst");
     RateLimiter::keyed(
         Quota::with_period(seconds).expect("Non-zero unauthenticated ratelimit seconds").allow_burst(burst),

src/sso_client.rs

@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static CLIENT_CACHE_KEY: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| "sso-client".to_own
 static CLIENT_CACHE: LazyLock<moka::sync::Cache<String, Client>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
     moka::sync::Cache::builder()
         .max_capacity(1)
-        .time_to_live(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.sso_client_cache_expiration()))
+        .time_to_live(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.sso_client_cache_expiration())))
         .build()
 });
 static REFRESH_CACHE: LazyLock<moka::future::Cache<String, Result<RefreshTokenResponse, String>>> =

src/static/scripts/admin_diagnostics.js

@@ -93,7 +93,9 @@ async function generateSupportString(event, dj) {
     supportString += `* Running within a container: ${yn(dj.running_within_container)} (Base: ${dj.container_base_image})\n`;
     supportString += `* Database type: ${dj.db_type}\n`;
     supportString += `* Database version: ${dj.db_version}\n`;
-    supportString += `* Uses config.json: ${yn(dj.overrides !== "")}\n`;
+    supportString += `* Uses config.json: ${yn(dj.config_file_status !== "NotFound")}`;
+    supportString += dj.config_file_status !== "NotFound" ? ` (Valid: ${chk(dj.config_file_status === "Loaded")})\n` : "\n";
+    supportString += `* Environment variables are valid: ${chk(dj.invalid_env_vars == "")}\n`;
     supportString += `* Uses custom templates: ${yn(dj.template_overrides !== "")}${template_overrides}\n`;
     supportString += `* Uses a reverse proxy: ${yn(dj.ip_header_exists)}\n`;
     if (dj.ip_header_exists) {
@@ -116,7 +118,7 @@ async function generateSupportString(event, dj) {
     }
     supportString += `* HTTP Response Checks: ${chk(httpResponseCheck)}\n`;
     if (dj.invalid_feature_flags != "") {
-        supportString += "* Invalid feature flags: true\n";
+        supportString += "* Invalid feature flags: true :x:\n";
     }
 
     const jsonResponse = await fetch(`${BASE_URL}/admin/diagnostics/config`, {
@@ -132,6 +134,11 @@ async function generateSupportString(event, dj) {
     supportString += "\n### Config & Details (Generated via diagnostics page)\n\n";
     supportString += "<details><summary>Show Config & Details</summary>\n";
 
+    // Show invalid environment variables if they exists
+    if (dj.invalid_env_vars != "") {
+        supportString += `\n**Invalid environment variables:** ${dj.invalid_env_vars}\n`;
+    }
+
     // Add overrides if they exists
     if (dj.overrides != "") {
         supportString += `\n**Environment settings which are overridden:** ${dj.overrides}\n`;

src/static/scripts/datatables.css

@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
  *
  * To rebuild or modify this file with the latest versions of the included
  * software please visit:
- *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.3
+ *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.4
  *
  * Included libraries:
- *   DataTables 3.1.3
+ *   DataTables 3.1.4
  */
 
 /*! DataTables Bootstrap 5 integration

src/static/scripts/datatables.js

@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@
  *
  * To rebuild or modify this file with the latest versions of the included
  * software please visit:
- *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.3
+ *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.4
  *
  * Included libraries:
- *   DataTables 3.1.3
+ *   DataTables 3.1.4
  */
 
-/*! DataTables 3.1.3
+/*! DataTables 3.1.4
  * Copyright (c) SpryMedia Ltd - datatables.net/license
  */
 
@@ -453,6 +453,9 @@ function assignDeep(out, ...inputs) {
             continue;
         }
         for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(input)) {
+            if (key === '__proto__') {
+                continue;
+            }
             if (Array.isArray(value)) {
                 if (!Array.isArray(out[key])) {
                     out[key] = [];
@@ -489,6 +492,9 @@ function assignDeep(out, ...inputs) {
 function assignDeepObjects(out, extender, breakRefs = false) {
     let val;
     for (let prop in extender) {
+        if (prop === '__proto__') {
+            continue;
+        }
         if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(extender, prop)) {
             val = extender[prop];
             if (plainObject(val)) {
@@ -2694,7 +2700,7 @@ class Dom {
      */
     prepend(content) {
         return this.each(el => {
-            if (content instanceof Dom) {
+            if (arrayLike(content) || dom(content)) {
                 // Reverse the array, so if there are multiple elements, they
                 // end up being added sequentially, just like jQuery
                 let itemsReversed = Array.from(content).reverse();
@@ -8714,7 +8720,7 @@ const ext = {
     /**
      * DataTables build type (expanded by the download builder)
      */
-    builder: 'bs5/dt-3.1.3',
+    builder: 'bs5/dt-3.1.4',
     /**
      * Buttons. For use with the Buttons extension for DataTables. This is
      * defined here so other extensions can define buttons regardless of load
@@ -8860,7 +8866,7 @@ const ext = {
      * Software version
      *  @type string
      */
-    version: '3.1.3'
+    version: '3.1.4'
 };
 //
 // Backwards compatibility. Alias to pre 1.10 Hungarian notation counter parts
@@ -9559,7 +9565,7 @@ register('destroy()', function (remove) {
         callbackFire(settings, 'destroy', 'destroy', [settings], true);
         // If not being removed from the document, make all columns visible
         if (!remove) {
-            new Api(settings).columns().visible();
+            new Api(settings).columns().visible(true);
         }
         // Container width change listener
         if (settings.resizeObserver) {

src/static/templates/admin/diagnostics.hbs

@@ -69,12 +69,26 @@
                     </dd>
                     <dt class="col-sm-5">Uses config.json</dt>
                     <dd class="col-sm-7">
-                    {{#if page_data.overrides}}
+                    {{#if (eq page_data.config_file_status "Loaded")}}
                         <span class="d-inline"><b>Yes</b></span>
+                        {{#if page_data.overrides}}
                         <span class="badge bg-info text-dark abbr-badge" title="Environment variables are overwritten by a config.json.&#013;&#010;{{page_data.overrides}}">Details</span>
+                        {{/if}}
+                    {{~else if (eq page_data.config_file_status "Error")}}
+                        <span class="d-inline"><b>Errors</b></span>
+                        <span class="badge bg-danger abbr-badge" title="Config file could not be loaded and was ignored. Check server logs for details.">Details</span>
+                    {{~else}}
+                        <span class="d-inline"><b>No</b></span>
                     {{/if}}
-                    {{#unless page_data.overrides}}
+                    </dd>
-                        <span class="d-block"><b>No</b></span>
+                    <dt class="col-sm-5">Environment variables are valid</dt>
+                    <dd class="col-sm-7">
+                    {{#if page_data.invalid_env_vars}}
+                        <span class="d-inline"><b>No</b></span>
+                        <span class="badge bg-danger abbr-badge" title="Invalid environment variables are found and defaults are used instead.&#013;&#010;{{page_data.invalid_env_vars}}">Details</span>
+                    {{/if}}
+                    {{#unless page_data.invalid_env_vars}}
+                        <span class="d-block"><b>Yes</b></span>
                     {{/unless}}
                     </dd>
                     <dt class="col-sm-5">Uses custom templates</dt>

src/static/templates/email/send_emergency_access_invite.html.hbs

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Emergency access for {{{grantor_name}}}
     </tr>
     <tr style="margin: 0; font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; color: #333; line-height: 25px; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none;">
        <td class="content-block" style="font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; color: #333; line-height: 25px; margin: 0; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; padding: 0 0 10px; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none; text-align: center;" valign="top" align="center">
-          <a href="{{{url}}}"
+          <a data-testid="emergency" href="{{{url}}}"
              clicktracking=off target="_blank" style="color: #ffffff; text-decoration: none; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; display: inline-block; border-radius: 5px; background-color: #3c8dbc; border-color: #3c8dbc; border-style: solid; border-width: 10px 20px; margin: 0; font-family: 'Helvetica Neue', Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif; box-sizing: border-box; font-size: 16px; line-height: 25px; -webkit-font-smoothing: antialiased; -webkit-text-size-adjust: none;">
           Become emergency contact
           </a>

src/util.rs

@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ impl Fairing for Cors {
 pub struct Cached<R> {
     response: R,
     is_immutable: bool,
-    ttl: u64,
+    ttl: u32,
 }
 
 impl<R> Cached<R> {
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ impl<R> Cached<R> {
         }
     }
 
-    pub fn ttl(response: R, ttl: u64, is_immutable: bool) -> Cached<R> {
+    pub fn ttl(response: R, ttl: u32, is_immutable: bool) -> Cached<R> {
         Self {
             response,
             is_immutable,
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ impl<'r, R: 'r + Responder<'r, 'static> + Send> Responder<'r, 'static> for Cache
         res.set_raw_header("Cache-Control", cache_control_header);
 
         let time_now = Local::now();
-        let expiry_time = time_now + chrono::TimeDelta::try_seconds(self.ttl.try_into().unwrap()).unwrap();
+        let expiry_time = time_now + chrono::TimeDelta::try_seconds(self.ttl.into()).unwrap();
         res.set_raw_header("Expires", format_datetime_http(&expiry_time));
         Ok(res)
     }
@@ -447,20 +447,34 @@ pub fn get_env_str_value(key: &str) -> Option<String> {
     }
 }
 
-pub fn get_env<V>(key: &str) -> Option<V>
+pub static INVALID_ENV_VARS: std::sync::Mutex<Vec<&'static str>> = std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new());
+
+pub fn get_env<V>(key: &'static str) -> Option<V>
 where
     V: FromStr,
 {
-    try_parse_string(get_env_str_value(key))
+    let value = get_env_str_value(key);
+    let value_is_some = value.is_some();
+    let parsed: Option<V> = try_parse_string(value);
+    if parsed.is_none() && value_is_some {
+        println!("[ERROR] `{key}` contains an invalid value for its type and is ignored, the default is used instead.");
+        INVALID_ENV_VARS.lock().unwrap().push(key);
+    }
+    parsed
 }
 
-pub fn get_env_bool(key: &str) -> Option<bool> {
+pub fn get_env_bool(key: &'static str) -> Option<bool> {
     const TRUE_VALUES: &[&str] = &["true", "t", "yes", "y", "1"];
     const FALSE_VALUES: &[&str] = &["false", "f", "no", "n", "0"];
 
     match get_env_str_value(key) {
         Some(val) if TRUE_VALUES.contains(&val.to_lowercase().as_ref()) => Some(true),
         Some(val) if FALSE_VALUES.contains(&val.to_lowercase().as_ref()) => Some(false),
+        Some(_) => {
+            println!("[ERROR] `{key}` contains an invalid boolean value and is ignored, the default is used instead.");
+            INVALID_ENV_VARS.lock().unwrap().push(key);
+            None
+        }
         _ => None,
     }
 }
@@ -839,12 +853,6 @@ pub fn parse_experimental_client_feature_flags(
         .collect()
 }
 
-/// Whether the admin enabled this supported client feature flag
-pub fn is_client_feature_flag_enabled(flag: &str) -> bool {
-    parse_experimental_client_feature_flags(&CONFIG.experimental_client_feature_flags(), &FeatureFlagFilter::ValidOnly)
-        .contains_key(flag)
-}
-
 /// TODO: This is extracted from IpAddr::is_global, which is unstable:
 /// https://doc.rust-lang.org/nightly/std/net/enum.IpAddr.html#method.is_global
 /// Remove once https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/27709 is merged