Add a manual workflow that runs the SDK live integration tests

.github/workflows/sdk-live-tests.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,65 @@
+name: SDK live tests
+permissions: {}
+
+# Runs the live-server integration tests of bitwarden/sdk-internal against this branch.
+# Only started by hand: it builds the SDK too, and the tests aren't in a released SDK yet.
+on:
+  workflow_dispatch:
+    inputs:
+      sdk_ref:
+        description: "Branch, tag or commit of bitwarden/sdk-internal to test with"
+        required: true
+        default: "km/live-server-integration-tests"
+
+defaults:
+  run:
+    shell: bash
+
+jobs:
+  sdk-live-tests:
+    name: SDK live tests
+    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
+    timeout-minutes: 90
+    steps:
+      - name: "Install dependencies Ubuntu"
+        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends build-essential libssl-dev pkg-config
+
+      - name: "Checkout"
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
+        with:
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      - name: "Checkout sdk-internal"
+        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
+        with:
+          repository: bitwarden/sdk-internal
+          ref: ${{ inputs.sdk_ref }}
+          path: sdk-internal
+          persist-credentials: false
+
+      # Each checkout pins its own toolchain in rust-toolchain.toml
+      - name: "Install toolchains"
+        run: |
+          rustup toolchain install
+          cd sdk-internal
+          rustup toolchain install
+          rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown
+          rustup component add rust-src
+
+      - name: "Setup Node"
+        uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7.0.0
+        with:
+          node-version: 20
+
+      - name: "Install binaryen"
+        run: npm i -g binaryen
+
+      - name: "Run the SDK live tests"
+        run: tools/sdk-live-tests/run.sh --sdk-dir sdk-internal
+
+      - name: "Upload logs"
+        if: ${{ failure() }}
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
+        with:
+          name: sdk-live-tests-logs
+          path: target/sdk-live-tests/**/*.log

.typos.toml

@@ -15,8 +15,10 @@ extend-ignore-re = [
     "(?i)helo_name",
     "Server name sent during.+HELO",
     # COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption, ignore these specific items
+    "COSE",
     "COSEKey",
     "COSEAlgorithm",
+    "CoseEncrypt0",
     # Ignore this specific string as it's valid
     "Ensure they are valid OTPs",
     # This word is misspelled upstream

Cargo.toml

@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
 serde_json = "1.0.151"
 
 # A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
-diesel = { version = "2.3.13", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
+diesel = { version = "2.3.13", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric", "64-column-tables"] }
 diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"
 
 derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [

migrations/mysql/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
+
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;

migrations/mysql/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
+
+CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
+    uuid                CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_uuid           CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
+    signature_algorithm INTEGER  NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
+    signing_key         TEXT     NOT NULL,
+    verifying_key       TEXT     NOT NULL,
+    created_at          DATETIME NOT NULL,
+    updated_at          DATETIME NOT NULL,
+    FOREIGN KEY (user_uuid) REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE
+);

migrations/mysql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;

migrations/mysql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;

migrations/postgresql/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
+
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;

migrations/postgresql/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
+
+CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
+    uuid                CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_uuid           CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    signature_algorithm INTEGER  NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
+    signing_key         TEXT     NOT NULL,
+    verifying_key       TEXT     NOT NULL,
+    created_at          TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
+    updated_at          TIMESTAMP NOT NULL
+);

migrations/postgresql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;

migrations/postgresql/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;

migrations/sqlite/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
+
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;

migrations/sqlite/2026-09-20-120000_user_crypto_v2/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
+
+CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
+    uuid                TEXT     NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
+    user_uuid           TEXT     NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
+    signature_algorithm INTEGER  NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
+    signing_key         TEXT     NOT NULL,
+    verifying_key       TEXT     NOT NULL,
+    created_at          DATETIME NOT NULL,
+    updated_at          DATETIME NOT NULL
+);

migrations/sqlite/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/down.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;

migrations/sqlite/2026-09-21-120000_add_v2_upgrade_token/up.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;

src/api/core/ciphers.rs

@@ -23,7 +23,8 @@ use crate::{
         models::{
             Archive, Attachment, AttachmentId, Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup,
             CollectionId, CollectionUser, EventType, Favorite, Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId, Group, KeyId,
-            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, UserId,
+            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, User, UserId,
+            is_data_blob_encrypted,
         },
     },
     util::{NumberOrString, deser_opt_nonempty_str, save_temp_file},
@@ -189,12 +190,22 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
             // https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
             "masterKeyEncryptedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
             "masterKeyWrappedUserKey": headers.user.akey,
-            "salt": headers.user.email
+            "salt": headers.user.email,
+            "containedKeyId": headers.user.key_id,
         })
     } else {
         Value::Null
     };
 
+    // Upstream omits these two when unset rather than sending null.
+    let mut user_decryption = json!({ "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock });
+    if let Some(key_id) = &headers.user.key_id {
+        user_decryption["userKeyId"] = json!(key_id);
+    }
+    if let Some(v2_upgrade_token) = headers.user.v2_upgrade_token_json() {
+        user_decryption["v2UpgradeToken"] = v2_upgrade_token;
+    }
+
     Ok(Json(json!({
         "profile": user_json,
         "folders": folders_json,
@@ -204,10 +215,7 @@ async fn sync(data: SyncData, headers: Headers, client_version: Option<ClientVer
         "ciphers": ciphers_json,
         "domains": domains_json,
         "sends": sends_json,
-        "userDecryption": {
-            "masterPasswordUnlock": master_password_unlock,
-            "userKeyId": headers.user.key_id,
-        },
+        "userDecryption": user_decryption,
         "object": "sync"
     })))
 }
@@ -284,7 +292,8 @@ pub struct CipherData {
     Passport = 8
     */
     pub r#type: i32,
-    pub name: String,
+    // Absent on a blob-encrypted cipher, whose name is sealed inside `data`
+    pub name: Option<String>,
     pub notes: Option<String>,
     fields: Option<Value>,
 
@@ -298,6 +307,9 @@ pub struct CipherData {
     drivers_license: Option<Value>,
     passport: Option<Value>,
 
+    // The sealed blob of a v2 account's cipher, which replaces all of the fields above
+    data: Option<String>,
+
     favorite: Option<bool>,
     reprompt: Option<i32>,
 
@@ -319,6 +331,70 @@ pub struct CipherData {
     archived_date: Option<String>,
 }
 
+/// A field of a [`CipherData`] that fails upstream's model validation.
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct CipherValidationError {
+    pub field: &'static str,
+    pub message: String,
+}
+
+impl From<CipherValidationError> for crate::Error {
+    fn from(e: CipherValidationError) -> Self {
+        Self::new_msg(e.message)
+    }
+}
+
+/// A user-owned cipher must be encrypted with the user's current key. Organization ciphers use the
+/// organization key, which has no id yet, and either id may be missing: from a client that predates
+/// the field, or a user whose key id isn't known yet. There is nothing to compare in those cases.
+///
+/// Ref: upstream's `CiphersController.ValidateCipherEncryptedByUser`
+fn validate_encrypted_by_user_key(data: &CipherData, user: &User, is_org_cipher: bool) -> EmptyResult {
+    if !is_org_cipher
+        && let (Some(cipher_key_id), Some(user_key_id)) = (&data.encrypted_by_key_id, &user.key_id)
+        && cipher_key_id != user_key_id
+    {
+        err!("Cipher was not encrypted with the current user key. Please try again.")
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Upstream's `[StringLength(500000)]` on `CipherRequestModel.Data`
+const MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH: usize = 500_000;
+
+impl CipherData {
+    /// Whether the content is a single blob rather than the per-type fields. This parses `data`, so
+    /// callers that need the answer more than once should keep it.
+    pub fn is_blob(&self) -> bool {
+        self.data.as_deref().is_some_and(is_data_blob_encrypted)
+    }
+
+    /// Checks the content the way upstream's model validation does, before anything is saved.
+    /// `is_blob` is [`Self::is_blob`].
+    ///
+    /// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Api/Vault/Models/Request/CipherRequestModel.cs>
+    pub fn validate_content(&self, is_blob: bool) -> Result<(), CipherValidationError> {
+        if let Some(data) = &self.data
+            && data.len() > MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH
+        {
+            return Err(CipherValidationError {
+                field: "Data",
+                message: format!("The field Data must be a string with a maximum length of {MAX_CIPHER_DATA_LENGTH}."),
+            });
+        }
+
+        // A blob carries the name inside it, so only the other formats need one
+        if !is_blob && self.name.as_deref().is_none_or(|n| n.trim().is_empty()) {
+            return Err(CipherValidationError {
+                field: "Name",
+                message: String::from("The Name field is required."),
+            });
+        }
+
+        Ok(())
+    }
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 pub struct PartialCipherData {
@@ -355,13 +431,14 @@ async fn post_ciphers_create(
     if data.cipher.encrypted_for != headers.user.uuid {
         err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
     }
+    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data.cipher, &headers.user, data.cipher.organization_id.is_some())?;
 
     // This check is usually only needed in update_cipher_from_data(), but we
     // need it here as well to avoid creating an empty cipher in the call to
     // cipher.save() below.
     enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data.cipher), &headers, &conn).await?;
 
-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, data.cipher.name.clone());
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.cipher.r#type, String::new());
     cipher.user_uuid = Some(headers.user.uuid.clone());
     cipher.save(&conn).await?;
 
@@ -389,12 +466,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt
         err_code!("Invalid user cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
     }
 
-    if let Some(cipher_key_id) = &data.encrypted_by_key_id
-        && let Some(user_key_id) = &headers.user.key_id
-        && cipher_key_id != user_key_id
-    {
-        err_code!("Invalid key cipher", Status::UnprocessableEntity.code);
-    }
+    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data, &headers.user, data.organization_id.is_some())?;
 
     // The web/browser clients set this field to null as expected, but the
     // mobile clients seem to set the invalid value `0001-01-01T00:00:00`,
@@ -402,7 +474,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers(data: Json<CipherData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt
     // needed when creating a new cipher, so just ignore it unconditionally.
     data.last_known_revision_date = None;
 
-    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, data.name.clone());
+    let mut cipher = Cipher::new(data.r#type, String::new());
     update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherCreate).await?;
 
     Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -451,6 +523,9 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
 
     enforce_personal_ownership_policy(Some(&data), headers, conn).await?;
 
+    let is_blob = data.is_blob();
+    data.validate_content(is_blob)?;
+
     // Check that the client isn't updating an existing cipher with stale data.
     // And only perform this check when not importing ciphers, else the date/time check will fail.
     if ut != UpdateType::None
@@ -551,26 +626,37 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
         _ => err!("Invalid type"),
     };
 
-    let type_data = if let Some(mut data) = type_data_opt {
+    if let Some(blob) = data.data.filter(|_| is_blob) {
+        // A blob holds all of the content, the name included, so nothing is kept outside it. The name
+        // column can't be null, so it's left empty; `to_json` reports it as null, as upstream does.
+        // TODO: Make `ciphers.name` nullable and store `None` here instead.
+        cipher.name = String::new();
+        cipher.notes = None;
+        cipher.fields = None;
+        cipher.password_history = None;
+        cipher.data = blob;
+    } else {
+        let Some(mut type_data) = type_data_opt else {
+            err!("Data missing")
+        };
         // Remove the 'Response' key from the base object.
-        if let Some(data_obj) = data.as_object_mut() {
+        if let Some(data_obj) = type_data.as_object_mut() {
             data_obj.remove("response");
         }
         // Remove the 'Response' key from every Uri.
-        if data["uris"].is_array() {
-            data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(data["uris"].clone());
+        if type_data["uris"].is_array() {
+            type_data["uris"] = clean_cipher_data(type_data["uris"].clone());
         }
-        data
-    } else {
-        err!("Data missing")
-    };
+
+        // `validate_content` made sure there is a name
+        cipher.name = data.name.unwrap_or_default();
+        cipher.notes = data.notes;
+        cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
+        cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
+        cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
+    }
 
     cipher.key = data.key;
-    cipher.name = data.name;
-    cipher.notes = data.notes;
-    cipher.fields = data.fields.map(|f| clean_cipher_data(f).to_string());
-    cipher.data = type_data.to_string();
-    cipher.password_history = data.password_history.map(|f| f.to_string());
     cipher.reprompt = data.reprompt.filter(|r| *r == RepromptType::None as i32 || *r == RepromptType::Password as i32);
 
     cipher.save(conn).await?;
@@ -667,7 +753,7 @@ async fn post_ciphers_import(data: Json<ImportData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
         let folder_id = relations_map.get(&index).and_then(|i| folders.get(*i).cloned());
         cipher_data.folder_id = folder_id;
 
-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, String::new());
         update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?;
     }
 
@@ -735,6 +821,8 @@ async fn put_cipher(
         err!("Cipher is not write accessible")
     }
 
+    validate_encrypted_by_user_key(&data, &headers.user, cipher.organization_uuid.is_some())?;
+
     update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate).await?;
 
     Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))

src/api/core/organizations.rs

@@ -1829,7 +1829,7 @@ async fn post_org_import(
         cipher_data.folder_id = None;
         // Replace the client-provided, unvalidated organizationId with the real target org
         cipher_data.organization_id = Some(org_id.clone());
-        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
+        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, String::new());
         update_cipher_from_data(
             &mut cipher,
             cipher_data,

src/api/identity.rs

@@ -552,18 +552,7 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
         Value::Null
     };
 
-    let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
-        json!({
-            "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
-                "wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
-                "publicKey": user.public_key,
-                "Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
-            },
-            "Object": "privateKeys"
-        })
-    } else {
-        Value::Null
-    };
+    let account_keys = user.account_keys_json(conn).await;
 
     let mut result = json!({
         "access_token": auth_tokens.access_token(),
@@ -709,18 +698,7 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
         Value::Null
     };
 
-    let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
-        json!({
-            "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
-                "wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
-                "publicKey": user.public_key,
-                "Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
-            },
-            "Object": "privateKeys"
-        })
-    } else {
-        Value::Null
-    };
+    let account_keys = user.account_keys_json(conn).await;
 
     // Note: No refresh_token is returned. The CLI just repeats the
     // client_credentials login flow when the existing token expires.

src/api/mod.rs

@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ pub use crate::api::{
     icons::routes as icons_routes,
     identity::routes as identity_routes,
     notifications::routes as notifications_routes,
-    notifications::{AnonymousNotify, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS},
+    notifications::{AnonymousNotify, LogOutReason, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS},
     push::{
         push_cipher_update, push_folder_update, push_logout, push_send_update, push_user_update, register_push_device,
         unregister_push_device,

src/api/notifications.rs

@@ -383,23 +383,36 @@ impl WebSocketUsers {
     }
 
     pub async fn send_logout(&self, user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) {
+        self.send_logout_with_reason(user, acting_device, None, conn).await;
+    }
+
+    /// A logout that clients may handle differently depending on `reason`, e.g. syncing instead of
+    /// logging out after a key rotation that kept the sessions alive.
+    pub async fn send_logout_with_reason(
+        &self,
+        user: &User,
+        acting_device: Option<&Device>,
+        reason: Option<LogOutReason>,
+        conn: &DbConn,
+    ) {
         // Skip any processing if both WebSockets and Push are not active
         if *NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED {
             return;
         }
         let acting_device_id = acting_device.map(|d| d.uuid.clone());
-        let data = create_update(
-            vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))],
-            UpdateType::LogOut,
-            acting_device_id,
-        );
+        let mut payload =
+            vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))];
+        if let Some(reason) = reason {
+            payload.push(("Reason".into(), (reason as i32).into()));
+        }
+        let data = create_update(payload, UpdateType::LogOut, acting_device_id);
 
         if CONFIG.enable_websocket() {
             self.send_update(&user.uuid, &data).await;
         }
 
         if CONFIG.push_enabled() {
-            push_logout(user, acting_device, conn).await;
+            push_logout(user, acting_device, reason, conn).await;
         }
     }
 
@@ -667,6 +680,15 @@ fn create_ping() -> Vec<u8> {
     serialize(&Value::Array(vec![6.into()]))
 }
 
+/// Why a logout was pushed. Absent for a plain logout.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/Enums/PushNotificationLogOutReason.cs>
+/// (`KdfChange = 0` is not sent by vaultwarden yet.)
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
+pub enum LogOutReason {
+    KeyRotation = 1,
+}
+
 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/375af7c43b10d9da03525d41452f95de3f921541/src/Core/Enums/PushType.cs
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
 pub enum UpdateType {

src/api/push.rs

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use tokio::sync::RwLock;
 
 use crate::{
     CONFIG,
-    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, UpdateType},
+    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, LogOutReason, UpdateType},
     db::{
         DbConn,
         models::{AuthRequestId, Cipher, Device, Folder, PushId, Send, User, UserId},
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ pub async fn push_cipher_update(ut: UpdateType, cipher: &Cipher, device: &Device
     }
 }
 
-pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) {
+pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, reason: Option<LogOutReason>, conn: &DbConn) {
     if Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, conn).await {
         tokio::task::spawn(send_to_push_relay(json!({
             "userId": user.uuid,
@@ -198,7 +198,8 @@ pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbC
             "type": UpdateType::LogOut as i32,
             "payload": {
                 "userId": user.uuid,
-                "date": format_date(&user.updated_at)
+                "date": format_date(&user.updated_at),
+                "reason": reason.map(|r| r as i32),
             },
             "clientType": null,
             "installationId": null

src/auth.rs

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ use crate::{
         models::{
             AttachmentId, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, EmergencyAccessId,
             EventType, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId,
-            SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, UserStampException,
+            SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId,
         },
     },
     error::Error,
@@ -682,31 +682,13 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for Headers {
         };
 
         if user.security_stamp != claims.sstamp {
-            if let Some(stamp_exception) =
-                user.stamp_exception.as_deref().and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str::<UserStampException>(s).ok())
-            {
-                let Some(current_route) = request.route().and_then(|r| r.name.as_deref()) else {
-                    err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception")
-                };
+            let Some(current_route) = request.route().and_then(|r| r.name.as_deref()) else {
+                err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception")
+            };
 
-                // Check if the stamp exception has expired first.
-                // Then, check if the current route matches any of the allowed routes.
-                // After that check the stamp in exception matches the one in the claims.
-                if Utc::now().timestamp() > stamp_exception.expire {
-                    // If the stamp exception has been expired remove it from the database.
-                    // This prevents checking this stamp exception for new requests.
-                    let mut user = user;
-                    user.reset_stamp_exception();
-                    if let Err(e) = user.save(&conn).await {
-                        error!("Error updating user: {e:#?}");
-                    }
-                    err_handler!("Stamp exception is expired")
-                } else if !stamp_exception.routes.contains(&current_route.to_owned()) {
-                    err_handler!("Invalid security stamp: Current route and exception route do not match")
-                } else if stamp_exception.security_stamp != claims.sstamp {
-                    err_handler!("Invalid security stamp for matched stamp exception")
-                }
-            } else {
+            // Expired exceptions are dropped the next time the stamp is reset, not here: writing them
+            // back from this request could undo a reset made since the user was read.
+            if !user.stamp_exceptions().iter().any(|e| e.allows(&claims.sstamp, current_route)) {
                 err_handler!("Invalid security stamp")
             }
         }

src/config.rs

@@ -1424,6 +1424,11 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
     "ssh-agent-v2",
     // Key Management Team
     "windows-native-credential-sync",
+    "pm-31050-no-logout-key-upgrade-rotation",
+    "pm-27278-v2-password-registration",
+    "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
+    "pm-30144-sdk-key-rotation",
+    "force-upgrade-v2-encryption",
     // Mobile Team
     "pm-34171-card-scanner",
     // Platform Team

src/db/models/cipher.rs

@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ pub struct Cipher {
     pub reprompt: Option<i32>,
 }
 
+/// Whether `data` is a sealed cipher blob rather than the legacy per-type JSON.
+///
+/// Ciphers of v2 accounts are encrypted as a single blob that carries everything, name included,
+/// and is opaque to us. It is recognized the same way upstream does, by a top-level
+/// `format_version` key that the legacy JSON never has.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/Vault/Entities/Cipher.cs>
+pub fn is_data_blob_encrypted(data: &str) -> bool {
+    serde_json::from_str::<Value>(data).is_ok_and(|d| is_blob_value(&d))
+}
+
+/// [`is_data_blob_encrypted`] for `data` that was already parsed.
+fn is_blob_value(data: &Value) -> bool {
+    data.get("format_version").is_some()
+}
+
 pub enum RepromptType {
     None = 0,
     Password = 1,
@@ -110,6 +126,11 @@ impl Cipher {
                     .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].Notes"), serde_json::to_value([&max_note_size_msg]).unwrap());
             }
 
+            if let Err(e) = cipher.validate_content(cipher.is_blob()) {
+                validation_errors
+                    .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].{}", e.field), serde_json::to_value([e.message]).unwrap());
+            }
+
             // Validate the password history if it contains `null` values and if so, return a warning
             if let Some(Value::Array(password_history)) = &cipher.password_history {
                 for pwh in password_history {
@@ -154,6 +175,11 @@ impl Cipher {
     ) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
         use crate::util::{format_date, validate_and_format_date};
 
+        // Parsed once here, since `data` can be large and this runs for every cipher in a sync.
+        // `LowerCase` only lowercases the first letter of each key, so it keeps `format_version`.
+        let type_data = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data).map(|d| d.data);
+        let is_blob_encrypted = type_data.as_ref().is_ok_and(is_blob_value);
+
         let mut attachments_json: Value = Value::Null;
         if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
             if let Some(attachments) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_attachments.get(&self.uuid)
@@ -189,124 +215,62 @@ impl Cipher {
             (false, false, false)
         };
 
-        let fields_json: Vec<_> = self
-            .fields
-            .as_ref()
-            .and_then(|s| {
-                serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
-                    .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing fields {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
-                    .ok()
-            })
-            .map(|d| {
-                d.into_iter()
-                    .map(|mut f| {
-                        // Check if the `type` key is a number, strings break some clients
-                        // The fallback type is the hidden type `1`. this should prevent accidental data disclosure
-                        // If not try to convert the string value to a number and fallback to `1`
-                        // If it is both not a number and not a string, fallback to `1`
-                        match f.data.get("type") {
-                            Some(t) if t.is_number() => {}
-                            Some(t) if t.is_string() => {
-                                let type_num = &t.as_str().unwrap_or("1").parse::<u8>().unwrap_or(1);
-                                f.data["type"] = json!(type_num);
+        // Like upstream, a cipher that was stored without fields or password history reports them as
+        // null rather than as an empty list; clients keep the two apart.
+        let fields_json: Option<Vec<_>> = self.fields.as_ref().map(|s| {
+            serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
+                .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing fields {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
+                .ok()
+                .map(|d| {
+                    d.into_iter()
+                        .map(|mut f| {
+                            // Check if the `type` key is a number, strings break some clients
+                            // The fallback type is the hidden type `1`. this should prevent accidental data disclosure
+                            // If not try to convert the string value to a number and fallback to `1`
+                            // If it is both not a number and not a string, fallback to `1`
+                            match f.data.get("type") {
+                                Some(t) if t.is_number() => {}
+                                Some(t) if t.is_string() => {
+                                    let type_num = &t.as_str().unwrap_or("1").parse::<u8>().unwrap_or(1);
+                                    f.data["type"] = json!(type_num);
+                                }
+                                _ => {
+                                    f.data["type"] = json!(1);
+                                }
                             }
-                            _ => {
-                                f.data["type"] = json!(1);
-                            }
-                        }
-                        f.data
-                    })
-                    .collect()
-            })
-            .unwrap_or_default();
+                            f.data
+                        })
+                        .collect()
+                })
+                .unwrap_or_default()
+        });
 
-        let password_history_json: Vec<_> = self
-            .password_history
-            .as_ref()
-            .and_then(|s| {
-                serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
-                    .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing password history {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
-                    .ok()
-            })
-            .map(|d| {
-                // Check every password history item if they are valid and return it.
-                // If a password field has the type `null` skip it, it breaks newer Bitwarden clients
-                // A second check is done to verify the lastUsedDate exists and is a valid DateTime string, if not the epoch start time will be used
-                d.into_iter()
-                    .filter_map(|d| match d.data.get("password") {
-                        Some(p) if p.is_string() => Some(d.data),
-                        _ => None,
-                    })
-                    .map(|mut d| {
-                        let lud = if let Some(l) = d.get("lastUsedDate").and_then(|l| l.as_str()) {
-                            validate_and_format_date(l)
-                        } else {
-                            "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z".to_owned()
-                        };
-                        d["lastUsedDate"] = json!(lud);
-                        d
-                    })
-                    .collect()
-            })
-            .unwrap_or_default();
-
-        // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
-        // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
-        let mut type_data_json = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data)
-            .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid))
-            .map_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()), |d| d.data);
-
-        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
-        // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
-        if self.atype == 1 {
-            // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
-            type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
-            if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
-                && !uris.is_empty()
-            {
-                // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
-                // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
-                for uri in &mut *uris {
-                    if uri["match"].is_string() {
-                        let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
-                            Ok(n) => json!(n),
-                            _ => Value::Null,
-                        };
-                        uri["match"] = match_value;
-                    }
-                }
-                type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
-            }
-
-            // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
-            if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
-                type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
-        // This breaks at least the native mobile clients
-        if self.atype == 2 {
-            match type_data_json {
-                Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
-                _ => {
-                    type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
-                }
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Fix invalid SSH Entries
-        // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
-        // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
-        // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
-        if self.atype == 5
-            && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
-                || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
-                || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
-        {
-            warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
-            type_data_json = Value::Null;
-        }
+        let password_history_json: Option<Vec<_>> = self.password_history.as_ref().map(|s| {
+            serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
+                .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing password history {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
+                .ok()
+                .map(|d| {
+                    // Check every password history item if they are valid and return it.
+                    // If a password field has the type `null` skip it, it breaks newer Bitwarden clients
+                    // A second check is done to verify the lastUsedDate exists and is a valid DateTime string, if not the epoch start time will be used
+                    d.into_iter()
+                        .filter_map(|d| match d.data.get("password") {
+                            Some(p) if p.is_string() => Some(d.data),
+                            _ => None,
+                        })
+                        .map(|mut d| {
+                            let lud = if let Some(l) = d.get("lastUsedDate").and_then(|l| l.as_str()) {
+                                validate_and_format_date(l)
+                            } else {
+                                "1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z".to_owned()
+                            };
+                            d["lastUsedDate"] = json!(lud);
+                            d
+                        })
+                        .collect()
+                })
+                .unwrap_or_default()
+        });
 
         let collection_ids = if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
             if let Some(cipher_collections) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_collections.get(&self.uuid) {
@@ -403,10 +367,83 @@ impl Cipher {
             _ => err!(format!("Cipher {} has an invalid type {}", self.uuid, self.atype)),
         };
 
-        json_object[key] = type_data_json;
+        if is_blob_encrypted {
+            // The blob holds all of the content, so it is sent back as-is and the structured fields
+            // stay null, as upstream does. Only the name needs clearing, the others are never stored.
+            json_object["data"] = json!(self.data);
+            json_object["name"] = Value::Null;
+        } else {
+            json_object[key] = self.legacy_type_data_json(type_data);
+        }
         Ok(json_object)
     }
 
+    /// The per-type data (`login`, `card`, …) of a legacy cipher, from `type_data` as parsed from
+    /// `self.data`, with fixups for values that are known to break clients.
+    fn legacy_type_data_json(&self, type_data: Result<Value, serde_json::Error>) -> Value {
+        use crate::util::validate_and_format_date;
+
+        // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
+        // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
+        let mut type_data_json = type_data
+            .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid))
+            .unwrap_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()));
+
+        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
+        // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
+        if self.atype == 1 {
+            // Upstream always has an `uri` key/value
+            type_data_json["uri"] = Value::Null;
+            if let Some(uris) = type_data_json["uris"].as_array_mut()
+                && !uris.is_empty()
+            {
+                // Fix uri match values first, they are only allowed to be a number or null
+                // If it is a string, convert it to an int or null if that fails
+                for uri in &mut *uris {
+                    if uri["match"].is_string() {
+                        let match_value = match uri["match"].as_str().unwrap_or_default().parse::<u8>() {
+                            Ok(n) => json!(n),
+                            _ => Value::Null,
+                        };
+                        uri["match"] = match_value;
+                    }
+                }
+                type_data_json["uri"] = uris[0]["uri"].clone();
+            }
+
+            // Check if `passwordRevisionDate` is a valid date, else convert it
+            if let Some(pw_revision) = type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"].as_str() {
+                type_data_json["passwordRevisionDate"] = json!(validate_and_format_date(pw_revision));
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Fix secure note issues when data is invalid
+        // This breaks at least the native mobile clients
+        if self.atype == 2 {
+            match type_data_json {
+                Value::Object(ref t) if t.get("type").is_some_and(Value::is_number) => {}
+                _ => {
+                    type_data_json = json!({"type": 0});
+                }
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Fix invalid SSH Entries
+        // This breaks at least the native mobile client if invalid
+        // The only way to fix this is by setting type_data_json to `null`
+        // Opening this ssh-key in the mobile client will probably crash the client, but you can edit, save and afterwards delete it
+        if self.atype == 5
+            && (type_data_json["keyFingerprint"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
+                || type_data_json["privateKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty)
+                || type_data_json["publicKey"].as_str().is_none_or(str::is_empty))
+        {
+            warn!("Error parsing ssh-key, mandatory fields are invalid for {}", self.uuid);
+            type_data_json = Value::Null;
+        }
+
+        type_data_json
+    }
+
     pub async fn update_users_revision(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<UserId> {
         let mut user_uuids = Vec::new();
         match self.user_uuid {

src/db/models/mod.rs

@@ -17,11 +17,12 @@ mod two_factor;
 mod two_factor_duo_context;
 mod two_factor_incomplete;
 mod user;
+mod user_signature_key_pair;
 
 pub use self::archive::Archive;
 pub use self::attachment::{Attachment, AttachmentId};
 pub use self::auth_request::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId};
-pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType};
+pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType, is_data_blob_encrypted};
 pub use self::collection::{Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionId, CollectionUser};
 pub use self::device::{Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest, PushId};
 pub use self::emergency_access::{EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType};
@@ -39,4 +40,5 @@ pub use self::sso_auth::{OIDCAuthenticatedUser, OIDCCodeResponseError, SsoAuth};
 pub use self::two_factor::{TwoFactor, TwoFactorType};
 pub use self::two_factor_duo_context::TwoFactorDuoContext;
 pub use self::two_factor_incomplete::TwoFactorIncomplete;
-pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserStampException};
+pub use self::user::{Invitation, KeyId, SsoUser, User, UserId, UserKdfType};
+pub use self::user_signature_key_pair::{SignatureAlgorithm, UserSignatureKeyPair};

src/db/models/organization.rs

@@ -54,6 +54,10 @@ pub struct Membership {
     pub atype: i32,
     pub reset_password_key: Option<String>,
     pub external_id: Option<String>,
+    /// A copy of the user's v2 upgrade token, kept when a v1 -> v2 upgrade leaves the account
+    /// recovery key (`reset_password_key`) wrapped by the v1 user key. It lets the organization
+    /// unwrap the v2 user key from it. Opaque to us, like `User::v2_upgrade_token`.
+    pub v2_upgrade_token: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
@@ -271,6 +275,7 @@ impl Membership {
             atype: MembershipType::User as i32,
             reset_password_key: None,
             external_id: None,
+            v2_upgrade_token: None,
         }
     }
 

src/db/models/user.rs

@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 use crate::{
     CONFIG,
     api::EmptyResult,
+    auth::DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY,
     crypto,
     db::{
         DbConn,
@@ -20,6 +21,7 @@ use macros::UuidFromParam;
 
 use super::{
     Cipher, Device, EmergencyAccess, Favorite, Folder, Membership, MembershipType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete,
+    UserSignatureKeyPair,
 };
 
 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
@@ -71,6 +73,15 @@ pub struct User {
     pub external_id: Option<String>, // Todo: Needs to be removed in the future, this is not used anymore.
 
     pub key_id: Option<KeyId>,
+
+    // "v2" account cryptographic state. Either all of these are set (together with a row in
+    // `user_signature_key_pairs`) or none of them are; see `User::is_v2`.
+    pub signed_public_key: Option<String>,
+    pub security_state: Option<String>,
+    pub security_version: Option<i32>,
+    /// JSON `{"wrappedUserKey1": ..., "wrappedUserKey2": ...}`, letting clients that still hold the
+    /// v1 user key obtain the v2 one after another client performed the upgrade. Opaque to us.
+    pub v2_upgrade_token: Option<String>,
 }
 
 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable)]
@@ -99,13 +110,28 @@ enum UserStatus {
     _Disabled = 2,
 }
 
+/// A previous security stamp that is still accepted, until `expire`.
 #[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct UserStampException {
-    pub routes: Vec<String>,
+    /// The routes the stamp is still accepted on, or `None` for any route.
+    pub routes: Option<Vec<String>>,
     pub security_stamp: String,
     pub expire: i64,
 }
 
+impl UserStampException {
+    pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool {
+        Utc::now().timestamp() > self.expire
+    }
+
+    /// Whether this exception lets a token carrying `security_stamp` through on `route`.
+    pub fn allows(&self, security_stamp: &str, route: &str) -> bool {
+        !self.is_expired()
+            && self.security_stamp == security_stamp
+            && self.routes.as_ref().is_none_or(|routes| routes.iter().any(|r| r == route))
+    }
+}
+
 /// Local methods
 impl User {
     pub const CLIENT_KDF_TYPE_DEFAULT: i32 = UserKdfType::Pbkdf2 as i32;
@@ -158,9 +184,18 @@ impl User {
             external_id: None, // Todo: Needs to be removed in the future, this is not used anymore.
 
             key_id: None,
+
+            signed_public_key: None,
+            security_state: None,
+            security_version: None,
+            v2_upgrade_token: None,
         }
     }
 
+    pub fn is_v2(&self) -> bool {
+        self.signed_public_key.is_some() && self.security_state.is_some() && self.security_version.is_some()
+    }
+
     pub fn check_valid_password(&self, password: &str) -> bool {
         crypto::verify_password_hash(
             password.as_bytes(),
@@ -220,10 +255,41 @@ impl User {
 
     pub async fn reset_security_stamp(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
         self.security_stamp = get_uuid();
+        // A reset is meant to end the other sessions, which a key rotation's grace would undo. The
+        // route exceptions stay, since they are set right before a reset, for the stamp it replaces.
+        // This is also where expired exceptions get dropped.
+        let mut exceptions = self.stamp_exceptions();
+        exceptions.retain(|e| e.routes.is_some() && !e.is_expired());
+        self.set_stamp_exceptions(&exceptions);
         Device::rotate_refresh_tokens_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         Ok(())
     }
 
+    /// Resets the security stamp after a key rotation, while letting the access tokens already
+    /// issued keep working until they expire.
+    ///
+    /// This is what upstream does: there the stamp is only checked when a token is refreshed, so a
+    /// rotation invalidates refresh tokens but not the access tokens in use. Clients rely on it to
+    /// keep a session going across a rotation. Chained rotations keep every earlier stamp that is
+    /// still within its window.
+    pub async fn reset_security_stamp_after_key_rotation(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+        let previous_stamp = self.security_stamp.clone();
+        let mut grace: Vec<UserStampException> =
+            self.stamp_exceptions().into_iter().filter(|e| e.routes.is_none() && !e.is_expired()).collect();
+
+        self.reset_security_stamp(conn).await?;
+
+        grace.push(UserStampException {
+            routes: None,
+            security_stamp: previous_stamp,
+            expire: (Utc::now() + *DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY).timestamp(),
+        });
+        let mut exceptions = self.stamp_exceptions();
+        exceptions.extend(grace);
+        self.set_stamp_exceptions(&exceptions);
+        Ok(())
+    }
+
     /// Set the stamp_exception to only allow a subsequent request matching a specific route using the current security-stamp.
     ///
     /// # Arguments
@@ -232,17 +298,30 @@ impl User {
     ///   After these 2 minutes this stamp will expire.
     ///
     pub fn set_stamp_exception(&mut self, route_exception: Vec<String>) {
-        let stamp_exception = UserStampException {
-            routes: route_exception,
+        self.set_stamp_exceptions(&[UserStampException {
+            routes: Some(route_exception),
             security_stamp: self.security_stamp.clone(),
             expire: (Utc::now() + TimeDelta::try_minutes(2).unwrap()).timestamp(),
-        };
-        self.stamp_exception = Some(serde_json::to_string(&stamp_exception).unwrap_or_default());
+        }]);
     }
 
-    /// Resets the stamp_exception to prevent re-use of the previous security-stamp
-    pub fn reset_stamp_exception(&mut self) {
-        self.stamp_exception = None;
+    /// The previous security stamps that are still accepted, expired ones included.
+    pub fn stamp_exceptions(&self) -> Vec<UserStampException> {
+        let Some(stored) = self.stamp_exception.as_deref() else {
+            return Vec::new();
+        };
+        // Before key rotations kept sessions alive, only a single route exception was stored.
+        serde_json::from_str::<Vec<UserStampException>>(stored)
+            .or_else(|_| serde_json::from_str::<UserStampException>(stored).map(|e| vec![e]))
+            .unwrap_or_default()
+    }
+
+    fn set_stamp_exceptions(&mut self, exceptions: &[UserStampException]) {
+        self.stamp_exception = if exceptions.is_empty() {
+            None
+        } else {
+            Some(serde_json::to_string(&exceptions).unwrap_or_default())
+        };
     }
 
     pub fn display_name(&self) -> &str {
@@ -261,23 +340,59 @@ impl User {
         !CONFIG.mail_enabled() || self.verified_at.is_some()
     }
 
-    /// The `accountKeys` object (upstream's `PrivateKeysResponseModel`), null without a key pair
-    pub fn account_keys_json(&self) -> Value {
-        if self.private_key.is_some() {
-            json!({
-                "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
-                    "wrappedPrivateKey": self.private_key,
-                    "publicKey": self.public_key,
-                    "signedPublicKey": null,
-                    "object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair",
-                },
-                "securityState": null,
-                "signatureKeyPair": null,
-                "object": "privateKeys"
-            })
-        } else {
-            Value::Null
+    async fn v2_signature_key_pair(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<UserSignatureKeyPair> {
+        if !self.is_v2() {
+            return None;
         }
+        UserSignatureKeyPair::find_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await
+    }
+
+    pub async fn account_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
+        if self.private_key.is_none() {
+            return Value::Null;
+        }
+
+        let (signed_public_key, signature_key_pair, security_state) = match self.v2_signature_key_pair(conn).await {
+            Some(key_pair) => (
+                json!(self.signed_public_key),
+                key_pair.to_json(),
+                json!({
+                    "securityState": self.security_state,
+                    "securityVersion": self.security_version,
+                }),
+            ),
+            None => (Value::Null, Value::Null, Value::Null),
+        };
+
+        json!({
+            "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
+                "wrappedPrivateKey": self.private_key,
+                "publicKey": self.public_key,
+                "signedPublicKey": signed_public_key,
+                "object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair",
+            },
+            "signatureKeyPair": signature_key_pair,
+            "securityState": security_state,
+            "object": "privateKeys"
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub async fn public_keys_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
+        let (signed_public_key, verifying_key) = match self.v2_signature_key_pair(conn).await {
+            Some(key_pair) => (json!(self.signed_public_key), json!(key_pair.verifying_key)),
+            None => (Value::Null, Value::Null),
+        };
+
+        json!({
+            "publicKey": self.public_key,
+            "signedPublicKey": signed_public_key,
+            "verifyingKey": verifying_key,
+            "object": "publicKeys"
+        })
+    }
+
+    pub fn v2_upgrade_token_json(&self) -> Option<Value> {
+        self.v2_upgrade_token.as_ref().and_then(|token| serde_json::from_str(token).ok())
     }
 
     pub async fn to_json(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
@@ -300,7 +415,7 @@ impl User {
             UserStatus::Enabled
         };
 
-        let account_keys = self.account_keys_json();
+        let account_keys = self.account_keys_json(conn).await;
 
         json!({
             "_status": status as i32,
@@ -376,6 +491,7 @@ impl User {
         Device::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         TwoFactorIncomplete::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
+        UserSignatureKeyPair::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
         Invitation::take(&self.email, conn).await; // Delete invitation if any
 
         conn.run(move |conn| {
@@ -564,7 +680,18 @@ pub struct UserId(String);
 )]
 #[deref(forward)]
 #[from(forward)]
-pub struct KeyId(String);
+pub struct KeyId(#[serde(deserialize_with = "deserialize_key_id")] String);
+
+/// Rejects a key id from a request that isn't 16 bytes as lowercase hex, as upstream's `[KeyId]` does.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Models/Data/KeyId.cs>
+fn deserialize_key_id<'de, D: serde::Deserializer<'de>>(deserializer: D) -> Result<String, D::Error> {
+    let key_id = <String as serde::Deserialize>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
+    if key_id.len() != 32 || !key_id.bytes().all(|b| matches!(b, b'0'..=b'9' | b'a'..=b'f')) {
+        return Err(serde::de::Error::custom("Key id must be a 32 character lowercase hex-encoded string."));
+    }
+    Ok(key_id)
+}
 
 impl SsoUser {
     pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {

src/db/models/user_signature_key_pair.rs

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
+use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
+use diesel::prelude::*;
+use serde_json::Value;
+
+use crate::{
+    api::EmptyResult,
+    db::{DbConn, schema::user_signature_key_pairs},
+    error::MapResult,
+    util::get_uuid,
+};
+
+use super::UserId;
+
+/// A user's signature key pair, part of the "v2" account cryptographic state.
+///
+/// Upstream keeps this in its own table rather than as columns on the user, with a unique index on
+/// the user id. The stated intent is to eventually keep superseded key pairs around (an `active`
+/// flag was sketched but not shipped), which is why this is modelled as a row with its own identity
+/// instead of a set of user attributes.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Sql/dbo/KeyManagement/Tables/UserSignatureKeyPair.sql>
+#[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
+#[diesel(table_name = user_signature_key_pairs)]
+#[diesel(treat_none_as_null = true)]
+#[diesel(primary_key(uuid))]
+pub struct UserSignatureKeyPair {
+    pub uuid: UserSignatureKeyPairId,
+    pub user_uuid: UserId,
+
+    pub signature_algorithm: i32,
+    /// The signing (private) key, wrapped by the user key.
+    pub signing_key: String,
+    /// The COSE-encoded public verifying key.
+    pub verifying_key: String,
+
+    pub created_at: NaiveDateTime,
+    pub updated_at: NaiveDateTime,
+}
+
+/// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/KeyManagement/Enums/SignatureAlgorithm.cs
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum SignatureAlgorithm {
+    Ed25519 = 0,
+    MlDsa44 = 1,
+}
+
+impl SignatureAlgorithm {
+    pub fn parse(algorithm: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        match algorithm {
+            "ed25519" => Some(Self::Ed25519),
+            "mldsa44" => Some(Self::MlDsa44),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Local methods
+impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
+    pub fn new(
+        user_uuid: UserId,
+        signature_algorithm: SignatureAlgorithm,
+        signing_key: String,
+        verifying_key: String,
+    ) -> Self {
+        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+
+        Self {
+            uuid: UserSignatureKeyPairId(get_uuid()),
+            user_uuid,
+            signature_algorithm: signature_algorithm as i32,
+            signing_key,
+            verifying_key,
+            created_at: now,
+            updated_at: now,
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn to_json(&self) -> Value {
+        json!({
+            "wrappedSigningKey": self.signing_key,
+            "verifyingKey": self.verifying_key,
+            "object": "signatureKeyPair",
+        })
+    }
+}
+
+/// Database methods
+impl UserSignatureKeyPair {
+    pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+        self.updated_at = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+
+        db_run! { conn:
+            mysql {
+                diesel::insert_into(user_signature_key_pairs::table)
+                    .values(&*self)
+                    .on_conflict(diesel::dsl::DuplicatedKeys)
+                    .do_update()
+                    .set(&*self)
+                    .execute(conn)
+                    .map_res("Error saving user signature key pair")
+            }
+            postgresql, sqlite {
+                diesel::insert_into(user_signature_key_pairs::table)
+                    .values(&*self)
+                    .on_conflict(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid)
+                    .do_update()
+                    .set(&*self)
+                    .execute(conn)
+                    .map_res("Error saving user signature key pair")
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The user's key pair. There is at most one, enforced by a unique index on `user_uuid`.
+    pub async fn find_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            user_signature_key_pairs::table
+                .filter(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
+                .first::<Self>(conn)
+                .ok()
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+
+    pub async fn delete_all_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            diesel::delete(user_signature_key_pairs::table.filter(user_signature_key_pairs::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .map_res("Error deleting user signature key pairs")
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+}
+
+#[derive(Clone, Debug, AsRef, Deref, DieselNewType, Display, From, Hash, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
+pub struct UserSignatureKeyPairId(String);

src/db/schema.rs

@@ -218,6 +218,22 @@ table! {
         avatar_color -> Nullable<Text>,
         external_id -> Nullable<Text>,
         key_id -> Nullable<Text>,
+        signed_public_key -> Nullable<Text>,
+        security_state -> Nullable<Text>,
+        security_version -> Nullable<Integer>,
+        v2_upgrade_token -> Nullable<Text>,
+    }
+}
+
+table! {
+    user_signature_key_pairs (uuid) {
+        uuid -> Text,
+        user_uuid -> Text,
+        signature_algorithm -> Integer,
+        signing_key -> Text,
+        verifying_key -> Text,
+        created_at -> Timestamp,
+        updated_at -> Timestamp,
     }
 }
 
@@ -243,6 +259,7 @@ table! {
         atype -> Integer,
         reset_password_key -> Nullable<Text>,
         external_id -> Nullable<Text>,
+        v2_upgrade_token -> Nullable<Text>,
     }
 }
 
@@ -383,6 +400,7 @@ joinable!(collections_groups -> groups (groups_uuid));
 joinable!(event -> users_organizations (uuid));
 joinable!(auth_requests -> users (user_uuid));
 joinable!(sso_users -> users (user_uuid));
+joinable!(user_signature_key_pairs -> users (user_uuid));
 
 allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
     archives,
@@ -409,4 +427,5 @@ allow_tables_to_appear_in_same_query!(
     collections_groups,
     event,
     auth_requests,
+    user_signature_key_pairs,
 );

tools/sdk-live-tests/register_vector.py

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+"""Registers the account of an sdk-internal test vector on a vaultwarden server, as a client would.
+
+Usage: register_vector.py <vector.json> <server-url>
+
+A V1 vector is registered with the flat `keys` object, a V2 one with `accountKeys` and the user key
+id. Prints the account's email and password on two lines, for the caller to log in with.
+
+Exits with SKIP, and the reason on stderr, for a vector the live tests can't use.
+"""
+
+import json
+import sys
+import urllib.error
+import urllib.request
+
+SKIP = 3
+MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS = 100_000
+
+
+def skip_reason(vector):
+    if not any("masterPasswordUnlock" in m for m in vector["unlockMethods"]):
+        return "it has no master password, which the live tests log in with"
+    pbkdf2 = vector["account"]["kdf"].get("pBKDF2")
+    if pbkdf2 is not None and pbkdf2["iterations"] < MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS:
+        return f"registration requires at least {MIN_PBKDF2_ITERATIONS} PBKDF2 iterations (upstream 600000)"
+    return None
+
+
+def kdf_of(account):
+    kind, params = next(iter(account["kdf"].items()))
+    if kind == "pBKDF2":
+        return {"kdfType": 0, "iterations": params["iterations"]}
+    return {
+        "kdfType": 1,
+        "iterations": params["iterations"],
+        "memory": params["memory"],
+        "parallelism": params["parallelism"],
+    }
+
+
+def register_body(vector):
+    account = vector["account"]
+    raw = vector["rawCryptographicState"]
+    version, state = next(iter(account["accountCryptographicState"].items()))
+    kdf = kdf_of(account)
+    unlock = next(m["masterPasswordUnlock"] for m in vector["unlockMethods"] if "masterPasswordUnlock" in m)
+    mp_unlock = unlock["master_password_unlock"]
+
+    body = {
+        "email": account["email"],
+        "masterPasswordHint": None,
+        "masterPasswordAuthentication": {
+            "kdf": kdf,
+            "salt": mp_unlock["salt"],
+            "masterPasswordAuthenticationHash": vector["masterPasswordAuthenticationHash"],
+        },
+        "masterPasswordUnlock": {
+            "kdf": kdf,
+            "salt": mp_unlock["salt"],
+            "masterKeyWrappedUserKey": mp_unlock["masterKeyWrappedUserKey"],
+        },
+    }
+
+    if version == "V2":
+        body["masterPasswordUnlock"]["containedKeyId"] = raw["userKeyId"]
+        body["accountKeys"] = {
+            "userKeyEncryptedAccountPrivateKey": state["private_key"],
+            "accountPublicKey": raw["publicKey"],
+            "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
+                "wrappedPrivateKey": state["private_key"],
+                "publicKey": raw["publicKey"],
+                "signedPublicKey": state["signed_public_key"],
+            },
+            "signatureKeyPair": {
+                "signatureAlgorithm": "ed25519",
+                "wrappedSigningKey": state["signing_key"],
+                "verifyingKey": raw["verifyingKey"],
+            },
+            "securityState": {
+                "securityState": state["security_state"],
+                "securityVersion": account["securityVersion"],
+            },
+        }
+    else:
+        body["keys"] = {"encryptedPrivateKey": state["private_key"], "publicKey": raw["publicKey"]}
+
+    return body, unlock["password"]
+
+
+def post(url, body):
+    request = urllib.request.Request(
+        url,
+        data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
+        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
+        method="POST",
+    )
+    try:
+        with urllib.request.urlopen(request) as response:
+            return response.read()
+    except urllib.error.HTTPError as e:
+        sys.exit(f"Registering {body['email']} failed at {url}: {e.code} {e.read().decode()}")
+
+
+def main():
+    with open(sys.argv[1]) as f:
+        vector = json.load(f)
+    server = sys.argv[2].rstrip("/")
+
+    reason = skip_reason(vector)
+    if reason is not None:
+        print(f"Skipped: {reason}", file=sys.stderr)
+        sys.exit(SKIP)
+
+    body, password = register_body(vector)
+    # With signup verification off, the server returns the token instead of mailing it
+    token = post(
+        f"{server}/identity/accounts/register/send-verification-email",
+        {"email": body["email"], "name": vector["name"]},
+    )
+    body["emailVerificationToken"] = json.loads(token)
+    post(f"{server}/identity/accounts/register/finish", body)
+
+    print(body["email"])
+    print(password)
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+    main()

tools/sdk-live-tests/run.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env bash
+# Runs the live-server integration tests of bitwarden/sdk-internal against vaultwarden.
+#
+# Usage: tools/sdk-live-tests/run.sh --sdk-dir <path> [--skip-sdk-build]
+#
+# Every test vector of the SDK (test-vectors/users/) that the tests can log in with gets a fresh
+# server and database, since the tests rotate the account's keys. Stops at the first failure; the
+# server logs are in target/sdk-live-tests/. Building the SDK needs its Rust toolchain with the
+# wasm32-unknown-unknown target and rust-src, Node.js, and binaryen (`npm i -g binaryen`).
+set -euo pipefail
+
+VW_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "$0")/../.." && pwd)"
+OUT_DIR="${VW_DIR}/target/sdk-live-tests"
+URL="http://127.0.0.1:8099"
+SKIP=3 # register_vector.py's exit code for a vector the tests can't use
+
+SDK_DIR=""
+BUILD_SDK=1
+while [[ $# -gt 0 ]]; do
+  case "$1" in
+    --sdk-dir) SDK_DIR="$(cd "$2" && pwd)"; shift 2 ;;
+    --skip-sdk-build) BUILD_SDK=0; shift ;;
+    *) echo "Unknown argument: $1" >&2; exit 2 ;;
+  esac
+done
+[[ -n "${SDK_DIR}" ]] || { echo "--sdk-dir is required" >&2; exit 2; }
+TESTS_DIR="${SDK_DIR}/crates/bitwarden-wasm-internal/integration-tests"
+
+(cd "${VW_DIR}" && cargo build --features sqlite)
+if [[ ${BUILD_SDK} -eq 1 ]]; then
+  bash "${SDK_DIR}/crates/bitwarden-wasm-internal/build.sh"
+  (cd "${TESTS_DIR}" && npm ci)
+fi
+
+trap 'kill $(jobs -p) 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT
+
+for vector_file in "${SDK_DIR}"/test-vectors/users/*.json; do
+  vector="$(basename "${vector_file}" .json)"
+  echo "=== ${vector}"
+  data_dir="${OUT_DIR}/${vector}"
+  rm -rf "${data_dir}" && mkdir -p "${data_dir}"
+
+  DATA_FOLDER="${data_dir}" DATABASE_URL="sqlite://${data_dir}/db.sqlite3" \
+    ROCKET_ADDRESS=127.0.0.1 ROCKET_PORT=8099 DOMAIN="${URL}" WEB_VAULT_ENABLED=false \
+    SIGNUPS_ALLOWED=true SIGNUPS_VERIFY=false LOGIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST=1000 \
+    "${VW_DIR}/target/debug/vaultwarden" > "${data_dir}/vaultwarden.log" 2>&1 &
+  server=$!
+  curl -sf --retry 30 --retry-connrefused --retry-delay 1 "${URL}/alive" > /dev/null
+
+  status=0
+  credentials="$(python3 "${VW_DIR}/tools/sdk-live-tests/register_vector.py" "${vector_file}" "${URL}")" || status=$?
+  if [[ ${status} -eq 0 ]]; then
+    (cd "${TESTS_DIR}" && BW_LIVE_SERVER_URL="${URL}" BW_LIVE_EMAIL="$(sed -n 1p <<< "${credentials}")" \
+      BW_LIVE_PASSWORD="$(sed -n 2p <<< "${credentials}")" npm run test:live)
+  elif [[ ${status} -ne ${SKIP} ]]; then
+    exit "${status}"
+  fi
+
+  kill "${server}" && wait "${server}" || true
+done
+echo "All test vectors passed"