Some simplifications

Add typo exception
Implement V2 key rotation support
2026-11-13 23:06:04 +02:00 · 2026-09-23 23:53:12 +02:00 · 2026-09-23 23:30:19 +02:00 · 2026-09-23 23:30:19 +02:00 · 2026-09-23 23:30:18 +02:00
125 changed files with 3639 additions and 8291 deletions
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
 # DB_CONNECTION_RETRIES=15

 ## Database timeout
-## Timeout in seconds when acquiring database connection
+## Timeout when acquiring database connection
 # DATABASE_TIMEOUT=30

 ## Database idle timeout
@@ -173,14 +173,14 @@
 ## Defaults to daily. Set blank to disable this job. Also without EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN set, this job will not start.
 # EVENT_CLEANUP_SCHEDULE="0 10 0 * * *"
 ## Number of days to retain events stored in the database.
-## If unset (the default) or 0, events are kept indefinitely and the scheduled job is disabled!
+## If unset (the default), events are kept indefinitely and the scheduled job is disabled!
 # EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN=
 ##
 ## Cron schedule of the job that cleans old auth requests from the auth request.
 ## Defaults to every minute. Set blank to disable this job.
 # AUTH_REQUEST_PURGE_SCHEDULE="30 * * * * *"
 ##
-## Cron schedule of the job that cleans expired Duo contexts from the database. Does nothing if Duo MFA is disabled.
+## Cron schedule of the job that cleans expired Duo contexts from the database. Does nothing if Duo MFA is disabled or set to use the legacy iframe prompt.
 ## Defaults to every minute. Set blank to disable this job.
 # DUO_CONTEXT_PURGE_SCHEDULE="30 * * * * *"
 #
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@
 # USER_SEND_LIMIT=

 ## Number of days to wait before auto-deleting a trashed item.
-## If unset (the default) or 0, trashed items are not auto-deleted.
+## If unset (the default), trashed items are not auto-deleted.
 ## This setting applies globally, so make sure to inform all users of any changes to this setting.
 # TRASH_AUTO_DELETE_DAYS=

@@ -338,8 +338,6 @@
 ## "local" accepts it from any non global address, which covers a reverse proxy running on the same
 ## host or container network. Use "all" to accept it from anywhere, or list the addresses of your
 ## proxy as IPs and CIDR ranges if it connects from a public address.
-## For a list header like X-Forwarded-For, the client IP is the rightmost address that isn't one of
-## these proxies, so with several proxies in a row (a CDN in front of nginx, for example) list all of them.
 # IP_HEADER_TRUSTED_PROXIES=local

 ## Icon service
@@ -386,35 +384,31 @@
 # HTTP_REQUEST_BLOCK_NON_GLOBAL_IPS=true

 ## Client Settings
-## Server-wide Fill Assist rules feed base directory URL, not a JSON file.
-## Defaults to https://fillassist.bitwarden.com.
-## Must be a valid HTTPS URL without credentials, query parameters, fragments, or surrounding whitespace.
-# FILL_ASSIST_RULES_URL=https://fillassist.bitwarden.com
-
 ## Enable experimental feature flags for clients.
 ## This is a comma-separated list of flags, e.g. "flag1,flag2,flag3".
 ## Note that clients cache the /api/config endpoint for about 1 hour and it could take some time before they are enabled or disabled!
 ##
 ## The following flags are available:
-## - "fill-assist-targeting-rules": Enable Fill Assist targeting rules in the browser extension. (Browser >= 2026.6.0)
 ## - "pm-5594-safari-account-switching": Enable account switching in Safari. (Safari >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "pm-32413-multi-client-password-management": Enable changing the master password directly in the client. (Desktop/Extension >= 2026.4.0)
+## - "ssh-agent": Enable SSH agent support on Desktop. (Desktop >= 2024.12.0)
 ## - "ssh-agent-v2": Enable newer SSH agent support. (Desktop >= 2026.2.1)
-## - "windows-desktop-autotype": Enable the autotype feature preview on Windows. (Desktop >= 2025.8.0)
-## - "windows-desktop-autotype-ga": Enable the new, still in development, autotype implementation on Windows. (Desktop >= 2026.9.1)
-##   Only enable one of the two autotype flags, the clients disable autotype completely when both are enabled.
-## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins": Allow passkeys stored in the vault to be used on related origins listed in a site's /.well-known/webauthn file (Browser >= 2026.2.0)
+## - "ssh-key-vault-item": Enable the creation and use of SSH key vault items. (Clients >= 2024.12.0)
+## - "pm-25373-windows-biometrics-v2": Enable the new implementation of biometrics on Windows. (Desktop >= 2025.11.0)
+## - "pm-26340-linux-biometrics-v2": Enable the new implementation of biometrics on Linux. (Desktop >= 2025.11.0)
+## - "anon-addy-self-host-alias": Enable configuring self-hosted Anon Addy alias generator. (Android >= 2025.3.0, iOS >= 2025.4.0)
+## - "simple-login-self-host-alias": Enable configuring self-hosted Simple Login alias generator. (Android >= 2025.3.0, iOS >= 2025.4.0)
+## - "mutual-tls": Enable the use of mutual TLS on Android (Clients >= 2025.2.0)
+## - "cxp-import-mobile": Enable the import via CXP on iOS (Clients >= 2025.9.2)
+## - "cxp-export-mobile": Enable the export via CXP on iOS (Clients >= 2025.9.2)
+## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins":
 ## - "pm-32009-new-item-types": Enable new item types: Bank Account, Driver's License, and Passport (Clients >= 2026.4.0)
 ## - "pm-34171-card-scanner": Enable the new card scanner feature on mobile (Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.4.1)
+## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-1": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
+## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-2": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
+## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-3": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
+## - "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-4": Special feature flag for desktop UI (Desktop >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "enable-basic-auth-response": Enable HTTP Basic Auth autofill in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.9.0)
-## - "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic": Enable the rewritten add/update login notification triggering logic in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.2.0)
-## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
-## - "windows-native-credential-sync": Register the desktop app as a passkey provider in Windows, so passkeys in the vault can be used by other apps and browsers.
-##   Requires the Microsoft Store (appx) build of the desktop app. Stable releases up to and including 2026.9.1 lack the required plugin registration, so it has no effect there yet.
-## - "macos-native-credential-sync": Enable the desktop app as a passkey provider on macOS, so passkeys in the vault can be used by other apps and browsers.
-## - "pm-27278-v2-password-registration": Register new accounts with v2 encryption. (Web >= 2026.6.4, Desktop/Browser/CLI >= 2026.7.0, Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.5.1)
-## - "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration": Give SSO users who set their master password on their first login v2 encryption. (Web >= 2026.1.1, Desktop/Browser/CLI >= 2026.1.0, Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.6.0)
-##   These two flags can't be undone: a v2 account stays v2, and it can only log in from clients that are 2026.10.1 or newer (2026.10.2 for the desktop app), so the versions above are only enough to create one.
 # EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=

 ## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.
@@ -475,7 +469,7 @@

 ## Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!)
 ## https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/connect-src
-## Allows other domains for URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
+## Allows other domains to URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
 ## This adds the configured value to the 'Content-Security-Policy' headers 'connect-src' value.
 ## Multiple values must be separated with a whitespace. And only HTTPS values are allowed.
 ## Example: "https://my-addy-io.domain.tld https://my-simplelogin.domain.tld"
@@ -501,15 +495,6 @@
 ## KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING!
 # ORG_GROUPS_ENABLED=false

-## EXPERIMENTAL FEATURE: Custom roles
-## Enables the Custom member role with granular permissions for organizations.
-## This is still being developed: only the permissions this version enforces can be granted.
-## This is enforced by the server and is unrelated to EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS.
-## Disabling it again keeps the stored Custom roles and permissions, but they grant nothing until it is re-enabled.
-## Disabled by default because this is an experimental feature!
-## KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING!
-# EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES=false
-
 ## Increase secure note size limit (Know the risks!)
 ## Sets the secure note size limit to 100_000 instead of the default 10_000.
 ## WARNING: This could cause issues with clients. Also exports will not work on Bitwarden servers!
@@ -602,6 +587,11 @@
 # DUO_HOST=<API Hostname>
 ## After that, you should be able to follow the rest of the guide linked above,
 ## ignoring the fields that ask for the values that you already configured beforehand.
+##
+## If you want to attempt to use Duo's 'Traditional Prompt' (deprecated, iframe based) set DUO_USE_IFRAME to 'true'.
+## Duo no longer supports this, but it still works for some integrations.
+## If you aren't sure, leave this alone.
+# DUO_USE_IFRAME=false

 ## Email 2FA settings
 ## Email token size
@@ -627,9 +617,6 @@
 ## Note that the checkbox would still be present, but ignored.
 # DISABLE_2FA_REMEMBER=false
 ##
-## Number of days before a remembered 2FA login expires (min: 1, max: 90).
-# TWO_FACTOR_REMEMBER_DAYS=30
-##
 ## Authenticator Settings
 ## Disable authenticator time drifted codes to be valid.
 ## TOTP codes of the previous and next 30 seconds will be invalid
@@ -638,7 +625,7 @@
 ## we allow by default the TOTP code which was valid one step back and one in the future.
 ## This can however allow attackers to be a bit more lucky with their attempts because there are 3 valid codes.
 ## You can disable this, so that only the current TOTP Code is allowed.
-## Keep in mind that when a server drifts out of time, valid codes could be marked as invalid.
+## Keep in mind that when a sever drifts out of time, valid codes could be marked as invalid.
 ## In any case, if a code has been used it can not be used again, also codes which predates it will be invalid.
 # AUTHENTICATOR_DISABLE_TIME_DRIFT=false

@@ -57,25 +57,7 @@ jobs:
    steps:
      # Install dependencies
      - name: "Install dependencies Ubuntu"
-        run: |
-          # Separate commands, so a failing update fails the step. The image already has Oracle's MySQL client
-          # library, so a skipped install would otherwise go unnoticed and build against that one.
-          sudo apt-get update
-          sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends openssl build-essential libmariadb-dev-compat libpq-dev libssl-dev pkg-config
-
-          # Pass the MariaDB client library to mysqlclient-sys through its environment variables.
-          # When it finds the library with pkg-config, its build script makes cargo rerun it whenever
-          # anything in the library directory changes, and the install above changes that directory on
-          # every run. So every MySQL build recompiled mysqlclient-sys, diesel and diesel_migrations,
-          # even with a cached build. Cargo compares environment variables by their value instead.
-          lib_dir="$(pkg-config --variable=libdir mysqlclient)"
-          version="$(pkg-config --modversion mysqlclient)"
-          {
-            echo "MYSQLCLIENT_NO_PKG_CONFIG=1"
-            echo "LIBMARIADB_NO_PKG_CONFIG=1"
-            echo "MYSQLCLIENT_LIB_DIR=${lib_dir}"
-            echo "MYSQLCLIENT_VERSION=${version}"
-          } | tee -a "${GITHUB_ENV}"
+        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends openssl build-essential libmariadb-dev-compat libpq-dev libssl-dev pkg-config
      # End Install dependencies

      # Checkout the repo
@@ -131,26 +113,28 @@ jobs:

      # Enable Rust Caching
      - name: Rust Caching
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@6323deb102c322ba6fcbdcafc7e3dddab59af2b6 # v2.9.2
        with:
          # Use a custom prefix-key to force a fresh start. This is sometimes needed with bigger changes.
          # Like changing the build host from Ubuntu 20.04 to 22.04 for example.
          # Only update when really needed! Use a <year>.<month>[.<inc>] format.
-          prefix-key: "v2026.11-rust"
-          # Only main saves caches. The repository can keep 10 GB of caches, and the ones saved by pull
-          # requests and other branches were mostly copies of main's that pushed other caches out.
-          save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
+          prefix-key: "v2025.09-rust"
      # End Enable Rust Caching

      # Run cargo tests
      # First test all features together, afterwards test them separately.
-      # enable_mimalloc only selects the allocator, so it is tested on and off, not with every combination.
      - name: "test features: sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3"
        id: test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql_mimalloc_s3
        if: ${{ !cancelled() }}
        run: |
          cargo test --profile ci --features sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3

+      - name: "test features: sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc"
+        id: test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql_mimalloc
+        if: ${{ !cancelled() }}
+        run: |
+          cargo test --profile ci --features sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc
+
      - name: "test features: sqlite,mysql,postgresql"
        id: test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql
        if: ${{ !cancelled() }}
@@ -174,13 +158,6 @@ jobs:
        if: ${{ !cancelled() }}
        run: |
          cargo test --profile ci --features postgresql
-
-      # The test seeder only exists with this feature, which no release build has
-      - name: "test features: sqlite,unsafe_test_mode"
-        id: test_unsafe_test_mode
-        if: ${{ !cancelled() }}
-        run: |
-          cargo test --profile ci --features sqlite,unsafe_test_mode
      # End Run cargo tests


@@ -190,12 +167,6 @@ jobs:
        if: ${{ !cancelled() && matrix.channel == 'rust-toolchain' }}
        run: |
          cargo clippy --profile ci --features sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3
-
-      - name: "clippy features: sqlite,unsafe_test_mode"
-        id: clippy_unsafe_test_mode
-        if: ${{ !cancelled() && matrix.channel == 'rust-toolchain' }}
-        run: |
-          cargo clippy --profile ci --features sqlite,unsafe_test_mode
      # End Run cargo clippy


@@ -214,13 +185,12 @@ jobs:
        if: ${{ failure() }}
        env:
          TEST_DB_M_S3: ${{ steps.test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql_mimalloc_s3.outcome }}
+          TEST_DB_M: ${{ steps.test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql_mimalloc.outcome }}
          TEST_DB: ${{ steps.test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql.outcome }}
          TEST_SQLITE: ${{ steps.test_sqlite.outcome }}
          TEST_MYSQL: ${{ steps.test_mysql.outcome }}
          TEST_POSTGRESQL: ${{ steps.test_postgresql.outcome }}
-          TEST_UNSAFE_TEST_MODE: ${{ steps.test_unsafe_test_mode.outcome }}
          CLIPPY: ${{ steps.clippy.outcome }}
-          CLIPPY_UNSAFE_TEST_MODE: ${{ steps.clippy_unsafe_test_mode.outcome }}
          FMT: ${{ steps.formatting.outcome }}
        run: |
          echo "### :x: Checks Failed!" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
@@ -228,13 +198,12 @@ jobs:
          echo "|Job|Status|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
          echo "|---|------|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
          echo "|test (sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3)|${TEST_DB_M_S3}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
+          echo "|test (sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc)|${TEST_DB_M}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
          echo "|test (sqlite,mysql,postgresql)|${TEST_DB}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
          echo "|test (sqlite)|${TEST_SQLITE}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
          echo "|test (mysql)|${TEST_MYSQL}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
          echo "|test (postgresql)|${TEST_POSTGRESQL}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
-          echo "|test (sqlite,unsafe_test_mode)|${TEST_UNSAFE_TEST_MODE}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
          echo "|clippy (sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3)|${CLIPPY}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
-          echo "|clippy (sqlite,unsafe_test_mode)|${CLIPPY_UNSAFE_TEST_MODE}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
          echo "|fmt|${FMT}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
          echo "" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
          echo "Please check the failed jobs and fix where needed." >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Docker Hub
      - name: Login to Docker Hub
-        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
        with:
          username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
          password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to GitHub Container Registry
      - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
        with:
          registry: ghcr.io
          username: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Quay.io
      - name: Login to Quay.io
-        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
        with:
          registry: quay.io
          username: ${{ secrets.QUAY_USERNAME }}
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ jobs:

      - name: Bake ${{ matrix.base_image }} containers
        id: bake_vw
-        uses: docker/bake-action@59cb1203cd42bcefd40a1b6d73b589e48c86040e # v7.5.0
+        uses: docker/bake-action@018cb6412ab401ebaa809aa5f85966b74628600f # v7.4.0
        env:
          BASE_TAGS: "${{ steps.determine-version.outputs.BASE_TAGS }}"
          SOURCE_COMMIT: "${{ env.SOURCE_COMMIT }}"
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ jobs:
          touch "${RUNNER_TEMP}/digests/${digest#sha256:}"

      - name: Upload digest
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
        with:
          name: digests-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}-${{ matrix.base_image }}
          path: ${{ runner.temp }}/digests/*
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ jobs:
          subject-path: vaultwarden-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}

      - name: Upload binaries as artifacts
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
        with:
          name: vaultwarden-${{ env.SOURCE_VERSION }}-linux-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}-${{ matrix.base_image }}
          path: vaultwarden-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ jobs:

    steps:
      - name: Download digests
-        uses: actions/download-artifact@9000827ccba6bdab643e8b6fd33ac0654aef8333 # v8.0.2
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
        with:
          path: ${{ runner.temp }}/digests
          pattern: digests-*-${{ matrix.base_image }}
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Docker Hub
      - name: Login to Docker Hub
-        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
        with:
          username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
          password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to GitHub Container Registry
      - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
        with:
          registry: ghcr.io
          username: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Quay.io
      - name: Login to Quay.io
-        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
        with:
          registry: quay.io
          username: ${{ secrets.QUAY_USERNAME }}
@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-name: SDK live tests
-permissions: {}
-
-# Runs the live-server end-to-end tests of bitwarden/sdk-internal against this branch, see tools/sdk-live-tests/run.sh.
-# By default it tests the latest @bitwarden/sdk-internal on npm, which the SDK publishes for every commit to its main
-# branch, with the e2e tests from that commit. A manual run can name an npm version instead, or a branch, tag or commit
-# to build the SDK from. It runs daily, by hand, and on changes to the test seeder or the runner.
-on:
-  schedule:
-    # 04:15 UTC, off the top of the hour, when GitHub may delay or drop scheduled runs
-    - cron: "15 4 * * *"
-  workflow_dispatch:
-    inputs:
-      sdk_npm_version:
-        description: "Version of @bitwarden/sdk-internal on npm to test (empty for the latest)"
-        required: false
-        default: ""
-      sdk_ref:
-        description: "Or a branch, tag or commit of bitwarden/sdk-internal to build and test (slower)"
-        required: false
-        default: ""
-  pull_request:
-    paths:
-      - ".github/workflows/sdk-live-tests.yml"
-      - "src/api/test_seeder.rs"
-      - "tools/sdk-live-tests/**"
-
-defaults:
-  run:
-    shell: bash
-
-jobs:
-  sdk-live-tests:
-    name: SDK live tests
-    runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
-    timeout-minutes: 90
-    env:
-      # Less to compile and link, and a smaller cache. Panics still show file and line.
-      CARGO_PROFILE_DEV_DEBUG: "0"
-    steps:
-      - name: "Install dependencies Ubuntu"
-        run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends build-essential libssl-dev pkg-config
-
-      - name: "Checkout"
-        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
-        with:
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      # A published package (npm) or a build from a git ref (git), and the sdk-internal commit to check out
-      - name: "Pick the SDK"
-        id: sdk
-        env:
-          NPM_VERSION: ${{ inputs.sdk_npm_version }}
-          GIT_REF: ${{ inputs.sdk_ref }}
-        run: |
-          if [[ -n "${NPM_VERSION}" && -n "${GIT_REF}" ]]; then
-            echo "::error::Give an npm version or a git ref, not both"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          if [[ -n "${GIT_REF}" ]]; then
-            {
-              echo "source=git"
-              echo "ref=${GIT_REF}"
-            } >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
-            echo "SDK: bitwarden/sdk-internal \`${GIT_REF}\`, built from source" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
-            exit 0
-          fi
-          spec="${NPM_VERSION:-latest}"
-          if [[ ! "${spec}" =~ ^[0-9A-Za-z.+-]+$ ]]; then
-            echo "::error::That is not an npm version or tag"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          manifest="$(curl -fsS --retry 3 "https://registry.npmjs.org/@bitwarden%2Fsdk-internal/${spec}")"
-          version="$(jq -r .version <<< "${manifest}")"
-          commit="$(jq -r .gitHead <<< "${manifest}")"
-          if [[ ! "${commit}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]; then
-            echo "::error::@bitwarden/sdk-internal@${version} doesn't name the commit it was built from"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-          {
-            echo "source=npm"
-            echo "version=${version}"
-            echo "ref=${commit}"
-          } >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
-          echo "SDK: @bitwarden/sdk-internal ${version} from npm, e2e tests at ${commit}" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
-
-      - name: "Checkout sdk-internal"
-        uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
-        with:
-          repository: bitwarden/sdk-internal
-          ref: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.ref }}
-          path: sdk-internal
-          persist-credentials: false
-
-      # Each checkout pins its own toolchain in rust-toolchain.toml. The SDK's is only needed to build it.
-      - name: "Install toolchains"
-        env:
-          SDK_SOURCE: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.source }}
-        run: |
-          rustup toolchain install
-          if [[ "${SDK_SOURCE}" == git ]]; then
-            cd sdk-internal
-            rustup toolchain install
-            rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown
-            rustup component add rust-src
-          fi
-
-      # One cache per SDK source, so that neither restores the other's
-      - name: "Cache Rust builds"
-        if: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.source == 'npm' }}
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3
-        with:
-          key: sdk-live-tests-npm
-          add-job-id-key: false
-          workspaces: ". -> target"
-
-      - name: "Cache Rust builds (with the SDK)"
-        if: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.source == 'git' }}
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3
-        with:
-          key: sdk-live-tests-sdk-build
-          add-job-id-key: false
-          workspaces: |
-            . -> target
-            sdk-internal -> target
-
-      - name: "Setup Node"
-        uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7.0.0
-        with:
-          node-version-file: sdk-internal/.nvmrc
-
-      # Where the SDK's build would put it
-      - name: "Download the SDK package"
-        if: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.source == 'npm' }}
-        env:
-          SDK_VERSION: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.version }}
-          SDK_COMMIT: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.ref }}
-        run: |
-          # npm checks the tarball against the registry's checksum
-          tarball="$(npm pack "@bitwarden/sdk-internal@${SDK_VERSION}" --pack-destination "${RUNNER_TEMP}" --json | jq -r '.[0].filename')"
-          package_dir=sdk-internal/crates/bitwarden-wasm-internal/npm
-          tar -xzf "${RUNNER_TEMP}/${tarball}" --strip-components=1 -C "${package_dir}"
-          if [[ "$(cat "${package_dir}/VERSION")" != "${SDK_COMMIT}" ]]; then
-            echo "::error::The package's VERSION doesn't match its commit ${SDK_COMMIT}"
-            exit 1
-          fi
-
-      - name: "Run the SDK live tests"
-        env:
-          SDK_SOURCE: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.source }}
-        run: |
-          args=(--sdk-dir sdk-internal)
-          if [[ "${SDK_SOURCE}" == npm ]]; then
-            args+=(--skip-sdk-build)
-          fi
-          tools/sdk-live-tests/run.sh "${args[@]}"
-
-      - name: "Upload logs"
-        if: ${{ !cancelled() }}
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
-        with:
-          name: sdk-live-tests-logs
-          path: target/sdk-live-tests/**/*.log
@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ jobs:
          severity: CRITICAL,HIGH

      - name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 # v4.39.1
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@1c5b675653bb5c22dbe9b12b556ec555138e09fd # v4.38.1
        with:
          sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ jobs:

      # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.pre-commit-config.yaml` too
      - name: Spell Check Repo
-        uses: crate-ci/typos@7f9d0819ca1c008ade73f4b41fa9d258d48f605b # v1.51.1
+        uses: crate-ci/typos@512fc24f32f44ab01972217aaaf3dc86ec234d53 # v1.50.2
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
          persist-credentials: false

      - name: Run zizmor
-        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@53290badfa369cb0bf7ad16342cb62c2fa47ac7b # v0.8.0
+        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@cc914d7f3750a2d13d75c7f184a1060aa0e9d482 # v0.6.4
        with:
          # intentionally not scanning the entire repository,
          # since it contains integration tests.
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ repos:

  # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.github/workflows/typos.yaml` too
  - repo: https://github.com/crate-ci/typos
-    rev: 7f9d0819ca1c008ade73f4b41fa9d258d48f605b # v1.51.1
+    rev: 512fc24f32f44ab01972217aaaf3dc86ec234d53 # v1.50.2
    hooks:
      - id: typos
        always_run: true
@@ -14,8 +14,11 @@ extend-ignore-re = [
    # In SMTP it's called HELO, so ignore it
    "(?i)helo_name",
    "Server name sent during.+HELO",
-    # COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
-    "(?i)cose",
+    # COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption, ignore these specific items
+    "COSE",
+    "COSEKey",
+    "COSEAlgorithm",
+    "CoseEncrypt0",
    # Ignore this specific string as it's valid
    "Ensure they are valid OTPs",
    # This word is misspelled upstream
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [workspace.package]
 edition = "2024"
-rust-version = "1.97.1"
+rust-version = "1.96.1"
 license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
 repository = "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden"
 publish = false
@@ -57,9 +57,6 @@ oidc-accept-string-booleans = ["openidconnect/accept-string-booleans"]
 # Currently only used to enable rusts official ip support
 unstable = []

-# Enables special test mode features. This should NEVER be enabled in production
-unsafe_test_mode = ["dep:serde_cbor_2"]
-
 [target."cfg(unix)".dependencies]
 nix = { version = "0.31.3", features = ["fs"] }
 # Logging
@@ -69,7 +66,7 @@ syslog = "7.0.0"
 macros = { path = "./macros" }

 # Logging
-log = "0.4.35"
+log = "0.4.34"
 fern = { version = "0.7.1", features = ["syslog-7", "reopen-1"] }
 # We need the `log` feature for `tracing` to enable logging for several crates to work, like lettre or webauthn-rs
 tracing = { version = "0.1.44", features = ["log"] }
@@ -80,10 +77,10 @@ dotenvy = { version = "0.15.7", default-features = false }
 # Numerical libraries
 num-traits = "0.2.19"
 num-derive = "0.5.1"
-bigdecimal = "0.4.11"
+bigdecimal = "0.4.10"

 # Web framework
-rocket = { version = "0.5.2", default-features = false, features = ["json", "tls"] }
+rocket = { version = "0.5.1", default-features = false, features = ["json", "tls"] }
 rocket_ws = { version = "0.1.1" }

 # WebSockets libraries
@@ -94,7 +91,7 @@ dashmap = "6.2.1"

 # Async futures
 futures = "0.3.34"
-tokio = { version = "1.54.1", features = [
+tokio = { version = "1.53.1", features = [
    "fs",
    "io-util",
    "net",
@@ -103,14 +100,14 @@ tokio = { version = "1.54.1", features = [
    "signal",
    "time",
 ] }
-tokio-util = { version = "0.7.20", features = ["compat"] }
+tokio-util = { version = "0.7.19", features = ["compat"] }

 # A generic serialization/deserialization framework
 serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
-serde_json = "1.0.154"
+serde_json = "1.0.151"

 # A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
-diesel = { version = "2.3.14", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric", "64-column-tables"] }
+diesel = { version = "2.3.13", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric", "64-column-tables"] }
 diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"

 derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
@@ -126,13 +123,13 @@ diesel-derive-newtype = "2.1.3"
 libsqlite3-sys = { version = "0.38.2", optional = true }

 # Crypto-related libraries
-rand = "0.10.3"
+rand = "0.10.2"
 ring = "0.17.14"
-rustls = { version = "0.23.46", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
+rustls = { version = "0.23.45", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
 subtle = "2.6.1"

 # UUID generation
-uuid = { version = "1.29.0", features = ["v4"] }
+uuid = { version = "1.26.1", features = ["v4"] }

 # Date and time libraries
 chrono = { version = "0.4.45", default-features = false, features = ["clock", "serde"] }
@@ -160,7 +157,6 @@ yubico_ng = { version = "1.0.0", default-features = false }
 webauthn-rs = { version = "0.5.5", features = ["danger-allow-state-serialisation", "danger-credential-internals"] }
 webauthn-rs-proto = "0.5.5"
 webauthn-rs-core = "0.5.5"
-serde_cbor_2 = { version = "0.13.0", optional = true }

 # Handling of URL's for WebAuthn and favicons
 url = "2.5.8"
@@ -208,7 +204,7 @@ reqwest = { version = "0.13.5", default-features = false, features = [
 hickory-resolver = "0.26.3"

 # Favicon extraction libraries
-html5gum = "0.9.0"
+html5gum = "0.8.4"
 regex = { version = "1.13.1", default-features = false, features = [
    "perf",
    "std",
@@ -219,7 +215,7 @@ bytes = "1.12.1"
 svg-hush = "0.9.7"

 # Cache function results (Used for version check and favicon fetching)
-cached = { version = "4.1.0", features = ["async"] }
+cached = { version = "4.0.0", features = ["async"] }

 # Used for custom short lived cookie jar during favicon extraction
 cookie = "0.18.2"
@@ -239,7 +235,7 @@ governor = "0.10.4"
 ipnet = "2.12.2"

 # OIDC for SSO
-openidconnect = { version = "4.1.0", default-features = false }
+openidconnect = { version = "4.0.1", default-features = false }
 moka = { version = "0.12.16", features = ["future"] }

 # Check client versions for specific features.
@@ -261,21 +257,21 @@ rpassword = "7.5.4"
 grass_compiler = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false }

 # File are accessed through Apache OpenDAL
-opendal = { version = "0.59.5", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
-opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.5", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
+opendal = { version = "0.59.2", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
+opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.2", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }

 # For retrieving AWS credentials, including temporary SSO credentials
-aws-config = { version = "1.13.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
+aws-config = { version = "1.12.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
    "behavior-version-latest",
    "credentials-process",
    "rt-tokio",
    "sso",
 ] }
-aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.1", optional = true }
-aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.19.2", optional = true }
+aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0", optional = true }
+aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.16.2", optional = true }
 http = { version = "1.5.0", optional = true }
-reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.3.1", optional = true }
-reqsign-core = { version = "3.3.2", optional = true }
+reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.3.0", optional = true }
+reqsign-core = { version = "3.3.1", optional = true }

 # Strip debuginfo from the release builds
 # The debug symbols are to provide better panic traces
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ---
-vault_version: "v2026.10.1"
-vault_image_digest: "sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52"
-# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.10.0
+vault_version: "v2026.7.0"
+vault_image_digest: "sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c"
+# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.9.0
 # We use the linux/amd64 platform shell scripts since there is no difference between the different platform scripts
 # https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx | https://hub.docker.com/r/tonistiigi/xx/tags
-xx_image_digest: "sha256:40fe21f44bb8cddf1eb1226db190d0a984118f62ee02a91b77d99448d28264a6"
+xx_image_digest: "sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707"
 # The `rust_version` variable is extracted from `rust-toolchain.toml`
 # rust_version: x.yy.z # Rust version to be used
 debian_version: trixie # Debian release name to be used
@@ -19,23 +19,23 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52]
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1]
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52 AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault

 ########################## ALPINE BUILD IMAGES ##########################
 ## NOTE: The Alpine Base Images do not support other platforms then linux/amd64 and linux/arm64
 ## And for Alpine we define all build images here, they will only be loaded when actually used
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.99.1 AS build_amd64
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.99.1 AS build_arm64
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.99.1 AS build_armv7
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.99.1 AS build_armv6
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.98.1 AS build_amd64
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.98.1 AS build_arm64
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.98.1 AS build_armv7
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.98.1 AS build_armv6

 ########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
 # hadolint ignore=DL3006
@@ -19,24 +19,24 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52]
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1]
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52 AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault

 ########################## Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts ##########################
 ## We use the linux/amd64 no matter which Build Platform, since these are all bash scripts
 ## And these bash scripts do not have any significant difference if at all
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:40fe21f44bb8cddf1eb1226db190d0a984118f62ee02a91b77d99448d28264a6 AS xx
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707 AS xx

 ########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
 # hadolint ignore=DL3006
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.99.1-slim-trixie AS build
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.98.1-slim-trixie AS build
 # hadolint ignore=DL3067
 COPY --from=xx / /
 ARG TARGETARCH
@@ -102,16 +102,8 @@ RUN . /env-cargo && \
    # https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/discussions/7522
    if xx-info is-cross; then \
        XX_RUSTFLAGS="-C link-arg=-Wl,-rpath-link,/usr/lib/$(xx-info triple)"; \
+        export XX_RUSTFLAGS; \
    fi && \
-    # Debian's GCC adds a special fix for cortex-a53 arch's which gets losts when using xx-cargo, which uses clang
-    # Checking if the arch is arm64 and adding this extra link-arg should cause this fix to be applied
-    # This should fix issues reported when running on a RPi3 which is a Cortex-A35 chip
-    # See: https://salsa.debian.org/toolchain-team/gcc/-/blob/master/debian/rules2?pow_referer=#L543-548
-    # See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/7754
-    if [ "$(xx-info arch)" = "arm64" ]; then \
-        XX_RUSTFLAGS="${XX_RUSTFLAGS} -Clink-arg=-Wl,--fix-cortex-a53-843419"; \
-    fi && \
-    export XX_RUSTFLAGS && \
    PKG_CONFIG="$(command -v "$(xx-info)-pkg-config")" xx-cargo build --features ${DB} --profile "${CARGO_PROFILE}" && \
    find . -not -path "./target*" -delete

@@ -132,16 +124,8 @@ RUN . /env-cargo && \
    # https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/discussions/7522
    if xx-info is-cross; then \
        XX_RUSTFLAGS="-C link-arg=-Wl,-rpath-link,/usr/lib/$(xx-info triple)"; \
+        export XX_RUSTFLAGS; \
    fi && \
-    # Debian's GCC adds a special fix for cortex-a53 arch's which gets losts when using xx-cargo, which uses clang
-    # Checking if the arch is arm64 and adding this extra link-arg should cause this fix to be applied
-    # This should fix issues reported when running on a RPi3 which is a Cortex-A35 chip
-    # See: https://salsa.debian.org/toolchain-team/gcc/-/blob/master/debian/rules2?pow_referer=#L543-548
-    # See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/7754
-    if [ "$(xx-info arch)" = "arm64" ]; then \
-        XX_RUSTFLAGS="${XX_RUSTFLAGS} -Clink-arg=-Wl,--fix-cortex-a53-843419"; \
-    fi && \
-    export XX_RUSTFLAGS && \
    PKG_CONFIG="$(command -v "$(xx-info)-pkg-config")" xx-cargo build --features ${DB} --profile "${CARGO_PROFILE}" && \
    if [ "${CARGO_PROFILE}" = "dev" ] ; then \
        ln -vfsr "/app/target/${CARGO_TARGET}/debug" /app/target/final ; \
@@ -33,16 +33,8 @@
    # https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/discussions/7522
    if xx-info is-cross; then \
        XX_RUSTFLAGS="-C link-arg=-Wl,-rpath-link,/usr/lib/$(xx-info triple)"; \
+        export XX_RUSTFLAGS; \
    fi && \
-    # Debian's GCC adds a special fix for cortex-a53 arch's which gets losts when using xx-cargo, which uses clang
-    # Checking if the arch is arm64 and adding this extra link-arg should cause this fix to be applied
-    # This should fix issues reported when running on a RPi3 which is a Cortex-A35 chip
-    # See: https://salsa.debian.org/toolchain-team/gcc/-/blob/master/debian/rules2?pow_referer=#L543-548
-    # See: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues/7754
-    if [ "$(xx-info arch)" = "arm64" ]; then \
-        XX_RUSTFLAGS="${XX_RUSTFLAGS} -Clink-arg=-Wl,--fix-cortex-a53-843419"; \
-    fi && \
-    export XX_RUSTFLAGS && \
    PKG_CONFIG="$(command -v "$(xx-info)-pkg-config")" xx-cargo build --features ${DB} --profile "${CARGO_PROFILE}"
 {%- endmacro %}
 FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@{{ vault_image_digest }} AS vault
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ Some unsupported platforms for Debian based images. These are not built and test
 - 386     (linux/386)
 - ppc64le (linux/ppc64le)
 - s390x   (linux/s390x)
- riscv64 (linux/riscv64)

 To build these containers you need to enable QEMU binfmt support to be able to run/emulate architectures which are different then your host.<br>
 This ensures the container build process can run binaries from other architectures.<br>
@@ -148,12 +148,6 @@ target "debian-s390x" {
  platforms = ["linux/s390x"]
  tags = generate_tags("", "-s390x")
 }
-
-target "debian-riscv64" {
-  inherits = ["debian"]
-  platforms = ["linux/riscv64"]
-  tags = generate_tags("", "-riscv64")
-}
 // ==== End of unsupported Debian architecture targets ===

 // A Group to build all platforms individually for local testing
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ proc-macro = true

 [dependencies]
 quote = "1.0.47"
-syn = "3.0.9"
+syn = "3.0.6"

 [lints]
 workspace = true
@@ -3,3 +3,5 @@ DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;

 CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
    uuid                CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;
@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-- DATETIME (not TIMESTAMP) to match this repo's convention for revision_date
-- columns elsewhere, and to avoid MySQL's implicit session-timezone
-- conversion and 2038 range limit on TIMESTAMP.
-ALTER TABLE org_policies
-ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
-
-UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = UTC_TIMESTAMP();
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-- A blob-encrypted cipher keeps all of its content in `data`, up to 500,000 characters, so the
-- 64 KiB of TEXT is too small. Like upstream, which uses LONGTEXT.
-ALTER TABLE ciphers MODIFY data LONGTEXT NOT NULL;
@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-- Dropping the permissions would silently take them away from the Custom members, who would also keep a role (4) the
-- versions before this one don't know. So while there are any, this fails on the duplicate key below, before anything
-- is dropped: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade.
-- A failed attempt leaves the temporary table on this connection. Clear it before retrying.
-DROP TEMPORARY TABLE IF EXISTS custom_role_downgrade;
-CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
-    SELECT 'Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
-    FROM users_organizations WHERE atype = 4 LIMIT 1;
-DROP TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
-
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations
-    DROP COLUMN manage_users,
-    DROP COLUMN manage_groups,
-    DROP COLUMN manage_policies,
-    DROP COLUMN create_new_collections,
-    DROP COLUMN edit_any_collection,
-    DROP COLUMN delete_any_collection,
-    DROP COLUMN access_event_logs,
-    DROP COLUMN access_import_export,
-    DROP COLUMN access_reports;
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-- The granular permissions of the Custom member role. They only take effect on a Custom membership
-- (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and every existing membership starts without any.
-- A single statement, so an interrupted upgrade cannot leave only some of the columns behind.
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations
-    ADD COLUMN manage_users BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN manage_groups BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN manage_policies BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN create_new_collections BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN edit_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN delete_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN access_event_logs BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN access_import_export BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN access_reports BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-- Key rotations before this kept the id of the old user key, so every new
-- cipher was refused from then on. Stale ids can't be told apart, so clear
-- all of them; clients record their current key's id again when it's empty.
-UPDATE users SET key_id = NULL;
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
@@ -3,3 +3,5 @@ DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;

 CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
    uuid                CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;
@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-- Backfill via `now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc'` rather than a DEFAULT of now():
-- assigning timestamptz now() into a naive TIMESTAMP column casts through
-- the server's TimeZone GUC, so a DEFAULT now() would store local wall-clock
-- instead of UTC on non-UTC servers, unlike every other naive-UTC timestamp
-- column in this schema.
-ALTER TABLE org_policies
-ADD COLUMN revision_date TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
-
-UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = (now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc');
@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change.
-- PostgreSQL rejects a migration that is only comments ("Received an empty query"), hence the no-op.
-SELECT 1;
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-- Dropping the permissions would silently take them away from the Custom members, who would also keep a role (4) the
-- versions before this one don't know. So while there are any, this fails on the duplicate key below: change their
-- role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade. It needs to run in one transaction, as Diesel does.
-CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
-    SELECT 'Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
-    FROM users_organizations WHERE atype = 4 LIMIT 1;
-DROP TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
-
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations
-    DROP COLUMN manage_users,
-    DROP COLUMN manage_groups,
-    DROP COLUMN manage_policies,
-    DROP COLUMN create_new_collections,
-    DROP COLUMN edit_any_collection,
-    DROP COLUMN delete_any_collection,
-    DROP COLUMN access_event_logs,
-    DROP COLUMN access_import_export,
-    DROP COLUMN access_reports;
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-- The granular permissions of the Custom member role. They only take effect on a Custom membership
-- (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and every existing membership starts without any.
-- A single statement, so an interrupted upgrade cannot leave only some of the columns behind.
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations
-    ADD COLUMN manage_users BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN manage_groups BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN manage_policies BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN create_new_collections BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN edit_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN delete_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN access_event_logs BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN access_import_export BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
-    ADD COLUMN access_reports BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-- Key rotations before this kept the id of the old user key, so every new
-- cipher was refused from then on. Stale ids can't be told apart, so clear
-- all of them; clients record their current key's id again when it's empty.
-UPDATE users SET key_id = NULL;
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
@@ -3,3 +3,5 @@ DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
 ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
+ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
 ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
+ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;

 CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
    uuid                TEXT     NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-- SQLite forbids non-constant defaults in ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN, so add
-- the column with a constant placeholder and backfill separately.
-ALTER TABLE org_policies
-ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
-
-UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP;
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change
@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-- Dropping the permissions would silently take them away from the Custom members, who would also keep a role (4) the
-- versions before this one don't know. So while there are any, this fails on the duplicate key below: change their
-- role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade. It needs to run in one transaction, as Diesel does.
-CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
-INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
-    SELECT 'Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
-    FROM users_organizations WHERE atype = 4 LIMIT 1;
-DROP TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
-
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_users;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_groups;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_policies;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN create_new_collections;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN edit_any_collection;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN delete_any_collection;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN access_event_logs;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN access_import_export;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN access_reports;
@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-- The granular permissions of the Custom member role. They only take effect on a Custom membership
-- (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and every existing membership starts without any.
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_users BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_groups BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_policies BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN create_new_collections BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN edit_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN delete_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN access_event_logs BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN access_import_export BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN access_reports BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-- Key rotations before this kept the id of the old user key, so every new
-- cipher was refused from then on. Stale ids can't be told apart, so clear
-- all of them; clients record their current key's id again when it's empty.
-UPDATE users SET key_id = NULL;
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
-ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
-ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@

 This allows running integration tests using [Playwright](https://playwright.dev/).
 \
-It uses its own [test.env](./test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.
+It usse its own [test.env](/test/scenarios/test.env) with different ports to not collide with a running dev instance.

 ## Install

@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ DOCKER_BUILDKIT=1 docker compose --profile playwright --env-file test.env run Pl

 ### Keep services running

-If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak running (states are not impacted by the tests):
+If you want you can keep the DB and Keycloak runnning (states are not impacted by the tests):

 ```bash
 PW_KEEP_SERVICE_RUNNING=true npx playwright test
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-import { test, expect, type Page, type TestInfo, Test } from '@playwright/test';
-import { MailDev } from 'maildev';
-
-import * as utils from "../global-utils";
-import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
-import { activateTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
-
-let users = utils.loadEnv();
-let mailserver;
-
-test.beforeAll('Setup', async ({ browser }, testInfo: TestInfo) => {
-    mailserver = new MailDev({
-        port: process.env.MAILDEV_SMTP_PORT,
-        web: { port: process.env.MAILDEV_HTTP_PORT },
-    })
-
-    await mailserver.listen();
-
-    await utils.startVault(browser, testInfo, {
-        SMTP_HOST: process.env.MAILDEV_HOST,
-        SMTP_FROM: process.env.PW_SMTP_FROM,
-    });
-});
-
-test.afterAll('Teardown', async ({}) => {
-    utils.stopVault();
-    if( mailserver ){
-        await mailserver.close();
-    }
-});
-
-async function emergencyAccess(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string }) {
-    await test.step('Navigate', async () => {
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Emergency access' }).click();
-        await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Emergency access', { exact: true })).toBeVisible();
-    });
-}
-
-test('Emergency access', async ({ browser, page }) => {
-    const context2 = await browser.newContext();
-    const page2 = await context2.newPage();
-
-    const mailBuffer = mailserver.buffer(users.user1.email);
-    const mailBuffer2 = mailserver.buffer(users.user2.email);
-
-    await createAccount(test, page, users.user1);
-    await createAccount(test, page2, users.user2);
-
-    await test.step('Add test2', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add emergency contact' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email * (required)' }).fill(users.user2.email);
-        await page.getByRole('radio', { name: 'Takeover Can reset your' }).check();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'User(s) invited');
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Accept', async () => {
-        const email = await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access for " + users.user1.name);
-        const pageE = await context2.newPage();
-        await pageE.setContent(email.html);
-        const link = await pageE.getByTestId("emergency").getAttribute("href");
-        await pageE.close();
-
-        await page2.goto(link);
-        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Invitation accepted');
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Confirm', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Needs confirmation')).toBeVisible();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, users.user2.name + ' confirmed');
-        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access contact for " + users.user1.name + " confirmed");
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Request', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Emergency access requested');
-        await mailBuffer.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request by " + users.user2.name + " initiated");
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Approved', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access approved');
-        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request for " + users.user1.name + " approved");
-    });
-    await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
-
-    let newPassword = "TotoNewPassword";
-    await test.step('Access', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Takeover' }).click();
-        await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'New master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(newPassword);
-        await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Confirm new master password' }).fill(newPassword);
-        await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Password reset for ' + users.user1.name);
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Changed no 2fa', async () => {
-        users.user1.password = newPassword;
-        await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Reject', async () => {
-        await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Reject' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access rejected');
-        await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request to " + users.user1.name + " rejected");
-    });
-
-    await test.step('Remove', async () => {
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Remove' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Yes' }).click();
-        await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Removed user ' + users.user2.name);
-        await expect(page.getByText('You have not added any emergency contacts')).toBeVisible();
-    });
-});
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";

 import * as utils from "../global-utils";
 import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
-import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP, recoveryCodes } from './setups/2fa';
+import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP } from './setups/2fa';

 let users = utils.loadEnv();
 let totp;
@@ -31,42 +31,21 @@ test('Authenticator 2fa', async ({ page }) => {

    await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);

-    await logUser(test, page, users.user1, { totp });
-
-    await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
-});
-
-test('Recovery codes', async ({ context, page }) => {
-    await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
-
-    await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
-    let recovery = await recoveryCodes(test, page, users.user1);
-
-    await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
-
    await test.step('login', async () => {
+        let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
+        timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
+
        await page.getByLabel(/Email address/).fill(users.user1.email);
        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(users.user1.password);
        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();

        await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
+        await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate({timestamp}));
+        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();

        await expect(page).toHaveTitle(/Vaultwarden Web/);
-
-        const newPagePromise = context.waitForEvent('page');
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Use your recovery code' }).click();
-        const newPage = await newPagePromise;
-
-        const tabs = context.pages();
-        await tabs[1].bringToFront();
-        await expect(tabs[1].getByRole('heading', { name: 'Recover account two-step login' })).toBeVisible();
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email address * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.email);
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.password);
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Recovery code * (required)' }).fill(recovery);
-        await tabs[1].getByRole('button', { name: 'Submit' }).click();
-
-        await expect(tabs[1]).toHaveTitle(/Two-step login/);
-    });
    });

+    await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
+});
@@ -4,24 +4,6 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";

 import * as utils from '../../global-utils';

-export async function recoveryCodes(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): string {
-    return await test.step('Recovery code', async () => {
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Security' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Two-step login' }).click();
-
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'View recovery code' }).click();
-        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
-        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
-
-        const recovery = await page.getByRole('code').innerText();
-        await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
-
-        return recovery;
-    })
-}
-
 export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): OTPAuth.TOTP {
    return await test.step('Activate TOTP 2FA', async () => {
        await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
@@ -39,6 +21,7 @@ export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string,
        await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate());
        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Turn on' }).click();
        await page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Turned on', exact: true });
+        await page.getByLabel('Close').click();

        return totp;
    })
@@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ import { expect, type Browser, Page } from '@playwright/test';

 import { type MailBuffer } from 'maildev';

-import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
 import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
 import { retrieveEmailCode } from './2fa';

@@ -44,7 +43,6 @@ export async function logUser(
        mailBuffer ?: MailBuffer,
        mail2fa?: boolean,
        notNewDevice?: boolean,
-        totp?: OTPAuth.TOTP,
    } = {}
 ) {
    await test.step(`Log user ${user.email}`, async () => {
@@ -57,23 +55,11 @@ export async function logUser(
        await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
        await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();

-        if( options.mail2fa || options.totp ){
-            let code;
-
+        if( options.mail2fa ){
            await test.step('2FA check', async () => {
                await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
-
-                if( options.totp ) {
-                    const totp = options.totp;
-                    let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
-                    timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
-                    code = totp.generate({timestamp});
-                } else if( options.mail2fa ){
-                    code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
-                }
-
+                let code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
                await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(code);
-
                await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
            });
        }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 [toolchain]
-channel = "1.99.1"
+channel = "1.98.1"
 components = [ "rustfmt", "clippy" ]
 profile = "minimal"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use std::{collections::HashMap, env, sync::LazyLock};
+use std::{env, sync::LazyLock};

 use reqwest::Method;
 use rocket::{
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ use crate::{
    api::{
        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify,
        core::{log_event, two_factor},
-        push_logout_to_relay, unregister_push_device,
+        unregister_push_device,
    },
    auth::{ClientIp, Secure, decode_admin, encode_jwt, generate_admin_claims},
    config::ConfigBuilder,
@@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ use crate::{
        models::{
            Attachment, Cipher, Collection, Device, Event, EventType, Group, Invitation, Membership, MembershipId,
            MembershipType, OrgPolicy, Organization, OrganizationId, SsoUser, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
-            custom_roles_enabled,
        },
    },
    error::{Error, MapResult},
@@ -202,15 +201,12 @@ fn post_admin_login(
    // If the token is invalid, redirect to login page
    if validate_token(&data.token) {
        // If the token received is valid, generate JWT and save it as a cookie
-        let claims = match generate_admin_claims() {
-            Ok(claims) => claims,
-            Err(e) => return Err(AdminResponse::Ok(render_admin_login(Some(e.message()), redirect.as_deref()))),
-        };
+        let claims = generate_admin_claims();
        let jwt = encode_jwt(&claims);

        let cookie = Cookie::build((COOKIE_NAME, jwt))
            .path(admin_path())
-            .max_age(time::Duration::minutes(i64::from(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime())))
+            .max_age(time::Duration::minutes(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime()))
            .same_site(SameSite::Strict)
            .http_only(true)
            .secure(secure.https);
@@ -257,7 +253,6 @@ struct AdminTemplateData {
    logged_in: bool,
    urlpath: String,
    sso_enabled: bool,
-    custom_roles_enabled: bool,
 }

 impl AdminTemplateData {
@@ -268,7 +263,6 @@ impl AdminTemplateData {
            logged_in: true,
            urlpath: CONFIG.domain_path(),
            sso_enabled: CONFIG.sso_enabled(),
-            custom_roles_enabled: custom_roles_enabled(),
        }
    }

@@ -393,18 +387,6 @@ async fn users_overview(_token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<Html<Stri

        usr["sso_identifier"] = json!(sso_u.map_or(String::new(), |u| u.identifier.to_string()));

-        // The clients are shown a Manager as a Custom member, but the admin panel tells the two roles apart
-        let roles: HashMap<String, i32> = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(&u.uuid, &conn)
-            .await
-            .into_iter()
-            .map(|member| (member.org_uuid.to_string(), member.atype))
-            .collect();
-        for org in usr["organizations"].as_array_mut().into_iter().flatten() {
-            if let Some(atype) = org["id"].as_str().and_then(|org_id| roles.get(org_id)) {
-                org["type"] = json!(atype);
-            }
-        }
-
        users_json.push(usr);
    }

@@ -434,21 +416,13 @@ async fn get_user_json(user_id: UserId, _token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> Jso
 }

 #[post("/users/<user_id>/delete", format = "application/json")]
-async fn delete_user(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult {
+async fn delete_user(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    let user = get_user_or_404(&user_id, &conn).await?;

-    // Get the membership records and push devices before deleting the actual user
+    // Get the membership records before deleting the actual user
    let memberships = Membership::find_any_state_by_user(&user_id, &conn).await;
-    let has_push_device = CONFIG.push_enabled() && Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user_id, &conn).await;
    let res = user.delete(&conn).await;

-    if res.is_ok() {
-        nt.send_logout(&user, None, &conn).await;
-        if has_push_device {
-            push_logout_to_relay(&user, None, None);
-        }
-    }
-
    for membership in memberships {
        log_event(
            EventType::OrganizationUserDeleted,
@@ -534,7 +508,6 @@ async fn enable_user(user_id: UserId, _token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> Empty
 async fn remove_2fa(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    let mut user = get_user_or_404(&user_id, &conn).await?;
    TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
-    Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
    two_factor::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &ACTING_ADMIN_USER.into(), 14, &token.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
    user.totp_recover = None;
    user.save(&conn).await
@@ -580,14 +553,10 @@ async fn update_membership_type(data: Json<MembershipTypeData>, token: AdminToke
        err!("The specified user isn't member of the organization")
    };

-    let new_type = match MembershipType::from_str(&data.user_type.into_string()) {
-        // Unlike the clients, the admin panel tells the Custom and the legacy Manager role apart. Unless Custom roles
-        // are enabled, a Custom role is a Manager here as well, but an existing Custom member is kept as one.
-        Some(MembershipType::Custom) if !custom_roles_enabled() && !member_to_edit.has_type(MembershipType::Custom) => {
-            MembershipType::Manager
-        }
-        Some(new_type) => new_type,
-        None => err!("Invalid type"),
+    let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = MembershipType::from_str(&data.user_type.into_string()) {
+        new_type as i32
+    } else {
+        err!("Invalid type")
    };

    if member_to_edit.atype == MembershipType::Owner && new_type != MembershipType::Owner {
@@ -597,16 +566,7 @@ async fn update_membership_type(data: Json<MembershipTypeData>, token: AdminToke
        }
    }

-    // A Manager only becomes a Custom member if that changes nothing they may do. Here they would keep the permissions
-    // they are shown with, the admin panel can't give up their access to all collections, so that is refused.
-    if new_type == MembershipType::Custom
-        && let Some(loss) =
-            member_to_edit.custom_role_conversion_loss(&member_to_edit.legacy_manager_permissions(), &conn).await
-    {
-        err!(loss)
-    }
-
-    member_to_edit.set_type(new_type);
+    member_to_edit.atype = new_type;
    // This check is also done at api::organizations::{accept_invite, _confirm_invite, _activate_member, edit_member}, update_membership_type
    OrgPolicy::check_user_allowed(&member_to_edit, "modify", &conn).await?;

@@ -818,8 +778,6 @@ async fn diagnostics(_token: AdminToken, ip_header: IpHeader, conn: DbConn) -> A
    .into_keys()
    .collect();

-    let invalid_env_vars = crate::util::INVALID_ENV_VARS.lock().unwrap().join(", ");
-
    let diagnostics_json = json!({
        "dns_resolved": dns_resolved,
        "current_release": VERSION,
@@ -842,9 +800,7 @@ async fn diagnostics(_token: AdminToken, ip_header: IpHeader, conn: DbConn) -> A
        "db_version": get_sql_server_version(&conn).await,
        "admin_url": format!("{}/diagnostics", admin_url()),
        "overrides": &CONFIG.get_overrides().join(", "),
-        "config_file_status": &CONFIG.get_config_file_status(),
        "template_overrides": check_template_overrides().join(", "),
-        "invalid_env_vars": invalid_env_vars,
        "invalid_feature_flags": invalid_feature_flags,
        "host_arch": env::consts::ARCH,
        "host_os":  env::consts::OS,
@@ -949,23 +905,23 @@ mod tests {
    fn validate_web_vault_compare() {
        // web_vault_compare(active, latest)
        // Test normal versions
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0", "2025.12.1"), -1);
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1", "2025.12.1"), 0);
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2", "2025.12.1"), 1);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0", "2025.12.1") == -1);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1", "2025.12.1") == 0);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2", "2025.12.1") == 1);

        // Test patched/+build.n versions
        // Newer latest version
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0+build.1", "2025.12.1"), -1);
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1", "2025.12.1+build.1"), -1);
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1"), -1);
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.2"), -1);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0+build.1", "2025.12.1") == -1);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1", "2025.12.1+build.1") == -1);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.0+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1") == -1);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.2") == -1);
        // Equal versions
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1"), 0);
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2+build.2", "2025.12.2+build.2"), 0);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1") == 0);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2+build.2", "2025.12.2+build.2") == 0);
        // Newer active version
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1"), 1);
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2", "2025.12.1+build.1"), 1);
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1"), 1);
-        assert_eq!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.3", "2025.12.1+build.2"), 1);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.1", "2025.12.1") == 1);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2", "2025.12.1+build.1") == 1);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.2+build.1", "2025.12.1+build.1") == 1);
+        assert!(web_vault_compare("2025.12.1+build.3", "2025.12.1+build.2") == 1);
    }
 }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use chrono::Utc;
+use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 use serde_json::Value;

@@ -6,17 +6,14 @@ use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{
        EmptyResult, JsonResult,
-        core::{
-            CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType,
-            accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData},
-        },
+        core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType},
    },
    auth::{Headers, decode_emergency_access_invite},
    db::{
        DbConn, DbPool,
        models::{
-            Cipher, EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus,
-            EmergencyAccessType, Invitation, Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
+            Cipher, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType, Invitation,
+            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
        },
    },
    mail,
@@ -136,21 +133,19 @@ async fn post_emergency_access(

    let data: EmergencyAccessUpdateData = data.into_inner();

-    let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) else {
-        err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
-    };
-
-    if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&data.wait_time_days) {
-        err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
-    }
-
    let Some(mut emergency_access) =
        EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantor_uuid(&emer_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
    else {
        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
    };

-    emergency_access.atype = new_type as i32;
+    let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) {
+        new_type as i32
+    } else {
+        err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
+    };
+
+    emergency_access.atype = new_type;
    emergency_access.wait_time_days = data.wait_time_days;
    if data.key_encrypted.is_some() {
        emergency_access.key_encrypted = data.key_encrypted;
@@ -212,11 +207,11 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
    let email = data.email.to_lowercase();
    let wait_time_days = data.wait_time_days;

-    if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&wait_time_days) {
-        err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
-    }
+    let emergency_access_status = EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32;

-    let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) else {
+    let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) {
+        new_type as i32
+    } else {
        err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
    };

@@ -230,7 +225,7 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
    let (grantee_user, new_user) = match User::find_by_mail(&email, &conn).await {
        None => {
            if !CONFIG.invitations_allowed() {
-                err!(format!("Grantee user does not exist: {}", email.escape_debug()))
+                err!(format!("Grantee user does not exist: {email}"))
            }

            if !CONFIG.is_email_domain_allowed(&email) {
@@ -262,8 +257,6 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
        err!(format!("Grantee user already invited: {}", &grantee_user.email))
    }

-    let new_type = new_type as i32;
-    let emergency_access_status = EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32;
    let mut new_emergency_access =
        EmergencyAccess::new(grantor_user.uuid, grantee_user.email, emergency_access_status, new_type, wait_time_days);
    new_emergency_access.save(&conn).await?;
@@ -296,7 +289,7 @@ async fn resend_invite(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
    };

    if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32 {
-        err!("The grantee user is already accepted or confirmed for emergency access");
+        err!("The grantee user is already accepted or confirmed to the organization");
    }

    let Some(email) = emergency_access.email.clone() else {
@@ -457,24 +450,11 @@ async fn initiate_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
    let Some(mut emergency_access) =
        EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantee_uuid(&emer_id, &initiating_user.uuid, &conn).await
    else {
-        err!(
-            "Emergency access not valid.",
-            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not found for user '{}'.", initiating_user.email)
-        )
+        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
    };

    if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::Confirmed as i32 {
-        err!(
-            "Emergency access not valid.",
-            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not confirmed for user '{}'.", initiating_user.email)
-        )
-    }
-
-    if !EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE.contains(&emergency_access.wait_time_days) {
-        err!(
-            "Emergency access not valid.",
-            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}' timeout range '{}' is invalid", emergency_access.wait_time_days)
-        )
+        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
    }

    let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emergency_access.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
@@ -507,17 +487,11 @@ async fn approve_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
    let Some(mut emergency_access) =
        EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantor_uuid(&emer_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
    else {
-        err!(
-            "Emergency access not valid.",
-            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not found for user '{}'.", headers.user.email)
-        )
+        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
    };

    if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryInitiated as i32 {
-        err!(
-            "Emergency access not valid.",
-            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not initiated for user '{}'.", headers.user.email)
-        )
+        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
    }

    let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await else {
@@ -641,7 +615,6 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
        "kdfMemory": grantor_user.client_kdf_memory,
        "kdfParallelism": grantor_user.client_kdf_parallelism,
        "keyEncrypted": &emergency_access.key_encrypted,
-        "salt": grantor_user.master_password_salt(),
        "object": "emergencyAccessTakeover",
    });

@@ -651,13 +624,8 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
 #[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct EmergencyAccessPasswordData {
-    // Legacy payload
-    new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
-    key: Option<String>,
-
-    // Current payload
-    authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
-    unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
+    new_master_password_hash: String,
+    key: String,
 }

 #[post("/emergency-access/<emer_id>/password", data = "<data>")]
@@ -670,6 +638,8 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
    check_emergency_access_enabled()?;

    let data: EmergencyAccessPasswordData = data.into_inner();
+    let new_master_password_hash = &data.new_master_password_hash;
+    //let key = &data.Key;

    let requesting_user = headers.user;
    let Some(emergency_access) =
@@ -686,23 +656,8 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
        err!("Grantor user not found.")
    };

-    let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) =
-        if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) = (data.authentication_data, data.unlock_data) {
-            authentication_data.check(&grantor_user, &unlock_data)?;
-
-            if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&grantor_user) {
-                err!("KDF settings do not match the grantor account")
-            }
-
-            (authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
-        } else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (data.new_master_password_hash, data.key) {
-            (new_master_password_hash, new_key)
-        } else {
-            err!("Invalid request!")
-        };
-
    // change grantor_user password
-    grantor_user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
+    grantor_user.set_password(new_master_password_hash, Some(data.key), true, None, &conn).await?;
    grantor_user.save(&conn).await?;

    // Disable TwoFactor providers since they will otherwise block logins
@@ -770,72 +725,53 @@ pub async fn emergency_request_timeout_job(pool: DbPool) {
        return;
    }

-    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
-        error!("Failed to get DB connection for emergency time-outs!");
-        return;
-    };
-
+    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
        let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;

        if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
            debug!("No emergency request timeout to approve");
-        return;
        }

        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
        for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
-        match emer.is_recovery_allowed(&now) {
-            Ok(true) => {} // Recovery is allowed
-            Ok(false) => continue,
-            Err(e) => {
-                error!("Failed to check if recovery is allowed for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
-                continue;
-            }
-        }
-
-        // Get grantor user to send Accepted email
-        let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
-            error!("Grantor user '{}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.grantor_uuid, emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
-        let Some(grantee_uuid) = emer.grantee_uuid.as_ref() else {
-            error!("Missing grantee for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
-        // Get grantee user to send Accepted email
-        let Some(grantee_user) = User::find_by_uuid(grantee_uuid, &conn).await else {
-            error!("Grantee user '{grantee_uuid}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
+            // The find_all_recoveries_initiated already checks if the recovery_initiated_at is not null (None)
+            let recovery_allowed_at =
+                emer.recovery_initiated_at.unwrap() + TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(emer.wait_time_days)).unwrap();
+            if recovery_allowed_at.le(&now) {
                // Only update the access status
                // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_notification_reminder_job is also active
-        let status_initiated = EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryInitiated as i32;
-        let status_approved = EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryApproved as i32;
-        if let Err(e) = emer.update_access_status_and_save(status_initiated, status_approved, &now, &conn).await {
-            error!("Unable to update emergency access status for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        }
+                emer.update_access_status_and_save(EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryApproved as i32, &now, &conn)
+                    .await
+                    .expect("Unable to update emergency access status");

                if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
-            if let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_timed_out(
+                    // get grantor user to send Accepted email
+                    let grantor_user =
+                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await.expect("Grantor user not found");
+
+                    // get grantee user to send Accepted email
+                    let grantee_user =
+                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantee_uuid.clone().expect("Grantee user invalid"), &conn)
+                            .await
+                            .expect("Grantee user not found");
+
+                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_timed_out(
                        &grantor_user.email,
                        &grantee_user.name,
                        emer.get_type_as_str(),
                    )
                    .await
-            {
-                error!("Failed to send emergency access recovery time-out email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
-            }
+                    .expect("Error on sending email");

-            if let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_approved(&grantee_user.email, &grantor_user.name).await
-            {
-                error!("Failed to send emergency access recovery approved email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
+                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_approved(&grantee_user.email, &grantor_user.name)
+                        .await
+                        .expect("Error on sending email");
                }
            }
        }
+    } else {
+        error!("Failed to get DB connection while searching emergency request timed out");
+    }
 }

 pub async fn emergency_notification_reminder_job(pool: DbPool) {
@@ -844,85 +780,55 @@ pub async fn emergency_notification_reminder_job(pool: DbPool) {
        return;
    }

-    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
-        error!("Failed to get DB connection for emergency reminders!");
-        return;
-    };
-
+    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
        let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;

        if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
            debug!("No emergency request reminder notification to send");
-        return;
        }

        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
        for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
-        let Ok(deadline_at) = emer.deadline_at() else {
-            error!("Invalid deadline for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
-        let Some(final_reminder_at) = deadline_at.checked_sub_days(chrono::Days::new(1)) else {
-            error!("Cannot calculate reminder date for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
-        // Only send reminders during the last 24 hours, else continue
-        if now < final_reminder_at || now >= deadline_at {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        // Check if we did not sent a recovery mail in the past 24h already, else skip it.
-        // In case something goes wrong with the date calculation or `last_notification_at` is None we use now.
-        // This is to prevent possible missed reminders, this might cause an extra reminder,
-        // but that is better then no reminder at all.
-        let next_reminder_at = if let Some(last_notification_at) = emer.last_notification_at {
-            last_notification_at.checked_add_days(chrono::Days::new(1)).unwrap_or(now)
+            // The find_all_recoveries_initiated already checks if the recovery_initiated_at is not null (None)
+            // Calculate the day before the recovery will become active
+            let final_recovery_reminder_at =
+                emer.recovery_initiated_at.unwrap() + TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(emer.wait_time_days - 1)).unwrap();
+            // Calculate if a day has passed since the previous notification, else no notification has been sent before
+            let next_recovery_reminder_at = if let Some(last_notification_at) = emer.last_notification_at {
+                last_notification_at + TimeDelta::try_days(1).unwrap()
            } else {
                now
            };
-
-        // Only send a reminder if the `next_reminder_at` is less then or equal to `now`
-        // Else we can skip the current emergency access this run.
-        if next_reminder_at.gt(&now) {
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        // Get grantor user to send Reminder email
-        let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
-            error!("Grantor user '{}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.grantor_uuid, emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
-        let Some(grantee_uuid) = emer.grantee_uuid.as_ref() else {
-            error!("Missing grantee for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
-        // Get grantee user to send Reminder email
-        let Some(grantee_user) = User::find_by_uuid(grantee_uuid, &conn).await else {
-            error!("Grantee user '{grantee_uuid}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
-
+            if final_recovery_reminder_at.le(&now) && next_recovery_reminder_at.le(&now) {
                // Only update the last notification date
                // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_request_timeout_job is also active
-        if let Err(e) = emer.update_last_notification_date_and_save(&now, &conn).await {
-            error!("Unable to update emergency access reminder date for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
-            continue;
-        }
+                emer.update_last_notification_date_and_save(&now, &conn)
+                    .await
+                    .expect("Unable to update emergency access notification date");

-        if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
-            && let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_reminder(
+                if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+                    // get grantor user to send Accepted email
+                    let grantor_user =
+                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await.expect("Grantor user not found");
+
+                    // get grantee user to send Accepted email
+                    let grantee_user =
+                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantee_uuid.clone().expect("Grantee user invalid"), &conn)
+                            .await
+                            .expect("Grantee user not found");
+
+                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_reminder(
                        &grantor_user.email,
                        &grantee_user.name,
                        emer.get_type_as_str(),
                        "1", // This notification is only triggered one day before the activation
                    )
                    .await
-        {
-            error!("Failed to send emergency access reminder email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
+                    .expect("Error on sending email");
                }
            }
        }
+    } else {
+        error!("Failed to get DB connection while searching emergency notification reminder");
+    }
+}
@@ -6,15 +6,12 @@ use serde_json::Value;

 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
-    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult},
+    api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult},
    auth::{AdminHeaders, Headers},
    db::{
        DbConn, DbPool,
-        models::{
-            Cipher, CipherAccessScope, CipherId, Event, EventType, Membership, MembershipId, OrganizationId, UserId,
+        models::{Cipher, CipherId, Event, EventType, Membership, MembershipId, OrganizationId, UserId},
    },
-    },
-    error::MapResult,
    util::parse_date,
 };

@@ -32,14 +29,6 @@ struct EventRange {
    continuation_token: Option<String>,
 }

-impl EventRange {
-    fn date_range(&self) -> ApiResult<(NaiveDateTime, NaiveDateTime)> {
-        let start_date = parse_date(&self.start).map_res("Invalid start date")?;
-        let end_date = parse_date(self.continuation_token.as_ref().unwrap_or(&self.end)).map_res("Invalid end date")?;
-        Ok((start_date, end_date))
-    }
-}
-
 // Upstream: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/AdminConsole/Controllers/EventsController.cs#L87
 #[get("/organizations/<org_id>/events?<data..>")]
 async fn get_org_events(org_id: OrganizationId, data: EventRange, headers: AdminHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
@@ -50,7 +39,12 @@ async fn get_org_events(org_id: OrganizationId, data: EventRange, headers: Admin
    // Return an empty vec when we org events are disabled.
    // This prevents client errors
    let events_json: Vec<Value> = if CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
-        let (start_date, end_date) = data.date_range()?;
+        let start_date = parse_date(&data.start);
+        let end_date = if let Some(before_date) = &data.continuation_token {
+            parse_date(before_date)
+        } else {
+            parse_date(&data.end)
+        };

        Event::find_by_organization_uuid(&org_id, &start_date, &end_date, &conn)
            .await
@@ -75,7 +69,12 @@ async fn get_cipher_events(cipher_id: CipherId, data: EventRange, headers: Heade
    let events_json: Vec<Value> = if CONFIG.org_events_enabled()
        && Membership::user_has_ge_admin_access_to_cipher(&headers.user.uuid, &cipher_id, &conn).await
    {
-        let (start_date, end_date) = data.date_range()?;
+        let start_date = parse_date(&data.start);
+        let end_date = if let Some(before_date) = &data.continuation_token {
+            parse_date(before_date)
+        } else {
+            parse_date(&data.end)
+        };

        Event::find_by_cipher_uuid(&cipher_id, &start_date, &end_date, &conn).await.iter().map(Event::to_json).collect()
    } else {
@@ -103,7 +102,12 @@ async fn get_user_events(
    // Return an empty vec when we org events are disabled.
    // This prevents client errors
    let events_json: Vec<Value> = if CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
-        let (start_date, end_date) = data.date_range()?;
+        let start_date = parse_date(&data.start);
+        let end_date = if let Some(before_date) = &data.continuation_token {
+            parse_date(before_date)
+        } else {
+            parse_date(&data.end)
+        };

        Event::find_by_org_and_member(&org_id, &member_id, &start_date, &end_date, &conn)
            .await
@@ -164,10 +168,9 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
    }

    for event in data.iter() {
-        let event_date = parse_date(&event.date).map_res("Invalid event date")?;
-        // Only the event types upstream accepts from clients, the rest are written server-side.
+        let event_date = parse_date(&event.date);
        match event.r#type {
-            t if t == EventType::UserClientExportedVault as i32 => {
+            1000..=1099 => {
                log_user_event_impl(
                    event.r#type,
                    &headers.user.uuid,
@@ -178,7 +181,7 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
                )
                .await;
            }
-            t if t == EventType::OrganizationClientExportedVault as i32 => {
+            1600..=1699 => {
                // Only allow logging events for an organization the user is actually a member of.
                if let Some(org_id) = &event.organization_id
                    && Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(&headers.user.uuid, org_id, &conn).await.is_some()
@@ -216,13 +219,12 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
                    .await;
                }
            }
-            // Client-side cipher events (viewed, copied, toggled, autofilled, HTTP auth).
-            1107..=1114 | 1117 | 1119..=1133 => {
+            _ => {
                // The cipher determines the organization the event is logged to, so make sure the
                // user can actually access it instead of trusting the provided cipher uuid.
                if let Some(cipher_uuid) = &event.cipher_id
                    && let Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(cipher_uuid, &conn).await
-                    && cipher.is_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, CipherAccessScope::User, &conn).await
+                    && cipher.is_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
                    && let Some(org_id) = cipher.organization_uuid
                {
                    log_event_impl(
@@ -238,17 +240,16 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
                    .await;
                }
            }
-            _ => {}
        }
    }
    Ok(())
 }

-pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: EventType, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
+pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: i32, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
    if !CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
        return;
    }
-    log_user_event_impl(event_type as i32, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
+    log_user_event_impl(event_type, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
 }

 async fn log_user_event_impl(
@@ -349,17 +350,14 @@ async fn log_event_impl(

 pub async fn event_cleanup_job(pool: DbPool) {
    debug!("Start events cleanup job");
-    if CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_none_or(|d| d == 0) {
-        debug!("events_days_retain is not configured or set to 0, skipping");
+    if CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_none() {
+        debug!("events_days_retain is not configured, abort");
        return;
    }

-    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
+    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
+        Event::clean_events(&conn).await.ok();
+    } else {
        error!("Failed to get DB connection while trying to cleanup the events table");
-        return;
-    };
-
-    if let Err(e) = Event::clean_events(&conn).await {
-        error!("Failed to cleanup the events table: {e}");
    }
 }
@@ -14,8 +14,6 @@ pub use ciphers::{CipherData, CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType, purge_trashed_ciph
 pub use emergency_access::{emergency_notification_reminder_job, emergency_request_timeout_job};
 pub use events::{event_cleanup_job, log_event, log_user_event};
 pub use sends::purge_sends;
-#[cfg(feature = "unsafe_test_mode")]
-pub use {ciphers::seed_cipher, sends::seed_send};

 use reqwest::Method;
 use rocket::{Catcher, Route, serde::json::Json, serde::json::Value};
@@ -249,7 +247,6 @@ fn config() -> Json<Value> {
          "notifications": format!("{domain}/notifications"),
          "sso": "",
          "cloudRegion": null,
-          "fillAssistRules": CONFIG.fill_assist_rules_url(),
        },
        // Bitwarden uses this for the self-hosted servers to indicate the default push technology
        "push": {
@@ -58,13 +58,25 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
    let org_id = token.0;
    let data = data.into_inner();

-    // Like upstream, the import never removes Owners, so it doesn't revoke or restore them either.
    for user_data in &data.members {
        let mut user_created: bool = false;
        if user_data.deleted {
            // If user is marked for deletion and it exists, revoke it
            if let Some(mut member) = Membership::find_by_email_and_org(&user_data.email, &org_id, &conn).await {
-                let revoked = member.atype != MembershipType::Owner && member.revoke();
+                // Only revoke a user if it is not the last confirmed owner
+                let revoked = if member.atype == MembershipType::Owner
+                    && member.status == MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32
+                {
+                    if Membership::count_confirmed_by_org_and_type(&org_id, MembershipType::Owner, &conn).await <= 1 {
+                        warn!("Can't revoke the last owner");
+                        false
+                    } else {
+                        member.revoke()
+                    }
+                } else {
+                    member.revoke()
+                };
+
                let ext_modified = member.set_external_id(Some(user_data.external_id.clone()));
                if revoked || ext_modified {
                    member.save(&conn).await?;
@@ -72,7 +84,7 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
            }
        // If user is part of the organization, restore it
        } else if let Some(mut member) = Membership::find_by_email_and_org(&user_data.email, &org_id, &conn).await {
-            let mut restored = member.atype != MembershipType::Owner && member.restore();
+            let mut restored = member.restore();
            let ext_modified = member.set_external_id(Some(user_data.external_id.clone()));
            // Enforce org policies as every other restore path does.
            // If the user is not allowed, we revoke again and continue so the external_id is still updated.
@@ -137,13 +149,9 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn

    if CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() {
        for group_data in &data.groups {
-            let group_uuid = if let Some(mut group) =
+            let group_uuid = if let Some(group) =
                Group::find_by_external_id_and_org(&group_data.external_id, &org_id, &conn).await
            {
-                if group.name != group_data.name {
-                    group.name = group_data.name.clone();
-                    group.save(&conn).await?;
-                }
                group.uuid
            } else {
                let mut group =
@@ -172,8 +180,14 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
        for member in Membership::find_by_org(&org_id, &conn).await {
            if let Some(ref user_external_id) = member.external_id
                && !sync_members.contains(user_external_id)
-                && member.atype != MembershipType::Owner
            {
+                if member.atype == MembershipType::Owner && member.status == MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32 {
+                    // Removing owner, check that there is at least one other confirmed owner
+                    if Membership::count_confirmed_by_org_and_type(&org_id, MembershipType::Owner, &conn).await <= 1 {
+                        warn!("Can't delete the last owner");
+                        continue;
+                    }
+                }
                member.delete(&conn).await?;
            }
        }
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;
 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, UpdateType},
-    auth::{Headers, Host, SendHeaders},
+    auth::{ClientIp, Headers, Host, SendHeaders},
    config::PathType,
    db::{
        DbConn, DbPool,
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use crate::{

 const SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG: &str = "Send does not exist or is no longer available";
 static ANON_PUSH_DEVICE: LazyLock<Device> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    let dt = DateTime::UNIX_EPOCH.naive_utc();
+    let dt = crate::util::parse_date("1970-01-01T00:00:00.000000Z");
    Device {
        uuid: String::from("00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000").into(),
        created_at: dt,
@@ -39,15 +39,18 @@ static ANON_PUSH_DEVICE: LazyLock<Device> = LazyLock::new(|| {
 });

 // The max file size allowed by Bitwarden clients and add an extra 5% to avoid issues
-pub(crate) const SIZE_525_MB: i64 = 550_502_400;
+const SIZE_525_MB: i64 = 550_502_400;

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<rocket::Route> {
    routes![
        get_sends,
        get_send,
        post_send,
+        post_send_file,
        post_access,
+        post_access_legacy,
        post_access_file,
+        post_access_file_legacy,
        put_send,
        delete_send,
        put_remove_password,
@@ -70,7 +73,7 @@ pub async fn purge_sends(pool: DbPool) {
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 pub struct SendData {
    r#type: i32,
-    pub key: String,
+    key: String,
    password: Option<String>,
    max_access_count: Option<NumberOrString>,
    expiration_date: Option<DateTime<Utc>>,
@@ -126,23 +129,6 @@ async fn enforce_disable_hide_email_policy(data: &SendData, headers: &Headers, c
    Ok(())
 }

-/// Stores a text Send that is already encrypted, as [`create_send`] does, for the test seeder (`unsafe_test_mode`).
-/// Its deletion date becomes a week from now: a recorded one can be years ahead, more than a Send may be.
-#[cfg(feature = "unsafe_test_mode")]
-pub async fn seed_send(mut encrypted: Value, user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<SendId> {
-    let Some(fields) = encrypted.as_object_mut() else {
-        err!("A seeded Send has to be a JSON object")
-    };
-    fields.insert("deletionDate".to_owned(), serde_json::to_value(Utc::now() + TimeDelta::try_days(7).unwrap())?);
-    let data: SendData = serde_json::from_value(encrypted)?;
-    if data.r#type != SendType::Text as i32 {
-        err!("Only text Sends can be seeded: a file Send needs its file")
-    }
-    let mut send = create_send(data, user_id.clone())?;
-    send.save(conn).await?;
-    Ok(send.uuid)
-}
-
 fn create_send(data: SendData, user_id: UserId) -> ApiResult<Send> {
    let data_val = if data.r#type == SendType::Text as i32 {
        data.text
@@ -215,7 +201,7 @@ async fn post_send(data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Not
    enforce_disable_hide_email_policy(&data, &headers, &conn).await?;

    if data.r#type == SendType::File as i32 {
-        err!("File sends should use /api/sends/file/v2")
+        err!("File sends should use /api/sends/file")
    }

    let mut send = create_send(data, headers.user.uuid)?;
@@ -232,11 +218,93 @@ async fn post_send(data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Not
    Ok(Json(send.to_json()))
 }

+#[derive(FromForm)]
+struct UploadData<'f> {
+    model: Json<SendData>,
+    data: TempFile<'f>,
+}
+
 #[derive(FromForm)]
 struct UploadDataV2<'f> {
    data: TempFile<'f>,
 }

+// @deprecated Mar 25 2021: This method has been deprecated in favor of direct uploads (v2).
+// This method still exists to support older clients, probably need to remove it sometime.
+// Upstream: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/d0c793c95181dfb1b447eb450f85ba0bfd7ef643/src/Api/Controllers/SendsController.cs#L164-L167
+// 2025: This endpoint doesn't seem to exists anymore in the latest version
+// See: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Tools/Controllers/SendsController.cs
+#[post("/sends/file", format = "multipart/form-data", data = "<data>")]
+async fn post_send_file(data: Form<UploadData<'_>>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> JsonResult {
+    enforce_disable_send_policy(&headers, &conn).await?;
+
+    let UploadData {
+        model,
+        data,
+    } = data.into_inner();
+    let model = model.into_inner();
+
+    let Some(size) = data.len().to_i64() else {
+        err!("Invalid send size");
+    };
+    if size < 0 {
+        err!("Send size can't be negative")
+    }
+
+    enforce_disable_hide_email_policy(&model, &headers, &conn).await?;
+
+    let size_limit = match CONFIG.user_send_limit() {
+        Some(0) => err!("File uploads are disabled"),
+        Some(limit_kb) => {
+            let Some(already_used) = Send::size_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await else {
+                err!("Existing sends overflow")
+            };
+            let Some(left) = limit_kb.checked_mul(1024).and_then(|l| l.checked_sub(already_used)) else {
+                err!("Send size overflow");
+            };
+            if left <= 0 {
+                err!("Send storage limit reached! Delete some sends to free up space")
+            }
+            i64::clamp(left, 0, SIZE_525_MB)
+        }
+        None => SIZE_525_MB,
+    };
+
+    if size > size_limit {
+        err!("Send storage limit exceeded with this file");
+    }
+
+    let mut send = create_send(model, headers.user.uuid)?;
+    if send.atype != SendType::File as i32 {
+        err!("Send content is not a file");
+    }
+
+    let file_id = crate::crypto::generate_send_file_id();
+
+    save_temp_file(&PathType::Sends, &format!("{}/{file_id}", send.uuid), data, true).await?;
+
+    let mut data_value: Value = serde_json::from_str(&send.data)?;
+    if let Some(o) = data_value.as_object_mut() {
+        o.insert(String::from("id"), Value::String(file_id));
+        o.insert(String::from("size"), Value::Number(size.into()));
+        o.insert(String::from("sizeName"), Value::String(crate::util::get_display_size(size)));
+    }
+    send.data = serde_json::to_string(&data_value)?;
+
+    // Save the changes in the database
+    send.save(&conn).await?;
+    nt.send_send_update(
+        UpdateType::SyncSendCreate,
+        &send,
+        &send.update_users_revision(&conn).await,
+        &headers.device,
+        &conn,
+    )
+    .await;
+
+    Ok(Json(send.to_json()))
+}
+
 // Upstream: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Tools/Controllers/SendsController.cs#L165
 #[post("/sends/file/v2", data = "<data>")]
 async fn post_send_file_v2(data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
@@ -285,12 +353,11 @@ async fn post_send_file_v2(data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
    let file_id = crate::crypto::generate_send_file_id();

    let mut data_value: Value = serde_json::from_str(&send.data)?;
-    let Some(o) = data_value.as_object_mut() else {
-        err!("Invalid Send file data")
-    };
+    if let Some(o) = data_value.as_object_mut() {
        o.insert(String::from("id"), Value::String(file_id.clone()));
        o.insert(String::from("size"), Value::Number(file_length.into()));
        o.insert(String::from("sizeName"), Value::String(crate::util::get_display_size(file_length)));
+    }
    send.data = serde_json::to_string(&data_value)?;
    send.save(&conn).await?;

@@ -346,8 +413,8 @@ async fn post_send_file_v2_data(
            "Send file name does not match.",
            format!(
                "Expected file name '{}' got '{}'",
-                send_data.fileName.escape_debug(),
-                raw_file_name.dangerous_unsafe_unsanitized_raw().as_str().escape_debug()
+                send_data.fileName,
+                raw_file_name.dangerous_unsafe_unsanitized_raw()
            )
        ),
        _ => err!("Send file name does not match or is not provided."),
@@ -383,16 +450,63 @@ async fn post_send_file_v2_data(

 #[post("/sends/access")]
 async fn post_access(headers: SendHeaders, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> JsonResult {
-    let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&headers.send_id, &conn).await else {
+    let Some(send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&headers.send_id, &conn).await else {
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    };
    if !send.is_accessible() {
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    }
-    // Files are incremented during the download
-    if send.atype == SendType::Text as i32 && !send.register_access(&conn).await? {
+    process_access(send, conn, nt).await
+}
+
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct SendAccessData {
+    pub password: Option<String>,
+}
+
+// Legacy since web-2026.6.0
+#[post("/sends/access/<access_id>", data = "<data>")]
+async fn post_access_legacy(
+    access_id: &str,
+    data: Json<SendAccessData>,
+    conn: DbConn,
+    ip: ClientIp,
+    nt: Notify<'_>,
+) -> JsonResult {
+    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
+
+    let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_access_id(access_id, &conn).await else {
+        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
+    };
+
+    if let Some(max_access_count) = send.max_access_count
+        && send.access_count >= max_access_count
+    {
+        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404);
+    }
+
+    if !send.is_accessible() {
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    }
+
+    if send.password_hash.is_some() {
+        match data.into_inner().password {
+            Some(ref p) if send.check_password(p) => { /* Nothing to do here */ }
+            Some(_) => err!("Invalid password", format!("IP: {}.", ip.ip)),
+            None => err_code!("Password not provided", format!("IP: {}.", ip.ip), 401),
+        }
+    }
+
+    // Files are incremented during the download
+    if send.atype == SendType::Text as i32 {
+        if !send.register_access(&conn).await? {
+            err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
+        }
+    } else {
+        send.save(&conn).await?;
+    }
+
    process_access(send, conn, nt).await
 }

@@ -417,27 +531,55 @@ async fn post_access_file(
    conn: DbConn,
    nt: Notify<'_>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
-    let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&headers.send_id, &conn).await else {
+    let Some(send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&headers.send_id, &conn).await else {
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    };
    if !send.is_accessible() {
        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    }
-    check_send_file_id(&send, &file_id)?;
-    if !send.register_access(&conn).await? {
-        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
-    }
    process_access_file(send, file_id, host, conn, nt).await
 }

-fn check_send_file_id(send: &Send, file_id: &SendFileId) -> EmptyResult {
-    if send.atype != SendType::File as i32 {
-        err!("Send is not a file type send.");
+// Legacy since web-2026.6.0
+#[post("/sends/<send_id>/access/file/<file_id>", data = "<data>")]
+async fn post_access_file_legacy(
+    send_id: SendId,
+    file_id: SendFileId,
+    data: Json<SendAccessData>,
+    host: Host,
+    conn: DbConn,
+    ip: ClientIp,
+    nt: Notify<'_>,
+) -> JsonResult {
+    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
+
+    let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&send_id, &conn).await else {
+        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
+    };
+
+    if let Some(max_access_count) = send.max_access_count
+        && send.access_count >= max_access_count
+    {
+        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    }
-    match serde_json::from_str::<SendFileData>(&send.data) {
-        Ok(data) if &data.id == file_id => Ok(()),
-        _ => err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404),
+
+    if !send.is_accessible() {
+        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
    }
+
+    if send.password_hash.is_some() {
+        match data.into_inner().password {
+            Some(ref p) if send.check_password(p) => { /* Nothing to do here */ }
+            Some(_) => err!("Invalid password."),
+            None => err_code!("Password not provided", 401),
+        }
+    }
+
+    if !send.register_access(&conn).await? {
+        err_code!(SEND_INACCESSIBLE_MSG, 404)
+    }
+
+    process_access_file(send, file_id, host, conn, nt).await
 }

 async fn process_access_file(send: Send, file_id: SendFileId, host: Host, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> JsonResult {
@@ -500,7 +642,7 @@ async fn put_send(send_id: SendId, data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn:
    Ok(Json(send.to_json()))
 }

-async fn update_send_from_data(
+pub async fn update_send_from_data(
    send: &mut Send,
    data: SendData,
    headers: &Headers,
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};

 use crate::{
    api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event, core::two_factor::generate_recover_code},
-    auth::{ClientIp, Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::{ClientIp, Headers},
    crypto,
    db::{
        DbConn,
@@ -20,23 +20,27 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {

 #[post("/two-factor/get-authenticator", data = "<data>")]
 async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
    let user = headers.user;

    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;

-    let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await;
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32;
+    let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await;

    let (enabled, key) = match twofactor {
        Some(tf) => (true, tf.data),
        _ => (false, crypto::encode_random_bytes::<20>(&BASE32)),
    };

+    // Upstream seems to also return `userVerificationToken`, but doesn't seem to be used at all.
+    // It should help prevent TOTP disclosure if someone keeps their vault unlocked.
+    // Since it doesn't seem to be used, and also does not cause any issues, lets leave it out of the response.
+    // See: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Auth/Controllers/TwoFactorController.cs#L94
    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "authenticator": json!({
        "enabled": enabled,
        "key": key,
-        }),
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::authenticator_token(user.uuid, key, enabled),
+        "object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
    })))
 }

@@ -45,7 +49,8 @@ async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers,
 struct EnableAuthenticatorData {
    key: String,
    token: NumberOrString,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 #[post("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
@@ -56,7 +61,12 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He

    let mut user = headers.user;

-    two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &key, false)?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;

    // Validate key as base32 and 20 bytes length
    let decoded_key: Vec<u8> = if let Ok(decoded) = BASE32.decode(key.as_bytes()) {
@@ -74,13 +84,12 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He

    generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;

    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "authenticator": json!({
        "enabled": true,
        "key": key,
-        }),
+        "object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
    })))
 }

@@ -116,7 +125,8 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
        err!("Invalid TOTP secret")
    };

-    let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, conn).await {
+    let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32, conn).await
+    {
        Some(tf) => tf,
        _ => TwoFactor::new(user_id.clone(), TwoFactorType::Authenticator, secret.to_owned()),
    };
@@ -174,25 +184,36 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct DisableAuthenticatorData {
    key: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: String,
+    r#type: NumberOrString,
 }

 #[delete("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
-async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
    let user = headers.user;
+    let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;

-    two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &data.key, true)?;
+    if !user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
+        err!("Invalid password");
+    }

-    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await {
+    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
        if twofactor.data == data.key {
            twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
-            log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+            log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+                .await;
        } else {
            err!(format!("TOTP key for user {} does not match recorded value, cannot deactivate", &user.email));
        }
    }

-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-
-    Ok(())
+    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
+        super::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "enabled": false,
+        "keys": type_,
+        "object": "twoFactorProvider"
+    })))
 }
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
 use chrono::Utc;
+use data_encoding::BASE64;
 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};

 use crate::{
+    CONFIG,
    api::{
-        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::log_user_event,
-        core::two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
+        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event,
+        core::two_factor::generate_recover_code,
    },
-    auth::{Headers, two_factor, two_factor::DuoData},
+    auth::Headers,
    crypto,
    db::{
        DbConn,
@@ -18,7 +19,55 @@ use crate::{
 };

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put, disable_duo,]
+    routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put,]
+}
+
+#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
+struct DuoData {
+    host: String, // Duo API hostname
+    ik: String,   // client id
+    sk: String,   // client secret
+}
+
+impl DuoData {
+    fn global() -> Option<Self> {
+        match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
+            (true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
+                host,
+                ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
+                sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
+            }),
+            _ => None,
+        }
+    }
+    fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            host: s.into(),
+            ik: s.into(),
+            sk: s.into(),
+        }
+    }
+    fn secret() -> Self {
+        Self::msg("<global_secret>")
+    }
+    fn obscure(self) -> Self {
+        let mut host = self.host;
+        let mut ik = self.ik;
+        let mut sk = self.sk;
+
+        let digits = 4;
+        let replaced = "************";
+
+        host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+        ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+        sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
+
+        Self {
+            host,
+            ik,
+            sk,
+        }
+    }
 }

 enum DuoStatus {
@@ -47,19 +96,22 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)

    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;

-    let (enabled, duo) = match get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await {
+    let data = get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await;
+
+    let (enabled, data) = match data {
        DuoStatus::Global(_) => (true, Some(DuoData::secret())),
        DuoStatus::User(data) => (true, Some(data.obscure())),
        DuoStatus::Disabled(true) => (false, Some(DuoData::msg(DISABLED_MESSAGE_DEFAULT))),
        DuoStatus::Disabled(false) => (false, None),
    };

-    let duo_json = if let Some(data) = duo.as_ref() {
+    let json = if let Some(data) = data {
        json!({
            "enabled": enabled,
            "host": data.host,
            "clientSecret": data.sk,
            "clientId": data.ik,
+            "object": "twoFactorDuo"
        })
    } else {
        json!({
@@ -67,13 +119,11 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
            "host": null,
            "clientSecret": null,
            "clientId": null,
+            "object": "twoFactorDuo"
        })
    };

-    Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
-        "duo": duo_json,
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::duo_token(user.uuid, duo, enabled),
-    })))
+    Ok(Json(json))
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -82,7 +132,8 @@ struct EnableDuoData {
    host: String,
    client_secret: String,
    client_id: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 impl From<EnableDuoData> for DuoData {
@@ -109,7 +160,12 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
    let data: EnableDuoData = data.into_inner();
    let mut user = headers.user;

-    two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, None, false)?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
+        otp: data.otp.clone(),
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;

    let (data, data_str) = if check_duo_fields_custom(&data) {
        let data_req: DuoData = data.into();
@@ -126,15 +182,14 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)

    generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;

    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "duo": json!({
        "enabled": true,
        "host": data.host,
        "clientSecret": data.sk,
        "clientId": data.ik,
-        }),
+        "object": "twoFactorDuo"
    })))
 }

@@ -143,29 +198,6 @@ async fn activate_duo_put(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
    activate_duo(data, headers, conn).await
 }

-#[delete("/two-factor/duo", data = "<data>")]
-async fn disable_duo(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Duo, &conn).await {
-        // Apply the same transformation than in `get_duo` to check we are disabling the correct one
-        let duo = match to_user_duo_data(&twofactor) {
-            DuoStatus::Global(_) => Some(DuoData::secret()),
-            DuoStatus::User(data) => Some(data.obscure()),
-            DuoStatus::Disabled(_) => None,
-        };
-
-        two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, duo.as_ref(), true)?;
-
-        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-    }
-
-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData) -> EmptyResult {
    use reqwest::{Method, header};
    use std::str::FromStr;
@@ -190,16 +222,21 @@ async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData)
    Ok(())
 }

+const DUO_EXPIRE: i64 = 300;
+const APP_EXPIRE: i64 = 3600;
+
+const AUTH_PREFIX: &str = "AUTH";
+const DUO_PREFIX: &str = "TX";
+const APP_PREFIX: &str = "APP";
+
 async fn get_user_duo_data(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> DuoStatus {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Duo as i32;
+
    // If the user doesn't have an entry, disabled
-    let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Duo, conn).await else {
+    let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await else {
        return DuoStatus::Disabled(DuoData::global().is_some());
    };

-    to_user_duo_data(&twofactor)
-}
-
-fn to_user_duo_data(twofactor: &TwoFactor) -> DuoStatus {
    // If the user has the required values, we use those
    if let Ok(data) = serde_json::from_str(&twofactor.data) {
        return DuoStatus::User(data);
@@ -214,13 +251,118 @@ fn to_user_duo_data(twofactor: &TwoFactor) -> DuoStatus {
    DuoStatus::Disabled(false)
 }

-// let (ik, sk, host) = get_duo_keys_email();
-pub(crate) async fn get_duo_keys_email(email: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<(String, String, String)> {
+// let (ik, sk, ak, host) = get_duo_keys();
+pub(crate) async fn get_duo_keys_email(email: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<(String, String, String, String)> {
    let data = match User::find_by_mail(email, conn).await {
        Some(u) => get_user_duo_data(&u.uuid, conn).await.data(),
        _ => DuoData::global(),
    }
    .map_res("Can't fetch Duo Keys")?;

-    Ok((data.ik, data.sk, data.host))
+    Ok((data.ik, data.sk, CONFIG.get_duo_akey().await, data.host))
+}
+
+pub async fn generate_duo_signature(email: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<(String, String)> {
+    let now = Utc::now().timestamp();
+
+    let (ik, sk, ak, host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;
+
+    let duo_sign = sign_duo_values(&sk, email, &ik, DUO_PREFIX, now + DUO_EXPIRE);
+    let app_sign = sign_duo_values(&ak, email, &ik, APP_PREFIX, now + APP_EXPIRE);
+
+    Ok((format!("{duo_sign}:{app_sign}"), host))
+}
+
+fn sign_duo_values(key: &str, email: &str, ikey: &str, prefix: &str, expire: i64) -> String {
+    let val = format!("{email}|{ikey}|{expire}");
+    let cookie = format!("{prefix}|{}", BASE64.encode(val.as_bytes()));
+
+    format!("{cookie}|{}", crypto::hmac_sign(key, &cookie))
+}
+
+pub async fn validate_duo_login(email: &str, response: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+    let split: Vec<&str> = response.split(':').collect();
+    if split.len() != 2 {
+        err!(
+            "Invalid response length",
+            ErrorEvent {
+                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn2fa
+            }
+        );
+    }
+
+    let auth_sig = split[0];
+    let app_sig = split[1];
+
+    let now = Utc::now().timestamp();
+
+    let (ik, sk, ak, _host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;
+
+    let auth_user = parse_duo_values(&sk, auth_sig, &ik, AUTH_PREFIX, now)?;
+    let app_user = parse_duo_values(&ak, app_sig, &ik, APP_PREFIX, now)?;
+
+    if !crypto::ct_eq(&auth_user, app_user) || !crypto::ct_eq(&auth_user, email) {
+        err!(
+            "Error validating duo authentication",
+            ErrorEvent {
+                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn2fa
+            }
+        )
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
+fn parse_duo_values(key: &str, val: &str, ikey: &str, prefix: &str, time: i64) -> ApiResult<String> {
+    let split: Vec<&str> = val.split('|').collect();
+    if split.len() != 3 {
+        err!("Invalid value length")
+    }
+
+    let u_prefix = split[0];
+    let u_b64 = split[1];
+    let u_sig = split[2];
+
+    let sig = crypto::hmac_sign(key, &format!("{u_prefix}|{u_b64}"));
+
+    if !crypto::ct_eq(crypto::hmac_sign(key, &sig), crypto::hmac_sign(key, u_sig)) {
+        err!("Duo signatures don't match")
+    }
+
+    if u_prefix != prefix {
+        err!("Prefixes don't match")
+    }
+
+    let Ok(cookie_vec) = BASE64.decode(u_b64.as_bytes()) else {
+        err!("Invalid Duo cookie encoding")
+    };
+
+    let Ok(cookie) = String::from_utf8(cookie_vec) else {
+        err!("Invalid Duo cookie encoding")
+    };
+
+    let cookie_split: Vec<&str> = cookie.split('|').collect();
+    if cookie_split.len() != 3 {
+        err!("Invalid cookie length")
+    }
+
+    let username = cookie_split[0];
+    let u_ikey = cookie_split[1];
+    let expire = cookie_split[2];
+
+    if !crypto::ct_eq(ikey, u_ikey) {
+        err!("Invalid ikey")
+    }
+
+    let expire: i64 = if let Ok(e) = expire.parse() {
+        e
+    } else {
+        err!("Invalid expire time")
+    };
+
+    if time >= expire {
+        err!("Expired authorization")
+    }
+
+    Ok(username.into())
 }
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ pub async fn get_duo_auth_url(
    device_identifier: &DeviceId,
    conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> Result<String, Error> {
-    let (ik, sk, host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;
+    let (ik, sk, _, host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;

    let callback_url = match make_callback_url(client_id) {
        Ok(url) => url,
@@ -435,7 +435,7 @@ pub async fn validate_duo_login(
    let code = split[0];
    let state = split[1];

-    let (ik, sk, host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;
+    let (ik, sk, _, host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;

    // Get the context by the state reported by the client. If we don't have one,
    // it means the context is either missing or expired.
@@ -5,26 +5,20 @@ use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{
        EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{
-            log_user_event,
-            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
+        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
    },
-    },
-    auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers},
    crypto,
    db::{
        DbConn,
-        models::{
-            AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User,
-            UserId,
-        },
+        models::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, User, UserId},
    },
    error::{Error, MapResult},
    mail,
 };

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email, disable_email]
+    routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email,]
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize)]
@@ -71,7 +65,7 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
        let Some(user) = User::find_by_mail(email, &conn).await else {
            err!(
                "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
-                format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, email.escape_debug())
+                format!("IP: {}. Username: {email}.", client_headers.ip.ip)
            )
        };

@@ -80,45 +74,23 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
            if !user.check_valid_password(master_password_hash) {
                err!(
                    "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
-                    format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, email.escape_debug())
+                    format!("IP: {}. Username: {email}.", client_headers.ip.ip)
                )
            }
        } else if let Some(auth_request_id) = auth_request_id {
+            let Some(auth_request) = AuthRequest::find_by_uuid(auth_request_id, &conn).await else {
+                err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "User not found")
+            };
            let Some(code) = &data.auth_request_access_code else {
                err!("no auth request access code")
            };
-            let Some(auth_request) = AuthRequest::find_by_uuid_and_user(auth_request_id, &user.uuid, &conn).await
-            else {
-                err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "Invalid auth request or does not belong to user")
-            };

-            let request_expired = Utc::now().naive_utc() >= auth_request.creation_date + TimeDelta::minutes(5);
-            if !auth_request.approved.unwrap_or(false)
-                || auth_request.authentication_date.is_some()
-                || request_expired
-                || auth_request.device_type != client_headers.device_type
+            if auth_request.device_type != client_headers.device_type
                || auth_request.request_ip != client_headers.ip.ip.to_string()
                || !auth_request.check_access_code(code)
            {
-                err!(
-                    "AuthRequest doesn't exist",
-                    "Auth request not approved, already used or expired, or invalid device, IP or code"
-                )
+                err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "Invalid device, IP or code")
            }
-        } else if let Some(device_identifier) = &data.device_identifier {
-            // iOS/Android SSO logins send the email and device id but no password hash,
-            // so accept a device that has a pending 2FA login for this user
-            if TwoFactorIncomplete::find_by_user_and_device(&user.uuid, device_identifier, &conn).await.is_none() {
-                err!(
-                    "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
-                    format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, email.escape_debug())
-                )
-            }
-            debug!(
-                "Email 2FA fallback: pending login. Username: {}. Device: {}.",
-                user.email,
-                device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug()
-            );
        } else {
            err!("No password hash has been submitted.")
        }
@@ -132,7 +104,7 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
        let Some(user) = User::find_by_device_for_email2fa(device_identifier, &conn).await else {
            err!(
                "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
-                format!("IP: {}. Device: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug())
+                format!("IP: {}. Device: {device_identifier}.", client_headers.ip.ip)
            )
        };

@@ -144,8 +116,8 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client

 /// Generate the token, save the data for later verification and send email to user
 pub async fn send_token(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let mut twofactor =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
+    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;

    let generated_token = crypto::generate_email_token(CONFIG.email_token_size());

@@ -168,19 +140,18 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;

    let (enabled, mfa_email) =
-        if let Some(x) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
+        match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, &conn).await {
+            Some(x) => {
                let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
-            (true, Some(twofactor_data.email))
-        } else {
-            (false, None)
+                (true, json!(twofactor_data.email))
+            }
+            _ => (false, serde_json::value::Value::Null),
        };

-    Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
-        "email": rocket::serde::json::json!({
-            "enabled": enabled,
+    Ok(Json(json!({
        "email": mfa_email,
-        }),
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::email_token(user.uuid, mfa_email, enabled),
+        "enabled": enabled,
+        "object": "twoFactorEmail"
    })))
 }

@@ -189,36 +160,43 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
 struct SendEmailData {
    /// Email where 2FA codes will be sent to, can be different than user email account.
    email: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 /// Send a verification email to the specified email address to check whether it exists/belongs to user.
 #[post("/two-factor/send-email", data = "<data>")]
-async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    let data: SendEmailData = data.into_inner();
    let user = headers.user;

-    two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email.clone(), false)?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, false, &conn)
+    .await?;

    if !CONFIG._enable_email_2fa() {
        err!("Email 2FA is disabled")
    }

-    if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
+
+    if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
        tf.delete(&conn).await?;
    }

    let generated_token = crypto::generate_email_token(CONFIG.email_token_size());
-    let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(data.email, Some(generated_token));
+    let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(data.email, generated_token);

    // Uses EmailVerificationChallenge as type to show that it's not verified yet.
-    let twofactor =
-        TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
+    let twofactor = TwoFactor::new(user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
    twofactor.save(&conn).await?;

    mail::send_token(&twofactor_data.email, &twofactor_data.last_token.map_res("Token is empty")?).await?;

-    Ok(Json(json!({})))
+    Ok(())
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)]
@@ -226,7 +204,8 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
 struct EmailData {
    email: String,
    token: String,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 /// Verify email belongs to user and can be used for 2FA email codes.
@@ -235,11 +214,17 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
    let data: EmailData = data.into_inner();
    let mut user = headers.user;

-    two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email, false)?;
+    // This is the last step in the verification process, delete the otp directly afterwards
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;

-    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, &conn)
-        .await
-        .map_res("Two factor not found")?;
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge as i32;
+    let mut twofactor =
+        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;

    let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;

@@ -258,26 +243,13 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes

    generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;

-    Ok(Json(json!({})))
-}
-
-#[delete("/two-factor/email", data = "<data>")]
-async fn disable_email(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
-        let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
-        two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, twofactor_data.email, true)?;
-
-        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-    }
-
-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-
-    Ok(())
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "email": email_data.email,
+        "enabled": "true",
+        "object": "twoFactorEmail"
+    })))
 }

 /// Validate the email code when used as TwoFactor token mechanism
@@ -289,8 +261,9 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
    conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
    let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(data)?;
-    let mut twofactor =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
+    let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, conn)
+        .await
+        .map_res("Two factor not found")?;
    let Some(issued_token) = &email_data.last_token else {
        err!(
            format!("No token available! IP: {ip}"),
@@ -302,7 +275,7 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(

    if !crypto::ct_eq(issued_token, token) {
        email_data.add_attempt();
-        if email_data.attempts >= u64::from(CONFIG.email_attempts_limit()) {
+        if email_data.attempts >= CONFIG.email_attempts_limit() {
            email_data.reset_token();
        }
        twofactor.data = email_data.to_json();
@@ -321,7 +294,7 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
    twofactor.save(conn).await?;

    let dt = DateTime::from_timestamp(email_data.token_sent, 0).expect("Email token timestamp invalid.").naive_utc();
-    let max_time = i64::from(CONFIG.email_expiration_time());
+    let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time().cast_signed();
    if dt + TimeDelta::try_seconds(max_time).unwrap() < Utc::now().naive_utc() {
        err!(
            "Token has expired",
@@ -349,10 +322,10 @@ pub struct EmailTokenData {
 }

 impl EmailTokenData {
-    pub fn new(email: String, token: Option<String>) -> EmailTokenData {
+    pub fn new(email: String, token: String) -> EmailTokenData {
        EmailTokenData {
            email,
-            last_token: token,
+            last_token: Some(token),
            token_sent: Utc::now().timestamp(),
            attempts: 0,
        }
@@ -390,8 +363,7 @@ pub async fn activate_email_2fa(user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    if user.verified_at.is_none() {
        err!("Auto-enabling of email 2FA failed because the users email address has not been verified!");
    }
-    // The token is set when the first code is sent
-    let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(user.email.clone(), None);
+    let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(user.email.clone(), String::new());
    let twofactor = TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::Email, twofactor_data.to_json());
    twofactor.save(conn).await
 }
@@ -7,7 +7,10 @@ use serde_json::Value;

 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
-    api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_event},
+    api::{
+        EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
+        core::{log_event, log_user_event},
+    },
    auth::Headers,
    crypto,
    db::{
@@ -18,6 +21,7 @@ use crate::{
        },
    },
    mail,
+    util::NumberOrString,
 };

 pub mod authenticator;
@@ -65,7 +69,13 @@ pub fn is_twofactor_provider_usable(provider_type: &TwoFactorType, provider_data
 }

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, get_device_verification_settings];
+    let mut routes = routes![
+        get_twofactor,
+        get_recover,
+        disable_twofactor,
+        disable_twofactor_put,
+        get_device_verification_settings,
+    ];

    routes.append(&mut authenticator::routes());
    routes.append(&mut duo::routes());
@@ -77,12 +87,6 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
    routes
 }

-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct VerificationTokenData {
-    user_verification_token: String,
-}
-
 #[get("/two-factor")]
 async fn get_twofactor(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value> {
    let twofactors = TwoFactor::find_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await;
@@ -122,14 +126,50 @@ async fn generate_recover_code(user: &mut User, conn: &DbConn) {
    }
 }

-/// Call after a 2FA provider, or one of its keys, was removed. No remembered device may keep skipping
-/// the providers that are left, and once every provider is gone the 2FA policy applies.
-pub async fn check_2fa_state(user: &User, device_type: i32, ip: &std::net::IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
-    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await.is_empty() {
-        enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device_type, ip, conn).await?;
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct DisableTwoFactorData {
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
+    r#type: NumberOrString,
 }
-    Ok(())
+
+#[post("/two-factor/disable", data = "<data>")]
+async fn disable_twofactor(data: Json<DisableTwoFactorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let data: DisableTwoFactorData = data.into_inner();
+    let user = headers.user;
+
+    // Delete directly after a valid token has been provided
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;
+
+    let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
+
+    if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
+        twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
+        Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
+        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
+            .await;
+    }
+
+    if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
+        enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
+    }
+
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "enabled": false,
+        "type": type_,
+        "object": "twoFactorProvider"
+    })))
+}
+
+#[put("/two-factor/disable", data = "<data>")]
+async fn disable_twofactor_put(data: Json<DisableTwoFactorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    disable_twofactor(data, headers, conn).await
 }

 pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy(
@@ -151,7 +191,7 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy(
            member.save(conn).await?;

            log_event(
-                EventType::OrganizationUserRevokedTwoFactorNonCompliance,
+                EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked,
                &member.uuid,
                &member.org_uuid,
                act_user_id,
@@ -185,15 +225,7 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy_for_org(
            member.revoke();
            member.save(conn).await?;

-            log_event(
-                EventType::OrganizationUserRevokedTwoFactorNonCompliance,
-                &member.uuid,
-                org_id,
-                act_user_id,
-                device_type,
-                ip,
-                conn,
-            )
+            log_event(EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked, &member.uuid, org_id, act_user_id, device_type, ip, conn)
                .await;
        }
    }
@@ -204,7 +236,7 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy_for_org(
 pub async fn send_incomplete_2fa_notifications(pool: DbPool) {
    debug!("Sending notifications for incomplete 2FA logins");

-    if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() == 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+    if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() <= 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
        return;
    }

@@ -214,21 +246,11 @@ pub async fn send_incomplete_2fa_notifications(pool: DbPool) {
    };

    let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-    let Some(time_limit) = TimeDelta::try_minutes(i64::from(CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit())) else {
-        error!("Failed to calculate the time limit for sending incomplete 2fa attempts");
-        return;
-    };
-    let Some(time_before) = now.checked_sub_signed(time_limit) else {
-        error!("Failed to calculate the timestamp for sending incomplete 2fa attempts");
-        return;
-    };
-
+    let time_limit = TimeDelta::try_minutes(CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit()).unwrap();
+    let time_before = now - time_limit;
    let incomplete_logins = TwoFactorIncomplete::find_logins_before(&time_before, &conn).await;
    for login in incomplete_logins {
-        let Some(user) = User::find_by_uuid(&login.user_uuid, &conn).await else {
-            error!("User '{}', not found!", login.user_uuid);
-            continue;
-        };
+        let user = User::find_by_uuid(&login.user_uuid, &conn).await.expect("User not found");
        info!(
            "User {} did not complete a 2FA login within the configured time limit. IP: {}",
            user.email, login.ip_address
@@ -72,7 +72,8 @@ async fn request_otp(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
    let user = headers.user;

    // Only one Protected Action per user is allowed to take place, delete the previous one
-    if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, &conn).await {
+    if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, &conn).await
+    {
        let pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
        let elapsed = pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds();
        let delay = 30;
@@ -124,28 +125,27 @@ pub async fn validate_protected_action_otp(
    delete_if_valid: bool,
    conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> EmptyResult {
-    let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, conn)
+    let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, conn)
        .await
        .map_res("Protected action token not found, try sending the code again or restart the process")?;
    let mut pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
+    pa_data.add_attempt();
+    pa.data = pa_data.to_json();

    // Fail after x attempts if the token has been used too many times.
    // Don't delete it, as we use it to keep track of attempts.
-    if pa_data.attempts >= u64::from(CONFIG.email_attempts_limit()) {
+    if pa_data.attempts >= CONFIG.email_attempts_limit() {
        err!("Token has expired")
    }

    // Check if the token has expired (Using the email 2fa expiration time)
-    let max_time = i64::from(CONFIG.email_expiration_time());
+    let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time().cast_signed();
    if pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds() > max_time {
        pa.delete(conn).await?;
        err!("Token has expired")
    }

    if !crypto::ct_eq(&pa_data.token, otp) {
-        pa_data.add_attempt();
-        pa.data = pa_data.to_json();
-
        pa.save(conn).await?;
        err!("Token is invalid")
    }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use std::{collections::HashSet, str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
+use std::{str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};

 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -18,18 +18,16 @@ use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{
        EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{
-            log_user_event,
-            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
+        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
    },
-    },
-    auth::{Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::Headers,
    crypto::ct_eq,
    db::{
        DbConn,
        models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
    },
    error::Error,
+    util::NumberOrString,
 };

 static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
@@ -47,14 +45,7 @@ static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
 });

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![
-        get_webauthn,
-        generate_webauthn_challenge,
-        activate_webauthn,
-        activate_webauthn_put,
-        delete_webauthn,
-        delete_webauthns
-    ]
+    routes![get_webauthn, generate_webauthn_challenge, activate_webauthn, activate_webauthn_put, delete_webauthn,]
 }

 // Some old u2f structs still needed for migrating from u2f to WebAuthn
@@ -128,36 +119,34 @@ async fn get_webauthn(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;

    let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
-    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
    let registrations_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();

    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "webAuthn": json!({
        "enabled": enabled,
        "keys": registrations_json,
-        }),
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::webauthn_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
+        "object": "twoFactorWebAuthn"
    })))
 }

 #[post("/two-factor/get-webauthn-challenge", data = "<data>")]
-async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
    let user = headers.user;

-    let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
-    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
-    let creds = registrations
+    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
+
+    let registrations = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn)
+        .await?
+        .1
        .into_iter()
        .map(|r| r.credential.cred_id().to_owned()) // We return the credentialIds to the clients to avoid double registering
        .collect();

-    two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, enabled)?;
-
    let (mut challenge, state) = WEBAUTHN.start_passkey_registration(
        Uuid::from_str(&user.uuid).expect("Failed to parse UUID"), // Should never fail
        &user.email,
        user.display_name(),
-        Some(creds),
+        Some(registrations),
    )?;

    let mut state = serde_json::to_value(&state)?;
@@ -177,19 +166,17 @@ async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers:
    let mut challenge_value = serde_json::to_value(challenge.public_key)?;
    challenge_value["status"] = "ok".into();
    challenge_value["errorMessage"] = "".into();
-
-    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "options": challenge_value
-    })))
+    Ok(Json(challenge_value))
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct EnableWebauthnData {
-    id: i32,
+    id: NumberOrString, // 1..5
    name: String,
    device_response: RegisterPublicKeyCredentialCopy,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@@ -270,14 +257,16 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
    let data: EnableWebauthnData = data.into_inner();
    let mut user = headers.user;

-    let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
-    let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
-    two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, !keys.is_empty())?;
+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
+        otp: data.otp,
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;

    // Retrieve and delete the saved challenge state
-    let state = if let Some(tf) =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge, &conn).await
-    {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge as i32;
+    let state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
        let state: PasskeyRegistration = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
        tf.delete(&conn).await?;
        state
@@ -288,9 +277,10 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
    // Verify the credentials with the saved state
    let credential = WEBAUTHN.finish_passkey_registration(&data.device_response.into(), &state)?;

+    let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
    // TODO: Check for repeated ID's
    registrations.push(WebauthnRegistration {
-        id: data.id,
+        id: data.id.into_i32()?,
        name: data.name,
        migrated: false,

@@ -303,13 +293,13 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
        .await?;
    generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;

+    let keys_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "webAuthn": json!({
        "enabled": true,
-            "keys": registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
-        }),
+        "keys": keys_json,
+        "object": "twoFactorU2f"
    })))
 }

@@ -320,87 +310,57 @@ async fn activate_webauthn_put(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers,

 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct DeleteWebauthnData {
-    id: i32,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+struct DeleteU2FData {
+    id: NumberOrString,
+    master_password_hash: String,
 }

 #[delete("/two-factor/webauthn", data = "<data>")]
-async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |key| key.id != data.id, headers, &conn).await
+async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteU2FData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    let id = data.id.into_i32()?;
+    if !headers.user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
+        err!("Invalid password");
    }

-#[delete("/two-factor/webauthn/all", data = "<data>")]
-async fn delete_webauthns(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |_| false, headers, &conn).await
-}
-
-async fn inner_delete_webauthns(
-    token: &str,
-    retain: impl Fn(&WebauthnRegistration) -> bool,
-    headers: Headers,
-    conn: &DbConn,
-) -> JsonResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    let Some(mut tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await else {
+    let Some(mut tf) =
+        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32, &conn).await
+    else {
        err!("Webauthn data not found!")
    };

-    let mut keys: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
-    let keys_id: Vec<i32> = keys.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
+    let mut data: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;

-    two_factor::validate_webauthn(token, &user.uuid, &keys_id, true)?;
-
-    let mut removed: HashSet<Vec<u8>> = HashSet::new();
-    let mut migrated = false;
-
-    keys.retain(|key| {
-        let retained = retain(key);
-        if !retained {
-            removed.insert(key.credential.cred_id().to_vec());
-            migrated = migrated || key.migrated;
-        }
-        retained
-    });
-
-    if removed.is_empty() {
+    let Some(item_pos) = data.iter().position(|r| r.id == id) else {
        err!("Webauthn entry not found")
-    }
+    };

-    if keys.is_empty() {
-        tf.delete(conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await;
-    } else {
-        tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&keys)?;
-        tf.save(conn).await?;
+    let removed_item = data.remove(item_pos);
+    tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
+    tf.save(&conn).await?;
    drop(tf);
-    }

    // If entry is migrated from u2f, delete the u2f entry as well
-    if migrated && let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f, conn).await {
-        let Ok(mut data) = serde_json::from_str::<Vec<U2FRegistration>>(&u2f.data) else {
+    if let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f as i32, &conn).await
+    {
+        let mut data: Vec<U2FRegistration> = if let Ok(d) = serde_json::from_str(&u2f.data) {
+            d
+        } else {
            err!("Error parsing U2F data")
        };

-        data.retain(|old| !removed.contains(&old.reg.key_handle));
-
-        if data.is_empty() {
-            u2f.delete(conn).await?;
-        } else {
+        data.retain(|r| r.reg.key_handle != removed_item.credential.cred_id().as_slice());
        let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
+
        u2f.data = new_data_str;
-            u2f.save(conn).await?;
-        }
+        u2f.save(&conn).await?;
    }

-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await?;
+    let keys_json: Vec<Value> = data.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();

    Ok(Json(json!({
-        "webAuthn": json!({
-            "enabled": !keys.is_empty(),
-            "keys": keys.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
-        }),
+        "enabled": true,
+        "keys": keys_json,
+        "object": "twoFactorU2f"
    })))
 }

@@ -408,7 +368,8 @@ pub async fn get_webauthn_registrations(
    user_id: &UserId,
    conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> Result<(bool, Vec<WebauthnRegistration>), Error> {
-    match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32;
+    match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
        Some(tf) => Ok((tf.enabled, serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?)),
        None => Ok((false, Vec::new())), // If no data, return empty list
    }
@@ -455,9 +416,8 @@ pub async fn generate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> JsonRes
 }

 pub async fn validate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, response: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let mut state = if let Some(tf) =
-        TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge, conn).await
-    {
+    let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge as i32;
+    let mut state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
        let state: PasskeyAuthentication = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
        tf.delete(conn).await?;
        state
@@ -10,12 +10,9 @@ use crate::{
    CONFIG,
    api::{
        EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
-        core::{
-            log_user_event,
-            two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
+        core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
    },
-    },
-    auth::{Headers, two_factor},
+    auth::Headers,
    db::{
        DbConn,
        models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType},
@@ -25,7 +22,7 @@ use crate::{
 };

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put, delete_yubikeys,]
+    routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put,]
 }

 struct HttpClientTransport {
@@ -63,7 +60,8 @@ struct EnableYubikeyData {
    key4: Option<String>,
    key5: Option<String>,
    nfc: bool,
-    user_verification_token: String,
+    master_password_hash: Option<String>,
+    otp: Option<String>,
 }

 #[derive(Deserialize, Serialize, Debug)]
@@ -127,47 +125,55 @@ async fn generate_yubikey(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn:
    data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;

    let user_id = &user.uuid;
+    let yubikey_type = TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32;

-    let (enabled, keys, yubikey_json) =
-        if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
+    let r = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, yubikey_type, &conn).await;
+
+    if let Some(r) = r {
        let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
-            let enabled = !yubikey_metadata.keys.is_empty();
-            let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys.clone());
-            result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(enabled);
+
+        let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
+
+        result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
        result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
-            (enabled, yubikey_metadata.keys, result)
+        result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
+
+        Ok(Json(result))
    } else {
-            (false, Vec::new(), json!({"enabled": false}))
-        };
        Ok(Json(json!({
-        "yubiKey": yubikey_json,
-        "userVerificationToken": two_factor::yubikey_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
+            "enabled": false,
+            "object": "twoFactorU2f",
        })))
    }
+}

 #[post("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
 async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
    let data: EnableYubikeyData = data.into_inner();
-    let yubikeys = parse_yubikeys(&data);
    let mut user = headers.user;

+    PasswordOrOtpData {
+        master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
+        otp: data.otp.clone(),
+    }
+    .validate(&user, true, &conn)
+    .await?;
+
+    // Check if we already have some data
+    let mut yubikey_data =
+        match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32, &conn).await {
+            Some(data) => data,
+            None => TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new()),
+        };
+
+    let yubikeys = parse_yubikeys(&data);
+
    if yubikeys.is_empty() {
        // Return an error to prevent saving empty keys which would cause users not being able to login anymore.
        // To remove all keys users should click the `Deactivate all keys` button
        err!("A key is required.");
    }

-    // Check if we already have some data
-    let mut yubikey_data =
-        if let Some(yd) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
-            let ym: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&yd.data)?;
-            two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &ym.keys, !ym.keys.is_empty())?;
-            yd
-        } else {
-            two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &Vec::new(), false)?;
-            TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new())
-        };
-
    // Ensure they are valid OTPs
    for yubikey in &yubikeys {
        if yubikey.is_empty() || yubikey.len() == 12 {
@@ -189,12 +195,15 @@ async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn:

    generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;

-    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+    log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;

    let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
+
    result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
    result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
-    Ok(Json(json!({"yubiKey": result})))
+    result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
+
+    Ok(Json(result))
 }

 #[put("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
@@ -202,32 +211,13 @@ async fn activate_yubikey_put(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, c
    activate_yubikey(data, headers, conn).await
 }

-#[delete("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
-async fn delete_yubikeys(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    let user = headers.user;
-
-    if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
-        let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
-        two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &yubikey_metadata.keys, true)?;
-
-        r.delete(&conn).await?;
-        log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
-    }
-
-    super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 pub async fn validate_yubikey_login(response: &str, twofactor_data: &str) -> EmptyResult {
    if response.len() != 44 {
        err!("Invalid Yubikey OTP length");
    }

    let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(twofactor_data).expect("Can't parse Yubikey Metadata");
-    let Some(response_id) = response.get(..12) else {
-        err!("Invalid Yubikey OTP");
-    };
+    let response_id = &response[..12];

    if !yubikey_metadata.keys.contains(&response_id.to_owned()) {
        err!("Given Yubikey is not registered");
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static CLIENT: LazyLock<Client> = LazyLock::new(|| {
    // Generate the cookie store
    let cookie_store = Arc::new(Jar::default());

-    let icon_download_timeout = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.icon_download_timeout()));
+    let icon_download_timeout = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.icon_download_timeout());
    let pool_idle_timeout = Duration::from_secs(10);
    // Reuse the client between requests
    get_reqwest_client_builder(true)
@@ -85,7 +85,7 @@ static ICON_SIZE_REGEX: LazyLock<Regex> = LazyLock::new(|| Regex::new(r"(?x)(\d+
 #[get("/<host>/icon.png")]
 fn icon_external(host: &str) -> Cached<Option<Redirect>> {
    let Ok(host) = get_valid_host(host) else {
-        warn!("Invalid host: {}", host.escape_debug());
+        warn!("Invalid host: {host}");
        return Cached::ttl(None, CONFIG.icon_cache_negttl(), true);
    };

@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ async fn icon_internal(host: &str) -> Cached<(ContentType, Vec<u8>)> {
    const FALLBACK_ICON: &[u8] = include_bytes!("../static/images/fallback-icon.png");

    let Ok(host) = get_valid_host(host) else {
-        warn!("Invalid host: {}", host.escape_debug());
+        warn!("Invalid host: {host}");
        return Cached::ttl(
            (ContentType::new("image", "png"), FALLBACK_ICON.to_vec()),
            CONFIG.icon_cache_negttl(),
@@ -193,14 +193,14 @@ async fn get_cached_icon(path: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
    None
 }

-async fn file_is_expired(path: &str, ttl: u32) -> Result<bool, Error> {
+async fn file_is_expired(path: &str, ttl: u64) -> Result<bool, Error> {
    let operator = CONFIG.opendal_operator_for_path_type(&PathType::IconCache)?;
    let meta = operator.stat(path).await?;
    let modified =
        meta.last_modified().ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other(format!("No last modified time for `{path}`")))?;
    let age = SystemTime::now().duration_since(modified.into())?;

-    Ok(ttl > 0 && u64::from(ttl) <= age.as_secs())
+    Ok(ttl > 0 && ttl <= age.as_secs())
 }

 async fn icon_is_negcached(path: &str) -> bool {
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ fn get_favicons_node(dom: Tokenizer<StringReader<'_>, FaviconEmitter>, icons: &m
            TAG_BASE => {
                base_url = if let Some(href) = token.tag.attributes.get(ATTR_HREF) {
                    let href = std::str::from_utf8(href).unwrap_or_default();
-                    debug!("Found base href: {}", href.escape_debug());
+                    debug!("Found base href: {href}");
                    match base_url.join(href) {
                        Ok(inner_url) => inner_url,
                        _ => continue,
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ async fn download_icon(domain: &str) -> Result<(Bytes, Option<&str>), Error> {
                Ok(())
            }) {
                Ok(_) => {
-                    // Also check if the size is at least 67 bytes, which seems to be the smallest png I could create
+                    // Also check if the size is atleast 67 bytes, which seems to be the smallest png i could create
                    if body.len() >= 67 {
                        // Check if the icon type is allowed, else try an icon from the list.
                        icon_type = get_icon_type(&body);
@@ -663,17 +663,6 @@ impl reqwest::cookie::CookieStore for Jar {
        use time::Duration;

        let mut cookie_store = self.0.write().unwrap();
-
-        // The store only skips expired cookies when reading them, so remove them here or they are kept forever
-        let expired: Vec<_> = cookie_store
-            .iter_any()
-            .filter(|c| c.is_expired())
-            .map(|c| (String::from(&c.domain), String::from(&c.path), c.name().to_owned()))
-            .collect();
-        for (domain, path, name) in expired {
-            cookie_store.remove(&domain, &path, &name);
-        }
-
        let cookies = cookie_headers.filter_map(|val| {
            std::str::from_utf8(val.as_bytes())
                .map_err(RawCookieParseError::from)
@@ -17,19 +17,20 @@ use crate::{
            accounts::{PreloginData, RegisterData, kdf_upgrade, prelogin, register},
            log_user_event,
            two_factor::{
-                authenticator, duo_oidc, email, enforce_2fa_policy, is_twofactor_provider_usable, webauthn, yubikey,
+                authenticator, duo, duo_oidc, email, enforce_2fa_policy, is_twofactor_provider_usable, webauthn,
+                yubikey,
            },
        },
-        identity_master_password_policy,
+        master_password_policy,
        push::register_push_device,
    },
    auth,
-    auth::{AuthMethod, ClientHeaders, ClientIp, Secure, generate_organization_api_key_login_claims},
+    auth::{AuthMethod, ClientHeaders, ClientIp, ClientVersion, Secure, generate_organization_api_key_login_claims},
    crypto,
    db::{
        DbConn,
        models::{
-            AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, EventType, Invitation, OIDCCodeResponseError,
+            AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, Device, DeviceId, EventType, Invitation, OIDCCodeResponseError,
            OrganizationApiKey, OrganizationId, SendId, SsoAuth, SsoUser, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete,
            TwoFactorType, User, UserId,
        },
@@ -45,8 +46,8 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
        login,
        post_prelogin,
        prelogin_password,
+        identity_register,
        register_verification_email,
-        register_verification_email_clicked,
        register_finish,
        prevalidate,
        authorize,
@@ -56,7 +57,12 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
 }

 #[post("/connect/token", data = "<data>")]
-async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+async fn login(
+    data: Form<ConnectData>,
+    client_header: ClientHeaders,
+    client_version: Option<ClientVersion>,
+    conn: DbConn,
+) -> JsonResult {
    let data: ConnectData = data.into_inner();

    let mut user_id: Option<UserId> = None;
@@ -77,14 +83,18 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
            check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;

-            password_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header).await
+            password_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip, client_version.as_ref()).await
        }
        "client_credentials" => {
            check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.client_secret.as_ref(), "client_secret cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.scope.as_ref(), "scope cannot be blank")?;

-            api_key_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header).await
+            check_is_some(data.device_identifier.as_ref(), "device_identifier cannot be blank")?;
+            check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
+            check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;
+
+            api_key_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
        }
        "authorization_code" if CONFIG.sso_enabled() => {
            check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
@@ -95,7 +105,7 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
            check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
            check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;

-            sso_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header).await
+            sso_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip, client_version.as_ref()).await
        }
        "authorization_code" => err!("SSO sign-in is not available"),
        "send_access" => {
@@ -112,14 +122,14 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
            .await?;
            Ok(Json(tokens.to_json()))
        }
-        t => err!("Invalid type", t.escape_debug().to_string()),
+        t => err!("Invalid type", t),
    };

    if let Some(user_id) = user_id {
        match &login_result {
            Ok(_) => {
                log_user_event(
-                    EventType::UserLoggedIn,
+                    EventType::UserLoggedIn as i32,
                    &user_id,
                    client_header.device_type,
                    &client_header.ip.ip,
@@ -129,7 +139,8 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
            }
            Err(e) => {
                if let Some(ev) = e.get_event() {
-                    log_user_event(ev.event, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn).await;
+                    log_user_event(ev.event as i32, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn)
+                        .await;
                }
            }
        }
@@ -183,9 +194,9 @@ async fn sso_login(
    data: ConnectData,
    user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
    conn: &DbConn,
-    client_header: &ClientHeaders,
+    ip: &ClientIp,
+    client_version: Option<&ClientVersion>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
-    let ip = &client_header.ip;
    AuthMethod::Sso.check_scope(data.scope.as_ref())?;

    // Ratelimit the login
@@ -323,8 +334,6 @@ async fn sso_login(
            }

            let mut user = User::new(&user_infos.email, user_infos.user_name.clone());
-            // Before saving, so that a client that can't log in doesn't create the account
-            check_client_version(&user, client_header)?;
            user.verified_at = Some(now);
            user.save(conn).await?;

@@ -333,8 +342,6 @@ async fn sso_login(
            (user, device, None, None)
        }
        Some((user, _)) if !user.enabled => {
-            // Set in both arms, not only after the match, so that their failed logins are logged
-            *user_id = Some(user.uuid.clone());
            err!(
                "This user has been disabled",
                format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", ip.ip, user.email),
@@ -344,12 +351,9 @@ async fn sso_login(
            )
        }
        Some((mut user, sso_user)) => {
-            *user_id = Some(user.uuid.clone());
-            check_client_version(&user, client_header)?;
-
            let mut device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;

-            let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&mut user, &data, &mut device, ip, conn).await?;
+            let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&mut user, &data, &mut device, ip, client_version, conn).await?;

            if user.private_key.is_none() {
                // User was invited a stub was created
@@ -385,9 +389,9 @@ async fn password_login(
    data: ConnectData,
    user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
    conn: &DbConn,
-    client_header: &ClientHeaders,
+    ip: &ClientIp,
+    client_version: Option<&ClientVersion>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
-    let ip = &client_header.ip;
    // Validate scope
    AuthMethod::Password.check_scope(data.scope.as_ref())?;

@@ -396,14 +400,24 @@ async fn password_login(

    // Get the user
    let username = data.username.as_ref().unwrap().trim();
-    let log_username = username.escape_debug();
    let Some(mut user) = User::find_by_mail(username, conn).await else {
-        err!("Username or password is incorrect. Try again", format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip))
+        err!("Username or password is incorrect. Try again", format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip))
    };

    // Set the user_id here to be passed back used for event logging.
    *user_id = Some(user.uuid.clone());

+    // Check if the user is disabled
+    if !user.enabled {
+        err!(
+            "This user has been disabled",
+            format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip),
+            ErrorEvent {
+                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
+            }
+        )
+    }
+
    let password = data.password.as_ref().unwrap();

    // If we get an auth request, we don't check the user's password, but the access code of the auth request
@@ -411,7 +425,7 @@ async fn password_login(
        let Some(auth_request) = AuthRequest::find_by_uuid_and_user(auth_request_id, &user.uuid, conn).await else {
            err!(
                "Auth request not found. Try again.",
-                format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
+                format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip),
                ErrorEvent {
                    event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
                }
@@ -423,14 +437,13 @@ async fn password_login(

        if auth_request.user_uuid != user.uuid
            || !auth_request.approved.unwrap_or(false)
-            || auth_request.authentication_date.is_some()
            || request_expired
            || ip.ip.to_string() != auth_request.request_ip
            || !auth_request.check_access_code(password)
        {
            err!(
                "Username or access code is incorrect. Try again",
-                format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
+                format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip),
                ErrorEvent {
                    event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
                }
@@ -439,26 +452,13 @@ async fn password_login(
    } else if !user.check_valid_password(password) {
        err!(
            "Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
-            format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
+            format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip),
            ErrorEvent {
                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
            }
        )
    }

-    // Check if the user is disabled
-    if !user.enabled {
-        err!(
-            "This user has been disabled",
-            format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
-            ErrorEvent {
-                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
-            }
-        )
-    }
-
-    check_client_version(&user, client_header)?;
-
    // Change the KDF Iterations (only when not logging in with an auth request)
    if data.auth_request.is_none() {
        kdf_upgrade(&mut user, password, conn).await?;
@@ -469,9 +469,9 @@ async fn password_login(
    if user.verified_at.is_none() && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.signups_verify() {
        if user.last_verifying_at.is_none()
            || now.signed_duration_since(user.last_verifying_at.unwrap()).num_seconds()
-                > i64::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_time())
+                > CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_time().cast_signed()
        {
-            let resend_limit = i32::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_limit());
+            let resend_limit = CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_limit().cast_signed();
            if resend_limit == 0 || user.login_verify_count < resend_limit {
                // We want to send another email verification if we require signups to verify
                // their email address, and we haven't sent them a reminder in a while...
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ async fn password_login(
        // We still want the login to fail until they actually verified the email address
        err!(
            "Please verify your email before trying again.",
-            format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
+            format!("IP: {}. Username: {username}.", ip.ip),
            ErrorEvent {
                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn
            }
@@ -500,86 +500,13 @@ async fn password_login(

    let mut device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;

-    let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&mut user, &data, &mut device, ip, conn).await?;
-
-    // Like upstream, an auth request can be used for one login only. Marked after 2FA so a 2FA prompt doesn't use it up.
-    if let Some(ref auth_request_id) = data.auth_request
-        && !AuthRequest::set_authentication_date(auth_request_id, conn).await?
-    {
-        err!(
-            "Username or access code is incorrect. Try again",
-            format!("IP: {}. Username: {log_username}.", ip.ip),
-            ErrorEvent {
-                event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
-            }
-        )
-    }
+    let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&mut user, &data, &mut device, ip, client_version, conn).await?;

    let auth_tokens = auth::AuthTokens::new(&device, &user, AuthMethod::Password, data.client_id);

    authenticated_response(&user, &mut device, auth_tokens, twofactor_token, conn, ip).await
 }

-/// Like upstream's `ClientVersionValidator`, every login needs the `Bitwarden-Client-Version` header, and a V2 account
-/// ([`User::has_v2_encryption`]) a client of at least 2026.10.1 (2026.10.2 for the desktop app). Called right after the
-/// credentials are checked, like upstream, so that it doesn't tell anyone else which accounts are V2.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/src/Identity/IdentityServer/RequestValidators/ClientVersionValidator.cs#L33-L79>
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/src/Core/KeyManagement/Constants.cs#L5-L6>
-fn check_client_version(user: &User, client_header: &ClientHeaders) -> EmptyResult {
-    let Some((error, description)) = client_version_error(
-        user.has_v2_encryption(),
-        client_header.client_version.as_ref(),
-        client_header.device_type,
-    ) else {
-        return Ok(());
-    };
-    Err(crate::error::Error::from((
-        // Escaped: on a first SSO login the email comes from the provider and isn't validated yet
-        format!("IP: {}. Username: {}. {error}", client_header.ip.ip, user.email.escape_debug()),
-        json!({
-            "error": error,
-            "error_description": description,
-            "ErrorModel": { "Message": description, "Object": "error" },
-        }),
-    ))
-    .with_event(crate::error::ErrorEvent {
-        event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
-    }))
-}
-
-/// The error id and message of [`check_client_version`], `None` when the client may log in.
-fn client_version_error(
-    is_v2: bool,
-    client_version: Option<&semver::Version>,
-    device_type: i32,
-) -> Option<(&'static str, &'static str)> {
-    const MIN_V2_CLIENT: semver::Version = semver::Version::new(2026, 10, 1);
-    const MIN_V2_DESKTOP_CLIENT: semver::Version = semver::Version::new(2026, 10, 2);
-
-    let Some(version) = client_version else {
-        return Some((
-            "version_header_missing",
-            "No client version header found, required to prevent encryption errors. Please confirm your client is supplying the header: \"Bitwarden-Client-Version\"",
-        ));
-    };
-    if !is_v2 {
-        return None;
-    }
-    // Upstream's desktop device types
-    // Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/src/Libraries/Clients/DeviceTypes.cs#L14-L20>
-    let is_desktop = matches!(
-        DeviceType::from_i32(device_type),
-        DeviceType::WindowsDesktop | DeviceType::MacOsDesktop | DeviceType::LinuxDesktop | DeviceType::Uwp
-    );
-    let min_version = if is_desktop {
-        &MIN_V2_DESKTOP_CLIENT
-    } else {
-        &MIN_V2_CLIENT
-    };
-    (version < min_version).then_some(("invalid_client_version", "Please update your app to continue using Bitwarden"))
-}
-
 async fn authenticated_response(
    user: &User,
    device: &mut Device,
@@ -612,7 +539,7 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
    // Save to update `device.updated_at` to track usage and toggle new status
    device.save(true, conn).await?;

-    let master_password_policy = identity_master_password_policy(user, conn).await;
+    let master_password_policy = master_password_policy(user, conn).await;

    let has_master_password = !user.password_hash.is_empty();
    let master_password_unlock = if has_master_password {
@@ -627,7 +554,7 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
            // https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
            "MasterKeyEncryptedUserKey": user.akey,
            "MasterKeyWrappedUserKey": user.akey,
-            "Salt": user.master_password_salt()
+            "Salt": user.email
        })
    } else {
        Value::Null
@@ -645,6 +572,7 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
        "KdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
        "KdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
        "KdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
+        "ResetMasterPassword": false, // TODO: Same as above
        "ForcePasswordReset": false,
        "MasterPasswordPolicy": master_password_policy,
        "scope": auth_tokens.scope(),
@@ -668,26 +596,13 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
    Ok(Json(result))
 }

-async fn api_key_login(
-    data: ConnectData,
-    user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
-    conn: &DbConn,
-    client_header: &ClientHeaders,
-) -> JsonResult {
-    let ip = &client_header.ip;
+async fn api_key_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
    // Ratelimit the login
    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_login(&ip.ip)?;

    // Validate scope
    match data.scope.as_ref() {
-        Some(scope) if scope == &AuthMethod::UserApiKey.scope() => {
-            // Like upstream, only the user API key logs in a device
-            check_is_some(data.device_identifier.as_ref(), "device_identifier cannot be blank")?;
-            check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
-            check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;
-
-            user_api_key_login(data, user_id, conn, client_header).await
-        }
+        Some(scope) if scope == &AuthMethod::UserApiKey.scope() => user_api_key_login(data, user_id, conn, ip).await,
        Some(scope) if scope == &AuthMethod::OrgApiKey.scope() => organization_api_key_login(data, conn, ip).await,
        _ => err!("Scope not supported"),
    }
@@ -697,9 +612,8 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
    data: ConnectData,
    user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
    conn: &DbConn,
-    client_header: &ClientHeaders,
+    ip: &ClientIp,
 ) -> JsonResult {
-    let ip = &client_header.ip;
    // Get the user via the client_id
    let client_id = data.client_id.as_ref().unwrap();
    let Some(client_user_id) = client_id.strip_prefix("user.") else {
@@ -736,8 +650,6 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
        )
    }

-    check_client_version(&user, client_header)?;
-
    let mut device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;

    if CONFIG.mail_enabled() && device.is_new() {
@@ -782,7 +694,7 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
            // https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
            "MasterKeyEncryptedUserKey": user.akey,
            "MasterKeyWrappedUserKey": user.akey,
-            "Salt": user.master_password_salt()
+            "Salt": user.email
        })
    } else {
        Value::Null
@@ -803,6 +715,7 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
        "KdfIterations": user.client_kdf_iter,
        "KdfMemory": user.client_kdf_memory,
        "KdfParallelism": user.client_kdf_parallelism,
+        "ResetMasterPassword": false, // TODO: according to official server seems something like: user.password_hash.is_empty(), but would need testing
        "ForcePasswordReset": false,
        "scope": AuthMethod::UserApiKey.scope(),
        "AccountKeys": account_keys,
@@ -868,6 +781,7 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
    data: &ConnectData,
    device: &mut Device,
    ip: &ClientIp,
+    client_version: Option<&ClientVersion>,
    conn: &DbConn,
 ) -> ApiResult<Option<String>> {
    let twofactors = TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await;
@@ -896,12 +810,17 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
    if ![TwoFactorType::Remember as i32, TwoFactorType::RecoveryCode as i32].contains(&selected_id)
        && !twofactor_ids.contains(&selected_id)
    {
-        err_json!(json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, user, data, conn).await?, "Invalid two factor provider")
+        err_json!(
+            json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, &user.uuid, data, client_version, conn).await?,
+            "Invalid two factor provider"
+        )
    }

-    // Like upstream, a blank token counts as not provided
-    let Some(twofactor_code) = data.two_factor_token.as_deref().filter(|t| !t.trim().is_empty()) else {
-        err_json!(json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, user, data, conn).await?, "2FA token not provided")
+    let Some(ref twofactor_code) = data.two_factor_token else {
+        err_json!(
+            json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, &user.uuid, data, client_version, conn).await?,
+            "2FA token not provided"
+        )
    };

    let selected_twofactor = twofactors.into_iter().find(|tf| tf.atype == selected_id && tf.enabled);
@@ -915,6 +834,11 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
        Some(TwoFactorType::Webauthn) => webauthn::validate_webauthn_login(&user.uuid, twofactor_code, conn).await?,
        Some(TwoFactorType::YubiKey) => yubikey::validate_yubikey_login(twofactor_code, &selected_data?).await?,
        Some(TwoFactorType::Duo) => {
+            if CONFIG.duo_use_iframe() {
+                // Legacy iframe prompt flow
+                duo::validate_duo_login(&user.email, twofactor_code, conn).await?;
+            } else {
+                // OIDC based flow
                duo_oidc::validate_duo_login(
                    &user.email,
                    twofactor_code,
@@ -924,6 +848,7 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
                )
                .await?;
            }
+        }
        Some(TwoFactorType::Email) => {
            email::validate_email_code_str(&user.uuid, twofactor_code, &selected_data?, &ip.ip, conn).await?;
        }
@@ -944,22 +869,16 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
                        device.save(true, conn).await?;
                    }
                    err_json!(
-                        json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, user, data, conn).await?,
+                        json_err_twofactor(&twofactor_ids, &user.uuid, data, client_version, conn).await?,
                        "2FA Remember token not provided or expired"
                    )
                }
            }
        }
        Some(TwoFactorType::RecoveryCode) => {
-            // Like upstream, spaces and case don't matter
-            let recovery_code = twofactor_code.replace(' ', "").trim().to_lowercase();
-            if !user.check_valid_recovery_code(&recovery_code) {
-                err!(
-                    "Two-step token is invalid. Try again.",
-                    ErrorEvent {
-                        event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn2fa
-                    }
-                )
+            // Check if recovery code is correct
+            if !user.check_valid_recovery_code(twofactor_code) {
+                err!("Recovery code is incorrect. Try again.")
            }

            // Remove all twofactors from the user
@@ -972,14 +891,7 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(

            enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await?;

-            log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
-
-            if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
-                && let Err(e) =
-                    mail::send_recover_twofactor(&user.email, &ip.ip.to_string(), &Utc::now().naive_utc()).await
-            {
-                error!("Error sending two-step login recovered email: {e:#?}");
-            }
+            log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa as i32, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;

            // Remove the recovery code, not needed without twofactors
            user.totp_recover = None;
@@ -1008,14 +920,21 @@ fn selected_data(tf: Option<TwoFactor>) -> ApiResult<String> {
    tf.map(|t| t.data).map_res("Two factor doesn't exist")
 }

-async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<Value> {
-    let user_id = &user.uuid;
+async fn json_err_twofactor(
+    providers: &[i32],
+    user_id: &UserId,
+    data: &ConnectData,
+    client_version: Option<&ClientVersion>,
+    conn: &DbConn,
+) -> ApiResult<Value> {
    let mut result = json!({
        "error" : "invalid_grant",
        "error_description" : "Two factor required.",
        "TwoFactorProviders" : providers.iter().map(ToString::to_string).collect::<Vec<String>>(),
        "TwoFactorProviders2" : {}, // { "0" : null }
-        "MasterPasswordPolicy": identity_master_password_policy(user, conn).await,
+        "MasterPasswordPolicy": {
+            "Object": "masterPasswordPolicy"
+        }
    });

    for provider in providers {
@@ -1028,8 +947,23 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
            }

            Some(TwoFactorType::Duo) => {
+                let email = if let Some(u) = User::find_by_uuid(user_id, conn).await {
+                    u.email
+                } else {
+                    err!("User does not exist")
+                };
+
+                if CONFIG.duo_use_iframe() {
+                    // Legacy iframe prompt flow
+                    let (signature, host) = duo::generate_duo_signature(&email, conn).await?;
+                    result["TwoFactorProviders2"][provider.to_string()] = json!({
+                        "Host": host,
+                        "Signature": signature,
+                    });
+                } else {
+                    // OIDC based flow
                    let auth_url = duo_oidc::get_duo_auth_url(
-                    &user.email,
+                        &email,
                        data.client_id.as_ref().unwrap(),
                        data.device_identifier.as_ref().unwrap(),
                        conn,
@@ -1040,9 +974,10 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
                        "AuthUrl": auth_url,
                    });
                }
+            }

            Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::YubiKey) => {
-                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
+                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
                    err!("No YubiKey devices registered")
                };

@@ -1054,10 +989,23 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
            }

            Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::Email) => {
-                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
+                let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
                    err!("No twofactor email registered")
                };

+                // Starting with version 2025.5.0 the client will call `/api/two-factor/send-email-login`.
+                let disabled_send = if let Some(cv) = client_version {
+                    let ver_match = semver::VersionReq::parse(">=2025.5.0").unwrap();
+                    ver_match.matches(&cv.0)
+                } else {
+                    false
+                };
+
+                // Send email immediately if email is the only 2FA option.
+                if providers.len() == 1 && !disabled_send {
+                    email::send_token(user_id, conn).await?;
+                }
+
                let email_data = email::EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
                result["TwoFactorProviders2"][provider.to_string()] = json!({
                    "Email": email::obscure_email(&email_data.email),
@@ -1095,6 +1043,11 @@ async fn prelogin_password(data: Json<PreloginData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn)
    prelogin(data, ip, conn).await
 }

+#[post("/accounts/register", data = "<data>")]
+async fn identity_register(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    register(data, false, conn).await
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct RegisterVerificationData {
@@ -1103,13 +1056,6 @@ struct RegisterVerificationData {
    // receiveMarketingEmails: bool,
 }

-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct RegisterVerificationEmailClickedData {
-    email: String,
-    email_verification_token: String,
-}
-
 #[derive(rocket::Responder)]
 enum RegisterVerificationResponse {
    #[response(status = 204)]
@@ -1172,29 +1118,9 @@ async fn register_verification_email(
    }
 }

-#[post("/accounts/register/verification-email-clicked", data = "<data>")]
-async fn register_verification_email_clicked(
-    data: Json<RegisterVerificationEmailClickedData>,
-    conn: DbConn,
-) -> EmptyResult {
-    let data = data.into_inner();
-    let token_valid = auth::decode_register_verify(&data.email_verification_token)
-        .is_ok_and(|claims| claims.verified && claims.sub.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&data.email));
-    let user_exists = User::find_by_mail(&data.email, &conn)
-        .await
-        .is_some_and(|user| !user.password_hash.is_empty() || user.private_key.is_some());
-
-    if !token_valid || user_exists {
-        err!("Expired link. Please restart registration or try logging in. You may already have an account")
-    }
-
-    Ok(())
-}
-
 #[post("/accounts/register/finish", data = "<data>")]
-async fn register_finish(data: Json<RegisterData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
-    register(data, conn).await
+async fn register_finish(data: Json<RegisterData>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
+    register(data, true, conn).await
 }

 // https://github.com/bitwarden/jslib/blob/master/common/src/models/request/tokenRequest.ts
@@ -1324,7 +1250,7 @@ async fn oidcsignin_redirect(
    let state = sso::decode_state(&base64_state)?;

    let Some(mut sso_auth) = SsoAuth::find(&state, conn).await else {
-        err!(format!("Cannot retrieve sso_auth for {}", state.escape_debug()))
+        err!(format!("Cannot retrieve sso_auth for {state}"))
    };

    // Browser-binding check
@@ -1333,7 +1259,7 @@ async fn oidcsignin_redirect(
    let provided_hash = cookie_value.as_deref().map(|v| crypto::sha256_hex(v.as_bytes()));
    match (sso_auth.binding_hash.as_deref(), provided_hash.as_deref()) {
        (Some(expected), Some(actual)) if crypto::ct_eq(expected, actual) => {}
-        _ => err!(format!("SSO session binding mismatch for {}", state.escape_debug())),
+        _ => err!(format!("SSO session binding mismatch for {state}")),
    }
    cookies
        .remove(Cookie::build(SSO_BINDING_COOKIE).path(format!("{}/identity/connect/", CONFIG.domain_path())).build());
@@ -1419,33 +1345,3 @@ async fn authorize(data: AuthorizeData, cookies: &CookieJar<'_>, secure: Secure,

    Ok(Redirect::temporary(String::from(auth_url)))
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    #[test]
-    fn test_client_version_error() {
-        let version = |v| semver::Version::parse(v).unwrap();
-        let web = DeviceType::ChromeBrowser as i32;
-        let desktop = DeviceType::WindowsDesktop as i32;
-        // Every login needs the header
-        assert_eq!(client_version_error(false, None, web).map(|e| e.0), Some("version_header_missing"));
-        assert_eq!(client_version_error(true, None, desktop).map(|e| e.0), Some("version_header_missing"));
-        // V1 accounts log in from any version
-        assert_eq!(client_version_error(false, Some(&version("2024.1.0")), web), None);
-        assert_eq!(client_version_error(false, Some(&version("2024.1.0")), desktop), None);
-        // V2 accounts need 2026.10.1, and 2026.10.2 for the desktop app
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_version_error(true, Some(&version("2026.10.0")), web).map(|e| e.0),
-            Some("invalid_client_version")
-        );
-        assert_eq!(client_version_error(true, Some(&version("2026.10.1")), web), None);
-        assert_eq!(
-            client_version_error(true, Some(&version("2026.10.1")), desktop).map(|e| e.0),
-            Some("invalid_client_version")
-        );
-        assert_eq!(client_version_error(true, Some(&version("2026.10.2")), DeviceType::Uwp as i32), None);
-        assert_eq!(client_version_error(true, Some(&version("2026.11.0")), desktop), None);
-    }
-}
@@ -4,13 +4,8 @@ mod icons;
 mod identity;
 mod notifications;
 mod push;
-#[cfg(feature = "unsafe_test_mode")]
-mod test_seeder;
 mod web;

-#[cfg(feature = "unsafe_test_mode")]
-pub use test_seeder::routes as test_seeder_routes;
-
 use rocket::serde::json::Json;
 use serde_json::Value;

@@ -30,12 +25,12 @@ pub use crate::api::{
    notifications::routes as notifications_routes,
    notifications::{AnonymousNotify, LogOutReason, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS},
    push::{
-        push_cipher_update, push_folder_update, push_logout, push_logout_to_relay, push_send_update, push_user_update,
-        register_push_device, unregister_push_device,
+        push_cipher_update, push_folder_update, push_logout, push_send_update, push_user_update, register_push_device,
+        unregister_push_device,
    },
    web::catchers as web_catchers,
    web::routes as web_routes,
-    web::{STATIC_FILES, invalidate_css_cache},
+    web::{invalidate_css_cache, static_files},
 };
 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
@@ -51,7 +46,7 @@ pub type JsonResult = ApiResult<Json<Value>>;
 pub type EmptyResult = ApiResult<()>;

 // Common structs representing JSON data received
-#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
 struct PasswordOrOtpData {
    #[serde(alias = "MasterPasswordHash")]
@@ -129,21 +124,3 @@ async fn master_password_policy(user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
    mpp_json["Object"] = json!("masterPasswordPolicy");
    mpp_json
 }
-
-// Identity responses use PascalCase keys like upstream, some clients (Android) only read those
-async fn identity_master_password_policy(user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
-    match master_password_policy(user, conn).await {
-        Value::Object(policy) => Value::Object(
-            policy
-                .into_iter()
-                .map(|(mut key, value)| {
-                    if let Some(first) = key.get_mut(..1) {
-                        first.make_ascii_uppercase();
-                    }
-                    (key, value)
-                })
-                .collect(),
-        ),
-        policy => policy,
-    }
-}
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 use std::{
    net::IpAddr,
    sync::{Arc, LazyLock},
-    time::{Duration, Instant},
+    time::Duration,
 };

 use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
@@ -41,14 +41,6 @@ pub static WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS: LazyLock<Arc<AnonymousWebSocketSubscripti
 /// One connection is needed per pending login request, several at once are only expected behind NAT.
 const MAX_ANONYMOUS_CONNECTIONS_PER_IP: u32 = 25;

-/// How often a Ping is sent to the client.
-const WS_PING_INTERVAL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);
-
-/// Close the connection if nothing, not even a Pong, was received from the client for this long.
-/// Otherwise half-open connections (client gone without a FIN, e.g. behind a proxy or NAT) are kept forever.
-/// Same as the default `ClientTimeoutInterval` of ASP.NET Core SignalR, which the official server uses.
-const WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);
-
 static NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED: LazyLock<bool> = LazyLock::new(|| !CONFIG.enable_websocket() && !CONFIG.push_enabled());

 pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
@@ -164,16 +156,12 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
        rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
            let mut ws = ws;
            let _guard = guard;
-            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
-            let mut last_received = Instant::now();
+            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
            loop {
                tokio::select! {
                    res = ws.next() =>  {
                        match res {
                            Some(Ok(message)) => {
-                                // Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
-                                last_received = Instant::now();
-
                                match message {
                                    // Respond to any pings
                                    Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -207,13 +195,7 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
                        }
                    }

-                    _ = interval.tick() => {
-                        // The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
-                        if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
-                            break;
-                        }
-                        yield Message::Ping(PING.to_vec());
-                    }
+                    _ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
                }
            }
        }}
@@ -247,16 +229,12 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
        rocket_ws::Stream! { ws => {
            let mut ws = ws;
            let _guard = guard;
-            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(WS_PING_INTERVAL);
-            let mut last_received = Instant::now();
+            let mut interval = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(15));
            loop {
                tokio::select! {
                    res = ws.next() =>  {
                        match res {
                            Some(Ok(message)) => {
-                                // Any message, including a Pong, means the client is still there
-                                last_received = Instant::now();
-
                                match message {
                                    // Respond to any pings
                                    Message::Ping(ping) => yield Message::Pong(ping),
@@ -290,13 +268,7 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
                        }
                    }

-                    _ = interval.tick() => {
-                        // The client stopped responding without closing the connection, drop it
-                        if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
-                            break;
-                        }
-                        yield Message::Ping(PING.to_vec());
-                    }
+                    _ = interval.tick() => yield Message::Ping(create_ping())
                }
            }
        }}
@@ -359,7 +331,6 @@ fn convert_option<T: Into<Value>>(option: Option<T>) -> Value {

 const RECORD_SEPARATOR: u8 = 0x1e;
 const INITIAL_RESPONSE: [u8; 3] = [0x7b, 0x7d, RECORD_SEPARATOR]; // {, }, <RS>
-const PING: [u8; 3] = [0x02, 0x91, 0x06];

 #[derive(Deserialize, Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
 struct InitialMessage<'a> {
@@ -415,7 +386,8 @@ impl WebSocketUsers {
        self.send_logout_with_reason(user, acting_device, None, conn).await;
    }

-    /// A logout that clients may handle differently depending on `reason`
+    /// A logout that clients may handle differently depending on `reason`, e.g. syncing instead of
+    /// logging out after a key rotation that kept the sessions alive.
    pub async fn send_logout_with_reason(
        &self,
        user: &User,
@@ -704,9 +676,14 @@ fn create_anonymous_update(payload: Vec<(Value, Value)>, ut: UpdateType, user_id
    serialize(&value)
 }

-/// Why a logout was pushed, absent for a plain one. `KdfChange` isn't sent yet.
+fn create_ping() -> Vec<u8> {
+    serialize(&Value::Array(vec![6.into()]))
+}
+
+/// Why a logout was pushed. Absent for a plain logout.
 ///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Enums/PushNotificationLogOutReason.cs#L3-L7>
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/Enums/PushNotificationLogOutReason.cs>
+/// (`KdfChange = 0` is not sent by vaultwarden yet.)
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
 pub enum LogOutReason {
    KeyRotation = 1,
@@ -139,25 +139,21 @@ pub async fn unregister_push_device(push_id: Option<&PushId>) -> EmptyResult {
    if !CONFIG.push_enabled() || push_id.is_none() {
        return Ok(());
    }
-    let data = json!({
-        "id": push_id.as_ref().unwrap(),
-    });
-
    let auth_api_token = get_auth_api_token().await?;
+
    let auth_header = format!("Bearer {auth_api_token}");

-    if let Err(e) = make_http_request(Method::POST, &(CONFIG.push_relay_uri() + "/push/delete"))?
-        .header(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
-        .header(ACCEPT, "application/json")
+    match make_http_request(
+        Method::POST,
+        &format!("{}/push/delete/{}", CONFIG.push_relay_uri(), push_id.as_ref().unwrap()),
+    )?
    .header(AUTHORIZATION, auth_header)
-        .json(&data)
    .send()
-        .await?
-        .error_for_status()
+    .await
    {
-        err!(format!("An error occurred during device unregistration: {e}"));
-    }
-
+        Ok(r) => r,
+        Err(e) => err!(format!("An error occurred during device unregistration: {e}")),
+    };
    Ok(())
 }

@@ -194,13 +190,6 @@ pub async fn push_cipher_update(ut: UpdateType, cipher: &Cipher, device: &Device

 pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, reason: Option<LogOutReason>, conn: &DbConn) {
    if Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, conn).await {
-        push_logout_to_relay(user, acting_device, reason);
-    }
-}
-
-// Sends the logout without checking for push devices first.
-// Needed after deleting a user, when the devices are already gone from the database.
-pub fn push_logout_to_relay(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, reason: Option<LogOutReason>) {
        tokio::task::spawn(send_to_push_relay(json!({
            "userId": user.uuid,
            "organizationId": (),
@@ -216,6 +205,7 @@ pub fn push_logout_to_relay(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, reason:
            "installationId": null
        })));
    }
+}

 pub async fn push_user_update(ut: UpdateType, user: &User, push_uuid: Option<&PushId>, conn: &DbConn) {
    if Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, conn).await {
@@ -1,511 +0,0 @@
-//! A seeder API for the end-to-end tests, only in builds with the `unsafe_test_mode` feature: it creates accounts with
-//! no checks at all, so it must never be in a release or a deployment.
-//!
-//! It answers the calls the SDK's live tests make to upstream's `util/SeederApi` (`POST /seed` with a scene,
-//! `DELETE /seed/{playId}`), under `/test/seeder`. Each request needs HTTP basic auth with `TEST_SEEDER_USERNAME` and
-//! `TEST_SEEDER_PASSWORD` from the environment; without both, every route answers 404. Seeding needs an `X-Play-Id`
-//! header, and destroying a play deletes the accounts seeded under it. Plays are kept in memory, which is enough for a
-//! test server that starts on an empty database.
-//!
-//! Scenes:
-//! - `SingleUserScene`: a V1 account for an email and password, under a mangled address like upstream's, with
-//!   PBKDF2 at upstream's default of 5000 iterations.
-//! - `TestVectorUserScene`: one of the SDK's user test vectors (`test-vectors/users/*.json`), stored as it is: the
-//!   account and its vault are already encrypted. Unlike upstream, the address isn't mangled, since our master
-//!   password salt is the email, so a vector can be seeded once at a time. Text Sends are stored too.
-//!
-//! Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/util/SeederApi/Controllers/SeedController.cs#L11-L107>
-//! Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/util/Seeder/Scenes/SingleUserScene.cs#L38-L154>
-
-use std::{
-    collections::HashMap,
-    num::NonZeroU32,
-    sync::{LazyLock, Mutex},
-};
-
-use chrono::Utc;
-use data_encoding::{BASE64, HEXLOWER};
-use openssl::{
-    pkey::PKey,
-    rsa::Rsa,
-    symm::{Cipher, encrypt},
-};
-use ring::{hkdf, hmac, pbkdf2};
-use rocket::{
-    Request, Route,
-    http::Status,
-    request::{FromRequest, Outcome},
-    serde::json::Json,
-};
-use serde_json::{Value, json};
-
-use crate::{
-    api::{
-        ApiResult, JsonResult,
-        core::{seed_cipher, seed_send},
-    },
-    crypto,
-    db::{
-        DbConn,
-        models::{Folder, FolderId, KeyId, SignatureAlgorithm, User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserSignatureKeyPair},
-    },
-};
-
-pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
-    routes![seed, destroy_play]
-}
-
-/// The accounts seeded under each play id.
-static PLAYS: LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, Vec<UserId>>>> = LazyLock::new(Mutex::default);
-
-/// HTTP basic auth with `TEST_SEEDER_USERNAME` and `TEST_SEEDER_PASSWORD`.
-struct SeederAuth;
-
-#[rocket::async_trait]
-impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for SeederAuth {
-    type Error = &'static str;
-
-    async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
-        let (Ok(username), Ok(password)) =
-            (std::env::var("TEST_SEEDER_USERNAME"), std::env::var("TEST_SEEDER_PASSWORD"))
-        else {
-            return Outcome::Error((Status::NotFound, "The test seeder is off"));
-        };
-        if username.is_empty() || password.is_empty() {
-            return Outcome::Error((Status::NotFound, "The test seeder is off"));
-        }
-        let expected = format!("Basic {}", BASE64.encode(format!("{username}:{password}").as_bytes()));
-        match request.headers().get_one("Authorization") {
-            Some(given) if crypto::ct_eq(given, expected) => Outcome::Success(Self),
-            _ => Outcome::Error((Status::Unauthorized, "Invalid test seeder credentials")),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// The `X-Play-Id` header, which names the play a seeding belongs to.
-struct PlayId(String);
-
-#[rocket::async_trait]
-impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for PlayId {
-    type Error = &'static str;
-
-    async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
-        match request.headers().get_one("X-Play-Id").map(str::trim) {
-            Some(play_id) if !play_id.is_empty() => Outcome::Success(Self(play_id.to_owned())),
-            _ => Outcome::Error((Status::BadRequest, "Seeding needs an X-Play-Id header")),
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct SeedRequest {
-    template: String,
-    arguments: Option<Value>,
-}
-
-#[post("/seed", data = "<data>")]
-async fn seed(data: Json<SeedRequest>, _auth: SeederAuth, play: PlayId, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let data = data.into_inner();
-    let arguments = data.arguments.unwrap_or(Value::Null);
-    let response = match data.template.as_str() {
-        "SingleUserScene" => single_user_scene(serde_json::from_value(arguments)?, &play.0, &conn).await?,
-        "TestVectorUserScene" => test_vector_user_scene(serde_json::from_value(arguments)?, &play.0, &conn).await?,
-        other => err_code!(format!("Unknown scene {}", other.escape_debug()), Status::NotFound.code),
-    };
-    Ok(Json(response))
-}
-
-/// Records an account in its play as soon as it's saved, so that destroying the play removes it even when the rest of
-/// the seeding fails.
-fn track(play: &str, user_id: &UserId) {
-    PLAYS.lock().unwrap().entry(play.to_owned()).or_default().push(user_id.clone());
-}
-
-/// Deletes the accounts seeded under `play_id`; an unknown play is a no-op, like upstream.
-#[delete("/seed/<play_id>")]
-async fn destroy_play(play_id: &str, _auth: SeederAuth, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let user_ids = PLAYS.lock().unwrap().remove(play_id).unwrap_or_default();
-    let mut remaining = Vec::new();
-    let mut error = None;
-    for user_id in &user_ids {
-        let Some(user) = User::find_by_uuid(user_id, &conn).await else {
-            continue;
-        };
-        if let Err(e) = user.delete(&conn).await {
-            remaining.push(user_id.clone());
-            error.get_or_insert(e);
-        }
-    }
-    if let Some(error) = error {
-        // Kept in the play, so that destroying it again retries them
-        PLAYS.lock().unwrap().entry(play_id.to_owned()).or_default().extend(remaining);
-        return Err(error);
-    }
-    Ok(Json(json!({ "userIds": user_ids })))
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct SingleUserRequest {
-    email: String,
-    password: String,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    email_verified: bool,
-    kdf_iterations: Option<u32>,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    enroll_in_email2_fa: bool,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    corrupt_private_key: bool,
-}
-
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/util/Seeder/Models/UserSeed.cs#L55>
-const DEFAULT_KDF_ITERATIONS: u32 = 5_000;
-
-async fn single_user_scene(request: SingleUserRequest, play: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<Value> {
-    if request.enroll_in_email2_fa || request.corrupt_private_key {
-        err!("enrollInEmail2Fa and corruptPrivateKey aren't supported")
-    }
-    let iterations = request.kdf_iterations.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_KDF_ITERATIONS);
-    if !(5_000..=2_000_000).contains(&iterations) {
-        err!("kdfIterations must be between 5000 and 2000000")
-    }
-    let Some((local, domain)) = request.email.split_once('@') else {
-        err!("The email has no @")
-    };
-    // Like upstream's ManglerService: unique addresses for every seeding
-    let mangled = format!("{}+{local}@{domain}", HEXLOWER.encode(&crypto::get_random_bytes::<4>()));
-
-    let mut user = User::new(&mangled, None);
-    let keys = V1Keys::new(&request.password, &user.master_password_salt(), iterations)?;
-    user.client_kdf_type = UserKdfType::Pbkdf2 as i32;
-    user.client_kdf_iter = iterations.cast_signed();
-    user.client_kdf_memory = None;
-    user.client_kdf_parallelism = None;
-    user.private_key = Some(keys.private_key.clone());
-    user.public_key = Some(keys.public_key.clone());
-    if request.email_verified {
-        user.verified_at = Some(Utc::now().naive_utc());
-    }
-    user.set_password(&keys.master_password_hash, Some(keys.wrapped_user_key.clone()), false, None, conn).await?;
-    user.save(conn).await?;
-    track(play, &user.uuid);
-
-    let response = json!({
-        "mangleMap": mangle_map(&request.email, &user.email),
-        "result": {
-            "userId": user.uuid,
-            "kdf": "PBKDF2_SHA256",
-            "kdfIterations": iterations,
-            "key": keys.wrapped_user_key,
-            "publicKey": keys.public_key,
-            "privateKey": keys.private_key,
-        },
-    });
-    Ok(response)
-}
-
-/// What a V1 client makes when it registers, from the master password.
-struct V1Keys {
-    /// The master password authentication hash, which the client logs in with.
-    master_password_hash: String,
-    /// The user key, wrapped by the stretched master key.
-    wrapped_user_key: String,
-    /// The PKCS#8 RSA private key, wrapped by the user key.
-    private_key: String,
-    /// The SPKI RSA public key.
-    public_key: String,
-}
-
-impl V1Keys {
-    fn new(password: &str, salt: &str, iterations: u32) -> ApiResult<Self> {
-        let master_key = pbkdf2_sha256(password.as_bytes(), salt.as_bytes(), iterations);
-        let master_password_hash = BASE64.encode(&pbkdf2_sha256(&master_key, password.as_bytes(), 1));
-        let stretched_enc = hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"enc");
-        let stretched_mac = hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"mac");
-
-        let user_key = crypto::get_random_bytes::<64>();
-        let wrapped_user_key = enc_string(&user_key, &stretched_enc, &stretched_mac)?;
-
-        let key_pair = PKey::from_rsa(Rsa::generate(2048)?)?;
-        let private_key = enc_string(&key_pair.private_key_to_pkcs8()?, &user_key[..32], &user_key[32..])?;
-        let public_key = BASE64.encode(&key_pair.public_key_to_der()?);
-
-        Ok(Self {
-            master_password_hash,
-            wrapped_user_key,
-            private_key,
-            public_key,
-        })
-    }
-}
-
-fn pbkdf2_sha256(secret: &[u8], salt: &[u8], iterations: u32) -> [u8; 32] {
-    let mut out = [0u8; 32];
-    let iterations = NonZeroU32::new(iterations).expect("iterations aren't zero");
-    pbkdf2::derive(pbkdf2::PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA256, iterations, salt, secret, &mut out);
-    out
-}
-
-/// HKDF-Expand with `key` as the pseudorandom key, as clients stretch the master key.
-fn hkdf_expand(key: &[u8; 32], info: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
-    let mut out = [0u8; 32];
-    hkdf::Prk::new_less_safe(hkdf::HKDF_SHA256, key)
-        .expand(&[info], hkdf::HKDF_SHA256)
-        .and_then(|okm| okm.fill(&mut out))
-        .expect("32 bytes is a valid HKDF-SHA256 length");
-    out
-}
-
-/// An `AesCbc256_HmacSha256_B64` (type 2) EncString.
-fn enc_string(plaintext: &[u8], enc_key: &[u8], mac_key: &[u8]) -> ApiResult<String> {
-    let iv = crypto::get_random_bytes::<16>();
-    let ciphertext = encrypt(Cipher::aes_256_cbc(), enc_key, Some(&iv), plaintext)?;
-    let mac = hmac::sign(&hmac::Key::new(hmac::HMAC_SHA256, mac_key), &[iv.as_slice(), &ciphertext].concat());
-    Ok(format!("2.{}|{}|{}", BASE64.encode(&iv), BASE64.encode(&ciphertext), BASE64.encode(mac.as_ref())))
-}
-
-/// A user test vector; only what a server holds is read from it.
-///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/sdk-internal/blob/ee307a55d5604e96b983595c6379cc9f76ca2f87/e2e/wasm/vectors/load.ts>
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct TestVector {
-    name: String,
-    account: VectorAccount,
-    unlock_methods: Vec<Value>,
-    master_password_authentication_hash: Option<String>,
-    raw_cryptographic_state: VectorRawCryptographicState,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    vault: VectorVault,
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct VectorAccount {
-    email: String,
-    security_version: Option<i32>,
-    account_cryptographic_state: Value,
-}
-
-/// The public halves the vector records; its private halves are never read.
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct VectorRawCryptographicState {
-    public_key: String,
-    verifying_key: Option<String>,
-    user_key_id: Option<String>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Default, Deserialize)]
-struct VectorVault {
-    #[serde(default)]
-    ciphers: Vec<VectorItem>,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    folders: Vec<VectorItem>,
-    #[serde(default)]
-    sends: Vec<VectorItem>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-struct VectorItem {
-    id: String,
-    encrypted: Value,
-}
-
-/// Upstream's scene, not merged there yet:
-/// <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9614f3f54f78ad57090a1fd5228f9c2fac5cbfe2/util/Seeder/Scenes/TestVectorUserScene.cs#L43-L361>
-async fn test_vector_user_scene(vector: TestVector, play: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<Value> {
-    let Some(unlock) =
-        vector.unlock_methods.iter().find_map(|m| m.pointer("/masterPasswordUnlock/master_password_unlock"))
-    else {
-        err!(format!("Vector {} has no master password unlock method", vector.name.escape_debug()))
-    };
-    let Some(hash) = vector.master_password_authentication_hash.as_deref() else {
-        err!(format!("Vector {} records no master password authentication hash", vector.name.escape_debug()))
-    };
-    let (Some(wrapped_user_key), Some(salt)) = (unlock["masterKeyWrappedUserKey"].as_str(), unlock["salt"].as_str())
-    else {
-        err!("The master password unlock method has no wrapped user key or salt")
-    };
-
-    let mut user = User::new(&vector.account.email, Some(vector.name.clone()));
-    if user.master_password_salt() != salt {
-        err!("The vector's master password salt isn't its email, which is the only salt Vaultwarden supports")
-    }
-    if User::find_by_mail(&user.email, conn).await.is_some() {
-        err!("This vector is already seeded: destroy its play first, its address can't be mangled")
-    }
-
-    apply_kdf(&mut user, &unlock["kdf"])?;
-    let state = &vector.account.account_cryptographic_state;
-    let (v2, private_key) = match (state.get("V1"), state.get("V2")) {
-        (Some(v1), None) => (None, &v1["private_key"]),
-        (None, Some(v2)) => (Some(v2), &v2["private_key"]),
-        _ => err!("The account cryptographic state is neither V1 nor V2"),
-    };
-    user.private_key = Some(json_str(private_key, "private_key")?);
-    user.public_key = Some(vector.raw_cryptographic_state.public_key.clone());
-    let key_id = vector.raw_cryptographic_state.user_key_id.as_deref().or_else(|| unlock["containedKeyId"].as_str());
-    user.key_id = key_id.map(|id| serde_json::from_value::<KeyId>(json!(id))).transpose()?;
-    let signature_key_pair = match v2 {
-        Some(v2) => {
-            user.signed_public_key = Some(json_str(&v2["signed_public_key"], "signed_public_key")?);
-            user.security_state = Some(json_str(&v2["security_state"], "security_state")?);
-            user.security_version = Some(vector.account.security_version.unwrap_or(2));
-            let Some(verifying_key) = vector.raw_cryptographic_state.verifying_key.clone() else {
-                err!("A V2 vector needs its verifying key")
-            };
-            let algorithm = cose_signature_algorithm(&verifying_key)?;
-            Some((algorithm, json_str(&v2["signing_key"], "signing_key")?, verifying_key))
-        }
-        None => None,
-    };
-    user.verified_at = Some(Utc::now().naive_utc());
-    user.set_password(hash, Some(wrapped_user_key.to_owned()), false, None, conn).await?;
-    user.save(conn).await?;
-    track(play, &user.uuid);
-    if let Some((algorithm, signing_key, verifying_key)) = signature_key_pair {
-        UserSignatureKeyPair::new(user.uuid.clone(), algorithm, signing_key, verifying_key).save(conn).await?;
-    }
-
-    // The vault, already encrypted, under fresh ids
-    let mut folder_ids = HashMap::new();
-    let mut folder_ids_by_vector_id = serde_json::Map::new();
-    for folder in &vector.vault.folders {
-        let mut saved = Folder::new(user.uuid.clone(), json_str(&folder.encrypted["name"], "name")?);
-        saved.save(conn).await?;
-        folder_ids.insert(serde_json::from_value::<FolderId>(json!(folder.id))?, saved.uuid.clone());
-        folder_ids_by_vector_id.insert(folder.id.clone(), json!(saved.uuid));
-    }
-    let mut cipher_ids = serde_json::Map::new();
-    for cipher in vector.vault.ciphers {
-        let cipher_id = seed_cipher(cipher.encrypted, &user.uuid, &folder_ids, conn).await?;
-        cipher_ids.insert(cipher.id, json!(cipher_id));
-    }
-    for send in vector.vault.sends {
-        seed_send(send.encrypted, &user.uuid, conn).await?;
-    }
-
-    let response = json!({
-        "mangleMap": mangle_map(&vector.account.email, &user.email),
-        "result": {
-            "userId": user.uuid,
-            "email": user.email,
-            "cipherIds": cipher_ids,
-            "folderIds": folder_ids_by_vector_id,
-        },
-    });
-    Ok(response)
-}
-
-/// The vector's KDF: `{"pBKDF2": {"iterations"}}` or `{"argon2id": {"iterations", "memory", "parallelism"}}`.
-fn apply_kdf(user: &mut User, kdf: &Value) -> ApiResult<()> {
-    let int = |value: &Value| value.as_i64().and_then(|v| i32::try_from(v).ok());
-    if let Some(iterations) = kdf.pointer("/pBKDF2/iterations").and_then(int) {
-        user.client_kdf_type = UserKdfType::Pbkdf2 as i32;
-        user.client_kdf_iter = iterations;
-        user.client_kdf_memory = None;
-        user.client_kdf_parallelism = None;
-    } else if let Some(argon2) = kdf.get("argon2id") {
-        let Some(iterations) = int(&argon2["iterations"]) else {
-            err!("The Argon2id KDF has no iterations")
-        };
-        user.client_kdf_type = UserKdfType::Argon2id as i32;
-        user.client_kdf_iter = iterations;
-        user.client_kdf_memory = int(&argon2["memory"]);
-        user.client_kdf_parallelism = int(&argon2["parallelism"]);
-    } else {
-        err!("Unknown KDF")
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-/// The signature algorithm a COSE verifying key names in its `alg` (label 3) entry.
-fn cose_signature_algorithm(verifying_key: &str) -> ApiResult<SignatureAlgorithm> {
-    const ALG: i128 = 3;
-    const EDDSA: i128 = -8;
-    const ML_DSA_44: i128 = -48;
-
-    let Ok(bytes) = BASE64.decode(verifying_key.as_bytes()) else {
-        err!("The verifying key isn't base64")
-    };
-    let Ok(serde_cbor_2::Value::Map(entries)) = serde_cbor_2::from_slice::<serde_cbor_2::Value>(&bytes) else {
-        err!("The verifying key isn't a COSE key")
-    };
-    match entries.get(&serde_cbor_2::Value::Integer(ALG)) {
-        Some(serde_cbor_2::Value::Integer(EDDSA)) => Ok(SignatureAlgorithm::Ed25519),
-        Some(serde_cbor_2::Value::Integer(ML_DSA_44)) => Ok(SignatureAlgorithm::MlDsa44),
-        _ => err!("The verifying key's algorithm isn't Ed25519 or ML-DSA-44"),
-    }
-}
-
-/// Upstream's map from the address a scene was asked for to the one it stored.
-fn mangle_map(requested: &str, stored: &str) -> Value {
-    let mut map = serde_json::Map::new();
-    map.insert(requested.to_owned(), json!(stored));
-    Value::Object(map)
-}
-
-fn json_str(value: &Value, field: &str) -> ApiResult<String> {
-    let Some(value) = value.as_str() else {
-        err!(format!("The vector's {field} is missing"))
-    };
-    Ok(value.to_owned())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use openssl::symm::decrypt;
-
-    use super::*;
-
-    // From sdk-internal's `test-vectors/users/v1-pbkdf2-min-iterations.json` (d9119f7af)
-    const EMAIL: &str = "v1-pbkdf2-min-iterations@test.bitwarden.com";
-    const PASSWORD: &str = "password-v1-pbkdf2-min-iterations";
-    const ITERATIONS: u32 = 5_000;
-    const AUTHENTICATION_HASH: &str = "4HcwTg4bQKEbuINCJGMqrij1yipl63Ugu/RazH2y7Qw=";
-    const WRAPPED_USER_KEY: &str = "2.tl+DrZdn+fVyBVu+0c/Gvg==|9ivOLNtKbvirNaUnkGsEtysp9de53ibTSu88HLkDOGLig3t8nhvK5JIqxSY1/ukcr2Y/Ly9OJ12tXUGjIlJ/PtIEIdYj3gZDwhAflPUwtW8=|FD5WuIvviib3yWYcI3slmqBSqMf38Z0CMwttPG1w5DY=";
-    const USER_KEY: &str = "49LghK4AVIybWSZFikb4nAn/BofxxBIoXv83EJWOP4taVMbR5XCfrbF2m/eUmfZdeFW7VybPYSGT/bmv5eeMBg==";
-
-    /// Decrypts a type 2 EncString, checking its MAC.
-    fn dec_string(enc_string: &str, enc_key: &[u8], mac_key: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
-        let parts: Vec<Vec<u8>> = enc_string
-            .strip_prefix("2.")
-            .unwrap()
-            .split('|')
-            .map(|part| BASE64.decode(part.as_bytes()).unwrap())
-            .collect();
-        let [iv, ciphertext, mac] = parts.as_slice() else {
-            panic!("not three parts")
-        };
-        let key = hmac::Key::new(hmac::HMAC_SHA256, mac_key);
-        hmac::verify(&key, &[iv.as_slice(), ciphertext].concat(), mac).unwrap();
-        decrypt(Cipher::aes_256_cbc(), enc_key, Some(iv), ciphertext).unwrap()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn derives_the_vectors_keys() {
-        let master_key = pbkdf2_sha256(PASSWORD.as_bytes(), EMAIL.as_bytes(), ITERATIONS);
-        assert_eq!(BASE64.encode(&pbkdf2_sha256(&master_key, PASSWORD.as_bytes(), 1)), AUTHENTICATION_HASH);
-
-        let user_key =
-            dec_string(WRAPPED_USER_KEY, &hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"enc"), &hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"mac"));
-        assert_eq!(BASE64.encode(&user_key), USER_KEY);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn makes_keys_a_client_can_open() {
-        let keys = V1Keys::new(PASSWORD, EMAIL, ITERATIONS).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(keys.master_password_hash, AUTHENTICATION_HASH);
-
-        let master_key = pbkdf2_sha256(PASSWORD.as_bytes(), EMAIL.as_bytes(), ITERATIONS);
-        let user_key =
-            dec_string(&keys.wrapped_user_key, &hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"enc"), &hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"mac"));
-        assert_eq!(user_key.len(), 64);
-
-        let pkcs8 = dec_string(&keys.private_key, &user_key[..32], &user_key[32..]);
-        let private_key = PKey::private_key_from_pkcs8(&pkcs8).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(BASE64.encode(&private_key.public_key_to_der().unwrap()), keys.public_key);
-    }
-}
@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
 use std::{
-    collections::HashMap,
    path::{Path, PathBuf},
-    sync::{Arc, LazyLock, RwLock},
+    sync::{Arc, RwLock},
 };

 use rocket::{
    Catcher, Route,
    fs::NamedFile,
    http::ContentType,
-    response::{Redirect, content::RawHtml as Html},
+    response::{Redirect, content::RawCss as Css, content::RawHtml as Html},
    serde::json::Json,
 };
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -20,7 +19,7 @@ use crate::{
    crypto::sha256_hex,
    db::{
        DbConn,
-        models::{AttachmentId, CipherId, custom_roles_enabled},
+        models::{AttachmentId, CipherId},
    },
    error::Error,
    util::{Cached, EtagCached},
@@ -80,18 +79,16 @@ pub fn invalidate_css_cache() {
 }

 #[get("/css/vaultwarden.css")]
-fn vaultwarden_css() -> EtagCached<String> {
+fn vaultwarden_css() -> EtagCached<Css<String>> {
    // If reload_templates is false, and we already have the CSS Cached, return this
    if !CONFIG.reload_templates()
        && let Some(cached) = CSS_CACHE.read().unwrap().as_ref()
    {
-        return EtagCached::new(cached.css.clone(), ContentType::CSS, &cached.etag);
+        return EtagCached::new(Css(cached.css.clone()), &cached.etag);
    }

    // Else, there is either no cache, or reload_templates is true and we need to rebuild the CSS
    let css_options = json!({
-        "custom_roles_enabled": custom_roles_enabled(),
-        "email_change_allowed": CONFIG.email_change_allowed(),
        "emergency_access_allowed": CONFIG.emergency_access_allowed(),
        "load_user_scss": true,
        "mail_2fa_enabled": CONFIG._enable_email_2fa(),
@@ -149,7 +146,7 @@ fn vaultwarden_css() -> EtagCached<String> {
    }

    // Etag Caching will let the browser send us an etag to verify and send new content if needed
-    EtagCached::new(cached.css.clone(), ContentType::CSS, &cached.etag)
+    EtagCached::new(Css(cached.css.clone()), &cached.etag)
 }

 #[get("/")]
@@ -258,7 +255,7 @@ fn alive_head(_conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
 // This endpoint/function is used during development and development only.
 // It allows to easily develop the admin interface by always loading the files from disk instead from a slice of bytes
 // This will only be active during a debug build and only when `RELOAD_TEMPLATES` is set to `true`
-// NOTE: Do not forget to add any new files added to the `STATIC_FILES` HashMap below!
+// NOTE: Do not forget to add any new files added to the `static_files` function below!
 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 #[get("/vw_static/<filename>", rank = 1)]
 pub async fn static_files_dev(filename: PathBuf) -> Option<NamedFile> {
@@ -278,61 +275,32 @@ pub async fn static_files_dev(filename: PathBuf) -> Option<NamedFile> {
    None
 }

-pub struct StaticFile {
-    pub content_type: ContentType,
-    pub bytes: &'static [u8],
-    pub etag: String,
-}
-
-pub static STATIC_FILES: LazyLock<HashMap<&'static str, StaticFile>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    [
-        ("404.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/404.png")[..]),
-        ("mail-github.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/mail-github.png")[..]),
-        ("logo-gray.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/logo-gray.png")[..]),
-        ("error-x.svg", ContentType::SVG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/error-x.svg")[..]),
-        ("hibp.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/hibp.png")[..]),
-        ("vaultwarden-icon.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-icon.png")[..]),
-        ("vaultwarden-favicon.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-favicon.png")[..]),
-        ("404.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/404.css")[..]),
-        ("admin.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.css")[..]),
-        ("admin.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.js")[..]),
-        ("admin_settings.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_settings.js")[..]),
-        ("admin_users.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_users.js")[..]),
-        (
-            "admin_organizations.js",
-            ContentType::JavaScript,
-            &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_organizations.js")[..],
-        ),
-        (
-            "admin_diagnostics.js",
-            ContentType::JavaScript,
-            &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_diagnostics.js")[..],
-        ),
-        ("bootstrap.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.css")[..]),
-        ("bootstrap.bundle.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.bundle.js")[..]),
-        ("jdenticon-3.3.0.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/jdenticon-3.3.0.js")[..]),
-        ("datatables.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.js")[..]),
-        ("datatables.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.css")[..]),
-    ]
-    .into_iter()
-    .map(|(name, content_type, bytes)| {
-        (
-            name,
-            StaticFile {
-                content_type,
-                bytes,
-                etag: sha256_hex(bytes),
-            },
-        )
-    })
-    .collect()
-});
-
 #[get("/vw_static/<filename>", rank = 2)]
-pub fn static_files(filename: &str) -> Result<EtagCached<&'static [u8]>, Error> {
-    if let Some(file) = STATIC_FILES.get(filename) {
-        Ok(EtagCached::new(file.bytes, file.content_type.clone(), &file.etag))
-    } else {
-        err!(format!("Static file not found: {}", filename.escape_debug()))
+pub fn static_files(filename: &str) -> Result<(ContentType, &'static [u8]), Error> {
+    match filename {
+        "404.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/404.png"))),
+        "mail-github.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/mail-github.png"))),
+        "logo-gray.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/logo-gray.png"))),
+        "error-x.svg" => Ok((ContentType::SVG, include_bytes!("../static/images/error-x.svg"))),
+        "hibp.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/hibp.png"))),
+        "vaultwarden-icon.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-icon.png"))),
+        "vaultwarden-favicon.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-favicon.png"))),
+        "404.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/404.css"))),
+        "admin.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.css"))),
+        "admin.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.js"))),
+        "admin_settings.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_settings.js"))),
+        "admin_users.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_users.js"))),
+        "admin_organizations.js" => {
+            Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_organizations.js")))
+        }
+        "admin_diagnostics.js" => {
+            Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_diagnostics.js")))
+        }
+        "bootstrap.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.css"))),
+        "bootstrap.bundle.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.bundle.js"))),
+        "jdenticon-3.3.0.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/jdenticon-3.3.0.js"))),
+        "datatables.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.js"))),
+        "datatables.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.css"))),
+        _ => err!(format!("Static file not found: {filename}")),
    }
 }
@@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
-#[path = "auth/two_factor.rs"]
-pub mod two_factor;
-
 #[path = "auth/send.rs"]
 pub mod send;
 pub type SendTokens = send::SendTokens;
@@ -17,7 +14,6 @@ use ipnet::IpNet;
 use jsonwebtoken::{Algorithm, DecodingKey, EncodingKey, Header, errors::ErrorKind};
 use num_traits::FromPrimitive;
 use openssl::rsa::Rsa;
-use ring::hmac;
 use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, ser::Serialize};

 use rocket::{
@@ -32,9 +28,9 @@ use crate::{
    db::{
        DbConn,
        models::{
-            AttachmentId, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, CustomPermission, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType,
-            EmergencyAccessId, EventType, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId,
-            OrganizationId, SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, custom_roles_enabled,
+            AttachmentId, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, EmergencyAccessId,
+            EventType, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId,
+            SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId,
        },
    },
    error::Error,
@@ -69,7 +65,6 @@ static JWT_2FA_REMEMBER_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|

 static PRIVATE_RSA_KEY: OnceLock<EncodingKey> = OnceLock::new();
 static PUBLIC_RSA_KEY: OnceLock<DecodingKey> = OnceLock::new();
-static PRELOGIN_KDF_KEY: OnceLock<hmac::Key> = OnceLock::new();

 pub async fn initialize_keys() -> Result<(), Error> {
    use std::io::Error as IoError;
@@ -104,22 +99,9 @@ pub async fn initialize_keys() -> Result<(), Error> {
    if PUBLIC_RSA_KEY.set(dec).is_err() {
        err!("PUBLIC_RSA_KEY must only be initialized once")
    }
-
-    // Derived from the RSA key, so it stays the same across restarts without storing another secret
-    let prelogin_kdf_key = hmac::sign(&hmac::Key::new(hmac::HMAC_SHA256, &priv_key_buffer), b"prelogin-kdf");
-    if PRELOGIN_KDF_KEY.set(hmac::Key::new(hmac::HMAC_SHA256, prelogin_kdf_key.as_ref())).is_err() {
-        err!("PRELOGIN_KDF_KEY must only be initialized once")
-    }
    Ok(())
 }

-/// Returns an index in `0..len` derived from the email, the same for every request
-pub fn prelogin_kdf_index(email: &str, len: usize) -> usize {
-    let tag = hmac::sign(PRELOGIN_KDF_KEY.wait(), email.as_bytes());
-    let tag = tag.as_ref();
-    usize::from(u16::from_be_bytes([tag[0], tag[1]])) % len
-}
-
 pub fn encode_jwt<T: Serialize>(claims: &T) -> String {
    match jsonwebtoken::encode(&JWT_HEADER, claims, PRIVATE_RSA_KEY.wait()) {
        Ok(token) => token,
@@ -271,7 +253,7 @@ impl LoginJwtClaims {
            premium: true,
            name: user.name.clone(),
            email: user.email.clone(),
-            email_verified: user.verified(),
+            email_verified: !CONFIG.mail_enabled() || user.verified_at.is_some(),

            // ---
            // Disabled these keys to be added to the JWT since they could cause the JWT to get too large
@@ -314,17 +296,6 @@ impl LoginJwtClaims {
    }
 }

-fn calculate_invite_expire_hours(now: &DateTime<Utc>) -> Result<DateTime<Utc>, Error> {
-    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
-    let Some(hours_delta) = TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours) else {
-        err!("Unable to calculate time delta for invite expire hours. Check `INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS`.");
-    };
-    let Some(exp) = now.checked_add_signed(hours_delta) else {
-        err!("Unable to calculate invitation expire date. Check `INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS`.");
-    };
-    Ok(exp)
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct InviteJwtClaims {
    // Not before
@@ -348,19 +319,19 @@ pub fn generate_invite_claims(
    org_id: OrganizationId,
    member_id: MembershipId,
    invited_by_email: Option<String>,
-) -> Result<InviteJwtClaims, Error> {
+) -> InviteJwtClaims {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    Ok(InviteJwtClaims {
+    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    InviteJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: exp.timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_INVITE_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: user_id,
        email,
        org_id,
        member_id,
        invited_by_email,
-    })
+    }
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -386,19 +357,19 @@ pub fn generate_emergency_access_invite_claims(
    emer_id: EmergencyAccessId,
    grantor_name: String,
    grantor_email: String,
-) -> Result<EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims, Error> {
+) -> EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    Ok(EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
+    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: exp.timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_EMERGENCY_ACCESS_INVITE_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: user_id,
        email,
        emer_id,
        grantor_name,
        grantor_email,
-    })
+    }
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -451,7 +422,7 @@ pub fn generate_file_download_claims(cipher_id: CipherId, file_id: AttachmentId)
    let time_now = Utc::now();
    FileDownloadClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(1).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_FILE_DOWNLOAD_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: cipher_id,
        file_id,
@@ -503,17 +474,13 @@ pub fn generate_2fa_remember_claims(device_uuid: DeviceId, user_uuid: UserId) ->
    let time_now = Utc::now();
    TwoFactorRememberClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: two_factor_remember_expiration(time_now, CONFIG.two_factor_remember_days()),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_days(30).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_2FA_REMEMBER_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: device_uuid,
        user_uuid,
    }
 }

-fn two_factor_remember_expiration(time_now: DateTime<Utc>, remember_days: i64) -> i64 {
-    (time_now + TimeDelta::try_days(remember_days).expect("TWO_FACTOR_REMEMBER_DAYS is validated")).timestamp()
-}
-
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct BasicJwtClaims {
    // Not before
@@ -536,43 +503,36 @@ impl BasicJwtClaims {
    }
 }

-pub fn generate_delete_claims(uuid: String) -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
+pub fn generate_delete_claims(uuid: String) -> BasicJwtClaims {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
+    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    BasicJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: exp.timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_DELETE_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: uuid,
-    })
+    }
 }

-pub fn generate_verify_email_claims(user_id: &UserId) -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
+pub fn generate_verify_email_claims(user_id: &UserId) -> BasicJwtClaims {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
-    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
+    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    BasicJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: exp.timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_VERIFYEMAIL_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: user_id.to_string(),
-    })
+    }
 }

-pub fn generate_admin_claims() -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
+pub fn generate_admin_claims() -> BasicJwtClaims {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let lifetime_minutes = i64::from(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime());
-    let Some(minutes_delta) = TimeDelta::try_minutes(lifetime_minutes) else {
-        err!("Unable to calculate time delta for admin session lifetime. Check `ADMIN_SESSION_LIFETIME`.");
-    };
-    let Some(exp) = time_now.checked_add_signed(minutes_delta) else {
-        err!("Unable to calculate admin session lifetime. Check `ADMIN_SESSION_LIFETIME`.");
-    };
-    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
+    BasicJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: exp.timestamp(),
+        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime()).unwrap()).timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_ADMIN_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: "admin_panel".to_owned(),
-    })
+    }
 }

 pub fn generate_send_claims(send_id: &SendId, file_id: &SendFileId) -> BasicJwtClaims {
@@ -632,9 +592,6 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for Host {
 pub struct ClientHeaders {
    pub device_type: i32,
    pub ip: ClientIp,
-    /// `Bitwarden-Client-Version`, `None` when missing or not a version. Unlike the [`ClientVersion`] guard, this
-    /// doesn't log an error, as not every client sends it.
-    pub client_version: Option<semver::Version>,
 }

 #[rocket::async_trait]
@@ -651,13 +608,10 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientHeaders {
            .get_one("device-type")
            .and_then(|d| d.parse().ok())
            .unwrap_or(DeviceType::UnknownBrowser as i32);
-        let client_version =
-            request.headers().get_one("Bitwarden-Client-Version").and_then(|v| semver::Version::parse(v).ok());

        Outcome::Success(ClientHeaders {
            device_type,
            ip,
-            client_version,
        })
    }
 }
@@ -717,7 +671,8 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for Headers {
                err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception")
            };

-            // Expired exceptions are only dropped on reset; writing them back here could undo a newer reset
+            // Expired exceptions are dropped the next time the stamp is reset, not here: writing them
+            // back from this request could undo a reset made since the user was read.
            if !user.stamp_exceptions().iter().any(|e| e.allows(&claims.sstamp, current_route)) {
                err_handler!("Invalid security stamp")
            }
@@ -757,12 +712,6 @@ impl OrgHeaders {
    fn is_confirmed_and_owner(&self) -> bool {
        self.membership_status == MembershipStatus::Confirmed && self.membership_type == MembershipType::Owner
    }
-    // A Custom member, while Custom roles are enabled. What they may do depends on their permissions.
-    fn is_confirmed_and_custom(&self) -> bool {
-        self.membership_status == MembershipStatus::Confirmed
-            && self.membership_type == MembershipType::Custom
-            && custom_roles_enabled()
-    }
 }

 // org_id is usually the second path param ("/organizations/<org_id>"),
@@ -901,77 +850,10 @@ fn get_col_id(request: &Request<'_>) -> Option<CollectionId> {
    None
 }

-/// What a collection route does with its collection, which decides what a Custom member needs for it.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
-pub enum CollectionAction {
-    Edit,
-    Read,
-    Delete,
-}
-
-/// Whether `member`, a confirmed Custom member, may `action` the collection `col_id` of their organization.
-///
-/// Deleting needs Delete any collection: the clients are told collection deletion is limited, so the manage option
-/// on a collection is no permission to delete it. Editing is open with Edit any collection, reading also with Delete
-/// any collection, and otherwise both need the manage option on the collection itself. Neither the role nor any
-/// `access_all` counts as that.
-pub async fn custom_member_may(
-    action: CollectionAction,
-    member: &Membership,
-    col_id: &CollectionId,
-    conn: &DbConn,
-) -> bool {
-    if !(member.has_type(MembershipType::Custom)
-        && member.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed)
-        && custom_roles_enabled())
-    {
-        return false;
-    }
-    match action {
-        CollectionAction::Delete => member.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection),
-        CollectionAction::Edit if member.can_edit_any_collection() => true,
-        CollectionAction::Read if member.can_view_all_collections() => true,
-        CollectionAction::Edit | CollectionAction::Read => {
-            Collection::find_explicitly_manageable_by_user(&member.org_uuid, &member.user_uuid, conn)
-                .await
-                .contains(col_id)
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/// Checks a collection route for the collection provided via the <col_id>/collections/collectionId: a Manager, Admin
-/// or Owner needs to be able to manage the collection, a Custom member is checked for the `action`.
-async fn collection_headers(request: &Request<'_>, action: CollectionAction) -> Outcome<OrgHeaders, &'static str> {
-    let headers = try_outcome!(OrgHeaders::from_request(request).await);
-    let is_custom = headers.is_confirmed_and_custom();
-    if !headers.is_confirmed_and_manager() && !is_custom {
-        err_handler!("You need to be a Manager, Admin or Owner to call this endpoint")
-    }
-
-    let Some(col_id) = get_col_id(request) else {
-        err_handler!("Error getting the collection id")
-    };
-    let Outcome::Success(conn) = DbConn::from_request(request).await else {
-        err_handler!("Error getting DB")
-    };
-
-    let allowed = if is_custom {
-        custom_member_may(action, &headers.membership, &col_id, &conn).await
-    } else {
-        Collection::is_coll_manageable_by_user(&col_id, &headers.membership.user_uuid, &conn).await
-    };
-    if !allowed {
-        // NotFound as in Bitwarden, the web vault logs the user out on a 401
-        error!(target: "auth", "Collection not found. The current user isn't a manager for this collection");
-        return Outcome::Error((rocket::http::Status::NotFound, "Collection not found"));
-    }
-    Outcome::Success(headers)
-}
-
-macro_rules! collection_headers {
-    ($(#[$doc:meta])* $name:ident, $action:expr) => {
-        $(#[$doc])*
-        pub struct $name {
+/// The ManagerHeaders are used to check if you are at least a Manager
+/// and have access to the specific collection provided via the <col_id>/collections/collectionId.
+/// This does strict checking on the collection_id, ManagerHeadersLoose does not.
+pub struct ManagerHeaders {
    pub host: String,
    pub device: Device,
    pub user: User,
@@ -980,11 +862,24 @@ macro_rules! collection_headers {
 }

 #[rocket::async_trait]
-        impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for $name {
+impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ManagerHeaders {
    type Error = &'static str;

    async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
-                let headers = try_outcome!(collection_headers(request, $action).await);
+        let headers = try_outcome!(OrgHeaders::from_request(request).await);
+        if headers.is_confirmed_and_manager() {
+            if let Some(col_id) = get_col_id(request) {
+                let Outcome::Success(conn) = DbConn::from_request(request).await else {
+                    err_handler!("Error getting DB")
+                };
+
+                if !Collection::is_coll_manageable_by_user(&col_id, &headers.membership.user_uuid, &conn).await {
+                    err_handler!("The current user isn't a manager for this collection")
+                }
+            } else {
+                err_handler!("Error getting the collection id")
+            }
+
            Outcome::Success(Self {
                host: headers.host,
                device: headers.device,
@@ -992,11 +887,14 @@ macro_rules! collection_headers {
                ip: headers.ip,
                org_id: headers.membership.org_uuid,
            })
+        } else {
+            err_handler!("You need to be a Manager, Admin or Owner to call this endpoint")
+        }
    }
 }

-        impl From<$name> for Headers {
-            fn from(h: $name) -> Headers {
+impl From<ManagerHeaders> for Headers {
+    fn from(h: ManagerHeaders) -> Headers {
        Headers {
            host: h.host,
            device: h.device,
@@ -1005,30 +903,9 @@ macro_rules! collection_headers {
        }
    }
 }
-    };
-}
-
-collection_headers!(
-    /// The ManagerHeaders are used to check if you are at least a Manager
-    /// and have access to the specific collection provided via the <col_id>/collections/collectionId.
-    /// This does strict checking on the collection_id, ManagerHeadersLoose does not.
-    ManagerHeaders,
-    CollectionAction::Edit
-);
-collection_headers!(
-    /// The same as ManagerHeaders, for the routes which only read the collection and its access.
-    CollectionReadHeaders,
-    CollectionAction::Read
-);
-collection_headers!(
-    /// The same as ManagerHeaders, for the routes which delete the collection.
-    CollectionDeleteHeaders,
-    CollectionAction::Delete
-);

 /// The ManagerHeadersLoose is used when you at least need to be a Manager,
 /// but there is no collection_id sent with the request (either in the path or as form data).
-/// A Custom member is let through as well, the routes check what their permissions allow.
 pub struct ManagerHeadersLoose {
    pub host: String,
    pub device: Device,
@@ -1043,7 +920,7 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ManagerHeadersLoose {

    async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
        let headers = try_outcome!(OrgHeaders::from_request(request).await);
-        if headers.is_confirmed_and_manager() || headers.is_confirmed_and_custom() {
+        if headers.is_confirmed_and_manager() {
            Outcome::Success(Self {
                host: headers.host,
                device: headers.device,
@@ -1068,29 +945,22 @@ impl From<ManagerHeadersLoose> for Headers {
    }
 }

-impl CollectionDeleteHeaders {
+impl ManagerHeaders {
    pub async fn from_loose(
        h: ManagerHeadersLoose,
        collections: &Vec<CollectionId>,
        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> Result<CollectionDeleteHeaders, Error> {
-        let is_custom = h.membership.has_type(MembershipType::Custom) && custom_roles_enabled();
+    ) -> Result<ManagerHeaders, Error> {
        for col_id in collections {
            if uuid::Uuid::parse_str(col_id.as_ref()).is_err() {
                err!("Collection Id is malformed!");
            }
-            let allowed = if is_custom {
-                Collection::find_by_uuid_and_org(col_id, &h.membership.org_uuid, conn).await.is_some()
-                    && custom_member_may(CollectionAction::Delete, &h.membership, col_id, conn).await
-            } else {
-                Collection::is_coll_manageable_by_user(col_id, &h.membership.user_uuid, conn).await
-            };
-            if !allowed {
+            if !Collection::is_coll_manageable_by_user(col_id, &h.membership.user_uuid, conn).await {
                err!("Collection not found", "The current user isn't a manager for this collection")
            }
        }

-        Ok(CollectionDeleteHeaders {
+        Ok(ManagerHeaders {
            host: h.host,
            device: h.device,
            user: h.user,
@@ -1203,31 +1073,6 @@ fn ip_header_is_trusted(remote: Option<IpAddr>) -> bool {
    trusted.split(',').filter_map(parse_trusted_proxy).any(|net| net.contains(&remote))
 }

-/// Each proxy appends the address it received the request from to a list header (`X-Forwarded-For: client, proxy1`).
-/// Like ASP.NET's ForwardedHeaders, walk the entries of every occurrence of the header from the right and take the
-/// first one that isn't a trusted proxy. If they all are, the leftmost one is the client.
-fn client_ip_from_header(req: &Request<'_>, header: &str, is_trusted: impl Fn(IpAddr) -> bool) -> Option<IpAddr> {
-    let values: Vec<&str> = req.headers().get(header).collect();
-    client_ip_from_header_values(&values, header, is_trusted)
-}
-
-fn client_ip_from_header_values(values: &[&str], header: &str, is_trusted: impl Fn(IpAddr) -> bool) -> Option<IpAddr> {
-    let entries: Vec<&str> = values.iter().flat_map(|value| value.split(',')).map(str::trim).collect();
-
-    let mut client_ip = None;
-    for entry in entries.into_iter().rev() {
-        let Ok(ip) = entry.parse() else {
-            warn!("'{header}' header is malformed: {entry}");
-            break;
-        };
-        client_ip = Some(ip);
-        if !is_trusted(ip) {
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-    client_ip
-}
-
 #[rocket::async_trait]
 impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientIp {
    type Error = ();
@@ -1236,7 +1081,15 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientIp {
        let remote = req.remote().map(|r| r.ip());

        let ip = if CONFIG._ip_header_enabled() && ip_header_is_trusted(remote) {
-            client_ip_from_header(req, &CONFIG.ip_header(), |ip| ip_header_is_trusted(Some(ip)))
+            req.headers().get_one(&CONFIG.ip_header()).and_then(|ip| {
+                match ip.find(',') {
+                    Some(idx) => &ip[..idx],
+                    None => ip,
+                }
+                .parse()
+                .map_err(|_| warn!("'{}' header is malformed: {ip}", CONFIG.ip_header()))
+                .ok()
+            })
        } else {
            if CONFIG._ip_header_enabled() && req.headers().get_one(&CONFIG.ip_header()).is_some() {
                // Log the canonical IP, which is what the user filter will need to match against
@@ -1355,7 +1208,7 @@ impl AuthMethod {
        match scope {
            None => err!("Missing scope"),
            Some(scope) if scope == &method_scope => Ok(method_scope),
-            Some(scope) => err!(format!("Scope ({}) not supported", scope.escape_debug())),
+            Some(scope) => err!(format!("Scope ({scope}) not supported")),
        }
    }
 }
@@ -1474,52 +1327,3 @@ pub async fn refresh_tokens(

    Ok((device, auth_tokens))
 }
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-
-    fn client_ip(values: &[&str]) -> Option<IpAddr> {
-        let is_trusted = |ip: IpAddr| match ip {
-            IpAddr::V4(v4) => v4.is_private() || v4.is_loopback(),
-            IpAddr::V6(v6) => v6.is_loopback(),
-        };
-        client_ip_from_header_values(values, "X-Forwarded-For", is_trusted)
-    }
-
-    fn ip(s: &str) -> Option<IpAddr> {
-        Some(s.parse().unwrap())
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ip_header_single_value() {
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&["203.0.113.5"]), ip("203.0.113.5"));
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&["10.0.0.7"]), ip("10.0.0.7"));
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&["2001:db8::1"]), ip("2001:db8::1"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ip_header_uses_rightmost_untrusted_entry() {
-        // Entries already in the request come before the one the proxy appended
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&["198.51.100.1, 203.0.113.5"]), ip("203.0.113.5"));
-        // Trusted proxies on the right are skipped
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&["198.51.100.1, 203.0.113.5, 10.0.0.2, 127.0.0.1"]), ip("203.0.113.5"));
-        // All trusted, so the leftmost entry is the client
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&["192.168.1.10, 10.0.0.2"]), ip("192.168.1.10"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ip_header_reads_every_occurrence() {
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&["198.51.100.1", "203.0.113.5"]), ip("203.0.113.5"));
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&["198.51.100.1", "203.0.113.5, 10.0.0.2"]), ip("203.0.113.5"));
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn ip_header_malformed_entries() {
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&[]), None);
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&[""]), None);
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&["203.0.113.5, not-an-ip"]), None);
-        // Stops at the malformed entry and keeps the closest proxy
-        assert_eq!(client_ip(&["not-an-ip, 10.0.0.2"]), ip("10.0.0.2"));
-    }
-}
@@ -72,14 +72,10 @@ impl SendTokens {
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> ApiResult<SendTokens> {
        let Some(send_id) = Self::as_send_id(access_id) else {
-            return Self::invalid_error(
-                &format!("Can't convert {}", access_id.escape_debug()),
-                "send_id_invalid",
-                false,
-            );
+            return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Can't convert {access_id}"), "send_id_invalid", false);
        };

-        let Some(send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&send_id, conn).await else {
+        let Some(mut send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&send_id, conn).await else {
            return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Can't find {send_id}"), "send_id_invalid", false);
        };

@@ -107,6 +103,10 @@ impl SendTokens {
            }
        }

+        if !send.register_access(conn).await? {
+            return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Send {send_id}, max access reached"), "send_id_invalid", true);
+        }
+
        Ok(Self {
            access_claims: generate_send_access_claims(&send_id),
        })
@@ -1,281 +0,0 @@
-use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
-use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, ser::Serialize};
-use std::sync::LazyLock;
-
-use crate::{
-    CONFIG,
-    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult},
-    auth::{decode_jwt, encode_jwt},
-    db::models::UserId,
-};
-
-static JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|api.2fa", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-pub struct TwoFactorClaims<T> {
-    // Not before
-    pub nbf: i64,
-    // Expiration time
-    pub exp: i64,
-    // Issuer
-    pub iss: String,
-    // Subject
-    pub sub: UserId,
-
-    pub enabled: bool,
-
-    pub claims: T,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct AuthenticatorClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "authenticator_key")]
-    pub key: String,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct DuoClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "duo_data")]
-    pub data: Option<DuoData>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct WebauthnClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "webauthn_keys")]
-    pub keys: Vec<i32>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct YubikeyClaims {
-    #[serde(rename = "yubi_keys")]
-    pub keys: Vec<String>,
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
-pub struct DuoData {
-    pub host: String, // Duo API hostname
-    pub ik: String,   // client id
-    pub sk: String,   // client secret
-}
-
-impl DuoData {
-    pub fn global() -> Option<Self> {
-        match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
-            (true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
-                host,
-                ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
-                sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
-            }),
-            _ => None,
-        }
-    }
-    pub fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
-        Self {
-            host: s.into(),
-            ik: s.into(),
-            sk: s.into(),
-        }
-    }
-    pub fn secret() -> Self {
-        Self::msg("<global_secret>")
-    }
-    pub fn obscure(self) -> Self {
-        let mut host = self.host;
-        let mut ik = self.ik;
-        let mut sk = self.sk;
-
-        let digits = 4;
-        let replaced = "************";
-
-        host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-        ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-        sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
-
-        Self {
-            host,
-            ik,
-            sk,
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
-#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
-pub struct EmailClaims {
-    pub email: Option<String>,
-}
-
-fn token<T: Serialize>(user_id: UserId, enabled: bool, claims: T) -> String {
-    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let claims = TwoFactorClaims {
-        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap()).timestamp(),
-        iss: JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string(),
-        sub: user_id,
-        enabled,
-        claims,
-    };
-    encode_jwt(&claims)
-}
-
-fn validate<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, enabled: bool) -> ApiResult<T> {
-    match decode_jwt::<TwoFactorClaims<T>>(token, JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string()) {
-        Ok(claims) => {
-            if claims.sub != *user_id {
-                err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid user");
-            }
-            if claims.enabled != enabled {
-                err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid state");
-            }
-            Ok(claims.claims)
-        }
-        Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to decode verification token: {err}")),
-    }
-}
-
-pub fn authenticator_token(user_id: UserId, key: String, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        AuthenticatorClaims {
-            key,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-pub fn validate_authenticator(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, key: &str, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<AuthenticatorClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if claims.key != key {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid key");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn duo_token(user_id: UserId, data: Option<DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        DuoClaims {
-            data,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-// When disabling we check that it's the correct data
-pub fn validate_duo(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, data: Option<&DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<DuoClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if enabled && claims.data.as_ref() != data {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid duo data");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn email_token(user_id: UserId, email: Option<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        EmailClaims {
-            email,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-// When disabling we check that it's the correct `email`
-pub fn validate_email(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, email: String, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<EmailClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if enabled && claims.email != Some(email) {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid email");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn webauthn_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<i32>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        WebauthnClaims {
-            keys,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-pub fn validate_webauthn(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &[i32], enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<WebauthnClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if keys != claims.keys {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-pub fn yubikey_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
-    token(
-        user_id,
-        enabled,
-        YubikeyClaims {
-            keys,
-        },
-    )
-}
-
-pub fn validate_yubikey(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = validate::<YubikeyClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
-    if *keys != claims.keys {
-        err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
-    }
-    Ok(())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-mod tests {
-    use super::*;
-    use serde_json::{Value, from_value, to_value};
-
-    fn token<T: Serialize>(claims: T) -> Value {
-        to_value(TwoFactorClaims {
-            nbf: 0,
-            exp: 0,
-            iss: String::new(),
-            sub: UserId::from(String::from("4ff0f0a4-0aa4-4c1d-9d43-1f2bd4d5e8b1")),
-            enabled: false,
-            claims,
-        })
-        .unwrap()
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn claims_only_parse_as_their_own_provider() {
-        let tokens = [
-            token(AuthenticatorClaims {
-                key: String::from("JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP"),
-            }),
-            token(DuoClaims {
-                data: None,
-            }),
-            token(WebauthnClaims {
-                keys: vec![1],
-            }),
-            token(YubikeyClaims {
-                keys: Vec::new(),
-            }),
-            token(EmailClaims {
-                email: None,
-            }),
-        ];
-        for (issued, token) in tokens.iter().enumerate() {
-            let parsed = [
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<AuthenticatorClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<DuoClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<WebauthnClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<YubikeyClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-                from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<EmailClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
-            ];
-            for (checked, ok) in parsed.into_iter().enumerate() {
-                assert_eq!(ok, issued == checked, "token {issued} parsed as {checked}");
-            }
-        }
-    }
-}
@@ -111,7 +111,6 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
            _usr: ConfigBuilder,

            _overrides: Vec<&'static str>,
-            _config_file_status: ConfigFileStatus,
        }

        // Custom Deserialize for ConfigBuilder, mainly based upon https://serde.rs/deserialize-struct.html
@@ -260,22 +259,11 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                builder
            }

-            async fn from_file() -> Result<Option<Self>, Error> {
-                // The Fs operator would create the folder if it doesn't exist, which we never want
-                if !CONFIG_FILE_PARENT_DIR.starts_with("s3://") && !std::path::Path::new(&*CONFIG_FILE_PARENT_DIR).is_dir() {
-                    return Ok(None);
-                }
+            async fn from_file() -> Result<Self, Error> {
                let operator = storage::operator_for_path(&CONFIG_FILE_PARENT_DIR)?;
-                let config_bytes = match operator.read(&CONFIG_FILENAME).await {
-                    Ok(bytes) => bytes,
-                    // No config file is fine, should not return any error
-                    Err(e) if e.kind() == opendal::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
-                    // Any other error might be an issue and should be passed back to the caller
-                    Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
-                };
-                let builder = serde_json::from_slice(&config_bytes.to_vec())?;
+                let config_bytes = operator.read(&CONFIG_FILENAME).await?;
                println!("[INFO] Using saved config from `{}` for configuration.\n", *CONFIG_FILE);
-                Ok(Some(builder))
+                serde_json::from_slice(&config_bytes.to_vec()).map_err(Into::into)
            }

            fn clear_non_editable(&mut self) {
@@ -452,8 +440,6 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                    "domain_origin",
                    "domain_path",
                    "domain",
-                    "duo_ikey",
-                    "duo_host",
                    "helo_name",
                    "org_creation_users",
                    "signups_domains_whitelist",
@@ -465,8 +451,6 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                    "sso_authority",
                    "sso_callback_path",
                    "sso_client_id",
-                    "yubico_client_id",
-                    "yubico_server",
                ];

                let cfg = {
@@ -499,10 +483,6 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                };
                overrides
            }
-
-            pub fn get_config_file_status(&self) -> ConfigFileStatus {
-                self.inner.read().unwrap()._config_file_status
-            }
        }
    };
 }
@@ -559,7 +539,7 @@ make_config! {
    jobs {
        /// Job scheduler poll interval |> How often the job scheduler thread checks for jobs to run.
        /// Set to 0 to globally disable scheduled jobs.
-        job_poll_interval_ms:   u32,    false,  def,    30_000;
+        job_poll_interval_ms:   u64,    false,  def,    30_000;
        /// Send purge schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that checks for Sends past their deletion date.
        /// Defaults to hourly. Set blank to disable this job.
        send_purge_schedule:    String, false,  def,    "0 5 * * * *".to_owned();
@@ -581,7 +561,7 @@ make_config! {
        /// Auth Request cleanup schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that cleans old auth requests from the auth request.
        /// Defaults to every minute. Set blank to disable this job.
        auth_request_purge_schedule:   String, false,  def,    "30 * * * * *".to_owned();
-        /// Duo Auth context cleanup schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that cleans expired Duo contexts from the database. Does nothing if Duo MFA is disabled.
+        /// Duo Auth context cleanup schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that cleans expired Duo contexts from the database. Does nothing if Duo MFA is disabled or set to use the legacy iframe prompt.
        /// Defaults to once every minute. Set blank to disable this job.
        duo_context_purge_schedule:   String, false,  def,    "30 * * * * *".to_owned();
        /// Purge incomplete SSO auth. |> Cron schedule of the job that cleans leftover auth in db due to incomplete SSO login.
@@ -607,9 +587,6 @@ make_config! {
        /// This setting applies globally to all users. To control this on a per-org basis instead, use the "Disable Send" org policy.
        sends_allowed:          bool,   true,   def,    true;

-        /// Fill Assist Rules URL |> HTTPS URL for the server-wide Fill Assist rules feed base directory.
-        fill_assist_rules_url: String, true, def, "https://fillassist.bitwarden.com".to_owned();
-
        /// HIBP Api Key |> HaveIBeenPwned API Key, request it here: https://haveibeenpwned.com/API/Key
        hibp_api_key:           Pass,   true,   option;

@@ -621,16 +598,16 @@ make_config! {
        user_send_limit:   i64,    true,   option;

        /// Trash auto-delete days |> Number of days to wait before auto-deleting a trashed item.
-        /// If unset or 0, trashed items are not auto-deleted. This setting applies globally, so make
+        /// If unset, trashed items are not auto-deleted. This setting applies globally, so make
        /// sure to inform all users of any changes to this setting.
-        trash_auto_delete_days: u16,    true,   option;
+        trash_auto_delete_days: i64,    true,   option;

        /// Incomplete 2FA time limit |> Number of minutes to wait before a 2FA-enabled login is
        /// considered incomplete, resulting in an email notification. An incomplete 2FA login is one
        /// where the correct master password was provided but the required 2FA step was not completed,
        /// which potentially indicates a master password compromise. Set to 0 to disable this check.
        /// This setting applies globally to all users.
-        incomplete_2fa_time_limit: u16, true,   def,    3;
+        incomplete_2fa_time_limit: i64, true,   def,    3;

        /// Disable icon downloads |> Set to true to disable icon downloading in the internal icon service.
        /// This still serves existing icons from $ICON_CACHE_FOLDER, without generating any external
@@ -643,9 +620,9 @@ make_config! {
        /// this will prevent logins from succeeding until the address has been verified
        signups_verify:         bool,   true,   def,    false;
        /// If signups require email verification, automatically re-send verification email if it hasn't been sent for a while (in seconds)
-        signups_verify_resend_time: u32, true,  def,    3_600;
+        signups_verify_resend_time: u64, true,  def,    3_600;
        /// If signups require email verification, limit how many emails are automatically sent when login is attempted (0 means no limit)
-        signups_verify_resend_limit: u16, true, def,    6;
+        signups_verify_resend_limit: u32, true, def,    6;
        /// Email domain whitelist |> Allow signups only from this list of comma-separated domains, even when signups are otherwise disabled
        signups_domains_whitelist: String, true, def,   String::new();
        /// Enable event logging |> Enables event logging for organizations.
@@ -657,7 +634,7 @@ make_config! {
        invitations_allowed:    bool,   true,   def,    true;
        /// Invitation token expiration time (in hours) |> The number of hours after which an organization invite token, emergency access invite token,
        /// email verification token and deletion request token will expire (must be at least 1)
-        invitation_expiration_hours: u16, false, def, 120;
+        invitation_expiration_hours: u32, false, def, 120;
        /// Enable emergency access |> Controls whether users can enable emergency access to their accounts. This setting applies globally to all users.
        emergency_access_allowed:    bool,   true,   def,    true;
        /// Allow email change |> Controls whether users can change their email. This setting applies globally to all users.
@@ -678,8 +655,8 @@ make_config! {
        /// Invitation organization name |> Name shown in the invitation emails that don't come from a specific organization
        invitation_org_name:    String, true,   def,    "Vaultwarden".to_owned();

-        /// Events days retain |> Number of days to retain events stored in the database. If unset or 0, events are kept indefinitely.
-        events_days_retain:     u16,    false,   option;
+        /// Events days retain |> Number of days to retain events stored in the database. If unset, events are kept indefinitely.
+        events_days_retain:     i64,    false,   option;
    },

    client {
@@ -698,8 +675,7 @@ make_config! {
        /// other address use the remote IP instead, so a client can't spoof the header.
        /// Either the string "local" (the default, any non-global address, which covers a reverse proxy
        /// running on the same host or container network), the string "all" to accept it from anywhere,
-        /// or a comma separated list of IPs and CIDR ranges. For a list header like X-Forwarded-For, the
-        /// client IP is the rightmost address that isn't a trusted proxy, so list every proxy in the chain.
+        /// or a comma separated list of IPs and CIDR ranges.
        ip_header_trusted_proxies: String, true, def,    "local".to_owned();
        /// Icon service |> The predefined icon services are: internal, bitwarden, duckduckgo, google.
        /// To specify a custom icon service, set a URL template with exactly one instance of `{}`,
@@ -717,13 +693,13 @@ make_config! {
        /// Temporary redirects are useful while testing different icon services, but once a service
        /// has been decided on, consider using permanent redirects for cacheability. The legacy codes
        /// are currently better supported by the Bitwarden clients.
-        icon_redirect_code:     u16,    true,   def,    302;
+        icon_redirect_code:     u32,    true,   def,    302;
        /// Positive icon cache expiry |> Number of seconds to consider that an already cached icon is fresh. After this period, the icon will be refreshed
-        icon_cache_ttl:         u32,    true,   def,    2_592_000;
+        icon_cache_ttl:         u64,    true,   def,    2_592_000;
        /// Negative icon cache expiry |> Number of seconds before trying to download an icon that failed again.
-        icon_cache_negttl:      u32,    true,   def,    259_200;
+        icon_cache_negttl:      u64,    true,   def,    259_200;
        /// Icon download timeout |> Number of seconds when to stop attempting to download an icon.
-        icon_download_timeout:  u16,    true,   def,    10;
+        icon_download_timeout:  u64,    true,   def,    10;

        /// [Deprecated] Icon blacklist Regex |> Use `http_request_block_regex` instead
        icon_blacklist_regex:   String, false,   option;
@@ -740,8 +716,6 @@ make_config! {
        /// Disable Two-Factor remember |> Enabling this would force the users to use a second factor to login every time.
        /// Note that the checkbox would still be present, but ignored.
        disable_2fa_remember:   bool,   true,   def,    false;
-        /// Two-Factor remember duration |> Number of days before a remembered Two-Factor login expires (min: 1, max: 90).
-        two_factor_remember_days: i64,  true,   def,    30;

        /// Disable authenticator time drifted codes to be valid |> Enabling this only allows the current TOTP code to be valid
        /// TOTP codes of the previous and next 30 seconds will be invalid.
@@ -776,11 +750,11 @@ make_config! {
        /// Max database connection retries |> Number of times to retry the database connection during startup, with 1 second between each retry, set to 0 to retry indefinitely
        db_connection_retries:  u32,    false,  def,    15;

-        /// Timeout in seconds when acquiring database connection
-        database_timeout:       u32,    false,  def,    30;
+        /// Timeout when acquiring database connection
+        database_timeout:       u64,    false,  def,    30;

        /// Timeout in seconds before idle connections to the database are closed
-        database_idle_timeout:  u32,    false, def,     600;
+        database_idle_timeout:  u64,    false, def,     600;

        /// Database connection max pool size
        database_max_conns:     u32,    false,  def,    10;
@@ -797,34 +771,30 @@ make_config! {
        /// Allowed iframe ancestors (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains to embed the web vault into an iframe, useful for embedding into secure intranets
        allowed_iframe_ancestors: String, true, def,    String::new();

-        /// Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains for URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
+        /// Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains to URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
        allowed_connect_src:      String, true, def,    String::new();

        /// Seconds between login requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between login and 2FA requests from the same IP address before rate limiting kicks in
-        login_ratelimit_seconds:       u16, false, def, 60;
+        login_ratelimit_seconds:       u64, false, def, 60;
        /// Max burst size for login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `login_ratelimit_seconds`. Note that this applies to both the login and the 2FA, so it's recommended to allow a burst size of at least 2
-        login_ratelimit_max_burst:     u16, false, def, 10;
+        login_ratelimit_max_burst:     u32, false, def, 10;

        /// Seconds between unauthenticated requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between requests from the same IP address to any of the rate limited unauthenticated endpoints
-        unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds:   u16, false, def, 60;
+        unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds:   u64, false, def, 60;
        /// Max burst size for unauthenticated requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds`. This is shared between several endpoints, so it needs to be more lenient than the login one
-        unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst: u16, false, def, 50;
+        unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst: u32, false, def, 50;

        /// Seconds between admin login requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between admin requests from the same IP address before rate limiting kicks in
-        admin_ratelimit_seconds:       u16, false, def, 300;
+        admin_ratelimit_seconds:       u64, false, def, 300;
        /// Max burst size for admin login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `admin_ratelimit_seconds`
-        admin_ratelimit_max_burst:     u16, false, def, 3;
+        admin_ratelimit_max_burst:     u32, false, def, 3;

        /// Admin session lifetime |> Set the lifetime of admin sessions to this value (in minutes).
-        admin_session_lifetime:        u32, true,  def, 20;
+        admin_session_lifetime:        i64, true,  def, 20;

        /// Enable groups (BETA!) (Know the risks!) |> Enables groups support for organizations (Currently contains known issues!).
        org_groups_enabled:            bool, false, def, false;

-        /// Enable Custom roles (EXPERIMENTAL!) (Know the risks!) |> Enables the in-development Custom member role with granular permissions for organizations.
-        /// Only the permissions this version enforces can be granted. Disabling it again keeps the stored Custom roles, but they grant nothing until it is re-enabled.
-        experimental_custom_roles:     bool, false, def, false;
-
        /// Increase note size limit (Know the risks!) |> Sets the secure note size limit to 100_000 instead of the default 10_000.
        /// WARNING: This could cause issues with clients. Also exports will not work on Bitwarden servers!
        increase_note_size_limit:      bool,  true,  def, false;
@@ -873,8 +843,8 @@ make_config! {
        sso_master_password_policy:     String, true,  option;
        /// Use SSO only for auth not the session lifecycle |> Use default Vaultwarden session lifecycle (Idle refresh token valid for 30days)
        sso_auth_only_not_session:      bool,   true,   def,    false;
-        /// Client cache for discovery endpoint. |> Duration in seconds (0 to disable). More details: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-SSO-support-using-OpenId-Connect#client-cache
-        sso_client_cache_expiration:    u32,    true,   def,    0;
+        /// Client cache for discovery endpoint. |> Duration in seconds (0 or less to disable). More details: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-SSO-support-using-OpenId-Connect#client-cache
+        sso_client_cache_expiration:    u64,    true,   def,    0;
        /// Log all tokens |> `LOG_LEVEL=debug` or `LOG_LEVEL=info,vaultwarden::sso=debug` is required
        sso_debug_tokens:               bool,   true,   def,    false;
    },
@@ -895,12 +865,16 @@ make_config! {
    duo: _enable_duo {
        /// Enabled
        _enable_duo:            bool,   true,   def,     true;
+        /// Attempt to use deprecated iframe-based Traditional Prompt (Duo WebSDK 2)
+        duo_use_iframe:         bool,   false,  def,     false;
        /// Client Id
        duo_ikey:               String, true,   option;
        /// Client Secret
        duo_skey:               Pass,   true,   option;
        /// Host
        duo_host:               String, true,   option;
+        /// Application Key (generated automatically)
+        _duo_akey:              Pass,   false,  option;
    },

    /// SMTP Email Settings
@@ -932,7 +906,7 @@ make_config! {
        /// SMTP Auth mechanism |> Defaults for SSL is "Plain" and "Login" and nothing for Non-SSL connections. Possible values: ["Plain", "Login", "Xoauth2"]. Multiple options need to be separated by a comma ','.
        smtp_auth_mechanism:           String, true,   option;
        /// SMTP connection timeout |> Number of seconds when to stop trying to connect to the SMTP server
-        smtp_timeout:                  u16,    true,   def,     15;
+        smtp_timeout:                  u64,    true,   def,     15;
        /// Server name sent during HELO |> By default this value should be the machine's hostname, but might need to be changed in case it trips some anti-spam filters
        helo_name:                     String, true,   option;
        /// Embed images as email attachments.
@@ -954,9 +928,9 @@ make_config! {
        /// Email token size |> Number of digits in an email 2FA token (min: 6, max: 255). Note that the Bitwarden clients are hardcoded to mention 6 digit codes regardless of this setting.
        email_token_size:       u8,     true,   def,      6;
        /// Token expiration time |> Maximum time in seconds a token is valid. The time the user has to open email client and copy token.
-        email_expiration_time:  u32,    true,   def,      600;
+        email_expiration_time:  u64,    true,   def,      600;
        /// Maximum attempts |> Maximum attempts before an email token is reset and a new email will need to be sent
-        email_attempts_limit:   u8,     true,   def,      3;
+        email_attempts_limit:   u64,    true,   def,      3;
        /// Setup email 2FA at signup |> Setup email 2FA provider on registration regardless of any organization policy
        email_2fa_enforce_on_verified_invite: bool,   true,   def,      false;
        /// Auto-enable 2FA (Know the risks!) |> Automatically setup email 2FA as fallback provider when needed
@@ -1012,15 +986,7 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
    }

    if cfg.database_min_conns > cfg.database_max_conns {
-        err!("`DATABASE_MIN_CONNS` must be less than or equal to `DATABASE_MAX_CONNS`.");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.database_timeout < 1 {
-        err!("`DATABASE_TIMEOUT` must be at least 1 second");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.database_idle_timeout < 1 {
-        err!("`DATABASE_IDLE_TIMEOUT` must be at least 1 second");
+        err!("`DATABASE_MIN_CONNS` must be smaller than or equal to `DATABASE_MAX_CONNS`.");
    }

    if let Some(log_file) = &cfg.log_file
@@ -1036,21 +1002,6 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
        );
    }

-    let valid_fill_assist_rules_url = Url::parse(&cfg.fill_assist_rules_url).is_ok_and(|url| {
-        url.scheme() == "https"
-            && url.has_host()
-            && url.username().is_empty()
-            && url.password().is_none()
-            && url.query().is_none()
-            && url.fragment().is_none()
-            && cfg.fill_assist_rules_url.trim() == cfg.fill_assist_rules_url
-    });
-    if !valid_fill_assist_rules_url {
-        err!(
-            "`FILL_ASSIST_RULES_URL` must be a valid HTTPS URL without credentials, query parameters, fragments, or surrounding whitespace."
-        );
-    }
-
    let connect_src = cfg.allowed_connect_src.to_lowercase();
    for url in connect_src.split_whitespace() {
        if !url.starts_with("https://") || Url::parse(url).is_err() {
@@ -1285,10 +1236,6 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
        err!("`INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS` has a minimum duration of 1 hour")
    }

-    if !(1..=90).contains(&cfg.two_factor_remember_days) {
-        err!("`TWO_FACTOR_REMEMBER_DAYS` must be between 1 and 90 days")
-    }
-
    // Validate schedule crontab format
    if !cfg.send_purge_schedule.is_empty() && cfg.send_purge_schedule.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
        err!("`SEND_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
@@ -1322,38 +1269,6 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
        err!("`AUTH_REQUEST_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
    }

-    if !cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.is_empty() && cfg.duo_context_purge_schedule.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
-        err!("`DUO_CONTEXT_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
-    }
-
-    if !cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.is_empty() && cfg.purge_incomplete_sso_auth.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
-        err!("`PURGE_INCOMPLETE_SSO_AUTH` is not a valid cron expression")
-    }
-
-    if cfg.login_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
-        err!("`LOGIN_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.login_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
-        err!("`LOGIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.admin_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
-        err!("`ADMIN_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.admin_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
-        err!("`ADMIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
-        err!("`UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
-    }
-
-    if cfg.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
-        err!("`UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
-    }
-
    if !cfg.disable_admin_token {
        match cfg.admin_token.as_ref() {
            Some(t) if t.starts_with("$argon2") => {
@@ -1503,23 +1418,33 @@ pub enum PathType {
 // Android (v2026.2.1): https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/6902c19c0093fa476bbf74ccaa70c9f14afbb82f/core/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/core/data/manager/model/FlagKey.kt#L31
 // iOS (v2026.2.1): https://github.com/bitwarden/ios/blob/cdd9ba1770ca2ffc098d02d12cc3208e3a830454/BitwardenShared/Core/Platform/Models/Enum/FeatureFlag.swift#L7
 pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
+    // Architecture
+    "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-1",
+    "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-2",
+    "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-3",
+    "desktop-ui-migration-milestone-4",
    // Auth Team
    "pm-5594-safari-account-switching",
    "pm-32413-multi-client-password-management",
    // Autofill Team
-    "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic",
    "enable-basic-auth-response",
-    "fill-assist-targeting-rules",
+    "ssh-agent",
    "ssh-agent-v2",
-    "windows-desktop-autotype",
-    "windows-desktop-autotype-ga",
    // Key Management Team
-    "biometrics-sdk-ipc",
-    "windows-native-credential-sync",
-    "macos-native-credential-sync",
-    "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
+    "ssh-key-vault-item",
+    "pm-25373-windows-biometrics-v2",
+    "pm-26340-linux-biometrics-v2",
+    "pm-31050-no-logout-key-upgrade-rotation",
    "pm-27278-v2-password-registration",
+    "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
+    "pm-30144-sdk-key-rotation",
+    "force-upgrade-v2-encryption",
    // Mobile Team
+    "anon-addy-self-host-alias",
+    "simple-login-self-host-alias",
+    "mutual-tls",
+    "cxp-import-mobile",
+    "cxp-export-mobile",
    "pm-34171-card-scanner",
    // Platform Team
    "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins",
@@ -1527,34 +1452,11 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
    "pm-32009-new-item-types",
 ];

-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Serialize)]
-pub enum ConfigFileStatus {
-    NotFound,
-    Loaded,
-    Error,
-}
-
 impl Config {
    pub async fn load() -> Result<Self, Error> {
        // Loading from env and file
        let env = ConfigBuilder::from_env();
-        let (usr, config_file_status) = match ConfigBuilder::from_file().await {
-            Ok(Some(usr)) => (usr, ConfigFileStatus::Loaded),
-            Ok(None) => (ConfigBuilder::default(), ConfigFileStatus::NotFound),
-            Err(e) => {
-                println!(
-                    "[ERROR] Failed to load configuration from `{}`\n\
-                    #####################################################################################\n\
-                    # The file seems to exist but might contain invalid JSON or invalid values.         #\n\
-                    # Check the syntax and make sure every value is valid and within its allowed range. #\n\
-                    # This file is not used until those errors are resolved.                            #\n\
-                    #####################################################################################\n\
-                {e:?}\n",
-                    *CONFIG_FILE
-                );
-                (ConfigBuilder::default(), ConfigFileStatus::Error)
-            }
-        };
+        let usr = ConfigBuilder::from_file().await.unwrap_or_default();

        // Create merged config, config file overwrites env
        let mut overrides = Vec::new();
@@ -1574,7 +1476,6 @@ impl Config {
                _env: env,
                _usr: usr,
                _overrides: overrides,
-                _config_file_status: config_file_status,
            }),
        })
    }
@@ -1608,7 +1509,6 @@ impl Config {
            writer.config = config;
            writer._usr = builder;
            writer._overrides = overrides;
-            writer._config_file_status = ConfigFileStatus::Loaded;
        }

        //Save to file
@@ -1621,13 +1521,22 @@ impl Config {
        Ok(())
    }

+    async fn update_config_partial(&self, other: ConfigBuilder) -> Result<(), Error> {
+        let builder = {
+            let usr = &self.inner.read().unwrap()._usr;
+            let mut overrides = Vec::new();
+            usr.merge(&other, false, &mut overrides)
+        };
+        self.update_config(builder, false).await
+    }
+
    /// Tests whether an email's domain is allowed. A domain is allowed if it
    /// is in signups_domains_whitelist, or if no whitelist is set (so there
    /// are no domain restrictions in effect).
    pub fn is_email_domain_allowed(&self, email: &str) -> bool {
        let e: Vec<&str> = email.rsplitn(2, '@').collect();
        if e.len() != 2 || e[0].is_empty() || e[1].is_empty() {
-            warn!("Failed to parse email address '{}'", email.escape_debug());
+            warn!("Failed to parse email address '{email}'");
            return false;
        }
        let email_domain = e[0].to_lowercase();
@@ -1700,7 +1609,6 @@ impl Config {
            writer.config = config;
            writer._usr = usr;
            writer._overrides = Vec::new();
-            writer._config_file_status = ConfigFileStatus::NotFound;
        }

        // Invalidate CSS Cache because several config items might have impact on the rendered CSS
@@ -1717,6 +1625,23 @@ impl Config {
        inner._enable_smtp && (inner.smtp_host.is_some() || inner.use_sendmail)
    }

+    pub async fn get_duo_akey(&self) -> String {
+        if let Some(akey) = self._duo_akey() {
+            akey
+        } else {
+            let akey_s = crate::crypto::encode_random_bytes::<64>(&data_encoding::BASE64);
+
+            // Save the new value
+            let builder = ConfigBuilder {
+                _duo_akey: Some(akey_s.clone()),
+                ..Default::default()
+            };
+            self.update_config_partial(builder).await.ok();
+
+            akey_s
+        }
+    }
+
    pub fn is_webauthn_2fa_supported(&self) -> bool {
        Url::parse(&self.domain()).expect("DOMAIN not a valid URL").domain().is_some()
    }
@@ -1848,7 +1773,6 @@ where
    reg!("email/protected_action", ".html");
    reg!("email/pw_hint_none", ".html");
    reg!("email/pw_hint_some", ".html");
-    reg!("email/recover_twofactor", ".html");
    reg!("email/register_verify_email", ".html");
    reg!("email/send_2fa_removed_from_org", ".html");
    reg!("email/send_emergency_access_invite", ".html");
@@ -1,11 +1,7 @@
 mod query_logger;

 use std::{
-    future::Future,
-    sync::{
-        Arc, OnceLock,
-        atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
-    },
+    sync::{Arc, OnceLock},
    time::Duration,
 };

@@ -127,7 +123,6 @@ pub static ACTIVE_DB_TYPE: OnceLock<DbConnType> = OnceLock::new();
 pub struct DbConn {
    conn: Arc<Mutex<Option<PooledConnection<DbConnManager>>>>,
    permit: Option<OwnedSemaphorePermit>,
-    transaction_open: AtomicBool,
 }

 #[derive(Debug)]
@@ -155,7 +150,6 @@ impl Drop for DbConn {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        let conn = Arc::clone(&self.conn);
        let permit = self.permit.take();
-        let transaction_open = self.transaction_open.load(Ordering::Acquire);

        // Since connection can't be on the stack in an async fn during an
        // await, we have to spawn a new blocking-safe thread...
@@ -163,13 +157,7 @@ impl Drop for DbConn {
            // And then re-enter the runtime to wait on the async mutex, but in a blocking fashion.
            let mut conn = tokio::runtime::Handle::current().block_on(conn.lock_owned());

-            if let Some(mut conn) = conn.take() {
-                if transaction_open {
-                    // A cancelled request must not return an open transaction to the pool.
-                    if let Err(error) = conn.batch_execute("ROLLBACK") {
-                        error!("Failed to roll back a cancelled database transaction: {error}");
-                    }
-                }
+            if let Some(conn) = conn.take() {
                drop(conn);
            }

@@ -224,8 +212,8 @@ impl DbPool {
        let pool = Pool::builder()
            .max_size(max_conns)
            .min_idle(Some(CONFIG.database_min_conns()))
-            .idle_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_idle_timeout()))))
-            .connection_timeout(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_timeout())))
+            .idle_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_idle_timeout())))
+            .connection_timeout(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_timeout()))
            .connection_customizer(Box::new(DbConnOptions {
                init_stmts: conn_type.get_init_stmts(),
            }))
@@ -245,7 +233,7 @@ impl DbPool {

    // Get a connection from the pool
    pub async fn get(&self) -> Result<DbConn, Error> {
-        let duration = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_timeout()));
+        let duration = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_timeout());
        let permit = match timeout(duration, Arc::clone(&self.semaphore).acquire_owned()).await {
            Ok(p) => p.expect("Semaphore should be open"),
            Err(_) => {
@@ -260,7 +248,6 @@ impl DbPool {
        Ok(DbConn {
            conn: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Some(c))),
            permit: Some(permit),
-            transaction_open: AtomicBool::new(false),
        })
    }
 }
@@ -333,29 +320,6 @@ impl DbConnType {
 }

 impl DbConn {
-    /// Run asynchronous model calls on this request's pooled connection in one transaction.
-    /// Send external notifications only after this returns successfully.
-    pub async fn transaction<F, Fut, T>(&self, operation: F) -> Result<T, Error>
-    where
-        F: FnOnce() -> Fut,
-        Fut: Future<Output = Result<T, Error>>,
-    {
-        self.run(|conn| conn.batch_execute("BEGIN")).await.map_res("Error starting database transaction")?;
-        self.transaction_open.store(true, Ordering::Release);
-        let result = operation().await;
-        if result.is_ok() {
-            let committed = self.run(|conn| conn.batch_execute("COMMIT")).await;
-            let closed = committed.is_ok() || self.run(|conn| conn.batch_execute("ROLLBACK")).await.is_ok();
-            if closed {
-                self.transaction_open.store(false, Ordering::Release);
-            }
-            committed.map_res("Error committing database transaction")?;
-        } else if self.run(|conn| conn.batch_execute("ROLLBACK")).await.is_ok() {
-            self.transaction_open.store(false, Ordering::Release);
-        }
-        result
-    }
-
    pub async fn run<F, R>(&self, f: F) -> R
    where
        F: FnOnce(&mut DbConnInner) -> R + Send,
@@ -570,257 +534,3 @@ mod postgresql_migrations {
        Ok(())
    }
 }
-
-/// A throwaway SQLite database with the real schema, for tests that need to run queries.
-#[cfg(all(test, sqlite))]
-pub mod test_db {
-    use super::{DbConn, DbConnManager, sqlite_migrations::MIGRATIONS};
-    use diesel::{Connection, connection::SimpleConnection, r2d2::Pool, sqlite::SqliteConnection};
-    use diesel_migrations::MigrationHarness;
-    use std::sync::{Arc, atomic::AtomicBool};
-    use tokio::sync::Mutex;
-
-    pub struct TestDb {
-        pool: Pool<DbConnManager>,
-        // Keep the named in-memory database alive across pooled connections.
-        _keeper: SqliteConnection,
-    }
-
-    impl TestDb {
-        fn new() -> Self {
-            let url = format!("sqlite://{}?mode=memory&cache=shared", crate::util::get_uuid());
-            let mut keeper = SqliteConnection::establish(&url).unwrap();
-            keeper.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS).unwrap();
-            let pool = Pool::builder().max_size(2).build(DbConnManager::new(&url)).unwrap();
-            Self {
-                pool,
-                _keeper: keeper,
-            }
-        }
-
-        pub fn conn(&self) -> DbConn {
-            DbConn {
-                conn: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Some(self.pool.get().unwrap()))),
-                permit: None,
-                transaction_open: AtomicBool::new(false),
-            }
-        }
-    }
-
-    // CONFIG must initialize in a child process: the DNS bootstrap test needs it uninitialized.
-    pub fn run(test: impl AsyncFnOnce(&TestDb)) {
-        if std::env::var_os("VAULTWARDEN_ISOLATED_CONFIG_TEST").is_none() {
-            let output = std::process::Command::new(std::env::current_exe().unwrap())
-                .args(["--exact", std::thread::current().name().unwrap(), "--nocapture"])
-                .env("VAULTWARDEN_ISOLATED_CONFIG_TEST", "1")
-                .env("DATABASE_URL", "sqlite://:memory:")
-                .output()
-                .unwrap();
-            assert!(
-                output.status.success() && String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).contains("1 passed; 0 failed"),
-                "{}\n{}",
-                String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout),
-                String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
-            );
-            return;
-        }
-        // DbConn::run uses block_in_place, requiring a multi-threaded runtime.
-        tokio::runtime::Builder::new_multi_thread().enable_all().build().unwrap().block_on(async {
-            super::models::test_flag::CUSTOM_ROLES_ENABLED.set(Some(true));
-            test(&TestDb::new()).await;
-        });
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn custom_role_migration_preserves_memberships_and_guards_downgrade() {
-        use super::schema::users_organizations::dsl::*;
-        use diesel::{migration::MigrationSource, prelude::*};
-        let mut conn = SqliteConnection::establish(":memory:").unwrap();
-        for migration in conn.pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS).unwrap() {
-            if migration.name().version().to_string() == "20261010120000" {
-                break;
-            }
-            conn.run_migration(&migration).unwrap();
-        }
-        conn.batch_execute(
-            "PRAGMA foreign_keys=OFF;
-            INSERT INTO organizations (uuid,name,billing_email) VALUES ('org','Org','a@b');
-            INSERT INTO users_organizations (uuid,user_uuid,org_uuid,access_all,akey,status,atype) VALUES
-            ('0','0','org',TRUE,'key',2,0), ('1','1','org',TRUE,'key',2,1),
-            ('2','2','org',FALSE,'key',1,2), ('3','3','org',FALSE,'key',2,3), ('4','4','org',TRUE,'key',2,3);",
-        )
-        .unwrap();
-        let rows = |conn: &mut SqliteConnection| {
-            users_organizations
-                .select((uuid, user_uuid, org_uuid, access_all, akey, status, atype))
-                .order(uuid)
-                .load::<(String, String, String, bool, String, i32, i32)>(conn)
-                .unwrap()
-        };
-        let before = rows(&mut conn);
-        conn.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(rows(&mut conn), before);
-        let grants = |conn: &mut SqliteConnection| {
-            diesel::select(diesel::dsl::sql::<diesel::sql_types::BigInt>(
-                "(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users_organizations WHERE manage_users OR manage_groups OR manage_policies
-                OR create_new_collections OR edit_any_collection OR delete_any_collection
-                OR access_event_logs OR access_import_export OR access_reports)",
-            ))
-            .get_result::<i64>(conn)
-            .unwrap()
-        };
-        assert_eq!(grants(&mut conn), 0);
-        let migration = MigrationSource::<diesel::sqlite::Sqlite>::migrations(&MIGRATIONS)
-            .unwrap()
-            .into_iter()
-            .find(|m| m.name().version().to_string() == "20261010120000")
-            .unwrap();
-        for member_status in [1, 2] {
-            conn.batch_execute(&format!(
-                "UPDATE users_organizations SET atype=4,manage_users=TRUE,status={member_status} WHERE uuid='2'"
-            ))
-            .unwrap();
-            let custom = rows(&mut conn);
-            assert!(conn.revert_migration(&*migration).is_err());
-            assert_eq!(rows(&mut conn), custom);
-            assert!(users_organizations.filter(uuid.eq("2")).select(manage_users).first::<bool>(&mut conn).unwrap());
-        }
-        conn.batch_execute("UPDATE users_organizations SET atype=2,manage_users=FALSE,status=1 WHERE uuid='2'")
-            .unwrap();
-        conn.revert_migration(&*migration).unwrap();
-        assert!(diesel::sql_query("SELECT manage_users FROM users_organizations").execute(&mut conn).is_err());
-        conn.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS).unwrap();
-        assert_eq!(grants(&mut conn), 0);
-        assert_eq!(rows(&mut conn), before);
-    }
-
-    use super::models::{Collection, CustomPermission, Membership, MembershipType, Organization, OrganizationId, User};
-
-    pub async fn organization(conn: &DbConn) -> Organization {
-        let org = Organization::new("Org".into(), "billing@example.com", None, None);
-        org.save(conn).await.unwrap();
-        org
-    }
-
-    pub async fn member(
-        conn: &DbConn,
-        org: &OrganizationId,
-        role: MembershipType,
-        permissions: &[CustomPermission],
-    ) -> (User, Membership) {
-        let mut user = User::new(&format!("{}@example.com", crate::util::get_uuid()), None);
-        user.password_hash = b"existing-account".to_vec();
-        user.save(conn).await.unwrap();
-        let mut member = Membership::new(user.uuid.clone(), org.clone(), None);
-        member.set_type(role);
-        member.status = 2;
-        member.set_custom_permissions(&permissions.iter().copied().collect());
-        member.save(conn).await.unwrap();
-        (user, member)
-    }
-
-    pub async fn custom_member(conn: &DbConn, permission: CustomPermission) -> (Organization, User, Membership) {
-        let org = organization(conn).await;
-        let (user, member) = member(conn, &org.uuid, MembershipType::Custom, &[permission]).await;
-        (org, user, member)
-    }
-
-    pub async fn collection(conn: &DbConn, org: &OrganizationId) -> Collection {
-        let collection = Collection::new(org.clone(), "Collection".into(), None);
-        collection.save(conn).await.unwrap();
-        collection
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn transactions_rollback_before_connection_reuse_and_commit_success() {
-        use crate::error::MapResult;
-        use diesel::RunQueryDsl;
-        run(async |db| {
-            let conn = db.conn();
-            conn.run(|c| c.batch_execute("CREATE TABLE probe (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY)")).await.unwrap();
-            for (sql, expected) in [
-                ("INSERT INTO probe VALUES (1); INSERT INTO probe VALUES (1)", 0_i64),
-                ("INSERT INTO probe VALUES (1)", 1),
-            ] {
-                let result: Result<(), super::Error> = conn
-                    .transaction(async || conn.run(move |c| c.batch_execute(sql)).await.map_res("Insert failed"))
-                    .await;
-                assert_eq!(result.is_ok(), expected == 1);
-                let count: i64 = conn
-                    .run(|c| {
-                        diesel::select(diesel::dsl::sql::<diesel::sql_types::BigInt>("(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM probe)"))
-                            .get_result(c)
-                    })
-                    .await
-                    .unwrap();
-                assert_eq!(count, expected);
-                // The same live connection must accept another transaction, before DbConn::drop can help.
-                conn.run(|c| c.batch_execute("BEGIN; ROLLBACK")).await.unwrap();
-            }
-        });
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn collection_and_cipher_access_requires_active_membership_and_enabled_groups() {
-        use super::models::{Cipher, CipherAccessScope, CollectionCipher, CollectionUser, test_flag};
-        use crate::{
-            api::core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType},
-            auth::{CollectionAction, custom_member_may},
-        };
-        run(async |db| {
-            let conn = db.conn();
-            let (org, user, mut member) = custom_member(&conn, CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection).await;
-            let collection = collection(&conn, &org.uuid).await;
-            let mut cipher = Cipher::new(2);
-            cipher.name = "Cipher".into();
-            cipher.organization_uuid = Some(org.uuid.clone());
-            cipher.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
-            CollectionCipher::save(&cipher.uuid, &collection.uuid, &conn).await.unwrap();
-            for (enabled, status, allowed) in [(true, 2, true), (false, 2, false), (true, 1, false)] {
-                test_flag::CUSTOM_ROLES_ENABLED.set(Some(enabled));
-                member.status = status;
-                member.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
-                assert!(!cipher.is_accessible_to_user(&user.uuid, CipherAccessScope::User, &conn).await);
-                assert_eq!(
-                    cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(&user.uuid, CipherAccessScope::OrganizationAdmin, &conn).await,
-                    allowed
-                );
-            }
-            test_flag::CUSTOM_ROLES_ENABLED.set(Some(true));
-            member.status = 2;
-            member.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
-            let foreign = organization(&conn).await;
-            cipher.organization_uuid = Some(foreign.uuid);
-            assert!(!cipher.is_accessible_to_user(&user.uuid, CipherAccessScope::OrganizationAdmin, &conn).await);
-            cipher.organization_uuid = Some(org.uuid.clone());
-            member.set_custom_permissions(&std::collections::HashSet::new());
-            member.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
-            let sql=format!("INSERT INTO groups (uuid,organizations_uuid,name,access_all,creation_date,revision_date)
-                VALUES ('g','{}','Group',FALSE,CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,CURRENT_TIMESTAMP);
-                INSERT INTO groups_users (groups_uuid,users_organizations_uuid) VALUES ('g','{}');
-                INSERT INTO collections_groups (collections_uuid,groups_uuid,read_only,hide_passwords,manage) VALUES ('{}','g',FALSE,FALSE,TRUE);",
-                org.uuid,member.uuid,collection.uuid);
-            conn.run(move |c| c.batch_execute(&sql)).await.unwrap();
-            for status in [2, 1, -3, -126] {
-                member.status = status;
-                member.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
-                let allowed = status == 2 && crate::CONFIG.org_groups_enabled();
-                assert_eq!(custom_member_may(CollectionAction::Edit, &member, &collection.uuid, &conn).await, allowed);
-                let sync = CipherSyncData::new(&user.uuid, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await;
-                for cached in [None, Some(&sync)] {
-                    assert_eq!(
-                        cipher
-                            .get_access_restrictions(&user.uuid, CipherAccessScope::User, cached, &conn)
-                            .await
-                            .is_some(),
-                        allowed
-                    );
-                }
-            }
-            member.status = 2;
-            member.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
-            CollectionUser::save(&user.uuid, &collection.uuid, false, false, true, &conn).await.unwrap();
-            assert!(custom_member_may(CollectionAction::Edit, &member, &collection.uuid, &conn).await);
-        });
-    }
-}
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ impl Attachment {
            let token = encode_jwt(&generate_file_download_claims(self.cipher_uuid.clone(), self.id.clone()));
            Ok(format!("{host}/attachments/{}/{}?token={token}", self.cipher_uuid, self.id))
        } else {
-            Ok(operator.presign_read(&self.get_file_path(), Duration::from_mins(1)).await?.uri().to_string())
+            Ok(operator.presign_read(&self.get_file_path(), Duration::from_mins(5)).await?.uri().to_string())
        }
    }

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ use diesel::prelude::*;
 use serde_json::Value;

 use crate::{
-    api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult},
+    api::EmptyResult,
    crypto::ct_eq,
    db::{DbConn, schema::auth_requests},
    error::MapResult,
@@ -166,30 +166,6 @@ impl AuthRequest {
        .await
    }

-    pub async fn delete_all_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        conn.run(move |conn| {
-            diesel::delete(auth_requests::table.filter(auth_requests::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)))
-                .execute(conn)
-                .map_res("Error deleting auth requests for user")
-        })
-        .await
-    }
-
-    /// Marks the request as used to log in. Returns false when it already was, so it only works once.
-    pub async fn set_authentication_date(uuid: &AuthRequestId, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<bool> {
-        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-        conn.run(move |conn| {
-            diesel::update(auth_requests::table)
-                .filter(auth_requests::uuid.eq(uuid))
-                .filter(auth_requests::authentication_date.is_null())
-                .set(auth_requests::authentication_date.eq(now))
-                .execute(conn)
-                .map(|updated| updated == 1)
-                .map_res("Error updating auth request")
-        })
-        .await
-    }
-
    pub fn check_access_code(&self, access_code: &str) -> bool {
        ct_eq(&self.access_code, access_code)
    }
@@ -197,7 +173,7 @@ impl AuthRequest {
    pub async fn purge_expired_auth_requests(conn: &DbConn) {
        // delete auth requests older than 15 minutes which is functionally equivalent to upstream:
        // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/f8ee2270409f7a13125cd414c450740af605a175/src/Sql/dbo/Auth/Stored%20Procedures/AuthRequest_DeleteIfExpired.sql
-        let expiry_time = Utc::now().naive_utc() - chrono::TimeDelta::minutes(15);
+        let expiry_time = Utc::now().naive_utc() - chrono::TimeDelta::try_minutes(15).unwrap();
        for auth_request in Self::find_created_before(&expiry_time, conn).await {
            auth_request.delete(conn).await.ok();
        }
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use std::{borrow::Cow, collections::HashSet};
+use std::borrow::Cow;

 use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, TimeDelta, Utc};
 use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
@@ -19,14 +19,13 @@ use crate::{
        },
    },
    error::MapResult,
-    util::{LowerCase, convert_json_key_lcase_first},
+    util::LowerCase,
 };
 use macros::UuidFromParam;

 use super::{
    Archive, Attachment, CollectionCipher, CollectionId, Favorite, FolderCipher, FolderId, Group, Membership,
-    MembershipStatus, OrganizationId, User, UserId,
-    organization::{ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES, custom_edit_any_collection},
+    MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrganizationId, User, UserId,
 };

 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
@@ -64,9 +63,13 @@ pub struct Cipher {
    pub reprompt: Option<i32>,
 }

-/// Whether `data` is a v2 cipher blob, recognized like upstream by a top-level `format_version` key.
+/// Whether `data` is a sealed cipher blob rather than the legacy per-type JSON.
 ///
-/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Vault/Entities/Cipher.cs#L36-L41>
+/// Ciphers of v2 accounts are encrypted as a single blob that carries everything, name included,
+/// and is opaque to us. It is recognized the same way upstream does, by a top-level
+/// `format_version` key that the legacy JSON never has.
+///
+/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/main/src/Core/Vault/Entities/Cipher.cs>
 pub fn is_data_blob_encrypted(data: &str) -> bool {
    serde_json::from_str::<Value>(data).is_ok_and(|d| is_blob_value(&d))
 }
@@ -81,51 +84,9 @@ pub enum RepromptType {
    Password = 1,
 }

-/// Which access a cipher operation is authorized with.
-///
-/// The administrative cipher routes (`/ciphers/<id>/admin` and friends) are served by the same handlers as the
-/// regular vault routes, so the handlers state which one applies. They only differ for a Custom member with Edit
-/// any collection, who reaches every cipher of the organization on the administrative routes, but keeps their
-/// own vault limited to the collections they are assigned to.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
-pub enum CipherAccessScope {
-    User,
-    OrganizationAdmin,
-}
-
-impl CipherAccessScope {
-    /// Whether `member` reaches every cipher of their organization with this access.
-    fn reaches_all_ciphers(self, member: &Membership) -> bool {
-        match self {
-            CipherAccessScope::User => member.has_full_access(),
-            CipherAccessScope::OrganizationAdmin => member.can_edit_any_collection(),
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The access the v2 attachment upload asks for with `adminRequest`. It only picks which check runs, the
-    /// administrative one still needs a member who may edit any collection.
-    pub fn requested(admin_request: Option<bool>) -> Self {
-        if admin_request == Some(true) {
-            CipherAccessScope::OrganizationAdmin
-        } else {
-            CipherAccessScope::User
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The access for a route that does not tell which one it is, from the member's own membership.
-    pub fn for_member(member: Option<&Membership>) -> Self {
-        if member.is_some_and(Membership::can_edit_any_collection) {
-            CipherAccessScope::OrganizationAdmin
-        } else {
-            CipherAccessScope::User
-        }
-    }
-}
-
 /// Local methods
 impl Cipher {
-    /// The name is set when the data is saved, since a blob-encrypted cipher has it inside `data`
-    pub fn new(atype: i32) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(atype: i32, name: String) -> Self {
        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();

        Self {
@@ -139,7 +100,7 @@ impl Cipher {
            key: None,

            atype,
-            name: String::new(),
+            name,

            notes: None,
            fields: None,
@@ -165,15 +126,10 @@ impl Cipher {
                    .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].Notes"), serde_json::to_value([&max_note_size_msg]).unwrap());
            }

-            let is_blob = cipher.is_blob();
-            if let Err(e) = cipher.validate_content(is_blob) {
+            if let Err(e) = cipher.validate_content(cipher.is_blob()) {
                validation_errors
                    .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].{}", e.field), serde_json::to_value([e.message]).unwrap());
            }
-            if let Err(e) = cipher.validate_type_data(is_blob) {
-                validation_errors
-                    .insert(format!("Ciphers[{index}].Type"), serde_json::to_value([e.message()]).unwrap());
-            }

            // Validate the password history if it contains `null` values and if so, return a warning
            if let Some(Value::Array(password_history)) = &cipher.password_history {
@@ -216,51 +172,12 @@ impl Cipher {
        cipher_sync_data: Option<&CipherSyncData>,
        sync_type: CipherSyncType,
        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
-        self.to_json_scoped(host, user_uuid, cipher_sync_data, sync_type, CipherAccessScope::User, conn).await
-    }
-
-    /// [`Cipher::to_json`] for an administrative route, telling what the member may do with the cipher there.
-    pub async fn to_json_org_admin(
-        &self,
-        host: &str,
-        user_uuid: &UserId,
-        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
-        self.to_json_scoped(host, user_uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, CipherAccessScope::OrganizationAdmin, conn)
-            .await
-    }
-
-    pub async fn to_json_org_admin_collections(
-        &self,
-        host: &str,
-        user_uuid: &UserId,
-        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
-        self.to_json_scoped(
-            host,
-            user_uuid,
-            None,
-            CipherSyncType::Organization,
-            CipherAccessScope::OrganizationAdmin,
-            conn,
-        )
-        .await
-    }
-
-    async fn to_json_scoped(
-        &self,
-        host: &str,
-        user_uuid: &UserId,
-        cipher_sync_data: Option<&CipherSyncData>,
-        sync_type: CipherSyncType,
-        scope: CipherAccessScope,
-        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
        use crate::util::{format_date, validate_and_format_date};

-        // Parsed once, since `data` can be large and this runs for every cipher in a sync
-        let type_data = serde_json::from_str::<Value>(&self.data);
+        // Parsed once here, since `data` can be large and this runs for every cipher in a sync.
+        // `LowerCase` only lowercases the first letter of each key, so it keeps `format_version`.
+        let type_data = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data).map(|d| d.data);
        let is_blob_encrypted = type_data.as_ref().is_ok_and(is_blob_value);

        let mut attachments_json: Value = Value::Null;
@@ -288,7 +205,7 @@ impl Cipher {
        // We don't need these values at all for Organizational syncs
        // Skip any other database calls if this is the case and just return false.
        let (read_only, hide_passwords, _) = if sync_type == CipherSyncType::User {
-            if let Some((ro, hp, mn)) = self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, scope, cipher_sync_data, conn).await {
+            if let Some((ro, hp, mn)) = self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, cipher_sync_data, conn).await {
                (ro, hp, mn)
            } else {
                error!("Cipher ownership assertion failure");
@@ -298,14 +215,12 @@ impl Cipher {
            (false, false, false)
        };

-        let fields_json: Vec<_> = self
-            .fields
-            .as_ref()
-            .and_then(|s| {
+        // Like upstream, a cipher that was stored without fields or password history reports them as
+        // null rather than as an empty list; clients keep the two apart.
+        let fields_json: Option<Vec<_>> = self.fields.as_ref().map(|s| {
            serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
                .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing fields {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
                .ok()
-            })
                .map(|d| {
                    d.into_iter()
                        .map(|mut f| {
@@ -327,16 +242,13 @@ impl Cipher {
                        })
                        .collect()
                })
-            .unwrap_or_default();
+                .unwrap_or_default()
+        });

-        let password_history_json: Vec<_> = self
-            .password_history
-            .as_ref()
-            .and_then(|s| {
+        let password_history_json: Option<Vec<_>> = self.password_history.as_ref().map(|s| {
            serde_json::from_str::<Vec<LowerCase<Value>>>(s)
                .inspect_err(|e| warn!("Error parsing password history {e:?} for {}", self.uuid))
                .ok()
-            })
                .map(|d| {
                    // Check every password history item if they are valid and return it.
                    // If a password field has the type `null` skip it, it breaks newer Bitwarden clients
@@ -357,11 +269,8 @@ impl Cipher {
                        })
                        .collect()
                })
-            .unwrap_or_default();
-
-        // Like upstream, fields and password history stored as NULL are sent as null, not `[]`
-        let fields_json = self.fields.is_some().then_some(fields_json);
-        let password_history_json = self.password_history.is_some().then_some(password_history_json);
+                .unwrap_or_default()
+        });

        let collection_ids = if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
            if let Some(cipher_collections) = cipher_sync_data.cipher_collections.get(&self.uuid) {
@@ -370,7 +279,7 @@ impl Cipher {
                Cow::from(Vec::new())
            }
        } else {
-            Cow::from(self.get_admin_collections(user_uuid.clone(), scope, conn).await)
+            Cow::from(self.get_admin_collections(user_uuid.clone(), conn).await)
        };

        // There are three types of cipher response models in upstream
@@ -459,7 +368,8 @@ impl Cipher {
        };

        if is_blob_encrypted {
-            // Like upstream, sent as-is with the structured fields null
+            // The blob holds all of the content, so it is sent back as-is and the structured fields
+            // stay null, as upstream does. Only the name needs clearing, the others are never stored.
            json_object["data"] = json!(self.data);
            json_object["name"] = Value::Null;
        } else {
@@ -468,18 +378,16 @@ impl Cipher {
        Ok(json_object)
    }

-    /// The per-type data of a legacy cipher, with fixups for values known to break clients.
+    /// The per-type data (`login`, `card`, …) of a legacy cipher, from `type_data` as parsed from
+    /// `self.data`, with fixups for values that are known to break clients.
    fn legacy_type_data_json(&self, type_data: Result<Value, serde_json::Error>) -> Value {
        use crate::util::validate_and_format_date;

        // Get the type_data or a default to an empty json object '{}'.
        // If not passing an empty object, mobile clients will crash.
-        let mut type_data_json = if let Ok(data @ Value::Object(_)) = type_data {
-            convert_json_key_lcase_first(data)
-        } else {
-            warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid);
-            Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new())
-        };
+        let mut type_data_json = type_data
+            .inspect_err(|_| warn!("Error parsing data field for {}", self.uuid))
+            .unwrap_or_else(|_| Value::Object(serde_json::Map::new()));

        // NOTE: This was marked as *Backwards Compatibility Code*, but as of January 2021 this is still being used by upstream
        // Set the first element of the Uris array as Uri, this is needed several (mobile) clients.
@@ -623,24 +531,14 @@ impl Cipher {

    /// Purge all ciphers that are old enough to be auto-deleted.
    pub async fn purge_trash(conn: &DbConn) {
-        let Some(auto_delete_days) = CONFIG.trash_auto_delete_days().filter(|&d| d != 0) else {
-            debug!("trash_auto_delete_days is not configured or set to 0, skipping");
-            return;
-        };
-
-        let Some(days) = TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(auto_delete_days)) else {
-            error!("Unable to calculate auto delete days!");
-            return;
-        };
+        if let Some(auto_delete_days) = CONFIG.trash_auto_delete_days() {
            let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-        let Some(dt) = now.checked_sub_signed(days) else {
-            error!("Unable to calculate trash purge date!");
-            return;
-        };
+            let dt = now - TimeDelta::try_days(auto_delete_days).unwrap();
            for cipher in Self::find_deleted_before(&dt, conn).await {
                cipher.delete(conn).await.ok();
            }
        }
+    }

    pub async fn move_to_folder(
        &self,
@@ -649,16 +547,7 @@ impl Cipher {
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> EmptyResult {
        User::update_uuid_revision(user_uuid, conn).await;
-        self.move_to_folder_without_revision_update(folder_uuid, user_uuid, conn).await
-    }

-    /// Same as `move_to_folder`, but the caller is responsible for updating the user's revision.
-    pub async fn move_to_folder_without_revision_update(
-        &self,
-        folder_uuid: Option<FolderId>,
-        user_uuid: &UserId,
-        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> EmptyResult {
        match (self.get_folder_uuid(user_uuid, conn).await, folder_uuid) {
            // No changes
            (None, None) => Ok(()),
@@ -691,21 +580,20 @@ impl Cipher {
        self.user_uuid.is_some() && self.user_uuid.as_ref().unwrap() == user_uuid
    }

-    /// Returns whether this cipher is owned by an org in which the user reaches every cipher with `scope`.
+    /// Returns whether this cipher is owned by an org in which the user has full access.
    async fn is_in_full_access_org(
        &self,
        user_uuid: &UserId,
-        scope: CipherAccessScope,
        cipher_sync_data: Option<&CipherSyncData>,
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> bool {
        if let Some(ref org_uuid) = self.organization_uuid {
            if let Some(cipher_sync_data) = cipher_sync_data {
                if let Some(cached_member) = cipher_sync_data.members.get(org_uuid) {
-                    return scope.reaches_all_ciphers(cached_member);
+                    return cached_member.has_full_access();
                }
            } else if let Some(member) = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(user_uuid, org_uuid, conn).await {
-                return scope.reaches_all_ciphers(&member);
+                return member.has_full_access();
            }
        }
        false
@@ -738,7 +626,6 @@ impl Cipher {
    pub async fn get_access_restrictions(
        &self,
        user_uuid: &UserId,
-        scope: CipherAccessScope,
        cipher_sync_data: Option<&CipherSyncData>,
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> Option<(bool, bool, bool)> {
@@ -746,7 +633,7 @@ impl Cipher {
        // a collection that the user has full access to. If so, there are no
        // access restrictions.
        if self.is_owned_by_user(user_uuid)
-            || self.is_in_full_access_org(user_uuid, scope, cipher_sync_data, conn).await
+            || self.is_in_full_access_org(user_uuid, cipher_sync_data, conn).await
            || self.is_in_full_access_group(user_uuid, cipher_sync_data, conn).await
        {
            return Some((false, false, true));
@@ -861,7 +748,6 @@ impl Cipher {
                // Only allow group access via a confirmed membership, since
                // groups_users rows are kept when a membership is revoked.
                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
-                .filter(ciphers::organization_uuid.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid.nullable()))
                .select((collections_groups::read_only, collections_groups::hide_passwords, collections_groups::manage))
                .load::<(bool, bool, bool)>(conn)
                .expect("Error getting group access restrictions")
@@ -869,13 +755,8 @@ impl Cipher {
        .await
    }

-    pub async fn is_write_accessible_to_user(
-        &self,
-        user_uuid: &UserId,
-        scope: CipherAccessScope,
-        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> bool {
-        match self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, scope, None, conn).await {
+    pub async fn is_write_accessible_to_user(&self, user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> bool {
+        match self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, None, conn).await {
            Some((read_only, _hide_passwords, manage)) => !read_only || manage,
            None => false,
        }
@@ -883,20 +764,15 @@ impl Cipher {

    // used for checking if collection can be edited (only if user has access to a collection they
    // can write to and also passwords are not hidden to prevent privilege escalation)
-    pub async fn is_in_editable_collection_by_user(
-        &self,
-        user_uuid: &UserId,
-        scope: CipherAccessScope,
-        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> bool {
-        match self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, scope, None, conn).await {
+    pub async fn is_in_editable_collection_by_user(&self, user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> bool {
+        match self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, None, conn).await {
            Some((read_only, hide_passwords, manage)) => (!read_only && !hide_passwords) || manage,
            None => false,
        }
    }

-    pub async fn is_accessible_to_user(&self, user_uuid: &UserId, scope: CipherAccessScope, conn: &DbConn) -> bool {
-        self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, scope, None, conn).await.is_some()
+    pub async fn is_accessible_to_user(&self, user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> bool {
+        self.get_access_restrictions(user_uuid, None, conn).await.is_some()
    }

    // Returns whether this cipher is a favorite of the specified user.
@@ -1013,7 +889,7 @@ impl Cipher {

                if !visible_only {
                    query = query.or_filter(
-                        users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin/owner
+                        users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin/owner
                    );
                }

@@ -1048,7 +924,7 @@ impl Cipher {

                if !visible_only {
                    query = query.or_filter(
-                        users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin/owner
+                        users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin/owner
                    );
                }

@@ -1164,7 +1040,6 @@ impl Cipher {
                            .eq(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
                            .and(collections_groups::groups_uuid.eq(groups::uuid))),
                    )
-                    .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                    .filter(
                        users_organizations::access_all
                            .eq(true) // User has access all
@@ -1196,7 +1071,6 @@ impl Cipher {
                            .eq(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
                            .and(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))),
                    )
-                    .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                    .filter(
                        users_organizations::access_all
                            .eq(true) // User has access all
@@ -1212,12 +1086,7 @@ impl Cipher {
        }
    }

-    pub async fn get_admin_collections(
-        &self,
-        user_uuid: UserId,
-        scope: CipherAccessScope,
-        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> Vec<CollectionId> {
+    pub async fn get_admin_collections(&self, user_uuid: UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<CollectionId> {
        if CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() {
            conn.run(move |conn| {
                ciphers_collections::table
@@ -1246,7 +1115,6 @@ impl Cipher {
                            .eq(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
                            .and(collections_groups::groups_uuid.eq(groups::uuid))),
                    )
-                    .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                    .filter(
                        users_organizations::access_all
                            .eq(true) // User has access all
@@ -1257,9 +1125,7 @@ impl Cipher {
                            .or(collections_groups::collections_uuid
                                .is_not_null() // Access via groups
                                .and(collections_groups::read_only.eq(false)))
-                            .or(users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES)) // User is admin or owner
-                            .or(custom_edit_any_collection()
-                                .and::<_, diesel::sql_types::Bool>(scope == CipherAccessScope::OrganizationAdmin)),
+                            .or(users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32)), // User is admin or owner
                    )
                    .select(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
                    .load::<CollectionId>(conn)
@@ -1281,16 +1147,13 @@ impl Cipher {
                            .eq(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
                            .and(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))),
                    )
-                    .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                    .filter(
                        users_organizations::access_all
                            .eq(true) // User has access all
                            .or(users_collections::user_uuid
                                .eq(user_uuid) // User has access to collection
                                .and(users_collections::read_only.eq(false)))
-                            .or(users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES)) // User is admin or owner
-                            .or(custom_edit_any_collection()
-                                .and::<_, diesel::sql_types::Bool>(scope == CipherAccessScope::OrganizationAdmin)),
+                            .or(users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32)), // User is admin or owner
                    )
                    .select(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
                    .load::<CollectionId>(conn)
@@ -1332,10 +1195,9 @@ impl Cipher {
                )
                .or_filter(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)) // User has access to collection
                .or_filter(users_organizations::access_all.eq(true)) // User has access all
-                .or_filter(users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES)) // User is admin or owner
+                .or_filter(users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32)) // User is admin or owner
                .or_filter(groups::access_all.eq(true)) //Access via group
                .or_filter(collections_groups::collections_uuid.is_not_null()) //Access via group
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .select(ciphers_collections::all_columns)
                .distinct()
                .load::<(CipherId, CollectionId)>(conn)
@@ -1343,50 +1205,6 @@ impl Cipher {
        })
        .await
    }
-
-    /// Every collection of every cipher of the organization, for the members who may see all of them.
-    pub async fn get_collections_with_cipher_by_organization(
-        org_uuid: &OrganizationId,
-        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> Vec<(CipherId, CollectionId)> {
-        conn.run(move |conn| {
-            ciphers_collections::table
-                .inner_join(collections::table.on(collections::uuid.eq(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)))
-                .filter(collections::org_uuid.eq(org_uuid))
-                .select(ciphers_collections::all_columns)
-                .load::<(CipherId, CollectionId)>(conn)
-                .unwrap_or_default()
-        })
-        .await
-    }
-
-    /// The ciphers of the organization of `member` the Admin Console lists when they may not edit every cipher, like
-    /// Bitwarden does: the ones in the member's own vault, then, for a member who may edit any collection, the ones in
-    /// no collection at all.
-    pub async fn find_assigned_to_member(member: &Membership, conn: &DbConn) -> (Vec<Self>, Vec<Self>) {
-        let assigned: Vec<Self> = Self::find_by_user_visible(&member.user_uuid, conn)
-            .await
-            .into_iter()
-            .filter(|cipher| cipher.organization_uuid.as_ref() == Some(&member.org_uuid))
-            .collect();
-        if !member.can_edit_any_collection() {
-            return (assigned, Vec::new());
-        }
-
-        let listed: HashSet<CipherId> = assigned.iter().map(|cipher| cipher.uuid.clone()).collect();
-        let in_collections: HashSet<CipherId> =
-            Self::get_collections_with_cipher_by_organization(&member.org_uuid, conn)
-                .await
-                .into_iter()
-                .map(|(cipher, _)| cipher)
-                .collect();
-        let unassigned = Self::find_by_org(&member.org_uuid, conn)
-            .await
-            .into_iter()
-            .filter(|cipher| !in_collections.contains(&cipher.uuid) && !listed.contains(&cipher.uuid))
-            .collect();
-        (assigned, unassigned)
-    }
 }

 #[derive(
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use macros::UuidFromParam;

 use super::{
    CipherId, CollectionGroup, GroupUser, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrganizationId,
-    User, UserId, custom_roles_enabled, organization::ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES,
+    User, UserId,
 };

 // See (v2026.7.0): https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/5d4461aa42cadbacfef8fe2166c5453a5c52773a/src/Core/AdminConsole/Entities/Collection.cs
@@ -109,22 +109,18 @@ impl Collection {
                Some(m) if m.has_full_access() => (false, false, m.atype >= MembershipType::Manager),
                Some(m) => {
                    // Only let a manager manage collections when the have full read/write access
-                    // A Custom member only manages a collection with the manage option
                    let is_manager = m.atype == MembershipType::Manager;
-                    let is_custom = m.has_type(MembershipType::Custom) && custom_roles_enabled();
                    if let Some(cu) = cipher_sync_data.user_collections.get(&self.uuid) {
                        (
                            cu.read_only,
                            cu.hide_passwords,
-                            (is_manager && (cu.manage || (!cu.read_only && !cu.hide_passwords)))
-                                || (is_custom && cu.manage),
+                            is_manager && (cu.manage || (!cu.read_only && !cu.hide_passwords)),
                        )
                    } else if let Some(cg) = cipher_sync_data.user_collections_groups.get(&self.uuid) {
                        (
                            cg.read_only,
                            cg.hide_passwords,
-                            (is_manager && (cg.manage || (!cg.read_only && !cg.hide_passwords)))
-                                || (is_custom && cg.manage),
+                            is_manager && (cg.manage || (!cg.read_only && !cg.hide_passwords)),
                        )
                    } else {
                        (false, false, false)
@@ -138,17 +134,6 @@ impl Collection {
                Some(m) if m.atype == MembershipType::Manager && self.is_manageable_by_user(user_uuid, conn).await => {
                    (false, false, true)
                }
-                // A Custom member reads and writes every collection with Edit any collection in the Admin Console, but
-                // only manages a collection with the manage option on it
-                Some(m) if m.has_type(MembershipType::Custom) && custom_roles_enabled() => {
-                    let manage = self.is_explicitly_manageable_by_user(user_uuid, conn).await;
-                    if manage || m.can_edit_any_collection() {
-                        (false, false, manage)
-                    } else {
-                        let read_only = !self.is_writable_by_user(user_uuid, conn).await;
-                        (read_only, self.hide_passwords_for_user(user_uuid, conn).await, false)
-                    }
-                }
                Some(m) => {
                    let is_manager = m.atype == MembershipType::Manager;
                    let read_only = !self.is_writable_by_user(user_uuid, conn).await;
@@ -382,7 +367,6 @@ impl Collection {
                            .and(collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(collections::uuid))),
                    )
                    .filter(collections::uuid.eq(uuid))
-                    .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                    .filter(
                        users_collections::collection_uuid
                            .eq(uuid)
@@ -390,7 +374,7 @@ impl Collection {
                                // Directly accessed collection
                                users_organizations::access_all.eq(true).or(
                                    // access_all in Organization
-                                    users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin or owner
+                                    users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin or owner
                                ),
                            )
                            .or(
@@ -422,12 +406,11 @@ impl Collection {
                            .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))),
                    )
                    .filter(collections::uuid.eq(uuid))
-                    .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                    .filter(users_collections::collection_uuid.eq(uuid).or(
                        // Directly accessed collection
                        users_organizations::access_all.eq(true).or(
                            // access_all in Organization
-                            users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin or owner
+                            users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin or owner
                        ),
                    ))
                    .select(collections::all_columns)
@@ -447,8 +430,7 @@ impl Collection {
                    .inner_join(
                        users_organizations::table.on(collections::org_uuid
                            .eq(users_organizations::org_uuid)
-                            .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))
-                            .and(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))),
+                            .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))),
                    )
                    .left_join(
                        users_collections::table.on(users_collections::collection_uuid
@@ -470,7 +452,7 @@ impl Collection {
                    )
                    .filter(
                        users_organizations::atype
-                            .eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES) // Org admin or owner
+                            .le(MembershipType::Admin as i32) // Org admin or owner
                            .or(users_organizations::access_all.eq(true)) // access_all via membership
                            .or(users_collections::collection_uuid
                                .eq(&self.uuid) // write access given to collection
@@ -494,8 +476,7 @@ impl Collection {
                    .inner_join(
                        users_organizations::table.on(collections::org_uuid
                            .eq(users_organizations::org_uuid)
-                            .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))
-                            .and(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))),
+                            .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid.clone()))),
                    )
                    .left_join(
                        users_collections::table.on(users_collections::collection_uuid
@@ -504,7 +485,7 @@ impl Collection {
                    )
                    .filter(
                        users_organizations::atype
-                            .eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES) // Org admin or owner
+                            .le(MembershipType::Admin as i32) // Org admin or owner
                            .or(users_organizations::access_all.eq(true)) // access_all via membership
                            .or(users_collections::collection_uuid
                                .eq(&self.uuid) // write access given to collection
@@ -546,7 +527,6 @@ impl Collection {
                        .and(collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(collections::uuid))),
                )
                .filter(collections::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .filter(
                    users_collections::collection_uuid
                        .eq(&self.uuid)
@@ -555,7 +535,7 @@ impl Collection {
                            // Directly accessed collection
                            users_organizations::access_all.eq(true).or(
                                // access_all in Organization
-                                users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin or owner
+                                users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin or owner
                            ),
                        )
                        .or(
@@ -606,7 +586,6 @@ impl Collection {
                        .and(collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(collections::uuid))),
                )
                .filter(collections::uuid.eq(&uuid))
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .filter(
                    users_collections::collection_uuid
                        .eq(&uuid)
@@ -615,7 +594,7 @@ impl Collection {
                            // Directly accessed collection
                            users_organizations::access_all.eq(true).or(
                                // access_all in Organization
-                                users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin or owner
+                                users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin or owner
                            ),
                        )
                        .or(
@@ -650,23 +629,8 @@ impl Collection {
        user_uuid: &UserId,
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> bool {
-        !Self::find_explicitly_manageable_by_user(org_uuid, user_uuid, conn).await.is_empty()
-    }
-
-    pub async fn is_explicitly_manageable_by_user(&self, user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> bool {
-        Self::find_explicitly_manageable_by_user(&self.org_uuid, user_uuid, conn).await.contains(&self.uuid)
-    }
-
-    // The collections of the org the user has manage access to by the manage option, directly or via a group.
-    // Unlike is_coll_manageable_by_user, neither the role nor any access_all counts.
-    pub async fn find_explicitly_manageable_by_user(
-        org_uuid: &OrganizationId,
-        user_uuid: &UserId,
-        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> Vec<CollectionId> {
        let org_uuid = org_uuid.to_string();
        let user_uuid = user_uuid.to_string();
-        let groups_enabled = CONFIG.org_groups_enabled();
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            collections::table
                .left_join(
@@ -686,18 +650,15 @@ impl Collection {
                        .and(collections_groups::collections_uuid.eq(collections::uuid))),
                )
                .filter(collections::org_uuid.eq(&org_uuid))
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .filter(
-                    users_collections::manage.eq(true).or(users_collections::user_uuid
-                        .is_null()
-                        .or(users_organizations::atype.eq(MembershipType::Manager as i32))
-                        .and(collections_groups::manage.eq(true))
-                        .and::<_, diesel::sql_types::Bool>(groups_enabled)),
+                    // Manage permission on a collection assigned directly or via a group.
+                    users_collections::manage.eq(true).or(collections_groups::manage.eq(true)),
                )
-                .select(collections::uuid)
-                .distinct()
-                .load::<CollectionId>(conn)
-                .unwrap_or_default()
+                .count()
+                .first::<i64>(conn)
+                .ok()
+                .unwrap_or(0)
+                != 0
        })
        .await
    }
@@ -858,18 +819,10 @@ impl CollectionUser {
        .await
    }

-    // Only returns the collections of organizations the user is a confirmed member of
    pub async fn find_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            users_collections::table
-                .inner_join(collections::table.on(collections::uuid.eq(users_collections::collection_uuid)))
-                .inner_join(
-                    users_organizations::table.on(users_organizations::org_uuid
-                        .eq(collections::org_uuid)
-                        .and(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(users_collections::user_uuid))),
-                )
                .filter(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .select(users_collections::all_columns)
                .load::<Self>(conn)
                .expect("Error loading users_collections")
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, TimeDelta, Utc};
+use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
 use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
 use diesel::prelude::*;
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -112,26 +112,8 @@ impl EmergencyAccess {
            "object": "emergencyAccessGranteeDetails",
        }))
    }
-
-    pub fn deadline_at(&self) -> Result<NaiveDateTime, crate::Error> {
-        if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&self.wait_time_days) {
-            err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
 }

-        let initiated_at = self.recovery_initiated_at.map_res("Emergency access initiation date missing!")?;
-
-        TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(self.wait_time_days))
-            .and_then(|w| initiated_at.checked_add_signed(w))
-            .map_res("Emergency access deadline is invalid")
-    }
-
-    pub fn is_recovery_allowed(&self, now: &NaiveDateTime) -> Result<bool, crate::Error> {
-        Ok(self.deadline_at()?.le(now))
-    }
-}
-
-pub const EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE: std::ops::RangeInclusive<i32> = 1..=90;
-
 #[derive(Copy, Clone)]
 pub enum EmergencyAccessType {
    View = 0,
@@ -187,42 +169,27 @@ impl EmergencyAccess {

    pub async fn update_access_status_and_save(
        &mut self,
-        from_status: i32,
-        to_status: i32,
+        status: i32,
        date: &NaiveDateTime,
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> EmptyResult {
-        let uuid = self.uuid.clone();
-        let updated_at = *date;
-        let res = conn
-            .run(move |conn| {
+        // Update the grantee so that it will refresh it's status.
+        User::update_uuid_revision(self.grantee_uuid.as_ref().expect("Error getting grantee"), conn).await;
+        self.status = status;
+        date.clone_into(&mut self.updated_at);
+
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
            crate::util::retry(
                || {
-                        diesel::update(
-                            emergency_access::table
-                                .filter(emergency_access::uuid.eq(&uuid))
-                                .filter(emergency_access::status.eq(from_status)),
-                        )
-                        .set((emergency_access::status.eq(to_status), emergency_access::updated_at.eq(updated_at)))
+                    diesel::update(emergency_access::table.filter(emergency_access::uuid.eq(&self.uuid)))
+                        .set((emergency_access::status.eq(status), emergency_access::updated_at.eq(date)))
                        .execute(conn)
                },
                10,
            )
+            .map_res("Error updating emergency access status")
        })
-            .await;
-
-        match res {
-            Ok(1) => {} // One record updated, which is valid
-            Ok(_) => err!("Emergency access status was changed already"),
-            Err(e) => err!("Error updating emergency access status", format!("{e}")),
-        }
-
-        self.status = to_status;
-        self.updated_at = updated_at;
-
-        // Update the grantee so that it will refresh it's status.
-        User::update_uuid_revision(self.grantee_uuid.as_ref().expect("Error getting grantee"), conn).await;
-        Ok(())
+        .await
    }

    pub async fn update_last_notification_date_and_save(&mut self, date: &NaiveDateTime, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
@@ -79,7 +79,6 @@ pub enum EventType {
    CipherSoftDeleted = 1115,
    CipherRestored = 1116,
    CipherClientToggledCardNumberVisible = 1117,
-    CipherClientHttpAuthReleased = 1133,

    // Collection
    CollectionCreated = 1300,
@@ -112,8 +111,8 @@ pub enum EventType {
    // OrganizationUserAutomaticallyConfirmed = 1517,
    // OrganizationUserSelfRevoked = 1518, // User self-revoked due to declining organization data ownership policy
    OrganizationUserAdminResetTwoFactor = 1519,
-    OrganizationUserRevokedTwoFactorNonCompliance = 1520,
-    OrganizationUserRevokedSingleOrganizationNonCompliance = 1521,
+    // OrganizationUserRevoked_TwoFactorNonCompliance = 1520,
+    // OrganizationUserRevoked_SingleOrganizationNonCompliance = 1521,
    OrganizationUserNotificationBannerActionClicked = 1522,

    // Organization
@@ -348,23 +347,17 @@ impl Event {
    }

    pub async fn clean_events(conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        let Some(days_to_retain) = CONFIG.events_days_retain().filter(|&d| d != 0) else {
-            return Ok(());
-        };
-
-        let Some(days_to_retain) = TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(days_to_retain)) else {
-            err!("Unable to calculate the event retention date, check 'EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN'")
-        };
-
-        let Some(dt) = Utc::now().naive_utc().checked_sub_signed(days_to_retain) else {
-            err!("Unable to calculate the event retention date, check 'EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN'")
-        };
+        if let Some(days_to_retain) = CONFIG.events_days_retain() {
+            let dt = Utc::now().naive_utc() - TimeDelta::try_days(days_to_retain).unwrap();
            conn.run(move |conn| {
                diesel::delete(event::table.filter(event::event_date.lt(dt)))
                    .execute(conn)
                    .map_res("Error cleaning old events")
            })
            .await
+        } else {
+            Ok(())
+        }
    }
 }

@@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ impl Group {
            "id": self.uuid,
            "organizationId": self.organizations_uuid,
            "name": self.name,
+            "accessAll": self.access_all,
            "externalId": self.external_id,
            "collections": collections_groups,
            "object": "groupDetails"
@@ -137,15 +138,15 @@ impl CollectionGroup {
    }

    pub fn to_json_details_for_group(&self) -> Value {
-        // Return the stored manage flag. Deriving it from !read_only && !hide_passwords turned the group
-        // permission "Can edit items" (readOnly=false, hidePasswords=false, manage=false) into "Can manage"
-        // in GET /organizations/<org>/collections/details, while GET /groups/<id>/details reported the stored
-        // value. Saving the collection access dialog then persisted manage=true.
+        // If both read_only and hide_passwords are false, then manage should be true
+        // You can't have an entry with read_only and manage, or hide_passwords and manage
+        // Or an entry with everything to false
+        // For backwards compatibility and migration proposes we keep checking read_only and hide_password
        json!({
            "id": self.groups_uuid,
            "readOnly": self.read_only,
            "hidePasswords": self.hide_passwords,
-            "manage": self.manage,
+            "manage": self.manage || (!self.read_only && !self.hide_passwords),
        })
    }
 }
@@ -248,7 +249,6 @@ impl Group {
                        .and(groups::organizations_uuid.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid))),
                )
                .filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .filter(groups::access_all.eq(true))
                .select(groups::organizations_uuid)
                .distinct()
@@ -387,7 +387,6 @@ impl CollectionGroup {
                        .and(collections::org_uuid.eq(groups::organizations_uuid))),
                )
                .filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .select(collections_groups::all_columns)
                .load::<Self>(conn)
                .expect("Error loading user collection groups")
@@ -573,6 +572,26 @@ impl GroupUser {
        }
    }

+    pub async fn delete_by_group_and_member(
+        group_uuid: &GroupId,
+        member_uuid: &MembershipId,
+        conn: &DbConn,
+    ) -> EmptyResult {
+        match Membership::find_by_uuid(member_uuid, conn).await {
+            Some(member) => User::update_uuid_revision(&member.user_uuid, conn).await,
+            None => warn!("Member could not be found!"),
+        }
+
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            diesel::delete(groups_users::table)
+                .filter(groups_users::groups_uuid.eq(group_uuid))
+                .filter(groups_users::users_organizations_uuid.eq(member_uuid))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .map_res("Error deleting group users")
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+
    pub async fn delete_all_by_group(group_uuid: &GroupId, org_uuid: &OrganizationId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
        let group_users = GroupUser::find_by_group(group_uuid, org_uuid, conn).await;
        for group_user in group_users {
@@ -22,22 +22,18 @@ mod user_signature_key_pair;
 pub use self::archive::Archive;
 pub use self::attachment::{Attachment, AttachmentId};
 pub use self::auth_request::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId};
-pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherAccessScope, CipherId, RepromptType, is_data_blob_encrypted};
+pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType, is_data_blob_encrypted};
 pub use self::collection::{Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionId, CollectionUser};
 pub use self::device::{Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest, PushId};
-pub use self::emergency_access::{
-    EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType,
-};
+pub use self::emergency_access::{EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType};
 pub use self::event::{Event, EventType};
 pub use self::favorite::Favorite;
 pub use self::folder::{Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId};
 pub use self::group::{CollectionGroup, Group, GroupId, GroupUser};
-pub use self::org_policy::{FillAssistPolicyData, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyId, OrgPolicyType};
-#[cfg(all(test, sqlite))]
-pub(crate) use self::organization::test_flag;
+pub use self::org_policy::{OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyId, OrgPolicyType};
 pub use self::organization::{
-    CustomPermission, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, Organization,
-    OrganizationApiKey, OrganizationId, custom_roles_enabled,
+    Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, Organization, OrganizationApiKey,
+    OrganizationId,
 };
 pub use self::send::{Send, SendFileId, SendId, SendType};
 pub use self::sso_auth::{OIDCAuthenticatedUser, OIDCCodeResponseError, SsoAuth};
@@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
-use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
 use derive_more::{AsRef, From};
 use diesel::prelude::*;
 use serde::Deserialize;
@@ -12,7 +11,6 @@ use crate::{
        schema::{org_policies, users_organizations},
    },
    error::MapResult,
-    util::format_date,
 };

 use super::{Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrganizationId, TwoFactor, UserId};
@@ -26,7 +24,6 @@ pub struct OrgPolicy {
    pub atype: i32,
    pub enabled: bool,
    pub data: String,
-    pub revision_date: NaiveDateTime,
 }

 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Core/AdminConsole/Enums/PolicyType.cs
@@ -49,12 +46,10 @@ pub enum OrgPolicyType {
    RemoveUnlockWithPin = 14,
    RestrictedItemTypes = 15,
    UriMatchDefaults = 16,
-    AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17,
+    // AutotypeDefaultSetting = 17, // Not supported yet
    // AutoConfirm = 18, // Not supported (not implemented yet)
    // BlockClaimedDomainAccountCreation = 19, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
    OrganizationUserNotification = 20,
-    // SendControls = 21, // Not supported yet
-    FillAssist = 22,
 }

 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Core/AdminConsole/Models/Data/Organizations/Policies/SendOptionsPolicyData.cs#L5
@@ -73,14 +68,6 @@ pub struct ResetPasswordDataModel {
    pub auto_enroll_enabled: bool,
 }

-// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/13bc813de8e715a71d3410f1e584e87ccdf76025/src/Core/AdminConsole/Models/Data/Organizations/Policies/FillAssistPolicyData.cs
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-pub struct FillAssistPolicyData {
-    #[serde(alias = "RulesUrl")]
-    pub rules_url: Option<String>,
-}
-
 /// Local methods
 impl OrgPolicy {
    pub fn new(org_uuid: OrganizationId, atype: OrgPolicyType, enabled: bool, data: String) -> Self {
@@ -90,7 +77,6 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
            atype: atype as i32,
            enabled,
            data,
-            revision_date: Utc::now().naive_utc(),
        }
    }

@@ -106,7 +92,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
            "type": self.atype,
            "data": data_json,
            "enabled": self.enabled,
-            "revisionDate": format_date(&self.revision_date),
+            "revisionDate": null,
            "object": "policy",
        });

@@ -124,13 +110,11 @@ impl OrgPolicy {

 /// Database methods
 impl OrgPolicy {
-    pub async fn save(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        self.revision_date = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-
+    pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
        db_run! { conn:
            sqlite, mysql {
                match diesel::replace_into(org_policies::table)
-                    .values(&*self)
+                    .values(self)
                    .execute(conn)
                {
                    Ok(_) => Ok(()),
@@ -138,7 +122,7 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
                    Err(diesel::result::Error::DatabaseError(diesel::result::DatabaseErrorKind::ForeignKeyViolation, _)) => {
                        diesel::update(org_policies::table)
                            .filter(org_policies::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))
-                            .set(&*self)
+                            .set(self)
                            .execute(conn)
                            .map_res("Error saving org_policy")
                    }
@@ -158,10 +142,10 @@ impl OrgPolicy {
                .map_res("Error deleting org_policy for insert")?;

                diesel::insert_into(org_policies::table)
-                    .values(&*self)
+                    .values(self)
                    .on_conflict(org_policies::uuid)
                    .do_update()
-                    .set(&*self)
+                    .set(self)
                    .execute(conn)
                    .map_res("Error saving org_policy")
            }
@@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ use crate::{
 use macros::UuidFromParam;

 use super::{
-    Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, CollectionUser, Group, GroupId, GroupUser, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType,
-    TwoFactor, User, UserId,
+    Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionGroup, CollectionId, CollectionUser, Group, GroupId, GroupUser, OrgPolicy,
+    OrgPolicyType, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
 };

 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ pub struct Organization {
 #[diesel(table_name = users_organizations)]
 #[diesel(treat_none_as_null = true)]
 #[diesel(primary_key(uuid))]
-#[expect(clippy::struct_excessive_bools, reason = "Each Custom role permission is a column of its own")]
 pub struct Membership {
    pub uuid: MembershipId,
    pub user_uuid: UserId,
@@ -58,19 +57,9 @@ pub struct Membership {
    pub atype: i32,
    pub reset_password_key: Option<String>,
    pub external_id: Option<String>,
-
-    // The permissions of a Custom role, only accessed through `CustomPermission`.
-    manage_users: bool,
-    manage_groups: bool,
-    manage_policies: bool,
-    create_new_collections: bool,
-    edit_any_collection: bool,
-    delete_any_collection: bool,
-    access_event_logs: bool,
-    access_import_export: bool,
-    access_reports: bool,
-
-    /// The user's v2 upgrade token, for the org to unwrap the v2 user key after an upgrade. Opaque to us.
+    /// A copy of the user's v2 upgrade token, kept when a v1 -> v2 upgrade leaves the account
+    /// recovery key (`reset_password_key`) wrapped by the v1 user key. It lets the organization
+    /// unwrap the v2 user key from it. Opaque to us, like `User::v2_upgrade_token`.
    pub v2_upgrade_token: Option<String>,
 }

@@ -107,74 +96,42 @@ impl MembershipStatus {
    }
 }

-#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, num_derive::FromPrimitive)]
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, num_derive::FromPrimitive)]
 pub enum MembershipType {
    Owner = 0,
    Admin = 1,
    User = 2,
-    // The legacy Manager role. The Bitwarden clients no longer know it and are shown a Custom role instead.
    Manager = 3,
-    // Only granted while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled.
-    Custom = 4,
 }

 impl MembershipType {
    pub fn from_str(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
+        #[expect(
+            clippy::match_same_arms,
+            reason = "Specifically define `4|Custom` since this is a hack, not a default"
+        )]
        match s {
            "0" | "Owner" => Some(MembershipType::Owner),
            "1" | "Admin" => Some(MembershipType::Admin),
            "2" | "User" => Some(MembershipType::User),
            "3" | "Manager" => Some(MembershipType::Manager),
-            "4" | "Custom" => Some(MembershipType::Custom),
+            // HACK: We convert the custom role to a manager role
+            "4" | "Custom" => Some(MembershipType::Manager),
            _ => None,
        }
    }
-
-    /// The role a member invite or edit from the Bitwarden clients asks for, given the member's current
-    /// role (`None` for an invite).
-    ///
-    /// The clients no longer know the legacy Manager role and are shown a Custom role in its place, so a
-    /// requested Custom role is the legacy Manager unless EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, in which case
-    /// `custom_permissions` are the permissions requested along with it. An existing Manager or Custom member
-    /// keeps their role when the request repeats it, so an unrelated edit never turns one into the other. A
-    /// Manager only becomes a Custom member when the permissions they are shown with are changed.
-    pub fn requested(
-        requested: MembershipType,
-        current: Option<&Membership>,
-        custom_permissions: Option<&HashSet<CustomPermission>>,
-    ) -> MembershipType {
-        if requested != MembershipType::Custom {
-            return requested;
-        }
-        match (current, custom_permissions) {
-            (Some(member), _) if member.has_type(MembershipType::Custom) => MembershipType::Custom,
-            (Some(member), Some(permissions))
-                if member.has_type(MembershipType::Manager) && *permissions != member.legacy_manager_permissions() =>
-            {
-                MembershipType::Custom
-            }
-            (Some(member), _) if member.has_type(MembershipType::Manager) => MembershipType::Manager,
-            (_, Some(_)) => MembershipType::Custom,
-            (_, None) => MembershipType::Manager,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The authority of a role, which is what roles are compared by. A Custom member gets its authority from
-    /// its permissions, never from its role, so the role itself ranks right above User and below Manager.
-    const fn rank(self) -> u8 {
-        match self {
-            MembershipType::User => 0,
-            MembershipType::Custom => 1,
-            MembershipType::Manager => 2,
-            MembershipType::Admin => 3,
-            MembershipType::Owner => 4,
-        }
-    }
 }

 impl Ord for MembershipType {
    fn cmp(&self, other: &MembershipType) -> Ordering {
-        self.rank().cmp(&other.rank())
+        // For easy comparison, map each variant to an access level (where 0 is lowest).
+        const ACCESS_LEVEL: [i32; 4] = [
+            3, // Owner
+            2, // Admin
+            0, // User
+            1, // Manager && Custom
+        ];
+        ACCESS_LEVEL[*self as usize].cmp(&ACCESS_LEVEL[*other as usize])
    }
 }

@@ -230,124 +187,6 @@ impl PartialOrd<MembershipType> for i32 {
    }
 }

-/// The granular permissions of the Custom role.
-#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
-pub enum CustomPermission {
-    ManageUsers,
-    ManageGroups,
-    ManagePolicies,
-    CreateNewCollections,
-    EditAnyCollection,
-    DeleteAnyCollection,
-    AccessEventLogs,
-    AccessImportExport,
-    AccessReports,
-}
-
-/// The permissions this version enforces on every endpoint they open. Only these can be granted, a stored
-/// grant of any other one grants nothing. They are implemented one at a time, so this grows with them.
-const SUPPORTED_CUSTOM_PERMISSIONS: &[CustomPermission] = &[
-    CustomPermission::CreateNewCollections,
-    CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection,
-    CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection,
-];
-
-impl CustomPermission {
-    pub const ALL: [CustomPermission; 9] = [
-        CustomPermission::ManageUsers,
-        CustomPermission::ManageGroups,
-        CustomPermission::ManagePolicies,
-        CustomPermission::CreateNewCollections,
-        CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection,
-        CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection,
-        CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs,
-        CustomPermission::AccessImportExport,
-        CustomPermission::AccessReports,
-    ];
-
-    /// The key of the permission in the `permissions` object of the Bitwarden clients.
-    pub const fn json_key(self) -> &'static str {
-        match self {
-            CustomPermission::ManageUsers => "manageUsers",
-            CustomPermission::ManageGroups => "manageGroups",
-            CustomPermission::ManagePolicies => "managePolicies",
-            CustomPermission::CreateNewCollections => "createNewCollections",
-            CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection => "editAnyCollection",
-            CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection => "deleteAnyCollection",
-            CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs => "accessEventLogs",
-            CustomPermission::AccessImportExport => "accessImportExport",
-            CustomPermission::AccessReports => "accessReports",
-        }
-    }
-
-    pub fn is_supported(self) -> bool {
-        SUPPORTED_CUSTOM_PERMISSIONS.contains(&self)
-    }
-
-    /// The permissions a member invite or edit grants a Custom role.
-    ///
-    /// A permission is only granted when it is set to `true`, and anything but a boolean is rejected: this
-    /// replaces the member's permissions, so a malformed value must not silently remove one. Granting a
-    /// permission this version does not enforce is rejected as well. The clients also send permissions
-    /// Vaultwarden does not know at all, like `manageSso`, those are ignored.
-    pub fn requested(permissions: &HashMap<String, Value>) -> Result<HashSet<CustomPermission>, crate::Error> {
-        let mut granted = HashSet::new();
-        for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
-            match permissions.get(permission.json_key()) {
-                None | Some(Value::Bool(false)) => {}
-                Some(Value::Bool(true)) if permission.is_supported() => {
-                    granted.insert(permission);
-                }
-                Some(Value::Bool(true)) => {
-                    err!(format!("The Custom role permission '{}' is not supported yet", permission.json_key()))
-                }
-                Some(_) => {
-                    err!(format!("The Custom role permission '{}' must be true or false", permission.json_key()))
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        Ok(granted)
-    }
-}
-
-/// The stored roles with authority over the whole organization. Queries match them by value, comparing
-/// `atype <= Admin` would also match any unknown value below it.
-pub(super) const ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES: [i32; 2] = [MembershipType::Owner as i32, MembershipType::Admin as i32];
-
-/// Whether the experimental Custom role is enabled. Nothing is ever granted through a Custom role otherwise.
-pub fn custom_roles_enabled() -> bool {
-    #[cfg(test)]
-    if let Some(enabled) = test_flag::CUSTOM_ROLES_ENABLED.get() {
-        return enabled;
-    }
-    CONFIG.experimental_custom_roles()
-}
-
-type CustomEditAnyCollection = diesel::dsl::And<
-    diesel::dsl::And<
-        diesel::dsl::Eq<users_organizations::atype, i32>,
-        diesel::dsl::Eq<users_organizations::edit_any_collection, bool>,
-    >,
-    bool,
-    diesel::sql_types::Bool,
->;
-
-/// SQL: a Custom member with Edit any collection, while Custom roles are enabled.
-pub(super) fn custom_edit_any_collection() -> CustomEditAnyCollection {
-    users_organizations::atype
-        .eq(MembershipType::Custom as i32)
-        .and(users_organizations::edit_any_collection.eq(true))
-        .and::<_, diesel::sql_types::Bool>(custom_roles_enabled())
-}
-
-#[cfg(test)]
-pub(crate) mod test_flag {
-    thread_local! {
-        /// Overrides EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES for the tests running on this thread.
-        pub static CUSTOM_ROLES_ENABLED: std::cell::Cell<Option<bool>> = const { std::cell::Cell::new(None) };
-    }
-}
-
 /// Local methods
 impl Organization {
    pub fn new(name: String, billing_email: &str, private_key: Option<String>, public_key: Option<String>) -> Self {
@@ -439,154 +278,10 @@ impl Membership {
            atype: MembershipType::User as i32,
            reset_password_key: None,
            external_id: None,
-
-            manage_users: false,
-            manage_groups: false,
-            manage_policies: false,
-            create_new_collections: false,
-            edit_any_collection: false,
-            delete_any_collection: false,
-            access_event_logs: false,
-            access_import_export: false,
-            access_reports: false,
-
            v2_upgrade_token: None,
        }
    }

-    fn custom_permission_mut(&mut self, permission: CustomPermission) -> &mut bool {
-        match permission {
-            CustomPermission::ManageUsers => &mut self.manage_users,
-            CustomPermission::ManageGroups => &mut self.manage_groups,
-            CustomPermission::ManagePolicies => &mut self.manage_policies,
-            CustomPermission::CreateNewCollections => &mut self.create_new_collections,
-            CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection => &mut self.edit_any_collection,
-            CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection => &mut self.delete_any_collection,
-            CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs => &mut self.access_event_logs,
-            CustomPermission::AccessImportExport => &mut self.access_import_export,
-            CustomPermission::AccessReports => &mut self.access_reports,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Change the role. Nothing the old role carried survives a role change: the Custom role permissions are
-    /// dropped, so changing the role back later starts from none. A Custom role never keeps the legacy
-    /// `access_all` flag, its reach only comes from its permissions.
-    pub fn set_type(&mut self, new_type: MembershipType) {
-        if self.atype != new_type as i32 {
-            for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
-                *self.custom_permission_mut(permission) = false;
-            }
-        }
-        if new_type == MembershipType::Custom {
-            self.access_all = false;
-        }
-        self.atype = new_type as i32;
-    }
-
-    /// Grant this Custom member exactly `permissions` out of those this version enforces. A stored grant of a
-    /// permission this version does not enforce is kept as it is: it grants nothing here.
-    pub fn set_custom_permissions(&mut self, permissions: &HashSet<CustomPermission>) {
-        for permission in CustomPermission::ALL.into_iter().filter(|p| p.is_supported()) {
-            *self.custom_permission_mut(permission) = permissions.contains(&permission);
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Why this legacy Manager can't become a Custom member with `permissions` without losing what they may do now, if
-    /// they can't. A conversion must not silently change their access. A Custom role can't keep access to all
-    /// collections, which also puts every collection in the Manager's own vault, unless the permissions it is shown as
-    /// are given up too. And it only manages every collection with Edit any collection, not through a group with access
-    /// to all collections, which stays dynamic. The collections they manage with the manage permission stay managed.
-    pub async fn custom_role_conversion_loss(
-        &self,
-        permissions: &HashSet<CustomPermission>,
-        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> Option<&'static str> {
-        if !self.has_type(MembershipType::Manager) {
-            return None;
-        }
-        if self.access_all && permissions.is_superset(&self.legacy_manager_permissions()) {
-            return Some(
-                "This Manager has access to all collections, which a Custom member can't have: the collections they \
-                 aren't assigned to would disappear from their vault. Uncheck Manage all collections for them to give \
-                 that access up, or keep the Manager role.",
-            );
-        }
-        if !permissions.contains(&CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection)
-            && GroupUser::has_full_access_by_member(&self.org_uuid, &self.uuid, conn).await
-        {
-            return Some(
-                "This Manager manages every collection through a group with access to all collections, which a Custom \
-                 member only does with Edit any collection. Grant that permission, or remove them from the group \
-                 first.",
-            );
-        }
-        None
-    }
-
-    fn custom_permission(&self, permission: CustomPermission) -> bool {
-        match permission {
-            CustomPermission::ManageUsers => self.manage_users,
-            CustomPermission::ManageGroups => self.manage_groups,
-            CustomPermission::ManagePolicies => self.manage_policies,
-            CustomPermission::CreateNewCollections => self.create_new_collections,
-            CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection => self.edit_any_collection,
-            CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection => self.delete_any_collection,
-            CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs => self.access_event_logs,
-            CustomPermission::AccessImportExport => self.access_import_export,
-            CustomPermission::AccessReports => self.access_reports,
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// Whether the role of this member grants `permission`. Only a Custom role grants any, only while Custom roles
-    /// are enabled, and only the permissions this version enforces.
-    fn grants_custom_permission(&self, permission: CustomPermission) -> bool {
-        custom_roles_enabled()
-            && permission.is_supported()
-            && self.has_type(MembershipType::Custom)
-            && self.custom_permission(permission)
-    }
-
-    /// Whether this member may act with `permission`, granted by their Custom role. Like the authority of any
-    /// other role, it needs a confirmed membership.
-    pub fn has_custom_permission(&self, permission: CustomPermission) -> bool {
-        self.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed) && self.grants_custom_permission(permission)
-    }
-
-    /// The permissions the "Manage all collections" a legacy Manager is shown with stands for: their `access_all`.
-    pub fn legacy_manager_permissions(&self) -> HashSet<CustomPermission> {
-        if self.has_type(MembershipType::Manager) && self.access_all {
-            HashSet::from([
-                CustomPermission::CreateNewCollections,
-                CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection,
-                CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection,
-            ])
-        } else {
-            HashSet::new()
-        }
-    }
-
-    /// The permissions the clients are shown, which a legacy Manager is shown as a Custom member with.
-    pub fn shown_custom_permissions(&self) -> HashSet<CustomPermission> {
-        if self.has_type(MembershipType::Manager) {
-            self.legacy_manager_permissions()
-        } else {
-            CustomPermission::ALL.into_iter().filter(|p| self.grants_custom_permission(*p)).collect()
-        }
-    }
-
-    fn custom_permissions_json(&self) -> Value {
-        let shown = self.shown_custom_permissions();
-        let mut permissions = json!({
-            "manageSso": false, // Not supported
-            "manageResetPassword": false,
-            "manageScim": false, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
-        });
-        for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
-            permissions[permission.json_key()] = json!(shown.contains(&permission));
-        }
-        permissions
-    }
-
    pub fn restore(&mut self) -> bool {
        if self.status < MembershipStatus::Invited as i32 {
            self.status += ACTIVATE_REVOKE_DIFF;
@@ -655,7 +350,7 @@ impl OrganizationApiKey {
 impl Organization {
    pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
        if !crate::util::is_valid_email(&self.billing_email) {
-            err!(format!("BillingEmail {} is not a valid email address", self.billing_email.escape_debug()))
+            err!(format!("BillingEmail {} is not a valid email address", self.billing_email))
        }

        for member in &Membership::find_by_org(&self.uuid, conn).await {
@@ -755,8 +450,24 @@ impl Membership {
        // It will be converted back on other locations
        let membership_type = self.type_manager_as_custom();

-        // A Manager is shown with the 3 Collection permissions set, when they have the access_all permission
-        let permissions = self.custom_permissions_json();
+        let permissions = json!({
+                // TODO: Add full support for Custom User Roles
+                // See: https://bitwarden.com/help/article/user-types-access-control/#custom-role
+                // Currently we use the custom role as a manager role and link the 3 Collection roles to mimic the access_all permission
+                "accessEventLogs": false,
+                "accessImportExport": false,
+                "accessReports": false,
+                // If the following 3 Collection roles are set to true a custom user has access all permission
+                "createNewCollections": membership_type == 4 && self.access_all,
+                "editAnyCollection": membership_type == 4 && self.access_all,
+                "deleteAnyCollection": membership_type == 4 && self.access_all,
+                "manageGroups": false,
+                "managePolicies": false,
+                "manageSso": false, // Not supported
+                "manageUsers": false,
+                "manageResetPassword": false,
+                "manageScim": false // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
+        });

        // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/AdminConsole/Models/Response/ProfileOrganizationResponseModel.cs
        json!({
@@ -812,7 +523,8 @@ impl Membership {
            "limitCollectionDeletion": true,
            "limitItemDeletion": false,
            "allowAdminAccessToAllCollectionItems": true,
-            "userIsClaimedByOrganization": false, // Means not managed via the Members UI, like SSO
+            "userIsManagedByOrganization": false, // Means not managed via the Members UI, like SSO
+            "userIsClaimedByOrganization": false, // The new key instead of the obsolete userIsManagedByOrganization

            "permissions": permissions,

@@ -820,8 +532,7 @@ impl Membership {

            // These are per user
            "userId": self.user_uuid,
-            // Accepted (not yet confirmed) members have no key yet; send null like upstream, not ""
-            "key": (!self.akey.is_empty()).then_some(&self.akey),
+            "key": self.akey,
            "status": self.status,
            "type": membership_type,
            "enabled": true,
@@ -830,13 +541,7 @@ impl Membership {
        })
    }

-    // Used by admins to view other members, so nothing here may depend on this member's status
-    pub async fn to_json_details_for_admin(
-        &self,
-        include_collections: bool,
-        include_groups: bool,
-        conn: &DbConn,
-    ) -> Value {
+    pub async fn to_json_user_details(&self, include_collections: bool, include_groups: bool, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
        let user = User::find_by_uuid(&self.user_uuid, conn).await.unwrap();

        // Because BitWarden want the status to be -1 for revoked users we need to catch that here.
@@ -859,23 +564,52 @@ impl Membership {

        // Check if a user is in a group which has access to all collections
        // If that is the case, we should not return individual collections!
-        // This is used by admins to view other members, so it must not depend on the membership status
        let full_access_group =
-            CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() && GroupUser::has_full_access_by_member(&self.org_uuid, &self.uuid, conn).await;
+            CONFIG.org_groups_enabled() && Group::is_in_full_access_group(&self.user_uuid, &self.org_uuid, conn).await;

        // If collections are to be included, only include them if the user does not have full access via a group or defined to the user it self
-        // Only the collections assigned directly are returned, the ones assigned via a group are returned via a special group endpoint
        let collections: Vec<Value> = if include_collections && !(full_access_group || self.access_all) {
+            // Get all collections for the user here already to prevent more queries
+            let cu: HashMap<CollectionId, CollectionUser> =
                CollectionUser::find_by_organization_and_user_uuid(&self.org_uuid, &self.user_uuid, conn)
                    .await
                    .into_iter()
-                .map(|cu| {
-                    json!({
-                        "id": cu.collection_uuid,
-                        "readOnly": cu.read_only,
-                        "hidePasswords": cu.hide_passwords,
-                        "manage": cu.manage || (self.atype == MembershipType::Manager && !cu.read_only && !cu.hide_passwords),
-                    })
+                    .map(|cu| (cu.collection_uuid.clone(), cu))
+                    .collect();
+
+            // Get all collection groups for this user to prevent there inclusion
+            let cg: HashSet<CollectionId> = CollectionGroup::find_by_user(&self.user_uuid, conn)
+                .await
+                .into_iter()
+                .map(|cg| cg.collections_uuid)
+                .collect();
+
+            Collection::find_by_organization_and_user_uuid(&self.org_uuid, &self.user_uuid, conn)
+                .await
+                .into_iter()
+                .filter_map(|c| {
+                    let (read_only, hide_passwords, manage) = if self.has_full_access() {
+                        (false, false, self.atype >= MembershipType::Manager)
+                    } else if let Some(cu) = cu.get(&c.uuid) {
+                        (
+                            cu.read_only,
+                            cu.hide_passwords,
+                            cu.manage || (self.atype == MembershipType::Manager && !cu.read_only && !cu.hide_passwords),
+                        )
+                    // If previous checks failed it might be that this user has access via a group, but we should not return those elements here
+                    // Those are returned via a special group endpoint
+                    } else if cg.contains(&c.uuid) {
+                        return None;
+                    } else {
+                        (true, true, false)
+                    };
+
+                    Some(json!({
+                        "id": c.uuid,
+                        "readOnly": read_only,
+                        "hidePasswords": hide_passwords,
+                        "manage": manage,
+                    }))
                })
                .collect()
        } else {
@@ -886,11 +620,29 @@ impl Membership {
        // It will be converted back on other locations
        let membership_type = self.type_manager_as_custom();

-        // Only return permissions if there are any, else Bitwarden will assume the defaults of all false
-        let permissions = if self.shown_custom_permissions().is_empty() {
-            json!(null)
+        // HACK: Only return permissions if the user is of type custom and has access_all
+        // Else Bitwarden will assume the defaults of all false
+        let permissions = if membership_type == 4 && self.access_all {
+            json!({
+                // TODO: Add full support for Custom User Roles
+                // See: https://bitwarden.com/help/article/user-types-access-control/#custom-role
+                // Currently we use the custom role as a manager role and link the 3 Collection roles to mimic the access_all permission
+                "accessEventLogs": false,
+                "accessImportExport": false,
+                "accessReports": false,
+                // If the following 3 Collection roles are set to true a custom user has access all permission
+                "createNewCollections": true,
+                "editAnyCollection": true,
+                "deleteAnyCollection": true,
+                "manageGroups": false,
+                "managePolicies": false,
+                "manageSso": false, // Not supported
+                "manageUsers": false,
+                "manageResetPassword": false,
+                "manageScim": false // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
+            })
        } else {
-            self.custom_permissions_json()
+            json!(null)
        };

        json!({
@@ -905,6 +657,7 @@ impl Membership {

            "status": status,
            "type": membership_type,
+            "accessAll": self.access_all,
            "twoFactorEnabled": twofactor_enabled,
            "resetPasswordEnrolled": self.reset_password_key.is_some(),
            "hasMasterPassword": !user.password_hash.is_empty(),
@@ -912,6 +665,7 @@ impl Membership {
            "permissions": permissions,

            "ssoBound": false, // Not supported
+            "managedByOrganization": false, // This key is obsolete replaced by claimedByOrganization
            "claimedByOrganization": false, // Means not managed via the Members UI, like SSO
            "usesKeyConnector": false, // Not supported
            "accessSecretsManager": false, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
@@ -962,6 +716,7 @@ impl Membership {

            "status": status,
            "type": self.atype,
+            "accessAll": self.access_all,
            "collections": coll_uuids,

            "object": "organizationUserDetails",
@@ -991,12 +746,6 @@ impl Membership {
    }

    pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        // The legacy `access_all` flag reaches every collection, which a Custom role may only do through its
-        // permissions, so it must never be stored on one. `set_type` takes care of this.
-        if self.has_type(MembershipType::Custom) && self.access_all {
-            err!("A Custom role membership can't have access to all collections")
-        }
-
        User::update_uuid_revision(&self.user_uuid, conn).await;

        db_run! { conn:
@@ -1071,19 +820,6 @@ impl Membership {
        (self.access_all || self.atype >= MembershipType::Admin) && self.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed)
    }

-    /// Whether this member may edit every collection and the items in them in the Admin Console: every member with
-    /// full access, and a Custom member with Edit any collection. Unlike full access, the permission does not add
-    /// anything to the member's own vault.
-    pub fn can_edit_any_collection(&self) -> bool {
-        self.has_full_access() || self.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection)
-    }
-
-    /// Whether this member may see every collection and who has access to them in the Admin Console. Deleting any
-    /// collection needs that, but not the items in them.
-    pub fn can_view_all_collections(&self) -> bool {
-        self.can_edit_any_collection() || self.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection)
-    }
-
    pub async fn find_by_uuid(uuid: &MembershipId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            users_organizations::table.filter(users_organizations::uuid.eq(uuid)).first::<Self>(conn).ok()
@@ -1206,8 +942,6 @@ impl Membership {
    }

    // Get all users which are either owner or admin, or a manager which can manage/access all
-    // A Custom member with Edit any collection is not listed: the Admin Console sends this list back when a collection
-    // is saved, which would assign them to it for good, while the others are skipped there for their access_all.
    pub async fn find_confirmed_and_manage_all_by_org(org_uuid: &OrganizationId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            users_organizations::table
@@ -1303,6 +1037,17 @@ impl Membership {
        .await
    }

+    pub async fn get_orgs_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<OrganizationId> {
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            users_organizations::table
+                .filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
+                .select(users_organizations::org_uuid)
+                .load::<OrganizationId>(conn)
+                .unwrap_or_default()
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+
    pub async fn find_by_user_and_policy(user_uuid: &UserId, policy_type: OrgPolicyType, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            users_organizations::table
@@ -1325,7 +1070,6 @@ impl Membership {
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            users_organizations::table
                .filter(users_organizations::org_uuid.eq(org_uuid))
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .left_join(users_collections::table.on(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(users_organizations::user_uuid)))
                .left_join(
                    ciphers_collections::table.on(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid
@@ -1352,7 +1096,6 @@ impl Membership {
        conn.run(move |conn| {
            users_organizations::table
                .filter(users_organizations::org_uuid.eq(org_uuid))
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .inner_join(
                    groups_users::table.on(groups_users::users_organizations_uuid.eq(users_organizations::uuid)),
                )
@@ -1388,7 +1131,6 @@ impl Membership {
                        .and(ciphers::organization_uuid.eq(users_organizations::org_uuid.nullable()))),
                )
                .filter(users_organizations::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid))
-                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
                .filter(
                    users_organizations::atype.eq_any(vec![MembershipType::Owner as i32, MembershipType::Admin as i32]),
                )
@@ -1528,163 +1270,13 @@ pub struct OrgApiKeyId(String);
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
-    use CustomPermission::*;
-    use MembershipType::{Admin, Custom, Manager, Owner, User};
-
-    fn member(role: MembershipType) -> Membership {
-        let mut member = Membership::new("user".into(), "org".into(), None);
-        member.atype = role as i32;
-        member.status = MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32;
-        member
-    }

    #[test]
-    fn membership_type_authority() {
-        assert!(Owner > Admin && Admin > Manager && Manager > Custom && Custom > User);
-        assert!((Custom as i32) >= User && (Custom as i32) < Manager && (Custom as i32) < Admin);
-        for raw in [99, -1] {
-            assert_eq!((raw >= User, raw >= Manager, raw >= Admin, raw < Admin), (false, false, false, true));
-        }
-        for (value, expected) in [
-            ("3", Some(Manager)),
-            ("Manager", Some(Manager)),
-            ("4", Some(Custom)),
-            ("Custom", Some(Custom)),
-            ("5", None),
-        ] {
-            assert_eq!(MembershipType::from_str(value), expected);
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn requested_membership_type() {
-        let none = HashSet::new();
-        let edit = HashSet::from([EditAnyCollection]);
-        let legacy = HashSet::from([CreateNewCollections, EditAnyCollection, DeleteAnyCollection]);
-        for (current, all, permissions, disabled, enabled) in [
-            (None, false, &none, Manager, Custom),
-            (Some(User), false, &edit, Manager, Custom),
-            (Some(Owner), false, &none, Manager, Custom),
-            (Some(Manager), false, &none, Manager, Manager),
-            (Some(Manager), true, &legacy, Manager, Manager),
-            (Some(Manager), false, &edit, Manager, Custom),
-            (Some(Manager), true, &none, Manager, Custom),
-            (Some(Manager), true, &edit, Manager, Custom),
-            (Some(Custom), false, &none, Custom, Custom),
-        ] {
-            let current = current.map(|role| {
-                let mut m = member(role);
-                m.access_all = all;
-                m
-            });
-            for (permissions, expected) in [(None, disabled), (Some(permissions), enabled)] {
-                assert_eq!(MembershipType::requested(Custom, current.as_ref(), permissions), expected);
-            }
-        }
-        assert_eq!(MembershipType::requested(User, Some(&member(Custom)), None), User);
-        assert_eq!(MembershipType::requested(User, Some(&member(Manager)), None), User);
-        for requested in [Owner, Admin, Manager] {
-            assert_eq!(MembershipType::requested(requested, Some(&member(Custom)), None), requested);
-        }
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn custom_permission_requests() {
-        let ignored = serde_json::from_value(json!({"manageUsers":false,"manageSso":true})).unwrap();
-        assert!(CustomPermission::requested(&ignored).unwrap().is_empty());
-        for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
-            for value in [json!(true), json!(null), json!("true"), json!(1), json!([true])] {
-                let request = HashMap::from([(permission.json_key().to_owned(), value.clone())]);
-                let result = CustomPermission::requested(&request);
-                if value == json!(true) && SUPPORTED_CUSTOM_PERMISSIONS.contains(&permission) {
-                    assert_eq!(result.unwrap(), HashSet::from([permission]));
-                } else {
-                    assert!(result.is_err(), "{permission:?}: {value}");
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        assert_eq!(SUPPORTED_CUSTOM_PERMISSIONS, [CreateNewCollections, EditAnyCollection, DeleteAnyCollection]);
-    }
-
-    #[test]
-    fn role_changes_drop_custom_permissions() {
-        for (from, to) in [
-            (Custom, Owner),
-            (Custom, Admin),
-            (Custom, Manager),
-            (Custom, User),
-            (User, Custom),
-            (Manager, Custom),
-            (Custom, Custom),
-            (Admin, User),
-        ] {
-            let mut member = member(from);
-            member.access_all = true;
-            for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
-                *member.custom_permission_mut(permission) = true;
-            }
-            member.set_type(to);
-            for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
-                assert_eq!(*member.custom_permission_mut(permission), from == to, "{from:?} -> {to:?}");
-            }
-            assert_eq!(member.access_all, to != Custom);
-        }
-    }
-    #[test]
-    fn permission_matrix_preserves_role_status_flag_and_collection_boundaries() {
-        let legacy = HashSet::from([CreateNewCollections, EditAnyCollection, DeleteAnyCollection]);
-        for (role, all) in
-            [(Owner, false), (Admin, false), (Manager, false), (Manager, true), (Custom, false), (User, false)]
-        {
-            for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
-                let mut member = member(role);
-                member.access_all = all;
-                *member.custom_permission_mut(permission) = true;
-                for enabled in [false, true] {
-                    test_flag::CUSTOM_ROLES_ENABLED.set(Some(enabled));
-                    let shown = if role == Manager && all {
-                        legacy.clone()
-                    } else if role == Custom && enabled && permission.is_supported() {
-                        HashSet::from([permission])
-                    } else {
-                        HashSet::new()
-                    };
-                    assert_eq!(member.shown_custom_permissions(), shown);
-                    for status in [-128, -127, -126, -3, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2] {
-                        member.status = status;
-                        let allowed = enabled && role == Custom && status == 2 && permission.is_supported();
-                        let full = status == 2 && (role == Owner || role == Admin || all);
-                        let edit = full || (allowed && permission == EditAnyCollection);
-                        let view = full || (allowed && matches!(permission, EditAnyCollection | DeleteAnyCollection));
-                        assert_eq!(
-                            (
-                                member.has_custom_permission(permission),
-                                member.can_edit_any_collection(),
-                                member.can_view_all_collections()
-                            ),
-                            (allowed, edit, view),
-                            "{role:?} {all} {enabled} {status} {permission:?}"
-                        );
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        for raw in [99, -1] {
-            let mut member = member(Custom);
-            member.atype = raw;
-            for p in CustomPermission::ALL {
-                *member.custom_permission_mut(p) = true;
-            }
-            for enabled in [false, true] {
-                test_flag::CUSTOM_ROLES_ENABLED.set(Some(enabled));
-                assert!(CustomPermission::ALL.into_iter().all(|p| !member.has_custom_permission(p)));
-                assert!(!member.can_edit_any_collection() && !member.can_view_all_collections());
-            }
-        }
-        let empty = member(Custom);
-        assert!(!empty.can_edit_any_collection() && !empty.can_view_all_collections());
-        assert!(empty.shown_custom_permissions().is_empty());
-
-        test_flag::CUSTOM_ROLES_ENABLED.set(None);
+    #[allow(non_snake_case)]
+    fn partial_cmp_MembershipType() {
+        assert!(MembershipType::Owner > MembershipType::Admin);
+        assert!(MembershipType::Admin > MembershipType::Manager);
+        assert!(MembershipType::Manager > MembershipType::User);
+        assert!(MembershipType::Manager == MembershipType::from_str("4").unwrap());
    }
 }
@@ -140,10 +140,6 @@ impl Send {
        None
    }

-    fn access_id(&self) -> String {
-        BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(Uuid::parse_str(&self.uuid).unwrap_or_default().as_bytes())
-    }
-
    pub fn to_json(&self) -> Value {
        let mut data = serde_json::from_str::<LowerCase<Value>>(&self.data).map(|d| d.data).unwrap_or_default();

@@ -154,7 +150,7 @@ impl Send {

        json!({
            "id": self.uuid,
-            "accessId": self.access_id(),
+            "accessId": BASE64URL_NOPAD.encode(Uuid::parse_str(&self.uuid).unwrap_or_default().as_bytes()),
            "type": self.atype,

            "name": self.name,
@@ -186,7 +182,7 @@ impl Send {
        }

        json!({
-            "id": self.access_id(),
+            "id": self.uuid,
            "type": self.atype,

            "name": self.name,
@@ -260,7 +256,7 @@ impl Send {

    /// Whether the Send is currently within its validity window: not disabled, not past its
    /// expiration date, and not past its deletion date. Does not consider `max_access_count`
-    /// (counted on each access) or the password.
+    /// (consumed at token issuance) or the password.
    pub fn is_accessible(&self) -> bool {
        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
        if self.disabled {
@@ -313,6 +309,19 @@ impl Send {
        Ok(())
    }

+    pub async fn find_by_access_id(access_id: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
+        let Ok(uuid_vec) = BASE64URL_NOPAD.decode(access_id.as_bytes()) else {
+            return None;
+        };
+
+        let uuid = match Uuid::from_slice(&uuid_vec) {
+            Ok(u) => SendId::from(u.to_string()),
+            Err(_) => return None,
+        };
+
+        Self::find_by_uuid(&uuid, conn).await
+    }
+
    pub async fn find_by_uuid(uuid: &SendId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<Self> {
        conn.run(move |conn| sends::table.filter(sends::uuid.eq(uuid)).first::<Self>(conn).ok()).await
    }
@@ -334,6 +343,7 @@ impl Send {
    pub async fn size_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<i64> {
        #[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
        struct FileData {
+            #[serde(rename = "size", alias = "Size")]
            size: NumberOrString,
        }

@@ -351,6 +361,13 @@ impl Send {
        Some(total)
    }

+    pub async fn find_by_org(org_uuid: &OrganizationId, conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            sends::table.filter(sends::organization_uuid.eq(org_uuid)).load::<Self>(conn).expect("Error loading sends")
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+
    pub async fn find_by_past_deletion_date(conn: &DbConn) -> Vec<Self> {
        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
        conn.run(move |conn| {
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Daniel García	d01db37e75	Some simplifications	2026-09-23 23:53:12 +02:00
Daniel García	fe212a425f	Add typo exception	2026-09-23 23:30:19 +02:00
Daniel García	72a39ae90b	Implement V2 key rotation support	2026-09-23 23:30:19 +02:00
Daniel García	fd7e1be788	Implement V2 registration support Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>	2026-09-23 23:30:18 +02:00
				`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
				`ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;`
				`@@ -1 +0,0 @@`
				`-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change`