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+34
-6
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
|
||||
# DB_CONNECTION_RETRIES=15
|
||||
|
||||
## Database timeout
|
||||
## Timeout when acquiring database connection
|
||||
## Timeout in seconds when acquiring database connection
|
||||
# DATABASE_TIMEOUT=30
|
||||
|
||||
## Database idle timeout
|
||||
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@
|
||||
## Defaults to daily. Set blank to disable this job. Also without EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN set, this job will not start.
|
||||
# EVENT_CLEANUP_SCHEDULE="0 10 0 * * *"
|
||||
## Number of days to retain events stored in the database.
|
||||
## If unset (the default), events are kept indefinitely and the scheduled job is disabled!
|
||||
## If unset (the default) or 0, events are kept indefinitely and the scheduled job is disabled!
|
||||
# EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN=
|
||||
##
|
||||
## Cron schedule of the job that cleans old auth requests from the auth request.
|
||||
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@
|
||||
# USER_SEND_LIMIT=
|
||||
|
||||
## Number of days to wait before auto-deleting a trashed item.
|
||||
## If unset (the default), trashed items are not auto-deleted.
|
||||
## If unset (the default) or 0, trashed items are not auto-deleted.
|
||||
## This setting applies globally, so make sure to inform all users of any changes to this setting.
|
||||
# TRASH_AUTO_DELETE_DAYS=
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -386,19 +386,35 @@
|
||||
# HTTP_REQUEST_BLOCK_NON_GLOBAL_IPS=true
|
||||
|
||||
## Client Settings
|
||||
## Server-wide Fill Assist rules feed base directory URL, not a JSON file.
|
||||
## Defaults to https://fillassist.bitwarden.com.
|
||||
## Must be a valid HTTPS URL without credentials, query parameters, fragments, or surrounding whitespace.
|
||||
# FILL_ASSIST_RULES_URL=https://fillassist.bitwarden.com
|
||||
|
||||
## Enable experimental feature flags for clients.
|
||||
## This is a comma-separated list of flags, e.g. "flag1,flag2,flag3".
|
||||
## Note that clients cache the /api/config endpoint for about 1 hour and it could take some time before they are enabled or disabled!
|
||||
##
|
||||
## The following flags are available:
|
||||
## - "fill-assist-targeting-rules": Enable Fill Assist targeting rules in the browser extension. (Browser >= 2026.6.0)
|
||||
## - "pm-5594-safari-account-switching": Enable account switching in Safari. (Safari >= 2026.2.0)
|
||||
## - "pm-32413-multi-client-password-management": Enable changing the master password directly in the client. (Desktop/Extension >= 2026.4.0)
|
||||
## - "ssh-agent-v2": Enable newer SSH agent support. (Desktop >= 2026.2.1)
|
||||
## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins":
|
||||
## - "windows-desktop-autotype": Enable the autotype feature preview on Windows. (Desktop >= 2025.8.0)
|
||||
## - "windows-desktop-autotype-ga": Enable the new, still in development, autotype implementation on Windows. (Desktop >= 2026.9.1)
|
||||
## Only enable one of the two autotype flags, the clients disable autotype completely when both are enabled.
|
||||
## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins": Allow passkeys stored in the vault to be used on related origins listed in a site's /.well-known/webauthn file (Browser >= 2026.2.0)
|
||||
## - "pm-32009-new-item-types": Enable new item types: Bank Account, Driver's License, and Passport (Clients >= 2026.4.0)
|
||||
## - "pm-34171-card-scanner": Enable the new card scanner feature on mobile (Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.4.1)
|
||||
## - "enable-basic-auth-response": Enable HTTP Basic Auth autofill in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.9.0)
|
||||
## - "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic": Enable the rewritten add/update login notification triggering logic in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.2.0)
|
||||
## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
|
||||
## - "windows-native-credential-sync": Register the desktop app as a passkey provider in Windows, so passkeys in the vault can be used by other apps and browsers.
|
||||
## Requires the Microsoft Store (appx) build of the desktop app. Stable releases up to and including 2026.9.1 lack the required plugin registration, so it has no effect there yet.
|
||||
## - "macos-native-credential-sync": Enable the desktop app as a passkey provider on macOS, so passkeys in the vault can be used by other apps and browsers.
|
||||
## - "pm-27278-v2-password-registration": Register new accounts with v2 encryption. (Web >= 2026.6.4, Desktop/Browser/CLI >= 2026.7.0, Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.5.1)
|
||||
## - "enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration": Give SSO users who set their master password on their first login v2 encryption. (Web >= 2026.1.1, Desktop/Browser/CLI >= 2026.1.0, Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.6.0)
|
||||
## These two flags can't be undone: a v2 account stays v2, and it can only log in from clients that are 2026.10.1 or newer (2026.10.2 for the desktop app), so the versions above are only enough to create one.
|
||||
# EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=
|
||||
|
||||
## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.
|
||||
@@ -459,7 +475,7 @@
|
||||
|
||||
## Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!)
|
||||
## https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/connect-src
|
||||
## Allows other domains to URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
|
||||
## Allows other domains for URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
|
||||
## This adds the configured value to the 'Content-Security-Policy' headers 'connect-src' value.
|
||||
## Multiple values must be separated with a whitespace. And only HTTPS values are allowed.
|
||||
## Example: "https://my-addy-io.domain.tld https://my-simplelogin.domain.tld"
|
||||
@@ -485,6 +501,15 @@
|
||||
## KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING!
|
||||
# ORG_GROUPS_ENABLED=false
|
||||
|
||||
## EXPERIMENTAL FEATURE: Custom roles
|
||||
## Enables the Custom member role with granular permissions for organizations.
|
||||
## This is still being developed: only the permissions this version enforces can be granted.
|
||||
## This is enforced by the server and is unrelated to EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS.
|
||||
## Disabling it again keeps the stored Custom roles and permissions, but they grant nothing until it is re-enabled.
|
||||
## Disabled by default because this is an experimental feature!
|
||||
## KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING!
|
||||
# EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES=false
|
||||
|
||||
## Increase secure note size limit (Know the risks!)
|
||||
## Sets the secure note size limit to 100_000 instead of the default 10_000.
|
||||
## WARNING: This could cause issues with clients. Also exports will not work on Bitwarden servers!
|
||||
@@ -602,6 +627,9 @@
|
||||
## Note that the checkbox would still be present, but ignored.
|
||||
# DISABLE_2FA_REMEMBER=false
|
||||
##
|
||||
## Number of days before a remembered 2FA login expires (min: 1, max: 90).
|
||||
# TWO_FACTOR_REMEMBER_DAYS=30
|
||||
##
|
||||
## Authenticator Settings
|
||||
## Disable authenticator time drifted codes to be valid.
|
||||
## TOTP codes of the previous and next 30 seconds will be invalid
|
||||
@@ -610,7 +638,7 @@
|
||||
## we allow by default the TOTP code which was valid one step back and one in the future.
|
||||
## This can however allow attackers to be a bit more lucky with their attempts because there are 3 valid codes.
|
||||
## You can disable this, so that only the current TOTP Code is allowed.
|
||||
## Keep in mind that when a sever drifts out of time, valid codes could be marked as invalid.
|
||||
## Keep in mind that when a server drifts out of time, valid codes could be marked as invalid.
|
||||
## In any case, if a code has been used it can not be used again, also codes which predates it will be invalid.
|
||||
# AUTHENTICATOR_DISABLE_TIME_DRIFT=false
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
|
||||
/.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/** @dani-garcia @BlackDex
|
||||
/.github/workflows/** @dani-garcia @BlackDex
|
||||
/SECURITY.md @dani-garcia @BlackDex
|
||||
/THREAT_MODEL.md @dani-garcia @BlackDex
|
||||
+28
-17
@@ -57,7 +57,23 @@ jobs:
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
# Install dependencies
|
||||
- name: "Install dependencies Ubuntu"
|
||||
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends openssl build-essential libmariadb-dev-compat libpq-dev libssl-dev pkg-config
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
sudo apt-get update
|
||||
sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends openssl build-essential libmariadb-dev-compat libpq-dev libssl-dev pkg-config
|
||||
|
||||
# Pass the MariaDB client library to mysqlclient-sys through its environment variables.
|
||||
# When it finds the library with pkg-config, its build script makes cargo rerun it whenever
|
||||
# anything in the library directory changes, and the install above changes that directory on
|
||||
# every run. So every MySQL build recompiled mysqlclient-sys, diesel and diesel_migrations,
|
||||
# even with a cached build. Cargo compares environment variables by their value instead.
|
||||
lib_dir="$(pkg-config --variable=libdir mysqlclient)"
|
||||
version="$(pkg-config --modversion mysqlclient)"
|
||||
{
|
||||
echo "MYSQLCLIENT_NO_PKG_CONFIG=1"
|
||||
echo "LIBMARIADB_NO_PKG_CONFIG=1"
|
||||
echo "MYSQLCLIENT_LIB_DIR=${lib_dir}"
|
||||
echo "MYSQLCLIENT_VERSION=${version}"
|
||||
} | tee -a "${GITHUB_ENV}"
|
||||
# End Install dependencies
|
||||
|
||||
# Checkout the repo
|
||||
@@ -113,27 +129,24 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
# Enable Rust Caching
|
||||
- name: Rust Caching
|
||||
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@6323deb102c322ba6fcbdcafc7e3dddab59af2b6 # v2.9.2
|
||||
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3
|
||||
with:
|
||||
# Use a custom prefix-key to force a fresh start. This is sometimes needed with bigger changes.
|
||||
# Like changing the build host from Ubuntu 20.04 to 22.04 for example.
|
||||
# Only update when really needed! Use a <year>.<month>[.<inc>] format.
|
||||
prefix-key: "v2025.09-rust"
|
||||
prefix-key: "v2026.11-rust"
|
||||
# Only save caches on main to save cache space.
|
||||
save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
|
||||
# End Enable Rust Caching
|
||||
|
||||
# Run cargo tests
|
||||
# First test all features together, afterwards test them separately.
|
||||
- name: "test features: sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3"
|
||||
# enable_mimalloc and unsafe_test_mode are additive, so we test them once here.
|
||||
- name: "test features: sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3,unsafe_test_mode"
|
||||
id: test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql_mimalloc_s3
|
||||
if: ${{ !cancelled() }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
cargo test --profile ci --features sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3
|
||||
|
||||
- name: "test features: sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc"
|
||||
id: test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql_mimalloc
|
||||
if: ${{ !cancelled() }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
cargo test --profile ci --features sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc
|
||||
cargo test --profile ci --features sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3,unsafe_test_mode
|
||||
|
||||
- name: "test features: sqlite,mysql,postgresql"
|
||||
id: test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql
|
||||
@@ -162,11 +175,11 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
# Run cargo clippy, and fail on warnings
|
||||
- name: "clippy features: sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3"
|
||||
- name: "clippy features: sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3,unsafe_test_mode"
|
||||
id: clippy
|
||||
if: ${{ !cancelled() && matrix.channel == 'rust-toolchain' }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
cargo clippy --profile ci --features sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3
|
||||
cargo clippy --profile ci --features sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3,unsafe_test_mode
|
||||
# End Run cargo clippy
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -185,7 +198,6 @@ jobs:
|
||||
if: ${{ failure() }}
|
||||
env:
|
||||
TEST_DB_M_S3: ${{ steps.test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql_mimalloc_s3.outcome }}
|
||||
TEST_DB_M: ${{ steps.test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql_mimalloc.outcome }}
|
||||
TEST_DB: ${{ steps.test_sqlite_mysql_postgresql.outcome }}
|
||||
TEST_SQLITE: ${{ steps.test_sqlite.outcome }}
|
||||
TEST_MYSQL: ${{ steps.test_mysql.outcome }}
|
||||
@@ -197,13 +209,12 @@ jobs:
|
||||
echo "" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|Job|Status|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|---|------|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|test (sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3)|${TEST_DB_M_S3}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|test (sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc)|${TEST_DB_M}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|test (sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3,unsafe_test_mode)|${TEST_DB_M_S3}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|test (sqlite,mysql,postgresql)|${TEST_DB}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|test (sqlite)|${TEST_SQLITE}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|test (mysql)|${TEST_MYSQL}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|test (postgresql)|${TEST_POSTGRESQL}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|clippy (sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3)|${CLIPPY}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|clippy (sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3,unsafe_test_mode)|${CLIPPY}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "|fmt|${FMT}|" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
echo "Please check the failed jobs and fix where needed." >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
# Login to Docker Hub
|
||||
- name: Login to Docker Hub
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
# Login to GitHub Container Registry
|
||||
- name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
registry: ghcr.io
|
||||
username: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
# Login to Quay.io
|
||||
- name: Login to Quay.io
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
registry: quay.io
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.QUAY_USERNAME }}
|
||||
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Bake ${{ matrix.base_image }} containers
|
||||
id: bake_vw
|
||||
uses: docker/bake-action@018cb6412ab401ebaa809aa5f85966b74628600f # v7.4.0
|
||||
uses: docker/bake-action@59cb1203cd42bcefd40a1b6d73b589e48c86040e # v7.5.0
|
||||
env:
|
||||
BASE_TAGS: "${{ steps.determine-version.outputs.BASE_TAGS }}"
|
||||
SOURCE_COMMIT: "${{ env.SOURCE_COMMIT }}"
|
||||
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
touch "${RUNNER_TEMP}/digests/${digest#sha256:}"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload digest
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: digests-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}-${{ matrix.base_image }}
|
||||
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/digests/*
|
||||
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
subject-path: vaultwarden-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload binaries as artifacts
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: vaultwarden-${{ env.SOURCE_VERSION }}-linux-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}-${{ matrix.base_image }}
|
||||
path: vaultwarden-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}
|
||||
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: Download digests
|
||||
uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
|
||||
uses: actions/download-artifact@9000827ccba6bdab643e8b6fd33ac0654aef8333 # v8.0.2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
path: ${{ runner.temp }}/digests
|
||||
pattern: digests-*-${{ matrix.base_image }}
|
||||
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
# Login to Docker Hub
|
||||
- name: Login to Docker Hub
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
|
||||
password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
|
||||
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
# Login to GitHub Container Registry
|
||||
- name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
registry: ghcr.io
|
||||
username: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
|
||||
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
# Login to Quay.io
|
||||
- name: Login to Quay.io
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
|
||||
uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
registry: quay.io
|
||||
username: ${{ secrets.QUAY_USERNAME }}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
|
||||
name: SDK live tests
|
||||
permissions: {}
|
||||
|
||||
# Runs the live-server end-to-end tests of bitwarden/sdk-internal against this branch, see tools/sdk-live-tests/run.sh.
|
||||
# By default it tests the latest @bitwarden/sdk-internal on npm, which the SDK publishes for every commit to its main
|
||||
# branch, with the e2e tests from that commit. A manual run can name an npm version instead, or a branch, tag or commit
|
||||
# to build the SDK from. It runs daily, by hand, and on changes to the test seeder or the runner.
|
||||
on:
|
||||
schedule:
|
||||
# 04:15 UTC, off the top of the hour, when GitHub may delay or drop scheduled runs
|
||||
- cron: "15 4 * * *"
|
||||
workflow_dispatch:
|
||||
inputs:
|
||||
sdk_npm_version:
|
||||
description: "Version of @bitwarden/sdk-internal on npm to test (empty for the latest)"
|
||||
required: false
|
||||
default: ""
|
||||
sdk_ref:
|
||||
description: "Or a branch, tag or commit of bitwarden/sdk-internal to build and test (slower)"
|
||||
required: false
|
||||
default: ""
|
||||
pull_request:
|
||||
paths:
|
||||
- ".github/workflows/sdk-live-tests.yml"
|
||||
- "src/api/test_seeder.rs"
|
||||
- "tools/sdk-live-tests/**"
|
||||
|
||||
defaults:
|
||||
run:
|
||||
shell: bash
|
||||
|
||||
jobs:
|
||||
sdk-live-tests:
|
||||
name: SDK live tests
|
||||
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
|
||||
timeout-minutes: 90
|
||||
env:
|
||||
# Less to compile and link, and a smaller cache. Panics still show file and line.
|
||||
CARGO_PROFILE_DEV_DEBUG: "0"
|
||||
steps:
|
||||
- name: "Install dependencies Ubuntu"
|
||||
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends build-essential libssl-dev pkg-config
|
||||
|
||||
- name: "Checkout"
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
|
||||
# A published package (npm) or a build from a git ref (git), and the sdk-internal commit to check out
|
||||
- name: "Pick the SDK"
|
||||
id: sdk
|
||||
env:
|
||||
NPM_VERSION: ${{ inputs.sdk_npm_version }}
|
||||
GIT_REF: ${{ inputs.sdk_ref }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
if [[ -n "${NPM_VERSION}" && -n "${GIT_REF}" ]]; then
|
||||
echo "::error::Give an npm version or a git ref, not both"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
if [[ -n "${GIT_REF}" ]]; then
|
||||
{
|
||||
echo "source=git"
|
||||
echo "ref=${GIT_REF}"
|
||||
} >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
|
||||
echo "SDK: bitwarden/sdk-internal \`${GIT_REF}\`, built from source" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
spec="${NPM_VERSION:-latest}"
|
||||
if [[ ! "${spec}" =~ ^[0-9A-Za-z.+-]+$ ]]; then
|
||||
echo "::error::That is not an npm version or tag"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
manifest="$(curl -fsS --retry 3 "https://registry.npmjs.org/@bitwarden%2Fsdk-internal/${spec}")"
|
||||
version="$(jq -r .version <<< "${manifest}")"
|
||||
commit="$(jq -r .gitHead <<< "${manifest}")"
|
||||
if [[ ! "${commit}" =~ ^[0-9a-f]{40}$ ]]; then
|
||||
echo "::error::@bitwarden/sdk-internal@${version} doesn't name the commit it was built from"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
{
|
||||
echo "source=npm"
|
||||
echo "version=${version}"
|
||||
echo "ref=${commit}"
|
||||
} >> "${GITHUB_OUTPUT}"
|
||||
echo "SDK: @bitwarden/sdk-internal ${version} from npm, e2e tests at ${commit}" >> "${GITHUB_STEP_SUMMARY}"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: "Checkout sdk-internal"
|
||||
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
repository: bitwarden/sdk-internal
|
||||
ref: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.ref }}
|
||||
path: sdk-internal
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
|
||||
# Each checkout pins its own toolchain in rust-toolchain.toml. The SDK's is only needed to build it.
|
||||
- name: "Install toolchains"
|
||||
env:
|
||||
SDK_SOURCE: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.source }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
rustup toolchain install
|
||||
if [[ "${SDK_SOURCE}" == git ]]; then
|
||||
cd sdk-internal
|
||||
rustup toolchain install
|
||||
rustup target add wasm32-unknown-unknown
|
||||
rustup component add rust-src
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# One cache per SDK source, so that neither restores the other's.
|
||||
# Only save caches on main to save cache space.
|
||||
- name: "Cache Rust builds"
|
||||
if: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.source == 'npm' }}
|
||||
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3
|
||||
with:
|
||||
key: sdk-live-tests-npm
|
||||
add-job-id-key: false
|
||||
workspaces: ". -> target"
|
||||
save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: "Cache Rust builds (with the SDK)"
|
||||
if: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.source == 'git' }}
|
||||
uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3
|
||||
with:
|
||||
key: sdk-live-tests-sdk-build
|
||||
add-job-id-key: false
|
||||
workspaces: |
|
||||
. -> target
|
||||
sdk-internal -> target
|
||||
save-if: ${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' }}
|
||||
|
||||
- name: "Setup Node"
|
||||
uses: actions/setup-node@820762786026740c76f36085b0efc47a31fe5020 # v7.0.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
node-version-file: sdk-internal/.nvmrc
|
||||
|
||||
# Where the SDK's build would put it
|
||||
- name: "Download the SDK package"
|
||||
if: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.source == 'npm' }}
|
||||
env:
|
||||
SDK_VERSION: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.version }}
|
||||
SDK_COMMIT: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.ref }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
# npm checks the tarball against the registry's checksum
|
||||
tarball="$(npm pack "@bitwarden/sdk-internal@${SDK_VERSION}" --pack-destination "${RUNNER_TEMP}" --json | jq -r '.[0].filename')"
|
||||
package_dir=sdk-internal/crates/bitwarden-wasm-internal/npm
|
||||
tar -xzf "${RUNNER_TEMP}/${tarball}" --strip-components=1 -C "${package_dir}"
|
||||
if [[ "$(cat "${package_dir}/VERSION")" != "${SDK_COMMIT}" ]]; then
|
||||
echo "::error::The package's VERSION doesn't match its commit ${SDK_COMMIT}"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
- name: "Run the SDK live tests"
|
||||
env:
|
||||
SDK_SOURCE: ${{ steps.sdk.outputs.source }}
|
||||
run: |
|
||||
args=(--sdk-dir sdk-internal)
|
||||
if [[ "${SDK_SOURCE}" == npm ]]; then
|
||||
args+=(--skip-sdk-build)
|
||||
fi
|
||||
tools/sdk-live-tests/run.sh "${args[@]}"
|
||||
|
||||
- name: "Upload logs"
|
||||
if: ${{ !cancelled() }}
|
||||
uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
|
||||
with:
|
||||
name: sdk-live-tests-logs
|
||||
path: target/sdk-live-tests/**/*.log
|
||||
@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ jobs:
|
||||
severity: CRITICAL,HIGH
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
|
||||
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@2892aa5e19bbd11bc0cff5427e3b750a04d9e3c2 # v4.38.2
|
||||
uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 # v4.39.1
|
||||
with:
|
||||
sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
|
||||
@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ jobs:
|
||||
|
||||
# When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.pre-commit-config.yaml` too
|
||||
- name: Spell Check Repo
|
||||
uses: crate-ci/typos@00f422f3b19c57bc6338715ebfe3316d38768461 # v1.50.3
|
||||
uses: crate-ci/typos@7f9d0819ca1c008ade73f4b41fa9d258d48f605b # v1.51.1
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
|
||||
persist-credentials: false
|
||||
|
||||
- name: Run zizmor
|
||||
uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@cc914d7f3750a2d13d75c7f184a1060aa0e9d482 # v0.6.4
|
||||
uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@53290badfa369cb0bf7ad16342cb62c2fa47ac7b # v0.8.0
|
||||
with:
|
||||
# intentionally not scanning the entire repository,
|
||||
# since it contains integration tests.
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ repos:
|
||||
|
||||
# When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.github/workflows/typos.yaml` too
|
||||
- repo: https://github.com/crate-ci/typos
|
||||
rev: 00f422f3b19c57bc6338715ebfe3316d38768461 # v1.50.3
|
||||
rev: 7f9d0819ca1c008ade73f4b41fa9d258d48f605b # v1.51.1
|
||||
hooks:
|
||||
- id: typos
|
||||
always_run: true
|
||||
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ repos:
|
||||
description: Test the package for errors.
|
||||
entry: cargo test
|
||||
language: system
|
||||
args: [ "--features", "sqlite,mysql,postgresql", "--" ]
|
||||
args: [ "--features", "sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3,unsafe_test_mode", "--" ]
|
||||
types_or: [ rust, toml ] # Cargo.lock matches toml type which is intended
|
||||
pass_filenames: false
|
||||
- id: cargo-clippy
|
||||
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ repos:
|
||||
description: Lint Rust sources
|
||||
entry: cargo clippy
|
||||
language: system
|
||||
args: [ "--features", "sqlite,mysql,postgresql", "--", "-D", "warnings" ]
|
||||
args: [ "--features", "sqlite,mysql,postgresql,enable_mimalloc,s3,unsafe_test_mode", "--", "-D", "warnings" ]
|
||||
types_or: [ rust, toml ] # Cargo.lock matches toml type which is intended
|
||||
pass_filenames: false
|
||||
- id: check-docker-templates
|
||||
|
||||
+2
-3
@@ -14,9 +14,8 @@ extend-ignore-re = [
|
||||
# In SMTP it's called HELO, so ignore it
|
||||
"(?i)helo_name",
|
||||
"Server name sent during.+HELO",
|
||||
# COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption, ignore these specific items
|
||||
"COSEKey",
|
||||
"COSEAlgorithm",
|
||||
# COSE Is short for CBOR Object Signing and Encryption
|
||||
"(?i)cose",
|
||||
# Ignore this specific string as it's valid
|
||||
"Ensure they are valid OTPs",
|
||||
# This word is misspelled upstream
|
||||
|
||||
Generated
+816
-796
File diff suppressed because it is too large.
Load diff
+48
-35
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
[workspace.package]
|
||||
edition = "2024"
|
||||
rust-version = "1.97.1"
|
||||
rust-version = "1.98.1"
|
||||
license = "AGPL-3.0-only"
|
||||
repository = "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden"
|
||||
publish = false
|
||||
@@ -44,7 +44,6 @@ s3 = [
|
||||
"dep:aws-config",
|
||||
"dep:aws-credential-types",
|
||||
"dep:aws-smithy-runtime-api",
|
||||
"dep:http",
|
||||
"dep:reqsign-aws-v4",
|
||||
"dep:reqsign-core",
|
||||
]
|
||||
@@ -57,8 +56,11 @@ oidc-accept-string-booleans = ["openidconnect/accept-string-booleans"]
|
||||
# Currently only used to enable rusts official ip support
|
||||
unstable = []
|
||||
|
||||
# Enables special test mode features. This should NEVER be enabled in production
|
||||
unsafe_test_mode = ["dep:serde_cbor_2"]
|
||||
|
||||
[target."cfg(unix)".dependencies]
|
||||
nix = { version = "0.31.3", features = ["fs"] }
|
||||
nix = { version = "0.32.0", features = ["fs"] }
|
||||
# Logging
|
||||
syslog = "7.0.0"
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -66,7 +68,7 @@ syslog = "7.0.0"
|
||||
macros = { path = "./macros" }
|
||||
|
||||
# Logging
|
||||
log = "0.4.34"
|
||||
log = "0.4.35"
|
||||
fern = { version = "0.7.1", features = ["syslog-7", "reopen-1"] }
|
||||
# We need the `log` feature for `tracing` to enable logging for several crates to work, like lettre or webauthn-rs
|
||||
tracing = { version = "0.1.44", features = ["log"] }
|
||||
@@ -80,8 +82,8 @@ num-derive = "0.5.1"
|
||||
bigdecimal = "0.4.11"
|
||||
|
||||
# Web framework
|
||||
rocket = { version = "0.5.1", default-features = false, features = ["json", "tls"] }
|
||||
rocket_ws = { version = "0.1.1" }
|
||||
rocket = { version = "0.5.3", default-features = false, features = ["json", "tls"] }
|
||||
rocket_ws = { version = "0.2.0" }
|
||||
|
||||
# WebSockets libraries
|
||||
rmpv = "1.3.1" # MessagePack library
|
||||
@@ -91,7 +93,7 @@ dashmap = "6.2.1"
|
||||
|
||||
# Async futures
|
||||
futures = "0.3.34"
|
||||
tokio = { version = "1.53.2", features = [
|
||||
tokio = { version = "1.54.1", features = [
|
||||
"fs",
|
||||
"io-util",
|
||||
"net",
|
||||
@@ -100,15 +102,15 @@ tokio = { version = "1.53.2", features = [
|
||||
"signal",
|
||||
"time",
|
||||
] }
|
||||
tokio-util = { version = "0.7.19", features = ["compat"] }
|
||||
tokio-util = { version = "0.7.20", features = ["compat"] }
|
||||
|
||||
# A generic serialization/deserialization framework
|
||||
serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
|
||||
serde_json = "1.0.151"
|
||||
serde_json = "1.0.154"
|
||||
|
||||
# A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
|
||||
diesel = { version = "2.3.13", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
|
||||
diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"
|
||||
diesel = { version = "2.4.0", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric", "64-column-tables"] }
|
||||
diesel_migrations = "2.4.0"
|
||||
|
||||
derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
|
||||
"as_ref",
|
||||
@@ -120,21 +122,20 @@ derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
|
||||
diesel-derive-newtype = "2.1.3"
|
||||
|
||||
# SQLite, statically bundled unless the `sqlite_system` feature is enabled
|
||||
libsqlite3-sys = { version = "0.38.2", optional = true }
|
||||
libsqlite3-sys = { version = "0.40.0", optional = true }
|
||||
|
||||
# Crypto-related libraries
|
||||
rand = "0.10.3"
|
||||
rand = "0.10.4"
|
||||
ring = "0.17.14"
|
||||
rustls = { version = "0.23.45", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
|
||||
rustls = { version = "0.23.46", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
|
||||
subtle = "2.6.1"
|
||||
|
||||
# UUID generation
|
||||
uuid = { version = "1.27.0", features = ["v4"] }
|
||||
uuid = { version = "1.29.3", features = ["v4"] }
|
||||
|
||||
# Date and time libraries
|
||||
chrono = { version = "0.4.45", default-features = false, features = ["clock", "serde"] }
|
||||
chrono-tz = "0.10.4"
|
||||
time = "0.3.55"
|
||||
|
||||
# Job scheduler
|
||||
job_scheduler_ng = "2.5.0"
|
||||
@@ -143,7 +144,7 @@ job_scheduler_ng = "2.5.0"
|
||||
data-encoding = "2.11.1"
|
||||
|
||||
# JWT library
|
||||
jsonwebtoken = { version = "11.1.0", default-features = false, features = ["rust_crypto", "use_pem"] }
|
||||
jsonwebtoken = { version = "12.0.0", default-features = false, features = ["rust_crypto", "use_pem"] }
|
||||
|
||||
# TOTP library
|
||||
totp-lite = "2.0.1"
|
||||
@@ -157,12 +158,13 @@ yubico_ng = { version = "1.0.0", default-features = false }
|
||||
webauthn-rs = { version = "0.5.5", features = ["danger-allow-state-serialisation", "danger-credential-internals"] }
|
||||
webauthn-rs-proto = "0.5.5"
|
||||
webauthn-rs-core = "0.5.5"
|
||||
serde_cbor_2 = { version = "0.13.0", optional = true }
|
||||
|
||||
# Handling of URL's for WebAuthn and favicons
|
||||
url = "2.5.8"
|
||||
|
||||
# Email libraries
|
||||
lettre = { version = "0.11.23", default-features = false, features = [
|
||||
lettre = { version = "0.11.24", default-features = false, features = [
|
||||
# Misc
|
||||
"tracing",
|
||||
"serde",
|
||||
@@ -177,7 +179,7 @@ lettre = { version = "0.11.23", default-features = false, features = [
|
||||
"sendmail-transport",
|
||||
] }
|
||||
percent-encoding = "2.3.2" # URL encoding library used for URL's in the emails
|
||||
email_address = "0.2.9"
|
||||
email_address = "0.2.10"
|
||||
|
||||
# HTML Template library
|
||||
handlebars = { version = "6.4.4", features = ["dir_source"] }
|
||||
@@ -204,25 +206,22 @@ reqwest = { version = "0.13.5", default-features = false, features = [
|
||||
hickory-resolver = "0.26.3"
|
||||
|
||||
# Favicon extraction libraries
|
||||
html5gum = "0.8.4"
|
||||
regex = { version = "1.13.1", default-features = false, features = [
|
||||
html5gum = "0.9.2"
|
||||
regex = { version = "1.13.2", default-features = false, features = [
|
||||
"perf",
|
||||
"std",
|
||||
"unicode-perl",
|
||||
] }
|
||||
data-url = "0.3.2"
|
||||
bytes = "1.12.1"
|
||||
bytes = "1.12.2"
|
||||
svg-hush = "0.9.7"
|
||||
|
||||
# Cache function results (Used for version check and favicon fetching)
|
||||
cached = { version = "4.0.1", features = ["async"] }
|
||||
|
||||
# Used for custom short lived cookie jar during favicon extraction
|
||||
cookie = "0.18.2"
|
||||
cookie_store = "0.22.1"
|
||||
|
||||
# Used by U2F, JWT and PostgreSQL
|
||||
openssl = "0.10.81"
|
||||
openssl = "0.10.82"
|
||||
|
||||
# CLI argument parsing
|
||||
pico-args = "0.5.0"
|
||||
@@ -235,7 +234,9 @@ governor = "0.10.4"
|
||||
ipnet = "2.12.2"
|
||||
|
||||
# OIDC for SSO
|
||||
openidconnect = { version = "4.0.1", default-features = false }
|
||||
openidconnect = { version = "4.1.0", default-features = false }
|
||||
|
||||
# Used for caching for ODIC/SSO and Admin version check
|
||||
moka = { version = "0.12.16", features = ["future"] }
|
||||
|
||||
# Check client versions for specific features.
|
||||
@@ -251,25 +252,24 @@ which = "8.0.6"
|
||||
argon2 = "0.6.0"
|
||||
|
||||
# Reading a password from the cli for generating the Argon2id ADMIN_TOKEN
|
||||
rpassword = "7.5.4"
|
||||
rpassword = "7.5.5"
|
||||
|
||||
# Loading a dynamic CSS Stylesheet
|
||||
grass_compiler = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false }
|
||||
|
||||
# File are accessed through Apache OpenDAL
|
||||
opendal = { version = "0.59.4", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
|
||||
opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.4", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
|
||||
opendal = { version = "0.59.5", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
|
||||
opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.5", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
|
||||
|
||||
# For retrieving AWS credentials, including temporary SSO credentials
|
||||
aws-config = { version = "1.12.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
|
||||
aws-config = { version = "1.13.3", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
|
||||
"behavior-version-latest",
|
||||
"credentials-process",
|
||||
"rt-tokio",
|
||||
"sso",
|
||||
] }
|
||||
aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0", optional = true }
|
||||
aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.19.0", optional = true }
|
||||
http = { version = "1.5.0", optional = true }
|
||||
aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.1", optional = true }
|
||||
aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.22.0", optional = true }
|
||||
reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.3.1", optional = true }
|
||||
reqsign-core = { version = "3.3.2", optional = true }
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -326,6 +326,14 @@ opt-level = 3
|
||||
# Linting config
|
||||
# https://doc.rust-lang.org/rustc/lints/groups.html
|
||||
[workspace.lints.rust]
|
||||
# Features
|
||||
unexpected_cfgs = { level = "warn", check-cfg = [
|
||||
'cfg(sqlite)',
|
||||
'cfg(mysql)',
|
||||
'cfg(postgresql)',
|
||||
'cfg(s3)',
|
||||
] }
|
||||
|
||||
# Forbid
|
||||
unsafe_code = "forbid"
|
||||
non_ascii_idents = "forbid"
|
||||
@@ -355,6 +363,7 @@ unused_import_braces = "deny"
|
||||
unused_lifetimes = "deny"
|
||||
unused_qualifications = "deny"
|
||||
variant_size_differences = "deny"
|
||||
redundant_imports = "deny"
|
||||
|
||||
# https://rust-lang.github.io/rust-clippy/stable/index.html
|
||||
[workspace.lints.clippy]
|
||||
@@ -382,11 +391,15 @@ iter_on_empty_collections = "deny"
|
||||
iter_on_single_items = "deny"
|
||||
mem_forget = "deny"
|
||||
needless_collect = "deny"
|
||||
needless_pass_by_ref_mut = "deny"
|
||||
or_fun_call = "deny"
|
||||
redundant_clone = "deny"
|
||||
significant_drop_in_scrutinee = "deny"
|
||||
str_to_string = "deny"
|
||||
unnecessary_self_imports = "deny"
|
||||
use_self = "deny"
|
||||
useless_let_if_seq = "deny"
|
||||
verbose_file_reads = "deny"
|
||||
str_to_string = "deny"
|
||||
|
||||
# Pedantic Opt-Outs
|
||||
inline_always = "allow" # We use this sparsely
|
||||
|
||||
+24
-35
@@ -1,49 +1,38 @@
|
||||
Vaultwarden tries to prevent security issues but there could always slip something through.
|
||||
If you believe you've found a security issue in our application, we encourage you to
|
||||
notify us. We welcome working with you to resolve the issue promptly. Thanks in advance!
|
||||
Vaultwarden tries to prevent security issues, but something could always slip through. If you believe you've found a security issue in our application, we encourage you to notify us. We welcome working with you to resolve the issue promptly. Thanks in advance!
|
||||
|
||||
# Disclosure Policy
|
||||
# Scope
|
||||
|
||||
- Let us know as soon as possible upon discovery of a potential security issue, and we'll make every
|
||||
effort to quickly resolve the issue.
|
||||
- Provide us a reasonable amount of time to resolve the issue before any disclosure to the public or a
|
||||
third-party. We may publicly disclose the issue before resolving it, if appropriate.
|
||||
- Make a good faith effort to avoid privacy violations, destruction of data, and interruption or
|
||||
degradation of our service. Only interact with accounts you own or with explicit permission of the
|
||||
account holder.
|
||||
Security issues in the current release of Vaultwarden and in the `main` branch (the `testing` image) are in scope. Our [threat model](THREAT_MODEL.md) describes who is trusted with what, what is out of scope, and how we rate severity. Please read it before reporting.
|
||||
|
||||
# In-scope
|
||||
# How to report a security issue
|
||||
|
||||
- Security issues in any current release of Vaultwarden. Source code is available at https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden. This includes the current `latest` release and `main / testing` release.
|
||||
- Let us know as soon as possible upon discovery of a potential security issue, and we'll make every effort to quickly resolve the issue.
|
||||
- Provide us a reasonable amount of time to resolve the issue before any disclosure to the public or a third party. We may publicly disclose the issue before resolving it, if appropriate.
|
||||
- Credit goes on the advisory and needs a GitHub account or email address. Reports of an issue whose fix is already public, from the moment its pull request is opened, are normally not credited.
|
||||
- Vaultwarden is an open source project and does not offer rewards.
|
||||
|
||||
# Exclusions
|
||||
|
||||
The following bug classes are out-of scope:
|
||||
|
||||
- Bugs that are already reported on Vaultwarden's issue tracker (https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues)
|
||||
- Bugs that are not part of Vaultwarden, like on the web-vault or mobile and desktop clients. These issues need to be reported in the respective project issue tracker at https://github.com/bitwarden to which we are not associated
|
||||
- Issues in an upstream software dependency (ex: Rust, or External Libraries) which are already reported to the upstream maintainer
|
||||
- Attacks requiring physical access to a user's device
|
||||
- Issues related to software or protocols not under Vaultwarden's control
|
||||
- Vulnerabilities in outdated versions of Vaultwarden
|
||||
- Missing security best practices that do not directly lead to a vulnerability (You may still report them as a normal issue)
|
||||
- Issues that do not have any impact on the general public
|
||||
Vaultwarden has no hosted service. Test only on instances you run yourself, and make a good-faith effort to avoid privacy violations, destruction of data, and interruption or degradation of other people's servers. Only interact with accounts you own or with the explicit permission of the account holder.
|
||||
|
||||
While researching, we'd like to ask you to refrain from:
|
||||
|
||||
- Denial of service
|
||||
- Spamming
|
||||
- Social engineering (including phishing) of Vaultwarden developers, contributors or users
|
||||
- Denial of service against servers you do not run. You can still report availability issues you reproduce on your own instance.
|
||||
- Spamming.
|
||||
- Social engineering (including phishing) of Vaultwarden developers, contributors or users.
|
||||
|
||||
Thank you for helping keep Vaultwarden and our users safe!
|
||||
A good report covers one root cause and states the version or commit you tested, the lowest privileges needed, what the attacker gains, any non-default settings, the steps to reproduce it, and whether you ran them or only read the code.
|
||||
|
||||
If you use AI tools, you remain responsible for what you send. Reproduce the issue on your own instance before reporting it, check its scope and severity against our threat model rather than the tool's assessment, and include the requests, responses or logs that show it.
|
||||
|
||||
# How to contact us
|
||||
|
||||
- You can contact us on Matrix https://matrix.to/#/#vaultwarden:matrix.org (users: `@danig:matrix.org` and/or `@blackdex:matrix.org`)
|
||||
- You can open a [private vulnerability report](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/new) on GitHub.
|
||||
- You can send an  to report a security issue.<br>
|
||||
If you want to send an encrypted email you can use the following GPG key: 13BB3A34C9E380258CE43D595CB150B31F6426BC<br>
|
||||
If you want to send an encrypted email, you can use the following GPG key: `13BB3A34C9E380258CE43D595CB150B31F6426BC`<br>
|
||||
It can be found on several public GPG key servers.<br>
|
||||
* https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=security%40vaultwarden.org
|
||||
* https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=security%40vaultwarden.org
|
||||
* https://pgpkeys.eu/pks/lookup?search=security%40vaultwarden.org&fingerprint=on&op=index
|
||||
* https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?search=security%40vaultwarden.org&fingerprint=on&op=index
|
||||
- https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=security%40vaultwarden.org
|
||||
- https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=security%40vaultwarden.org
|
||||
- https://pgpkeys.eu/pks/lookup?search=security%40vaultwarden.org&fingerprint=on&op=index
|
||||
- https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?search=security%40vaultwarden.org&fingerprint=on&op=index
|
||||
- You can contact us on Matrix for questions, without vulnerability details: https://matrix.to/#/#vaultwarden:matrix.org (users: `@danig:matrix.org` and/or `@blackdex:matrix.org`).
|
||||
|
||||
Thank you for helping keep Vaultwarden and our users safe!
|
||||
+148
@@ -0,0 +1,148 @@
|
||||
# Vaultwarden threat model
|
||||
|
||||
To report a security issue, see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
|
||||
|
||||
## Overview
|
||||
|
||||
Vaultwarden is an unofficial, self-hosted server for the Bitwarden clients, written in Rust. It stores encrypted vaults, handles login, two-factor authentication, organizations, file and text sharing through Send, and emergency access, and provides an admin panel for the operator. It is not affiliated with Bitwarden. The browser, desktop, mobile and CLI clients come from Bitwarden. Our container images include a web vault built from Bitwarden's web client with our own patches.
|
||||
|
||||
## Security expectations
|
||||
|
||||
### Deployment
|
||||
|
||||
We expect a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front of the server, `DOMAIN` set to its public URL, and an operator who keeps the host secure. This model covers Vaultwarden itself. Third-party software that consumes its output or sits in front of it, such as log parsers and reverse proxies, is the operator's to configure and secure.
|
||||
|
||||
### Encryption
|
||||
|
||||
Clients encrypt vault contents end to end. The server stores and serves ciphertext it cannot decrypt, and it never sees the master password. The server enforces access to data and actions itself, without relying on a client to behave. A few settings rely on the client for part of their effect, listed under [Out of scope](#out-of-scope).
|
||||
|
||||
A member receives the organization key when they are confirmed. Invited and accepted members do not have it. A revoked member who was once confirmed may still have it. Every confirmed member holds the same key for the whole organization, so only the server separates collections.
|
||||
|
||||
The server can read everything that is not end-to-end encrypted, such as user, group, device and organization names, email addresses, who owns what, item types and timestamps, attachment sizes, password hints, the stored master password hash and KDF settings, the TOTP and other 2FA secrets that protect login to the account, API keys, refresh tokens, security stamps, the JWT signing key, and SMTP and push credentials. TOTP secrets that users store in vault items are end-to-end encrypted with the rest of the item.
|
||||
|
||||
Someone who controls the server can also serve a modified web vault, so end-to-end encryption does not protect web vault users from them.
|
||||
|
||||
### Trust
|
||||
|
||||
Registration is open by default (`SIGNUPS_ALLOWED=true`), but many personal and small-team instances turn it off, so holding an account usually implies a minimal level of trust. Account holders are still never trusted with anyone else's data. Members of an organization have some trust in each other.
|
||||
|
||||
| Actor | Can reach | Must not reach |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| Anonymous internet | Login, prelogin, registration, public Send access, icons, the anonymous notifications hub, static files | Any vault, organization or member data; Sends they have no link to; the admin panel; the internal network through outbound requests |
|
||||
| Websites and icon sources | The icon fetcher, through any response, redirect or DNS answer; the server, through cross-site requests from a visitor's browser | The internal network through outbound requests; script on the vault origin; acting through a visitor's session |
|
||||
| Registered user | Their own vault, Sends, devices and settings; organizations they belong to | Another user's data; any other organization; raising their own role or status |
|
||||
| Invited or accepted member | Accepting the invitation, enrolling in account recovery, and the organization's name, public key and policies | Items, collections, the member list, the organization key, any other privileged action before confirmation |
|
||||
| Revoked member | Nothing in that organization | Any organization data from the server, even data they could once read |
|
||||
| Organization User | Items in assigned collections, with `read_only` and `manage` enforced by the server | Other collections, write access to read-only collections, Admin-level metadata |
|
||||
| Organization Manager (a legacy role, shown as Custom in clients) | The above, plus managing collections where they have `manage`. With "Manage all collections" (`access_all`), every collection and full member and group details | Without `access_all`: managing other collections, full member and group details. Always: changing policies or roles |
|
||||
| Organization Admin | All data in that organization, members below Owner (some actions on Managers and Admins are limited to Owners), policies, events, account recovery for enrolled members below Owner | Owners, other organizations, the personal vault of a member who is not enrolled in recovery, the organization API key |
|
||||
| Organization Owner | The whole organization, including account recovery for enrolled members | Other organizations, the personal vault of a member who is not enrolled in recovery |
|
||||
| Organization API key holder (Owner-issued) | Directory import into its own organization | Other organizations, item content, Owners |
|
||||
| Send recipient | One Send, within its limits | Other Sends, access beyond the configured limits, the owner's vault |
|
||||
| Emergency access grantee | After approval or the wait time: the access the grantor configured, which can be full takeover by design | Anything before that, or more than the access the grantor configured |
|
||||
| Admin panel (`ADMIN_TOKEN`) | All users, organizations and settings | No limit once authenticated |
|
||||
| Host operator, database and data folder access | Everything | No limit |
|
||||
| Services the operator configures (SSO provider, SMTP server, push relay, S3 endpoint, Yubico) | What they need for their function | Vault contents |
|
||||
|
||||
### Configuration
|
||||
|
||||
Optional features that operators turn on, other than experimental and beta ones, carry the same expectations as the defaults, such as SSO, organization events, anything needing SMTP (email 2FA, invitations), push, S3 storage, the admin panel, and the MySQL and PostgreSQL backends.
|
||||
|
||||
Some settings remove a protection on purpose, and using them is the operator's choice: `DISABLE_ADMIN_TOKEN`, a plain-text `ADMIN_TOKEN`, `IP_HEADER_TRUSTED_PROXIES=all` on a directly exposed instance, turning off `HTTP_REQUEST_BLOCK_NON_GLOBAL_IPS`, `SSO_DEBUG_TOKENS`, `SSO_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_EMAIL_VERIFICATION`, `SSO_PKCE=false`, `SHOW_PASSWORD_HINT`, `SMTP_SECURITY=off`, `SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS`, `SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_HOSTNAMES`, `SMTP_DEBUG`, `ALLOWED_IFRAME_ANCESTORS`, `ALLOWED_CONNECT_SRC`, and `LOG_LEVEL` set to `debug` or `trace`. Issues that need one of them are out of scope.
|
||||
|
||||
### Upstream Bitwarden
|
||||
|
||||
Where this document does not cover a behavior, we follow upstream Bitwarden by default.
|
||||
|
||||
## Out of scope
|
||||
|
||||
These are intended behavior or outside this model. Several match upstream Bitwarden.
|
||||
|
||||
- What an admin token holder or the host operator can do, including running code on the server. We expect them to have admin access to the machine.
|
||||
- Organization Owners and Admins reading all organization data, and account recovery of enrolled members.
|
||||
- Organization Managers listing basic member details, such as names and emails. Upstream allows this for all members.
|
||||
- Settings the client applies: `hide_passwords` ("hidden passwords" in the clients), master password reprompt, and organization policies on values the server never sees, such as master password complexity and password generator rules. The client already holds the data.
|
||||
- Bugs in Bitwarden's client code, including in the web vault we bundle, such as CSV formula injection (exports are built in the browser) or a client failing on a malformed stored value. The advisory and CVE for those belong to Bitwarden. Report them through [Bitwarden's HackerOne program](https://hackerone.com/bitwarden/). When the bundled web vault is affected, we ship a security release that references theirs. Bugs that our own web vault patches add are ours.
|
||||
- The server not decrypting or authenticating ciphertext. It holds no key.
|
||||
- `/identity/accounts/prelogin` and `/identity/accounts/prelogin/password` returning KDF settings for any email, with deterministic fake settings for unknown ones.
|
||||
- Login timing not being equalized.
|
||||
- Probing whether an icon is already cached. Setting `ICON_SERVICE` to an external service avoids it.
|
||||
- Download link replay: an attachment token or Send access token being reusable by its holder until it expires (1 and 2 minutes), and object storage presigned URLs that we cannot count or revoke. The holder already has the content.
|
||||
- Short-lived tokens that stay valid after an authorization change elsewhere until they expire, such as an organization API token (1 hour) after its key is rotated. This includes connections the notifications WebSocket accepted before the change, which stay open and carry change notifications and device login requests, not vault data.
|
||||
- The access token in the notifications WebSocket's `access_token` query parameter, which reverse proxies may log. Clients send it that way, and our [hardening guide](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Hardening-Guide#access-logs-contain-access_token-parameter) covers redacting it.
|
||||
- A client's tokens staying valid after it logs out. Logging out discards them on that device, as upstream, and deauthorizing sessions or changing the password ends them.
|
||||
- The personal API key skipping 2FA, and working after a password change until the user rotates it. It is a separate credential.
|
||||
- A linked SSO identity still logging in after a master password change, and the SSO provider deciding how long a session lasts (`SSO_AUTH_ONLY_NOT_SESSION` turns that off). The provider manages that credential, and it doesn't unlock the vault.
|
||||
- A revoked or removed member's login session staying valid. It belongs to their own account, and the server checks membership on every request.
|
||||
- A revoked or removed member keeping what their client already synced, and the organization key not being rotated when a member leaves.
|
||||
- Unauthenticated requests to `/api/devices/identifier/<id>/clear-token`. The impact is delayed push delivery.
|
||||
- Limits we leave out or keep simple by design: no cap on the number of items a user stores, no cleanup of attachments reserved but never uploaded, and rate limits kept in memory per process and IP, which reset on restart and are shared by users behind one address.
|
||||
- Log injection. It only affects software that parses our logs, such as Fail2Ban with our community wiki's filters.
|
||||
- Attacks that need a missing or misconfigured reverse proxy, such as one not sending `X-Forwarded-Proto` (it decides the admin cookie's `Secure` flag).
|
||||
- Attacks that need another component to break its own specification, such as a NAT64 translator that forwards the `64:ff9b::/96` prefix to private addresses, against RFC 6052.
|
||||
- Outbound requests to the SSO provider, Yubico server or S3 endpoint the operator configures, which skip the outbound filter and can be on the internal network.
|
||||
- File permissions in the data folder. Host security belongs to the operator.
|
||||
- Attacks that need physical access to a user's device.
|
||||
- Self-exploitation, where someone can only affect their own account, such as self-XSS or weak KDF settings they choose.
|
||||
- Text that users choose showing up in emails or pages, such as an organization, user or device name, as long as it can't cause XSS or modify the page.
|
||||
- Dependency and base image CVEs without a path reachable through Vaultwarden.
|
||||
- Packages, images and deployment templates that we don't publish. Report those to their maintainers.
|
||||
- Missing best practices with no demonstrated impact, such as security headers, `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` (the web vault needs it) or version disclosure, and design recommendations without a concrete issue.
|
||||
- Bugs already reported on our [issue tracker](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues).
|
||||
- Experimental and beta features. They are opt-in and outside this model until they are stable.
|
||||
- Issues that only affect outdated versions.
|
||||
|
||||
## Severity
|
||||
|
||||
We rate issues by what the attacker ends up with, such as decrypted data, ciphertext, or the power to change or delete data, and by the access they needed first. An attack that needs no account usually rates higher than one that does. Our ratings can differ from CVSS 3.1, which doesn't translate well to an end-to-end encrypted system. Older advisories may be rated differently.
|
||||
|
||||
Denial of service and resource exhaustion only count if they still apply with a reverse proxy in front. Races, denial of service and resource exhaustion are never rated above Medium.
|
||||
|
||||
Secrets written to logs at the default log level are rated by what they give someone who can read the logs but not the host.
|
||||
|
||||
### Critical
|
||||
|
||||
- Reading another account's data decrypted, with or without an account, such as through script on the vault origin or exposed key material.
|
||||
- Code execution on the server by anyone other than an admin token holder.
|
||||
- Changing released builds or images, including through our CI workflows or their secrets.
|
||||
- Anyone other than the named grantee reaching an emergency access outcome.
|
||||
- With no account: forging login or admin tokens, reading the JWT signing key, reaching the admin panel without the token, or taking over accounts with no action by the victim.
|
||||
|
||||
### High
|
||||
|
||||
- Decrypted reads within the same organization, such as a member reaching collections they are not assigned to.
|
||||
- Changing or deleting another user's or organization's existing data.
|
||||
- Reading another user's server-held secrets, such as their 2FA secrets, API keys, stored master password hash or encrypted user key.
|
||||
- SSRF that returns the response to the attacker.
|
||||
- Escalating within an organization.
|
||||
- Account takeover through SSO.
|
||||
- The named emergency access grantee reaching the outcome early.
|
||||
- Script or a cross-site request acting through an admin panel session.
|
||||
- Script on the vault origin that needs unusual victim interaction.
|
||||
|
||||
### Medium
|
||||
|
||||
- Ciphertext read by someone with no key.
|
||||
- Defeating login brute-force protection.
|
||||
- 2FA bypass that needs the password, such as a remembered device still skipping 2FA after the method is removed.
|
||||
- A refresh token still working after a password change or "Deauthorize sessions".
|
||||
- Getting past an organization policy the server enforces.
|
||||
- Adding data to another user's or organization's space without permission.
|
||||
- Data loss for another user or organization that the attacker cannot reliably trigger or aim.
|
||||
- SSRF where the response is filtered or blind.
|
||||
- Reading a Send that is disabled or expired.
|
||||
- Denial of service that lasts until someone restarts the server or repairs data, from one request with no account in the default configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
### Low
|
||||
|
||||
These may be handled as ordinary hardening.
|
||||
|
||||
- Behavior that differs from upstream Bitwarden with low impact.
|
||||
- Bypassing a non-default limit, such as `USER_ATTACHMENT_LIMIT`.
|
||||
- Metadata across a boundary, such as who is assigned to which collection.
|
||||
- Exceeding a Send's access limits when the attacker already holds the link.
|
||||
- A missing rate limit outside login.
|
||||
- Forging organization audit events.
|
||||
- Other ways to tell whether an email has an account.
|
||||
- Denial of service that lasts until someone acts, from one operation that needs an account or a non-default setting.
|
||||
- Denial of service that lasts only while the attacker keeps going or that recovers by itself, such as a crash the container restarts from.
|
||||
@@ -16,13 +16,6 @@ fn main() {
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "s3")]
|
||||
println!("cargo:rustc-cfg=s3");
|
||||
|
||||
// Use check-cfg to let cargo know which cfg's we define,
|
||||
// and avoid warnings when they are used in the code.
|
||||
println!("cargo::rustc-check-cfg=cfg(sqlite)");
|
||||
println!("cargo::rustc-check-cfg=cfg(mysql)");
|
||||
println!("cargo::rustc-check-cfg=cfg(postgresql)");
|
||||
println!("cargo::rustc-check-cfg=cfg(s3)");
|
||||
|
||||
// Rerun when these paths are changed.
|
||||
// Someone could have checked-out a tag or specific commit, but no other files changed.
|
||||
println!("cargo:rerun-if-changed=.git");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
|
||||
---
|
||||
vault_version: "v2026.7.0"
|
||||
vault_image_digest: "sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c"
|
||||
# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.9.0
|
||||
vault_version: "v2026.10.1"
|
||||
vault_image_digest: "sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52"
|
||||
# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.10.0
|
||||
# We use the linux/amd64 platform shell scripts since there is no difference between the different platform scripts
|
||||
# https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx | https://hub.docker.com/r/tonistiigi/xx/tags
|
||||
xx_image_digest: "sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707"
|
||||
xx_image_digest: "sha256:40fe21f44bb8cddf1eb1226db190d0a984118f62ee02a91b77d99448d28264a6"
|
||||
# The `rust_version` variable is extracted from `rust-toolchain.toml`
|
||||
# rust_version: x.yy.z # Rust version to be used
|
||||
debian_version: trixie # Debian release name to be used
|
||||
|
||||
+10
-10
@@ -19,23 +19,23 @@
|
||||
# - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
|
||||
# click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
|
||||
# - From the command line:
|
||||
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
|
||||
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
|
||||
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
|
||||
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
|
||||
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
|
||||
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
|
||||
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
|
||||
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
|
||||
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52
|
||||
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1]
|
||||
#
|
||||
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault
|
||||
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52 AS vault
|
||||
|
||||
########################## ALPINE BUILD IMAGES ##########################
|
||||
## NOTE: The Alpine Base Images do not support other platforms then linux/amd64 and linux/arm64
|
||||
## And for Alpine we define all build images here, they will only be loaded when actually used
|
||||
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.99.0 AS build_amd64
|
||||
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.99.0 AS build_arm64
|
||||
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.99.0 AS build_armv7
|
||||
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.99.0 AS build_armv6
|
||||
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.100.0 AS build_amd64
|
||||
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.100.0 AS build_arm64
|
||||
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.100.0 AS build_armv7
|
||||
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.100.0 AS build_armv6
|
||||
|
||||
########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
|
||||
# hadolint ignore=DL3006
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -19,24 +19,24 @@
|
||||
# - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
|
||||
# click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
|
||||
# - From the command line:
|
||||
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
|
||||
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0
|
||||
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c]
|
||||
# $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
|
||||
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
|
||||
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52]
|
||||
#
|
||||
# - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
|
||||
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c
|
||||
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.7.0]
|
||||
# $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52
|
||||
# [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1]
|
||||
#
|
||||
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:ba8bab66d4330ab9dbafa8f245bcbe99cf6ee3f2c8ce9b5fbb10e9c49658451c AS vault
|
||||
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52 AS vault
|
||||
|
||||
########################## Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts ##########################
|
||||
## We use the linux/amd64 no matter which Build Platform, since these are all bash scripts
|
||||
## And these bash scripts do not have any significant difference if at all
|
||||
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707 AS xx
|
||||
FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:40fe21f44bb8cddf1eb1226db190d0a984118f62ee02a91b77d99448d28264a6 AS xx
|
||||
|
||||
########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
|
||||
# hadolint ignore=DL3006
|
||||
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.99.0-slim-trixie AS build
|
||||
FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.100.0-slim-trixie AS build
|
||||
# hadolint ignore=DL3067
|
||||
COPY --from=xx / /
|
||||
ARG TARGETARCH
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ Some unsupported platforms for Debian based images. These are not built and test
|
||||
- 386 (linux/386)
|
||||
- ppc64le (linux/ppc64le)
|
||||
- s390x (linux/s390x)
|
||||
- riscv64 (linux/riscv64)
|
||||
|
||||
To build these containers you need to enable QEMU binfmt support to be able to run/emulate architectures which are different then your host.<br>
|
||||
This ensures the container build process can run binaries from other architectures.<br>
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -148,6 +148,12 @@ target "debian-s390x" {
|
||||
platforms = ["linux/s390x"]
|
||||
tags = generate_tags("", "-s390x")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
target "debian-riscv64" {
|
||||
inherits = ["debian"]
|
||||
platforms = ["linux/riscv64"]
|
||||
tags = generate_tags("", "-riscv64")
|
||||
}
|
||||
// ==== End of unsupported Debian architecture targets ===
|
||||
|
||||
// A Group to build all platforms individually for local testing
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ proc-macro = true
|
||||
|
||||
[dependencies]
|
||||
quote = "1.0.47"
|
||||
syn = "3.0.6"
|
||||
syn = "3.0.10"
|
||||
|
||||
[lints]
|
||||
workspace = true
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ fn impl_derive_uuid_macro(ast: &DeriveInput) -> TokenStream {
|
||||
|
||||
#[inline(always)]
|
||||
fn from_param(param: &'r str) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
if uuid::Uuid::parse_str(param).is_ok() {
|
||||
if uuid::Uuid::try_parse(param).is_ok() {
|
||||
Ok(Self(param.to_string()))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Err(())
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
||||
-- DATETIME (not TIMESTAMP) to match this repo's convention for revision_date
|
||||
-- columns elsewhere, and to avoid MySQL's implicit session-timezone
|
||||
-- conversion and 2038 range limit on TIMESTAMP.
|
||||
ALTER TABLE org_policies
|
||||
ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
|
||||
|
||||
UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = UTC_TIMESTAMP();
|
||||
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
-- A blob-encrypted cipher keeps all of its content in `data`, up to 500,000 characters, so the
|
||||
-- 64 KiB of TEXT is too small. Like upstream, which uses LONGTEXT.
|
||||
ALTER TABLE ciphers MODIFY data LONGTEXT NOT NULL;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
|
||||
uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||
user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE,
|
||||
signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
|
||||
signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
|
||||
updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
|
||||
FOREIGN KEY (user_uuid) REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
|
||||
-- Dropping the permissions would silently take them away from the Custom members, who would also keep a role (4) the
|
||||
-- versions before this one don't know. So while there are any, this fails on the duplicate key below, before anything
|
||||
-- is dropped: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade.
|
||||
-- A failed attempt leaves the temporary table on this connection. Clear it before retrying.
|
||||
DROP TEMPORARY TABLE IF EXISTS custom_role_downgrade;
|
||||
CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
|
||||
SELECT 'Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
|
||||
FROM users_organizations WHERE atype = 4 LIMIT 1;
|
||||
DROP TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations
|
||||
DROP COLUMN manage_users,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN manage_groups,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN manage_policies,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN create_new_collections,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN edit_any_collection,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN delete_any_collection,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN access_event_logs,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN access_import_export,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN access_reports;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
-- The granular permissions of the Custom member role. They only take effect on a Custom membership
|
||||
-- (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and every existing membership starts without any.
|
||||
-- A single statement, so an interrupted upgrade cannot leave only some of the columns behind.
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations
|
||||
ADD COLUMN manage_users BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN manage_groups BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN manage_policies BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN create_new_collections BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN edit_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN delete_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN access_event_logs BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN access_import_export BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN access_reports BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
|
||||
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
||||
-- Key rotations before this kept the id of the old user key, so every new
|
||||
-- cipher was refused from then on. Stale ids can't be told apart, so clear
|
||||
-- all of them; clients record their current key's id again when it's empty.
|
||||
UPDATE users SET key_id = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
-- Dropping the permission would silently take it away from the Custom members holding it. So while there are any,
|
||||
-- this fails on the duplicate key below, before anything is dropped: take it away first, or restore the backup
|
||||
-- taken before the upgrade.
|
||||
-- A failed attempt leaves the temporary table on this connection. Clear it before retrying.
|
||||
DROP TEMPORARY TABLE IF EXISTS custom_role_downgrade;
|
||||
CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
|
||||
SELECT 'Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
|
||||
FROM users_organizations WHERE manage_reset_password LIMIT 1;
|
||||
DROP TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_reset_password;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
-- The Manage account recovery permission of the Custom member role. Like the other permissions it only takes
|
||||
-- effect on a Custom membership (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and nobody starts with it.
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_reset_password BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
ALTER TABLE org_policies DROP COLUMN revision_date;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
||||
-- Backfill via `now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc'` rather than a DEFAULT of now():
|
||||
-- assigning timestamptz now() into a naive TIMESTAMP column casts through
|
||||
-- the server's TimeZone GUC, so a DEFAULT now() would store local wall-clock
|
||||
-- instead of UTC on non-UTC servers, unlike every other naive-UTC timestamp
|
||||
-- column in this schema.
|
||||
ALTER TABLE org_policies
|
||||
ADD COLUMN revision_date TIMESTAMP NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
|
||||
|
||||
UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = (now() AT TIME ZONE 'utc');
|
||||
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change.
|
||||
-- PostgreSQL rejects a migration that is only comments ("Received an empty query"), hence the no-op.
|
||||
SELECT 1;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
|
||||
uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||
user_uuid CHAR(36) NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||||
signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
|
||||
signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
created_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL,
|
||||
updated_at TIMESTAMP NOT NULL
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
||||
-- Dropping the permissions would silently take them away from the Custom members, who would also keep a role (4) the
|
||||
-- versions before this one don't know. So while there are any, this fails on the duplicate key below: change their
|
||||
-- role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade. It needs to run in one transaction, as Diesel does.
|
||||
CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
|
||||
SELECT 'Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
|
||||
FROM users_organizations WHERE atype = 4 LIMIT 1;
|
||||
DROP TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations
|
||||
DROP COLUMN manage_users,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN manage_groups,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN manage_policies,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN create_new_collections,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN edit_any_collection,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN delete_any_collection,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN access_event_logs,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN access_import_export,
|
||||
DROP COLUMN access_reports;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
-- The granular permissions of the Custom member role. They only take effect on a Custom membership
|
||||
-- (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and every existing membership starts without any.
|
||||
-- A single statement, so an interrupted upgrade cannot leave only some of the columns behind.
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations
|
||||
ADD COLUMN manage_users BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN manage_groups BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN manage_policies BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN create_new_collections BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN edit_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN delete_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN access_event_logs BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN access_import_export BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
|
||||
ADD COLUMN access_reports BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
|
||||
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
||||
-- Key rotations before this kept the id of the old user key, so every new
|
||||
-- cipher was refused from then on. Stale ids can't be told apart, so clear
|
||||
-- all of them; clients record their current key's id again when it's empty.
|
||||
UPDATE users SET key_id = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
|
||||
+11
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
||||
-- Dropping the permission would silently take it away from the Custom members holding it. So while there are any,
|
||||
-- this fails on the duplicate key below: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade.
|
||||
-- It needs to run in one transaction, as Diesel does.
|
||||
CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
|
||||
SELECT 'Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
|
||||
FROM users_organizations WHERE manage_reset_password LIMIT 1;
|
||||
DROP TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_reset_password;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
-- The Manage account recovery permission of the Custom member role. Like the other permissions it only takes
|
||||
-- effect on a Custom membership (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and nobody starts with it.
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_reset_password BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
|
||||
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
||||
-- SQLite forbids non-constant defaults in ALTER TABLE ... ADD COLUMN, so add
|
||||
-- the column with a constant placeholder and backfill separately.
|
||||
ALTER TABLE org_policies
|
||||
ADD COLUMN revision_date DATETIME NOT NULL DEFAULT '1970-01-01 00:00:00';
|
||||
|
||||
UPDATE org_policies SET revision_date = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP;
|
||||
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
|
||||
-- TEXT has no size limit here, only MySQL needed the change
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
|
||||
DROP TABLE IF EXISTS user_signature_key_pairs;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN signed_public_key;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_state;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN security_version;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN signed_public_key TEXT;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_state TEXT;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN security_version INTEGER;
|
||||
|
||||
CREATE TABLE user_signature_key_pairs (
|
||||
uuid TEXT NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY,
|
||||
user_uuid TEXT NOT NULL UNIQUE REFERENCES users (uuid) ON DELETE CASCADE,
|
||||
signature_algorithm INTEGER NOT NULL, -- 0 = ed25519, 1 = mldsa44
|
||||
signing_key TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
verifying_key TEXT NOT NULL,
|
||||
created_at DATETIME NOT NULL,
|
||||
updated_at DATETIME NOT NULL
|
||||
);
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
|
||||
-- Dropping the permissions would silently take them away from the Custom members, who would also keep a role (4) the
|
||||
-- versions before this one don't know. So while there are any, this fails on the duplicate key below: change their
|
||||
-- role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade. It needs to run in one transaction, as Diesel does.
|
||||
CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
|
||||
SELECT 'Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
|
||||
FROM users_organizations WHERE atype = 4 LIMIT 1;
|
||||
DROP TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_users;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_groups;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_policies;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN create_new_collections;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN edit_any_collection;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN delete_any_collection;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN access_event_logs;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN access_import_export;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN access_reports;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
||||
-- The granular permissions of the Custom member role. They only take effect on a Custom membership
|
||||
-- (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and every existing membership starts without any.
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_users BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_groups BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_policies BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN create_new_collections BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN edit_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN delete_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN access_event_logs BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN access_import_export BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN access_reports BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
|
||||
Whitespace-only changes.
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
|
||||
-- Key rotations before this kept the id of the old user key, so every new
|
||||
-- cipher was refused from then on. Stale ids can't be told apart, so clear
|
||||
-- all of them; clients record their current key's id again when it's empty.
|
||||
UPDATE users SET key_id = NULL;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN v2_upgrade_token;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN v2_upgrade_token TEXT;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
|
||||
-- Dropping the permission would silently take it away from the Custom members holding it. So while there are any,
|
||||
-- this fails on the duplicate key below: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade.
|
||||
-- It needs to run in one transaction, as Diesel does.
|
||||
CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
|
||||
INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
|
||||
SELECT 'Manage account recovery: take it away first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
|
||||
FROM users_organizations WHERE manage_reset_password LIMIT 1;
|
||||
DROP TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
|
||||
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_reset_password;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
|
||||
-- The Manage account recovery permission of the Custom member role. Like the other permissions it only takes
|
||||
-- effect on a Custom membership (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and nobody starts with it.
|
||||
ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_reset_password BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
|
||||
import { test, expect, type Page, type TestInfo, Test } from '@playwright/test';
|
||||
import { MailDev } from 'maildev';
|
||||
|
||||
import * as utils from "../global-utils";
|
||||
import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
|
||||
import { activateTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
|
||||
|
||||
let users = utils.loadEnv();
|
||||
let mailserver;
|
||||
|
||||
test.beforeAll('Setup', async ({ browser }, testInfo: TestInfo) => {
|
||||
mailserver = new MailDev({
|
||||
port: process.env.MAILDEV_SMTP_PORT,
|
||||
web: { port: process.env.MAILDEV_HTTP_PORT },
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
await mailserver.listen();
|
||||
|
||||
await utils.startVault(browser, testInfo, {
|
||||
SMTP_HOST: process.env.MAILDEV_HOST,
|
||||
SMTP_FROM: process.env.PW_SMTP_FROM,
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test.afterAll('Teardown', async ({}) => {
|
||||
utils.stopVault();
|
||||
if( mailserver ){
|
||||
await mailserver.close();
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
async function emergencyAccess(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string }) {
|
||||
await test.step('Navigate', async () => {
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Emergency access' }).click();
|
||||
await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Emergency access', { exact: true })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
test('Emergency access', async ({ browser, page }) => {
|
||||
const context2 = await browser.newContext();
|
||||
const page2 = await context2.newPage();
|
||||
|
||||
const mailBuffer = mailserver.buffer(users.user1.email);
|
||||
const mailBuffer2 = mailserver.buffer(users.user2.email);
|
||||
|
||||
await createAccount(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
await createAccount(test, page2, users.user2);
|
||||
|
||||
await test.step('Add test2', async () => {
|
||||
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Add emergency contact' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email * (required)' }).fill(users.user2.email);
|
||||
await page.getByRole('radio', { name: 'Takeover Can reset your' }).check();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
|
||||
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'User(s) invited');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await test.step('Accept', async () => {
|
||||
const email = await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access for " + users.user1.name);
|
||||
const pageE = await context2.newPage();
|
||||
await pageE.setContent(email.html);
|
||||
const link = await pageE.getByTestId("emergency").getAttribute("href");
|
||||
await pageE.close();
|
||||
|
||||
await page2.goto(link);
|
||||
await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Invitation accepted');
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await test.step('Confirm', async () => {
|
||||
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
await expect(page.locator('#main-content').getByText('Needs confirmation')).toBeVisible();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Confirm' }).click();
|
||||
await utils.checkNotification(page, users.user2.name + ' confirmed');
|
||||
await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access contact for " + users.user1.name + " confirmed");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await test.step('Request', async () => {
|
||||
await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
|
||||
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
|
||||
await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
|
||||
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Request Access' }).click();
|
||||
await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Emergency access requested');
|
||||
await mailBuffer.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request by " + users.user2.name + " initiated");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await test.step('Approved', async () => {
|
||||
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Approve' }).click();
|
||||
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access approved');
|
||||
await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request for " + users.user1.name + " approved");
|
||||
});
|
||||
await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
|
||||
let newPassword = "TotoNewPassword";
|
||||
await test.step('Access', async () => {
|
||||
await emergencyAccess(test, page2, users.user2);
|
||||
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
|
||||
await page2.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Takeover' }).click();
|
||||
await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'New master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(newPassword);
|
||||
await page2.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Confirm new master password' }).fill(newPassword);
|
||||
await page2.getByRole('button', { name: 'Save' }).click();
|
||||
await utils.checkNotification(page2, 'Password reset for ' + users.user1.name);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await test.step('Changed no 2fa', async () => {
|
||||
users.user1.password = newPassword;
|
||||
await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await test.step('Reject', async () => {
|
||||
await emergencyAccess(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Reject' }).click();
|
||||
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Emergency access rejected');
|
||||
await mailBuffer2.expect((m) => m.subject === "Emergency access request to " + users.user1.name + " rejected");
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await test.step('Remove', async () => {
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Options' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Remove' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Yes' }).click();
|
||||
await utils.checkNotification(page, 'Removed user ' + users.user2.name);
|
||||
await expect(page.getByText('You have not added any emergency contacts')).toBeVisible();
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
|
||||
|
||||
import * as utils from "../global-utils";
|
||||
import { createAccount, logUser } from './setups/user';
|
||||
import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP } from './setups/2fa';
|
||||
import { activateTOTP, disableTOTP, recoveryCodes } from './setups/2fa';
|
||||
|
||||
let users = utils.loadEnv();
|
||||
let totp;
|
||||
@@ -31,21 +31,42 @@ test('Authenticator 2fa', async ({ page }) => {
|
||||
|
||||
await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
|
||||
await test.step('login', async () => {
|
||||
let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
|
||||
timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
|
||||
await logUser(test, page, users.user1, { totp });
|
||||
|
||||
await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
test('Recovery codes', async ({ context, page }) => {
|
||||
await logUser(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
|
||||
await activateTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
let recovery = await recoveryCodes(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
|
||||
await utils.logout(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
|
||||
await test.step('login', async () => {
|
||||
await page.getByLabel(/Email address/).fill(users.user1.email);
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(users.user1.password);
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate({timestamp}));
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(page).toHaveTitle(/Vaultwarden Web/);
|
||||
|
||||
const newPagePromise = context.waitForEvent('page');
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Use your recovery code' }).click();
|
||||
const newPage = await newPagePromise;
|
||||
|
||||
const tabs = context.pages();
|
||||
await tabs[1].bringToFront();
|
||||
await expect(tabs[1].getByRole('heading', { name: 'Recover account two-step login' })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Email address * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.email);
|
||||
await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)' }).fill(users.user1.password);
|
||||
await tabs[1].getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Recovery code * (required)' }).fill(recovery);
|
||||
await tabs[1].getByRole('button', { name: 'Submit' }).click();
|
||||
|
||||
await expect(tabs[1]).toHaveTitle(/Two-step login/);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
await disableTOTP(test, page, users.user1);
|
||||
});
|
||||
@@ -4,6 +4,24 @@ import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
|
||||
|
||||
import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
|
||||
|
||||
export async function recoveryCodes(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): string {
|
||||
return await test.step('Recovery code', async () => {
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('menuitem', { name: 'Account settings' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Security' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('link', { name: 'Two-step login' }).click();
|
||||
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'View recovery code' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
|
||||
|
||||
const recovery = await page.getByRole('code').innerText();
|
||||
await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
|
||||
|
||||
return recovery;
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string, password: string }): OTPAuth.TOTP {
|
||||
return await test.step('Activate TOTP 2FA', async () => {
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: user.name }).click();
|
||||
@@ -21,7 +39,6 @@ export async function activateTOTP(test: Test, page: Page, user: { name: string,
|
||||
await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(totp.generate());
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Turn on' }).click();
|
||||
await page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Turned on', exact: true });
|
||||
await page.getByLabel('Close').click();
|
||||
|
||||
return totp;
|
||||
})
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ import { expect, type Browser, Page } from '@playwright/test';
|
||||
|
||||
import { type MailBuffer } from 'maildev';
|
||||
|
||||
import * as OTPAuth from "otpauth";
|
||||
import * as utils from '../../global-utils';
|
||||
import { retrieveEmailCode } from './2fa';
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -43,6 +44,7 @@ export async function logUser(
|
||||
mailBuffer ?: MailBuffer,
|
||||
mail2fa?: boolean,
|
||||
notNewDevice?: boolean,
|
||||
totp?: OTPAuth.TOTP,
|
||||
} = {}
|
||||
) {
|
||||
await test.step(`Log user ${user.email}`, async () => {
|
||||
@@ -55,11 +57,23 @@ export async function logUser(
|
||||
await page.getByRole('textbox', { name: 'Master password * (required)', exact: true }).fill(user.password);
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Log in', exact: true }).click();
|
||||
|
||||
if( options.mail2fa ){
|
||||
if( options.mail2fa || options.totp ){
|
||||
let code;
|
||||
|
||||
await test.step('2FA check', async () => {
|
||||
await expect(page.getByRole('heading', { name: 'Verify your Identity' })).toBeVisible();
|
||||
let code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
|
||||
|
||||
if( options.totp ) {
|
||||
const totp = options.totp;
|
||||
let timestamp = Date.now(); // Needed to use the next token
|
||||
timestamp = timestamp + (totp.period - (Math.floor(timestamp / 1000) % totp.period) + 1) * 1000;
|
||||
code = totp.generate({timestamp});
|
||||
} else if( options.mail2fa ){
|
||||
code = await retrieveEmailCode(test, page, options.mailBuffer);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
await page.getByLabel(/Verification code/).fill(code);
|
||||
|
||||
await page.getByRole('button', { name: 'Continue' }).click();
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+1
-1
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
[toolchain]
|
||||
channel = "1.99.0"
|
||||
channel = "1.100.0"
|
||||
components = [ "rustfmt", "clippy" ]
|
||||
profile = "minimal"
|
||||
+83
-32
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
use std::{env, sync::LazyLock};
|
||||
use std::{collections::HashMap, env, sync::LazyLock};
|
||||
|
||||
use reqwest::Method;
|
||||
use rocket::{
|
||||
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
api::{
|
||||
ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify,
|
||||
core::{log_event, two_factor},
|
||||
unregister_push_device,
|
||||
push_logout_to_relay, unregister_push_device,
|
||||
},
|
||||
auth::{ClientIp, Secure, decode_admin, encode_jwt, generate_admin_claims},
|
||||
config::ConfigBuilder,
|
||||
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
models::{
|
||||
Attachment, Cipher, Collection, Device, Event, EventType, Group, Invitation, Membership, MembershipId,
|
||||
MembershipType, OrgPolicy, Organization, OrganizationId, SsoUser, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
|
||||
custom_roles_enabled,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
error::{Error, MapResult},
|
||||
@@ -124,15 +125,15 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for IpHeader {
|
||||
|
||||
async fn from_request(req: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
if req.headers().get_one(&CONFIG.ip_header()).is_some() {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(IpHeader(Some(CONFIG.ip_header())))
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self(Some(CONFIG.ip_header())))
|
||||
} else if req.headers().get_one("X-Client-IP").is_some() {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(IpHeader(Some(String::from("X-Client-IP"))))
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self(Some(String::from("X-Client-IP"))))
|
||||
} else if req.headers().get_one("X-Real-IP").is_some() {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(IpHeader(Some(String::from("X-Real-IP"))))
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self(Some(String::from("X-Real-IP"))))
|
||||
} else if req.headers().get_one("X-Forwarded-For").is_some() {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(IpHeader(Some(String::from("X-Forwarded-For"))))
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self(Some(String::from("X-Forwarded-For"))))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(IpHeader(None))
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self(None))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -201,12 +202,15 @@ fn post_admin_login(
|
||||
// If the token is invalid, redirect to login page
|
||||
if validate_token(&data.token) {
|
||||
// If the token received is valid, generate JWT and save it as a cookie
|
||||
let claims = generate_admin_claims();
|
||||
let claims = match generate_admin_claims() {
|
||||
Ok(claims) => claims,
|
||||
Err(e) => return Err(AdminResponse::Ok(render_admin_login(Some(e.message()), redirect.as_deref()))),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let jwt = encode_jwt(&claims);
|
||||
|
||||
let cookie = Cookie::build((COOKIE_NAME, jwt))
|
||||
.path(admin_path())
|
||||
.max_age(time::Duration::minutes(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime()))
|
||||
.max_age(rocket::time::Duration::minutes(i64::from(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime())))
|
||||
.same_site(SameSite::Strict)
|
||||
.http_only(true)
|
||||
.secure(secure.https);
|
||||
@@ -253,6 +257,7 @@ struct AdminTemplateData {
|
||||
logged_in: bool,
|
||||
urlpath: String,
|
||||
sso_enabled: bool,
|
||||
custom_roles_enabled: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl AdminTemplateData {
|
||||
@@ -263,6 +268,7 @@ impl AdminTemplateData {
|
||||
logged_in: true,
|
||||
urlpath: CONFIG.domain_path(),
|
||||
sso_enabled: CONFIG.sso_enabled(),
|
||||
custom_roles_enabled: custom_roles_enabled(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -385,7 +391,19 @@ async fn users_overview(_token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<Html<Stri
|
||||
None => json!("Never"),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
usr["sso_identifier"] = json!(sso_u.map_or(String::new(), |u| u.identifier.to_string()));
|
||||
usr["sso_identifier"] = json!(sso_u.map_or_default(|u| u.identifier.to_string()));
|
||||
|
||||
// The clients are shown a Manager as a Custom member, but the admin panel tells the two roles apart
|
||||
let roles: HashMap<String, i32> = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(&u.uuid, &conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.into_iter()
|
||||
.map(|member| (member.org_uuid.to_string(), member.atype))
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
for org in usr["organizations"].as_array_mut().into_iter().flatten() {
|
||||
if let Some(atype) = org["id"].as_str().and_then(|org_id| roles.get(org_id)) {
|
||||
org["type"] = json!(atype);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
users_json.push(usr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -416,13 +434,21 @@ async fn get_user_json(user_id: UserId, _token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> Jso
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[post("/users/<user_id>/delete", format = "application/json")]
|
||||
async fn delete_user(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
async fn delete_user(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let user = get_user_or_404(&user_id, &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Get the membership records before deleting the actual user
|
||||
// Get the membership records and push devices before deleting the actual user
|
||||
let memberships = Membership::find_any_state_by_user(&user_id, &conn).await;
|
||||
let has_push_device = CONFIG.push_enabled() && Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user_id, &conn).await;
|
||||
let res = user.delete(&conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
if res.is_ok() {
|
||||
nt.send_logout(&user, None, &conn).await;
|
||||
if has_push_device {
|
||||
push_logout_to_relay(&user, None, None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for membership in memberships {
|
||||
log_event(
|
||||
EventType::OrganizationUserDeleted,
|
||||
@@ -509,7 +535,7 @@ async fn remove_2fa(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyRe
|
||||
let mut user = get_user_or_404(&user_id, &conn).await?;
|
||||
TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
|
||||
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
|
||||
two_factor::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &ACTING_ADMIN_USER.into(), 14, &token.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
|
||||
two_factor::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &ACTING_ADMIN_USER.into(), 14, &token.ip.ip, true, &conn).await?;
|
||||
user.totp_recover = None;
|
||||
user.save(&conn).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -554,10 +580,14 @@ async fn update_membership_type(data: Json<MembershipTypeData>, token: AdminToke
|
||||
err!("The specified user isn't member of the organization")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = MembershipType::from_str(&data.user_type.into_string()) {
|
||||
new_type as i32
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
err!("Invalid type")
|
||||
let new_type = match MembershipType::from_str(&data.user_type.into_string()) {
|
||||
// Unlike the clients, the admin panel tells the Custom and the legacy Manager role apart. Unless Custom roles
|
||||
// are enabled, a Custom role is a Manager here as well, but an existing Custom member is kept as one.
|
||||
Some(MembershipType::Custom) if !custom_roles_enabled() && !member_to_edit.has_type(MembershipType::Custom) => {
|
||||
MembershipType::Manager
|
||||
}
|
||||
Some(new_type) => new_type,
|
||||
None => err!("Invalid type"),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if member_to_edit.atype == MembershipType::Owner && new_type != MembershipType::Owner {
|
||||
@@ -567,7 +597,16 @@ async fn update_membership_type(data: Json<MembershipTypeData>, token: AdminToke
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
member_to_edit.atype = new_type;
|
||||
// A Manager only becomes a Custom member if that changes nothing they may do. Here they would keep the permissions
|
||||
// they are shown with, the admin panel can't give up their access to all collections, so that is refused.
|
||||
if new_type == MembershipType::Custom
|
||||
&& let Some(loss) =
|
||||
member_to_edit.custom_role_conversion_loss(&member_to_edit.legacy_manager_permissions(), &conn).await
|
||||
{
|
||||
err!(loss)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
member_to_edit.set_type(new_type);
|
||||
// This check is also done at api::organizations::{accept_invite, _confirm_invite, _activate_member, edit_member}, update_membership_type
|
||||
OrgPolicy::check_user_allowed(&member_to_edit, "modify", &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -638,28 +677,33 @@ async fn has_http_access() -> bool {
|
||||
let Ok(req) = make_http_request(Method::HEAD, "https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden") else {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
};
|
||||
match req.send().await {
|
||||
Ok(r) => r.status().is_success(),
|
||||
_ => false,
|
||||
}
|
||||
req.send().await.is_ok_and(|r| r.status().is_success())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
use cached::macros::cached;
|
||||
/// Cache this function to prevent API call rate limit. Github only allows 60 requests per hour, and we use 3 here already
|
||||
/// It will cache this function for 600 seconds (10 minutes) which should prevent the exhaustion of the rate limit
|
||||
/// Any cache will be lost if Vaultwarden is restarted
|
||||
#[cached(ttl_secs = 600, sync_writes = "default")]
|
||||
async fn get_release_info(has_http_access: bool) -> (String, String, String) {
|
||||
// Cache this function to prevent API call rate limit. Github only allows 60 requests per hour, and we use 3 here already
|
||||
// It will cache this function for 600 seconds (10 minutes) which should prevent the exhaustion of the rate limit
|
||||
// Any cache will be lost if Vaultwarden is restarted
|
||||
static CACHE: LazyLock<moka::future::Cache<bool, (String, String, String)>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
|
||||
moka::future::Cache::builder().max_capacity(2).time_to_live(std::time::Duration::from_mins(10)).build()
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
CACHE
|
||||
.get_with(has_http_access, async {
|
||||
// If the HTTP Check failed, do not even attempt to check for new versions since we were not able to connect with github.com anyway.
|
||||
if has_http_access {
|
||||
(
|
||||
match get_json_api::<GitRelease>("https://api.github.com/repos/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/latest")
|
||||
match get_json_api::<GitRelease>(
|
||||
"https://api.github.com/repos/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/releases/latest",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
{
|
||||
Ok(r) => r.tag_name,
|
||||
_ => "-".to_owned(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
match get_json_api::<GitCommit>("https://api.github.com/repos/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/commits/main").await {
|
||||
match get_json_api::<GitCommit>("https://api.github.com/repos/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/commits/main")
|
||||
.await
|
||||
{
|
||||
Ok(mut c) => {
|
||||
c.sha.truncate(8);
|
||||
c.sha
|
||||
@@ -668,7 +712,9 @@ async fn get_release_info(has_http_access: bool) -> (String, String, String) {
|
||||
},
|
||||
// Do not fetch the web-vault version when running within a container
|
||||
// The web-vault version is embedded within the container it self, and should not be updated manually
|
||||
match get_json_api::<GitRelease>("https://api.github.com/repos/dani-garcia/bw_web_builds/releases/latest")
|
||||
match get_json_api::<GitRelease>(
|
||||
"https://api.github.com/repos/dani-garcia/bw_web_builds/releases/latest",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
{
|
||||
Ok(r) => r.tag_name.trim_start_matches('v').to_owned(),
|
||||
@@ -678,6 +724,8 @@ async fn get_release_info(has_http_access: bool) -> (String, String, String) {
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
("-".to_owned(), "-".to_owned(), "-".to_owned())
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
.await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_ntp_time(has_http_access: bool) -> String {
|
||||
@@ -779,6 +827,8 @@ async fn diagnostics(_token: AdminToken, ip_header: IpHeader, conn: DbConn) -> A
|
||||
.into_keys()
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
let invalid_env_vars = crate::util::INVALID_ENV_VARS.lock().unwrap().join(", ");
|
||||
|
||||
let diagnostics_json = json!({
|
||||
"dns_resolved": dns_resolved,
|
||||
"current_release": VERSION,
|
||||
@@ -801,7 +851,9 @@ async fn diagnostics(_token: AdminToken, ip_header: IpHeader, conn: DbConn) -> A
|
||||
"db_version": get_sql_server_version(&conn).await,
|
||||
"admin_url": format!("{}/diagnostics", admin_url()),
|
||||
"overrides": &CONFIG.get_overrides().join(", "),
|
||||
"config_file_status": &CONFIG.get_config_file_status(),
|
||||
"template_overrides": check_template_overrides().join(", "),
|
||||
"invalid_env_vars": invalid_env_vars,
|
||||
"invalid_feature_flags": invalid_feature_flags,
|
||||
"host_arch": env::consts::ARCH,
|
||||
"host_os": env::consts::OS,
|
||||
@@ -874,8 +926,7 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for AdminToken {
|
||||
let access_token = if let Some(cookie) = cookies.get(COOKIE_NAME) {
|
||||
cookie.value()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let requested_page =
|
||||
request.segments::<std::path::PathBuf>(0..).unwrap_or_default().display().to_string();
|
||||
let requested_page = request.segments::<std::path::PathBuf>(0..).unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
// When the requested page is empty, it is `/admin`, in that case, Forward, so it will render the login page
|
||||
// Else, return a 401 failure, which will be caught
|
||||
if requested_page.is_empty() {
|
||||
|
||||
+1042
-209
File diff suppressed because it is too large.
Load diff
+1097
-382
File diff suppressed because it is too large.
Load diff
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
|
||||
use chrono::Utc;
|
||||
use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
|
||||
use serde_json::Value;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -6,14 +6,18 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
CONFIG,
|
||||
api::{
|
||||
EmptyResult, JsonResult,
|
||||
core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType},
|
||||
core::{
|
||||
CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType,
|
||||
accounts::{AuthenticationData, UnlockData},
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
auth::{Headers, decode_emergency_access_invite},
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn, DbPool,
|
||||
models::{
|
||||
Cipher, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType, Invitation,
|
||||
Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
|
||||
Attachment, AttachmentId, Cipher, CipherId, EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE, EmergencyAccess,
|
||||
EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType, Invitation, Membership, MembershipType,
|
||||
OrgPolicy, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
mail,
|
||||
@@ -39,6 +43,7 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
|
||||
takeover_emergency_access,
|
||||
password_emergency_access,
|
||||
view_emergency_access,
|
||||
get_emergency_access_attachment,
|
||||
policies_emergency_access,
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -133,19 +138,21 @@ async fn post_emergency_access(
|
||||
|
||||
let data: EmergencyAccessUpdateData = data.into_inner();
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) else {
|
||||
err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&data.wait_time_days) {
|
||||
err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(mut emergency_access) =
|
||||
EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantor_uuid(&emer_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
|
||||
else {
|
||||
err!("Emergency access not valid.")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) {
|
||||
new_type as i32
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
emergency_access.atype = new_type;
|
||||
emergency_access.atype = new_type as i32;
|
||||
emergency_access.wait_time_days = data.wait_time_days;
|
||||
if data.key_encrypted.is_some() {
|
||||
emergency_access.key_encrypted = data.key_encrypted;
|
||||
@@ -207,11 +214,11 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
|
||||
let email = data.email.to_lowercase();
|
||||
let wait_time_days = data.wait_time_days;
|
||||
|
||||
let emergency_access_status = EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32;
|
||||
if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&wait_time_days) {
|
||||
err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) {
|
||||
new_type as i32
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) else {
|
||||
err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -257,6 +264,8 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
|
||||
err!(format!("Grantee user already invited: {}", &grantee_user.email))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let new_type = new_type as i32;
|
||||
let emergency_access_status = EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32;
|
||||
let mut new_emergency_access =
|
||||
EmergencyAccess::new(grantor_user.uuid, grantee_user.email, emergency_access_status, new_type, wait_time_days);
|
||||
new_emergency_access.save(&conn).await?;
|
||||
@@ -289,7 +298,7 @@ async fn resend_invite(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32 {
|
||||
err!("The grantee user is already accepted or confirmed to the organization");
|
||||
err!("The grantee user is already accepted or confirmed for emergency access");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(email) = emergency_access.email.clone() else {
|
||||
@@ -450,11 +459,24 @@ async fn initiate_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
|
||||
let Some(mut emergency_access) =
|
||||
EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantee_uuid(&emer_id, &initiating_user.uuid, &conn).await
|
||||
else {
|
||||
err!("Emergency access not valid.")
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"Emergency access not valid.",
|
||||
format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not found for user '{}'.", initiating_user.email)
|
||||
)
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::Confirmed as i32 {
|
||||
err!("Emergency access not valid.")
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"Emergency access not valid.",
|
||||
format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not confirmed for user '{}'.", initiating_user.email)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE.contains(&emergency_access.wait_time_days) {
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"Emergency access not valid.",
|
||||
format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}' timeout range '{}' is invalid", emergency_access.wait_time_days)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emergency_access.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
|
||||
@@ -487,11 +509,17 @@ async fn approve_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
|
||||
let Some(mut emergency_access) =
|
||||
EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantor_uuid(&emer_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
|
||||
else {
|
||||
err!("Emergency access not valid.")
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"Emergency access not valid.",
|
||||
format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not found for user '{}'.", headers.user.email)
|
||||
)
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryInitiated as i32 {
|
||||
err!("Emergency access not valid.")
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"Emergency access not valid.",
|
||||
format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not initiated for user '{}'.", headers.user.email)
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await else {
|
||||
@@ -590,6 +618,46 @@ async fn view_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers, con
|
||||
})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// An attachment of the grantor's for a grantee with approved view access, with a `url` to download it from: the view
|
||||
/// lists the attachments with one that only names the file. Only the grantor's own ciphers, the ones the view lists.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Api/Auth/Controllers/EmergencyAccessController.cs#L219-L226>
|
||||
#[get("/emergency-access/<emer_id>/<cipher_id>/attachment/<attachment_id>")]
|
||||
async fn get_emergency_access_attachment(
|
||||
emer_id: EmergencyAccessId,
|
||||
cipher_id: CipherId,
|
||||
attachment_id: AttachmentId,
|
||||
headers: Headers,
|
||||
conn: DbConn,
|
||||
) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
check_emergency_access_enabled()?;
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(emergency_access) =
|
||||
EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantee_uuid(&emer_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
|
||||
else {
|
||||
err!("Emergency access not valid.")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if !is_valid_request(&emergency_access, &headers.user.uuid, EmergencyAccessType::View) {
|
||||
err!("Emergency access not valid.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(&cipher_id, &conn).await else {
|
||||
err!("Cipher doesn't exist")
|
||||
};
|
||||
if cipher.user_uuid.as_ref() != Some(&emergency_access.grantor_uuid) || cipher.organization_uuid.is_some() {
|
||||
err!("Cipher is not accessible")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
match Attachment::find_by_id(&attachment_id, &conn).await {
|
||||
Some(attachment) if attachment.cipher_uuid == cipher_id => {
|
||||
Ok(Json(attachment.to_json_for_download(&headers.host).await?))
|
||||
}
|
||||
Some(_) => err!("Attachment doesn't belong to cipher"),
|
||||
None => err!("Attachment doesn't exist"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[post("/emergency-access/<emer_id>/takeover")]
|
||||
async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
check_emergency_access_enabled()?;
|
||||
@@ -615,6 +683,7 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
|
||||
"kdfMemory": grantor_user.client_kdf_memory,
|
||||
"kdfParallelism": grantor_user.client_kdf_parallelism,
|
||||
"keyEncrypted": &emergency_access.key_encrypted,
|
||||
"salt": grantor_user.master_password_salt(),
|
||||
"object": "emergencyAccessTakeover",
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -624,8 +693,13 @@ async fn takeover_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct EmergencyAccessPasswordData {
|
||||
new_master_password_hash: String,
|
||||
key: String,
|
||||
// Legacy payload
|
||||
new_master_password_hash: Option<String>,
|
||||
key: Option<String>,
|
||||
|
||||
// Current payload
|
||||
authentication_data: Option<AuthenticationData>,
|
||||
unlock_data: Option<UnlockData>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[post("/emergency-access/<emer_id>/password", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
@@ -638,8 +712,6 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
|
||||
check_emergency_access_enabled()?;
|
||||
|
||||
let data: EmergencyAccessPasswordData = data.into_inner();
|
||||
let new_master_password_hash = &data.new_master_password_hash;
|
||||
//let key = &data.Key;
|
||||
|
||||
let requesting_user = headers.user;
|
||||
let Some(emergency_access) =
|
||||
@@ -656,8 +728,23 @@ async fn password_emergency_access(
|
||||
err!("Grantor user not found.")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let (new_master_password_hash, new_key) =
|
||||
if let (Some(authentication_data), Some(unlock_data)) = (data.authentication_data, data.unlock_data) {
|
||||
authentication_data.check(&grantor_user, &unlock_data)?;
|
||||
|
||||
if !authentication_data.kdf.matches_user(&grantor_user) {
|
||||
err!("KDF settings do not match the grantor account")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
(authentication_data.master_password_authentication_hash, unlock_data.master_key_wrapped_user_key)
|
||||
} else if let (Some(new_master_password_hash), Some(new_key)) = (data.new_master_password_hash, data.key) {
|
||||
(new_master_password_hash, new_key)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
err!("Invalid request!")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// change grantor_user password
|
||||
grantor_user.set_password(new_master_password_hash, Some(data.key), true, None, &conn).await?;
|
||||
grantor_user.set_password(&new_master_password_hash, Some(new_key), true, None, &conn).await?;
|
||||
grantor_user.save(&conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Disable TwoFactor providers since they will otherwise block logins
|
||||
@@ -706,8 +793,7 @@ fn is_valid_request(
|
||||
requesting_user_id: &UserId,
|
||||
requested_access_type: EmergencyAccessType,
|
||||
) -> bool {
|
||||
emergency_access.grantee_uuid.is_some()
|
||||
&& emergency_access.grantee_uuid.as_ref().unwrap() == requesting_user_id
|
||||
emergency_access.grantee_uuid.as_ref().is_some_and(|u| u == requesting_user_id)
|
||||
&& emergency_access.status == EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryApproved as i32
|
||||
&& emergency_access.atype == requested_access_type as i32
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -725,53 +811,72 @@ pub async fn emergency_request_timeout_job(pool: DbPool) {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
|
||||
let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
|
||||
error!("Failed to get DB connection for emergency time-outs!");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
|
||||
debug!("No emergency request timeout to approve");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
|
||||
for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
|
||||
// The find_all_recoveries_initiated already checks if the recovery_initiated_at is not null (None)
|
||||
let recovery_allowed_at =
|
||||
emer.recovery_initiated_at.unwrap() + TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(emer.wait_time_days)).unwrap();
|
||||
if recovery_allowed_at.le(&now) {
|
||||
match emer.is_recovery_allowed(&now) {
|
||||
Ok(true) => {} // Recovery is allowed
|
||||
Ok(false) => continue,
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
error!("Failed to check if recovery is allowed for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Get grantor user to send Accepted email
|
||||
let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
|
||||
error!("Grantor user '{}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.grantor_uuid, emer.uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(grantee_uuid) = emer.grantee_uuid.as_ref() else {
|
||||
error!("Missing grantee for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Get grantee user to send Accepted email
|
||||
let Some(grantee_user) = User::find_by_uuid(grantee_uuid, &conn).await else {
|
||||
error!("Grantee user '{grantee_uuid}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Only update the access status
|
||||
// Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_notification_reminder_job is also active
|
||||
emer.update_access_status_and_save(EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryApproved as i32, &now, &conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("Unable to update emergency access status");
|
||||
let status_initiated = EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryInitiated as i32;
|
||||
let status_approved = EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryApproved as i32;
|
||||
if let Err(e) = emer.update_access_status_and_save(status_initiated, status_approved, &now, &conn).await {
|
||||
error!("Unable to update emergency access status for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
|
||||
// get grantor user to send Accepted email
|
||||
let grantor_user =
|
||||
User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await.expect("Grantor user not found");
|
||||
|
||||
// get grantee user to send Accepted email
|
||||
let grantee_user =
|
||||
User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantee_uuid.clone().expect("Grantee user invalid"), &conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("Grantee user not found");
|
||||
|
||||
mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_timed_out(
|
||||
if let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_timed_out(
|
||||
&grantor_user.email,
|
||||
&grantee_user.name,
|
||||
emer.get_type_as_str(),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("Error on sending email");
|
||||
{
|
||||
error!("Failed to send emergency access recovery time-out email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_approved(&grantee_user.email, &grantor_user.name)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("Error on sending email");
|
||||
if let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_approved(&grantee_user.email, &grantor_user.name).await
|
||||
{
|
||||
error!("Failed to send emergency access recovery approved email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
error!("Failed to get DB connection while searching emergency request timed out");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn emergency_notification_reminder_job(pool: DbPool) {
|
||||
@@ -780,55 +885,85 @@ pub async fn emergency_notification_reminder_job(pool: DbPool) {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
|
||||
let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
|
||||
error!("Failed to get DB connection for emergency reminders!");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
|
||||
debug!("No emergency request reminder notification to send");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
|
||||
for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
|
||||
// The find_all_recoveries_initiated already checks if the recovery_initiated_at is not null (None)
|
||||
// Calculate the day before the recovery will become active
|
||||
let final_recovery_reminder_at =
|
||||
emer.recovery_initiated_at.unwrap() + TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(emer.wait_time_days - 1)).unwrap();
|
||||
// Calculate if a day has passed since the previous notification, else no notification has been sent before
|
||||
let next_recovery_reminder_at = if let Some(last_notification_at) = emer.last_notification_at {
|
||||
last_notification_at + TimeDelta::try_days(1).unwrap()
|
||||
let Ok(deadline_at) = emer.deadline_at() else {
|
||||
error!("Invalid deadline for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(final_reminder_at) = deadline_at.checked_sub_days(chrono::Days::new(1)) else {
|
||||
error!("Cannot calculate reminder date for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Only send reminders during the last 24 hours, else continue
|
||||
if !(final_reminder_at..deadline_at).contains(&now) {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if we did not sent a recovery mail in the past 24h already, else skip it.
|
||||
// In case something goes wrong with the date calculation or `last_notification_at` is None we use now.
|
||||
// This is to prevent possible missed reminders, this might cause an extra reminder,
|
||||
// but that is better then no reminder at all.
|
||||
let next_reminder_at = if let Some(last_notification_at) = emer.last_notification_at {
|
||||
last_notification_at.checked_add_days(chrono::Days::new(1)).unwrap_or(now)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
now
|
||||
};
|
||||
if final_recovery_reminder_at.le(&now) && next_recovery_reminder_at.le(&now) {
|
||||
|
||||
// Only send a reminder if the `next_reminder_at` is less then or equal to `now`
|
||||
// Else we can skip the current emergency access this run.
|
||||
if next_reminder_at.gt(&now) {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Get grantor user to send Reminder email
|
||||
let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
|
||||
error!("Grantor user '{}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.grantor_uuid, emer.uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(grantee_uuid) = emer.grantee_uuid.as_ref() else {
|
||||
error!("Missing grantee for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Get grantee user to send Reminder email
|
||||
let Some(grantee_user) = User::find_by_uuid(grantee_uuid, &conn).await else {
|
||||
error!("Grantee user '{grantee_uuid}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Only update the last notification date
|
||||
// Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_request_timeout_job is also active
|
||||
emer.update_last_notification_date_and_save(&now, &conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("Unable to update emergency access notification date");
|
||||
if let Err(e) = emer.update_last_notification_date_and_save(&now, &conn).await {
|
||||
error!("Unable to update emergency access reminder date for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
|
||||
// get grantor user to send Accepted email
|
||||
let grantor_user =
|
||||
User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await.expect("Grantor user not found");
|
||||
|
||||
// get grantee user to send Accepted email
|
||||
let grantee_user =
|
||||
User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantee_uuid.clone().expect("Grantee user invalid"), &conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("Grantee user not found");
|
||||
|
||||
mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_reminder(
|
||||
if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
|
||||
&& let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_reminder(
|
||||
&grantor_user.email,
|
||||
&grantee_user.name,
|
||||
emer.get_type_as_str(),
|
||||
"1", // This notification is only triggered one day before the activation
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("Error on sending email");
|
||||
{
|
||||
error!("Failed to send emergency access reminder email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
error!("Failed to get DB connection while searching emergency notification reminder");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+39
-21
@@ -7,10 +7,13 @@ use serde_json::Value;
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
CONFIG,
|
||||
api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult},
|
||||
auth::{AdminHeaders, Headers},
|
||||
auth::{AccessEventLogsHeaders, Headers},
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn, DbPool,
|
||||
models::{Cipher, CipherId, Event, EventType, Membership, MembershipId, OrganizationId, UserId},
|
||||
models::{
|
||||
Cipher, CipherAccessScope, CipherId, CustomPermission, Event, EventType, Membership, MembershipId,
|
||||
MembershipType, OrganizationId, UserId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
error::MapResult,
|
||||
util::parse_date,
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +43,12 @@ impl EventRange {
|
||||
|
||||
// Upstream: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/AdminConsole/Controllers/EventsController.cs#L87
|
||||
#[get("/organizations/<org_id>/events?<data..>")]
|
||||
async fn get_org_events(org_id: OrganizationId, data: EventRange, headers: AdminHeaders, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
async fn get_org_events(
|
||||
org_id: OrganizationId,
|
||||
data: EventRange,
|
||||
headers: AccessEventLogsHeaders,
|
||||
conn: DbConn,
|
||||
) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
if org_id != headers.org_id {
|
||||
err!("Organization not found", "Organization id's do not match");
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -70,12 +78,21 @@ async fn get_org_events(org_id: OrganizationId, data: EventRange, headers: Admin
|
||||
async fn get_cipher_events(cipher_id: CipherId, data: EventRange, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
// Return an empty vec when org events are disabled.
|
||||
// This prevents client errors
|
||||
// Only an Owner or Admin of the organization of the cipher, or a Custom member there with Access event logs, gets
|
||||
// its events, and only the ones of that organization
|
||||
let events_json: Vec<Value> = if CONFIG.org_events_enabled()
|
||||
&& Membership::user_has_ge_admin_access_to_cipher(&headers.user.uuid, &cipher_id, &conn).await
|
||||
&& let Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(&cipher_id, &conn).await
|
||||
&& let Some(org_id) = cipher.organization_uuid
|
||||
&& let Some(member) = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(&headers.user.uuid, &org_id, &conn).await
|
||||
&& (member.atype >= MembershipType::Admin || member.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs))
|
||||
{
|
||||
let (start_date, end_date) = data.date_range()?;
|
||||
|
||||
Event::find_by_cipher_uuid(&cipher_id, &start_date, &end_date, &conn).await.iter().map(Event::to_json).collect()
|
||||
Event::find_by_cipher_uuid(&cipher_id, &org_id, &start_date, &end_date, &conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.iter()
|
||||
.map(Event::to_json)
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Vec::new()
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -92,7 +109,7 @@ async fn get_user_events(
|
||||
org_id: OrganizationId,
|
||||
member_id: MembershipId,
|
||||
data: EventRange,
|
||||
headers: AdminHeaders,
|
||||
headers: AccessEventLogsHeaders,
|
||||
conn: DbConn,
|
||||
) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
if org_id != headers.org_id {
|
||||
@@ -123,15 +140,13 @@ fn get_continuation_token(events_json: &[Value]) -> Option<&str> {
|
||||
// When the length of the vec equals the max page_size there probably is more data
|
||||
// When it is less, then all events are loaded.
|
||||
#[expect(clippy::cast_possible_truncation, reason = "PAGE_SIZE fits within usize")]
|
||||
if events_json.len() == Event::PAGE_SIZE as usize {
|
||||
if let Some(last_event) = events_json.last() {
|
||||
if events_json.len() == Event::PAGE_SIZE as usize
|
||||
&& let Some(last_event) = events_json.last()
|
||||
{
|
||||
last_event["date"].as_str()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
None
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
None
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// ###############################################################################################################
|
||||
@@ -214,13 +229,13 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Client-side cipher events (viewed, copied, toggled, autofilled).
|
||||
1107..=1114 | 1117 | 1119..=1132 => {
|
||||
// Client-side cipher events (viewed, copied, toggled, autofilled, HTTP auth).
|
||||
1107..=1114 | 1117 | 1119..=1133 => {
|
||||
// The cipher determines the organization the event is logged to, so make sure the
|
||||
// user can actually access it instead of trusting the provided cipher uuid.
|
||||
if let Some(cipher_uuid) = &event.cipher_id
|
||||
&& let Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(cipher_uuid, &conn).await
|
||||
&& cipher.is_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
|
||||
&& cipher.is_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, CipherAccessScope::User, &conn).await
|
||||
&& let Some(org_id) = cipher.organization_uuid
|
||||
{
|
||||
log_event_impl(
|
||||
@@ -242,11 +257,11 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: i32, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
|
||||
pub async fn log_user_event(event_type: EventType, user_id: &UserId, device_type: i32, ip: &IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) {
|
||||
if !CONFIG.org_events_enabled() {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
log_user_event_impl(event_type, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
|
||||
log_user_event_impl(event_type as i32, user_id, device_type, None, ip, conn).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn log_user_event_impl(
|
||||
@@ -347,14 +362,17 @@ async fn log_event_impl(
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn event_cleanup_job(pool: DbPool) {
|
||||
debug!("Start events cleanup job");
|
||||
if CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_none() {
|
||||
debug!("events_days_retain is not configured, abort");
|
||||
if CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_none_or(|d| d == 0) {
|
||||
debug!("events_days_retain is not configured or set to 0, skipping");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
|
||||
Event::clean_events(&conn).await.ok();
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
|
||||
error!("Failed to get DB connection while trying to cleanup the events table");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if let Err(e) = Event::clean_events(&conn).await {
|
||||
error!("Failed to cleanup the events table: {e}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ pub use ciphers::{CipherData, CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType, purge_trashed_ciph
|
||||
pub use emergency_access::{emergency_notification_reminder_job, emergency_request_timeout_job};
|
||||
pub use events::{event_cleanup_job, log_event, log_user_event};
|
||||
pub use sends::purge_sends;
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "unsafe_test_mode")]
|
||||
pub use {ciphers::seed_cipher, sends::seed_send};
|
||||
|
||||
use reqwest::Method;
|
||||
use rocket::{Catcher, Route, serde::json::Json, serde::json::Value};
|
||||
@@ -247,6 +249,7 @@ fn config() -> Json<Value> {
|
||||
"notifications": format!("{domain}/notifications"),
|
||||
"sso": "",
|
||||
"cloudRegion": null,
|
||||
"fillAssistRules": CONFIG.fill_assist_rules_url(),
|
||||
},
|
||||
// Bitwarden uses this for the self-hosted servers to indicate the default push technology
|
||||
"push": {
|
||||
|
||||
+1308
-283
File diff suppressed because it is too large.
Load diff
@@ -156,7 +156,7 @@ async fn ldap_import(data: Json<OrgImportData>, token: PublicToken, conn: DbConn
|
||||
|
||||
for ext_id in &group_data.member_external_ids {
|
||||
if let Some(member) = Membership::find_by_external_id_and_org(ext_id, &org_id, &conn).await {
|
||||
let mut group_user = GroupUser::new(group_uuid.clone(), member.uuid.clone());
|
||||
let group_user = GroupUser::new(group_uuid.clone(), member.uuid.clone());
|
||||
group_user.save(&conn).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -237,6 +237,6 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for PublicToken {
|
||||
err_handler!("Token not issued for this client");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Outcome::Success(PublicToken(claims.client_sub))
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self(claims.client_sub))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+24
-16
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
|
||||
use std::{path::Path, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
|
||||
|
||||
use chrono::{DateTime, TimeDelta, Utc};
|
||||
use num_traits::ToPrimitive;
|
||||
use rocket::{
|
||||
form::Form,
|
||||
fs::{NamedFile, TempFile},
|
||||
@@ -126,6 +125,23 @@ async fn enforce_disable_hide_email_policy(data: &SendData, headers: &Headers, c
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Stores a text Send that is already encrypted, as [`create_send`] does, for the test seeder (`unsafe_test_mode`).
|
||||
/// Its deletion date becomes a week from now: a recorded one can be years ahead, more than a Send may be.
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "unsafe_test_mode")]
|
||||
pub async fn seed_send(mut encrypted: Value, user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<SendId> {
|
||||
let Some(fields) = encrypted.as_object_mut() else {
|
||||
err!("A seeded Send has to be a JSON object")
|
||||
};
|
||||
fields.insert("deletionDate".to_owned(), serde_json::to_value(Utc::now() + TimeDelta::try_days(7).unwrap())?);
|
||||
let data: SendData = serde_json::from_value(encrypted)?;
|
||||
if data.r#type != SendType::Text as i32 {
|
||||
err!("Only text Sends can be seeded: a file Send needs its file")
|
||||
}
|
||||
let mut send = create_send(data, user_id.clone())?;
|
||||
send.save(conn).await?;
|
||||
Ok(send.uuid)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn create_send(data: SendData, user_id: UserId) -> ApiResult<Send> {
|
||||
let data_val = if data.r#type == SendType::Text as i32 {
|
||||
data.text
|
||||
@@ -155,10 +171,7 @@ fn create_send(data: SendData, user_id: UserId) -> ApiResult<Send> {
|
||||
let mut send = Send::new(data.r#type, data.name, data_str, data.key, data.deletion_date.naive_utc());
|
||||
send.user_uuid = Some(user_id);
|
||||
send.notes = data.notes;
|
||||
send.max_access_count = match data.max_access_count {
|
||||
Some(m) => Some(m.into_i32()?),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
send.max_access_count = data.max_access_count.map(|m| m.into_i32()).transpose()?;
|
||||
send.expiration_date = data.expiration_date.map(|d| d.naive_utc());
|
||||
send.disabled = data.disabled;
|
||||
send.hide_email = data.hide_email;
|
||||
@@ -268,11 +281,12 @@ async fn post_send_file_v2(data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
|
||||
let file_id = crate::crypto::generate_send_file_id();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut data_value: Value = serde_json::from_str(&send.data)?;
|
||||
if let Some(o) = data_value.as_object_mut() {
|
||||
let Some(o) = data_value.as_object_mut() else {
|
||||
err!("Invalid Send file data")
|
||||
};
|
||||
o.insert(String::from("id"), Value::String(file_id.clone()));
|
||||
o.insert(String::from("size"), Value::Number(file_length.into()));
|
||||
o.insert(String::from("sizeName"), Value::String(crate::util::get_display_size(file_length)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
send.data = serde_json::to_string(&data_value)?;
|
||||
send.save(&conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -285,7 +299,7 @@ async fn post_send_file_v2(data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[allow(non_snake_case)]
|
||||
#[expect(non_snake_case, reason = "Bitwarden clients use this format")]
|
||||
pub struct SendFileData {
|
||||
id: SendFileId,
|
||||
size: u64,
|
||||
@@ -339,10 +353,7 @@ async fn post_send_file_v2_data(
|
||||
err!("Send file does not match send data.", format!("Expected id {} got {file_id}", send_data.id));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(size) = data.data.len().to_u64() else {
|
||||
err!("Send file size overflow.");
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let size = data.data.len();
|
||||
if size != send_data.size {
|
||||
err!("Send file size does not match.", format!("Expected a file size of {} got {size}", send_data.size));
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -520,10 +531,7 @@ async fn update_send_from_data(
|
||||
send.akey = data.key;
|
||||
send.deletion_date = data.deletion_date.naive_utc();
|
||||
send.notes = data.notes;
|
||||
send.max_access_count = match data.max_access_count {
|
||||
Some(m) => Some(m.into_i32()?),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
send.max_access_count = data.max_access_count.map(|m| m.into_i32()).transpose()?;
|
||||
send.expiration_date = data.expiration_date.map(|d| d.naive_utc());
|
||||
send.hide_email = data.hide_email;
|
||||
send.disabled = data.disabled;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -3,11 +3,11 @@ use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event, core::two_factor::generate_recover_code},
|
||||
auth::{ClientIp, Headers},
|
||||
auth::{ClientIp, Headers, two_factor},
|
||||
crypto,
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn,
|
||||
models::{Device, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
|
||||
models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
|
||||
},
|
||||
util::NumberOrString,
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -20,27 +20,23 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
|
||||
|
||||
#[post("/two-factor/get-authenticator", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
|
||||
let user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32;
|
||||
let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await;
|
||||
let twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
let (enabled, key) = match twofactor {
|
||||
Some(tf) => (true, tf.data),
|
||||
_ => (false, crypto::encode_random_bytes::<20>(&BASE32)),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Upstream seems to also return `userVerificationToken`, but doesn't seem to be used at all.
|
||||
// It should help prevent TOTP disclosure if someone keeps their vault unlocked.
|
||||
// Since it doesn't seem to be used, and also does not cause any issues, lets leave it out of the response.
|
||||
// See: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Api/Auth/Controllers/TwoFactorController.cs#L94
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"authenticator": json!({
|
||||
"enabled": enabled,
|
||||
"key": key,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
|
||||
}),
|
||||
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::authenticator_token(user.uuid, key, enabled),
|
||||
})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -49,8 +45,7 @@ async fn generate_authenticator(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers,
|
||||
struct EnableAuthenticatorData {
|
||||
key: String,
|
||||
token: NumberOrString,
|
||||
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
|
||||
otp: Option<String>,
|
||||
user_verification_token: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[post("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
@@ -61,12 +56,7 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He
|
||||
|
||||
let mut user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
PasswordOrOtpData {
|
||||
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
|
||||
otp: data.otp,
|
||||
}
|
||||
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &key, false)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate key as base32 and 20 bytes length
|
||||
let decoded_key: Vec<u8> = if let Ok(decoded) = BASE32.decode(key.as_bytes()) {
|
||||
@@ -84,12 +74,13 @@ async fn activate_authenticator(data: Json<EnableAuthenticatorData>, headers: He
|
||||
|
||||
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"authenticator": json!({
|
||||
"enabled": true,
|
||||
"key": key,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorAuthenticator"
|
||||
}),
|
||||
})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -125,11 +116,9 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
|
||||
err!("Invalid TOTP secret")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut twofactor = match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator as i32, conn).await
|
||||
{
|
||||
Some(tf) => tf,
|
||||
_ => TwoFactor::new(user_id.clone(), TwoFactorType::Authenticator, secret.to_owned()),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.unwrap_or_else(|| TwoFactor::new(user_id.clone(), TwoFactorType::Authenticator, secret.to_owned()));
|
||||
|
||||
// The amount of steps back and forward in time
|
||||
// Also check if we need to disable time drifted TOTP codes.
|
||||
@@ -184,37 +173,25 @@ pub async fn validate_totp_code(
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct DisableAuthenticatorData {
|
||||
key: String,
|
||||
master_password_hash: String,
|
||||
r#type: NumberOrString,
|
||||
user_verification_token: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[delete("/two-factor/authenticator", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
async fn disable_authenticator(data: Json<DisableAuthenticatorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let user = headers.user;
|
||||
let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
|
||||
|
||||
if !user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
|
||||
err!("Invalid password");
|
||||
}
|
||||
two_factor::validate_authenticator(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &data.key, true)?;
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
|
||||
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Authenticator, &conn).await {
|
||||
if twofactor.data == data.key {
|
||||
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
|
||||
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
err!(format!("TOTP key for user {} does not match recorded value, cannot deactivate", &user.email));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
|
||||
super::enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"enabled": false,
|
||||
"keys": type_,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorProvider"
|
||||
})))
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -2,12 +2,12 @@ use chrono::Utc;
|
||||
use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
CONFIG,
|
||||
api::{
|
||||
ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_user_event,
|
||||
core::two_factor::generate_recover_code,
|
||||
ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
|
||||
core::log_user_event,
|
||||
core::two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
|
||||
},
|
||||
auth::Headers,
|
||||
auth::{Headers, two_factor, two_factor::DuoData},
|
||||
crypto,
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn,
|
||||
@@ -18,55 +18,7 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
|
||||
routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put,]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
struct DuoData {
|
||||
host: String, // Duo API hostname
|
||||
ik: String, // client id
|
||||
sk: String, // client secret
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl DuoData {
|
||||
fn global() -> Option<Self> {
|
||||
match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
|
||||
(true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
|
||||
host,
|
||||
ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
|
||||
sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
host: s.into(),
|
||||
ik: s.into(),
|
||||
sk: s.into(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn secret() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::msg("<global_secret>")
|
||||
}
|
||||
fn obscure(self) -> Self {
|
||||
let mut host = self.host;
|
||||
let mut ik = self.ik;
|
||||
let mut sk = self.sk;
|
||||
|
||||
let digits = 4;
|
||||
let replaced = "************";
|
||||
|
||||
host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
|
||||
ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
|
||||
sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
|
||||
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
host,
|
||||
ik,
|
||||
sk,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
routes![get_duo, activate_duo, activate_duo_put, disable_duo,]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
enum DuoStatus {
|
||||
@@ -80,8 +32,8 @@ enum DuoStatus {
|
||||
impl DuoStatus {
|
||||
fn data(self) -> Option<DuoData> {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
DuoStatus::Global(data) | DuoStatus::User(data) => Some(data),
|
||||
DuoStatus::Disabled(_) => None,
|
||||
Self::Global(data) | Self::User(data) => Some(data),
|
||||
Self::Disabled(_) => None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -95,22 +47,19 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
|
||||
|
||||
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let data = get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
let (enabled, data) = match data {
|
||||
let (enabled, duo) = match get_user_duo_data(&user.uuid, &conn).await {
|
||||
DuoStatus::Global(_) => (true, Some(DuoData::secret())),
|
||||
DuoStatus::User(data) => (true, Some(data.obscure())),
|
||||
DuoStatus::Disabled(true) => (false, Some(DuoData::msg(DISABLED_MESSAGE_DEFAULT))),
|
||||
DuoStatus::Disabled(false) => (false, None),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let json = if let Some(data) = data {
|
||||
let duo_json = if let Some(data) = duo.as_ref() {
|
||||
json!({
|
||||
"enabled": enabled,
|
||||
"host": data.host,
|
||||
"clientSecret": data.sk,
|
||||
"clientId": data.ik,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorDuo"
|
||||
})
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
json!({
|
||||
@@ -118,11 +67,13 @@ async fn get_duo(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
|
||||
"host": null,
|
||||
"clientSecret": null,
|
||||
"clientId": null,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorDuo"
|
||||
})
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(json))
|
||||
Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
|
||||
"duo": duo_json,
|
||||
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::duo_token(user.uuid, duo, enabled),
|
||||
})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
@@ -131,8 +82,7 @@ struct EnableDuoData {
|
||||
host: String,
|
||||
client_secret: String,
|
||||
client_id: String,
|
||||
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
|
||||
otp: Option<String>,
|
||||
user_verification_token: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<EnableDuoData> for DuoData {
|
||||
@@ -159,12 +109,7 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
|
||||
let data: EnableDuoData = data.into_inner();
|
||||
let mut user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
PasswordOrOtpData {
|
||||
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
|
||||
otp: data.otp.clone(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, None, false)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let (data, data_str) = if check_duo_fields_custom(&data) {
|
||||
let data_req: DuoData = data.into();
|
||||
@@ -181,14 +126,15 @@ async fn activate_duo(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
|
||||
|
||||
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"duo": json!({
|
||||
"enabled": true,
|
||||
"host": data.host,
|
||||
"clientSecret": data.sk,
|
||||
"clientId": data.ik,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorDuo"
|
||||
}),
|
||||
})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -197,6 +143,29 @@ async fn activate_duo_put(data: Json<EnableDuoData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
|
||||
activate_duo(data, headers, conn).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[delete("/two-factor/duo", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn disable_duo(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Duo, &conn).await {
|
||||
// Apply the same transformation than in `get_duo` to check we are disabling the correct one
|
||||
let duo = match to_user_duo_data(&twofactor) {
|
||||
DuoStatus::Global(_) => Some(DuoData::secret()),
|
||||
DuoStatus::User(data) => Some(data.obscure()),
|
||||
DuoStatus::Disabled(_) => None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
two_factor::validate_duo(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, duo.as_ref(), true)?;
|
||||
|
||||
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
use reqwest::{Method, header};
|
||||
use std::str::FromStr;
|
||||
@@ -222,13 +191,15 @@ async fn duo_api_request(method: &str, path: &str, params: &str, data: &DuoData)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn get_user_duo_data(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> DuoStatus {
|
||||
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Duo as i32;
|
||||
|
||||
// If the user doesn't have an entry, disabled
|
||||
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await else {
|
||||
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Duo, conn).await else {
|
||||
return DuoStatus::Disabled(DuoData::global().is_some());
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
to_user_duo_data(&twofactor)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn to_user_duo_data(twofactor: &TwoFactor) -> DuoStatus {
|
||||
// If the user has the required values, we use those
|
||||
if let Ok(data) = serde_json::from_str(&twofactor.data) {
|
||||
return DuoStatus::User(data);
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ struct DuoClient {
|
||||
|
||||
impl DuoClient {
|
||||
// Construct a new DuoClient
|
||||
fn new(client_id: String, client_secret: String, api_host: String, redirect_uri: String) -> DuoClient {
|
||||
DuoClient {
|
||||
fn new(client_id: String, client_secret: String, api_host: String, redirect_uri: String) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
client_id,
|
||||
client_secret,
|
||||
api_host,
|
||||
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ impl DuoClient {
|
||||
match jsonwebtoken::encode(
|
||||
&Header::new(JWT_SIGNATURE_ALG),
|
||||
&jwt_payload,
|
||||
&EncodingKey::from_secret(self.client_secret.as_bytes()),
|
||||
&EncodingKey::from_secret(self.client_secret.as_bytes())?,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Ok(token) => Ok(token),
|
||||
Err(e) => err!(format!("Error encoding Duo JWT: {e:?}")),
|
||||
@@ -157,10 +157,7 @@ impl DuoClient {
|
||||
Err(e) => return Err(e),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut post_body = HashMap::new();
|
||||
post_body.insert("client_assertion", token);
|
||||
post_body.insert("client_id", self.client_id.clone());
|
||||
|
||||
let post_body = HashMap::from([("client_assertion", token), ("client_id", self.client_id.clone())]);
|
||||
let res = match make_http_request(reqwest::Method::POST, &health_check_url)?
|
||||
.header(header::USER_AGENT, "vaultwarden:Duo/2.0 (Rust)")
|
||||
.form(&post_body)
|
||||
@@ -253,16 +250,14 @@ impl DuoClient {
|
||||
Err(e) => return Err(e),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut post_body = HashMap::new();
|
||||
post_body.insert("grant_type", String::from("authorization_code"));
|
||||
post_body.insert("code", String::from(duo_code));
|
||||
|
||||
let post_body = HashMap::from([
|
||||
("grant_type", String::from("authorization_code")),
|
||||
("code", String::from(duo_code)),
|
||||
// Must be the same URL that was supplied in the authorization request for the supplied duo_code
|
||||
post_body.insert("redirect_uri", self.redirect_uri.clone());
|
||||
|
||||
post_body
|
||||
.insert("client_assertion_type", String::from("urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer"));
|
||||
post_body.insert("client_assertion", token);
|
||||
("redirect_uri", self.redirect_uri.clone()),
|
||||
("client_assertion_type", String::from("urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer")),
|
||||
("client_assertion", token),
|
||||
]);
|
||||
|
||||
let res = match make_http_request(reqwest::Method::POST, &token_url)?
|
||||
.header(header::USER_AGENT, "vaultwarden:Duo/2.0 (Rust)")
|
||||
@@ -291,7 +286,7 @@ impl DuoClient {
|
||||
|
||||
let token_data = match jsonwebtoken::decode::<IdTokenClaims>(
|
||||
&response.id_token,
|
||||
&DecodingKey::from_secret(self.client_secret.as_bytes()),
|
||||
&DecodingKey::from_secret(self.client_secret.as_bytes())?,
|
||||
&validation,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
Ok(c) => c,
|
||||
@@ -422,18 +417,14 @@ pub async fn validate_duo_login(
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
// Result supplied to us by clients in the form "<authz code>|<state>"
|
||||
let split: Vec<&str> = two_factor_token.split('|').collect();
|
||||
if split.len() != 2 {
|
||||
let Some((code, state)) = two_factor_token.split_once('|').filter(|(_, state)| !state.contains('|')) else {
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"Invalid response length",
|
||||
ErrorEvent {
|
||||
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn2fa
|
||||
}
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let code = split[0];
|
||||
let state = split[1];
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let (ik, sk, host) = get_duo_keys_email(email, conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -5,20 +5,26 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
CONFIG,
|
||||
api::{
|
||||
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
|
||||
core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
|
||||
core::{
|
||||
log_user_event,
|
||||
two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
|
||||
},
|
||||
auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers},
|
||||
},
|
||||
auth::{ClientHeaders, Headers, two_factor},
|
||||
crypto,
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn,
|
||||
models::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, User, UserId},
|
||||
models::{
|
||||
AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, DeviceId, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User,
|
||||
UserId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
error::{Error, MapResult},
|
||||
mail,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
|
||||
routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email,]
|
||||
routes![get_email, send_email_login, send_email, email, disable_email]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
@@ -48,18 +54,9 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
|
||||
crate::ratelimit::check_limit_login(&client_headers.ip.ip)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Get the user
|
||||
let email = match &data.email {
|
||||
Some(email) if !email.is_empty() => Some(email),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let master_password_hash = match &data.master_password_hash {
|
||||
Some(password_hash) if !password_hash.is_empty() => Some(password_hash),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let auth_request_id = match &data.auth_request_id {
|
||||
Some(auth_request_id) if !auth_request_id.is_empty() => Some(auth_request_id),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let email = data.email.as_ref().filter(|e| !e.is_empty());
|
||||
let master_password_hash = data.master_password_hash.as_ref().filter(|h| !h.is_empty());
|
||||
let auth_request_id = data.auth_request_id.as_ref().filter(|a| !a.is_empty());
|
||||
|
||||
let user = if let Some(email) = email {
|
||||
let Some(user) = User::find_by_mail(email, &conn).await else {
|
||||
@@ -78,19 +75,41 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if let Some(auth_request_id) = auth_request_id {
|
||||
let Some(auth_request) = AuthRequest::find_by_uuid(auth_request_id, &conn).await else {
|
||||
err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "User not found")
|
||||
};
|
||||
let Some(code) = &data.auth_request_access_code else {
|
||||
err!("no auth request access code")
|
||||
};
|
||||
let Some(auth_request) = AuthRequest::find_by_uuid_and_user(auth_request_id, &user.uuid, &conn).await
|
||||
else {
|
||||
err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "Invalid auth request or does not belong to user")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if auth_request.device_type != client_headers.device_type
|
||||
let request_expired = Utc::now().naive_utc() >= auth_request.creation_date + TimeDelta::minutes(5);
|
||||
if !auth_request.approved.unwrap_or(false)
|
||||
|| auth_request.authentication_date.is_some()
|
||||
|| request_expired
|
||||
|| auth_request.device_type != client_headers.device_type
|
||||
|| auth_request.request_ip != client_headers.ip.ip.to_string()
|
||||
|| !auth_request.check_access_code(code)
|
||||
{
|
||||
err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "Invalid device, IP or code")
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"AuthRequest doesn't exist",
|
||||
"Auth request not approved, already used or expired, or invalid device, IP or code"
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if let Some(device_identifier) = &data.device_identifier {
|
||||
// iOS/Android SSO logins send the email and device id but no password hash,
|
||||
// so accept a device that has a pending 2FA login for this user
|
||||
if TwoFactorIncomplete::find_by_user_and_device(&user.uuid, device_identifier, &conn).await.is_none() {
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
|
||||
format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, email.escape_debug())
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
debug!(
|
||||
"Email 2FA fallback: pending login. Username: {}. Device: {}.",
|
||||
user.email,
|
||||
device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug()
|
||||
);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
err!("No password hash has been submitted.")
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -104,7 +123,7 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
|
||||
let Some(user) = User::find_by_device_for_email2fa(device_identifier, &conn).await else {
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"Username or password is incorrect. Try again",
|
||||
format!("IP: {}. Device: {device_identifier}.", client_headers.ip.ip)
|
||||
format!("IP: {}. Device: {}.", client_headers.ip.ip, device_identifier.to_string().escape_debug())
|
||||
)
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -116,8 +135,8 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
|
||||
|
||||
/// Generate the token, save the data for later verification and send email to user
|
||||
pub async fn send_token(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
|
||||
let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
|
||||
let mut twofactor =
|
||||
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
|
||||
|
||||
let generated_token = crypto::generate_email_token(CONFIG.email_token_size());
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -140,18 +159,19 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
|
||||
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let (enabled, mfa_email) =
|
||||
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, &conn).await {
|
||||
Some(x) => {
|
||||
if let Some(x) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
|
||||
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&x.data)?;
|
||||
(true, json!(twofactor_data.email))
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => (false, serde_json::value::Value::Null),
|
||||
(true, Some(twofactor_data.email))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(false, None)
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"email": mfa_email,
|
||||
Ok(Json(rocket::serde::json::json!({
|
||||
"email": rocket::serde::json::json!({
|
||||
"enabled": enabled,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorEmail"
|
||||
"email": mfa_email,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::email_token(user.uuid, mfa_email, enabled),
|
||||
})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -160,30 +180,22 @@ async fn get_email(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn
|
||||
struct SendEmailData {
|
||||
/// Email where 2FA codes will be sent to, can be different than user email account.
|
||||
email: String,
|
||||
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
|
||||
otp: Option<String>,
|
||||
user_verification_token: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Send a verification email to the specified email address to check whether it exists/belongs to user.
|
||||
#[post("/two-factor/send-email", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let data: SendEmailData = data.into_inner();
|
||||
let user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
PasswordOrOtpData {
|
||||
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
|
||||
otp: data.otp,
|
||||
}
|
||||
.validate(&user, false, &conn)
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email.clone(), false)?;
|
||||
|
||||
if !CONFIG._enable_email_2fa() {
|
||||
err!("Email 2FA is disabled")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Email as i32;
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
|
||||
if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
|
||||
tf.delete(&conn).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -191,12 +203,13 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
|
||||
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::new(data.email, Some(generated_token));
|
||||
|
||||
// Uses EmailVerificationChallenge as type to show that it's not verified yet.
|
||||
let twofactor = TwoFactor::new(user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
|
||||
let twofactor =
|
||||
TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, twofactor_data.to_json());
|
||||
twofactor.save(&conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
mail::send_token(&twofactor_data.email, &twofactor_data.last_token.map_res("Token is empty")?).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize, Serialize)]
|
||||
@@ -204,8 +217,7 @@ async fn send_email(data: Json<SendEmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -
|
||||
struct EmailData {
|
||||
email: String,
|
||||
token: String,
|
||||
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
|
||||
otp: Option<String>,
|
||||
user_verification_token: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Verify email belongs to user and can be used for 2FA email codes.
|
||||
@@ -214,17 +226,11 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
|
||||
let data: EmailData = data.into_inner();
|
||||
let mut user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
// This is the last step in the verification process, delete the otp directly afterwards
|
||||
PasswordOrOtpData {
|
||||
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
|
||||
otp: data.otp,
|
||||
}
|
||||
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, data.email, false)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let type_ = TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge as i32;
|
||||
let mut twofactor =
|
||||
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
|
||||
let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::EmailVerificationChallenge, &conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -243,13 +249,26 @@ async fn email(data: Json<EmailData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonRes
|
||||
|
||||
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"email": email_data.email,
|
||||
"enabled": "true",
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorEmail"
|
||||
})))
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[delete("/two-factor/email", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn disable_email(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await {
|
||||
let twofactor_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(&twofactor.data)?;
|
||||
two_factor::validate_email(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, twofactor_data.email, true)?;
|
||||
|
||||
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Validate the email code when used as TwoFactor token mechanism
|
||||
@@ -261,9 +280,8 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let mut email_data = EmailTokenData::from_json(data)?;
|
||||
let mut twofactor = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email as i32, conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
|
||||
let mut twofactor =
|
||||
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Email, conn).await.map_res("Two factor not found")?;
|
||||
let Some(issued_token) = &email_data.last_token else {
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
format!("No token available! IP: {ip}"),
|
||||
@@ -275,7 +293,7 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
|
||||
|
||||
if !crypto::ct_eq(issued_token, token) {
|
||||
email_data.add_attempt();
|
||||
if email_data.attempts >= CONFIG.email_attempts_limit() {
|
||||
if email_data.attempts >= u64::from(CONFIG.email_attempts_limit()) {
|
||||
email_data.reset_token();
|
||||
}
|
||||
twofactor.data = email_data.to_json();
|
||||
@@ -294,7 +312,7 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
|
||||
twofactor.save(conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let dt = DateTime::from_timestamp(email_data.token_sent, 0).expect("Email token timestamp invalid.").naive_utc();
|
||||
let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time().cast_signed();
|
||||
let max_time = i64::from(CONFIG.email_expiration_time());
|
||||
if dt + TimeDelta::try_seconds(max_time).unwrap() < Utc::now().naive_utc() {
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"Token has expired",
|
||||
@@ -322,8 +340,8 @@ pub struct EmailTokenData {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl EmailTokenData {
|
||||
pub fn new(email: String, token: Option<String>) -> EmailTokenData {
|
||||
EmailTokenData {
|
||||
pub fn new(email: String, token: Option<String>) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
email,
|
||||
last_token: token,
|
||||
token_sent: Utc::now().timestamp(),
|
||||
@@ -349,8 +367,8 @@ impl EmailTokenData {
|
||||
serde_json::to_string(&self).unwrap()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn from_json(string: &str) -> Result<EmailTokenData, Error> {
|
||||
let res: Result<EmailTokenData, serde_json::Error> = serde_json::from_str(string);
|
||||
pub fn from_json(string: &str) -> Result<Self, Error> {
|
||||
let res: Result<Self, serde_json::Error> = serde_json::from_str(string);
|
||||
if let Ok(x) = res {
|
||||
Ok(x)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
@@ -371,22 +389,21 @@ pub async fn activate_email_2fa(user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
|
||||
/// Takes an email address and obscures it by replacing it with asterisks except two characters.
|
||||
pub fn obscure_email(email: &str) -> String {
|
||||
let split: Vec<&str> = email.rsplitn(2, '@').collect();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut name = split[1].to_owned();
|
||||
let domain = &split[0];
|
||||
|
||||
let name_size = name.chars().count();
|
||||
|
||||
let new_name = if let 1..=3 = name_size {
|
||||
"*".repeat(name_size)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let stars = "*".repeat(name_size - 2);
|
||||
name.truncate(2);
|
||||
format!("{name}{stars}")
|
||||
let Some((name, domain)) = email.rsplit_once('@') else {
|
||||
return "*".repeat(email.chars().count());
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
format!("{new_name}@{domain}")
|
||||
let len = name.chars().count();
|
||||
let keep = if len > 3 {
|
||||
2
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
0
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Byte offset after the first `keep` chars (UTF-8 safe).
|
||||
let end = name.char_indices().nth(keep).map_or(name.len(), |(i, _)| i);
|
||||
|
||||
format!("{}{}@{domain}", &name[..end], "*".repeat(len - keep))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn find_and_activate_email_2fa(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
@@ -404,7 +421,6 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_obscure_email_long() {
|
||||
let email = "bytes@example.ext";
|
||||
|
||||
let result = obscure_email(email);
|
||||
|
||||
// Only first two characters should be visible.
|
||||
@@ -414,10 +430,37 @@ mod tests {
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_obscure_email_short() {
|
||||
let email = "byt@example.ext";
|
||||
|
||||
let result = obscure_email(email);
|
||||
|
||||
// If it's smaller than 3 characters it should only show asterisks.
|
||||
assert_eq!(result, "***@example.ext");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Test unicode email address, as that might cut a unicode char in half and cause a panic
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_obscure_email_unicode_long() {
|
||||
let email = "bɏtes@example.ext";
|
||||
let result = obscure_email(email);
|
||||
|
||||
// Only first two characters should be visible.
|
||||
assert_eq!(result, "bɏ***@example.ext");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_obscure_email_unicode_short() {
|
||||
let email = "bɏt@example.ext";
|
||||
let result = obscure_email(email);
|
||||
|
||||
// If it's smaller than 3 characters it should only show asterisks.
|
||||
assert_eq!(result, "***@example.ext");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_missing_at() {
|
||||
let email = "bɏt_at_example.ext";
|
||||
let result = obscure_email(email);
|
||||
|
||||
// With a missing `@` the whole string should show asterisks
|
||||
assert_eq!(result, "******************");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -7,21 +7,17 @@ use serde_json::Value;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
CONFIG,
|
||||
api::{
|
||||
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
|
||||
core::{log_event, log_user_event},
|
||||
},
|
||||
api::{EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData, core::log_event},
|
||||
auth::Headers,
|
||||
crypto,
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn, DbPool,
|
||||
models::{
|
||||
Device, DeviceType, EventType, Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationId,
|
||||
TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User, UserId,
|
||||
Device, DeviceType, EventType, Membership, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgPolicyType, Organization,
|
||||
OrganizationId, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete, TwoFactorType, User, UserId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
mail,
|
||||
util::NumberOrString,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
pub mod authenticator;
|
||||
@@ -69,7 +65,7 @@ pub fn is_twofactor_provider_usable(provider_type: &TwoFactorType, provider_data
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
|
||||
let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, disable_twofactor, get_device_verification_settings];
|
||||
let mut routes = routes![get_twofactor, get_recover, get_device_verification_settings];
|
||||
|
||||
routes.append(&mut authenticator::routes());
|
||||
routes.append(&mut duo::routes());
|
||||
@@ -81,6 +77,12 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
|
||||
routes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct VerificationTokenData {
|
||||
user_verification_token: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[get("/two-factor")]
|
||||
async fn get_twofactor(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> Json<Value> {
|
||||
let twofactors = TwoFactor::find_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await;
|
||||
@@ -120,57 +122,30 @@ async fn generate_recover_code(user: &mut User, conn: &DbConn) {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct DisableTwoFactorData {
|
||||
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
|
||||
otp: Option<String>,
|
||||
r#type: NumberOrString,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[put("/two-factor/disable", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn disable_twofactor(data: Json<DisableTwoFactorData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let data: DisableTwoFactorData = data.into_inner();
|
||||
let user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
// Delete directly after a valid token has been provided
|
||||
PasswordOrOtpData {
|
||||
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
|
||||
otp: data.otp,
|
||||
}
|
||||
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let type_ = data.r#type.into_i32()?;
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
|
||||
twofactor.delete(&conn).await?;
|
||||
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, &conn).await.is_empty() {
|
||||
enforce_2fa_policy(&user, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"enabled": false,
|
||||
"type": type_,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorProvider"
|
||||
})))
|
||||
/// Call after a 2FA provider, or one of its keys, was removed. No remembered device may keep skipping
|
||||
/// the providers that are left, and once every provider is gone the 2FA policy applies.
|
||||
pub async fn check_2fa_state(user: &User, device_type: i32, ip: &std::net::IpAddr, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
|
||||
if TwoFactor::find_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await.is_empty() {
|
||||
enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device_type, ip, true, conn).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Revokes the user's memberships that the 2FA policy no longer allows. With `accepted_too`, which is for removing the
|
||||
/// user's last 2FA method, accepted memberships are revoked as well, as in Bitwarden. Otherwise only confirmed ones
|
||||
/// are: an accepted member still has to set up 2FA before being confirmed.
|
||||
pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy(
|
||||
user: &User,
|
||||
act_user_id: &UserId,
|
||||
device_type: i32,
|
||||
ip: &std::net::IpAddr,
|
||||
accepted_too: bool,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
for member in Membership::find_by_user_and_policy(&user.uuid, OrgPolicyType::TwoFactorAuthentication, conn).await {
|
||||
// Policy only applies to non-Owner/non-Admin members who have accepted joining the org
|
||||
if member.atype < MembershipType::Admin {
|
||||
if member.atype < MembershipType::Admin && (accepted_too || member.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed)) {
|
||||
if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
|
||||
let org = Organization::find_by_uuid(&member.org_uuid, conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
mail::send_2fa_removed_from_org(&user.email, &org.name).await?;
|
||||
@@ -180,7 +155,7 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy(
|
||||
member.save(conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
log_event(
|
||||
EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked,
|
||||
EventType::OrganizationUserRevokedTwoFactorNonCompliance,
|
||||
&member.uuid,
|
||||
&member.org_uuid,
|
||||
act_user_id,
|
||||
@@ -203,9 +178,14 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy_for_org(
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let org = Organization::find_by_uuid(org_id, conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
for member in Membership::find_confirmed_by_org(org_id, conn).await {
|
||||
// Don't enforce the policy for Admins and Owners.
|
||||
if member.atype < MembershipType::Admin && TwoFactor::find_by_user(&member.user_uuid, conn).await.is_empty() {
|
||||
for member in Membership::find_by_org(org_id, conn).await {
|
||||
// As in Bitwarden, accepted and confirmed members lose access, except Owners, Admins and the member enabling
|
||||
// the policy.
|
||||
if (member.has_status(MembershipStatus::Accepted) || member.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed))
|
||||
&& member.atype < MembershipType::Admin
|
||||
&& member.user_uuid != *act_user_id
|
||||
&& TwoFactor::find_by_user(&member.user_uuid, conn).await.is_empty()
|
||||
{
|
||||
if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
|
||||
let user = User::find_by_uuid(&member.user_uuid, conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
mail::send_2fa_removed_from_org(&user.email, &org.name).await?;
|
||||
@@ -214,7 +194,15 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy_for_org(
|
||||
member.revoke();
|
||||
member.save(conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
log_event(EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked, &member.uuid, org_id, act_user_id, device_type, ip, conn)
|
||||
log_event(
|
||||
EventType::OrganizationUserRevokedTwoFactorNonCompliance,
|
||||
&member.uuid,
|
||||
org_id,
|
||||
act_user_id,
|
||||
device_type,
|
||||
ip,
|
||||
conn,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -225,7 +213,7 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy_for_org(
|
||||
pub async fn send_incomplete_2fa_notifications(pool: DbPool) {
|
||||
debug!("Sending notifications for incomplete 2FA logins");
|
||||
|
||||
if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() <= 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
|
||||
if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() == 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -235,11 +223,21 @@ pub async fn send_incomplete_2fa_notifications(pool: DbPool) {
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
|
||||
let time_limit = TimeDelta::try_minutes(CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit()).unwrap();
|
||||
let time_before = now - time_limit;
|
||||
let Some(time_limit) = TimeDelta::try_minutes(i64::from(CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit())) else {
|
||||
error!("Failed to calculate the time limit for sending incomplete 2fa attempts");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
};
|
||||
let Some(time_before) = now.checked_sub_signed(time_limit) else {
|
||||
error!("Failed to calculate the timestamp for sending incomplete 2fa attempts");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let incomplete_logins = TwoFactorIncomplete::find_logins_before(&time_before, &conn).await;
|
||||
for login in incomplete_logins {
|
||||
let user = User::find_by_uuid(&login.user_uuid, &conn).await.expect("User not found");
|
||||
let Some(user) = User::find_by_uuid(&login.user_uuid, &conn).await else {
|
||||
error!("User '{}', not found!", login.user_uuid);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
info!(
|
||||
"User {} did not complete a 2FA login within the configured time limit. IP: {}",
|
||||
user.email, login.ip_address
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -72,8 +72,7 @@ async fn request_otp(headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
// Only one Protected Action per user is allowed to take place, delete the previous one
|
||||
if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, &conn).await
|
||||
{
|
||||
if let Some(pa) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, &conn).await {
|
||||
let pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
|
||||
let elapsed = pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds();
|
||||
let delay = 30;
|
||||
@@ -125,27 +124,28 @@ pub async fn validate_protected_action_otp(
|
||||
delete_if_valid: bool,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions as i32, conn)
|
||||
let mut pa = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::ProtectedActions, conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.map_res("Protected action token not found, try sending the code again or restart the process")?;
|
||||
let mut pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
|
||||
pa_data.add_attempt();
|
||||
pa.data = pa_data.to_json();
|
||||
|
||||
// Fail after x attempts if the token has been used too many times.
|
||||
// Don't delete it, as we use it to keep track of attempts.
|
||||
if pa_data.attempts >= CONFIG.email_attempts_limit() {
|
||||
if pa_data.attempts >= u64::from(CONFIG.email_attempts_limit()) {
|
||||
err!("Token has expired")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if the token has expired (Using the email 2fa expiration time)
|
||||
let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time().cast_signed();
|
||||
let max_time = i64::from(CONFIG.email_expiration_time());
|
||||
if pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds() > max_time {
|
||||
pa.delete(conn).await?;
|
||||
err!("Token has expired")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !crypto::ct_eq(&pa_data.token, otp) {
|
||||
pa_data.add_attempt();
|
||||
pa.data = pa_data.to_json();
|
||||
|
||||
pa.save(conn).await?;
|
||||
err!("Token is invalid")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
|
||||
use std::{str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
|
||||
use std::{collections::HashSet, str::FromStr, sync::LazyLock, time::Duration};
|
||||
|
||||
use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
|
||||
use serde_json::Value;
|
||||
@@ -18,22 +18,24 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
CONFIG,
|
||||
api::{
|
||||
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
|
||||
core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
|
||||
core::{
|
||||
log_user_event,
|
||||
two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
|
||||
},
|
||||
auth::Headers,
|
||||
},
|
||||
auth::{Headers, two_factor},
|
||||
crypto::ct_eq,
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn,
|
||||
models::{Device, EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
|
||||
models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, UserId},
|
||||
},
|
||||
error::Error,
|
||||
util::NumberOrString,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
|
||||
let domain = CONFIG.domain();
|
||||
let domain_origin = CONFIG.domain_origin();
|
||||
let rp_id = Url::parse(&domain).map(|u| u.domain().map(str::to_owned)).ok().flatten().unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
let rp_id = Url::parse(&domain).map_or_default(|u| u.domain().map_or_default(str::to_owned));
|
||||
let rp_origin = Url::parse(&domain_origin).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let webauthn = WebauthnBuilder::new(&rp_id, &rp_origin)
|
||||
@@ -45,7 +47,14 @@ static WEBAUTHN: LazyLock<Webauthn> = LazyLock::new(|| {
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
|
||||
routes![get_webauthn, generate_webauthn_challenge, activate_webauthn, activate_webauthn_put, delete_webauthn,]
|
||||
routes![
|
||||
get_webauthn,
|
||||
generate_webauthn_challenge,
|
||||
activate_webauthn,
|
||||
activate_webauthn_put,
|
||||
delete_webauthn,
|
||||
delete_webauthns
|
||||
]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Some old u2f structs still needed for migrating from u2f to WebAuthn
|
||||
@@ -119,34 +128,36 @@ async fn get_webauthn(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
|
||||
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
|
||||
let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
|
||||
let registrations_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"webAuthn": json!({
|
||||
"enabled": enabled,
|
||||
"keys": registrations_json,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorWebAuthn"
|
||||
}),
|
||||
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::webauthn_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
|
||||
})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[post("/two-factor/get-webauthn-challenge", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
|
||||
async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let registrations = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn)
|
||||
.await?
|
||||
.1
|
||||
let (enabled, registrations) = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?;
|
||||
let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
|
||||
let creds = registrations
|
||||
.into_iter()
|
||||
.map(|r| r.credential.cred_id().to_owned()) // We return the credentialIds to the clients to avoid double registering
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
|
||||
two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, enabled)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let (mut challenge, state) = WEBAUTHN.start_passkey_registration(
|
||||
Uuid::from_str(&user.uuid).expect("Failed to parse UUID"), // Should never fail
|
||||
&user.email,
|
||||
user.display_name(),
|
||||
Some(registrations),
|
||||
Some(creds),
|
||||
)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut state = serde_json::to_value(&state)?;
|
||||
@@ -166,17 +177,19 @@ async fn generate_webauthn_challenge(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Hea
|
||||
let mut challenge_value = serde_json::to_value(challenge.public_key)?;
|
||||
challenge_value["status"] = "ok".into();
|
||||
challenge_value["errorMessage"] = "".into();
|
||||
Ok(Json(challenge_value))
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"options": challenge_value
|
||||
})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct EnableWebauthnData {
|
||||
id: NumberOrString, // 1..5
|
||||
id: i32,
|
||||
name: String,
|
||||
device_response: RegisterPublicKeyCredentialCopy,
|
||||
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
|
||||
otp: Option<String>,
|
||||
user_verification_token: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
|
||||
@@ -257,16 +270,14 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
|
||||
let data: EnableWebauthnData = data.into_inner();
|
||||
let mut user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
PasswordOrOtpData {
|
||||
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash,
|
||||
otp: data.otp,
|
||||
}
|
||||
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
|
||||
let keys: Vec<i32> = registrations.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
|
||||
two_factor::validate_webauthn(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &keys, !keys.is_empty())?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Retrieve and delete the saved challenge state
|
||||
let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge as i32;
|
||||
let state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, type_, &conn).await {
|
||||
let state = if let Some(tf) =
|
||||
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::WebauthnRegisterChallenge, &conn).await
|
||||
{
|
||||
let state: PasskeyRegistration = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
|
||||
tf.delete(&conn).await?;
|
||||
state
|
||||
@@ -277,10 +288,9 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
|
||||
// Verify the credentials with the saved state
|
||||
let credential = WEBAUTHN.finish_passkey_registration(&data.device_response.into(), &state)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut registrations: Vec<_> = get_webauthn_registrations(&user.uuid, &conn).await?.1;
|
||||
// TODO: Check for repeated ID's
|
||||
registrations.push(WebauthnRegistration {
|
||||
id: data.id.into_i32()?,
|
||||
id: data.id,
|
||||
name: data.name,
|
||||
migrated: false,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -293,13 +303,13 @@ async fn activate_webauthn(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, con
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
let keys_json: Vec<Value> = registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"webAuthn": json!({
|
||||
"enabled": true,
|
||||
"keys": keys_json,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorU2f"
|
||||
"keys": registrations.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -310,58 +320,83 @@ async fn activate_webauthn_put(data: Json<EnableWebauthnData>, headers: Headers,
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct DeleteU2FData {
|
||||
id: NumberOrString,
|
||||
master_password_hash: String,
|
||||
struct DeleteWebauthnData {
|
||||
id: i32,
|
||||
user_verification_token: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[delete("/two-factor/webauthn", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteU2FData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let id = data.id.into_i32()?;
|
||||
if !headers.user.check_valid_password(&data.master_password_hash) {
|
||||
err!("Invalid password");
|
||||
async fn delete_webauthn(data: Json<DeleteWebauthnData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |key| key.id != data.id, headers, &conn).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(mut tf) =
|
||||
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32, &conn).await
|
||||
else {
|
||||
#[delete("/two-factor/webauthn/all", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn delete_webauthns(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
inner_delete_webauthns(&data.user_verification_token, |_| false, headers, &conn).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn inner_delete_webauthns(
|
||||
token: &str,
|
||||
retain: impl Fn(&WebauthnRegistration) -> bool,
|
||||
headers: Headers,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(mut tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await else {
|
||||
err!("Webauthn data not found!")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut data: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
|
||||
let mut keys: Vec<WebauthnRegistration> = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
|
||||
let keys_id: Vec<i32> = keys.iter().map(|r| r.id).collect();
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(item_pos) = data.iter().position(|r| r.id == id) else {
|
||||
two_factor::validate_webauthn(token, &user.uuid, &keys_id, true)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut removed: HashSet<Vec<u8>> = HashSet::new();
|
||||
let mut migrated = false;
|
||||
|
||||
keys.extract_if(.., |key| !retain(key)).for_each(|key| {
|
||||
removed.insert(key.credential.cred_id().to_vec());
|
||||
migrated |= key.migrated;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
if removed.is_empty() {
|
||||
err!("Webauthn entry not found")
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let removed_item = data.remove(item_pos);
|
||||
tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
|
||||
tf.save(&conn).await?;
|
||||
if keys.is_empty() {
|
||||
tf.delete(conn).await?;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
tf.data = serde_json::to_string(&keys)?;
|
||||
tf.save(conn).await?;
|
||||
drop(tf);
|
||||
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// If entry is migrated from u2f, delete the u2f entry as well
|
||||
if let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&headers.user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f as i32, &conn).await
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut data: Vec<U2FRegistration> = if let Ok(d) = serde_json::from_str(&u2f.data) {
|
||||
d
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if migrated && let Some(mut u2f) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::U2f, conn).await {
|
||||
let Ok(mut data) = serde_json::from_str::<Vec<U2FRegistration>>(&u2f.data) else {
|
||||
err!("Error parsing U2F data")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
data.retain(|r| r.reg.key_handle != removed_item.credential.cred_id().as_slice());
|
||||
let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
|
||||
data.retain(|old| !removed.contains(&old.reg.key_handle));
|
||||
|
||||
if data.is_empty() {
|
||||
u2f.delete(conn).await?;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let new_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&data)?;
|
||||
u2f.data = new_data_str;
|
||||
u2f.save(&conn).await?;
|
||||
u2f.save(conn).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let keys_json: Vec<Value> = data.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect();
|
||||
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"enabled": true,
|
||||
"keys": keys_json,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorU2f"
|
||||
"webAuthn": json!({
|
||||
"enabled": !keys.is_empty(),
|
||||
"keys": keys.iter().map(WebauthnRegistration::to_json).collect::<Vec<Value>>(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -369,8 +404,7 @@ pub async fn get_webauthn_registrations(
|
||||
user_id: &UserId,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) -> Result<(bool, Vec<WebauthnRegistration>), Error> {
|
||||
let type_ = TwoFactorType::Webauthn as i32;
|
||||
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
|
||||
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::Webauthn, conn).await {
|
||||
Some(tf) => Ok((tf.enabled, serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?)),
|
||||
None => Ok((false, Vec::new())), // If no data, return empty list
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -417,8 +451,9 @@ pub async fn generate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> JsonRes
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn validate_webauthn_login(user_id: &UserId, response: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let type_ = TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge as i32;
|
||||
let mut state = if let Some(tf) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, type_, conn).await {
|
||||
let mut state = if let Some(tf) =
|
||||
TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::WebauthnLoginChallenge, conn).await
|
||||
{
|
||||
let state: PasskeyAuthentication = serde_json::from_str(&tf.data)?;
|
||||
tf.delete(conn).await?;
|
||||
state
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -10,9 +10,12 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
CONFIG,
|
||||
api::{
|
||||
EmptyResult, JsonResult, PasswordOrOtpData,
|
||||
core::{log_user_event, two_factor::generate_recover_code},
|
||||
core::{
|
||||
log_user_event,
|
||||
two_factor::{VerificationTokenData, generate_recover_code},
|
||||
},
|
||||
auth::Headers,
|
||||
},
|
||||
auth::{Headers, two_factor},
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn,
|
||||
models::{EventType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType},
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +25,7 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
|
||||
routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put,]
|
||||
routes![generate_yubikey, activate_yubikey, activate_yubikey_put, delete_yubikeys,]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
struct HttpClientTransport {
|
||||
@@ -60,8 +63,7 @@ struct EnableYubikeyData {
|
||||
key4: Option<String>,
|
||||
key5: Option<String>,
|
||||
nfc: bool,
|
||||
master_password_hash: Option<String>,
|
||||
otp: Option<String>,
|
||||
user_verification_token: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize, Serialize, Debug)]
|
||||
@@ -125,48 +127,29 @@ async fn generate_yubikey(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn:
|
||||
data.validate(&user, false, &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let user_id = &user.uuid;
|
||||
let yubikey_type = TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32;
|
||||
|
||||
let r = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, yubikey_type, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(r) = r {
|
||||
let (enabled, keys, yubikey_json) =
|
||||
if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
|
||||
let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
|
||||
|
||||
result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
|
||||
let enabled = !yubikey_metadata.keys.is_empty();
|
||||
let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys.clone());
|
||||
result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(enabled);
|
||||
result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
|
||||
result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(result))
|
||||
(enabled, yubikey_metadata.keys, result)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
(false, Vec::new(), json!({"enabled": false}))
|
||||
};
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({
|
||||
"enabled": false,
|
||||
"object": "twoFactorU2f",
|
||||
"yubiKey": yubikey_json,
|
||||
"userVerificationToken": two_factor::yubikey_token(user.uuid, keys, enabled),
|
||||
})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[post("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let data: EnableYubikeyData = data.into_inner();
|
||||
let mut user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
PasswordOrOtpData {
|
||||
master_password_hash: data.master_password_hash.clone(),
|
||||
otp: data.otp.clone(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
.validate(&user, true, &conn)
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if we already have some data
|
||||
let mut yubikey_data =
|
||||
match TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey as i32, &conn).await {
|
||||
Some(data) => data,
|
||||
None => TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new()),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let yubikeys = parse_yubikeys(&data);
|
||||
let mut user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
if yubikeys.is_empty() {
|
||||
// Return an error to prevent saving empty keys which would cause users not being able to login anymore.
|
||||
@@ -174,6 +157,17 @@ async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn:
|
||||
err!("A key is required.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if we already have some data
|
||||
let mut yubikey_data =
|
||||
if let Some(yd) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
|
||||
let ym: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&yd.data)?;
|
||||
two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &ym.keys, !ym.keys.is_empty())?;
|
||||
yd
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &Vec::new(), false)?;
|
||||
TwoFactor::new(user.uuid.clone(), TwoFactorType::YubiKey, String::new())
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Ensure they are valid OTPs
|
||||
for yubikey in &yubikeys {
|
||||
if yubikey.is_empty() || yubikey.len() == 12 {
|
||||
@@ -195,15 +189,12 @@ async fn activate_yubikey(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, conn:
|
||||
|
||||
generate_recover_code(&mut user, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa as i32, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserUpdated2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut result = jsonify_yubikeys(yubikey_metadata.keys);
|
||||
|
||||
result["enabled"] = Value::Bool(true);
|
||||
result["nfc"] = Value::Bool(yubikey_metadata.nfc);
|
||||
result["object"] = Value::String("twoFactorU2f".to_owned());
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Json(result))
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({"yubiKey": result})))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[put("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
@@ -211,6 +202,23 @@ async fn activate_yubikey_put(data: Json<EnableYubikeyData>, headers: Headers, c
|
||||
activate_yubikey(data, headers, conn).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[delete("/two-factor/yubikey", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn delete_yubikeys(data: Json<VerificationTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let user = headers.user;
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(r) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::YubiKey, &conn).await {
|
||||
let yubikey_metadata: YubikeyMetadata = serde_json::from_str(&r.data)?;
|
||||
two_factor::validate_yubikey(&data.user_verification_token, &user.uuid, &yubikey_metadata.keys, true)?;
|
||||
|
||||
r.delete(&conn).await?;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserDisabled2fa, &user.uuid, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
super::check_2fa_state(&user, headers.device.atype, &headers.ip.ip, &conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn validate_yubikey_login(response: &str, twofactor_data: &str) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
if response.len() != 44 {
|
||||
err!("Invalid Yubikey OTP length");
|
||||
|
||||
+143
-158
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static CLIENT: LazyLock<Client> = LazyLock::new(|| {
|
||||
// Generate the cookie store
|
||||
let cookie_store = Arc::new(Jar::default());
|
||||
|
||||
let icon_download_timeout = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.icon_download_timeout());
|
||||
let icon_download_timeout = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.icon_download_timeout()));
|
||||
let pool_idle_timeout = Duration::from_secs(10);
|
||||
// Reuse the client between requests
|
||||
get_reqwest_client_builder(true)
|
||||
@@ -76,9 +76,6 @@ static CLIENT: LazyLock<Client> = LazyLock::new(|| {
|
||||
.expect("Failed to build client")
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Build Regex only once since this takes a lot of time.
|
||||
static ICON_SIZE_REGEX: LazyLock<Regex> = LazyLock::new(|| Regex::new(r"(?x)(\d+)\D*(\d+)").unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
// The function name `icon_external` is checked in the `on_response` function in `AppHeaders`
|
||||
// It is used to prevent sending a specific header which breaks icon downloads.
|
||||
// If this function needs to be renamed, also adjust the code in `util.rs`
|
||||
@@ -193,14 +190,14 @@ async fn get_cached_icon(path: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
|
||||
None
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn file_is_expired(path: &str, ttl: u64) -> Result<bool, Error> {
|
||||
async fn file_is_expired(path: &str, ttl: u32) -> Result<bool, Error> {
|
||||
let operator = CONFIG.opendal_operator_for_path_type(&PathType::IconCache)?;
|
||||
let meta = operator.stat(path).await?;
|
||||
let modified =
|
||||
meta.last_modified().ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other(format!("No last modified time for `{path}`")))?;
|
||||
let age = SystemTime::now().duration_since(modified.into())?;
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(ttl > 0 && ttl <= age.as_secs())
|
||||
Ok(ttl > 0 && u64::from(ttl) <= age.as_secs())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn icon_is_negcached(path: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
@@ -253,43 +250,34 @@ fn get_favicons_node(dom: Tokenizer<StringReader<'_>, FaviconEmitter>, icons: &m
|
||||
const ATTR_HREF: &[u8] = b"href";
|
||||
const ATTR_SIZES: &[u8] = b"sizes";
|
||||
|
||||
let mut base_url = url.clone();
|
||||
let mut icon_tags: Vec<Tag> = Vec::new();
|
||||
for Ok(token) in dom {
|
||||
let tag_name: &[u8] = &token.tag.name;
|
||||
match tag_name {
|
||||
TAG_LINK => {
|
||||
icon_tags.push(token.tag);
|
||||
}
|
||||
TAG_BASE => {
|
||||
base_url = if let Some(href) = token.tag.attributes.get(ATTR_HREF) {
|
||||
let href = std::str::from_utf8(href).unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
debug!("Found base href: {href}");
|
||||
match base_url.join(href) {
|
||||
Ok(inner_url) => inner_url,
|
||||
_ => continue,
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
TAG_HEAD if token.closing => {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
let mut base_href = None;
|
||||
let mut icon_tags = Vec::new();
|
||||
for Ok(mut token) in dom {
|
||||
match token.tag.name.as_slice() {
|
||||
TAG_LINK => icon_tags.push(token.tag),
|
||||
TAG_BASE if base_href.is_none() => {
|
||||
base_href = token.tag.attributes.remove(ATTR_HREF);
|
||||
}
|
||||
TAG_HEAD if token.closing => break,
|
||||
b"body" | b"frameset" if !token.closing => break,
|
||||
_ => {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let parsed_base = base_href.as_ref().and_then(|value| {
|
||||
let href = str::from_utf8(value).ok()?;
|
||||
debug!("Found base href: {}", href.escape_debug());
|
||||
url.join(href).ok().filter(|base| !matches!(base.scheme(), "data" | "javascript"))
|
||||
});
|
||||
let base_url = parsed_base.as_ref().unwrap_or(url);
|
||||
|
||||
for icon_tag in icon_tags {
|
||||
if let Some(icon_href) = icon_tag.attributes.get(ATTR_HREF)
|
||||
&& let Ok(full_href) = base_url.join(std::str::from_utf8(icon_href).unwrap_or_default())
|
||||
&& let Ok(full_href) = base_url.join(str::from_utf8(icon_href).unwrap_or_default())
|
||||
{
|
||||
let sizes = if let Some(v) = icon_tag.attributes.get(ATTR_SIZES) {
|
||||
std::str::from_utf8(v).unwrap_or_default()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
""
|
||||
};
|
||||
let priority = get_icon_priority(full_href.as_str(), sizes);
|
||||
let sizes = icon_tag.attributes.get(ATTR_SIZES).map_or_default(|v| str::from_utf8(v).unwrap_or_default());
|
||||
// Only check the full_href path during priority checks so query strings like `/path/to/icon.png?v=xxx` will be ignored
|
||||
let priority = get_icon_priority(full_href.path(), sizes);
|
||||
icons.push(Icon::new(priority, full_href.to_string()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -323,25 +311,18 @@ async fn get_icon_url(domain: &str) -> Result<IconUrlResult, Error> {
|
||||
// If we get an error that is not caused by the blacklist, we retry with HTTP
|
||||
match get_page(&httpdomain).await {
|
||||
mut sub_resp @ Err(_) => {
|
||||
// When the domain is not an IP, and has more then one dot, remove all subdomains.
|
||||
let is_ip = domain.parse::<IpAddr>();
|
||||
if is_ip.is_err() && domain.matches('.').count() > 1 {
|
||||
let mut domain_parts = domain.split('.');
|
||||
let base_domain = format!(
|
||||
"{base}.{tld}",
|
||||
tld = domain_parts.next_back().unwrap(),
|
||||
base = domain_parts.next_back().unwrap()
|
||||
);
|
||||
if get_valid_host(&base_domain).is_ok() {
|
||||
if domain.parse::<IpAddr>().is_err() {
|
||||
if let Some((dot, _)) = domain.rmatch_indices('.').nth(1) {
|
||||
// Use the last two labels when the domain has at least two dots.
|
||||
let base_domain = &domain[dot + 1..];
|
||||
if get_valid_host(base_domain).is_ok() {
|
||||
let sslbase = format!("https://{base_domain}");
|
||||
let httpbase = format!("http://{base_domain}");
|
||||
debug!("[get_icon_url]: Trying without subdomains '{base_domain}'");
|
||||
|
||||
sub_resp = get_page(&sslbase).or_else(|_| get_page(&httpbase)).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// When the domain is not an IP, and has less then 2 dots, try to add www. infront of it.
|
||||
} else if is_ip.is_err() && domain.matches('.').count() < 2 {
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let www_domain = format!("www.{domain}");
|
||||
if get_valid_host(&www_domain).is_ok() {
|
||||
let sslwww = format!("https://{www_domain}");
|
||||
@@ -351,6 +332,7 @@ async fn get_icon_url(domain: &str) -> Result<IconUrlResult, Error> {
|
||||
sub_resp = get_page(&sslwww).or_else(|_| get_page(&httpwww)).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
sub_resp
|
||||
}
|
||||
res => res,
|
||||
@@ -378,9 +360,8 @@ async fn get_icon_url(domain: &str) -> Result<IconUrlResult, Error> {
|
||||
iconlist.push(Icon::new(40, String::from(url.join("/apple-touch-icon.png").unwrap())));
|
||||
|
||||
// 384KB should be more than enough for the HTML, though as we only really need the HTML header.
|
||||
let limited_reader = stream_to_bytes_limit(content, 384 * 1024).await?.to_vec();
|
||||
|
||||
let dom = Tokenizer::new_with_emitter(limited_reader.to_reader(), FaviconEmitter::default());
|
||||
let limited_reader = stream_to_bytes_limit(content, 384 * 1024).await?;
|
||||
let dom = Tokenizer::new_with_emitter(limited_reader.as_ref().to_reader(), FaviconEmitter::default());
|
||||
get_favicons_node(dom, &mut iconlist, &url);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Add the default favicon.ico to the list with just the given domain
|
||||
@@ -443,7 +424,7 @@ async fn get_page_with_referer(url: &str, referer: &str) -> Result<Response, Err
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
fn get_icon_priority(href: &str, sizes: &str) -> u8 {
|
||||
static PRIORITY_MAP: LazyLock<HashMap<&'static str, u8>> =
|
||||
LazyLock::new(|| [(".png", 10), (".jpg", 20), (".jpeg", 20)].into_iter().collect());
|
||||
LazyLock::new(|| HashMap::from([("png", 10), ("jpg", 20), ("jpeg", 20)]));
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if there is a dimension set
|
||||
let (width, height) = parse_sizes(sizes);
|
||||
@@ -489,100 +470,76 @@ fn get_icon_priority(href: &str, sizes: &str) -> u8 {
|
||||
/// let (width, height) = parse_sizes("32"); // (0, 0)
|
||||
/// ```
|
||||
fn parse_sizes(sizes: &str) -> (u16, u16) {
|
||||
let mut width: u16 = 0;
|
||||
let mut height: u16 = 0;
|
||||
static ICON_SIZE_REGEX: LazyLock<Regex> = LazyLock::new(|| Regex::new(r"(\d+)\D+(\d+)").unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
if !sizes.is_empty() {
|
||||
match ICON_SIZE_REGEX.captures(sizes.trim()) {
|
||||
Some(dimensions) if dimensions.len() >= 3 => {
|
||||
width = dimensions[1].parse::<u16>().unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
height = dimensions[2].parse::<u16>().unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
(width, height)
|
||||
ICON_SIZE_REGEX
|
||||
.captures(sizes)
|
||||
.and_then(|c| Some((c[1].parse::<u16>().ok()?, c[2].parse::<u16>().ok()?)))
|
||||
.unwrap_or((0, 0))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn download_icon(domain: &str) -> Result<(Bytes, Option<&str>), Error> {
|
||||
let icon_result = get_icon_url(domain).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut buffer = Bytes::new();
|
||||
let mut icon_type: Option<&str> = None;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut icons = icon_result.iconlist.iter().take(5).peekable();
|
||||
while let Some(icon) = icons.next() {
|
||||
if icon.href.starts_with("data:image") {
|
||||
let mut buffer = if icon.href.starts_with("data:image") {
|
||||
let Ok(datauri) = data_url::DataUrl::process(&icon.href) else {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Check if we are able to decode the data uri
|
||||
let mut body = BytesMut::new();
|
||||
match datauri.decode::<_, ()>(|bytes| {
|
||||
if datauri
|
||||
.decode::<_, ()>(|bytes| {
|
||||
body.extend_from_slice(bytes);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}) {
|
||||
Ok(_) => {
|
||||
// Also check if the size is atleast 67 bytes, which seems to be the smallest png i could create
|
||||
if body.len() >= 67 {
|
||||
// Check if the icon type is allowed, else try an icon from the list.
|
||||
icon_type = get_icon_type(&body);
|
||||
if icon_type.is_none() {
|
||||
debug!("Icon from {domain} data:image uri, is not a valid image type");
|
||||
})
|
||||
.is_err()
|
||||
{
|
||||
debug!("Extracted icon from data:image uri is invalid");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
info!("Extracted icon from data:image uri for {domain}");
|
||||
buffer = body.freeze();
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => debug!("Extracted icon from data:image uri is invalid"),
|
||||
// Preserve the minimum size required for data URI icons.
|
||||
if body.len() < 67 {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
body.freeze()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
debug!("Trying {}", icon.href);
|
||||
// Make sure all icons are checked before returning error
|
||||
let res = match get_page_with_referer(&icon.href, &icon_result.referer).await {
|
||||
Ok(r) => r,
|
||||
Err(e) if icons.peek().is_none() => return Err(e),
|
||||
Err(e) if CustomHttpClientError::downcast_ref(&e).is_some() => return Err(e), // If blacklisted stop immediately instead of checking the rest of the icons. see explanation and actual handling inside get_icon()
|
||||
// If blacklisted stop immediately instead of checking the rest of the icons. see explanation and actual handling inside get_icon()
|
||||
Err(e) if CustomHttpClientError::downcast_ref(&e).is_some() => return Err(e),
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
warn!("Unable to download icon: {e:?}");
|
||||
|
||||
// Continue to next icon
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
stream_to_bytes_limit(res, 5120 * 1024).await?
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
buffer = stream_to_bytes_limit(res, 5120 * 1024).await?; // 5120KB/5MB for each icon max (Same as icons.bitwarden.net)
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if the icon type is allowed, else try another icon from the list.
|
||||
icon_type = get_icon_type(&buffer);
|
||||
if icon_type.is_none() {
|
||||
buffer.clear();
|
||||
debug!("Icon from {}, is not a valid image type", icon.href);
|
||||
let Some(icon_type) = get_icon_type(&buffer) else {
|
||||
debug!("Icon candidate for {domain} is not a valid image type");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
info!("Downloaded icon from {}", icon.href);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if buffer.is_empty() {
|
||||
err_silent!("Empty response or unable find a valid icon", domain);
|
||||
} else if icon_type == Some("svg+xml") {
|
||||
// Validate SVG format early incase it is invalid, it will continue to the next icon in the list
|
||||
if icon_type == "svg+xml" {
|
||||
let mut svg_filter = Filter::new();
|
||||
svg_filter.set_data_url_filter(data_url_filter::allow_standard_images);
|
||||
let mut sanitized_svg = Vec::new();
|
||||
if svg_filter.filter(&*buffer, &mut sanitized_svg).is_err() {
|
||||
icon_type = None;
|
||||
buffer.clear();
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if svg_filter.filter(&*buffer, &mut sanitized_svg).is_err() || sanitized_svg.is_empty() {
|
||||
debug!("SVG icon candidate for {domain} could not be sanitized");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
buffer = sanitized_svg.into();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
info!("Found valid icon for {domain}");
|
||||
return Ok((buffer, Some(icon_type)));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok((buffer, icon_type))
|
||||
err_silent!("Empty response or unable find a valid icon", domain);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn save_icon(path: &str, icon: Vec<u8>) {
|
||||
@@ -602,12 +559,10 @@ async fn save_icon(path: &str, icon: Vec<u8>) {
|
||||
fn get_icon_type(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<&'static str> {
|
||||
fn check_svg_after_xml_declaration(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<&'static str> {
|
||||
// Look for SVG tag within the first 1KB
|
||||
if let Ok(content) = std::str::from_utf8(&bytes[..bytes.len().min(1024)])
|
||||
&& (content.contains("<svg") || content.contains("<SVG"))
|
||||
{
|
||||
return Some("svg+xml");
|
||||
}
|
||||
None
|
||||
const SVG_MATCH: &[u8; 4] = b"<svg";
|
||||
let content = &bytes[..bytes.len().min(1024)];
|
||||
// Even though XML is case-sensitive we will do a case insensitive match
|
||||
content.windows(SVG_MATCH.len()).any(|w| w.eq_ignore_ascii_case(SVG_MATCH)).then_some("svg+xml")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Some details can be found here:
|
||||
@@ -659,12 +614,22 @@ pub struct Jar(std::sync::RwLock<CookieStore>);
|
||||
|
||||
impl reqwest::cookie::CookieStore for Jar {
|
||||
fn set_cookies(&self, cookie_headers: &mut dyn Iterator<Item = &HeaderValue>, url: &url::Url) {
|
||||
use cookie::{Cookie as RawCookie, ParseError as RawCookieParseError};
|
||||
use time::Duration;
|
||||
use cookie::{Cookie as RawCookie, ParseError as RawCookieParseError, time::Duration};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut cookie_store = self.0.write().unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
// The store only skips expired cookies when reading them, so remove them here or they are kept forever
|
||||
let expired: Vec<_> = cookie_store
|
||||
.iter_any()
|
||||
.filter(|c| c.is_expired())
|
||||
.map(|c| (String::from(&c.domain), String::from(&c.path), c.name().to_owned()))
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
for (domain, path, name) in expired {
|
||||
cookie_store.remove(&domain, &path, &name);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let cookies = cookie_headers.filter_map(|val| {
|
||||
std::str::from_utf8(val.as_bytes())
|
||||
str::from_utf8(val.as_bytes())
|
||||
.map_err(RawCookieParseError::from)
|
||||
.and_then(RawCookie::parse)
|
||||
.map(|mut c| {
|
||||
@@ -679,11 +644,15 @@ impl reqwest::cookie::CookieStore for Jar {
|
||||
|
||||
fn cookies(&self, url: &url::Url) -> Option<HeaderValue> {
|
||||
let cookie_store = self.0.read().unwrap();
|
||||
let s = cookie_store
|
||||
.get_request_values(url)
|
||||
.map(|(name, value)| format!("{name}={value}"))
|
||||
.collect::<Vec<_>>()
|
||||
.join("; ");
|
||||
let mut s = String::new();
|
||||
for (name, value) in cookie_store.get_request_values(url) {
|
||||
if !s.is_empty() {
|
||||
s.push_str("; ");
|
||||
}
|
||||
s.push_str(name);
|
||||
s.push('=');
|
||||
s.push_str(value);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if s.is_empty() {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
@@ -725,34 +694,48 @@ struct FaviconEmitter {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl FaviconEmitter {
|
||||
fn flush_current_attribute(&mut self, emit_current_tag: bool) {
|
||||
const ATTR_HREF: &[u8] = b"href";
|
||||
const ATTR_REL: &[u8] = b"rel";
|
||||
const TAG_LINK: &[u8] = b"link";
|
||||
const TAG_BASE: &[u8] = b"base";
|
||||
const TAG_HEAD: &[u8] = b"head";
|
||||
fn is_icon_rel(rel: &[u8]) -> bool {
|
||||
let mut has_icon = false;
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(ref mut token) = self.current_token {
|
||||
let tag_name: &[u8] = &token.tag.name;
|
||||
|
||||
if self.current_attribute.is_some() && (tag_name == TAG_BASE || tag_name == TAG_LINK) {
|
||||
let (k, v) = self.current_attribute.take().unwrap();
|
||||
token.tag.attributes.entry(k).and_modify(|_| {}).or_insert(v);
|
||||
for keyword in rel.split(u8::is_ascii_whitespace) {
|
||||
if keyword.eq_ignore_ascii_case(b"mask-icon") {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if keyword.eq_ignore_ascii_case(b"icon")
|
||||
|| keyword.eq_ignore_ascii_case(b"favicon")
|
||||
|| keyword.eq_ignore_ascii_case(b"fluid-icon")
|
||||
|| keyword.eq_ignore_ascii_case(b"apple-touch-icon")
|
||||
|| keyword.eq_ignore_ascii_case(b"apple-touch-icon-precomposed")
|
||||
{
|
||||
has_icon = true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let tag_attr = &token.tag.attributes;
|
||||
match tag_name {
|
||||
TAG_HEAD if token.closing => self.emit_token = true,
|
||||
TAG_BASE if tag_attr.contains_key(ATTR_HREF) => self.emit_token = true,
|
||||
TAG_LINK if emit_current_tag && tag_attr.contains_key(ATTR_REL) && tag_attr.contains_key(ATTR_HREF) => {
|
||||
let rel_value =
|
||||
std::str::from_utf8(token.tag.attributes.get(ATTR_REL).unwrap()).unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
if rel_value.contains("icon") && !rel_value.contains("mask-icon") {
|
||||
self.emit_token = true;
|
||||
has_icon
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn flush_current_attribute(&mut self, tag_complete: bool) {
|
||||
let Some(token) = &mut self.current_token else {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some((name, value)) = self.current_attribute.take() {
|
||||
token.tag.attributes.entry(name).or_insert(value);
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => (),
|
||||
|
||||
if tag_complete {
|
||||
let attrs = &token.tag.attributes;
|
||||
let href: &[u8] = b"href";
|
||||
let rel: &[u8] = b"rel";
|
||||
|
||||
self.emit_token = match (token.closing, token.tag.name.as_slice()) {
|
||||
(true, b"head") | (false, b"body" | b"frameset") => true,
|
||||
(false, b"base") => attrs.contains_key(href),
|
||||
(false, b"link") => {
|
||||
attrs.contains_key(href) && attrs.get(rel).is_some_and(|value| Self::is_icon_rel(value))
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -807,16 +790,11 @@ impl Emitter for FaviconEmitter {
|
||||
|
||||
fn init_attribute(&mut self) {
|
||||
self.flush_current_attribute(false);
|
||||
self.current_attribute = match &self.current_token {
|
||||
Some(token) => {
|
||||
let tag_name: &[u8] = &token.tag.name;
|
||||
match tag_name {
|
||||
b"link" | b"head" | b"base" => Some(Default::default()),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
self.current_attribute = self
|
||||
.current_token
|
||||
.as_ref()
|
||||
.filter(|token| !token.closing && matches!(token.tag.name.as_slice(), b"link" | b"base"))
|
||||
.map(|_| Default::default());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn push_attribute_name(&mut self, s: &[u8]) {
|
||||
@@ -832,25 +810,32 @@ impl Emitter for FaviconEmitter {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn current_is_appropriate_end_tag_token(&mut self) -> bool {
|
||||
match &self.current_token {
|
||||
Some(token) if token.closing => !self.last_start_tag.is_empty() && self.last_start_tag == token.tag.name,
|
||||
_ => false,
|
||||
self.current_token
|
||||
.as_ref()
|
||||
.is_some_and(|t| t.closing && (!self.last_start_tag.is_empty() && self.last_start_tag == t.tag.name))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn should_emit_errors(&mut self) -> bool {
|
||||
false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// We do not want and need these parts of the HTML document
|
||||
// These will be skipped and ignored during the tokenization and iteration.
|
||||
fn emit_current_comment(&mut self) {}
|
||||
fn emit_current_doctype(&mut self) {}
|
||||
fn emit_current_processing_instruction(&mut self) {}
|
||||
fn emit_eof(&mut self) {}
|
||||
fn emit_error(&mut self, _: html5gum::Error) {}
|
||||
fn emit_string(&mut self, _: &[u8]) {}
|
||||
fn init_comment(&mut self) {}
|
||||
fn init_doctype(&mut self) {}
|
||||
fn init_processing_instruction(&mut self) {}
|
||||
fn push_comment(&mut self, _: &[u8]) {}
|
||||
fn push_doctype_name(&mut self, _: &[u8]) {}
|
||||
fn push_doctype_public_identifier(&mut self, _: &[u8]) {}
|
||||
fn push_doctype_system_identifier(&mut self, _: &[u8]) {}
|
||||
fn push_processing_instruction_data(&mut self, _: &[u8]) {}
|
||||
fn push_processing_instruction_target(&mut self, _: &[u8]) {}
|
||||
fn set_doctype_public_identifier(&mut self, _: &[u8]) {}
|
||||
fn set_doctype_system_identifier(&mut self, _: &[u8]) {}
|
||||
fn set_force_quirks(&mut self) {}
|
||||
|
||||
+187
-68
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn,
|
||||
models::{
|
||||
AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, Device, DeviceId, EventType, Invitation, OIDCCodeResponseError,
|
||||
AuthRequest, AuthRequestId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, EventType, Invitation, OIDCCodeResponseError,
|
||||
OrganizationApiKey, OrganizationId, SendId, SsoAuth, SsoUser, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete,
|
||||
TwoFactorType, User, UserId,
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
|
||||
post_prelogin,
|
||||
prelogin_password,
|
||||
register_verification_email,
|
||||
register_verification_email_clicked,
|
||||
register_finish,
|
||||
prevalidate,
|
||||
authorize,
|
||||
@@ -76,14 +77,14 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
|
||||
check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
|
||||
check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;
|
||||
|
||||
password_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
|
||||
password_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
"client_credentials" => {
|
||||
check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
|
||||
check_is_some(data.client_secret.as_ref(), "client_secret cannot be blank")?;
|
||||
check_is_some(data.scope.as_ref(), "scope cannot be blank")?;
|
||||
|
||||
api_key_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
|
||||
api_key_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
"authorization_code" if CONFIG.sso_enabled() => {
|
||||
check_is_some(data.client_id.as_ref(), "client_id cannot be blank")?;
|
||||
@@ -94,7 +95,7 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
|
||||
check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
|
||||
check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;
|
||||
|
||||
sso_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header.ip).await
|
||||
sso_login(data, &mut user_id, &conn, &client_header).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
"authorization_code" => err!("SSO sign-in is not available"),
|
||||
"send_access" => {
|
||||
@@ -111,14 +112,14 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
|
||||
.await?;
|
||||
Ok(Json(tokens.to_json()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
t => err!("Invalid type", t),
|
||||
t => err!("Invalid type", t.escape_debug().to_string()),
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(user_id) = user_id {
|
||||
match &login_result {
|
||||
Ok(_) => {
|
||||
log_user_event(
|
||||
EventType::UserLoggedIn as i32,
|
||||
EventType::UserLoggedIn,
|
||||
&user_id,
|
||||
client_header.device_type,
|
||||
&client_header.ip.ip,
|
||||
@@ -128,8 +129,7 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
if let Some(ev) = e.get_event() {
|
||||
log_user_event(ev.event as i32, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn)
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
log_user_event(ev.event, &user_id, client_header.device_type, &client_header.ip.ip, &conn).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -179,7 +179,13 @@ async fn refresh_login(data: ConnectData, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonR
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// After exchanging the code we need to check first if 2FA is needed before continuing
|
||||
async fn sso_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
async fn sso_login(
|
||||
data: ConnectData,
|
||||
user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
client_header: &ClientHeaders,
|
||||
) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let ip = &client_header.ip;
|
||||
AuthMethod::Sso.check_scope(data.scope.as_ref())?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Ratelimit the login
|
||||
@@ -317,6 +323,8 @@ async fn sso_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbCon
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let mut user = User::new(&user_infos.email, user_infos.user_name.clone());
|
||||
// Before saving, so that a client that can't log in doesn't create the account
|
||||
check_client_version(&user, client_header)?;
|
||||
user.verified_at = Some(now);
|
||||
user.save(conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -325,6 +333,8 @@ async fn sso_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbCon
|
||||
(user, device, None, None)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Some((user, _)) if !user.enabled => {
|
||||
// Set in both arms, not only after the match, so that their failed logins are logged
|
||||
*user_id = Some(user.uuid.clone());
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"This user has been disabled",
|
||||
format!("IP: {}. Username: {}.", ip.ip, user.email),
|
||||
@@ -334,6 +344,9 @@ async fn sso_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbCon
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Some((mut user, sso_user)) => {
|
||||
*user_id = Some(user.uuid.clone());
|
||||
check_client_version(&user, client_header)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let twofactor_token = twofactor_auth(&mut user, &data, &mut device, ip, conn).await?;
|
||||
@@ -368,7 +381,13 @@ async fn sso_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbCon
|
||||
authenticated_response(&user, &mut device, auth_tokens, twofactor_token, conn, ip).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn password_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
async fn password_login(
|
||||
data: ConnectData,
|
||||
user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
client_header: &ClientHeaders,
|
||||
) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let ip = &client_header.ip;
|
||||
// Validate scope
|
||||
AuthMethod::Password.check_scope(data.scope.as_ref())?;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -438,6 +457,8 @@ async fn password_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
check_client_version(&user, client_header)?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Change the KDF Iterations (only when not logging in with an auth request)
|
||||
if data.auth_request.is_none() {
|
||||
kdf_upgrade(&mut user, password, conn).await?;
|
||||
@@ -446,11 +467,11 @@ async fn password_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &
|
||||
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
|
||||
|
||||
if user.verified_at.is_none() && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.signups_verify() {
|
||||
if user.last_verifying_at.is_none()
|
||||
|| now.signed_duration_since(user.last_verifying_at.unwrap()).num_seconds()
|
||||
> CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_time().cast_signed()
|
||||
if user
|
||||
.last_verifying_at
|
||||
.is_none_or(|d| now.signed_duration_since(d).num_seconds() > i64::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_time()))
|
||||
{
|
||||
let resend_limit = CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_limit().cast_signed();
|
||||
let resend_limit = i32::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_limit());
|
||||
if resend_limit == 0 || user.login_verify_count < resend_limit {
|
||||
// We want to send another email verification if we require signups to verify
|
||||
// their email address, and we haven't sent them a reminder in a while...
|
||||
@@ -499,6 +520,66 @@ async fn password_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &
|
||||
authenticated_response(&user, &mut device, auth_tokens, twofactor_token, conn, ip).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Like upstream's `ClientVersionValidator`, every login needs the `Bitwarden-Client-Version` header, and a V2 account
|
||||
/// ([`User::has_v2_encryption`]) a client of at least 2026.10.1 (2026.10.2 for the desktop app). Called right after the
|
||||
/// credentials are checked, like upstream, so that it doesn't tell anyone else which accounts are V2.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/src/Identity/IdentityServer/RequestValidators/ClientVersionValidator.cs#L33-L79>
|
||||
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/src/Core/KeyManagement/Constants.cs#L5-L6>
|
||||
fn check_client_version(user: &User, client_header: &ClientHeaders) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let Some((error, description)) = client_version_error(
|
||||
user.has_v2_encryption(),
|
||||
client_header.client_version.as_ref(),
|
||||
client_header.device_type,
|
||||
) else {
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
};
|
||||
Err(crate::error::Error::from((
|
||||
// Escaped: on a first SSO login the email comes from the provider and isn't validated yet
|
||||
format!("IP: {}. Username: {}. {error}", client_header.ip.ip, user.email.escape_debug()),
|
||||
json!({
|
||||
"error": error,
|
||||
"error_description": description,
|
||||
"ErrorModel": { "Message": description, "Object": "error" },
|
||||
}),
|
||||
))
|
||||
.with_event(crate::error::ErrorEvent {
|
||||
event: EventType::UserFailedLogIn,
|
||||
}))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The error id and message of [`check_client_version`], `None` when the client may log in.
|
||||
fn client_version_error(
|
||||
is_v2: bool,
|
||||
client_version: Option<&semver::Version>,
|
||||
device_type: i32,
|
||||
) -> Option<(&'static str, &'static str)> {
|
||||
const MIN_V2_CLIENT: semver::Version = semver::Version::new(2026, 10, 1);
|
||||
const MIN_V2_DESKTOP_CLIENT: semver::Version = semver::Version::new(2026, 10, 2);
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(version) = client_version else {
|
||||
return Some((
|
||||
"version_header_missing",
|
||||
"No client version header found, required to prevent encryption errors. Please confirm your client is supplying the header: \"Bitwarden-Client-Version\"",
|
||||
));
|
||||
};
|
||||
if !is_v2 {
|
||||
return None;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Upstream's desktop device types
|
||||
// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/src/Libraries/Clients/DeviceTypes.cs#L14-L20>
|
||||
let is_desktop = matches!(
|
||||
DeviceType::from_i32(device_type),
|
||||
DeviceType::WindowsDesktop | DeviceType::MacOsDesktop | DeviceType::LinuxDesktop | DeviceType::Uwp
|
||||
);
|
||||
let min_version = if is_desktop {
|
||||
&MIN_V2_DESKTOP_CLIENT
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
&MIN_V2_CLIENT
|
||||
};
|
||||
(version < min_version).then_some(("invalid_client_version", "Please update your app to continue using Bitwarden"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn authenticated_response(
|
||||
user: &User,
|
||||
device: &mut Device,
|
||||
@@ -546,24 +627,13 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
|
||||
// https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
|
||||
"MasterKeyEncryptedUserKey": user.akey,
|
||||
"MasterKeyWrappedUserKey": user.akey,
|
||||
"Salt": user.email
|
||||
"Salt": user.master_password_salt()
|
||||
})
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Value::Null
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
|
||||
json!({
|
||||
"publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
|
||||
"wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
|
||||
"publicKey": user.public_key,
|
||||
"Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Object": "privateKeys"
|
||||
})
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Value::Null
|
||||
};
|
||||
let account_keys = user.account_keys_json(conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut result = json!({
|
||||
"access_token": auth_tokens.access_token(),
|
||||
@@ -598,7 +668,13 @@ async fn authenticated_response(
|
||||
Ok(Json(result))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn api_key_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &DbConn, ip: &ClientIp) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
async fn api_key_login(
|
||||
data: ConnectData,
|
||||
user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
client_header: &ClientHeaders,
|
||||
) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let ip = &client_header.ip;
|
||||
// Ratelimit the login
|
||||
crate::ratelimit::check_limit_login(&ip.ip)?;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -610,7 +686,7 @@ async fn api_key_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &D
|
||||
check_is_some(data.device_name.as_ref(), "device_name cannot be blank")?;
|
||||
check_is_some(data.device_type.as_ref(), "device_type cannot be blank")?;
|
||||
|
||||
user_api_key_login(data, user_id, conn, ip).await
|
||||
user_api_key_login(data, user_id, conn, client_header).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
Some(scope) if scope == &AuthMethod::OrgApiKey.scope() => organization_api_key_login(data, conn, ip).await,
|
||||
_ => err!("Scope not supported"),
|
||||
@@ -621,8 +697,9 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
|
||||
data: ConnectData,
|
||||
user_id: &mut Option<UserId>,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
ip: &ClientIp,
|
||||
client_header: &ClientHeaders,
|
||||
) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let ip = &client_header.ip;
|
||||
// Get the user via the client_id
|
||||
let client_id = data.client_id.as_ref().unwrap();
|
||||
let Some(client_user_id) = client_id.strip_prefix("user.") else {
|
||||
@@ -659,6 +736,8 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
check_client_version(&user, client_header)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut device = get_device(&data, conn, &user).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
if CONFIG.mail_enabled() && device.is_new() {
|
||||
@@ -703,24 +782,13 @@ async fn user_api_key_login(
|
||||
// https://github.com/bitwarden/android/blob/release/2025.12-rc41/network/src/main/kotlin/com/bitwarden/network/model/MasterPasswordUnlockDataJson.kt#L22-L26
|
||||
"MasterKeyEncryptedUserKey": user.akey,
|
||||
"MasterKeyWrappedUserKey": user.akey,
|
||||
"Salt": user.email
|
||||
"Salt": user.master_password_salt()
|
||||
})
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Value::Null
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let account_keys = if user.private_key.is_some() {
|
||||
json!({
|
||||
"publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair": {
|
||||
"wrappedPrivateKey": user.private_key,
|
||||
"publicKey": user.public_key,
|
||||
"Object": "publicKeyEncryptionKeyPair"
|
||||
},
|
||||
"Object": "privateKeys"
|
||||
})
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Value::Null
|
||||
};
|
||||
let account_keys = user.account_keys_json(conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// Note: No refresh_token is returned. The CLI just repeats the
|
||||
// client_credentials login flow when the existing token expires.
|
||||
@@ -806,7 +874,7 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
|
||||
|
||||
// No twofactor token if twofactor is disabled
|
||||
if twofactors.is_empty() {
|
||||
enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await?;
|
||||
enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, false, conn).await?;
|
||||
return Ok(None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -902,9 +970,9 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
|
||||
Device::clear_twofactor_remember_by_user(&user.uuid, conn).await?;
|
||||
device.delete_twofactor_remember();
|
||||
|
||||
enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await?;
|
||||
enforce_2fa_policy(user, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, true, conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa as i32, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
|
||||
log_user_event(EventType::UserRecovered2fa, &user.uuid, device.atype, &ip.ip, conn).await;
|
||||
|
||||
if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
|
||||
&& let Err(e) =
|
||||
@@ -928,12 +996,7 @@ async fn twofactor_auth(
|
||||
TwoFactorIncomplete::mark_complete(&user.uuid, &device.uuid, conn).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
let remember = data.two_factor_remember.unwrap_or(0);
|
||||
let two_factor = if !CONFIG.disable_2fa_remember() && remember == 1 {
|
||||
Some(device.refresh_twofactor_remember())
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
None
|
||||
};
|
||||
Ok(two_factor)
|
||||
Ok((!CONFIG.disable_2fa_remember() && remember == 1).then(|| device.refresh_twofactor_remember()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn selected_data(tf: Option<TwoFactor>) -> ApiResult<String> {
|
||||
@@ -974,7 +1037,7 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::YubiKey) => {
|
||||
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
|
||||
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
|
||||
err!("No YubiKey devices registered")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -986,7 +1049,7 @@ async fn json_err_twofactor(providers: &[i32], user: &User, data: &ConnectData,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Some(tf_type @ TwoFactorType::Email) => {
|
||||
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type as i32, conn).await else {
|
||||
let Some(twofactor) = TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(user_id, tf_type, conn).await else {
|
||||
err!("No twofactor email registered")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1035,6 +1098,13 @@ struct RegisterVerificationData {
|
||||
// receiveMarketingEmails: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct RegisterVerificationEmailClickedData {
|
||||
email: String,
|
||||
email_verification_token: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(rocket::Responder)]
|
||||
enum RegisterVerificationResponse {
|
||||
#[response(status = 204)]
|
||||
@@ -1080,7 +1150,7 @@ async fn register_verification_email(
|
||||
use rand::{RngExt, rngs::SmallRng};
|
||||
let mut rng: SmallRng = rand::make_rng();
|
||||
let sleep_ms: u64 = rng.random_range(900..=1100);
|
||||
tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_millis(sleep_ms)).await;
|
||||
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(sleep_ms)).await;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
mail::send_register_verify_email(&data.email, &token).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1097,6 +1167,25 @@ async fn register_verification_email(
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[post("/accounts/register/verification-email-clicked", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn register_verification_email_clicked(
|
||||
data: Json<RegisterVerificationEmailClickedData>,
|
||||
conn: DbConn,
|
||||
) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let data = data.into_inner();
|
||||
let token_valid = auth::decode_register_verify(&data.email_verification_token)
|
||||
.is_ok_and(|claims| claims.verified && claims.sub.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&data.email));
|
||||
let user_exists = User::find_by_mail(&data.email, &conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.is_some_and(|user| !user.password_hash.is_empty() || user.private_key.is_some());
|
||||
|
||||
if !token_valid || user_exists {
|
||||
err!("Expired link. Please restart registration or try logging in. You may already have an account")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[post("/accounts/register/finish", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn register_finish(data: Json<RegisterData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
|
||||
@@ -1139,10 +1228,10 @@ struct ConnectData {
|
||||
#[field(name = uncased("device_type"))]
|
||||
#[field(name = uncased("devicetype"))]
|
||||
device_type: Option<String>,
|
||||
#[allow(unused)]
|
||||
#[expect(unused, reason = "Unused, mobile device push not yet supported")]
|
||||
#[field(name = uncased("device_push_token"))]
|
||||
#[field(name = uncased("devicepushtoken"))]
|
||||
_device_push_token: Option<String>, // Unused; mobile device push not yet supported.
|
||||
device_push_token: Option<String>,
|
||||
|
||||
// Needed for two-factor auth
|
||||
#[field(name = uncased("two_factor_provider"))]
|
||||
@@ -1189,8 +1278,8 @@ fn prevalidate() -> JsonResult {
|
||||
const SSO_BINDING_COOKIE: &str = "VW_SSO_BINDING";
|
||||
|
||||
#[get("/connect/oidc-signin?<code>&<state>", rank = 1)]
|
||||
async fn oidcsignin(code: OIDCCode, state: String, cookies: &CookieJar<'_>, mut conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
|
||||
oidcsignin_redirect(state, code, None, cookies, &mut conn).await
|
||||
async fn oidcsignin(code: OIDCCode, state: String, cookies: &CookieJar<'_>, conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
|
||||
oidcsignin_redirect(state, code, None, cookies, &conn).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Bitwarden client appear to only care for code and state
|
||||
@@ -1202,7 +1291,7 @@ async fn oidcsignin_error(
|
||||
error: String,
|
||||
error_description: Option<String>,
|
||||
cookies: &CookieJar<'_>,
|
||||
mut conn: DbConn,
|
||||
conn: DbConn,
|
||||
) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
|
||||
oidcsignin_redirect(
|
||||
state.clone(),
|
||||
@@ -1212,7 +1301,7 @@ async fn oidcsignin_error(
|
||||
error_description,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
cookies,
|
||||
&mut conn,
|
||||
&conn,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1225,7 +1314,7 @@ async fn oidcsignin_redirect(
|
||||
code: OIDCCode,
|
||||
error: Option<OIDCCodeResponseError>,
|
||||
cookies: &CookieJar<'_>,
|
||||
conn: &mut DbConn,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) -> ApiResult<Redirect> {
|
||||
let state = sso::decode_state(&base64_state)?;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1273,18 +1362,18 @@ struct AuthorizeData {
|
||||
#[field(name = uncased("redirect_uri"))]
|
||||
#[field(name = uncased("redirecturi"))]
|
||||
redirect_uri: String,
|
||||
#[allow(unused)]
|
||||
#[expect(unused)]
|
||||
response_type: Option<String>,
|
||||
#[allow(unused)]
|
||||
#[expect(unused)]
|
||||
scope: Option<String>,
|
||||
state: OIDCState,
|
||||
code_challenge: OIDCCodeChallenge,
|
||||
code_challenge_method: String,
|
||||
#[allow(unused)]
|
||||
#[expect(unused)]
|
||||
response_mode: Option<String>,
|
||||
#[allow(unused)]
|
||||
#[expect(unused)]
|
||||
domain_hint: Option<String>,
|
||||
#[allow(unused)]
|
||||
#[expect(unused)]
|
||||
#[field(name = uncased("ssoToken"))]
|
||||
sso_token: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1316,7 +1405,7 @@ async fn authorize(data: AuthorizeData, cookies: &CookieJar<'_>, secure: Secure,
|
||||
cookies.add(
|
||||
Cookie::build((SSO_BINDING_COOKIE, binding_token))
|
||||
.path(format!("{}/identity/connect/", CONFIG.domain_path()))
|
||||
.max_age(time::Duration::seconds(sso::SSO_AUTH_EXPIRATION.num_seconds()))
|
||||
.max_age(rocket::time::Duration::seconds(sso::SSO_AUTH_EXPIRATION.num_seconds()))
|
||||
.same_site(SameSite::Lax) // Lax is needed because the IdP runs on a different FQDN
|
||||
.http_only(true)
|
||||
.secure(secure.https)
|
||||
@@ -1325,3 +1414,33 @@ async fn authorize(data: AuthorizeData, cookies: &CookieJar<'_>, secure: Secure,
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Redirect::temporary(String::from(auth_url)))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn test_client_version_error() {
|
||||
let version = |v| semver::Version::parse(v).unwrap();
|
||||
let web = DeviceType::ChromeBrowser as i32;
|
||||
let desktop = DeviceType::WindowsDesktop as i32;
|
||||
// Every login needs the header
|
||||
assert_eq!(client_version_error(false, None, web).map(|e| e.0), Some("version_header_missing"));
|
||||
assert_eq!(client_version_error(true, None, desktop).map(|e| e.0), Some("version_header_missing"));
|
||||
// V1 accounts log in from any version
|
||||
assert_eq!(client_version_error(false, Some(&version("2024.1.0")), web), None);
|
||||
assert_eq!(client_version_error(false, Some(&version("2024.1.0")), desktop), None);
|
||||
// V2 accounts need 2026.10.1, and 2026.10.2 for the desktop app
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
client_version_error(true, Some(&version("2026.10.0")), web).map(|e| e.0),
|
||||
Some("invalid_client_version")
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(client_version_error(true, Some(&version("2026.10.1")), web), None);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
client_version_error(true, Some(&version("2026.10.1")), desktop).map(|e| e.0),
|
||||
Some("invalid_client_version")
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert_eq!(client_version_error(true, Some(&version("2026.10.2")), DeviceType::Uwp as i32), None);
|
||||
assert_eq!(client_version_error(true, Some(&version("2026.11.0")), desktop), None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+11
-6
@@ -4,8 +4,13 @@ mod icons;
|
||||
mod identity;
|
||||
mod notifications;
|
||||
mod push;
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "unsafe_test_mode")]
|
||||
mod test_seeder;
|
||||
mod web;
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(feature = "unsafe_test_mode")]
|
||||
pub use test_seeder::routes as test_seeder_routes;
|
||||
|
||||
use rocket::serde::json::Json;
|
||||
use serde_json::Value;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -23,14 +28,14 @@ pub use crate::api::{
|
||||
icons::routes as icons_routes,
|
||||
identity::routes as identity_routes,
|
||||
notifications::routes as notifications_routes,
|
||||
notifications::{AnonymousNotify, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS},
|
||||
notifications::{AnonymousNotify, LogOutReason, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS},
|
||||
push::{
|
||||
push_cipher_update, push_folder_update, push_logout, push_send_update, push_user_update, register_push_device,
|
||||
unregister_push_device,
|
||||
push_cipher_update, push_folder_update, push_logout, push_logout_to_relay, push_send_update, push_user_update,
|
||||
register_push_device, unregister_push_device,
|
||||
},
|
||||
web::catchers as web_catchers,
|
||||
web::routes as web_routes,
|
||||
web::{invalidate_css_cache, static_files},
|
||||
web::{STATIC_FILES, invalidate_css_cache},
|
||||
};
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
CONFIG,
|
||||
@@ -46,7 +51,7 @@ pub type JsonResult = ApiResult<Json<Value>>;
|
||||
pub type EmptyResult = ApiResult<()>;
|
||||
|
||||
// Common structs representing JSON data received
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct PasswordOrOtpData {
|
||||
#[serde(alias = "MasterPasswordHash")]
|
||||
@@ -115,7 +120,7 @@ async fn master_password_policy(user: &User, conn: &DbConn) -> Value {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}))
|
||||
} else if CONFIG.sso_enabled() {
|
||||
CONFIG.sso_master_password_policy_value().unwrap_or(json!({}))
|
||||
CONFIG.sso_master_password_policy_value().unwrap_or_else(|| json!({}))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
json!({})
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
+47
-31
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ use std::{
|
||||
time::{Duration, Instant},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use bytes::Bytes;
|
||||
use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
|
||||
use rmpv::Value;
|
||||
use rocket::{Route, futures::StreamExt};
|
||||
@@ -212,7 +213,7 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
|
||||
if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
|
||||
yield Message::Ping(PING);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -295,7 +296,7 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
|
||||
if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
|
||||
yield Message::Ping(PING);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -307,7 +308,7 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
|
||||
// Websockets server
|
||||
//
|
||||
|
||||
fn serialize(val: &Value) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
fn serialize(val: &Value) -> Bytes {
|
||||
use rmpv::encode::write_value;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut buf = Vec::new();
|
||||
@@ -335,7 +336,7 @@ fn serialize(val: &Value) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
len_buf.append(&mut buf);
|
||||
len_buf
|
||||
len_buf.into()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn serialize_date(date: NaiveDateTime) -> Value {
|
||||
@@ -358,7 +359,8 @@ fn convert_option<T: Into<Value>>(option: Option<T>) -> Value {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const RECORD_SEPARATOR: u8 = 0x1e;
|
||||
const INITIAL_RESPONSE: [u8; 3] = [0x7b, 0x7d, RECORD_SEPARATOR]; // {, }, <RS>
|
||||
const INITIAL_RESPONSE: Bytes = Bytes::from_static(&[0x7b, 0x7d, RECORD_SEPARATOR]); // {, }, <RS>
|
||||
const PING: Bytes = Bytes::from_static(&[0x02, 0x91, 0x06]);
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize, Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
|
||||
struct InitialMessage<'a> {
|
||||
@@ -379,10 +381,10 @@ pub struct WebSocketUsers {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl WebSocketUsers {
|
||||
async fn send_update(&self, user_id: &UserId, data: &[u8]) {
|
||||
async fn send_update(&self, user_id: &UserId, data: &Bytes) {
|
||||
if let Some(user) = self.map.get(user_id.as_ref()).map(|v| v.clone()) {
|
||||
for (_, sender) in &user {
|
||||
if let Err(e) = sender.send(Message::binary(data)).await {
|
||||
if let Err(e) = sender.send(Message::binary(data.clone())).await {
|
||||
error!("Error sending WS update {e}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -411,23 +413,34 @@ impl WebSocketUsers {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn send_logout(&self, user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) {
|
||||
self.send_logout_with_reason(user, acting_device, None, conn).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A logout that clients may handle differently depending on `reason`
|
||||
pub async fn send_logout_with_reason(
|
||||
&self,
|
||||
user: &User,
|
||||
acting_device: Option<&Device>,
|
||||
reason: Option<LogOutReason>,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) {
|
||||
// Skip any processing if both WebSockets and Push are not active
|
||||
if *NOTIFICATIONS_DISABLED {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let acting_device_id = acting_device.map(|d| d.uuid.clone());
|
||||
let data = create_update(
|
||||
vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))],
|
||||
UpdateType::LogOut,
|
||||
acting_device_id,
|
||||
);
|
||||
let mut payload =
|
||||
vec![("UserId".into(), user.uuid.to_string().into()), ("Date".into(), serialize_date(user.updated_at))];
|
||||
if let Some(reason) = reason {
|
||||
payload.push(("Reason".into(), (reason as i32).into()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
let data = create_update(payload, UpdateType::LogOut, acting_device.map(|d| &d.uuid));
|
||||
|
||||
if CONFIG.enable_websocket() {
|
||||
self.send_update(&user.uuid, &data).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if CONFIG.push_enabled() {
|
||||
push_logout(user, acting_device, conn).await;
|
||||
push_logout(user, acting_device, reason, conn).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -443,7 +456,7 @@ impl WebSocketUsers {
|
||||
("RevisionDate".into(), serialize_date(folder.updated_at)),
|
||||
],
|
||||
ut,
|
||||
Some(device.uuid.clone()),
|
||||
Some(&device.uuid),
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
if CONFIG.enable_websocket() {
|
||||
@@ -490,7 +503,7 @@ impl WebSocketUsers {
|
||||
("RevisionDate".into(), revision_date),
|
||||
],
|
||||
ut,
|
||||
Some(device.uuid.clone()), // Acting device id (unique device/app uuid)
|
||||
Some(&device.uuid), // Acting device id (unique device/app uuid)
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
if CONFIG.enable_websocket() {
|
||||
@@ -546,7 +559,7 @@ impl WebSocketUsers {
|
||||
let data = create_update(
|
||||
vec![("Id".into(), auth_request_uuid.to_owned().into()), ("UserId".into(), user_id.to_string().into())],
|
||||
UpdateType::AuthRequest,
|
||||
Some(device.uuid.clone()),
|
||||
Some(&device.uuid),
|
||||
);
|
||||
if CONFIG.enable_websocket() {
|
||||
self.send_update(user_id, &data).await;
|
||||
@@ -571,7 +584,7 @@ impl WebSocketUsers {
|
||||
let data = create_update(
|
||||
vec![("Id".into(), auth_request_id.to_string().into()), ("UserId".into(), user_id.to_string().into())],
|
||||
UpdateType::AuthRequestResponse,
|
||||
Some(device.uuid.clone()),
|
||||
Some(&device.uuid),
|
||||
);
|
||||
if CONFIG.enable_websocket() {
|
||||
self.send_update(user_id, &data).await;
|
||||
@@ -602,23 +615,22 @@ impl AnonymousWebSocketSubscriptions {
|
||||
|
||||
/// Releases a slot taken by `try_reserve`.
|
||||
fn release(&self, addr: IpAddr) {
|
||||
let empty = if let Some(mut count) = self.connections.get_mut(&addr) {
|
||||
*count = count.saturating_sub(1);
|
||||
*count == 0
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
false
|
||||
};
|
||||
let empty = self.connections.get_mut(&addr).is_some_and(|mut c| {
|
||||
*c = c.saturating_sub(1);
|
||||
*c == 0
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
// Only remove once the guard above is dropped, otherwise this deadlocks.
|
||||
if empty {
|
||||
self.connections.remove_if(&addr, |_, count| *count == 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn send_update(&self, token: &str, data: &[u8]) {
|
||||
async fn send_update(&self, token: &str, data: &Bytes) {
|
||||
// Clone the senders so the map isn't kept locked while sending.
|
||||
let senders = self.map.get(token).map(|v| v.clone()).unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
let senders = self.map.get(token).map_or_default(|v| v.clone());
|
||||
for (_, sender) in senders {
|
||||
if let Err(e) = sender.send(Message::binary(data)).await {
|
||||
if let Err(e) = sender.send(Message::binary(data.clone())).await {
|
||||
error!("Error sending WS update {e}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -652,7 +664,7 @@ impl AnonymousWebSocketSubscriptions {
|
||||
]
|
||||
]
|
||||
*/
|
||||
fn create_update(payload: Vec<(Value, Value)>, ut: UpdateType, acting_device_id: Option<DeviceId>) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
fn create_update(payload: Vec<(Value, Value)>, ut: UpdateType, acting_device_id: Option<&DeviceId>) -> Bytes {
|
||||
use rmpv::Value as V;
|
||||
|
||||
let value = V::Array(vec![
|
||||
@@ -670,7 +682,7 @@ fn create_update(payload: Vec<(Value, Value)>, ut: UpdateType, acting_device_id:
|
||||
serialize(&value)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn create_anonymous_update(payload: Vec<(Value, Value)>, ut: UpdateType, user_id: &UserId) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
fn create_anonymous_update(payload: Vec<(Value, Value)>, ut: UpdateType, user_id: &UserId) -> Bytes {
|
||||
use rmpv::Value as V;
|
||||
|
||||
let value = V::Array(vec![
|
||||
@@ -691,8 +703,12 @@ fn create_anonymous_update(payload: Vec<(Value, Value)>, ut: UpdateType, user_id
|
||||
serialize(&value)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn create_ping() -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
serialize(&Value::Array(vec![6.into()]))
|
||||
/// Why a logout was pushed, absent for a plain one. `KdfChange` isn't sent yet.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9030c42bf7d8f9ac2ff9fee85c39588d5eb81499/src/Core/Enums/PushNotificationLogOutReason.cs#L3-L7>
|
||||
#[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
|
||||
pub enum LogOutReason {
|
||||
KeyRotation = 1,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/375af7c43b10d9da03525d41452f95de3f921541/src/Core/Enums/PushType.cs
|
||||
|
||||
+24
-13
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ use tokio::sync::RwLock;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
CONFIG,
|
||||
api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, UpdateType},
|
||||
api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult, LogOutReason, UpdateType},
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn,
|
||||
models::{AuthRequestId, Cipher, Device, Folder, PushId, Send, User, UserId},
|
||||
@@ -139,21 +139,25 @@ pub async fn unregister_push_device(push_id: Option<&PushId>) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
if !CONFIG.push_enabled() || push_id.is_none() {
|
||||
return Ok(());
|
||||
}
|
||||
let auth_api_token = get_auth_api_token().await?;
|
||||
let data = json!({
|
||||
"id": push_id.as_ref().unwrap(),
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
let auth_api_token = get_auth_api_token().await?;
|
||||
let auth_header = format!("Bearer {auth_api_token}");
|
||||
|
||||
match make_http_request(
|
||||
Method::POST,
|
||||
&format!("{}/push/delete/{}", CONFIG.push_relay_uri(), push_id.as_ref().unwrap()),
|
||||
)?
|
||||
if let Err(e) = make_http_request(Method::POST, &(CONFIG.push_relay_uri() + "/push/delete"))?
|
||||
.header(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
|
||||
.header(ACCEPT, "application/json")
|
||||
.header(AUTHORIZATION, auth_header)
|
||||
.json(&data)
|
||||
.send()
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.await?
|
||||
.error_for_status()
|
||||
{
|
||||
Ok(r) => r,
|
||||
Err(e) => err!(format!("An error occurred during device unregistration: {e}")),
|
||||
};
|
||||
err!(format!("An error occurred during device unregistration: {e}"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -188,8 +192,15 @@ pub async fn push_cipher_update(ut: UpdateType, cipher: &Cipher, device: &Device
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) {
|
||||
pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, reason: Option<LogOutReason>, conn: &DbConn) {
|
||||
if Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, conn).await {
|
||||
push_logout_to_relay(user, acting_device, reason);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Sends the logout without checking for push devices first.
|
||||
// Needed after deleting a user, when the devices are already gone from the database.
|
||||
pub fn push_logout_to_relay(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, reason: Option<LogOutReason>) {
|
||||
tokio::task::spawn(send_to_push_relay(json!({
|
||||
"userId": user.uuid,
|
||||
"organizationId": (),
|
||||
@@ -198,13 +209,13 @@ pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbC
|
||||
"type": UpdateType::LogOut as i32,
|
||||
"payload": {
|
||||
"userId": user.uuid,
|
||||
"date": format_date(&user.updated_at)
|
||||
"date": format_date(&user.updated_at),
|
||||
"reason": reason.map(|r| r as i32),
|
||||
},
|
||||
"clientType": null,
|
||||
"installationId": null
|
||||
})));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn push_user_update(ut: UpdateType, user: &User, push_uuid: Option<&PushId>, conn: &DbConn) {
|
||||
if Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, conn).await {
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,511 @@
|
||||
//! A seeder API for the end-to-end tests, only in builds with the `unsafe_test_mode` feature: it creates accounts with
|
||||
//! no checks at all, so it must never be in a release or a deployment.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! It answers the calls the SDK's live tests make to upstream's `util/SeederApi` (`POST /seed` with a scene,
|
||||
//! `DELETE /seed/{playId}`), under `/test/seeder`. Each request needs HTTP basic auth with `TEST_SEEDER_USERNAME` and
|
||||
//! `TEST_SEEDER_PASSWORD` from the environment; without both, every route answers 404. Seeding needs an `X-Play-Id`
|
||||
//! header, and destroying a play deletes the accounts seeded under it. Plays are kept in memory, which is enough for a
|
||||
//! test server that starts on an empty database.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Scenes:
|
||||
//! - `SingleUserScene`: a V1 account for an email and password, under a mangled address like upstream's, with
|
||||
//! PBKDF2 at upstream's default of 5000 iterations.
|
||||
//! - `TestVectorUserScene`: one of the SDK's user test vectors (`test-vectors/users/*.json`), stored as it is: the
|
||||
//! account and its vault are already encrypted. Unlike upstream, the address isn't mangled, since our master
|
||||
//! password salt is the email, so a vector can be seeded once at a time. Text Sends are stored too.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/util/SeederApi/Controllers/SeedController.cs#L11-L107>
|
||||
//! Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/util/Seeder/Scenes/SingleUserScene.cs#L38-L154>
|
||||
|
||||
use std::{
|
||||
collections::HashMap,
|
||||
num::NonZeroU32,
|
||||
sync::{LazyLock, Mutex},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use chrono::Utc;
|
||||
use data_encoding::{BASE64, HEXLOWER};
|
||||
use openssl::{
|
||||
pkey::PKey,
|
||||
rsa::Rsa,
|
||||
symm::{Cipher, encrypt},
|
||||
};
|
||||
use ring::{hkdf, hmac, pbkdf2};
|
||||
use rocket::{
|
||||
Request, Route,
|
||||
http::Status,
|
||||
request::{FromRequest, Outcome},
|
||||
serde::json::Json,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use serde_json::{Value, json};
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
api::{
|
||||
ApiResult, JsonResult,
|
||||
core::{seed_cipher, seed_send},
|
||||
},
|
||||
crypto,
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn,
|
||||
models::{Folder, FolderId, KeyId, SignatureAlgorithm, User, UserId, UserKdfType, UserSignatureKeyPair},
|
||||
},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
|
||||
routes![seed, destroy_play]
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The accounts seeded under each play id.
|
||||
static PLAYS: LazyLock<Mutex<HashMap<String, Vec<UserId>>>> = LazyLock::new(Mutex::default);
|
||||
|
||||
/// HTTP basic auth with `TEST_SEEDER_USERNAME` and `TEST_SEEDER_PASSWORD`.
|
||||
struct SeederAuth;
|
||||
|
||||
#[rocket::async_trait]
|
||||
impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for SeederAuth {
|
||||
type Error = &'static str;
|
||||
|
||||
async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let (Ok(username), Ok(password)) =
|
||||
(std::env::var("TEST_SEEDER_USERNAME"), std::env::var("TEST_SEEDER_PASSWORD"))
|
||||
else {
|
||||
return Outcome::Error((Status::NotFound, "The test seeder is off"));
|
||||
};
|
||||
if username.is_empty() || password.is_empty() {
|
||||
return Outcome::Error((Status::NotFound, "The test seeder is off"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
let expected = format!("Basic {}", BASE64.encode(format!("{username}:{password}").as_bytes()));
|
||||
match request.headers().get_one("Authorization") {
|
||||
Some(given) if crypto::ct_eq(given, expected) => Outcome::Success(Self),
|
||||
_ => Outcome::Error((Status::Unauthorized, "Invalid test seeder credentials")),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The `X-Play-Id` header, which names the play a seeding belongs to.
|
||||
struct PlayId(String);
|
||||
|
||||
#[rocket::async_trait]
|
||||
impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for PlayId {
|
||||
type Error = &'static str;
|
||||
|
||||
async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
match request.headers().get_one("X-Play-Id").map(str::trim) {
|
||||
Some(play_id) if !play_id.is_empty() => Outcome::Success(Self(play_id.to_owned())),
|
||||
_ => Outcome::Error((Status::BadRequest, "Seeding needs an X-Play-Id header")),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct SeedRequest {
|
||||
template: String,
|
||||
arguments: Option<Value>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[post("/seed", data = "<data>")]
|
||||
async fn seed(data: Json<SeedRequest>, _auth: SeederAuth, play: PlayId, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let data = data.into_inner();
|
||||
let arguments = data.arguments.unwrap_or(Value::Null);
|
||||
let response = match data.template.as_str() {
|
||||
"SingleUserScene" => single_user_scene(serde_json::from_value(arguments)?, &play.0, &conn).await?,
|
||||
"TestVectorUserScene" => test_vector_user_scene(serde_json::from_value(arguments)?, &play.0, &conn).await?,
|
||||
other => err_code!(format!("Unknown scene {}", other.escape_debug()), Status::NotFound.code),
|
||||
};
|
||||
Ok(Json(response))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Records an account in its play as soon as it's saved, so that destroying the play removes it even when the rest of
|
||||
/// the seeding fails.
|
||||
fn track(play: &str, user_id: &UserId) {
|
||||
PLAYS.lock().unwrap().entry(play.to_owned()).or_default().push(user_id.clone());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Deletes the accounts seeded under `play_id`; an unknown play is a no-op, like upstream.
|
||||
#[delete("/seed/<play_id>")]
|
||||
async fn destroy_play(play_id: &str, _auth: SeederAuth, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
|
||||
let user_ids = PLAYS.lock().unwrap().remove(play_id).unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
let mut remaining = Vec::new();
|
||||
let mut error = None;
|
||||
for user_id in &user_ids {
|
||||
let Some(user) = User::find_by_uuid(user_id, &conn).await else {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
};
|
||||
if let Err(e) = user.delete(&conn).await {
|
||||
remaining.push(user_id.clone());
|
||||
error.get_or_insert(e);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(error) = error {
|
||||
// Kept in the play, so that destroying it again retries them
|
||||
PLAYS.lock().unwrap().entry(play_id.to_owned()).or_default().extend(remaining);
|
||||
return Err(error);
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(Json(json!({ "userIds": user_ids })))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct SingleUserRequest {
|
||||
email: String,
|
||||
password: String,
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
email_verified: bool,
|
||||
kdf_iterations: Option<u32>,
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
enroll_in_email2_fa: bool,
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
corrupt_private_key: bool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/15c94ac58bf361a162381749c146d254a21b2098/util/Seeder/Models/UserSeed.cs#L55>
|
||||
const DEFAULT_KDF_ITERATIONS: u32 = 5_000;
|
||||
|
||||
async fn single_user_scene(request: SingleUserRequest, play: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<Value> {
|
||||
if request.enroll_in_email2_fa || request.corrupt_private_key {
|
||||
err!("enrollInEmail2Fa and corruptPrivateKey aren't supported")
|
||||
}
|
||||
let iterations = request.kdf_iterations.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_KDF_ITERATIONS);
|
||||
if !(5_000..=2_000_000).contains(&iterations) {
|
||||
err!("kdfIterations must be between 5000 and 2000000")
|
||||
}
|
||||
let Some((local, domain)) = request.email.split_once('@') else {
|
||||
err!("The email has no @")
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Like upstream's ManglerService: unique addresses for every seeding
|
||||
let mangled = format!("{}+{local}@{domain}", HEXLOWER.encode(&crypto::get_random_bytes::<4>()));
|
||||
|
||||
let mut user = User::new(&mangled, None);
|
||||
let keys = V1Keys::new(&request.password, &user.master_password_salt(), iterations)?;
|
||||
user.client_kdf_type = UserKdfType::Pbkdf2 as i32;
|
||||
user.client_kdf_iter = iterations.cast_signed();
|
||||
user.client_kdf_memory = None;
|
||||
user.client_kdf_parallelism = None;
|
||||
user.private_key = Some(keys.private_key.clone());
|
||||
user.public_key = Some(keys.public_key.clone());
|
||||
if request.email_verified {
|
||||
user.verified_at = Some(Utc::now().naive_utc());
|
||||
}
|
||||
user.set_password(&keys.master_password_hash, Some(keys.wrapped_user_key.clone()), false, None, conn).await?;
|
||||
user.save(conn).await?;
|
||||
track(play, &user.uuid);
|
||||
|
||||
let response = json!({
|
||||
"mangleMap": mangle_map(&request.email, &user.email),
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"userId": user.uuid,
|
||||
"kdf": "PBKDF2_SHA256",
|
||||
"kdfIterations": iterations,
|
||||
"key": keys.wrapped_user_key,
|
||||
"publicKey": keys.public_key,
|
||||
"privateKey": keys.private_key,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
Ok(response)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// What a V1 client makes when it registers, from the master password.
|
||||
struct V1Keys {
|
||||
/// The master password authentication hash, which the client logs in with.
|
||||
master_password_hash: String,
|
||||
/// The user key, wrapped by the stretched master key.
|
||||
wrapped_user_key: String,
|
||||
/// The PKCS#8 RSA private key, wrapped by the user key.
|
||||
private_key: String,
|
||||
/// The SPKI RSA public key.
|
||||
public_key: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl V1Keys {
|
||||
fn new(password: &str, salt: &str, iterations: u32) -> ApiResult<Self> {
|
||||
let master_key = pbkdf2_sha256(password.as_bytes(), salt.as_bytes(), iterations);
|
||||
let master_password_hash = BASE64.encode(&pbkdf2_sha256(&master_key, password.as_bytes(), 1));
|
||||
let stretched_enc = hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"enc");
|
||||
let stretched_mac = hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"mac");
|
||||
|
||||
let user_key = crypto::get_random_bytes::<64>();
|
||||
let wrapped_user_key = enc_string(&user_key, &stretched_enc, &stretched_mac)?;
|
||||
|
||||
let key_pair = PKey::from_rsa(Rsa::generate(2048)?)?;
|
||||
let private_key = enc_string(&key_pair.private_key_to_pkcs8()?, &user_key[..32], &user_key[32..])?;
|
||||
let public_key = BASE64.encode(&key_pair.public_key_to_der()?);
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
master_password_hash,
|
||||
wrapped_user_key,
|
||||
private_key,
|
||||
public_key,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn pbkdf2_sha256(secret: &[u8], salt: &[u8], iterations: u32) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
let mut out = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
let iterations = NonZeroU32::new(iterations).expect("iterations aren't zero");
|
||||
pbkdf2::derive(pbkdf2::PBKDF2_HMAC_SHA256, iterations, salt, secret, &mut out);
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// HKDF-Expand with `key` as the pseudorandom key, as clients stretch the master key.
|
||||
fn hkdf_expand(key: &[u8; 32], info: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] {
|
||||
let mut out = [0u8; 32];
|
||||
hkdf::Prk::new_less_safe(hkdf::HKDF_SHA256, key)
|
||||
.expand(&[info], hkdf::HKDF_SHA256)
|
||||
.and_then(|okm| okm.fill(&mut out))
|
||||
.expect("32 bytes is a valid HKDF-SHA256 length");
|
||||
out
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// An `AesCbc256_HmacSha256_B64` (type 2) EncString.
|
||||
fn enc_string(plaintext: &[u8], enc_key: &[u8], mac_key: &[u8]) -> ApiResult<String> {
|
||||
let iv = crypto::get_random_bytes::<16>();
|
||||
let ciphertext = encrypt(Cipher::aes_256_cbc(), enc_key, Some(&iv), plaintext)?;
|
||||
let mac = hmac::sign(&hmac::Key::new(hmac::HMAC_SHA256, mac_key), &[iv.as_slice(), &ciphertext].concat());
|
||||
Ok(format!("2.{}|{}|{}", BASE64.encode(&iv), BASE64.encode(&ciphertext), BASE64.encode(mac.as_ref())))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A user test vector; only what a server holds is read from it.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/sdk-internal/blob/ee307a55d5604e96b983595c6379cc9f76ca2f87/e2e/wasm/vectors/load.ts>
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct TestVector {
|
||||
name: String,
|
||||
account: VectorAccount,
|
||||
unlock_methods: Vec<Value>,
|
||||
master_password_authentication_hash: Option<String>,
|
||||
raw_cryptographic_state: VectorRawCryptographicState,
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
vault: VectorVault,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct VectorAccount {
|
||||
email: String,
|
||||
security_version: Option<i32>,
|
||||
account_cryptographic_state: Value,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The public halves the vector records; its private halves are never read.
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
|
||||
struct VectorRawCryptographicState {
|
||||
public_key: String,
|
||||
verifying_key: Option<String>,
|
||||
user_key_id: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Default, Deserialize)]
|
||||
struct VectorVault {
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
ciphers: Vec<VectorItem>,
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
folders: Vec<VectorItem>,
|
||||
#[serde(default)]
|
||||
sends: Vec<VectorItem>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Deserialize)]
|
||||
struct VectorItem {
|
||||
id: String,
|
||||
encrypted: Value,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Upstream's scene, not merged there yet:
|
||||
/// <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9614f3f54f78ad57090a1fd5228f9c2fac5cbfe2/util/Seeder/Scenes/TestVectorUserScene.cs#L43-L361>
|
||||
async fn test_vector_user_scene(vector: TestVector, play: &str, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<Value> {
|
||||
let Some(unlock) =
|
||||
vector.unlock_methods.iter().find_map(|m| m.pointer("/masterPasswordUnlock/master_password_unlock"))
|
||||
else {
|
||||
err!(format!("Vector {} has no master password unlock method", vector.name.escape_debug()))
|
||||
};
|
||||
let Some(hash) = vector.master_password_authentication_hash.as_deref() else {
|
||||
err!(format!("Vector {} records no master password authentication hash", vector.name.escape_debug()))
|
||||
};
|
||||
let (Some(wrapped_user_key), Some(salt)) = (unlock["masterKeyWrappedUserKey"].as_str(), unlock["salt"].as_str())
|
||||
else {
|
||||
err!("The master password unlock method has no wrapped user key or salt")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let mut user = User::new(&vector.account.email, Some(vector.name.clone()));
|
||||
if user.master_password_salt() != salt {
|
||||
err!("The vector's master password salt isn't its email, which is the only salt Vaultwarden supports")
|
||||
}
|
||||
if User::find_by_mail(&user.email, conn).await.is_some() {
|
||||
err!("This vector is already seeded: destroy its play first, its address can't be mangled")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
apply_kdf(&mut user, &unlock["kdf"])?;
|
||||
let state = &vector.account.account_cryptographic_state;
|
||||
let (v2, private_key) = match (state.get("V1"), state.get("V2")) {
|
||||
(Some(v1), None) => (None, &v1["private_key"]),
|
||||
(None, Some(v2)) => (Some(v2), &v2["private_key"]),
|
||||
_ => err!("The account cryptographic state is neither V1 nor V2"),
|
||||
};
|
||||
user.private_key = Some(json_str(private_key, "private_key")?);
|
||||
user.public_key = Some(vector.raw_cryptographic_state.public_key.clone());
|
||||
let key_id = vector.raw_cryptographic_state.user_key_id.as_deref().or_else(|| unlock["containedKeyId"].as_str());
|
||||
user.key_id = key_id.map(|id| serde_json::from_value::<KeyId>(json!(id))).transpose()?;
|
||||
let signature_key_pair = match v2 {
|
||||
Some(v2) => {
|
||||
user.signed_public_key = Some(json_str(&v2["signed_public_key"], "signed_public_key")?);
|
||||
user.security_state = Some(json_str(&v2["security_state"], "security_state")?);
|
||||
user.security_version = Some(vector.account.security_version.unwrap_or(2));
|
||||
let Some(verifying_key) = vector.raw_cryptographic_state.verifying_key.clone() else {
|
||||
err!("A V2 vector needs its verifying key")
|
||||
};
|
||||
let algorithm = cose_signature_algorithm(&verifying_key)?;
|
||||
Some((algorithm, json_str(&v2["signing_key"], "signing_key")?, verifying_key))
|
||||
}
|
||||
None => None,
|
||||
};
|
||||
user.verified_at = Some(Utc::now().naive_utc());
|
||||
user.set_password(hash, Some(wrapped_user_key.to_owned()), false, None, conn).await?;
|
||||
user.save(conn).await?;
|
||||
track(play, &user.uuid);
|
||||
if let Some((algorithm, signing_key, verifying_key)) = signature_key_pair {
|
||||
UserSignatureKeyPair::new(user.uuid.clone(), algorithm, signing_key, verifying_key).save(conn).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// The vault, already encrypted, under fresh ids
|
||||
let mut folder_ids = HashMap::new();
|
||||
let mut folder_ids_by_vector_id = serde_json::Map::new();
|
||||
for folder in &vector.vault.folders {
|
||||
let mut saved = Folder::new(user.uuid.clone(), json_str(&folder.encrypted["name"], "name")?);
|
||||
saved.save(conn).await?;
|
||||
folder_ids.insert(serde_json::from_value::<FolderId>(json!(folder.id))?, saved.uuid.clone());
|
||||
folder_ids_by_vector_id.insert(folder.id.clone(), json!(saved.uuid));
|
||||
}
|
||||
let mut cipher_ids = serde_json::Map::new();
|
||||
for cipher in vector.vault.ciphers {
|
||||
let cipher_id = seed_cipher(cipher.encrypted, &user.uuid, &folder_ids, conn).await?;
|
||||
cipher_ids.insert(cipher.id, json!(cipher_id));
|
||||
}
|
||||
for send in vector.vault.sends {
|
||||
seed_send(send.encrypted, &user.uuid, conn).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let response = json!({
|
||||
"mangleMap": mangle_map(&vector.account.email, &user.email),
|
||||
"result": {
|
||||
"userId": user.uuid,
|
||||
"email": user.email,
|
||||
"cipherIds": cipher_ids,
|
||||
"folderIds": folder_ids_by_vector_id,
|
||||
},
|
||||
});
|
||||
Ok(response)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The vector's KDF: `{"pBKDF2": {"iterations"}}` or `{"argon2id": {"iterations", "memory", "parallelism"}}`.
|
||||
fn apply_kdf(user: &mut User, kdf: &Value) -> ApiResult<()> {
|
||||
let int = |value: &Value| value.as_i64().and_then(|v| i32::try_from(v).ok());
|
||||
if let Some(iterations) = kdf.pointer("/pBKDF2/iterations").and_then(int) {
|
||||
user.client_kdf_type = UserKdfType::Pbkdf2 as i32;
|
||||
user.client_kdf_iter = iterations;
|
||||
user.client_kdf_memory = None;
|
||||
user.client_kdf_parallelism = None;
|
||||
} else if let Some(argon2) = kdf.get("argon2id") {
|
||||
let Some(iterations) = int(&argon2["iterations"]) else {
|
||||
err!("The Argon2id KDF has no iterations")
|
||||
};
|
||||
user.client_kdf_type = UserKdfType::Argon2id as i32;
|
||||
user.client_kdf_iter = iterations;
|
||||
user.client_kdf_memory = int(&argon2["memory"]);
|
||||
user.client_kdf_parallelism = int(&argon2["parallelism"]);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
err!("Unknown KDF")
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The signature algorithm a COSE verifying key names in its `alg` (label 3) entry.
|
||||
fn cose_signature_algorithm(verifying_key: &str) -> ApiResult<SignatureAlgorithm> {
|
||||
const ALG: i128 = 3;
|
||||
const EDDSA: i128 = -8;
|
||||
const ML_DSA_44: i128 = -48;
|
||||
|
||||
let Ok(bytes) = BASE64.decode(verifying_key.as_bytes()) else {
|
||||
err!("The verifying key isn't base64")
|
||||
};
|
||||
let Ok(serde_cbor_2::Value::Map(entries)) = serde_cbor_2::from_slice::<serde_cbor_2::Value>(&bytes) else {
|
||||
err!("The verifying key isn't a COSE key")
|
||||
};
|
||||
match entries.get(&serde_cbor_2::Value::Integer(ALG)) {
|
||||
Some(serde_cbor_2::Value::Integer(EDDSA)) => Ok(SignatureAlgorithm::Ed25519),
|
||||
Some(serde_cbor_2::Value::Integer(ML_DSA_44)) => Ok(SignatureAlgorithm::MlDsa44),
|
||||
_ => err!("The verifying key's algorithm isn't Ed25519 or ML-DSA-44"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Upstream's map from the address a scene was asked for to the one it stored.
|
||||
fn mangle_map(requested: &str, stored: &str) -> Value {
|
||||
let mut map = serde_json::Map::new();
|
||||
map.insert(requested.to_owned(), json!(stored));
|
||||
Value::Object(map)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn json_str(value: &Value, field: &str) -> ApiResult<String> {
|
||||
let Some(value) = value.as_str() else {
|
||||
err!(format!("The vector's {field} is missing"))
|
||||
};
|
||||
Ok(value.to_owned())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use openssl::symm::decrypt;
|
||||
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
// From sdk-internal's `test-vectors/users/v1-pbkdf2-min-iterations.json` (d9119f7af)
|
||||
const EMAIL: &str = "v1-pbkdf2-min-iterations@test.bitwarden.com";
|
||||
const PASSWORD: &str = "password-v1-pbkdf2-min-iterations";
|
||||
const ITERATIONS: u32 = 5_000;
|
||||
const AUTHENTICATION_HASH: &str = "4HcwTg4bQKEbuINCJGMqrij1yipl63Ugu/RazH2y7Qw=";
|
||||
const WRAPPED_USER_KEY: &str = "2.tl+DrZdn+fVyBVu+0c/Gvg==|9ivOLNtKbvirNaUnkGsEtysp9de53ibTSu88HLkDOGLig3t8nhvK5JIqxSY1/ukcr2Y/Ly9OJ12tXUGjIlJ/PtIEIdYj3gZDwhAflPUwtW8=|FD5WuIvviib3yWYcI3slmqBSqMf38Z0CMwttPG1w5DY=";
|
||||
const USER_KEY: &str = "49LghK4AVIybWSZFikb4nAn/BofxxBIoXv83EJWOP4taVMbR5XCfrbF2m/eUmfZdeFW7VybPYSGT/bmv5eeMBg==";
|
||||
|
||||
/// Decrypts a type 2 EncString, checking its MAC.
|
||||
fn dec_string(enc_string: &str, enc_key: &[u8], mac_key: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
|
||||
let parts: Vec<Vec<u8>> = enc_string
|
||||
.strip_prefix("2.")
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.split('|')
|
||||
.map(|part| BASE64.decode(part.as_bytes()).unwrap())
|
||||
.collect();
|
||||
let [iv, ciphertext, mac] = parts.as_slice() else {
|
||||
panic!("not three parts")
|
||||
};
|
||||
let key = hmac::Key::new(hmac::HMAC_SHA256, mac_key);
|
||||
hmac::verify(&key, &[iv.as_slice(), ciphertext].concat(), mac).unwrap();
|
||||
decrypt(Cipher::aes_256_cbc(), enc_key, Some(iv), ciphertext).unwrap()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn derives_the_vectors_keys() {
|
||||
let master_key = pbkdf2_sha256(PASSWORD.as_bytes(), EMAIL.as_bytes(), ITERATIONS);
|
||||
assert_eq!(BASE64.encode(&pbkdf2_sha256(&master_key, PASSWORD.as_bytes(), 1)), AUTHENTICATION_HASH);
|
||||
|
||||
let user_key =
|
||||
dec_string(WRAPPED_USER_KEY, &hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"enc"), &hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"mac"));
|
||||
assert_eq!(BASE64.encode(&user_key), USER_KEY);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn makes_keys_a_client_can_open() {
|
||||
let keys = V1Keys::new(PASSWORD, EMAIL, ITERATIONS).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(keys.master_password_hash, AUTHENTICATION_HASH);
|
||||
|
||||
let master_key = pbkdf2_sha256(PASSWORD.as_bytes(), EMAIL.as_bytes(), ITERATIONS);
|
||||
let user_key =
|
||||
dec_string(&keys.wrapped_user_key, &hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"enc"), &hkdf_expand(&master_key, b"mac"));
|
||||
assert_eq!(user_key.len(), 64);
|
||||
|
||||
let pkcs8 = dec_string(&keys.private_key, &user_key[..32], &user_key[32..]);
|
||||
let private_key = PKey::private_key_from_pkcs8(&pkcs8).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(BASE64.encode(&private_key.public_key_to_der().unwrap()), keys.public_key);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+64
-33
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
|
||||
use std::{
|
||||
collections::HashMap,
|
||||
path::{Path, PathBuf},
|
||||
sync::{Arc, RwLock},
|
||||
sync::{Arc, LazyLock, RwLock},
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use rocket::{
|
||||
Catcher, Route,
|
||||
fs::NamedFile,
|
||||
http::ContentType,
|
||||
response::{Redirect, content::RawCss as Css, content::RawHtml as Html},
|
||||
response::{Redirect, content::RawHtml as Html},
|
||||
serde::json::Json,
|
||||
};
|
||||
use serde_json::Value;
|
||||
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
crypto::sha256_hex,
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn,
|
||||
models::{AttachmentId, CipherId},
|
||||
models::{AttachmentId, CipherId, custom_roles_enabled},
|
||||
},
|
||||
error::Error,
|
||||
util::{Cached, EtagCached},
|
||||
@@ -79,16 +80,17 @@ pub fn invalidate_css_cache() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[get("/css/vaultwarden.css")]
|
||||
fn vaultwarden_css() -> EtagCached<Css<String>> {
|
||||
fn vaultwarden_css() -> EtagCached<String> {
|
||||
// If reload_templates is false, and we already have the CSS Cached, return this
|
||||
if !CONFIG.reload_templates()
|
||||
&& let Some(cached) = CSS_CACHE.read().unwrap().as_ref()
|
||||
{
|
||||
return EtagCached::new(Css(cached.css.clone()), &cached.etag);
|
||||
return EtagCached::new(cached.css.clone(), ContentType::CSS, &cached.etag);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Else, there is either no cache, or reload_templates is true and we need to rebuild the CSS
|
||||
let css_options = json!({
|
||||
"custom_roles_enabled": custom_roles_enabled(),
|
||||
"email_change_allowed": CONFIG.email_change_allowed(),
|
||||
"emergency_access_allowed": CONFIG.emergency_access_allowed(),
|
||||
"load_user_scss": true,
|
||||
@@ -147,7 +149,7 @@ fn vaultwarden_css() -> EtagCached<Css<String>> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Etag Caching will let the browser send us an etag to verify and send new content if needed
|
||||
EtagCached::new(Css(cached.css.clone()), &cached.etag)
|
||||
EtagCached::new(cached.css.clone(), ContentType::CSS, &cached.etag)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[get("/")]
|
||||
@@ -256,7 +258,7 @@ fn alive_head(_conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
// This endpoint/function is used during development and development only.
|
||||
// It allows to easily develop the admin interface by always loading the files from disk instead from a slice of bytes
|
||||
// This will only be active during a debug build and only when `RELOAD_TEMPLATES` is set to `true`
|
||||
// NOTE: Do not forget to add any new files added to the `static_files` function below!
|
||||
// NOTE: Do not forget to add any new files added to the `STATIC_FILES` HashMap below!
|
||||
#[cfg(debug_assertions)]
|
||||
#[get("/vw_static/<filename>", rank = 1)]
|
||||
pub async fn static_files_dev(filename: PathBuf) -> Option<NamedFile> {
|
||||
@@ -276,32 +278,61 @@ pub async fn static_files_dev(filename: PathBuf) -> Option<NamedFile> {
|
||||
None
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub struct StaticFile {
|
||||
pub content_type: ContentType,
|
||||
pub bytes: &'static [u8],
|
||||
pub etag: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub static STATIC_FILES: LazyLock<HashMap<&'static str, StaticFile>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
|
||||
[
|
||||
("404.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/404.png")[..]),
|
||||
("mail-github.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/mail-github.png")[..]),
|
||||
("logo-gray.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/logo-gray.png")[..]),
|
||||
("error-x.svg", ContentType::SVG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/error-x.svg")[..]),
|
||||
("hibp.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/hibp.png")[..]),
|
||||
("vaultwarden-icon.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-icon.png")[..]),
|
||||
("vaultwarden-favicon.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-favicon.png")[..]),
|
||||
("404.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/404.css")[..]),
|
||||
("admin.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.css")[..]),
|
||||
("admin.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.js")[..]),
|
||||
("admin_settings.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_settings.js")[..]),
|
||||
("admin_users.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_users.js")[..]),
|
||||
(
|
||||
"admin_organizations.js",
|
||||
ContentType::JavaScript,
|
||||
&include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_organizations.js")[..],
|
||||
),
|
||||
(
|
||||
"admin_diagnostics.js",
|
||||
ContentType::JavaScript,
|
||||
&include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_diagnostics.js")[..],
|
||||
),
|
||||
("bootstrap.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.css")[..]),
|
||||
("bootstrap.bundle.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.bundle.js")[..]),
|
||||
("jdenticon-3.3.0.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/jdenticon-3.3.0.js")[..]),
|
||||
("datatables.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.js")[..]),
|
||||
("datatables.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.css")[..]),
|
||||
]
|
||||
.into_iter()
|
||||
.map(|(name, content_type, bytes)| {
|
||||
(
|
||||
name,
|
||||
StaticFile {
|
||||
content_type,
|
||||
bytes,
|
||||
etag: sha256_hex(bytes),
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.collect()
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
#[get("/vw_static/<filename>", rank = 2)]
|
||||
pub fn static_files(filename: &str) -> Result<(ContentType, &'static [u8]), Error> {
|
||||
match filename {
|
||||
"404.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/404.png"))),
|
||||
"mail-github.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/mail-github.png"))),
|
||||
"logo-gray.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/logo-gray.png"))),
|
||||
"error-x.svg" => Ok((ContentType::SVG, include_bytes!("../static/images/error-x.svg"))),
|
||||
"hibp.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/hibp.png"))),
|
||||
"vaultwarden-icon.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-icon.png"))),
|
||||
"vaultwarden-favicon.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-favicon.png"))),
|
||||
"404.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/404.css"))),
|
||||
"admin.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.css"))),
|
||||
"admin.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.js"))),
|
||||
"admin_settings.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_settings.js"))),
|
||||
"admin_users.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_users.js"))),
|
||||
"admin_organizations.js" => {
|
||||
Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_organizations.js")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
"admin_diagnostics.js" => {
|
||||
Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_diagnostics.js")))
|
||||
}
|
||||
"bootstrap.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.css"))),
|
||||
"bootstrap.bundle.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.bundle.js"))),
|
||||
"jdenticon-3.3.0.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/jdenticon-3.3.0.js"))),
|
||||
"datatables.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.js"))),
|
||||
"datatables.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.css"))),
|
||||
_ => err!(format!("Static file not found: {filename}")),
|
||||
pub fn static_files(filename: &str) -> Result<EtagCached<&'static [u8]>, Error> {
|
||||
if let Some(file) = STATIC_FILES.get(filename) {
|
||||
Ok(EtagCached::new(file.bytes, file.content_type.clone(), &file.etag))
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
err!(format!("Static file not found: {}", filename.escape_debug()))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+287
-115
@@ -1,3 +1,6 @@
|
||||
#[path = "auth/two_factor.rs"]
|
||||
pub mod two_factor;
|
||||
|
||||
#[path = "auth/send.rs"]
|
||||
pub mod send;
|
||||
pub type SendTokens = send::SendTokens;
|
||||
@@ -24,14 +27,14 @@ use rocket::{
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
CONFIG,
|
||||
api::{ApiResult, core::log_event},
|
||||
api::ApiResult,
|
||||
config::PathType,
|
||||
db::{
|
||||
DbConn,
|
||||
models::{
|
||||
AttachmentId, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, EmergencyAccessId,
|
||||
EventType, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId,
|
||||
SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, UserStampException,
|
||||
AttachmentId, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, CustomPermission, Device, DeviceId, DeviceType,
|
||||
EmergencyAccessId, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, OrganizationId,
|
||||
SendFileId, SendId, User, UserId, custom_roles_enabled,
|
||||
},
|
||||
},
|
||||
error::Error,
|
||||
@@ -40,12 +43,12 @@ use crate::{
|
||||
|
||||
const JWT_ALGORITHM: Algorithm = Algorithm::RS256;
|
||||
|
||||
// Limit when BitWarden consider the token as expired
|
||||
pub static BW_EXPIRATION: LazyLock<TimeDelta> = LazyLock::new(|| TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap());
|
||||
// Limit when Bitwarden consider the token as expired
|
||||
pub static BW_EXPIRATION: TimeDelta = TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
pub static DEFAULT_REFRESH_VALIDITY: LazyLock<TimeDelta> = LazyLock::new(|| TimeDelta::try_days(30).unwrap());
|
||||
pub static MOBILE_REFRESH_VALIDITY: LazyLock<TimeDelta> = LazyLock::new(|| TimeDelta::try_days(90).unwrap());
|
||||
pub static DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY: LazyLock<TimeDelta> = LazyLock::new(|| TimeDelta::try_hours(2).unwrap());
|
||||
pub static DEFAULT_REFRESH_VALIDITY: TimeDelta = TimeDelta::try_days(30).unwrap();
|
||||
pub static MOBILE_REFRESH_VALIDITY: TimeDelta = TimeDelta::try_days(90).unwrap();
|
||||
pub static DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY: TimeDelta = TimeDelta::try_hours(2).unwrap();
|
||||
static JWT_HEADER: LazyLock<Header> = LazyLock::new(|| Header::new(JWT_ALGORITHM));
|
||||
|
||||
pub static JWT_LOGIN_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|login", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
|
||||
@@ -83,7 +86,8 @@ pub async fn initialize_keys() -> Result<(), Error> {
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let (priv_key, priv_key_buffer) = if let Some(priv_key_buffer) = priv_key_buffer {
|
||||
(Rsa::private_key_from_pem(priv_key_buffer.to_vec().as_slice())?, priv_key_buffer.to_vec())
|
||||
let pem = priv_key_buffer.to_vec();
|
||||
(Rsa::private_key_from_pem(&pem)?, pem)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let rsa_key = Rsa::generate(2048)?;
|
||||
let priv_key_buffer = rsa_key.private_key_to_pem()?;
|
||||
@@ -255,7 +259,7 @@ impl LoginJwtClaims {
|
||||
// let orguser: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 2).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
|
||||
// let orgmanager: Vec<_> = orgs.iter().filter(|o| o.atype == 3).map(|o| o.org_uuid.clone()).collect();
|
||||
|
||||
if exp <= (now + *BW_EXPIRATION).timestamp() {
|
||||
if exp <= (now + BW_EXPIRATION).timestamp() {
|
||||
warn!("Raise access_token lifetime to more than 5min.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -283,7 +287,7 @@ impl LoginJwtClaims {
|
||||
sstamp: user.security_stamp.clone(),
|
||||
device: device.uuid.clone(),
|
||||
devicetype: DeviceType::from_i32(device.atype).to_string(),
|
||||
client_id: client_id.unwrap_or("undefined".to_owned()),
|
||||
client_id: client_id.unwrap_or_else(|| "undefined".to_owned()),
|
||||
scope,
|
||||
amr: vec!["Application".into()],
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -295,7 +299,7 @@ impl LoginJwtClaims {
|
||||
device,
|
||||
user,
|
||||
time_now.timestamp(),
|
||||
(time_now + *DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY).timestamp(),
|
||||
(time_now + DEFAULT_ACCESS_VALIDITY).timestamp(),
|
||||
auth_method.scope_vec(),
|
||||
client_id,
|
||||
time_now,
|
||||
@@ -311,6 +315,17 @@ impl LoginJwtClaims {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn calculate_invite_expire_hours(now: &DateTime<Utc>) -> Result<DateTime<Utc>, Error> {
|
||||
let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
|
||||
let Some(hours_delta) = TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours) else {
|
||||
err!("Unable to calculate time delta for invite expire hours. Check `INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS`.");
|
||||
};
|
||||
let Some(exp) = now.checked_add_signed(hours_delta) else {
|
||||
err!("Unable to calculate invitation expire date. Check `INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS`.");
|
||||
};
|
||||
Ok(exp)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
pub struct InviteJwtClaims {
|
||||
// Not before
|
||||
@@ -334,19 +349,19 @@ pub fn generate_invite_claims(
|
||||
org_id: OrganizationId,
|
||||
member_id: MembershipId,
|
||||
invited_by_email: Option<String>,
|
||||
) -> InviteJwtClaims {
|
||||
) -> Result<InviteJwtClaims, Error> {
|
||||
let time_now = Utc::now();
|
||||
let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
|
||||
InviteJwtClaims {
|
||||
let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
|
||||
Ok(InviteJwtClaims {
|
||||
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: exp.timestamp(),
|
||||
iss: JWT_INVITE_ISSUER.to_string(),
|
||||
sub: user_id,
|
||||
email,
|
||||
org_id,
|
||||
member_id,
|
||||
invited_by_email,
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
@@ -372,19 +387,19 @@ pub fn generate_emergency_access_invite_claims(
|
||||
emer_id: EmergencyAccessId,
|
||||
grantor_name: String,
|
||||
grantor_email: String,
|
||||
) -> EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
|
||||
) -> Result<EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims, Error> {
|
||||
let time_now = Utc::now();
|
||||
let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
|
||||
EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
|
||||
let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
|
||||
Ok(EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
|
||||
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: exp.timestamp(),
|
||||
iss: JWT_EMERGENCY_ACCESS_INVITE_ISSUER.to_string(),
|
||||
sub: user_id,
|
||||
email,
|
||||
emer_id,
|
||||
grantor_name,
|
||||
grantor_email,
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
@@ -489,13 +504,17 @@ pub fn generate_2fa_remember_claims(device_uuid: DeviceId, user_uuid: UserId) ->
|
||||
let time_now = Utc::now();
|
||||
TwoFactorRememberClaims {
|
||||
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_days(30).unwrap()).timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: two_factor_remember_expiration(time_now, CONFIG.two_factor_remember_days()),
|
||||
iss: JWT_2FA_REMEMBER_ISSUER.to_string(),
|
||||
sub: device_uuid,
|
||||
user_uuid,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn two_factor_remember_expiration(time_now: DateTime<Utc>, remember_days: i64) -> i64 {
|
||||
(time_now + TimeDelta::try_days(remember_days).expect("TWO_FACTOR_REMEMBER_DAYS is validated")).timestamp()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
pub struct BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
// Not before
|
||||
@@ -518,36 +537,43 @@ impl BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn generate_delete_claims(uuid: String) -> BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
pub fn generate_delete_claims(uuid: String) -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
|
||||
let time_now = Utc::now();
|
||||
let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
|
||||
BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
|
||||
Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: exp.timestamp(),
|
||||
iss: JWT_DELETE_ISSUER.to_string(),
|
||||
sub: uuid,
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn generate_verify_email_claims(user_id: &UserId) -> BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
pub fn generate_verify_email_claims(user_id: &UserId) -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
|
||||
let time_now = Utc::now();
|
||||
let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
|
||||
BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
|
||||
Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: exp.timestamp(),
|
||||
iss: JWT_VERIFYEMAIL_ISSUER.to_string(),
|
||||
sub: user_id.to_string(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn generate_admin_claims() -> BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
pub fn generate_admin_claims() -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
|
||||
let time_now = Utc::now();
|
||||
BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
let lifetime_minutes = i64::from(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime());
|
||||
let Some(minutes_delta) = TimeDelta::try_minutes(lifetime_minutes) else {
|
||||
err!("Unable to calculate time delta for admin session lifetime. Check `ADMIN_SESSION_LIFETIME`.");
|
||||
};
|
||||
let Some(exp) = time_now.checked_add_signed(minutes_delta) else {
|
||||
err!("Unable to calculate admin session lifetime. Check `ADMIN_SESSION_LIFETIME`.");
|
||||
};
|
||||
Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime()).unwrap()).timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: exp.timestamp(),
|
||||
iss: JWT_ADMIN_ISSUER.to_string(),
|
||||
sub: "admin_panel".to_owned(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn generate_send_claims(send_id: &SendId, file_id: &SendFileId) -> BasicJwtClaims {
|
||||
@@ -598,7 +624,7 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for Host {
|
||||
format!("{protocol}://{host}")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Host {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self {
|
||||
host,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -607,6 +633,9 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for Host {
|
||||
pub struct ClientHeaders {
|
||||
pub device_type: i32,
|
||||
pub ip: ClientIp,
|
||||
/// `Bitwarden-Client-Version`, `None` when missing or not a version. Unlike the [`ClientVersion`] guard, this
|
||||
/// doesn't log an error, as not every client sends it.
|
||||
pub client_version: Option<semver::Version>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[rocket::async_trait]
|
||||
@@ -623,10 +652,13 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientHeaders {
|
||||
.get_one("device-type")
|
||||
.and_then(|d| d.parse().ok())
|
||||
.unwrap_or(DeviceType::UnknownBrowser as i32);
|
||||
let client_version =
|
||||
request.headers().get_one("Bitwarden-Client-Version").and_then(|v| semver::Version::parse(v).ok());
|
||||
|
||||
Outcome::Success(ClientHeaders {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self {
|
||||
device_type,
|
||||
ip,
|
||||
client_version,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -682,36 +714,17 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for Headers {
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if user.security_stamp != claims.sstamp {
|
||||
if let Some(stamp_exception) =
|
||||
user.stamp_exception.as_deref().and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str::<UserStampException>(s).ok())
|
||||
{
|
||||
let Some(current_route) = request.route().and_then(|r| r.name.as_deref()) else {
|
||||
err_handler!("Error getting current route for stamp exception")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Check if the stamp exception has expired first.
|
||||
// Then, check if the current route matches any of the allowed routes.
|
||||
// After that check the stamp in exception matches the one in the claims.
|
||||
if Utc::now().timestamp() > stamp_exception.expire {
|
||||
// If the stamp exception has been expired remove it from the database.
|
||||
// This prevents checking this stamp exception for new requests.
|
||||
let mut user = user;
|
||||
user.reset_stamp_exception();
|
||||
if let Err(e) = user.save(&conn).await {
|
||||
error!("Error updating user: {e:#?}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
err_handler!("Stamp exception is expired")
|
||||
} else if !stamp_exception.routes.contains(¤t_route.to_owned()) {
|
||||
err_handler!("Invalid security stamp: Current route and exception route do not match")
|
||||
} else if stamp_exception.security_stamp != claims.sstamp {
|
||||
err_handler!("Invalid security stamp for matched stamp exception")
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Expired exceptions are only dropped on reset; writing them back here could undo a newer reset
|
||||
if !user.stamp_exceptions().iter().any(|e| e.allows(&claims.sstamp, current_route)) {
|
||||
err_handler!("Invalid security stamp")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Headers {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self {
|
||||
host,
|
||||
device,
|
||||
user,
|
||||
@@ -745,6 +758,12 @@ impl OrgHeaders {
|
||||
fn is_confirmed_and_owner(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
self.membership_status == MembershipStatus::Confirmed && self.membership_type == MembershipType::Owner
|
||||
}
|
||||
// A Custom member, while Custom roles are enabled. What they may do depends on their permissions.
|
||||
fn is_confirmed_and_custom(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
self.membership_status == MembershipStatus::Confirmed
|
||||
&& self.membership_type == MembershipType::Custom
|
||||
&& custom_roles_enabled()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// org_id is usually the second path param ("/organizations/<org_id>"),
|
||||
@@ -771,7 +790,7 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for OrgIdGuard {
|
||||
|
||||
async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
match get_org_id(request) {
|
||||
Some(_) => Outcome::Success(OrgIdGuard),
|
||||
Some(_) => Outcome::Success(Self),
|
||||
None => Outcome::Forward(rocket::http::Status::NotFound),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -829,7 +848,6 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for OrgHeaders {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub struct AdminHeaders {
|
||||
pub host: String,
|
||||
pub device: Device,
|
||||
pub user: User,
|
||||
pub membership_type: MembershipType,
|
||||
@@ -837,12 +855,6 @@ pub struct AdminHeaders {
|
||||
pub org_id: OrganizationId,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl AdminHeaders {
|
||||
pub async fn log_event(&self, event_type: EventType, source_uuid: &str, org_id: &OrganizationId, conn: &DbConn) {
|
||||
log_event(event_type, source_uuid, org_id, &self.user.uuid, self.device.atype, &self.ip.ip, conn).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[rocket::async_trait]
|
||||
impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for AdminHeaders {
|
||||
type Error = &'static str;
|
||||
@@ -851,7 +863,6 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for AdminHeaders {
|
||||
let headers = try_outcome!(OrgHeaders::from_request(request).await);
|
||||
if headers.is_confirmed_and_admin() {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self {
|
||||
host: headers.host,
|
||||
device: headers.device,
|
||||
user: headers.user,
|
||||
membership_type: headers.membership_type,
|
||||
@@ -864,6 +875,79 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for AdminHeaders {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Generates the request guard of the routes a Custom member may use with a permission. Like AdminHeaders it lets a
|
||||
/// confirmed Owner or Admin through, and a confirmed Custom member holding the permission.
|
||||
macro_rules! permission_headers {
|
||||
($(#[$doc:meta])* $name:ident, $permission:expr) => {
|
||||
$(#[$doc])*
|
||||
#[allow(dead_code, reason = "Not every route reads every field")]
|
||||
pub struct $name {
|
||||
pub host: String,
|
||||
pub device: Device,
|
||||
pub user: User,
|
||||
pub membership_type: MembershipType,
|
||||
pub membership: Membership,
|
||||
pub ip: ClientIp,
|
||||
pub org_id: OrganizationId,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[rocket::async_trait]
|
||||
impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for $name {
|
||||
type Error = &'static str;
|
||||
|
||||
async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let headers = try_outcome!(OrgHeaders::from_request(request).await);
|
||||
if headers.is_confirmed_and_admin() || headers.membership.has_custom_permission($permission) {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self {
|
||||
host: headers.host,
|
||||
device: headers.device,
|
||||
user: headers.user,
|
||||
membership_type: headers.membership_type,
|
||||
org_id: headers.membership.org_uuid.clone(),
|
||||
membership: headers.membership,
|
||||
ip: headers.ip,
|
||||
})
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Forbidden as in Bitwarden's permission requirements
|
||||
error!(target: "auth", "The current user is missing the permission for this endpoint");
|
||||
Outcome::Error((rocket::http::Status::Forbidden, "You don't have permission to call this endpoint"))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
permission_headers!(
|
||||
/// For the routes that manage the members of an organization.
|
||||
ManageUsersHeaders,
|
||||
CustomPermission::ManageUsers
|
||||
);
|
||||
permission_headers!(
|
||||
/// For the routes that manage the policies of an organization.
|
||||
ManagePoliciesHeaders,
|
||||
CustomPermission::ManagePolicies
|
||||
);
|
||||
permission_headers!(
|
||||
/// For the routes that manage the groups of an organization.
|
||||
ManageGroupsHeaders,
|
||||
CustomPermission::ManageGroups
|
||||
);
|
||||
permission_headers!(
|
||||
/// For the routes that read the event logs of an organization.
|
||||
AccessEventLogsHeaders,
|
||||
CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs
|
||||
);
|
||||
permission_headers!(
|
||||
/// For the routes that export the vault of an organization.
|
||||
AccessImportExportHeaders,
|
||||
CustomPermission::AccessImportExport
|
||||
);
|
||||
permission_headers!(
|
||||
/// For the routes that recover the accounts of the members of an organization.
|
||||
ManageResetPasswordHeaders,
|
||||
CustomPermission::ManageResetPassword
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// col_id is usually the fourth path param ("/organizations/<org_id>/collections/<col_id>"),
|
||||
// but there could be cases where it is a query value.
|
||||
// First check the path, if this is not a valid uuid, try the query values.
|
||||
@@ -883,10 +967,81 @@ fn get_col_id(request: &Request<'_>) -> Option<CollectionId> {
|
||||
None
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The ManagerHeaders are used to check if you are at least a Manager
|
||||
/// and have access to the specific collection provided via the <col_id>/collections/collectionId.
|
||||
/// This does strict checking on the collection_id, ManagerHeadersLoose does not.
|
||||
pub struct ManagerHeaders {
|
||||
/// What a collection route does with its collection, which decides what a Custom member needs for it.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy)]
|
||||
pub enum CollectionAction {
|
||||
Edit,
|
||||
Read,
|
||||
ReadAccess,
|
||||
Delete,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Whether `member`, a confirmed Custom member, may `action` the collection `col_id` of their organization.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Deleting needs Delete any collection: the clients are told collection deletion is limited, so the manage option
|
||||
/// on a collection is no permission to delete it. Editing is open with Edit any collection, reading also with Delete
|
||||
/// any collection, and otherwise both need the manage option on the collection itself. Neither the role nor any
|
||||
/// `access_all` counts as that.
|
||||
pub async fn custom_member_may(
|
||||
action: CollectionAction,
|
||||
member: &Membership,
|
||||
col_id: &CollectionId,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) -> bool {
|
||||
if !(member.has_type(MembershipType::Custom)
|
||||
&& member.has_status(MembershipStatus::Confirmed)
|
||||
&& custom_roles_enabled())
|
||||
{
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
match action {
|
||||
CollectionAction::Delete => member.has_custom_permission(CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection),
|
||||
CollectionAction::Edit if member.can_edit_any_collection() => true,
|
||||
// Individual access details may be read with Manage users. The separate /users route follows
|
||||
// Bitwarden's ReadAccess operation, which does not grant that permission on its own.
|
||||
CollectionAction::Read if member.can_view_all_collection_access_details() => true,
|
||||
CollectionAction::ReadAccess if member.can_view_all_collections() => true,
|
||||
CollectionAction::Edit | CollectionAction::Read | CollectionAction::ReadAccess => {
|
||||
Collection::find_explicitly_manageable_by_user(&member.org_uuid, &member.user_uuid, conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.contains(col_id)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Checks a collection route for the collection provided via the <col_id>/collections/collectionId: a Manager, Admin
|
||||
/// or Owner needs to be able to manage the collection, a Custom member is checked for the `action`.
|
||||
async fn collection_headers(request: &Request<'_>, action: CollectionAction) -> Outcome<OrgHeaders, &'static str> {
|
||||
let headers = try_outcome!(OrgHeaders::from_request(request).await);
|
||||
let is_custom = headers.is_confirmed_and_custom();
|
||||
if !headers.is_confirmed_and_manager() && !is_custom {
|
||||
err_handler!("You need to be a Manager, Admin or Owner to call this endpoint")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(col_id) = get_col_id(request) else {
|
||||
err_handler!("Error getting the collection id")
|
||||
};
|
||||
let Outcome::Success(conn) = DbConn::from_request(request).await else {
|
||||
err_handler!("Error getting DB")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let allowed = if is_custom {
|
||||
custom_member_may(action, &headers.membership, &col_id, &conn).await
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Collection::is_coll_manageable_by_user(&col_id, &headers.membership.user_uuid, &conn).await
|
||||
};
|
||||
if !allowed {
|
||||
// NotFound as in Bitwarden, the web vault logs the user out on a 401
|
||||
error!(target: "auth", "Collection not found. The current user isn't a manager for this collection");
|
||||
return Outcome::Error((rocket::http::Status::NotFound, "Collection not found"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
Outcome::Success(headers)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
macro_rules! collection_headers {
|
||||
($(#[$doc:meta])* $name:ident, $action:expr) => {
|
||||
$(#[$doc])*
|
||||
pub struct $name {
|
||||
pub host: String,
|
||||
pub device: Device,
|
||||
pub user: User,
|
||||
@@ -895,24 +1050,11 @@ pub struct ManagerHeaders {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[rocket::async_trait]
|
||||
impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ManagerHeaders {
|
||||
impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for $name {
|
||||
type Error = &'static str;
|
||||
|
||||
async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let headers = try_outcome!(OrgHeaders::from_request(request).await);
|
||||
if headers.is_confirmed_and_manager() {
|
||||
if let Some(col_id) = get_col_id(request) {
|
||||
let Outcome::Success(conn) = DbConn::from_request(request).await else {
|
||||
err_handler!("Error getting DB")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if !Collection::is_coll_manageable_by_user(&col_id, &headers.membership.user_uuid, &conn).await {
|
||||
err_handler!("The current user isn't a manager for this collection")
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
err_handler!("Error getting the collection id")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let headers = try_outcome!(collection_headers(request, $action).await);
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self {
|
||||
host: headers.host,
|
||||
device: headers.device,
|
||||
@@ -920,15 +1062,12 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ManagerHeaders {
|
||||
ip: headers.ip,
|
||||
org_id: headers.membership.org_uuid,
|
||||
})
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
err_handler!("You need to be a Manager, Admin or Owner to call this endpoint")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<ManagerHeaders> for Headers {
|
||||
fn from(h: ManagerHeaders) -> Headers {
|
||||
Headers {
|
||||
impl From<$name> for Headers {
|
||||
fn from(h: $name) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
host: h.host,
|
||||
device: h.device,
|
||||
user: h.user,
|
||||
@@ -936,9 +1075,35 @@ impl From<ManagerHeaders> for Headers {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
collection_headers!(
|
||||
/// The ManagerHeaders are used to check if you are at least a Manager
|
||||
/// and have access to the specific collection provided via the <col_id>/collections/collectionId.
|
||||
/// This does strict checking on the collection_id, ManagerHeadersLoose does not.
|
||||
ManagerHeaders,
|
||||
CollectionAction::Edit
|
||||
);
|
||||
collection_headers!(
|
||||
/// The same as ManagerHeaders, for the routes which only read the collection and its access.
|
||||
CollectionReadHeaders,
|
||||
CollectionAction::Read
|
||||
);
|
||||
collection_headers!(
|
||||
/// The collection's /users route has narrower access than its /details route.
|
||||
CollectionUsersReadHeaders,
|
||||
CollectionAction::ReadAccess
|
||||
);
|
||||
collection_headers!(
|
||||
/// The same as ManagerHeaders, for the routes which delete the collection.
|
||||
CollectionDeleteHeaders,
|
||||
CollectionAction::Delete
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
/// The ManagerHeadersLoose is used when you at least need to be a Manager,
|
||||
/// but there is no collection_id sent with the request (either in the path or as form data).
|
||||
/// A Custom member is let through as well, the routes check what their permissions allow.
|
||||
pub struct ManagerHeadersLoose {
|
||||
pub host: String,
|
||||
pub device: Device,
|
||||
@@ -953,7 +1118,7 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ManagerHeadersLoose {
|
||||
|
||||
async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>) -> Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
|
||||
let headers = try_outcome!(OrgHeaders::from_request(request).await);
|
||||
if headers.is_confirmed_and_manager() {
|
||||
if headers.is_confirmed_and_manager() || headers.is_confirmed_and_custom() {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self {
|
||||
host: headers.host,
|
||||
device: headers.device,
|
||||
@@ -968,8 +1133,8 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ManagerHeadersLoose {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<ManagerHeadersLoose> for Headers {
|
||||
fn from(h: ManagerHeadersLoose) -> Headers {
|
||||
Headers {
|
||||
fn from(h: ManagerHeadersLoose) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
host: h.host,
|
||||
device: h.device,
|
||||
user: h.user,
|
||||
@@ -978,22 +1143,29 @@ impl From<ManagerHeadersLoose> for Headers {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl ManagerHeaders {
|
||||
impl CollectionDeleteHeaders {
|
||||
pub async fn from_loose(
|
||||
h: ManagerHeadersLoose,
|
||||
collections: &Vec<CollectionId>,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) -> Result<ManagerHeaders, Error> {
|
||||
) -> Result<Self, Error> {
|
||||
let is_custom = h.membership.has_type(MembershipType::Custom) && custom_roles_enabled();
|
||||
for col_id in collections {
|
||||
if uuid::Uuid::parse_str(col_id.as_ref()).is_err() {
|
||||
err!("Collection Id is malformed!");
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !Collection::is_coll_manageable_by_user(col_id, &h.membership.user_uuid, conn).await {
|
||||
let allowed = if is_custom {
|
||||
Collection::find_by_uuid_and_org(col_id, &h.membership.org_uuid, conn).await.is_some()
|
||||
&& custom_member_may(CollectionAction::Delete, &h.membership, col_id, conn).await
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
Collection::is_coll_manageable_by_user(col_id, &h.membership.user_uuid, conn).await
|
||||
};
|
||||
if !allowed {
|
||||
err!("Collection not found", "The current user isn't a manager for this collection")
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(ManagerHeaders {
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
host: h.host,
|
||||
device: h.device,
|
||||
user: h.user,
|
||||
@@ -1058,8 +1230,8 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for OrgMemberHeaders {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl From<OrgMemberHeaders> for Headers {
|
||||
fn from(h: OrgMemberHeaders) -> Headers {
|
||||
Headers {
|
||||
fn from(h: OrgMemberHeaders) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
host: h.host,
|
||||
device: h.device,
|
||||
user: h.user,
|
||||
@@ -1115,10 +1287,10 @@ fn client_ip_from_header(req: &Request<'_>, header: &str, is_trusted: impl Fn(Ip
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn client_ip_from_header_values(values: &[&str], header: &str, is_trusted: impl Fn(IpAddr) -> bool) -> Option<IpAddr> {
|
||||
let entries: Vec<&str> = values.iter().flat_map(|value| value.split(',')).map(str::trim).collect();
|
||||
let entries = values.iter().flat_map(|value| value.split(',')).rev().map(str::trim);
|
||||
|
||||
let mut client_ip = None;
|
||||
for entry in entries.into_iter().rev() {
|
||||
for entry in entries {
|
||||
let Ok(ip) = entry.parse() else {
|
||||
warn!("'{header}' header is malformed: {entry}");
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@@ -1151,7 +1323,7 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientIp {
|
||||
|
||||
let ip = ip.or(remote).unwrap_or_else(|| "0.0.0.0".parse().unwrap());
|
||||
|
||||
Outcome::Success(ClientIp {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self {
|
||||
ip,
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1181,7 +1353,7 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for Secure {
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Secure {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self {
|
||||
https: protocol == "https",
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1227,7 +1399,7 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientVersion {
|
||||
err_handler!("Invalid Bitwarden-Client-Version header provided")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Outcome::Success(ClientVersion(version))
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self(version))
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1243,9 +1415,9 @@ pub enum AuthMethod {
|
||||
impl AuthMethod {
|
||||
pub fn scope(&self) -> String {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
AuthMethod::OrgApiKey => "api.organization".to_owned(),
|
||||
AuthMethod::UserApiKey => "api".to_owned(),
|
||||
AuthMethod::Password | AuthMethod::Sso => "api offline_access".to_owned(),
|
||||
Self::OrgApiKey => "api.organization".to_owned(),
|
||||
Self::UserApiKey => "api".to_owned(),
|
||||
Self::Password | Self::Sso => "api offline_access".to_owned(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1315,9 +1487,9 @@ impl AuthTokens {
|
||||
let access_claims = LoginJwtClaims::default(device, user, &sub, client_id);
|
||||
|
||||
let validity = if device.is_mobile() {
|
||||
*MOBILE_REFRESH_VALIDITY
|
||||
MOBILE_REFRESH_VALIDITY
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
*DEFAULT_REFRESH_VALIDITY
|
||||
DEFAULT_REFRESH_VALIDITY
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let refresh_claims = RefreshJwtClaims {
|
||||
|
||||
+9
-5
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ impl SendTokens {
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn expected_error(msg: &str, error_type: &str) -> ApiResult<SendTokens> {
|
||||
fn expected_error(msg: &str, error_type: &str) -> ApiResult<Self> {
|
||||
let err = json!({
|
||||
"kind": "expected_server",
|
||||
"error": "invalid_request",
|
||||
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ impl SendTokens {
|
||||
Err(Error::new_msg(msg).with_kind(ErrorKind::Json(err)).silent())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn invalid_error(msg: &str, error_type: &str, silent: bool) -> ApiResult<SendTokens> {
|
||||
fn invalid_error(msg: &str, error_type: &str, silent: bool) -> ApiResult<Self> {
|
||||
let err = json!({
|
||||
"kind": "expected_server",
|
||||
"error": "invalid_grant",
|
||||
@@ -70,9 +70,13 @@ impl SendTokens {
|
||||
password: Option<String>,
|
||||
ip: &ClientIp,
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
) -> ApiResult<SendTokens> {
|
||||
) -> ApiResult<Self> {
|
||||
let Some(send_id) = Self::as_send_id(access_id) else {
|
||||
return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Can't convert {access_id}"), "send_id_invalid", false);
|
||||
return Self::invalid_error(
|
||||
&format!("Can't convert {}", access_id.escape_debug()),
|
||||
"send_id_invalid",
|
||||
false,
|
||||
);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let Some(send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&send_id, conn).await else {
|
||||
@@ -136,7 +140,7 @@ impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for SendHeaders {
|
||||
err_handler!("Invalid claim")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
Outcome::Success(SendHeaders {
|
||||
Outcome::Success(Self {
|
||||
send_id: claims.sub.into(),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
|
||||
use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
|
||||
use serde::{de::DeserializeOwned, ser::Serialize};
|
||||
use std::sync::LazyLock;
|
||||
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
CONFIG,
|
||||
api::{ApiResult, EmptyResult},
|
||||
auth::{decode_jwt, encode_jwt},
|
||||
db::models::UserId,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| format!("{}|api.2fa", CONFIG.domain_origin()));
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
pub struct TwoFactorClaims<T> {
|
||||
// Not before
|
||||
pub nbf: i64,
|
||||
// Expiration time
|
||||
pub exp: i64,
|
||||
// Issuer
|
||||
pub iss: String,
|
||||
// Subject
|
||||
pub sub: UserId,
|
||||
|
||||
pub enabled: bool,
|
||||
|
||||
pub claims: T,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
pub struct AuthenticatorClaims {
|
||||
#[serde(rename = "authenticator_key")]
|
||||
pub key: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
pub struct DuoClaims {
|
||||
#[serde(rename = "duo_data")]
|
||||
pub data: Option<DuoData>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
pub struct WebauthnClaims {
|
||||
#[serde(rename = "webauthn_keys")]
|
||||
pub keys: Vec<i32>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
pub struct YubikeyClaims {
|
||||
#[serde(rename = "yubi_keys")]
|
||||
pub keys: Vec<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
|
||||
pub struct DuoData {
|
||||
pub host: String, // Duo API hostname
|
||||
pub ik: String, // client id
|
||||
pub sk: String, // client secret
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl DuoData {
|
||||
pub fn global() -> Option<Self> {
|
||||
match (CONFIG._enable_duo(), CONFIG.duo_host()) {
|
||||
(true, Some(host)) => Some(Self {
|
||||
host,
|
||||
ik: CONFIG.duo_ikey().unwrap(),
|
||||
sk: CONFIG.duo_skey().unwrap(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn msg(s: &str) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
host: s.into(),
|
||||
ik: s.into(),
|
||||
sk: s.into(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn secret() -> Self {
|
||||
Self::msg("<global_secret>")
|
||||
}
|
||||
pub fn obscure(self) -> Self {
|
||||
let mut host = self.host;
|
||||
let mut ik = self.ik;
|
||||
let mut sk = self.sk;
|
||||
|
||||
let digits = 4;
|
||||
let replaced = "************";
|
||||
|
||||
host.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
|
||||
ik.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
|
||||
sk.replace_range(digits.., replaced);
|
||||
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
host,
|
||||
ik,
|
||||
sk,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
|
||||
pub struct EmailClaims {
|
||||
pub email: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn token<T: Serialize>(user_id: UserId, enabled: bool, claims: T) -> String {
|
||||
let time_now = Utc::now();
|
||||
let claims = TwoFactorClaims {
|
||||
nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
|
||||
exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(5).unwrap()).timestamp(),
|
||||
iss: JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string(),
|
||||
sub: user_id,
|
||||
enabled,
|
||||
claims,
|
||||
};
|
||||
encode_jwt(&claims)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn validate<T: DeserializeOwned>(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, enabled: bool) -> ApiResult<T> {
|
||||
match decode_jwt::<TwoFactorClaims<T>>(token, JWT_2FA_AUTH_ISSUER.to_string()) {
|
||||
Ok(claims) => {
|
||||
if claims.sub != *user_id {
|
||||
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid user");
|
||||
}
|
||||
if claims.enabled != enabled {
|
||||
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid state");
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(claims.claims)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(err) => err!(format!("Failed to decode verification token: {err}")),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn authenticator_token(user_id: UserId, key: String, enabled: bool) -> String {
|
||||
token(
|
||||
user_id,
|
||||
enabled,
|
||||
AuthenticatorClaims {
|
||||
key,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn validate_authenticator(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, key: &str, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let claims = validate::<AuthenticatorClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
|
||||
if claims.key != key {
|
||||
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid key");
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn duo_token(user_id: UserId, data: Option<DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> String {
|
||||
token(
|
||||
user_id,
|
||||
enabled,
|
||||
DuoClaims {
|
||||
data,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// When disabling we check that it's the correct data
|
||||
pub fn validate_duo(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, data: Option<&DuoData>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let claims = validate::<DuoClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
|
||||
if enabled && claims.data.as_ref() != data {
|
||||
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid duo data");
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn email_token(user_id: UserId, email: Option<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
|
||||
token(
|
||||
user_id,
|
||||
enabled,
|
||||
EmailClaims {
|
||||
email,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// When disabling we check that it's the correct `email`
|
||||
pub fn validate_email(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, email: String, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let claims = validate::<EmailClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
|
||||
if enabled && claims.email != Some(email) {
|
||||
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid email");
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn webauthn_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<i32>, enabled: bool) -> String {
|
||||
token(
|
||||
user_id,
|
||||
enabled,
|
||||
WebauthnClaims {
|
||||
keys,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn validate_webauthn(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &[i32], enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let claims = validate::<WebauthnClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
|
||||
if keys != claims.keys {
|
||||
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn yubikey_token(user_id: UserId, keys: Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> String {
|
||||
token(
|
||||
user_id,
|
||||
enabled,
|
||||
YubikeyClaims {
|
||||
keys,
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn validate_yubikey(token: &str, user_id: &UserId, keys: &Vec<String>, enabled: bool) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
let claims = validate::<YubikeyClaims>(token, user_id, enabled)?;
|
||||
if *keys != claims.keys {
|
||||
err!("Invalid verification token: Invalid keys");
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
use serde_json::{Value, from_value, to_value};
|
||||
|
||||
fn token<T: Serialize>(claims: T) -> Value {
|
||||
to_value(TwoFactorClaims {
|
||||
nbf: 0,
|
||||
exp: 0,
|
||||
iss: String::new(),
|
||||
sub: UserId::from(String::from("4ff0f0a4-0aa4-4c1d-9d43-1f2bd4d5e8b1")),
|
||||
enabled: false,
|
||||
claims,
|
||||
})
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn claims_only_parse_as_their_own_provider() {
|
||||
let tokens = [
|
||||
token(AuthenticatorClaims {
|
||||
key: String::from("JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP"),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
token(DuoClaims {
|
||||
data: None,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
token(WebauthnClaims {
|
||||
keys: vec![1],
|
||||
}),
|
||||
token(YubikeyClaims {
|
||||
keys: Vec::new(),
|
||||
}),
|
||||
token(EmailClaims {
|
||||
email: None,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
];
|
||||
for (issued, token) in tokens.iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
let parsed = [
|
||||
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<AuthenticatorClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
|
||||
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<DuoClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
|
||||
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<WebauthnClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
|
||||
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<YubikeyClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
|
||||
from_value::<TwoFactorClaims<EmailClaims>>(token.clone()).is_ok(),
|
||||
];
|
||||
for (checked, ok) in parsed.into_iter().enumerate() {
|
||||
assert_eq!(ok, issued == checked, "token {issued} parsed as {checked}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
+168
-66
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
|
||||
_usr: ConfigBuilder,
|
||||
|
||||
_overrides: Vec<&'static str>,
|
||||
_config_file_status: ConfigFileStatus,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Custom Deserialize for ConfigBuilder, mainly based upon https://serde.rs/deserialize-struct.html
|
||||
@@ -128,7 +129,7 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
|
||||
)+)+
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(non_camel_case_types)]
|
||||
#[expect(non_camel_case_types, reason="ConfigBuilder uses different case types")]
|
||||
enum Field {
|
||||
$($(
|
||||
$name,
|
||||
@@ -259,11 +260,22 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
|
||||
builder
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn from_file() -> Result<Self, Error> {
|
||||
async fn from_file() -> Result<Option<Self>, Error> {
|
||||
// The Fs operator would create the folder if it doesn't exist, which we never want
|
||||
if !CONFIG_FILE_PARENT_DIR.starts_with("s3://") && !std::path::Path::new(&*CONFIG_FILE_PARENT_DIR).is_dir() {
|
||||
return Ok(None);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let operator = storage::operator_for_path(&CONFIG_FILE_PARENT_DIR)?;
|
||||
let config_bytes = operator.read(&CONFIG_FILENAME).await?;
|
||||
let config_bytes = match operator.read(&CONFIG_FILENAME).await {
|
||||
Ok(bytes) => bytes,
|
||||
// No config file is fine, should not return any error
|
||||
Err(e) if e.kind() == opendal::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
|
||||
// Any other error might be an issue and should be passed back to the caller
|
||||
Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let builder = serde_json::from_slice(&config_bytes.to_vec())?;
|
||||
println!("[INFO] Using saved config from `{}` for configuration.\n", *CONFIG_FILE);
|
||||
serde_json::from_slice(&config_bytes.to_vec()).map_err(Into::into)
|
||||
Ok(Some(builder))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn clear_non_editable(&mut self) {
|
||||
@@ -350,7 +362,6 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
|
||||
elements: Vec<ElementData>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[allow(unused)]
|
||||
impl Config {
|
||||
$($(
|
||||
$(#[doc = $doc])+
|
||||
@@ -440,6 +451,8 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
|
||||
"domain_origin",
|
||||
"domain_path",
|
||||
"domain",
|
||||
"duo_ikey",
|
||||
"duo_host",
|
||||
"helo_name",
|
||||
"org_creation_users",
|
||||
"signups_domains_whitelist",
|
||||
@@ -451,6 +464,8 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
|
||||
"sso_authority",
|
||||
"sso_callback_path",
|
||||
"sso_client_id",
|
||||
"yubico_client_id",
|
||||
"yubico_server",
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
let cfg = {
|
||||
@@ -463,15 +478,13 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
|
||||
let mut json = serde_json::Map::new();
|
||||
$($(
|
||||
json.insert(String::from(stringify!($name)), make_config! { @supportstr $name, cfg.$name, $ty, $none_action });
|
||||
)+)+;
|
||||
)+)+
|
||||
// Loop through all privacy sensitive keys and mask them
|
||||
for mask_key in PRIVACY_CONFIG {
|
||||
if let Some(value) = json.get_mut(*mask_key) {
|
||||
if let Some(s) = value.as_str() {
|
||||
if let Some(value) = json.get_mut(*mask_key) && let Some(s) = value.as_str() {
|
||||
*value = privacy_mask(s).into();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
json
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -483,6 +496,10 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
|
||||
};
|
||||
overrides
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn get_config_file_status(&self) -> ConfigFileStatus {
|
||||
self.inner.read().unwrap()._config_file_status
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -539,7 +556,7 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
jobs {
|
||||
/// Job scheduler poll interval |> How often the job scheduler thread checks for jobs to run.
|
||||
/// Set to 0 to globally disable scheduled jobs.
|
||||
job_poll_interval_ms: u64, false, def, 30_000;
|
||||
job_poll_interval_ms: u32, false, def, 30_000;
|
||||
/// Send purge schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that checks for Sends past their deletion date.
|
||||
/// Defaults to hourly. Set blank to disable this job.
|
||||
send_purge_schedule: String, false, def, "0 5 * * * *".to_owned();
|
||||
@@ -587,6 +604,9 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
/// This setting applies globally to all users. To control this on a per-org basis instead, use the "Disable Send" org policy.
|
||||
sends_allowed: bool, true, def, true;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Fill Assist Rules URL |> HTTPS URL for the server-wide Fill Assist rules feed base directory.
|
||||
fill_assist_rules_url: String, true, def, "https://fillassist.bitwarden.com".to_owned();
|
||||
|
||||
/// HIBP Api Key |> HaveIBeenPwned API Key, request it here: https://haveibeenpwned.com/API/Key
|
||||
hibp_api_key: Pass, true, option;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -598,16 +618,16 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
user_send_limit: i64, true, option;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Trash auto-delete days |> Number of days to wait before auto-deleting a trashed item.
|
||||
/// If unset, trashed items are not auto-deleted. This setting applies globally, so make
|
||||
/// If unset or 0, trashed items are not auto-deleted. This setting applies globally, so make
|
||||
/// sure to inform all users of any changes to this setting.
|
||||
trash_auto_delete_days: i64, true, option;
|
||||
trash_auto_delete_days: u16, true, option;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Incomplete 2FA time limit |> Number of minutes to wait before a 2FA-enabled login is
|
||||
/// considered incomplete, resulting in an email notification. An incomplete 2FA login is one
|
||||
/// where the correct master password was provided but the required 2FA step was not completed,
|
||||
/// which potentially indicates a master password compromise. Set to 0 to disable this check.
|
||||
/// This setting applies globally to all users.
|
||||
incomplete_2fa_time_limit: i64, true, def, 3;
|
||||
incomplete_2fa_time_limit: u16, true, def, 3;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Disable icon downloads |> Set to true to disable icon downloading in the internal icon service.
|
||||
/// This still serves existing icons from $ICON_CACHE_FOLDER, without generating any external
|
||||
@@ -620,9 +640,9 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
/// this will prevent logins from succeeding until the address has been verified
|
||||
signups_verify: bool, true, def, false;
|
||||
/// If signups require email verification, automatically re-send verification email if it hasn't been sent for a while (in seconds)
|
||||
signups_verify_resend_time: u64, true, def, 3_600;
|
||||
signups_verify_resend_time: u32, true, def, 3_600;
|
||||
/// If signups require email verification, limit how many emails are automatically sent when login is attempted (0 means no limit)
|
||||
signups_verify_resend_limit: u32, true, def, 6;
|
||||
signups_verify_resend_limit: u16, true, def, 6;
|
||||
/// Email domain whitelist |> Allow signups only from this list of comma-separated domains, even when signups are otherwise disabled
|
||||
signups_domains_whitelist: String, true, def, String::new();
|
||||
/// Enable event logging |> Enables event logging for organizations.
|
||||
@@ -634,7 +654,7 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
invitations_allowed: bool, true, def, true;
|
||||
/// Invitation token expiration time (in hours) |> The number of hours after which an organization invite token, emergency access invite token,
|
||||
/// email verification token and deletion request token will expire (must be at least 1)
|
||||
invitation_expiration_hours: u32, false, def, 120;
|
||||
invitation_expiration_hours: u16, false, def, 120;
|
||||
/// Enable emergency access |> Controls whether users can enable emergency access to their accounts. This setting applies globally to all users.
|
||||
emergency_access_allowed: bool, true, def, true;
|
||||
/// Allow email change |> Controls whether users can change their email. This setting applies globally to all users.
|
||||
@@ -655,8 +675,8 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
/// Invitation organization name |> Name shown in the invitation emails that don't come from a specific organization
|
||||
invitation_org_name: String, true, def, "Vaultwarden".to_owned();
|
||||
|
||||
/// Events days retain |> Number of days to retain events stored in the database. If unset, events are kept indefinitely.
|
||||
events_days_retain: i64, false, option;
|
||||
/// Events days retain |> Number of days to retain events stored in the database. If unset or 0, events are kept indefinitely.
|
||||
events_days_retain: u16, false, option;
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
client {
|
||||
@@ -670,7 +690,7 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
/// Set to the string "none" (without quotes), to disable any headers and just use the remote IP
|
||||
ip_header: String, true, def, "X-Real-IP".to_owned();
|
||||
/// Internal IP header property, used to avoid recomputing each time
|
||||
_ip_header_enabled: bool, false, generated, |c| &c.ip_header.trim().to_lowercase() != "none";
|
||||
_ip_header_enabled: bool, false, generated, |c| !c.ip_header.trim().eq_ignore_ascii_case("none");
|
||||
/// Trusted proxies |> Which addresses the client IP header is accepted from. Requests from any
|
||||
/// other address use the remote IP instead, so a client can't spoof the header.
|
||||
/// Either the string "local" (the default, any non-global address, which covers a reverse proxy
|
||||
@@ -694,13 +714,13 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
/// Temporary redirects are useful while testing different icon services, but once a service
|
||||
/// has been decided on, consider using permanent redirects for cacheability. The legacy codes
|
||||
/// are currently better supported by the Bitwarden clients.
|
||||
icon_redirect_code: u32, true, def, 302;
|
||||
icon_redirect_code: u16, true, def, 302;
|
||||
/// Positive icon cache expiry |> Number of seconds to consider that an already cached icon is fresh. After this period, the icon will be refreshed
|
||||
icon_cache_ttl: u64, true, def, 2_592_000;
|
||||
icon_cache_ttl: u32, true, def, 2_592_000;
|
||||
/// Negative icon cache expiry |> Number of seconds before trying to download an icon that failed again.
|
||||
icon_cache_negttl: u64, true, def, 259_200;
|
||||
icon_cache_negttl: u32, true, def, 259_200;
|
||||
/// Icon download timeout |> Number of seconds when to stop attempting to download an icon.
|
||||
icon_download_timeout: u64, true, def, 10;
|
||||
icon_download_timeout: u16, true, def, 10;
|
||||
|
||||
/// [Deprecated] Icon blacklist Regex |> Use `http_request_block_regex` instead
|
||||
icon_blacklist_regex: String, false, option;
|
||||
@@ -717,6 +737,8 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
/// Disable Two-Factor remember |> Enabling this would force the users to use a second factor to login every time.
|
||||
/// Note that the checkbox would still be present, but ignored.
|
||||
disable_2fa_remember: bool, true, def, false;
|
||||
/// Two-Factor remember duration |> Number of days before a remembered Two-Factor login expires (min: 1, max: 90).
|
||||
two_factor_remember_days: i64, true, def, 30;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Disable authenticator time drifted codes to be valid |> Enabling this only allows the current TOTP code to be valid
|
||||
/// TOTP codes of the previous and next 30 seconds will be invalid.
|
||||
@@ -751,11 +773,11 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
/// Max database connection retries |> Number of times to retry the database connection during startup, with 1 second between each retry, set to 0 to retry indefinitely
|
||||
db_connection_retries: u32, false, def, 15;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Timeout when acquiring database connection
|
||||
database_timeout: u64, false, def, 30;
|
||||
/// Timeout in seconds when acquiring database connection
|
||||
database_timeout: u32, false, def, 30;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Timeout in seconds before idle connections to the database are closed
|
||||
database_idle_timeout: u64, false, def, 600;
|
||||
database_idle_timeout: u32, false, def, 600;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Database connection max pool size
|
||||
database_max_conns: u32, false, def, 10;
|
||||
@@ -772,30 +794,34 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
/// Allowed iframe ancestors (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains to embed the web vault into an iframe, useful for embedding into secure intranets
|
||||
allowed_iframe_ancestors: String, true, def, String::new();
|
||||
|
||||
/// Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains to URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
|
||||
/// Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains for URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
|
||||
allowed_connect_src: String, true, def, String::new();
|
||||
|
||||
/// Seconds between login requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between login and 2FA requests from the same IP address before rate limiting kicks in
|
||||
login_ratelimit_seconds: u64, false, def, 60;
|
||||
login_ratelimit_seconds: u16, false, def, 60;
|
||||
/// Max burst size for login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `login_ratelimit_seconds`. Note that this applies to both the login and the 2FA, so it's recommended to allow a burst size of at least 2
|
||||
login_ratelimit_max_burst: u32, false, def, 10;
|
||||
login_ratelimit_max_burst: u16, false, def, 10;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Seconds between unauthenticated requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between requests from the same IP address to any of the rate limited unauthenticated endpoints
|
||||
unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds: u64, false, def, 60;
|
||||
unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds: u16, false, def, 60;
|
||||
/// Max burst size for unauthenticated requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds`. This is shared between several endpoints, so it needs to be more lenient than the login one
|
||||
unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst: u32, false, def, 50;
|
||||
unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst: u16, false, def, 50;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Seconds between admin login requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between admin requests from the same IP address before rate limiting kicks in
|
||||
admin_ratelimit_seconds: u64, false, def, 300;
|
||||
admin_ratelimit_seconds: u16, false, def, 300;
|
||||
/// Max burst size for admin login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `admin_ratelimit_seconds`
|
||||
admin_ratelimit_max_burst: u32, false, def, 3;
|
||||
admin_ratelimit_max_burst: u16, false, def, 3;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Admin session lifetime |> Set the lifetime of admin sessions to this value (in minutes).
|
||||
admin_session_lifetime: i64, true, def, 20;
|
||||
admin_session_lifetime: u32, true, def, 20;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Enable groups (BETA!) (Know the risks!) |> Enables groups support for organizations (Currently contains known issues!).
|
||||
org_groups_enabled: bool, false, def, false;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Enable Custom roles (EXPERIMENTAL!) (Know the risks!) |> Enables the in-development Custom member role with granular permissions for organizations.
|
||||
/// Only the permissions this version enforces can be granted. Disabling it again keeps the stored Custom roles, but they grant nothing until it is re-enabled.
|
||||
experimental_custom_roles: bool, false, def, false;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Increase note size limit (Know the risks!) |> Sets the secure note size limit to 100_000 instead of the default 10_000.
|
||||
/// WARNING: This could cause issues with clients. Also exports will not work on Bitwarden servers!
|
||||
increase_note_size_limit: bool, true, def, false;
|
||||
@@ -844,8 +870,8 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
sso_master_password_policy: String, true, option;
|
||||
/// Use SSO only for auth not the session lifecycle |> Use default Vaultwarden session lifecycle (Idle refresh token valid for 30days)
|
||||
sso_auth_only_not_session: bool, true, def, false;
|
||||
/// Client cache for discovery endpoint. |> Duration in seconds (0 or less to disable). More details: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-SSO-support-using-OpenId-Connect#client-cache
|
||||
sso_client_cache_expiration: u64, true, def, 0;
|
||||
/// Client cache for discovery endpoint. |> Duration in seconds (0 to disable). More details: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-SSO-support-using-OpenId-Connect#client-cache
|
||||
sso_client_cache_expiration: u32, true, def, 0;
|
||||
/// Log all tokens |> `LOG_LEVEL=debug` or `LOG_LEVEL=info,vaultwarden::sso=debug` is required
|
||||
sso_debug_tokens: bool, true, def, false;
|
||||
},
|
||||
@@ -903,7 +929,7 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
/// SMTP Auth mechanism |> Defaults for SSL is "Plain" and "Login" and nothing for Non-SSL connections. Possible values: ["Plain", "Login", "Xoauth2"]. Multiple options need to be separated by a comma ','.
|
||||
smtp_auth_mechanism: String, true, option;
|
||||
/// SMTP connection timeout |> Number of seconds when to stop trying to connect to the SMTP server
|
||||
smtp_timeout: u64, true, def, 15;
|
||||
smtp_timeout: u16, true, def, 15;
|
||||
/// Server name sent during HELO |> By default this value should be the machine's hostname, but might need to be changed in case it trips some anti-spam filters
|
||||
helo_name: String, true, option;
|
||||
/// Embed images as email attachments.
|
||||
@@ -925,9 +951,9 @@ make_config! {
|
||||
/// Email token size |> Number of digits in an email 2FA token (min: 6, max: 255). Note that the Bitwarden clients are hardcoded to mention 6 digit codes regardless of this setting.
|
||||
email_token_size: u8, true, def, 6;
|
||||
/// Token expiration time |> Maximum time in seconds a token is valid. The time the user has to open email client and copy token.
|
||||
email_expiration_time: u64, true, def, 600;
|
||||
email_expiration_time: u32, true, def, 600;
|
||||
/// Maximum attempts |> Maximum attempts before an email token is reset and a new email will need to be sent
|
||||
email_attempts_limit: u64, true, def, 3;
|
||||
email_attempts_limit: u8, true, def, 3;
|
||||
/// Setup email 2FA at signup |> Setup email 2FA provider on registration regardless of any organization policy
|
||||
email_2fa_enforce_on_verified_invite: bool, true, def, false;
|
||||
/// Auto-enable 2FA (Know the risks!) |> Automatically setup email 2FA as fallback provider when needed
|
||||
@@ -974,16 +1000,24 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let limit = 256;
|
||||
if cfg.database_max_conns < 1 || cfg.database_max_conns > limit {
|
||||
if !(1..=limit).contains(&cfg.database_max_conns) {
|
||||
err!(format!("`DATABASE_MAX_CONNS` contains an invalid value. Ensure it is between 1 and {limit}.",));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.database_min_conns < 1 || cfg.database_min_conns > limit {
|
||||
if !(1..=limit).contains(&cfg.database_min_conns) {
|
||||
err!(format!("`DATABASE_MIN_CONNS` contains an invalid value. Ensure it is between 1 and {limit}.",));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.database_min_conns > cfg.database_max_conns {
|
||||
err!("`DATABASE_MIN_CONNS` must be smaller than or equal to `DATABASE_MAX_CONNS`.");
|
||||
err!("`DATABASE_MIN_CONNS` must be less than or equal to `DATABASE_MAX_CONNS`.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.database_timeout < 1 {
|
||||
err!("`DATABASE_TIMEOUT` must be at least 1 second");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.database_idle_timeout < 1 {
|
||||
err!("`DATABASE_IDLE_TIMEOUT` must be at least 1 second");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(log_file) = &cfg.log_file
|
||||
@@ -999,6 +1033,21 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let valid_fill_assist_rules_url = Url::parse(&cfg.fill_assist_rules_url).is_ok_and(|url| {
|
||||
url.scheme() == "https"
|
||||
&& url.has_host()
|
||||
&& url.username().is_empty()
|
||||
&& url.password().is_none()
|
||||
&& url.query().is_none()
|
||||
&& url.fragment().is_none()
|
||||
&& cfg.fill_assist_rules_url.trim() == cfg.fill_assist_rules_url
|
||||
});
|
||||
if !valid_fill_assist_rules_url {
|
||||
err!(
|
||||
"`FILL_ASSIST_RULES_URL` must be a valid HTTPS URL without credentials, query parameters, fragments, or surrounding whitespace."
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let connect_src = cfg.allowed_connect_src.to_lowercase();
|
||||
for url in connect_src.split_whitespace() {
|
||||
if !url.starts_with("https://") || Url::parse(url).is_err() {
|
||||
@@ -1233,6 +1282,10 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
|
||||
err!("`INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS` has a minimum duration of 1 hour")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !(1..=90).contains(&cfg.two_factor_remember_days) {
|
||||
err!("`TWO_FACTOR_REMEMBER_DAYS` must be between 1 and 90 days")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Validate schedule crontab format
|
||||
if !cfg.send_purge_schedule.is_empty() && cfg.send_purge_schedule.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
|
||||
err!("`SEND_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
|
||||
@@ -1274,6 +1327,30 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
|
||||
err!("`PURGE_INCOMPLETE_SSO_AUTH` is not a valid cron expression")
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.login_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
|
||||
err!("`LOGIN_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.login_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
|
||||
err!("`LOGIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.admin_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
|
||||
err!("`ADMIN_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.admin_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
|
||||
err!("`ADMIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
|
||||
err!("`UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if cfg.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
|
||||
err!("`UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if !cfg.disable_admin_token {
|
||||
match cfg.admin_token.as_ref() {
|
||||
Some(t) if t.starts_with("$argon2") => {
|
||||
@@ -1342,13 +1419,7 @@ fn extract_url_origin(url: &str) -> String {
|
||||
/// Extracts the path from a URL.
|
||||
/// All trailing '/' chars are trimmed, even if the path is a lone '/'.
|
||||
fn extract_url_path(url: &str) -> String {
|
||||
match Url::parse(url) {
|
||||
Ok(u) => u.path().trim_end_matches('/').to_owned(),
|
||||
Err(_) => {
|
||||
// We already print it in the method above, no need to do it again
|
||||
String::new()
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Url::parse(url).map_or_default(|u| u.path().trim_end_matches('/').to_owned())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn generate_smtp_img_src(embed_images: bool, domain: &str) -> String {
|
||||
@@ -1383,10 +1454,7 @@ fn generate_icon_service_url(icon_service: &str) -> String {
|
||||
fn generate_icon_service_csp(icon_service: &str, icon_service_url: &str) -> String {
|
||||
// We split on the first '{', since that is the variable delimiter for an icon service URL.
|
||||
// Everything up until the first '{' should be fixed and can be used as an CSP string.
|
||||
let csp_string = match icon_service_url.split_once('{') {
|
||||
Some((c, _)) => c.to_owned(),
|
||||
None => String::new(),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let csp_string = icon_service_url.split_once('{').map_or_default(|(c, _)| c.to_owned());
|
||||
|
||||
// Because Google does a second redirect to there gstatic.com domain, we need to add an extra csp string.
|
||||
match icon_service {
|
||||
@@ -1400,9 +1468,9 @@ fn smtp_convert_deprecated_ssl_options(smtp_ssl: Option<bool>, smtp_explicit_tls
|
||||
if smtp_explicit_tls.is_some() || smtp_ssl.is_some() {
|
||||
println!("[DEPRECATED]: `SMTP_SSL` or `SMTP_EXPLICIT_TLS` is set. Please use `SMTP_SECURITY` instead.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
if smtp_explicit_tls.is_some() && smtp_explicit_tls.unwrap() {
|
||||
if smtp_explicit_tls.is_some_and(|b| b) {
|
||||
return "force_tls".to_owned();
|
||||
} else if smtp_ssl.is_some() && !smtp_ssl.unwrap() {
|
||||
} else if smtp_ssl.is_some_and(|b| !b) {
|
||||
return "off".to_owned();
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Return the default `starttls` in all other cases
|
||||
@@ -1429,9 +1497,16 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
|
||||
// Autofill Team
|
||||
"undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic",
|
||||
"enable-basic-auth-response",
|
||||
"fill-assist-targeting-rules",
|
||||
"ssh-agent-v2",
|
||||
"windows-desktop-autotype",
|
||||
"windows-desktop-autotype-ga",
|
||||
// Key Management Team
|
||||
"biometrics-sdk-ipc",
|
||||
"windows-native-credential-sync",
|
||||
"macos-native-credential-sync",
|
||||
"enable-account-encryption-v2-jit-password-registration",
|
||||
"pm-27278-v2-password-registration",
|
||||
// Mobile Team
|
||||
"pm-34171-card-scanner",
|
||||
// Platform Team
|
||||
@@ -1440,11 +1515,34 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
|
||||
"pm-32009-new-item-types",
|
||||
];
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Serialize)]
|
||||
pub enum ConfigFileStatus {
|
||||
NotFound,
|
||||
Loaded,
|
||||
Error,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl Config {
|
||||
pub async fn load() -> Result<Self, Error> {
|
||||
// Loading from env and file
|
||||
let env = ConfigBuilder::from_env();
|
||||
let usr = ConfigBuilder::from_file().await.unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
let (usr, config_file_status) = match ConfigBuilder::from_file().await {
|
||||
Ok(Some(usr)) => (usr, ConfigFileStatus::Loaded),
|
||||
Ok(None) => (ConfigBuilder::default(), ConfigFileStatus::NotFound),
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"[ERROR] Failed to load configuration from `{}`\n\
|
||||
#####################################################################################\n\
|
||||
# The file seems to exist but might contain invalid JSON or invalid values. #\n\
|
||||
# Check the syntax and make sure every value is valid and within its allowed range. #\n\
|
||||
# This file is not used until those errors are resolved. #\n\
|
||||
#####################################################################################\n\
|
||||
{e:?}\n",
|
||||
*CONFIG_FILE
|
||||
);
|
||||
(ConfigBuilder::default(), ConfigFileStatus::Error)
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Create merged config, config file overwrites env
|
||||
let mut overrides = Vec::new();
|
||||
@@ -1456,7 +1554,7 @@ impl Config {
|
||||
validate_config(&config, false)?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(Config {
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
inner: RwLock::new(Inner {
|
||||
rocket_shutdown_handle: None,
|
||||
templates: load_templates(&config.templates_folder),
|
||||
@@ -1464,6 +1562,7 @@ impl Config {
|
||||
_env: env,
|
||||
_usr: usr,
|
||||
_overrides: overrides,
|
||||
_config_file_status: config_file_status,
|
||||
}),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1497,6 +1596,7 @@ impl Config {
|
||||
writer.config = config;
|
||||
writer._usr = builder;
|
||||
writer._overrides = overrides;
|
||||
writer._config_file_status = ConfigFileStatus::Loaded;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
//Save to file
|
||||
@@ -1513,15 +1613,17 @@ impl Config {
|
||||
/// is in signups_domains_whitelist, or if no whitelist is set (so there
|
||||
/// are no domain restrictions in effect).
|
||||
pub fn is_email_domain_allowed(&self, email: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
let e: Vec<&str> = email.rsplitn(2, '@').collect();
|
||||
if e.len() != 2 || e[0].is_empty() || e[1].is_empty() {
|
||||
warn!("Failed to parse email address '{email}'");
|
||||
let Some((_, domain)) = email.rsplit_once('@').filter(|(name, domain)| !name.is_empty() && !domain.is_empty())
|
||||
else {
|
||||
warn!("Failed to parse email address '{}'", email.escape_debug());
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
let email_domain = e[0].to_lowercase();
|
||||
let whitelist = self.signups_domains_whitelist();
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
whitelist.is_empty() || whitelist.split(',').any(|d| d.trim() == email_domain)
|
||||
let domain = &domain.to_lowercase();
|
||||
let whitelist = self.signups_domains_whitelist();
|
||||
let whitelist = whitelist.trim();
|
||||
|
||||
whitelist.is_empty() || whitelist.split(',').any(|d| d.trim() == domain)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Tests whether signup is allowed for an email address, taking into
|
||||
@@ -1588,6 +1690,7 @@ impl Config {
|
||||
writer.config = config;
|
||||
writer._usr = usr;
|
||||
writer._overrides = Vec::new();
|
||||
writer._config_file_status = ConfigFileStatus::NotFound;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Invalidate CSS Cache because several config items might have impact on the rendered CSS
|
||||
@@ -1611,8 +1714,7 @@ impl Config {
|
||||
/// Tests whether the admin token is set to a non-empty value.
|
||||
pub fn is_admin_token_set(&self) -> bool {
|
||||
let token = self.admin_token();
|
||||
|
||||
token.is_some() && !token.unwrap().trim().is_empty()
|
||||
token.is_some_and(|t| !t.trim().is_empty())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn opendal_operator_for_path_type(&self, path_type: &PathType) -> Result<opendal::Operator, Error> {
|
||||
|
||||
+311
-15
@@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
|
||||
mod query_logger;
|
||||
|
||||
use std::{
|
||||
sync::{Arc, OnceLock},
|
||||
sync::{
|
||||
Arc, OnceLock,
|
||||
atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
|
||||
},
|
||||
time::Duration,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -123,6 +126,7 @@ pub static ACTIVE_DB_TYPE: OnceLock<DbConnType> = OnceLock::new();
|
||||
pub struct DbConn {
|
||||
conn: Arc<Mutex<Option<PooledConnection<DbConnManager>>>>,
|
||||
permit: Option<OwnedSemaphorePermit>,
|
||||
transaction_open: AtomicBool,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
@@ -150,6 +154,7 @@ impl Drop for DbConn {
|
||||
fn drop(&mut self) {
|
||||
let conn = Arc::clone(&self.conn);
|
||||
let permit = self.permit.take();
|
||||
let transaction_open = self.transaction_open.load(Ordering::Acquire);
|
||||
|
||||
// Since connection can't be on the stack in an async fn during an
|
||||
// await, we have to spawn a new blocking-safe thread...
|
||||
@@ -157,7 +162,13 @@ impl Drop for DbConn {
|
||||
// And then re-enter the runtime to wait on the async mutex, but in a blocking fashion.
|
||||
let mut conn = tokio::runtime::Handle::current().block_on(conn.lock_owned());
|
||||
|
||||
if let Some(conn) = conn.take() {
|
||||
if let Some(mut conn) = conn.take() {
|
||||
if transaction_open {
|
||||
// A cancelled request must not return an open transaction to the pool.
|
||||
if let Err(error) = conn.batch_execute("ROLLBACK") {
|
||||
error!("Failed to roll back a cancelled database transaction: {error}");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
drop(conn);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -212,8 +223,8 @@ impl DbPool {
|
||||
let pool = Pool::builder()
|
||||
.max_size(max_conns)
|
||||
.min_idle(Some(CONFIG.database_min_conns()))
|
||||
.idle_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_idle_timeout())))
|
||||
.connection_timeout(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_timeout()))
|
||||
.idle_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_idle_timeout()))))
|
||||
.connection_timeout(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_timeout())))
|
||||
.connection_customizer(Box::new(DbConnOptions {
|
||||
init_stmts: conn_type.get_init_stmts(),
|
||||
}))
|
||||
@@ -225,7 +236,7 @@ impl DbPool {
|
||||
error!("Tried to set the active database connection type more than once.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
Ok(DbPool {
|
||||
Ok(Self {
|
||||
pool: Some(pool),
|
||||
semaphore: Arc::new(Semaphore::new(max_conns as usize)),
|
||||
})
|
||||
@@ -233,7 +244,7 @@ impl DbPool {
|
||||
|
||||
// Get a connection from the pool
|
||||
pub async fn get(&self) -> Result<DbConn, Error> {
|
||||
let duration = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_timeout());
|
||||
let duration = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_timeout()));
|
||||
let permit = match timeout(duration, Arc::clone(&self.semaphore).acquire_owned()).await {
|
||||
Ok(p) => p.expect("Semaphore should be open"),
|
||||
Err(_) => {
|
||||
@@ -248,6 +259,7 @@ impl DbPool {
|
||||
Ok(DbConn {
|
||||
conn: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Some(c))),
|
||||
permit: Some(permit),
|
||||
transaction_open: AtomicBool::new(false),
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -255,25 +267,25 @@ impl DbPool {
|
||||
impl DbConnType {
|
||||
pub fn from_url(url: &str) -> Result<Self, Error> {
|
||||
// Mysql
|
||||
if url.len() > 6 && &url[..6] == "mysql:" {
|
||||
if url.starts_with("mysql:") {
|
||||
#[cfg(mysql)]
|
||||
return Ok(DbConnType::Mysql);
|
||||
return Ok(Self::Mysql);
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(not(mysql))]
|
||||
err!("`DATABASE_URL` is a MySQL URL, but the 'mysql' feature is not enabled")
|
||||
|
||||
// Postgresql
|
||||
} else if url.len() > 11 && (&url[..11] == "postgresql:" || &url[..9] == "postgres:") {
|
||||
} else if url.starts_with("postgresql:") || url.starts_with("postgres:") {
|
||||
#[cfg(postgresql)]
|
||||
return Ok(DbConnType::Postgresql);
|
||||
return Ok(Self::Postgresql);
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(not(postgresql))]
|
||||
err!("`DATABASE_URL` is a PostgreSQL URL, but the 'postgresql' feature is not enabled")
|
||||
|
||||
// Sqlite (explicit)
|
||||
} else if url.len() > 7 && &url[..7] == "sqlite:" {
|
||||
} else if url.starts_with("sqlite:") {
|
||||
#[cfg(sqlite)]
|
||||
return Ok(DbConnType::Sqlite);
|
||||
return Ok(Self::Sqlite);
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(not(sqlite))]
|
||||
err!("`DATABASE_URL` is a SQLite URL, but the 'sqlite' feature is not enabled")
|
||||
@@ -284,7 +296,7 @@ impl DbConnType {
|
||||
#[cfg(sqlite)]
|
||||
{
|
||||
if std::path::Path::new(url).exists() {
|
||||
return Ok(DbConnType::Sqlite);
|
||||
return Ok(Self::Sqlite);
|
||||
}
|
||||
err!(format!(
|
||||
"`DATABASE_URL` does not match any known database scheme (mysql://, postgresql://, sqlite://) \
|
||||
@@ -320,6 +332,29 @@ impl DbConnType {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl DbConn {
|
||||
/// Run asynchronous model calls on this request's pooled connection in one transaction.
|
||||
/// Send external notifications only after this returns successfully.
|
||||
pub async fn transaction<F, Fut, T>(&self, operation: F) -> Result<T, Error>
|
||||
where
|
||||
F: FnOnce() -> Fut,
|
||||
Fut: Future<Output = Result<T, Error>>,
|
||||
{
|
||||
self.run(|conn| conn.batch_execute("BEGIN")).await.map_res("Error starting database transaction")?;
|
||||
self.transaction_open.store(true, Ordering::Release);
|
||||
let result = operation().await;
|
||||
if result.is_ok() {
|
||||
let committed = self.run(|conn| conn.batch_execute("COMMIT")).await;
|
||||
let closed = committed.is_ok() || self.run(|conn| conn.batch_execute("ROLLBACK")).await.is_ok();
|
||||
if closed {
|
||||
self.transaction_open.store(false, Ordering::Release);
|
||||
}
|
||||
committed.map_res("Error committing database transaction")?;
|
||||
} else if self.run(|conn| conn.batch_execute("ROLLBACK")).await.is_ok() {
|
||||
self.transaction_open.store(false, Ordering::Release);
|
||||
}
|
||||
result
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn run<F, R>(&self, f: F) -> R
|
||||
where
|
||||
F: FnOnce(&mut DbConnInner) -> R + Send,
|
||||
@@ -402,8 +437,6 @@ pub mod models;
|
||||
/// MySQL/MariaDB and PostgreSQL are not supported.
|
||||
#[cfg(sqlite)]
|
||||
pub fn backup_sqlite() -> Result<String, Error> {
|
||||
use diesel::Connection;
|
||||
|
||||
let db_url = CONFIG.database_url();
|
||||
if DbConnType::from_url(&CONFIG.database_url()).is_ok_and(|t| t == DbConnType::Sqlite) {
|
||||
// Strip the sqlite:// prefix if present to get the raw file path
|
||||
@@ -534,3 +567,266 @@ mod postgresql_migrations {
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A throwaway SQLite database with the real schema, for tests that need to run queries.
|
||||
#[cfg(all(test, sqlite))]
|
||||
pub mod test_db {
|
||||
use super::{DbConn, DbConnManager, sqlite_migrations::MIGRATIONS};
|
||||
use diesel::{Connection, connection::SimpleConnection, r2d2::Pool, sqlite::SqliteConnection};
|
||||
use diesel_migrations::MigrationHarness;
|
||||
use std::sync::{Arc, atomic::AtomicBool};
|
||||
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
|
||||
|
||||
pub struct TestDb {
|
||||
pool: Pool<DbConnManager>,
|
||||
// Keep the named in-memory database alive across pooled connections.
|
||||
_keeper: SqliteConnection,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl TestDb {
|
||||
fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
let url = format!("sqlite://{}?mode=memory&cache=shared", crate::util::get_uuid());
|
||||
let mut keeper = SqliteConnection::establish(&url).unwrap();
|
||||
keeper.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS).unwrap();
|
||||
let pool = Pool::builder().max_size(2).build(DbConnManager::new(&url)).unwrap();
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
pool,
|
||||
_keeper: keeper,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub fn conn(&self) -> DbConn {
|
||||
DbConn {
|
||||
conn: Arc::new(Mutex::new(Some(self.pool.get().unwrap()))),
|
||||
permit: None,
|
||||
transaction_open: AtomicBool::new(false),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// CONFIG must initialize in a child process: the DNS bootstrap test needs it uninitialized.
|
||||
pub fn run(test: impl AsyncFnOnce(&TestDb)) {
|
||||
if std::env::var_os("VAULTWARDEN_ISOLATED_CONFIG_TEST").is_none() {
|
||||
let output = std::process::Command::new(std::env::current_exe().unwrap())
|
||||
.args(["--exact", std::thread::current().name().unwrap(), "--nocapture"])
|
||||
.env("VAULTWARDEN_ISOLATED_CONFIG_TEST", "1")
|
||||
.env("DATABASE_URL", "sqlite://:memory:")
|
||||
// Keep a local `.env` out of the tests, such as SMTP settings that would send mail
|
||||
.env(
|
||||
"ENV_FILE",
|
||||
if cfg!(windows) {
|
||||
"NUL"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"/dev/null"
|
||||
},
|
||||
)
|
||||
.output()
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
output.status.success() && String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).contains("1 passed; 0 failed"),
|
||||
"{}\n{}",
|
||||
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout),
|
||||
String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr)
|
||||
);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// DbConn::run uses block_in_place, requiring a multi-threaded runtime.
|
||||
tokio::runtime::Builder::new_multi_thread().enable_all().build().unwrap().block_on(async {
|
||||
super::models::test_flag::CUSTOM_ROLES_ENABLED.set(Some(true));
|
||||
test(&TestDb::new()).await;
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn custom_role_migration_preserves_memberships_and_guards_downgrade() {
|
||||
use super::schema::users_organizations::dsl::*;
|
||||
use diesel::{migration::MigrationSource, prelude::*};
|
||||
let mut conn = SqliteConnection::establish(":memory:").unwrap();
|
||||
for migration in conn.pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS).unwrap() {
|
||||
if migration.name().version().to_string() == "20261010120000" {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
conn.run_migration(&migration).unwrap();
|
||||
}
|
||||
conn.batch_execute(
|
||||
"PRAGMA foreign_keys=OFF;
|
||||
INSERT INTO organizations (uuid,name,billing_email) VALUES ('org','Org','a@b');
|
||||
INSERT INTO users_organizations (uuid,user_uuid,org_uuid,access_all,akey,status,atype) VALUES
|
||||
('0','0','org',TRUE,'key',2,0), ('1','1','org',TRUE,'key',2,1),
|
||||
('2','2','org',FALSE,'key',1,2), ('3','3','org',FALSE,'key',2,3), ('4','4','org',TRUE,'key',2,3);",
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let rows = |conn: &mut SqliteConnection| {
|
||||
users_organizations
|
||||
.select((uuid, user_uuid, org_uuid, access_all, akey, status, atype))
|
||||
.order(uuid)
|
||||
.load::<(String, String, String, bool, String, i32, i32)>(conn)
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
};
|
||||
let before = rows(&mut conn);
|
||||
conn.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(rows(&mut conn), before);
|
||||
let grants = |conn: &mut SqliteConnection| {
|
||||
diesel::select(diesel::dsl::sql::<diesel::sql_types::BigInt>(
|
||||
"(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users_organizations WHERE manage_users OR manage_groups OR manage_policies
|
||||
OR create_new_collections OR edit_any_collection OR delete_any_collection
|
||||
OR access_event_logs OR access_import_export OR access_reports)",
|
||||
))
|
||||
.get_result::<i64>(conn)
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
};
|
||||
assert_eq!(grants(&mut conn), 0);
|
||||
let migration = MigrationSource::<diesel::sqlite::Sqlite>::migrations(&MIGRATIONS)
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.into_iter()
|
||||
.find(|m| m.name().version().to_string() == "20261010120000")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
for member_status in [1, 2] {
|
||||
conn.batch_execute(&format!(
|
||||
"UPDATE users_organizations SET atype=4,manage_users=TRUE,status={member_status} WHERE uuid='2'"
|
||||
))
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let custom = rows(&mut conn);
|
||||
assert!(conn.revert_migration(&*migration).is_err());
|
||||
assert_eq!(rows(&mut conn), custom);
|
||||
assert!(users_organizations.filter(uuid.eq("2")).select(manage_users).first::<bool>(&mut conn).unwrap());
|
||||
}
|
||||
conn.batch_execute("UPDATE users_organizations SET atype=2,manage_users=FALSE,status=1 WHERE uuid='2'")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
conn.revert_migration(&*migration).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(diesel::sql_query("SELECT manage_users FROM users_organizations").execute(&mut conn).is_err());
|
||||
conn.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(grants(&mut conn), 0);
|
||||
assert_eq!(rows(&mut conn), before);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
use super::models::{Collection, CustomPermission, Membership, MembershipType, Organization, OrganizationId, User};
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn organization(conn: &DbConn) -> Organization {
|
||||
let org = Organization::new("Org".into(), "billing@example.com", None, None);
|
||||
org.save(conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
org
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn member(
|
||||
conn: &DbConn,
|
||||
org: &OrganizationId,
|
||||
role: MembershipType,
|
||||
permissions: &[CustomPermission],
|
||||
) -> (User, Membership) {
|
||||
let mut user = User::new(&format!("{}@example.com", crate::util::get_uuid()), None);
|
||||
user.password_hash = b"existing-account".to_vec();
|
||||
user.save(conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
let mut member = Membership::new(user.uuid.clone(), org.clone(), None);
|
||||
member.set_type(role);
|
||||
member.status = 2;
|
||||
member.set_custom_permissions(&permissions.iter().copied().collect());
|
||||
member.save(conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
(user, member)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn custom_member(conn: &DbConn, permission: CustomPermission) -> (Organization, User, Membership) {
|
||||
let org = organization(conn).await;
|
||||
let (user, member) = member(conn, &org.uuid, MembershipType::Custom, &[permission]).await;
|
||||
(org, user, member)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn collection(conn: &DbConn, org: &OrganizationId) -> Collection {
|
||||
let collection = Collection::new(org.clone(), "Collection".into(), None);
|
||||
collection.save(conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
collection
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn transactions_rollback_before_connection_reuse_and_commit_success() {
|
||||
use crate::error::MapResult;
|
||||
use diesel::RunQueryDsl;
|
||||
run(async |db| {
|
||||
let conn = db.conn();
|
||||
conn.run(|c| c.batch_execute("CREATE TABLE probe (id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY)")).await.unwrap();
|
||||
for (sql, expected) in [
|
||||
("INSERT INTO probe VALUES (1); INSERT INTO probe VALUES (1)", 0_i64),
|
||||
("INSERT INTO probe VALUES (1)", 1),
|
||||
] {
|
||||
let result: Result<(), super::Error> = conn
|
||||
.transaction(async || conn.run(move |c| c.batch_execute(sql)).await.map_res("Insert failed"))
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
assert_eq!(result.is_ok(), expected == 1);
|
||||
let count: i64 = conn
|
||||
.run(|c| {
|
||||
diesel::select(diesel::dsl::sql::<diesel::sql_types::BigInt>("(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM probe)"))
|
||||
.get_result(c)
|
||||
})
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(count, expected);
|
||||
// The same live connection must accept another transaction, before DbConn::drop can help.
|
||||
conn.run(|c| c.batch_execute("BEGIN; ROLLBACK")).await.unwrap();
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn collection_and_cipher_access_requires_active_membership_and_enabled_groups() {
|
||||
use super::models::{Cipher, CipherAccessScope, CollectionCipher, CollectionUser, test_flag};
|
||||
use crate::{
|
||||
api::core::{CipherSyncData, CipherSyncType},
|
||||
auth::{CollectionAction, custom_member_may},
|
||||
};
|
||||
run(async |db| {
|
||||
let conn = db.conn();
|
||||
let (org, user, mut member) = custom_member(&conn, CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection).await;
|
||||
let collection = collection(&conn, &org.uuid).await;
|
||||
let mut cipher = Cipher::new(2);
|
||||
cipher.name = "Cipher".into();
|
||||
cipher.organization_uuid = Some(org.uuid.clone());
|
||||
cipher.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
CollectionCipher::save(&cipher.uuid, &collection.uuid, &conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
for (enabled, status, allowed) in [(true, 2, true), (false, 2, false), (true, 1, false)] {
|
||||
test_flag::CUSTOM_ROLES_ENABLED.set(Some(enabled));
|
||||
member.status = status;
|
||||
member.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(!cipher.is_accessible_to_user(&user.uuid, CipherAccessScope::User, &conn).await);
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
cipher.is_write_accessible_to_user(&user.uuid, CipherAccessScope::OrganizationAdmin, &conn).await,
|
||||
allowed
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
test_flag::CUSTOM_ROLES_ENABLED.set(Some(true));
|
||||
member.status = 2;
|
||||
member.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
let foreign = organization(&conn).await;
|
||||
cipher.organization_uuid = Some(foreign.uuid);
|
||||
assert!(!cipher.is_accessible_to_user(&user.uuid, CipherAccessScope::OrganizationAdmin, &conn).await);
|
||||
cipher.organization_uuid = Some(org.uuid.clone());
|
||||
member.set_custom_permissions(&std::collections::HashSet::new());
|
||||
member.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
let sql=format!("INSERT INTO groups (uuid,organizations_uuid,name,access_all,creation_date,revision_date)
|
||||
VALUES ('g','{}','Group',FALSE,CURRENT_TIMESTAMP,CURRENT_TIMESTAMP);
|
||||
INSERT INTO groups_users (groups_uuid,users_organizations_uuid) VALUES ('g','{}');
|
||||
INSERT INTO collections_groups (collections_uuid,groups_uuid,read_only,hide_passwords,manage) VALUES ('{}','g',FALSE,FALSE,TRUE);",
|
||||
org.uuid,member.uuid,collection.uuid);
|
||||
conn.run(move |c| c.batch_execute(&sql)).await.unwrap();
|
||||
for status in [2, 1, -3, -126] {
|
||||
member.status = status;
|
||||
member.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
let allowed = status == 2 && crate::CONFIG.org_groups_enabled();
|
||||
assert_eq!(custom_member_may(CollectionAction::Edit, &member, &collection.uuid, &conn).await, allowed);
|
||||
let sync = CipherSyncData::new(&user.uuid, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await;
|
||||
for cached in [None, Some(&sync)] {
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
cipher
|
||||
.get_access_restrictions(&user.uuid, CipherAccessScope::User, cached, &conn)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.is_some(),
|
||||
allowed
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
member.status = 2;
|
||||
member.save(&conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
CollectionUser::save(&user.uuid, &collection.uuid, false, false, true, &conn).await.unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(custom_member_may(CollectionAction::Edit, &member, &collection.uuid, &conn).await);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -65,16 +65,33 @@ impl Attachment {
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn to_json(&self, host: &str) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
|
||||
Ok(json!({
|
||||
/// The attachment as sync and the cipher responses list it. Its `url` is a leftover from the old download flow.
|
||||
/// Clients get a signed URL from the attachment routes (`to_json_for_download`) instead, only the web vault and the
|
||||
/// CLI read this one, as a fallback when those routes answer 404.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Api/Vault/Models/Response/AttachmentResponseModel.cs#L24-L29>
|
||||
pub fn to_json(&self, host: &str) -> Value {
|
||||
self.json_with_url(&format!("{host}/attachments/{}/{}", self.cipher_uuid, self.id))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The attachment with a `url` the client can download it from for a short while, for the attachment routes
|
||||
/// (`GET /ciphers/{id}/attachment/{attachmentId}`, its admin variant, the emergency access one).
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Ref: <https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/341acc9d3d8988cec8fe05debfa6d557cf5ab749/src/Api/Vault/Controllers/CiphersController.cs#L1699-L1717>
|
||||
pub async fn to_json_for_download(&self, host: &str) -> Result<Value, crate::Error> {
|
||||
Ok(self.json_with_url(&self.get_url(host).await?))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn json_with_url(&self, url: &str) -> Value {
|
||||
json!({
|
||||
"id": self.id,
|
||||
"url": self.get_url(host).await?,
|
||||
"url": url,
|
||||
"fileName": self.file_name,
|
||||
"size": self.file_size.to_string(),
|
||||
"sizeName": crate::util::get_display_size(self.file_size),
|
||||
"key": self.akey,
|
||||
"object": "attachment"
|
||||
}))
|
||||
})
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -129,7 +146,7 @@ impl Attachment {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn delete_all_by_cipher(cipher_uuid: &CipherId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
for attachment in Attachment::find_by_cipher(cipher_uuid, conn).await {
|
||||
for attachment in Self::find_by_cipher(cipher_uuid, conn).await {
|
||||
attachment.delete(conn).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -166,6 +166,15 @@ impl AuthRequest {
|
||||
.await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pub async fn delete_all_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
|
||||
conn.run(move |conn| {
|
||||
diesel::delete(auth_requests::table.filter(auth_requests::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)))
|
||||
.execute(conn)
|
||||
.map_res("Error deleting auth requests for user")
|
||||
})
|
||||
.await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Marks the request as used to log in. Returns false when it already was, so it only works once.
|
||||
pub async fn set_authentication_date(uuid: &AuthRequestId, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<bool> {
|
||||
let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
|
||||
@@ -188,7 +197,7 @@ impl AuthRequest {
|
||||
pub async fn purge_expired_auth_requests(conn: &DbConn) {
|
||||
// delete auth requests older than 15 minutes which is functionally equivalent to upstream:
|
||||
// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/f8ee2270409f7a13125cd414c450740af605a175/src/Sql/dbo/Auth/Stored%20Procedures/AuthRequest_DeleteIfExpired.sql
|
||||
let expiry_time = Utc::now().naive_utc() - chrono::TimeDelta::try_minutes(15).unwrap();
|
||||
let expiry_time = Utc::now().naive_utc() - chrono::TimeDelta::minutes(15);
|
||||
for auth_request in Self::find_created_before(&expiry_time, conn).await {
|
||||
auth_request.delete(conn).await.ok();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
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Reference in new issue
Block a user