Define threat model

Don't let OpenDAL create a missing config folder (#7935 )
The Fs operator creates its root folder if it doesn't exist, so loading the config created the data folder (or failed with a misleading invalid config.json error when it couldn't). Skip building the operator if the local config folder doesn't exist, so a missing data folder is reported again like before.
2026-11-12 10:48:36 +02:00 · 2026-11-12 00:41:22 +01:00 · 2026-11-04 22:17:54 +01:00 · 2026-11-04 22:11:52 +01:00 · 2026-11-03 00:12:56 +01:00 · 2026-11-02 20:28:51 +01:00
73 changed files with 2881 additions and 1168 deletions
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@
 # DB_CONNECTION_RETRIES=15

 ## Database timeout
-## Timeout when acquiring database connection
+## Timeout in seconds when acquiring database connection
 # DATABASE_TIMEOUT=30

 ## Database idle timeout
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@
 ## Defaults to daily. Set blank to disable this job. Also without EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN set, this job will not start.
 # EVENT_CLEANUP_SCHEDULE="0 10 0 * * *"
 ## Number of days to retain events stored in the database.
-## If unset (the default), events are kept indefinitely and the scheduled job is disabled!
+## If unset (the default) or 0, events are kept indefinitely and the scheduled job is disabled!
 # EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN=
 ##
 ## Cron schedule of the job that cleans old auth requests from the auth request.
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@
 # USER_SEND_LIMIT=

 ## Number of days to wait before auto-deleting a trashed item.
-## If unset (the default), trashed items are not auto-deleted.
+## If unset (the default) or 0, trashed items are not auto-deleted.
 ## This setting applies globally, so make sure to inform all users of any changes to this setting.
 # TRASH_AUTO_DELETE_DAYS=

@@ -386,23 +386,31 @@
 # HTTP_REQUEST_BLOCK_NON_GLOBAL_IPS=true

 ## Client Settings
+## Server-wide Fill Assist rules feed base directory URL, not a JSON file.
+## Defaults to https://fillassist.bitwarden.com.
+## Must be a valid HTTPS URL without credentials, query parameters, fragments, or surrounding whitespace.
+# FILL_ASSIST_RULES_URL=https://fillassist.bitwarden.com
+
 ## Enable experimental feature flags for clients.
 ## This is a comma-separated list of flags, e.g. "flag1,flag2,flag3".
 ## Note that clients cache the /api/config endpoint for about 1 hour and it could take some time before they are enabled or disabled!
 ##
 ## The following flags are available:
+## - "fill-assist-targeting-rules": Enable Fill Assist targeting rules in the browser extension. (Browser >= 2026.6.0)
 ## - "pm-5594-safari-account-switching": Enable account switching in Safari. (Safari >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "pm-32413-multi-client-password-management": Enable changing the master password directly in the client. (Desktop/Extension >= 2026.4.0)
 ## - "ssh-agent-v2": Enable newer SSH agent support. (Desktop >= 2026.2.1)
 ## - "windows-desktop-autotype": Enable the autotype feature preview on Windows. (Desktop >= 2025.8.0)
 ## - "windows-desktop-autotype-ga": Enable the new, still in development, autotype implementation on Windows. (Desktop >= 2026.9.1)
 ##   Only enable one of the two autotype flags, the clients disable autotype completely when both are enabled.
-## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins":
+## - "pm-30529-webauthn-related-origins": Allow passkeys stored in the vault to be used on related origins listed in a site's /.well-known/webauthn file (Browser >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "pm-32009-new-item-types": Enable new item types: Bank Account, Driver's License, and Passport (Clients >= 2026.4.0)
 ## - "pm-34171-card-scanner": Enable the new card scanner feature on mobile (Android >= 2026.4.1, iOS >= 2026.4.1)
 ## - "enable-basic-auth-response": Enable HTTP Basic Auth autofill in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.9.0)
 ## - "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic": Enable the rewritten add/update login notification triggering logic in the browser extension (Browser >= 2026.2.0)
 ## - "biometrics-sdk-ipc": Enable biometric unlock over the SDK IPC framework (Desktop >= 2026.9.0, Browser >= 2026.9.0)
+## - "windows-native-credential-sync": Register the desktop app as a passkey provider in Windows, so passkeys in the vault can be used by other apps and browsers.
+##   Requires the Microsoft Store (appx) build of the desktop app. Stable releases up to and including 2026.9.1 lack the required plugin registration, so it has no effect there yet.
 # EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS=

 ## Require new device emails. When a user logs in an email is required to be sent.
@@ -463,7 +471,7 @@

 ## Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!)
 ## https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Headers/Content-Security-Policy/connect-src
-## Allows other domains to URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
+## Allows other domains for URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
 ## This adds the configured value to the 'Content-Security-Policy' headers 'connect-src' value.
 ## Multiple values must be separated with a whitespace. And only HTTPS values are allowed.
 ## Example: "https://my-addy-io.domain.tld https://my-simplelogin.domain.tld"
@@ -489,6 +497,15 @@
 ## KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING!
 # ORG_GROUPS_ENABLED=false

+## EXPERIMENTAL FEATURE: Custom roles
+## Enables the Custom member role with granular permissions for organizations.
+## This is still being developed: only the permissions this version enforces can be granted.
+## This is enforced by the server and is unrelated to EXPERIMENTAL_CLIENT_FEATURE_FLAGS.
+## Disabling it again keeps the stored Custom roles and permissions, but they grant nothing until it is re-enabled.
+## Disabled by default because this is an experimental feature!
+## KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING!
+# EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES=false
+
 ## Increase secure note size limit (Know the risks!)
 ## Sets the secure note size limit to 100_000 instead of the default 10_000.
 ## WARNING: This could cause issues with clients. Also exports will not work on Bitwarden servers!
@@ -606,6 +623,9 @@
 ## Note that the checkbox would still be present, but ignored.
 # DISABLE_2FA_REMEMBER=false
 ##
+## Number of days before a remembered 2FA login expires (min: 1, max: 90).
+# TWO_FACTOR_REMEMBER_DAYS=30
+##
 ## Authenticator Settings
 ## Disable authenticator time drifted codes to be valid.
 ## TOTP codes of the previous and next 30 seconds will be invalid
@@ -614,7 +634,7 @@
 ## we allow by default the TOTP code which was valid one step back and one in the future.
 ## This can however allow attackers to be a bit more lucky with their attempts because there are 3 valid codes.
 ## You can disable this, so that only the current TOTP Code is allowed.
-## Keep in mind that when a sever drifts out of time, valid codes could be marked as invalid.
+## Keep in mind that when a server drifts out of time, valid codes could be marked as invalid.
 ## In any case, if a code has been used it can not be used again, also codes which predates it will be invalid.
 # AUTHENTICATOR_DISABLE_TIME_DRIFT=false

@@ -4,3 +4,4 @@
 /.github/ISSUE_TEMPLATE/** @dani-garcia @BlackDex
 /.github/workflows/** @dani-garcia @BlackDex
 /SECURITY.md @dani-garcia @BlackDex
+/THREAT_MODEL.md @dani-garcia @BlackDex
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ jobs:

      # Enable Rust Caching
      - name: Rust Caching
-        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@6323deb102c322ba6fcbdcafc7e3dddab59af2b6 # v2.9.2
+        uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@d1527c8f67ef9af357290475d4af4b0fab8f12e0 # v2.9.3
        with:
          # Use a custom prefix-key to force a fresh start. This is sometimes needed with bigger changes.
          # Like changing the build host from Ubuntu 20.04 to 22.04 for example.
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Docker Hub
      - name: Login to Docker Hub
-        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
        with:
          username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
          password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to GitHub Container Registry
      - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
        with:
          registry: ghcr.io
          username: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Quay.io
      - name: Login to Quay.io
-        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
        with:
          registry: quay.io
          username: ${{ secrets.QUAY_USERNAME }}
@@ -185,7 +185,7 @@ jobs:

      - name: Bake ${{ matrix.base_image }} containers
        id: bake_vw
-        uses: docker/bake-action@018cb6412ab401ebaa809aa5f85966b74628600f # v7.4.0
+        uses: docker/bake-action@59cb1203cd42bcefd40a1b6d73b589e48c86040e # v7.5.0
        env:
          BASE_TAGS: "${{ steps.determine-version.outputs.BASE_TAGS }}"
          SOURCE_COMMIT: "${{ env.SOURCE_COMMIT }}"
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ jobs:
          touch "${RUNNER_TEMP}/digests/${digest#sha256:}"

      - name: Upload digest
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
        with:
          name: digests-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}-${{ matrix.base_image }}
          path: ${{ runner.temp }}/digests/*
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ jobs:
          subject-path: vaultwarden-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}

      - name: Upload binaries as artifacts
-        uses: actions/upload-artifact@043fb46d1a93c77aae656e7c1c64a875d1fc6a0a # v7.0.1
+        uses: actions/upload-artifact@cf430e030ddbb5b0abf93d22962f4752f3646cd9 # v7.0.2
        with:
          name: vaultwarden-${{ env.SOURCE_VERSION }}-linux-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}-${{ matrix.base_image }}
          path: vaultwarden-${{ env.NORMALIZED_ARCH }}
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ jobs:

    steps:
      - name: Download digests
-        uses: actions/download-artifact@3e5f45b2cfb9172054b4087a40e8e0b5a5461e7c # v8.0.1
+        uses: actions/download-artifact@9000827ccba6bdab643e8b6fd33ac0654aef8333 # v8.0.2
        with:
          path: ${{ runner.temp }}/digests
          pattern: digests-*-${{ matrix.base_image }}
@@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Docker Hub
      - name: Login to Docker Hub
-        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
        with:
          username: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_USERNAME }}
          password: ${{ secrets.DOCKERHUB_TOKEN }}
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to GitHub Container Registry
      - name: Login to GitHub Container Registry
-        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
        with:
          registry: ghcr.io
          username: ${{ github.repository_owner }}
@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ jobs:

      # Login to Quay.io
      - name: Login to Quay.io
-        uses: docker/login-action@dbcb813823bdd20940b903addbd779551569679f # v4.6.0
+        uses: docker/login-action@81c6f93d4bc991e510b342a00b419b3bb4efc5c6 # v4.7.0
        with:
          registry: quay.io
          username: ${{ secrets.QUAY_USERNAME }}
@@ -50,6 +50,6 @@ jobs:
          severity: CRITICAL,HIGH

      - name: Upload Trivy scan results to GitHub Security tab
-        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@2892aa5e19bbd11bc0cff5427e3b750a04d9e3c2 # v4.38.2
+        uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@9b3254085494b55a0f7c4c2b3d2d52cc712ce370 # v4.39.1
        with:
          sarif_file: 'trivy-results.sarif'
@@ -23,4 +23,4 @@ jobs:

      # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.pre-commit-config.yaml` too
      - name: Spell Check Repo
-        uses: crate-ci/typos@00f422f3b19c57bc6338715ebfe3316d38768461 # v1.50.3
+        uses: crate-ci/typos@7f9d0819ca1c008ade73f4b41fa9d258d48f605b # v1.51.1
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ jobs:
          persist-credentials: false

      - name: Run zizmor
-        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@cc914d7f3750a2d13d75c7f184a1060aa0e9d482 # v0.6.4
+        uses: zizmorcore/zizmor-action@53290badfa369cb0bf7ad16342cb62c2fa47ac7b # v0.8.0
        with:
          # intentionally not scanning the entire repository,
          # since it contains integration tests.
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ repos:

  # When this version is updated, do not forget to update this in `.github/workflows/typos.yaml` too
  - repo: https://github.com/crate-ci/typos
-    rev: 00f422f3b19c57bc6338715ebfe3316d38768461 # v1.50.3
+    rev: 7f9d0819ca1c008ade73f4b41fa9d258d48f605b # v1.51.1
    hooks:
      - id: typos
        always_run: true
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ syslog = "7.0.0"
 macros = { path = "./macros" }

 # Logging
-log = "0.4.34"
+log = "0.4.35"
 fern = { version = "0.7.1", features = ["syslog-7", "reopen-1"] }
 # We need the `log` feature for `tracing` to enable logging for several crates to work, like lettre or webauthn-rs
 tracing = { version = "0.1.44", features = ["log"] }
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ num-derive = "0.5.1"
 bigdecimal = "0.4.11"

 # Web framework
-rocket = { version = "0.5.1", default-features = false, features = ["json", "tls"] }
+rocket = { version = "0.5.2", default-features = false, features = ["json", "tls"] }
 rocket_ws = { version = "0.1.1" }

 # WebSockets libraries
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ dashmap = "6.2.1"

 # Async futures
 futures = "0.3.34"
-tokio = { version = "1.53.2", features = [
+tokio = { version = "1.54.1", features = [
    "fs",
    "io-util",
    "net",
@@ -100,14 +100,14 @@ tokio = { version = "1.53.2", features = [
    "signal",
    "time",
 ] }
-tokio-util = { version = "0.7.19", features = ["compat"] }
+tokio-util = { version = "0.7.20", features = ["compat"] }

 # A generic serialization/deserialization framework
 serde = { version = "1.0.229", features = ["derive"] }
-serde_json = "1.0.151"
+serde_json = "1.0.154"

 # A safe, extensible ORM and Query builder
-diesel = { version = "2.3.13", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
+diesel = { version = "2.3.14", features = ["chrono", "r2d2", "numeric"] }
 diesel_migrations = "2.3.2"

 derive_more = { version = "2.1.1", features = [
@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ libsqlite3-sys = { version = "0.38.2", optional = true }
 # Crypto-related libraries
 rand = "0.10.3"
 ring = "0.17.14"
-rustls = { version = "0.23.45", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
+rustls = { version = "0.23.46", features = ["ring", "std"], default-features = false }
 subtle = "2.6.1"

 # UUID generation
-uuid = { version = "1.27.0", features = ["v4"] }
+uuid = { version = "1.29.0", features = ["v4"] }

 # Date and time libraries
 chrono = { version = "0.4.45", default-features = false, features = ["clock", "serde"] }
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ reqwest = { version = "0.13.5", default-features = false, features = [
 hickory-resolver = "0.26.3"

 # Favicon extraction libraries
-html5gum = "0.8.4"
+html5gum = "0.9.0"
 regex = { version = "1.13.1", default-features = false, features = [
    "perf",
    "std",
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ bytes = "1.12.1"
 svg-hush = "0.9.7"

 # Cache function results (Used for version check and favicon fetching)
-cached = { version = "4.0.1", features = ["async"] }
+cached = { version = "4.1.0", features = ["async"] }

 # Used for custom short lived cookie jar during favicon extraction
 cookie = "0.18.2"
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ governor = "0.10.4"
 ipnet = "2.12.2"

 # OIDC for SSO
-openidconnect = { version = "4.0.1", default-features = false }
+openidconnect = { version = "4.1.0", default-features = false }
 moka = { version = "0.12.16", features = ["future"] }

 # Check client versions for specific features.
@@ -257,18 +257,18 @@ rpassword = "7.5.4"
 grass_compiler = { version = "0.13.4", default-features = false }

 # File are accessed through Apache OpenDAL
-opendal = { version = "0.59.4", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
-opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.4", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }
+opendal = { version = "0.59.5", default-features = false, features = ["services-fs"] }
+opendal-http-transport-reqwest = { version = "0.59.5", default-features = false, features = ["rustls-no-provider"], optional = true }

 # For retrieving AWS credentials, including temporary SSO credentials
-aws-config = { version = "1.12.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
+aws-config = { version = "1.13.0", optional = true, default-features = false, features = [
    "behavior-version-latest",
    "credentials-process",
    "rt-tokio",
    "sso",
 ] }
-aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.0", optional = true }
-aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.19.0", optional = true }
+aws-credential-types = { version = "1.3.1", optional = true }
+aws-smithy-runtime-api = { version = "1.19.2", optional = true }
 http = { version = "1.5.0", optional = true }
 reqsign-aws-v4 = { version = "3.3.1", optional = true }
 reqsign-core = { version = "3.3.2", optional = true }
@@ -1,49 +1,38 @@
-Vaultwarden tries to prevent security issues but there could always slip something through.
-If you believe you've found a security issue in our application, we encourage you to
-notify us. We welcome working with you to resolve the issue promptly. Thanks in advance!
+Vaultwarden tries to prevent security issues, but something could always slip through. If you believe you've found a security issue in our application, we encourage you to notify us. We welcome working with you to resolve the issue promptly. Thanks in advance!

-# Disclosure Policy
+# Scope

- Let us know as soon as possible upon discovery of a potential security issue, and we'll make every
-  effort to quickly resolve the issue.
- Provide us a reasonable amount of time to resolve the issue before any disclosure to the public or a
-  third-party. We may publicly disclose the issue before resolving it, if appropriate.
- Make a good faith effort to avoid privacy violations, destruction of data, and interruption or
-  degradation of our service. Only interact with accounts you own or with explicit permission of the
-  account holder.
+Security issues in the current release of Vaultwarden and in the `main` branch (the `testing` image) are in scope. Our [threat model](THREAT_MODEL.md) describes who is trusted with what, what is out of scope, and how we rate severity. Please read it before reporting.

-# In-scope
+# How to report a security issue

- Security issues in any current release of Vaultwarden. Source code is available at https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden. This includes the current `latest` release and `main / testing` release.
+- Let us know as soon as possible upon discovery of a potential security issue, and we'll make every effort to quickly resolve the issue.
+- Provide us a reasonable amount of time to resolve the issue before any disclosure to the public or a third party. We may publicly disclose the issue before resolving it, if appropriate.
+- Credit goes on the advisory and needs a GitHub account or email address. Reports of an issue whose fix is already public, from the moment its pull request is opened, are normally not credited.
+- Vaultwarden is an open source project and does not offer rewards.

-# Exclusions
-
-The following bug classes are out-of scope:
-
- Bugs that are already reported on Vaultwarden's issue tracker (https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues)
- Bugs that are not part of Vaultwarden, like on the web-vault or mobile and desktop clients. These issues need to be reported in the respective project issue tracker at https://github.com/bitwarden to which we are not associated
- Issues in an upstream software dependency (ex: Rust, or External Libraries) which are already reported to the upstream maintainer
- Attacks requiring physical access to a user's device
- Issues related to software or protocols not under Vaultwarden's control
- Vulnerabilities in outdated versions of Vaultwarden
- Missing security best practices that do not directly lead to a vulnerability (You may still report them as a normal issue)
- Issues that do not have any impact on the general public
+Vaultwarden has no hosted service. Test only on instances you run yourself, and make a good-faith effort to avoid privacy violations, destruction of data, and interruption or degradation of other people's servers. Only interact with accounts you own or with the explicit permission of the account holder.

 While researching, we'd like to ask you to refrain from:

- Denial of service
- Spamming
- Social engineering (including phishing) of Vaultwarden developers, contributors or users
+- Denial of service against servers you do not run. You can still report availability issues you reproduce on your own instance.
+- Spamming.
+- Social engineering (including phishing) of Vaultwarden developers, contributors or users.

-Thank you for helping keep Vaultwarden and our users safe!
+A good report covers one root cause and states the version or commit you tested, the lowest privileges needed, what the attacker gains, any non-default settings, the steps to reproduce it, and whether you ran them or only read the code.
+
+If you use AI tools, you remain responsible for what you send. Reproduce the issue on your own instance before reporting it, check its scope and severity against our threat model rather than the tool's assessment, and include the requests, responses or logs that show it.

 # How to contact us

- You can contact us on Matrix https://matrix.to/#/#vaultwarden:matrix.org (users: `@danig:matrix.org` and/or `@blackdex:matrix.org`)
+- You can open a [private vulnerability report](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/security/advisories/new) on GitHub.
 - You can send an ![security-contact](/.github/security-contact.gif) to report a security issue.<br>
-  If you want to send an encrypted email you can use the following GPG key: 13BB3A34C9E380258CE43D595CB150B31F6426BC<br>
+  If you want to send an encrypted email, you can use the following GPG key: `13BB3A34C9E380258CE43D595CB150B31F6426BC`<br>
  It can be found on several public GPG key servers.<br>
-    * https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=security%40vaultwarden.org
-    * https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=security%40vaultwarden.org
-    * https://pgpkeys.eu/pks/lookup?search=security%40vaultwarden.org&fingerprint=on&op=index
-    * https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?search=security%40vaultwarden.org&fingerprint=on&op=index
+    - https://keys.openpgp.org/search?q=security%40vaultwarden.org
+    - https://keys.mailvelope.com/pks/lookup?op=get&search=security%40vaultwarden.org
+    - https://pgpkeys.eu/pks/lookup?search=security%40vaultwarden.org&fingerprint=on&op=index
+    - https://keyserver.ubuntu.com/pks/lookup?search=security%40vaultwarden.org&fingerprint=on&op=index
+- You can contact us on Matrix for questions, without vulnerability details: https://matrix.to/#/#vaultwarden:matrix.org (users: `@danig:matrix.org` and/or `@blackdex:matrix.org`).
+
+Thank you for helping keep Vaultwarden and our users safe!
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
+# Vaultwarden threat model
+
+To report a security issue, see [SECURITY.md](SECURITY.md).
+
+## Overview
+
+Vaultwarden is an unofficial, self-hosted server for the Bitwarden clients, written in Rust. It stores encrypted vaults, handles login, two-factor authentication, organizations, file and text sharing through Send, and emergency access, and provides an admin panel for the operator. It is not affiliated with Bitwarden. The browser, desktop, mobile and CLI clients come from Bitwarden. Our container images include a web vault built from Bitwarden's web client with our own patches.
+
+## Security expectations
+
+### Deployment
+
+We expect a TLS-terminating reverse proxy in front of the server, `DOMAIN` set to its public URL, and an operator who keeps the host secure. This model covers Vaultwarden itself. Third-party software that consumes its output or sits in front of it, such as log parsers and reverse proxies, is the operator's to configure and secure.
+
+### Encryption
+
+Clients encrypt vault contents end to end. The server stores and serves ciphertext it cannot decrypt, and it never sees the master password. The server enforces access to data and actions itself, without relying on a client to behave. A few settings rely on the client for part of their effect, listed under [Out of scope](#out-of-scope).
+
+A member receives the organization key when they are confirmed. Invited and accepted members do not have it. A revoked member who was once confirmed may still have it. Every confirmed member holds the same key for the whole organization, so only the server separates collections.
+
+The server can read everything that is not end-to-end encrypted, such as user, group, device and organization names, email addresses, who owns what, item types and timestamps, attachment sizes, password hints, the stored master password hash and KDF settings, the TOTP and other 2FA secrets that protect login to the account, API keys, refresh tokens, security stamps, the JWT signing key, and SMTP and push credentials. TOTP secrets that users store in vault items are end-to-end encrypted with the rest of the item.
+
+Someone who controls the server can also serve a modified web vault, so end-to-end encryption does not protect web vault users from them.
+
+### Trust
+
+Registration is open by default (`SIGNUPS_ALLOWED=true`), but many personal and small-team instances turn it off, so holding an account usually implies a minimal level of trust. Account holders are still never trusted with anyone else's data. Members of an organization have some trust in each other.
+
+| Actor | Can reach | Must not reach |
+|---|---|---|
+| Anonymous internet | Login, prelogin, registration, public Send access, icons, the anonymous notifications hub, static files | Any vault, organization or member data; Sends they have no link to; the admin panel; the internal network through outbound requests |
+| Websites and icon sources | The icon fetcher, through any response, redirect or DNS answer; the server, through cross-site requests from a visitor's browser | The internal network through outbound requests; script on the vault origin; acting through a visitor's session |
+| Registered user | Their own vault, Sends, devices and settings; organizations they belong to | Another user's data; any other organization; raising their own role or status |
+| Invited or accepted member | Accepting the invitation, enrolling in account recovery, and the organization's name, public key and policies | Items, collections, the member list, the organization key, any other privileged action before confirmation |
+| Revoked member | Nothing in that organization | Any organization data from the server, even data they could once read |
+| Organization User | Items in assigned collections, with `read_only` and `manage` enforced by the server | Other collections, write access to read-only collections, Admin-level metadata |
+| Organization Manager (a legacy role, shown as Custom in clients) | The above, plus managing collections where they have `manage`. With "Manage all collections" (`access_all`), every collection and full member and group details | Without `access_all`: managing other collections, full member and group details. Always: changing policies or roles |
+| Organization Admin | All data in that organization, members below Owner (some actions on Managers and Admins are limited to Owners), policies, events, account recovery for enrolled members below Owner | Owners, other organizations, the personal vault of a member who is not enrolled in recovery, the organization API key |
+| Organization Owner | The whole organization, including account recovery for enrolled members | Other organizations, the personal vault of a member who is not enrolled in recovery |
+| Organization API key holder (Owner-issued) | Directory import into its own organization | Other organizations, item content, Owners |
+| Send recipient | One Send, within its limits | Other Sends, access beyond the configured limits, the owner's vault |
+| Emergency access grantee | After approval or the wait time: the access the grantor configured, which can be full takeover by design | Anything before that, or more than the access the grantor configured |
+| Admin panel (`ADMIN_TOKEN`) | All users, organizations and settings | No limit once authenticated |
+| Host operator, database and data folder access | Everything | No limit |
+| Services the operator configures (SSO provider, SMTP server, push relay, S3 endpoint, Yubico) | What they need for their function | Vault contents |
+
+### Configuration
+
+Optional features that operators turn on, other than experimental and beta ones, carry the same expectations as the defaults, such as SSO, organization events, anything needing SMTP (email 2FA, invitations), push, S3 storage, the admin panel, and the MySQL and PostgreSQL backends.
+
+Some settings remove a protection on purpose, and using them is the operator's choice: `DISABLE_ADMIN_TOKEN`, a plain-text `ADMIN_TOKEN`, `IP_HEADER_TRUSTED_PROXIES=all` on a directly exposed instance, turning off `HTTP_REQUEST_BLOCK_NON_GLOBAL_IPS`, `SSO_DEBUG_TOKENS`, `SSO_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_EMAIL_VERIFICATION`, `SSO_PKCE=false`, `SHOW_PASSWORD_HINT`, `SMTP_SECURITY=off`, `SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_CERTS`, `SMTP_ACCEPT_INVALID_HOSTNAMES`, `SMTP_DEBUG`, `ALLOWED_IFRAME_ANCESTORS`, `ALLOWED_CONNECT_SRC`, and `LOG_LEVEL` set to `debug` or `trace`. Issues that need one of them are out of scope.
+
+### Upstream Bitwarden
+
+Where this document does not cover a behavior, we follow upstream Bitwarden by default.
+
+## Out of scope
+
+These are intended behavior or outside this model. Several match upstream Bitwarden.
+
+- What an admin token holder or the host operator can do, including running code on the server. We expect them to have admin access to the machine.
+- Organization Owners and Admins reading all organization data, and account recovery of enrolled members.
+- Organization Managers listing basic member details, such as names and emails. Upstream allows this for all members.
+- Settings the client applies: `hide_passwords` ("hidden passwords" in the clients), master password reprompt, and organization policies on values the server never sees, such as master password complexity and password generator rules. The client already holds the data.
+- Bugs in Bitwarden's client code, including in the web vault we bundle, such as CSV formula injection (exports are built in the browser) or a client failing on a malformed stored value. The advisory and CVE for those belong to Bitwarden. Report them through [Bitwarden's HackerOne program](https://hackerone.com/bitwarden/). When the bundled web vault is affected, we ship a security release that references theirs. Bugs that our own web vault patches add are ours.
+- The server not decrypting or authenticating ciphertext. It holds no key.
+- `/identity/accounts/prelogin` and `/identity/accounts/prelogin/password` returning KDF settings for any email, with deterministic fake settings for unknown ones.
+- Login timing not being equalized.
+- Probing whether an icon is already cached. Setting `ICON_SERVICE` to an external service avoids it.
+- Download link replay: an attachment token or Send access token being reusable by its holder until it expires (1 and 2 minutes), and object storage presigned URLs that we cannot count or revoke. The holder already has the content.
+- Short-lived tokens that stay valid after an authorization change elsewhere until they expire, such as an organization API token (1 hour) after its key is rotated. This includes connections the notifications WebSocket accepted before the change, which stay open and carry change notifications and device login requests, not vault data.
+- The access token in the notifications WebSocket's `access_token` query parameter, which reverse proxies may log. Clients send it that way, and our [hardening guide](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Hardening-Guide#access-logs-contain-access_token-parameter) covers redacting it.
+- The personal API key skipping 2FA, and working after a password change until the user rotates it. It is a separate credential.
+- A revoked or removed member's login session staying valid. It belongs to their own account, and the server checks membership on every request.
+- A revoked or removed member keeping what their client already synced, and the organization key not being rotated when a member leaves.
+- Unauthenticated requests to `/api/devices/identifier/<id>/clear-token`. The impact is delayed push delivery.
+- Limits we leave out or keep simple by design: no cap on the number of items a user stores, no cleanup of attachments reserved but never uploaded, and rate limits kept in memory per process and IP, which reset on restart and are shared by users behind one address.
+- Log injection. It only affects software that parses our logs, such as Fail2Ban with our community wiki's filters.
+- Attacks that need a misconfigured reverse proxy, such as one not sending `X-Forwarded-Proto` (it decides the admin cookie's `Secure` flag).
+- Attacks that need another component to break its own specification, such as a NAT64 translator that forwards the `64:ff9b::/96` prefix to private addresses, against RFC 6052.
+- Outbound requests to the SSO provider, Yubico server or S3 endpoint the operator configures, which skip the outbound filter and can be on the internal network.
+- File permissions in the data folder. Host security belongs to the operator.
+- Attacks that need physical access to a user's device.
+- Self-exploitation, where someone can only affect their own account, such as self-XSS or weak KDF settings they choose.
+- Text that users choose showing up in emails or pages, such as an organization, user or device name, as long as it can't cause XSS or modify the page.
+- Dependency and base image CVEs without a path reachable through Vaultwarden.
+- Packages, images and deployment templates that we don't publish. Report those to their maintainers.
+- Missing best practices with no demonstrated impact, such as security headers, `style-src 'unsafe-inline'` (the web vault needs it) or version disclosure, and design recommendations without a concrete issue.
+- Bugs already reported on our [issue tracker](https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/issues).
+- Experimental and beta features. They are opt-in and outside this model until they are stable.
+- Issues that only affect outdated versions.
+
+## Severity
+
+We rate issues by what the attacker ends up with, such as decrypted data, ciphertext, or the power to change or delete data, and by the access they needed first. An attack that needs no account usually rates higher than one that does. Our ratings can differ from CVSS 3.1, which doesn't translate well to an end-to-end encrypted system. Older advisories may be rated differently.
+
+Denial of service and resource exhaustion only count if they still apply with a reverse proxy in front. Races, denial of service and resource exhaustion are never rated above Medium.
+
+Secrets written to logs at the default log level are rated by what they give someone who can read the logs but not the host.
+
+### Critical
+
+- Reading another account's data decrypted, with or without an account, such as through script on the vault origin or exposed key material.
+- Code execution on the server by anyone other than an admin token holder.
+- Changing released builds or images, including through our CI workflows or their secrets.
+- Anyone other than the named grantee reaching an emergency access outcome.
+- With no account: forging login or admin tokens, reading the JWT signing key, reaching the admin panel without the token, or taking over accounts with no action by the victim.
+
+### High
+
+- Decrypted reads within the same organization, such as a member reaching collections they are not assigned to.
+- Changing or deleting another user's or organization's existing data.
+- Reading another user's server-held secrets, such as their 2FA secrets, API keys, stored master password hash or encrypted user key.
+- SSRF that returns the response to the attacker.
+- Escalating within an organization.
+- Account takeover through SSO.
+- The named emergency access grantee reaching the outcome early.
+- Script or a cross-site request acting through an admin panel session.
+- Script on the vault origin that needs unusual victim interaction.
+
+### Medium
+
+- Ciphertext read by someone with no key.
+- Defeating login brute-force protection.
+- 2FA bypass that needs the password, such as a remembered device still skipping 2FA after the method is removed.
+- A refresh token still working after a password change or "Deauthorize sessions".
+- Getting past an organization policy the server enforces.
+- Adding data to another user's or organization's space without permission.
+- Data loss for another user or organization that the attacker cannot reliably trigger or aim.
+- SSRF where the response is filtered or blind.
+- Reading a Send that is disabled or expired.
+- Denial of service that lasts until someone restarts the server or repairs data, from one request with no account in the default configuration.
+
+### Low
+
+These may be handled as ordinary hardening.
+
+- Behavior that differs from upstream Bitwarden with low impact.
+- Bypassing a non-default limit, such as `USER_ATTACHMENT_LIMIT`.
+- Metadata across a boundary, such as who is assigned to which collection.
+- Exceeding a Send's access limits when the attacker already holds the link.
+- A missing rate limit outside login.
+- Forging organization audit events.
+- Other ways to tell whether an email has an account.
+- Denial of service that lasts until someone acts, from one operation that needs an account or a non-default setting.
+- Denial of service that lasts only while the attacker keeps going or that recovers by itself, such as a crash the container restarts from.
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 ---
-vault_version: "v2026.8.0"
-vault_image_digest: "sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a"
-# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.9.0
+vault_version: "v2026.10.1"
+vault_image_digest: "sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52"
+# Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts v1.10.0
 # We use the linux/amd64 platform shell scripts since there is no difference between the different platform scripts
 # https://github.com/tonistiigi/xx | https://hub.docker.com/r/tonistiigi/xx/tags
-xx_image_digest: "sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707"
+xx_image_digest: "sha256:40fe21f44bb8cddf1eb1226db190d0a984118f62ee02a91b77d99448d28264a6"
 # The `rust_version` variable is extracted from `rust-toolchain.toml`
 # rust_version: x.yy.z # Rust version to be used
 debian_version: trixie # Debian release name to be used
@@ -19,23 +19,23 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52 AS vault

 ########################## ALPINE BUILD IMAGES ##########################
 ## NOTE: The Alpine Base Images do not support other platforms then linux/amd64 and linux/arm64
 ## And for Alpine we define all build images here, they will only be loaded when actually used
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.99.0 AS build_amd64
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.99.0 AS build_arm64
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.99.0 AS build_armv7
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.99.0 AS build_armv6
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:x86_64-musl-stable-1.99.1 AS build_amd64
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:aarch64-musl-stable-1.99.1 AS build_arm64
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:armv7-musleabihf-stable-1.99.1 AS build_armv7
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM ghcr.io/blackdex/rust-musl:arm-musleabi-stable-1.99.1 AS build_armv6

 ########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
 # hadolint ignore=DL3006
@@ -19,24 +19,24 @@
 # - From https://hub.docker.com/r/vaultwarden/web-vault/tags,
 #   click the tag name to view the digest of the image it currently points to.
 # - From the command line:
-#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a]
+#     $ docker pull docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoDigests}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52]
 #
 # - Conversely, to get the tag name from the digest:
-#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a
-#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.8.0]
+#     $ docker image inspect --format "{{.RepoTags}}" docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52
+#     [docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault:v2026.10.1]
 #
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:632375471c7c06a799335cd74dfeaef63f92f45f9cd322c337ae7ad70081e48a AS vault
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/vaultwarden/web-vault@sha256:7baaa7d5349742548b6c44e557c1512157b22010cdf314ccc399ffdcacb5eb52 AS vault

 ########################## Cross Compile Docker Helper Scripts ##########################
 ## We use the linux/amd64 no matter which Build Platform, since these are all bash scripts
 ## And these bash scripts do not have any significant difference if at all
-FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:c64defb9ed5a91eacb37f96ccc3d4cd72521c4bd18d5442905b95e2226b0e707 AS xx
+FROM --platform=linux/amd64 docker.io/tonistiigi/xx@sha256:40fe21f44bb8cddf1eb1226db190d0a984118f62ee02a91b77d99448d28264a6 AS xx

 ########################## BUILD IMAGE ##########################
 # hadolint ignore=DL3006
-FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.99.0-slim-trixie AS build
+FROM --platform=$BUILDPLATFORM docker.io/library/rust:1.99.1-slim-trixie AS build
 # hadolint ignore=DL3067
 COPY --from=xx / /
 ARG TARGETARCH
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ Some unsupported platforms for Debian based images. These are not built and test
 - 386     (linux/386)
 - ppc64le (linux/ppc64le)
 - s390x   (linux/s390x)
+- riscv64 (linux/riscv64)

 To build these containers you need to enable QEMU binfmt support to be able to run/emulate architectures which are different then your host.<br>
 This ensures the container build process can run binaries from other architectures.<br>
@@ -148,6 +148,12 @@ target "debian-s390x" {
  platforms = ["linux/s390x"]
  tags = generate_tags("", "-s390x")
 }
+
+target "debian-riscv64" {
+  inherits = ["debian"]
+  platforms = ["linux/riscv64"]
+  tags = generate_tags("", "-riscv64")
+}
 // ==== End of unsupported Debian architecture targets ===

 // A Group to build all platforms individually for local testing
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ proc-macro = true

 [dependencies]
 quote = "1.0.47"
-syn = "3.0.6"
+syn = "3.0.9"

 [lints]
 workspace = true
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+-- Dropping the permissions would silently take them away from the Custom members, who would also keep a role (4) the
+-- versions before this one don't know. So while there are any, this fails on the duplicate key below, before anything
+-- is dropped: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade.
+-- A failed attempt leaves the temporary table on this connection. Clear it before retrying.
+DROP TEMPORARY TABLE IF EXISTS custom_role_downgrade;
+CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
+INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
+INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
+    SELECT 'Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
+    FROM users_organizations WHERE atype = 4 LIMIT 1;
+DROP TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
+
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations
+    DROP COLUMN manage_users,
+    DROP COLUMN manage_groups,
+    DROP COLUMN manage_policies,
+    DROP COLUMN create_new_collections,
+    DROP COLUMN edit_any_collection,
+    DROP COLUMN delete_any_collection,
+    DROP COLUMN access_event_logs,
+    DROP COLUMN access_import_export,
+    DROP COLUMN access_reports;
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-- The granular permissions of the Custom member role. They only take effect on a Custom membership
+-- (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and every existing membership starts without any.
+-- A single statement, so an interrupted upgrade cannot leave only some of the columns behind.
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations
+    ADD COLUMN manage_users BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN manage_groups BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN manage_policies BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN create_new_collections BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN edit_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN delete_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN access_event_logs BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN access_import_export BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN access_reports BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+-- Dropping the permissions would silently take them away from the Custom members, who would also keep a role (4) the
+-- versions before this one don't know. So while there are any, this fails on the duplicate key below: change their
+-- role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade. It needs to run in one transaction, as Diesel does.
+CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
+INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
+INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
+    SELECT 'Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
+    FROM users_organizations WHERE atype = 4 LIMIT 1;
+DROP TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
+
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations
+    DROP COLUMN manage_users,
+    DROP COLUMN manage_groups,
+    DROP COLUMN manage_policies,
+    DROP COLUMN create_new_collections,
+    DROP COLUMN edit_any_collection,
+    DROP COLUMN delete_any_collection,
+    DROP COLUMN access_event_logs,
+    DROP COLUMN access_import_export,
+    DROP COLUMN access_reports;
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+-- The granular permissions of the Custom member role. They only take effect on a Custom membership
+-- (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and every existing membership starts without any.
+-- A single statement, so an interrupted upgrade cannot leave only some of the columns behind.
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations
+    ADD COLUMN manage_users BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN manage_groups BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN manage_policies BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN create_new_collections BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN edit_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN delete_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN access_event_logs BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN access_import_export BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE,
+    ADD COLUMN access_reports BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT FALSE;
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+-- Dropping the permissions would silently take them away from the Custom members, who would also keep a role (4) the
+-- versions before this one don't know. So while there are any, this fails on the duplicate key below: change their
+-- role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade. It needs to run in one transaction, as Diesel does.
+CREATE TEMPORARY TABLE custom_role_downgrade (blocked_by VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL PRIMARY KEY);
+INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade VALUES ('Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade');
+INSERT INTO custom_role_downgrade
+    SELECT 'Custom members: change their role first, or restore the backup taken before the upgrade'
+    FROM users_organizations WHERE atype = 4 LIMIT 1;
+DROP TABLE custom_role_downgrade;
+
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_users;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_groups;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN manage_policies;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN create_new_collections;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN edit_any_collection;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN delete_any_collection;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN access_event_logs;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN access_import_export;
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations DROP COLUMN access_reports;
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+-- The granular permissions of the Custom member role. They only take effect on a Custom membership
+-- (atype 4) while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled, and every existing membership starts without any.
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_users BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_groups BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN manage_policies BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN create_new_collections BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN edit_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN delete_any_collection BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN access_event_logs BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN access_import_export BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
+ALTER TABLE users_organizations ADD COLUMN access_reports BOOLEAN NOT NULL DEFAULT 0; -- FALSE
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 [toolchain]
-channel = "1.99.0"
+channel = "1.99.1"
 components = [ "rustfmt", "clippy" ]
 profile = "minimal"
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use std::{env, sync::LazyLock};
+use std::{collections::HashMap, env, sync::LazyLock};

 use reqwest::Method;
 use rocket::{
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ use crate::{
    api::{
        ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify,
        core::{log_event, two_factor},
-        unregister_push_device,
+        push_logout_to_relay, unregister_push_device,
    },
    auth::{ClientIp, Secure, decode_admin, encode_jwt, generate_admin_claims},
    config::ConfigBuilder,
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ use crate::{
        models::{
            Attachment, Cipher, Collection, Device, Event, EventType, Group, Invitation, Membership, MembershipId,
            MembershipType, OrgPolicy, Organization, OrganizationId, SsoUser, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
+            custom_roles_enabled,
        },
    },
    error::{Error, MapResult},
@@ -201,12 +202,15 @@ fn post_admin_login(
    // If the token is invalid, redirect to login page
    if validate_token(&data.token) {
        // If the token received is valid, generate JWT and save it as a cookie
-        let claims = generate_admin_claims();
+        let claims = match generate_admin_claims() {
+            Ok(claims) => claims,
+            Err(e) => return Err(AdminResponse::Ok(render_admin_login(Some(e.message()), redirect.as_deref()))),
+        };
        let jwt = encode_jwt(&claims);

        let cookie = Cookie::build((COOKIE_NAME, jwt))
            .path(admin_path())
-            .max_age(time::Duration::minutes(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime()))
+            .max_age(time::Duration::minutes(i64::from(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime())))
            .same_site(SameSite::Strict)
            .http_only(true)
            .secure(secure.https);
@@ -253,6 +257,7 @@ struct AdminTemplateData {
    logged_in: bool,
    urlpath: String,
    sso_enabled: bool,
+    custom_roles_enabled: bool,
 }

 impl AdminTemplateData {
@@ -263,6 +268,7 @@ impl AdminTemplateData {
            logged_in: true,
            urlpath: CONFIG.domain_path(),
            sso_enabled: CONFIG.sso_enabled(),
+            custom_roles_enabled: custom_roles_enabled(),
        }
    }

@@ -387,6 +393,18 @@ async fn users_overview(_token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> ApiResult<Html<Stri

        usr["sso_identifier"] = json!(sso_u.map_or(String::new(), |u| u.identifier.to_string()));

+        // The clients are shown a Manager as a Custom member, but the admin panel tells the two roles apart
+        let roles: HashMap<String, i32> = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(&u.uuid, &conn)
+            .await
+            .into_iter()
+            .map(|member| (member.org_uuid.to_string(), member.atype))
+            .collect();
+        for org in usr["organizations"].as_array_mut().into_iter().flatten() {
+            if let Some(atype) = org["id"].as_str().and_then(|org_id| roles.get(org_id)) {
+                org["type"] = json!(atype);
+            }
+        }
+
        users_json.push(usr);
    }

@@ -416,13 +434,21 @@ async fn get_user_json(user_id: UserId, _token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> Jso
 }

 #[post("/users/<user_id>/delete", format = "application/json")]
-async fn delete_user(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+async fn delete_user(user_id: UserId, token: AdminToken, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult {
    let user = get_user_or_404(&user_id, &conn).await?;

-    // Get the membership records before deleting the actual user
+    // Get the membership records and push devices before deleting the actual user
    let memberships = Membership::find_any_state_by_user(&user_id, &conn).await;
+    let has_push_device = CONFIG.push_enabled() && Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user_id, &conn).await;
    let res = user.delete(&conn).await;

+    if res.is_ok() {
+        nt.send_logout(&user, None, &conn).await;
+        if has_push_device {
+            push_logout_to_relay(&user, None);
+        }
+    }
+
    for membership in memberships {
        log_event(
            EventType::OrganizationUserDeleted,
@@ -554,10 +580,14 @@ async fn update_membership_type(data: Json<MembershipTypeData>, token: AdminToke
        err!("The specified user isn't member of the organization")
    };

-    let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = MembershipType::from_str(&data.user_type.into_string()) {
-        new_type as i32
-    } else {
-        err!("Invalid type")
+    let new_type = match MembershipType::from_str(&data.user_type.into_string()) {
+        // Unlike the clients, the admin panel tells the Custom and the legacy Manager role apart. Unless Custom roles
+        // are enabled, a Custom role is a Manager here as well, but an existing Custom member is kept as one.
+        Some(MembershipType::Custom) if !custom_roles_enabled() && !member_to_edit.has_type(MembershipType::Custom) => {
+            MembershipType::Manager
+        }
+        Some(new_type) => new_type,
+        None => err!("Invalid type"),
    };

    if member_to_edit.atype == MembershipType::Owner && new_type != MembershipType::Owner {
@@ -567,7 +597,14 @@ async fn update_membership_type(data: Json<MembershipTypeData>, token: AdminToke
        }
    }

-    member_to_edit.atype = new_type;
+    // A Manager only becomes a Custom member if that changes nothing they may do
+    if new_type == MembershipType::Custom
+        && let Some(loss) = member_to_edit.custom_role_conversion_loss(&conn).await
+    {
+        err!(loss)
+    }
+
+    member_to_edit.set_type(new_type);
    // This check is also done at api::organizations::{accept_invite, _confirm_invite, _activate_member, edit_member}, update_membership_type
    OrgPolicy::check_user_allowed(&member_to_edit, "modify", &conn).await?;

@@ -779,6 +816,8 @@ async fn diagnostics(_token: AdminToken, ip_header: IpHeader, conn: DbConn) -> A
    .into_keys()
    .collect();

+    let invalid_env_vars = crate::util::INVALID_ENV_VARS.lock().unwrap().join(", ");
+
    let diagnostics_json = json!({
        "dns_resolved": dns_resolved,
        "current_release": VERSION,
@@ -801,7 +840,9 @@ async fn diagnostics(_token: AdminToken, ip_header: IpHeader, conn: DbConn) -> A
        "db_version": get_sql_server_version(&conn).await,
        "admin_url": format!("{}/diagnostics", admin_url()),
        "overrides": &CONFIG.get_overrides().join(", "),
+        "config_file_status": &CONFIG.get_config_file_status(),
        "template_overrides": check_template_overrides().join(", "),
+        "invalid_env_vars": invalid_env_vars,
        "invalid_feature_flags": invalid_feature_flags,
        "host_arch": env::consts::ARCH,
        "host_os":  env::consts::OS,
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use crate::{
    api::{
        AnonymousNotify, ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType,
        core::{accept_org_invite, log_user_event, two_factor::email},
-        master_password_policy, register_push_device, unregister_push_device,
+        master_password_policy, push_logout_to_relay, register_push_device, unregister_push_device,
    },
    auth::{ClientHeaders, ClientIp, Headers, decode_delete, decode_invite, decode_verify_email},
    crypto,
@@ -1148,7 +1148,11 @@ async fn post_email_token(data: Json<EmailTokenData>, headers: Headers, conn: Db
            error!("Error sending change-email email: {e:#?}");
        }
    } else {
-        debug!("Email change request for user ({}) to email ({}) with token ({token})", user.uuid, data.new_email);
+        debug!(
+            "Email change request for user ({}) to email ({}) with token ({token})",
+            user.uuid,
+            data.new_email.escape_debug()
+        );
    }

    user.email_new = Some(data.new_email);
@@ -1301,7 +1305,7 @@ struct DeleteRecoverTokenData {
 }

 #[post("/accounts/delete-recover-token", data = "<data>")]
-async fn post_delete_recover_token(data: Json<DeleteRecoverTokenData>, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+async fn post_delete_recover_token(data: Json<DeleteRecoverTokenData>, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult {
    let data: DeleteRecoverTokenData = data.into_inner();

    let Ok(claims) = decode_delete(&data.token) else {
@@ -1315,22 +1319,44 @@ async fn post_delete_recover_token(data: Json<DeleteRecoverTokenData>, conn: DbC
    if claims.sub != *user.uuid {
        err!("Invalid claim");
    }
-    user.delete(&conn).await
+
+    // The devices are deleted together with the user, so check for push devices beforehand
+    let has_push_device = CONFIG.push_enabled() && Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, &conn).await;
+    user.delete(&conn).await?;
+
+    nt.send_logout(&user, None, &conn).await;
+    if has_push_device {
+        push_logout_to_relay(&user, None);
+    }
+    Ok(())
 }

 #[post("/accounts/delete", data = "<data>")]
-async fn post_delete_account(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-    delete_account(data, headers, conn).await
+async fn post_delete_account(
+    data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>,
+    headers: Headers,
+    conn: DbConn,
+    nt: Notify<'_>,
+) -> EmptyResult {
+    delete_account(data, headers, conn, nt).await
 }

 #[delete("/accounts", data = "<data>")]
-async fn delete_account(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+async fn delete_account(data: Json<PasswordOrOtpData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn, nt: Notify<'_>) -> EmptyResult {
    let data: PasswordOrOtpData = data.into_inner();
    let user = headers.user;

    data.validate(&user, true, &conn).await?;

-    user.delete(&conn).await
+    // The devices are deleted together with the user, so check for push devices beforehand
+    let has_push_device = CONFIG.push_enabled() && Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, &conn).await;
+    user.delete(&conn).await?;
+
+    nt.send_logout(&user, None, &conn).await;
+    if has_push_device {
+        push_logout_to_relay(&user, None);
+    }
+    Ok(())
 }

 #[expect(clippy::needless_pass_by_value, reason = "Not beneficial for Headers")]
@@ -1381,7 +1407,7 @@ async fn password_hint(data: Json<PasswordHintData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn)
                mail::send_password_hint(email, hint).await?;
                Ok(())
            } else if let Some(hint) = hint {
-                err!(format!("Your password hint is: {hint}"));
+                err_silent!(format!("Your password hint is: {hint}"));
            } else {
                err!(NO_HINT);
            }
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ use serde_json::Value;

 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
-    api::{self, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType, core::log_event},
+    api::{self, ApiResult, EmptyResult, JsonResult, Notify, PasswordOrOtpData, UpdateType, core::log_event},
    auth::ClientVersion,
    auth::{Headers, OrgIdGuard, OwnerHeaders},
    config::PathType,
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ use crate::{
        models::{
            Archive, Attachment, AttachmentId, Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup,
            CollectionId, CollectionUser, EventType, Favorite, Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId, Group, KeyId,
-            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, UserId,
+            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, OrganizationId, RepromptType, Send, User, UserId,
        },
    },
    util::{NumberOrString, deser_opt_nonempty_str, save_temp_file},
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
    {
        match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(&dt, "%+") {
            // ISO 8601 format
-            Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing LastKnownRevisionDate '{dt}': {err}"),
+            Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing LastKnownRevisionDate '{}': {err}", dt.escape_debug()),
            Ok(dt) if cipher.updated_at.signed_duration_since(dt).num_seconds() > 1 => {
                err!("The client copy of this cipher is out of date. Resync the client and try again.")
            }
@@ -521,7 +521,7 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
                // A missing attachment means it was removed via an other client.
                // Also the Desktop Client supports removing attachments and save an update afterwards.
                // Bitwarden it self ignores these mismatches server side.
-                warn!("Attachment {id} doesn't exist");
+                warn!("Attachment {} doesn't exist", id.escape_debug());
                continue;
            };

@@ -580,7 +580,7 @@ pub async fn update_cipher_from_data(
    match data.archived_date {
        Some(dt_str) => match NaiveDateTime::parse_from_str(&dt_str, "%+") {
            Ok(dt) => cipher.set_archived_at(dt, &headers.user.uuid, conn).await?,
-            Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing ArchivedDate '{dt_str}': {err}"),
+            Err(err) => warn!("Error parsing ArchivedDate '{}': {err}", dt_str.escape_debug()),
        },
        None => cipher.unarchive(&headers.user.uuid, conn).await?,
    }
@@ -666,6 +666,9 @@ async fn post_ciphers_import(data: Json<ImportData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbC
    for (index, mut cipher_data) in data.ciphers.into_iter().enumerate() {
        let folder_id = relations_map.get(&index).and_then(|i| folders.get(*i).cloned());
        cipher_data.folder_id = folder_id;
+        // A personal import always creates personal ciphers, the organization ID is ignored instead of rejected
+        // Upstream: https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/b06b81c1fb33ce9c9872b96397ba2b4d879b66af/src/Api/Tools/Controllers/ImportCiphersController.cs#L58
+        cipher_data.organization_id = None;

        let mut cipher = Cipher::new(cipher_data.r#type, cipher_data.name.clone());
        update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, cipher_data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::None).await?;
@@ -687,6 +690,11 @@ async fn put_cipher_admin(
    conn: DbConn,
    nt: Notify<'_>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
+    // Only organization ciphers can be edited here, put_cipher() rejects an organization ID that isn't the cipher's
+    if data.organization_id.is_none() {
+        err_code!("Resource not found.", "Cipher is not an organization cipher", Status::NotFound.code);
+    }
+
    put_cipher(cipher_id, data, headers, conn, nt).await
 }

@@ -698,7 +706,7 @@ async fn post_cipher_admin(
    conn: DbConn,
    nt: Notify<'_>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
-    post_cipher(cipher_id, data, headers, conn, nt).await
+    put_cipher_admin(cipher_id, data, headers, conn, nt).await
 }

 #[post("/ciphers/<cipher_id>", data = "<data>")]
@@ -735,6 +743,11 @@ async fn put_cipher(
        err!("Cipher is not write accessible")
    }

+    // Moving a cipher into an organization is only possible through the share endpoints
+    if cipher.organization_uuid != data.organization_id {
+        err!("Organization mismatch. Please resync the client before updating the cipher")
+    }
+
    update_cipher_from_data(&mut cipher, data, &headers, None, &conn, &nt, UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate).await?;

    Ok(Json(cipher.to_json(&headers.host, &headers.user.uuid, None, CipherSyncType::User, &conn).await?))
@@ -993,9 +1006,7 @@ async fn post_cipher_share(
    conn: DbConn,
    nt: Notify<'_>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
-    let data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();
-
-    share_cipher_by_uuid(&cipher_id, data, &headers, &conn, &nt, None).await
+    put_cipher_share(cipher_id, data, headers, conn, nt).await
 }

 #[put("/ciphers/<cipher_id>/share", data = "<data>")]
@@ -1008,6 +1019,14 @@ async fn put_cipher_share(
 ) -> JsonResult {
    let data: ShareCipherData = data.into_inner();

+    if data.cipher.organization_id.is_none() {
+        err!("Cipher OrganizationId is required.")
+    }
+
+    if data.collection_ids.is_empty() {
+        err!("You must select at least one collection.")
+    }
+
    share_cipher_by_uuid(&cipher_id, data, &headers, &conn, &nt, None).await
 }

@@ -1018,14 +1037,53 @@ struct ShareSelectedCipherData {
    collection_ids: Vec<CollectionId>,
 }

+// A bulk share returns cipherMini models, not the cipherDetails models used by
+// the single-share route. Keep the encrypted legacy fields and a future v2
+// `data` blob, but do not expose details-only fields in this response.
+fn cipher_mini_from_json(mut cipher: Value) -> Value {
+    const FIELDS: &[&str] = &[
+        "id",
+        "organizationId",
+        "type",
+        "data",
+        "partialData",
+        "name",
+        "notes",
+        "login",
+        "card",
+        "identity",
+        "secureNote",
+        "sshKey",
+        "bankAccount",
+        "driversLicense",
+        "passport",
+        "fields",
+        "passwordHistory",
+        "attachments",
+        "organizationUseTotp",
+        "revisionDate",
+        "creationDate",
+        "deletedDate",
+        "reprompt",
+        "key",
+    ];
+
+    let Some(object) = cipher.as_object_mut() else {
+        return json!({ "object": "cipherMini" });
+    };
+    object.retain(|field, _| FIELDS.contains(&field.as_str()));
+    object.insert("object".into(), "cipherMini".into());
+    cipher
+}
+
 #[put("/ciphers/share", data = "<data>")]
 async fn put_cipher_share_selected(
    data: Json<ShareSelectedCipherData>,
    headers: Headers,
    conn: DbConn,
    nt: Notify<'_>,
-) -> EmptyResult {
-    let mut data: ShareSelectedCipherData = data.into_inner();
+) -> JsonResult {
+    let data: ShareSelectedCipherData = data.into_inner();

    if data.ciphers.is_empty() {
        err!("You must select at least one cipher.")
@@ -1039,25 +1097,43 @@ async fn put_cipher_share_selected(
        if cipher.id.is_none() {
            err!("Request missing ids field")
        }
+        if cipher.organization_id.is_none() {
+            err!("Cipher OrganizationId is required.")
+        }
    }

-    while let Some(cipher) = data.ciphers.pop() {
+    let mut responses = Vec::with_capacity(data.ciphers.len());
+    for cipher in data.ciphers {
        let mut shared_cipher_data = ShareCipherData {
            cipher,
            collection_ids: data.collection_ids.clone(),
        };

        if let Some(id) = shared_cipher_data.cipher.id.take() {
-            share_cipher_by_uuid(&id, shared_cipher_data, &headers, &conn, &nt, Some(UpdateType::None)).await?
+            let response =
+                share_cipher_by_uuid(&id, shared_cipher_data, &headers, &conn, &nt, Some(UpdateType::None)).await?;
+
+            // Like upstream's VisibleToClient, withhold a cipher if sharing it
+            // removed the user's access to it. Only then include its encrypted
+            // mini response; the full single-share response stays internal.
+            if let Some(shared_cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(&id, &conn).await
+                && shared_cipher.is_accessible_to_user(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
+            {
+                responses.push(cipher_mini_from_json(response.into_inner()));
+            }
        } else {
            err!("Request missing ids field")
-        };
+        }
    }

    // Multi share actions do not send out a push for each cipher, we need to send a general sync here
    nt.send_user_update(UpdateType::SyncCiphers, &headers.user, headers.device.push_uuid.as_ref(), &conn).await;

-    Ok(())
+    Ok(Json(json!({
+        "data": responses,
+        "object": "list",
+        "continuationToken": null,
+    })))
 }

 async fn share_cipher_by_uuid(
@@ -1160,6 +1236,40 @@ enum FileUploadType {
    // Azure = 1, // only used upstream
 }

+/// Remaining attachment storage in bytes for the cipher's owner, `None` when unlimited.
+/// `size_adjust` credits a v2 attachment whose record already counts as used.
+async fn attachment_size_limit(cipher: &Cipher, size_adjust: i64, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<Option<i64>> {
+    let (limit_kb, already_used) = if let Some(ref user_id) = cipher.user_uuid {
+        let Some(limit_kb) = CONFIG.user_attachment_limit() else {
+            return Ok(None);
+        };
+        (limit_kb, Attachment::size_by_user(user_id, conn).await)
+    } else if let Some(ref org_id) = cipher.organization_uuid {
+        let Some(limit_kb) = CONFIG.org_attachment_limit() else {
+            return Ok(None);
+        };
+        (limit_kb, Attachment::size_by_org(org_id, conn).await)
+    } else {
+        err!("Cipher is neither owned by a user nor an organization");
+    };
+
+    if limit_kb == 0 {
+        err!("Attachments are disabled")
+    }
+
+    let Some(left) =
+        limit_kb.checked_mul(1024).and_then(|l| l.checked_sub(already_used)).and_then(|l| l.checked_add(size_adjust))
+    else {
+        err!("Attachment size overflow");
+    };
+
+    if left <= 0 {
+        err!("Attachment storage limit reached! Delete some attachments to free up space")
+    }
+
+    Ok(Some(left))
+}
+
 /// v2 API for creating an attachment associated with a cipher.
 /// This redirects the client to the API it should use to upload the attachment.
 /// For upstream's cloud-hosted service, it's an Azure object storage API.
@@ -1170,6 +1280,7 @@ async fn post_attachment_v2(
    data: Json<AttachmentRequestData>,
    headers: Headers,
    conn: DbConn,
+    nt: Notify<'_>,
 ) -> JsonResult {
    let Some(cipher) = Cipher::find_by_uuid(&cipher_id, &conn).await else {
        err!("Cipher doesn't exist")
@@ -1189,10 +1300,18 @@ async fn post_attachment_v2(
    if file_size > SIZE_525_MB {
        err!("Max file size is 525 MB.")
    }
+
+    if let Some(size_limit) = attachment_size_limit(&cipher, 0, &conn).await?
+        && file_size > size_limit
+    {
+        err!("Attachment storage limit exceeded with this file");
+    }
+
    let attachment_id = crypto::generate_attachment_id();
    let attachment =
        Attachment::new(attachment_id.clone(), cipher.uuid.clone(), data.file_name, file_size, Some(data.key));
    attachment.save(&conn).await.expect("Error saving attachment");
+    notify_attachment_created(&cipher, &headers, &conn, &nt).await;

    let url = format!("/ciphers/{}/attachment/{attachment_id}", cipher.uuid);
    let response_key = match data.admin_request {
@@ -1255,55 +1374,7 @@ async fn save_attachment(
        Some(a) => a.file_size, // v2 API
    };

-    let size_limit = if let Some(ref user_id) = cipher.user_uuid {
-        match CONFIG.user_attachment_limit() {
-            Some(0) => err!("Attachments are disabled"),
-            Some(limit_kb) => {
-                let already_used = Attachment::size_by_user(user_id, &conn).await;
-                let left = limit_kb
-                    .checked_mul(1024)
-                    .and_then(|l| l.checked_sub(already_used))
-                    .and_then(|l| l.checked_add(size_adjust));
-
-                let Some(left) = left else {
-                    err!("Attachment size overflow");
-                };
-
-                if left <= 0 {
-                    err!("Attachment storage limit reached! Delete some attachments to free up space")
-                }
-
-                Some(left)
-            }
-            None => None,
-        }
-    } else if let Some(ref org_id) = cipher.organization_uuid {
-        match CONFIG.org_attachment_limit() {
-            Some(0) => err!("Attachments are disabled"),
-            Some(limit_kb) => {
-                let already_used = Attachment::size_by_org(org_id, &conn).await;
-                let left = limit_kb
-                    .checked_mul(1024)
-                    .and_then(|l| l.checked_sub(already_used))
-                    .and_then(|l| l.checked_add(size_adjust));
-
-                let Some(left) = left else {
-                    err!("Attachment size overflow");
-                };
-
-                if left <= 0 {
-                    err!("Attachment storage limit reached! Delete some attachments to free up space")
-                }
-
-                Some(left)
-            }
-            None => None,
-        }
-    } else {
-        err!("Cipher is neither owned by a user nor an organization");
-    };
-
-    if let Some(size_limit) = size_limit
+    if let Some(size_limit) = attachment_size_limit(&cipher, size_adjust, &conn).await?
        && size > size_limit
    {
        err!("Attachment storage limit exceeded with this file");
@@ -1360,13 +1431,23 @@ async fn save_attachment(

    save_temp_file(&PathType::Attachments, &format!("{cipher_id}/{file_id}"), data.data, true).await?;

+    // With the v2 API, post_attachment_v2() already did this when it created the attachment record
+    if attachment.is_none() {
+        notify_attachment_created(&cipher, headers, &conn, &nt).await;
+    }
+
+    Ok((cipher, conn))
+}
+
+/// Sends the cipher update to the clients and logs the attachment event
+async fn notify_attachment_created(cipher: &Cipher, headers: &Headers, conn: &DbConn, nt: &Notify<'_>) {
    nt.send_cipher_update(
        UpdateType::SyncCipherUpdate,
-        &cipher,
-        &cipher.update_users_revision(&conn).await,
+        cipher,
+        &cipher.update_users_revision(conn).await,
        &headers.device,
        None,
-        &conn,
+        conn,
    )
    .await;

@@ -1378,12 +1459,10 @@ async fn save_attachment(
            &headers.user.uuid,
            headers.device.atype,
            &headers.ip.ip,
-            &conn,
+            conn,
        )
        .await;
    }
-
-    Ok((cipher, conn))
 }

 /// v2 API for uploading the actual data content of an attachment.
@@ -1659,12 +1738,22 @@ async fn move_cipher_selected(
    // Find all ciphers a user has access to, all others will be ignored
    let accessible_ciphers = Cipher::find_by_user_and_ciphers(user_id, &data.ids, &conn).await;
    let accessible_ciphers_count = accessible_ciphers.len();
+    let mut move_result = Ok(());
    for cipher in accessible_ciphers {
-        cipher.move_to_folder(data.folder_id.clone(), user_id, &conn).await?;
+        move_result = cipher.move_to_folder_without_revision_update(data.folder_id.clone(), user_id, &conn).await;
+        if move_result.is_err() {
+            break;
+        }
        if cipher_count == 1 {
            single_cipher = Some(cipher);
        }
    }
+    // Update the revision once for the whole batch. Also when a move failed halfway,
+    // since the ciphers moved before it are already changed.
+    if accessible_ciphers_count > 0 {
+        User::update_uuid_revision(user_id, &conn).await;
+    }
+    move_result?;

    if let Some(cipher) = single_cipher {
        nt.send_cipher_update(
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use chrono::{TimeDelta, Utc};
+use chrono::Utc;
 use rocket::{Route, serde::json::Json};
 use serde_json::Value;

@@ -15,8 +15,8 @@ use crate::{
    db::{
        DbConn, DbPool,
        models::{
-            Cipher, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType, Invitation,
-            Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
+            Cipher, EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus,
+            EmergencyAccessType, Invitation, Membership, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
        },
    },
    mail,
@@ -136,19 +136,21 @@ async fn post_emergency_access(

    let data: EmergencyAccessUpdateData = data.into_inner();

+    let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) else {
+        err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
+    };
+
+    if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&data.wait_time_days) {
+        err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
+    }
+
    let Some(mut emergency_access) =
        EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantor_uuid(&emer_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
    else {
        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
    };

-    let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) {
-        new_type as i32
-    } else {
-        err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
-    };
-
-    emergency_access.atype = new_type;
+    emergency_access.atype = new_type as i32;
    emergency_access.wait_time_days = data.wait_time_days;
    if data.key_encrypted.is_some() {
        emergency_access.key_encrypted = data.key_encrypted;
@@ -210,11 +212,11 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
    let email = data.email.to_lowercase();
    let wait_time_days = data.wait_time_days;

-    let emergency_access_status = EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32;
+    if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&wait_time_days) {
+        err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
+    }

-    let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) {
-        new_type as i32
-    } else {
+    let Some(new_type) = EmergencyAccessType::from_str(&data.r#type.into_string()) else {
        err!("Invalid emergency access type.")
    };

@@ -260,6 +262,8 @@ async fn send_invite(data: Json<EmergencyAccessInviteData>, headers: Headers, co
        err!(format!("Grantee user already invited: {}", &grantee_user.email))
    }

+    let new_type = new_type as i32;
+    let emergency_access_status = EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32;
    let mut new_emergency_access =
        EmergencyAccess::new(grantor_user.uuid, grantee_user.email, emergency_access_status, new_type, wait_time_days);
    new_emergency_access.save(&conn).await?;
@@ -292,7 +296,7 @@ async fn resend_invite(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers, conn: DbCon
    };

    if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::Invited as i32 {
-        err!("The grantee user is already accepted or confirmed to the organization");
+        err!("The grantee user is already accepted or confirmed for emergency access");
    }

    let Some(email) = emergency_access.email.clone() else {
@@ -453,11 +457,24 @@ async fn initiate_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
    let Some(mut emergency_access) =
        EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantee_uuid(&emer_id, &initiating_user.uuid, &conn).await
    else {
-        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
+        err!(
+            "Emergency access not valid.",
+            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not found for user '{}'.", initiating_user.email)
+        )
    };

    if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::Confirmed as i32 {
-        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
+        err!(
+            "Emergency access not valid.",
+            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not confirmed for user '{}'.", initiating_user.email)
+        )
+    }
+
+    if !EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE.contains(&emergency_access.wait_time_days) {
+        err!(
+            "Emergency access not valid.",
+            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}' timeout range '{}' is invalid", emergency_access.wait_time_days)
+        )
    }

    let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emergency_access.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
@@ -490,11 +507,17 @@ async fn approve_emergency_access(emer_id: EmergencyAccessId, headers: Headers,
    let Some(mut emergency_access) =
        EmergencyAccess::find_by_uuid_and_grantor_uuid(&emer_id, &headers.user.uuid, &conn).await
    else {
-        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
+        err!(
+            "Emergency access not valid.",
+            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not found for user '{}'.", headers.user.email)
+        )
    };

    if emergency_access.status != EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryInitiated as i32 {
-        err!("Emergency access not valid.")
+        err!(
+            "Emergency access not valid.",
+            format!("Emergency access '{emer_id}', not initiated for user '{}'.", headers.user.email)
+        )
    }

    let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&headers.user.uuid, &conn).await else {
@@ -747,52 +770,71 @@ pub async fn emergency_request_timeout_job(pool: DbPool) {
        return;
    }

-    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
-        let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;
+    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
+        error!("Failed to get DB connection for emergency time-outs!");
+        return;
+    };

-        if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
-            debug!("No emergency request timeout to approve");
-        }
+    let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;

-        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-        for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
-            // The find_all_recoveries_initiated already checks if the recovery_initiated_at is not null (None)
-            let recovery_allowed_at =
-                emer.recovery_initiated_at.unwrap() + TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(emer.wait_time_days)).unwrap();
-            if recovery_allowed_at.le(&now) {
-                // Only update the access status
-                // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_notification_reminder_job is also active
-                emer.update_access_status_and_save(EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryApproved as i32, &now, &conn)
-                    .await
-                    .expect("Unable to update emergency access status");
+    if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
+        debug!("No emergency request timeout to approve");
+        return;
+    }

-                if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
-                    // get grantor user to send Accepted email
-                    let grantor_user =
-                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await.expect("Grantor user not found");
-
-                    // get grantee user to send Accepted email
-                    let grantee_user =
-                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantee_uuid.clone().expect("Grantee user invalid"), &conn)
-                            .await
-                            .expect("Grantee user not found");
-
-                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_timed_out(
-                        &grantor_user.email,
-                        &grantee_user.name,
-                        emer.get_type_as_str(),
-                    )
-                    .await
-                    .expect("Error on sending email");
-
-                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_approved(&grantee_user.email, &grantor_user.name)
-                        .await
-                        .expect("Error on sending email");
-                }
+    let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+    for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
+        match emer.is_recovery_allowed(&now) {
+            Ok(true) => {} // Recovery is allowed
+            Ok(false) => continue,
+            Err(e) => {
+                error!("Failed to check if recovery is allowed for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
+                continue;
+            }
+        }
+
+        // Get grantor user to send Accepted email
+        let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
+            error!("Grantor user '{}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.grantor_uuid, emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        let Some(grantee_uuid) = emer.grantee_uuid.as_ref() else {
+            error!("Missing grantee for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        // Get grantee user to send Accepted email
+        let Some(grantee_user) = User::find_by_uuid(grantee_uuid, &conn).await else {
+            error!("Grantee user '{grantee_uuid}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        // Only update the access status
+        // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_notification_reminder_job is also active
+        let status_initiated = EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryInitiated as i32;
+        let status_approved = EmergencyAccessStatus::RecoveryApproved as i32;
+        if let Err(e) = emer.update_access_status_and_save(status_initiated, status_approved, &now, &conn).await {
+            error!("Unable to update emergency access status for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+            if let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_timed_out(
+                &grantor_user.email,
+                &grantee_user.name,
+                emer.get_type_as_str(),
+            )
+            .await
+            {
+                error!("Failed to send emergency access recovery time-out email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
+            }
+
+            if let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_approved(&grantee_user.email, &grantor_user.name).await
+            {
+                error!("Failed to send emergency access recovery approved email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
            }
        }
-    } else {
-        error!("Failed to get DB connection while searching emergency request timed out");
    }
 }

@@ -802,55 +844,85 @@ pub async fn emergency_notification_reminder_job(pool: DbPool) {
        return;
    }

-    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
-        let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;
+    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
+        error!("Failed to get DB connection for emergency reminders!");
+        return;
+    };

-        if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
-            debug!("No emergency request reminder notification to send");
+    let emergency_access_list = EmergencyAccess::find_all_recoveries_initiated(&conn).await;
+
+    if emergency_access_list.is_empty() {
+        debug!("No emergency request reminder notification to send");
+        return;
+    }
+
+    let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+    for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
+        let Ok(deadline_at) = emer.deadline_at() else {
+            error!("Invalid deadline for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        let Some(final_reminder_at) = deadline_at.checked_sub_days(chrono::Days::new(1)) else {
+            error!("Cannot calculate reminder date for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        // Only send reminders during the last 24 hours, else continue
+        if now < final_reminder_at || now >= deadline_at {
+            continue;
        }

-        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-        for mut emer in emergency_access_list {
-            // The find_all_recoveries_initiated already checks if the recovery_initiated_at is not null (None)
-            // Calculate the day before the recovery will become active
-            let final_recovery_reminder_at =
-                emer.recovery_initiated_at.unwrap() + TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(emer.wait_time_days - 1)).unwrap();
-            // Calculate if a day has passed since the previous notification, else no notification has been sent before
-            let next_recovery_reminder_at = if let Some(last_notification_at) = emer.last_notification_at {
-                last_notification_at + TimeDelta::try_days(1).unwrap()
-            } else {
-                now
-            };
-            if final_recovery_reminder_at.le(&now) && next_recovery_reminder_at.le(&now) {
-                // Only update the last notification date
-                // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_request_timeout_job is also active
-                emer.update_last_notification_date_and_save(&now, &conn)
-                    .await
-                    .expect("Unable to update emergency access notification date");
+        // Check if we did not sent a recovery mail in the past 24h already, else skip it.
+        // In case something goes wrong with the date calculation or `last_notification_at` is None we use now.
+        // This is to prevent possible missed reminders, this might cause an extra reminder,
+        // but that is better then no reminder at all.
+        let next_reminder_at = if let Some(last_notification_at) = emer.last_notification_at {
+            last_notification_at.checked_add_days(chrono::Days::new(1)).unwrap_or(now)
+        } else {
+            now
+        };

-                if CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
-                    // get grantor user to send Accepted email
-                    let grantor_user =
-                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await.expect("Grantor user not found");
-
-                    // get grantee user to send Accepted email
-                    let grantee_user =
-                        User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantee_uuid.clone().expect("Grantee user invalid"), &conn)
-                            .await
-                            .expect("Grantee user not found");
-
-                    mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_reminder(
-                        &grantor_user.email,
-                        &grantee_user.name,
-                        emer.get_type_as_str(),
-                        "1", // This notification is only triggered one day before the activation
-                    )
-                    .await
-                    .expect("Error on sending email");
-                }
-            }
+        // Only send a reminder if the `next_reminder_at` is less then or equal to `now`
+        // Else we can skip the current emergency access this run.
+        if next_reminder_at.gt(&now) {
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        // Get grantor user to send Reminder email
+        let Some(grantor_user) = User::find_by_uuid(&emer.grantor_uuid, &conn).await else {
+            error!("Grantor user '{}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.grantor_uuid, emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        let Some(grantee_uuid) = emer.grantee_uuid.as_ref() else {
+            error!("Missing grantee for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        // Get grantee user to send Reminder email
+        let Some(grantee_user) = User::find_by_uuid(grantee_uuid, &conn).await else {
+            error!("Grantee user '{grantee_uuid}' not found for emergency access '{}'", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
+
+        // Only update the last notification date
+        // Updating the whole record could cause issues when the emergency_request_timeout_job is also active
+        if let Err(e) = emer.update_last_notification_date_and_save(&now, &conn).await {
+            error!("Unable to update emergency access reminder date for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if CONFIG.mail_enabled()
+            && let Err(e) = mail::send_emergency_access_recovery_reminder(
+                &grantor_user.email,
+                &grantee_user.name,
+                emer.get_type_as_str(),
+                "1", // This notification is only triggered one day before the activation
+            )
+            .await
+        {
+            error!("Failed to send emergency access reminder email for '{}': {e}", emer.uuid);
        }
-    } else {
-        error!("Failed to get DB connection while searching emergency notification reminder");
    }
 }
@@ -214,8 +214,8 @@ async fn post_events_collect(data: Json<Vec<EventCollection>>, headers: Headers,
                    .await;
                }
            }
-            // Client-side cipher events (viewed, copied, toggled, autofilled).
-            1107..=1114 | 1117 | 1119..=1132 => {
+            // Client-side cipher events (viewed, copied, toggled, autofilled, HTTP auth).
+            1107..=1114 | 1117 | 1119..=1133 => {
                // The cipher determines the organization the event is logged to, so make sure the
                // user can actually access it instead of trusting the provided cipher uuid.
                if let Some(cipher_uuid) = &event.cipher_id
@@ -347,14 +347,17 @@ async fn log_event_impl(

 pub async fn event_cleanup_job(pool: DbPool) {
    debug!("Start events cleanup job");
-    if CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_none() {
-        debug!("events_days_retain is not configured, abort");
+    if CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_none_or(|d| d == 0) {
+        debug!("events_days_retain is not configured or set to 0, skipping");
        return;
    }

-    if let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await {
-        Event::clean_events(&conn).await.ok();
-    } else {
+    let Ok(conn) = pool.get().await else {
        error!("Failed to get DB connection while trying to cleanup the events table");
+        return;
+    };
+
+    if let Err(e) = Event::clean_events(&conn).await {
+        error!("Failed to cleanup the events table: {e}");
    }
 }
@@ -247,6 +247,7 @@ fn config() -> Json<Value> {
          "notifications": format!("{domain}/notifications"),
          "sso": "",
          "cloudRegion": null,
+          "fillAssistRules": CONFIG.fill_assist_rules_url(),
        },
        // Bitwarden uses this for the self-hosted servers to indicate the default push technology
        "push": {
@@ -15,10 +15,10 @@ use crate::{
    db::{
        DbConn,
        models::{
-            Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup, CollectionId, CollectionUser, Device,
-            EventType, Group, GroupId, GroupUser, Invitation, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus,
-            MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, Organization, OrganizationApiKey, OrganizationId, TwoFactor,
-            TwoFactorType, User, UserId,
+            Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionGroup, CollectionId, CollectionUser,
+            CustomPermission, Device, EventType, FillAssistPolicyData, Group, GroupId, GroupUser, Invitation,
+            Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType, Organization,
+            OrganizationApiKey, OrganizationId, TwoFactor, TwoFactorType, User, UserId, custom_roles_enabled,
        },
    },
    mail,
@@ -131,13 +131,16 @@ impl FullCollectionData {
        let org_groups = Group::find_by_organization(org_id, conn).await;
        let org_group_ids: HashSet<&GroupId> = org_groups.iter().map(|c| &c.uuid).collect();
        if let Some(e) = self.groups.iter().find(|g| !org_group_ids.contains(&g.id)) {
-            err!("Invalid group", format!("Group {} does not belong to organization {}!", e.id, org_id))
+            err!("Invalid group", format!("Group {} does not belong to organization {}!", e.id.escape_debug(), org_id))
        }

        let org_memberships = Membership::find_by_org(org_id, conn).await;
        let org_membership_ids: HashSet<&MembershipId> = org_memberships.iter().map(|m| &m.uuid).collect();
        if let Some(e) = self.users.iter().find(|m| !org_membership_ids.contains(&m.id)) {
-            err!("Invalid member", format!("Member {} does not belong to organization {}!", e.id, org_id))
+            err!(
+                "Invalid member",
+                format!("Member {} does not belong to organization {}!", e.id.escape_debug(), org_id)
+            )
        }

        Ok(())
@@ -552,7 +555,7 @@ async fn post_bulk_access_collections(
    let org_groups = Group::find_by_organization(&org_id, &conn).await;
    let org_group_ids: HashSet<&GroupId> = org_groups.iter().map(|g| &g.uuid).collect();
    if let Some(g) = data.groups.iter().find(|g| !org_group_ids.contains(&g.id)) {
-        err!("Invalid group", format!("Group {} does not belong to organization {}!", g.id, org_id))
+        err!("Invalid group", format!("Group {} does not belong to organization {}!", g.id.escape_debug(), org_id))
    }

    for col_id in data.collection_ids {
@@ -975,13 +978,16 @@ impl InviteData {
        let org_collections = Collection::find_by_organization(org_id, conn).await;
        let org_collection_ids: HashSet<&CollectionId> = org_collections.iter().map(|c| &c.uuid).collect();
        if let Some(e) = self.collections.iter().flatten().find(|c| !org_collection_ids.contains(&c.id)) {
-            err!("Invalid collection", format!("Collection {} does not belong to organization {}!", e.id, org_id))
+            err!(
+                "Invalid collection",
+                format!("Collection {} does not belong to organization {}!", e.id.escape_debug(), org_id)
+            )
        }

        let org_groups = Group::find_by_organization(org_id, conn).await;
        let org_group_ids: HashSet<&GroupId> = org_groups.iter().map(|c| &c.uuid).collect();
        if let Some(e) = self.groups.iter().find(|g| !org_group_ids.contains(g)) {
-            err!("Invalid group", format!("Group {} does not belong to organization {}!", e, org_id))
+            err!("Invalid group", format!("Group {} does not belong to organization {}!", e.escape_debug(), org_id))
        }

        Ok(())
@@ -1002,14 +1008,12 @@ async fn send_invite(
    data.validate(&org_id, &conn).await?;

    // HACK: We need the raw user-type to be sure custom role is selected to determine the access_all permission
-    // The from_str() will convert the custom role type into a manager role type
+    // Unless Custom roles are enabled, a custom role (4) is converted to a manager role (3)
    let raw_type = &data.r#type.into_string();
-    // Membership::from_str will convert custom (4) to manager (3)
-    let new_type = if let Some(new_type) = MembershipType::from_str(raw_type) {
-        new_type as i32
-    } else {
+    let Some(requested_type) = MembershipType::from_str(raw_type) else {
        err!("Invalid type")
    };
+    let new_type = MembershipType::requested(requested_type, None, custom_roles_enabled());

    if new_type != MembershipType::User && headers.membership_type != MembershipType::Owner {
        err!("Only Owners can invite Managers, Admins or Owners")
@@ -1019,11 +1023,19 @@ async fn send_invite(
    // Since the parent checkbox is not sent to the server we need to check and verify the child checkboxes
    // If the box is not checked, the user will still be a manager, but not with the access_all permission
    let access_all = new_type >= MembershipType::Admin
-        || (raw_type.eq("4")
+        || (new_type == MembershipType::Manager
+            && raw_type.eq("4")
            && data.permissions.get("editAnyCollection") == Some(&json!(true))
            && data.permissions.get("deleteAnyCollection") == Some(&json!(true))
            && data.permissions.get("createNewCollections") == Some(&json!(true)));

+    // Checked before anything is created, so a rejected permission leaves nothing behind
+    let custom_permissions = if new_type == MembershipType::Custom {
+        Some(CustomPermission::requested(&data.permissions)?)
+    } else {
+        None
+    };
+
    let mut user_created: bool;
    for email in &data.emails {
        let mut member_status = MembershipStatus::Invited as i32;
@@ -1065,8 +1077,11 @@ async fn send_invite(
        };

        let mut new_member = Membership::new(user.uuid.clone(), org_id.clone(), Some(headers.user.email.clone()));
+        new_member.set_type(new_type);
        new_member.access_all = access_all;
-        new_member.atype = new_type;
+        if let Some(permissions) = &custom_permissions {
+            new_member.set_custom_permissions(permissions);
+        }
        new_member.status = member_status;
        new_member.save(&conn).await?;

@@ -1156,7 +1171,10 @@ async fn bulk_reinvite_members(
    for member_id in data.ids {
        let err_msg = match reinvite_member_impl(&org_id, &member_id, &headers.user.email, &conn).await {
            Ok(()) => String::new(),
-            Err(e) => format!("{e:?}"),
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!("Unable to reinvite member {}: {e:?}", member_id.escape_debug());
+                e.message().to_owned()
+            }
        };

        bulk_response.push(json!(
@@ -1329,7 +1347,10 @@ async fn bulk_confirm_invite(
                let user_key = invite.key.unwrap_or_default();
                let err_msg = match confirm_invite_impl(&org_id, &member_id, &user_key, &headers, &conn, &nt).await {
                    Ok(()) => String::new(),
-                    Err(e) => format!("{e:?}"),
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        warn!("Unable to confirm member {}: {e:?}", member_id.escape_debug());
+                        e.message().to_owned()
+                    }
                };

                bulk_response.push(json!(
@@ -1496,24 +1517,32 @@ async fn edit_member(
    let data: EditUserData = data.into_inner();

    // HACK: We need the raw user-type to be sure custom role is selected to determine the access_all permission
-    // The from_str() will convert the custom role type into a manager role type
+    // Unless Custom roles are enabled, a custom role (4) is converted to a manager role (3)
    let raw_type = &data.r#type.into_string();
-    // MembershipType::from_str will convert custom (4) to manager (3)
-    let Some(new_type) = MembershipType::from_str(raw_type) else {
+    let Some(requested_type) = MembershipType::from_str(raw_type) else {
        err!("Invalid type")
    };

+    let Some(mut member_to_edit) = Membership::find_by_uuid_and_org(&member_id, &org_id, &conn).await else {
+        err!("The specified user isn't member of the organization")
+    };
+    let new_type = MembershipType::requested(requested_type, Some(&member_to_edit), custom_roles_enabled());
+
    // HACK: This converts the Custom role which has the `Manage all collections` box checked into an access_all flag
    // Since the parent checkbox is not sent to the server we need to check and verify the child checkboxes
    // If the box is not checked, the user will still be a manager, but not with the access_all permission
    let access_all = new_type >= MembershipType::Admin
-        || (raw_type.eq("4")
+        || (new_type == MembershipType::Manager
+            && raw_type.eq("4")
            && data.permissions.get("editAnyCollection") == Some(&json!(true))
            && data.permissions.get("deleteAnyCollection") == Some(&json!(true))
            && data.permissions.get("createNewCollections") == Some(&json!(true)));

-    let Some(mut member_to_edit) = Membership::find_by_uuid_and_org(&member_id, &org_id, &conn).await else {
-        err!("The specified user isn't member of the organization")
+    // While Custom roles are disabled, a Custom member keeps their stored permissions untouched
+    let custom_permissions = if new_type == MembershipType::Custom && custom_roles_enabled() {
+        Some(CustomPermission::requested(&data.permissions)?)
+    } else {
+        None
    };

    if new_type != member_to_edit.atype
@@ -1537,8 +1566,11 @@ async fn edit_member(
        }
    }

+    member_to_edit.set_type(new_type);
    member_to_edit.access_all = access_all;
-    member_to_edit.atype = new_type as i32;
+    if let Some(permissions) = &custom_permissions {
+        member_to_edit.set_custom_permissions(permissions);
+    }

    // This check is also done at accept_invite, _confirm_invite, _activate_member, edit_member, admin::update_membership_type
    // We need to perform the check after changing the type since `admin` is exempt.
@@ -1610,7 +1642,10 @@ async fn bulk_delete_member(
    for member_id in data.ids {
        let err_msg = match delete_member_impl(&org_id, &member_id, &headers, &conn, &nt).await {
            Ok(()) => String::new(),
-            Err(e) => format!("{e:?}"),
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!("Unable to delete member {}: {e:?}", member_id.escape_debug());
+                e.message().to_owned()
+            }
        };

        bulk_response.push(json!(
@@ -2039,6 +2074,29 @@ async fn put_policy(
        err!("Invalid or unsupported policy type")
    };

+    let current_policy = OrgPolicy::find_by_org_and_type(&org_id, pol_type_enum, &conn).await;
+    let is_currently_enabled = current_policy.as_ref().is_some_and(|policy| policy.enabled);
+
+    // Fill Assist depends on Single Organization. Match Bitwarden's dependency checks by only checking when the
+    // policy changes state.
+    if pol_type_enum == OrgPolicyType::FillAssist && data.enabled && !is_currently_enabled {
+        let single_org_policy_enabled =
+            OrgPolicy::find_by_org_and_type(&org_id, OrgPolicyType::SingleOrg, &conn).await.is_some_and(|p| p.enabled);
+
+        if !single_org_policy_enabled {
+            err!("Turn on the Single organization policy because it is required for the Activate fill assist policy.")
+        }
+    }
+
+    if pol_type_enum == OrgPolicyType::SingleOrg && !data.enabled && is_currently_enabled {
+        let fill_assist_policy_enabled =
+            OrgPolicy::find_by_org_and_type(&org_id, OrgPolicyType::FillAssist, &conn).await.is_some_and(|p| p.enabled);
+
+        if fill_assist_policy_enabled {
+            err!("Turn off the Activate fill assist policy because it requires the Single organization policy.")
+        }
+    }
+
    // Bitwarden only allows the Reset Password policy when Single Org policy is enabled
    // Vaultwarden encouraged to use multiple orgs instead of groups because groups were not available in the past
    // Now that groups are available we can enforce this option when wanted.
@@ -2071,6 +2129,37 @@ async fn put_policy(
        }
    }

+    if pol_type_enum == OrgPolicyType::FillAssist {
+        let fill_assist_data = match data.data.as_ref() {
+            None | Some(Value::Null) => FillAssistPolicyData {
+                rules_url: None,
+            },
+            Some(data) => {
+                let Ok(data) = serde_json::from_value::<FillAssistPolicyData>(data.clone()) else {
+                    err!("Invalid data for FillAssist policy: rulesUrl has an invalid value.")
+                };
+                data
+            }
+        };
+
+        if data.enabled {
+            let Some(rules_url) = fill_assist_data.rules_url.filter(|url| !url.trim().is_empty()) else {
+                err!("The RulesUrl field is required.")
+            };
+            let Ok(rules_url) = url::Url::parse(&rules_url) else {
+                err!("The RulesUrl field is not a valid fully-qualified http, https, or ftp URL.")
+            };
+
+            if !rules_url.has_host() || !matches!(rules_url.scheme(), "http" | "https" | "ftp") {
+                err!("The RulesUrl field is not a valid fully-qualified http, https, or ftp URL.")
+            }
+
+            if rules_url.scheme() != "https" {
+                err!("RulesUrl must use HTTPS.")
+            }
+        }
+    }
+
    // When enabling the TwoFactorAuthentication policy, revoke all members that do not have 2FA
    if pol_type_enum == OrgPolicyType::TwoFactorAuthentication && data.enabled {
        two_factor::enforce_2fa_policy_for_org(
@@ -2102,7 +2191,7 @@ async fn put_policy(
                }

                log_event(
-                    EventType::OrganizationUserRemoved,
+                    EventType::OrganizationUserRevokedSingleOrganizationNonCompliance,
                    &member.uuid,
                    &org_id,
                    &headers.user.uuid,
@@ -2118,7 +2207,7 @@ async fn put_policy(
        }
    }

-    let mut policy = match OrgPolicy::find_by_org_and_type(&org_id, pol_type_enum, &conn).await {
+    let mut policy = match current_policy {
        Some(p) => p,
        None => OrgPolicy::new(org_id.clone(), pol_type_enum, false, "{}".to_owned()),
    };
@@ -2222,7 +2311,10 @@ async fn bulk_revoke_members(
            for member_id in members {
                let err_msg = match revoke_member_impl(&org_id, &member_id, &headers, &conn).await {
                    Ok(()) => String::new(),
-                    Err(e) => format!("{e:?}"),
+                    Err(e) => {
+                        warn!("Unable to revoke member {}: {e:?}", member_id.escape_debug());
+                        e.message().to_owned()
+                    }
                };

                bulk_response.push(json!(
@@ -2325,7 +2417,10 @@ async fn bulk_restore_members(
    for member_id in data.ids {
        let err_msg = match restore_member_impl(&org_id, &member_id, &headers, &conn).await {
            Ok(()) => String::new(),
-            Err(e) => format!("{e:?}"),
+            Err(e) => {
+                warn!("Unable to restore member {}: {e:?}", member_id.escape_debug());
+                e.message().to_owned()
+            }
        };

        bulk_response.push(json!(
@@ -2478,13 +2573,16 @@ impl GroupRequest {
        let org_collections = Collection::find_by_organization(org_id, conn).await;
        let org_collection_ids: HashSet<&CollectionId> = org_collections.iter().map(|c| &c.uuid).collect();
        if let Some(e) = self.collections.iter().find(|c| !org_collection_ids.contains(&c.id)) {
-            err!("Invalid collection", format!("Collection {} does not belong to organization {}!", e.id, org_id))
+            err!(
+                "Invalid collection",
+                format!("Collection {} does not belong to organization {}!", e.id.escape_debug(), org_id)
+            )
        }

        let org_memberships = Membership::find_by_org(org_id, conn).await;
        let org_membership_ids: HashSet<&MembershipId> = org_memberships.iter().map(|m| &m.uuid).collect();
        if let Some(e) = self.users.iter().find(|m| !org_membership_ids.contains(m)) {
-            err!("Invalid member", format!("Member {} does not belong to organization {}!", e, org_id))
+            err!("Invalid member", format!("Member {} does not belong to organization {}!", e.escape_debug(), org_id))
        }

        Ok(())
@@ -2838,12 +2936,11 @@ async fn recover_account(
        err!("Organization user must be confirmed for password reset functionality");
    }

-    let fallback_2fa_email =
-        if req.reset_two_factor && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.email_2fa_auto_fallback() && user.verified() {
-            TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await.is_none()
-        } else {
-            false
-        };
+    let fallback_2fa_email = req.reset_two_factor
+        && CONFIG.mail_enabled()
+        && CONFIG.email_2fa_auto_fallback()
+        && user.verified()
+        && TwoFactor::find_by_user_and_type(&user.uuid, TwoFactorType::Email, &conn).await.is_none();

    // Check the new password before the email below, so that a rejected request doesn't tell the user
    // their password was reset
@@ -268,11 +268,12 @@ async fn post_send_file_v2(data: Json<SendData>, headers: Headers, conn: DbConn)
    let file_id = crate::crypto::generate_send_file_id();

    let mut data_value: Value = serde_json::from_str(&send.data)?;
-    if let Some(o) = data_value.as_object_mut() {
-        o.insert(String::from("id"), Value::String(file_id.clone()));
-        o.insert(String::from("size"), Value::Number(file_length.into()));
-        o.insert(String::from("sizeName"), Value::String(crate::util::get_display_size(file_length)));
-    }
+    let Some(o) = data_value.as_object_mut() else {
+        err!("Invalid Send file data")
+    };
+    o.insert(String::from("id"), Value::String(file_id.clone()));
+    o.insert(String::from("size"), Value::Number(file_length.into()));
+    o.insert(String::from("sizeName"), Value::String(crate::util::get_display_size(file_length)));
    send.data = serde_json::to_string(&data_value)?;
    send.save(&conn).await?;

@@ -84,18 +84,26 @@ async fn send_email_login(data: Json<SendEmailLoginData>, client_headers: Client
                )
            }
        } else if let Some(auth_request_id) = auth_request_id {
-            let Some(auth_request) = AuthRequest::find_by_uuid(auth_request_id, &conn).await else {
-                err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "User not found")
-            };
            let Some(code) = &data.auth_request_access_code else {
                err!("no auth request access code")
            };
+            let Some(auth_request) = AuthRequest::find_by_uuid_and_user(auth_request_id, &user.uuid, &conn).await
+            else {
+                err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "Invalid auth request or does not belong to user")
+            };

-            if auth_request.device_type != client_headers.device_type
+            let request_expired = Utc::now().naive_utc() >= auth_request.creation_date + TimeDelta::minutes(5);
+            if !auth_request.approved.unwrap_or(false)
+                || auth_request.authentication_date.is_some()
+                || request_expired
+                || auth_request.device_type != client_headers.device_type
                || auth_request.request_ip != client_headers.ip.ip.to_string()
                || !auth_request.check_access_code(code)
            {
-                err!("AuthRequest doesn't exist", "Invalid device, IP or code")
+                err!(
+                    "AuthRequest doesn't exist",
+                    "Auth request not approved, already used or expired, or invalid device, IP or code"
+                )
            }
        } else if let Some(device_identifier) = &data.device_identifier {
            // iOS/Android SSO logins send the email and device id but no password hash,
@@ -294,7 +302,7 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(

    if !crypto::ct_eq(issued_token, token) {
        email_data.add_attempt();
-        if email_data.attempts >= CONFIG.email_attempts_limit() {
+        if email_data.attempts >= u64::from(CONFIG.email_attempts_limit()) {
            email_data.reset_token();
        }
        twofactor.data = email_data.to_json();
@@ -313,7 +321,7 @@ pub async fn validate_email_code_str(
    twofactor.save(conn).await?;

    let dt = DateTime::from_timestamp(email_data.token_sent, 0).expect("Email token timestamp invalid.").naive_utc();
-    let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time().cast_signed();
+    let max_time = i64::from(CONFIG.email_expiration_time());
    if dt + TimeDelta::try_seconds(max_time).unwrap() < Utc::now().naive_utc() {
        err!(
            "Token has expired",
@@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy(
            member.save(conn).await?;

            log_event(
-                EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked,
+                EventType::OrganizationUserRevokedTwoFactorNonCompliance,
                &member.uuid,
                &member.org_uuid,
                act_user_id,
@@ -185,8 +185,16 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy_for_org(
            member.revoke();
            member.save(conn).await?;

-            log_event(EventType::OrganizationUserRevoked, &member.uuid, org_id, act_user_id, device_type, ip, conn)
-                .await;
+            log_event(
+                EventType::OrganizationUserRevokedTwoFactorNonCompliance,
+                &member.uuid,
+                org_id,
+                act_user_id,
+                device_type,
+                ip,
+                conn,
+            )
+            .await;
        }
    }

@@ -196,7 +204,7 @@ pub async fn enforce_2fa_policy_for_org(
 pub async fn send_incomplete_2fa_notifications(pool: DbPool) {
    debug!("Sending notifications for incomplete 2FA logins");

-    if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() <= 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+    if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() == 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
        return;
    }

@@ -206,11 +214,21 @@ pub async fn send_incomplete_2fa_notifications(pool: DbPool) {
    };

    let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-    let time_limit = TimeDelta::try_minutes(CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit()).unwrap();
-    let time_before = now - time_limit;
+    let Some(time_limit) = TimeDelta::try_minutes(i64::from(CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit())) else {
+        error!("Failed to calculate the time limit for sending incomplete 2fa attempts");
+        return;
+    };
+    let Some(time_before) = now.checked_sub_signed(time_limit) else {
+        error!("Failed to calculate the timestamp for sending incomplete 2fa attempts");
+        return;
+    };
+
    let incomplete_logins = TwoFactorIncomplete::find_logins_before(&time_before, &conn).await;
    for login in incomplete_logins {
-        let user = User::find_by_uuid(&login.user_uuid, &conn).await.expect("User not found");
+        let Some(user) = User::find_by_uuid(&login.user_uuid, &conn).await else {
+            error!("User '{}', not found!", login.user_uuid);
+            continue;
+        };
        info!(
            "User {} did not complete a 2FA login within the configured time limit. IP: {}",
            user.email, login.ip_address
@@ -128,23 +128,24 @@ pub async fn validate_protected_action_otp(
        .await
        .map_res("Protected action token not found, try sending the code again or restart the process")?;
    let mut pa_data = ProtectedActionData::from_json(&pa.data)?;
-    pa_data.add_attempt();
-    pa.data = pa_data.to_json();

    // Fail after x attempts if the token has been used too many times.
    // Don't delete it, as we use it to keep track of attempts.
-    if pa_data.attempts >= CONFIG.email_attempts_limit() {
+    if pa_data.attempts >= u64::from(CONFIG.email_attempts_limit()) {
        err!("Token has expired")
    }

    // Check if the token has expired (Using the email 2fa expiration time)
-    let max_time = CONFIG.email_expiration_time().cast_signed();
+    let max_time = i64::from(CONFIG.email_expiration_time());
    if pa_data.time_since_sent().num_seconds() > max_time {
        pa.delete(conn).await?;
        err!("Token has expired")
    }

    if !crypto::ct_eq(&pa_data.token, otp) {
+        pa_data.add_attempt();
+        pa.data = pa_data.to_json();
+
        pa.save(conn).await?;
        err!("Token is invalid")
    }
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ static CLIENT: LazyLock<Client> = LazyLock::new(|| {
    // Generate the cookie store
    let cookie_store = Arc::new(Jar::default());

-    let icon_download_timeout = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.icon_download_timeout());
+    let icon_download_timeout = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.icon_download_timeout()));
    let pool_idle_timeout = Duration::from_secs(10);
    // Reuse the client between requests
    get_reqwest_client_builder(true)
@@ -193,14 +193,14 @@ async fn get_cached_icon(path: &str) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
    None
 }

-async fn file_is_expired(path: &str, ttl: u64) -> Result<bool, Error> {
+async fn file_is_expired(path: &str, ttl: u32) -> Result<bool, Error> {
    let operator = CONFIG.opendal_operator_for_path_type(&PathType::IconCache)?;
    let meta = operator.stat(path).await?;
    let modified =
        meta.last_modified().ok_or_else(|| std::io::Error::other(format!("No last modified time for `{path}`")))?;
    let age = SystemTime::now().duration_since(modified.into())?;

-    Ok(ttl > 0 && ttl <= age.as_secs())
+    Ok(ttl > 0 && u64::from(ttl) <= age.as_secs())
 }

 async fn icon_is_negcached(path: &str) -> bool {
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ fn get_favicons_node(dom: Tokenizer<StringReader<'_>, FaviconEmitter>, icons: &m
            TAG_BASE => {
                base_url = if let Some(href) = token.tag.attributes.get(ATTR_HREF) {
                    let href = std::str::from_utf8(href).unwrap_or_default();
-                    debug!("Found base href: {href}");
+                    debug!("Found base href: {}", href.escape_debug());
                    match base_url.join(href) {
                        Ok(inner_url) => inner_url,
                        _ => continue,
@@ -524,7 +524,7 @@ async fn download_icon(domain: &str) -> Result<(Bytes, Option<&str>), Error> {
                Ok(())
            }) {
                Ok(_) => {
-                    // Also check if the size is atleast 67 bytes, which seems to be the smallest png i could create
+                    // Also check if the size is at least 67 bytes, which seems to be the smallest png I could create
                    if body.len() >= 67 {
                        // Check if the icon type is allowed, else try an icon from the list.
                        icon_type = get_icon_type(&body);
@@ -663,6 +663,17 @@ impl reqwest::cookie::CookieStore for Jar {
        use time::Duration;

        let mut cookie_store = self.0.write().unwrap();
+
+        // The store only skips expired cookies when reading them, so remove them here or they are kept forever
+        let expired: Vec<_> = cookie_store
+            .iter_any()
+            .filter(|c| c.is_expired())
+            .map(|c| (String::from(&c.domain), String::from(&c.path), c.name().to_owned()))
+            .collect();
+        for (domain, path, name) in expired {
+            cookie_store.remove(&domain, &path, &name);
+        }
+
        let cookies = cookie_headers.filter_map(|val| {
            std::str::from_utf8(val.as_bytes())
                .map_err(RawCookieParseError::from)
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ pub fn routes() -> Vec<Route> {
        post_prelogin,
        prelogin_password,
        register_verification_email,
+        register_verification_email_clicked,
        register_finish,
        prevalidate,
        authorize,
@@ -111,7 +112,7 @@ async fn login(data: Form<ConnectData>, client_header: ClientHeaders, conn: DbCo
            .await?;
            Ok(Json(tokens.to_json()))
        }
-        t => err!("Invalid type", t),
+        t => err!("Invalid type", t.escape_debug().to_string()),
    };

    if let Some(user_id) = user_id {
@@ -447,9 +448,9 @@ async fn password_login(data: ConnectData, user_id: &mut Option<UserId>, conn: &
    if user.verified_at.is_none() && CONFIG.mail_enabled() && CONFIG.signups_verify() {
        if user.last_verifying_at.is_none()
            || now.signed_duration_since(user.last_verifying_at.unwrap()).num_seconds()
-                > CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_time().cast_signed()
+                > i64::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_time())
        {
-            let resend_limit = CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_limit().cast_signed();
+            let resend_limit = i32::from(CONFIG.signups_verify_resend_limit());
            if resend_limit == 0 || user.login_verify_count < resend_limit {
                // We want to send another email verification if we require signups to verify
                // their email address, and we haven't sent them a reminder in a while...
@@ -1034,6 +1035,13 @@ struct RegisterVerificationData {
    // receiveMarketingEmails: bool,
 }

+#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+struct RegisterVerificationEmailClickedData {
+    email: String,
+    email_verification_token: String,
+}
+
 #[derive(rocket::Responder)]
 enum RegisterVerificationResponse {
    #[response(status = 204)]
@@ -1096,6 +1104,25 @@ async fn register_verification_email(
    }
 }

+#[post("/accounts/register/verification-email-clicked", data = "<data>")]
+async fn register_verification_email_clicked(
+    data: Json<RegisterVerificationEmailClickedData>,
+    conn: DbConn,
+) -> EmptyResult {
+    let data = data.into_inner();
+    let token_valid = auth::decode_register_verify(&data.email_verification_token)
+        .is_ok_and(|claims| claims.verified && claims.sub.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&data.email));
+    let user_exists = User::find_by_mail(&data.email, &conn)
+        .await
+        .is_some_and(|user| !user.password_hash.is_empty() || user.private_key.is_some());
+
+    if !token_valid || user_exists {
+        err!("Expired link. Please restart registration or try logging in. You may already have an account")
+    }
+
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 #[post("/accounts/register/finish", data = "<data>")]
 async fn register_finish(data: Json<RegisterData>, ip: ClientIp, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
    crate::ratelimit::check_limit_unauthenticated(&ip.ip)?;
@@ -25,12 +25,12 @@ pub use crate::api::{
    notifications::routes as notifications_routes,
    notifications::{AnonymousNotify, Notify, UpdateType, WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS, WS_USERS},
    push::{
-        push_cipher_update, push_folder_update, push_logout, push_send_update, push_user_update, register_push_device,
-        unregister_push_device,
+        push_cipher_update, push_folder_update, push_logout, push_logout_to_relay, push_send_update, push_user_update,
+        register_push_device, unregister_push_device,
    },
    web::catchers as web_catchers,
    web::routes as web_routes,
-    web::{invalidate_css_cache, static_files},
+    web::{STATIC_FILES, invalidate_css_cache},
 };
 use crate::{
    CONFIG,
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@ fn websockets_hub<'r>(
                        if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
                            break;
                        }
-                        yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
+                        yield Message::Ping(PING.to_vec());
                    }
                }
            }
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ fn anonymous_websockets_hub<'r>(ws: WebSocket, token: String, ip: ClientIp) -> R
                        if last_received.elapsed() > WS_CLIENT_TIMEOUT {
                            break;
                        }
-                        yield Message::Ping(create_ping());
+                        yield Message::Ping(PING.to_vec());
                    }
                }
            }
@@ -359,6 +359,7 @@ fn convert_option<T: Into<Value>>(option: Option<T>) -> Value {

 const RECORD_SEPARATOR: u8 = 0x1e;
 const INITIAL_RESPONSE: [u8; 3] = [0x7b, 0x7d, RECORD_SEPARATOR]; // {, }, <RS>
+const PING: [u8; 3] = [0x02, 0x91, 0x06];

 #[derive(Deserialize, Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
 struct InitialMessage<'a> {
@@ -691,10 +692,6 @@ fn create_anonymous_update(payload: Vec<(Value, Value)>, ut: UpdateType, user_id
    serialize(&value)
 }

-fn create_ping() -> Vec<u8> {
-    serialize(&Value::Array(vec![6.into()]))
-}
-
 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/375af7c43b10d9da03525d41452f95de3f921541/src/Core/Enums/PushType.cs
 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq)]
 pub enum UpdateType {
@@ -139,21 +139,25 @@ pub async fn unregister_push_device(push_id: Option<&PushId>) -> EmptyResult {
    if !CONFIG.push_enabled() || push_id.is_none() {
        return Ok(());
    }
-    let auth_api_token = get_auth_api_token().await?;
+    let data = json!({
+        "id": push_id.as_ref().unwrap(),
+    });

+    let auth_api_token = get_auth_api_token().await?;
    let auth_header = format!("Bearer {auth_api_token}");

-    match make_http_request(
-        Method::POST,
-        &format!("{}/push/delete/{}", CONFIG.push_relay_uri(), push_id.as_ref().unwrap()),
-    )?
-    .header(AUTHORIZATION, auth_header)
-    .send()
-    .await
+    if let Err(e) = make_http_request(Method::POST, &(CONFIG.push_relay_uri() + "/push/delete"))?
+        .header(CONTENT_TYPE, "application/json")
+        .header(ACCEPT, "application/json")
+        .header(AUTHORIZATION, auth_header)
+        .json(&data)
+        .send()
+        .await?
+        .error_for_status()
    {
-        Ok(r) => r,
-        Err(e) => err!(format!("An error occurred during device unregistration: {e}")),
-    };
+        err!(format!("An error occurred during device unregistration: {e}"));
+    }
+
    Ok(())
 }

@@ -190,22 +194,28 @@ pub async fn push_cipher_update(ut: UpdateType, cipher: &Cipher, device: &Device

 pub async fn push_logout(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>, conn: &DbConn) {
    if Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, conn).await {
-        tokio::task::spawn(send_to_push_relay(json!({
-            "userId": user.uuid,
-            "organizationId": (),
-            "deviceId": acting_device.and_then(|d| d.push_uuid.as_ref()),
-            "identifier": acting_device.map(|d| &d.uuid),
-            "type": UpdateType::LogOut as i32,
-            "payload": {
-                "userId": user.uuid,
-                "date": format_date(&user.updated_at)
-            },
-            "clientType": null,
-            "installationId": null
-        })));
+        push_logout_to_relay(user, acting_device);
    }
 }

+// Sends the logout without checking for push devices first.
+// Needed after deleting a user, when the devices are already gone from the database.
+pub fn push_logout_to_relay(user: &User, acting_device: Option<&Device>) {
+    tokio::task::spawn(send_to_push_relay(json!({
+        "userId": user.uuid,
+        "organizationId": (),
+        "deviceId": acting_device.and_then(|d| d.push_uuid.as_ref()),
+        "identifier": acting_device.map(|d| &d.uuid),
+        "type": UpdateType::LogOut as i32,
+        "payload": {
+            "userId": user.uuid,
+            "date": format_date(&user.updated_at)
+        },
+        "clientType": null,
+        "installationId": null
+    })));
+}
+
 pub async fn push_user_update(ut: UpdateType, user: &User, push_uuid: Option<&PushId>, conn: &DbConn) {
    if Device::check_user_has_push_device(&user.uuid, conn).await {
        tokio::task::spawn(send_to_push_relay(json!({
@@ -1,13 +1,14 @@
 use std::{
+    collections::HashMap,
    path::{Path, PathBuf},
-    sync::{Arc, RwLock},
+    sync::{Arc, LazyLock, RwLock},
 };

 use rocket::{
    Catcher, Route,
    fs::NamedFile,
    http::ContentType,
-    response::{Redirect, content::RawCss as Css, content::RawHtml as Html},
+    response::{Redirect, content::RawHtml as Html},
    serde::json::Json,
 };
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -19,7 +20,7 @@ use crate::{
    crypto::sha256_hex,
    db::{
        DbConn,
-        models::{AttachmentId, CipherId},
+        models::{AttachmentId, CipherId, custom_roles_enabled},
    },
    error::Error,
    util::{Cached, EtagCached},
@@ -79,16 +80,17 @@ pub fn invalidate_css_cache() {
 }

 #[get("/css/vaultwarden.css")]
-fn vaultwarden_css() -> EtagCached<Css<String>> {
+fn vaultwarden_css() -> EtagCached<String> {
    // If reload_templates is false, and we already have the CSS Cached, return this
    if !CONFIG.reload_templates()
        && let Some(cached) = CSS_CACHE.read().unwrap().as_ref()
    {
-        return EtagCached::new(Css(cached.css.clone()), &cached.etag);
+        return EtagCached::new(cached.css.clone(), ContentType::CSS, &cached.etag);
    }

    // Else, there is either no cache, or reload_templates is true and we need to rebuild the CSS
    let css_options = json!({
+        "custom_roles_enabled": custom_roles_enabled(),
        "email_change_allowed": CONFIG.email_change_allowed(),
        "emergency_access_allowed": CONFIG.emergency_access_allowed(),
        "load_user_scss": true,
@@ -147,7 +149,7 @@ fn vaultwarden_css() -> EtagCached<Css<String>> {
    }

    // Etag Caching will let the browser send us an etag to verify and send new content if needed
-    EtagCached::new(Css(cached.css.clone()), &cached.etag)
+    EtagCached::new(cached.css.clone(), ContentType::CSS, &cached.etag)
 }

 #[get("/")]
@@ -256,7 +258,7 @@ fn alive_head(_conn: DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
 // This endpoint/function is used during development and development only.
 // It allows to easily develop the admin interface by always loading the files from disk instead from a slice of bytes
 // This will only be active during a debug build and only when `RELOAD_TEMPLATES` is set to `true`
-// NOTE: Do not forget to add any new files added to the `static_files` function below!
+// NOTE: Do not forget to add any new files added to the `STATIC_FILES` HashMap below!
 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
 #[get("/vw_static/<filename>", rank = 1)]
 pub async fn static_files_dev(filename: PathBuf) -> Option<NamedFile> {
@@ -276,32 +278,61 @@ pub async fn static_files_dev(filename: PathBuf) -> Option<NamedFile> {
    None
 }

+pub struct StaticFile {
+    pub content_type: ContentType,
+    pub bytes: &'static [u8],
+    pub etag: String,
+}
+
+pub static STATIC_FILES: LazyLock<HashMap<&'static str, StaticFile>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
+    [
+        ("404.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/404.png")[..]),
+        ("mail-github.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/mail-github.png")[..]),
+        ("logo-gray.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/logo-gray.png")[..]),
+        ("error-x.svg", ContentType::SVG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/error-x.svg")[..]),
+        ("hibp.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/hibp.png")[..]),
+        ("vaultwarden-icon.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-icon.png")[..]),
+        ("vaultwarden-favicon.png", ContentType::PNG, &include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-favicon.png")[..]),
+        ("404.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/404.css")[..]),
+        ("admin.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.css")[..]),
+        ("admin.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.js")[..]),
+        ("admin_settings.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_settings.js")[..]),
+        ("admin_users.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_users.js")[..]),
+        (
+            "admin_organizations.js",
+            ContentType::JavaScript,
+            &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_organizations.js")[..],
+        ),
+        (
+            "admin_diagnostics.js",
+            ContentType::JavaScript,
+            &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_diagnostics.js")[..],
+        ),
+        ("bootstrap.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.css")[..]),
+        ("bootstrap.bundle.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.bundle.js")[..]),
+        ("jdenticon-3.3.0.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/jdenticon-3.3.0.js")[..]),
+        ("datatables.js", ContentType::JavaScript, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.js")[..]),
+        ("datatables.css", ContentType::CSS, &include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.css")[..]),
+    ]
+    .into_iter()
+    .map(|(name, content_type, bytes)| {
+        (
+            name,
+            StaticFile {
+                content_type,
+                bytes,
+                etag: sha256_hex(bytes),
+            },
+        )
+    })
+    .collect()
+});
+
 #[get("/vw_static/<filename>", rank = 2)]
-pub fn static_files(filename: &str) -> Result<(ContentType, &'static [u8]), Error> {
-    match filename {
-        "404.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/404.png"))),
-        "mail-github.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/mail-github.png"))),
-        "logo-gray.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/logo-gray.png"))),
-        "error-x.svg" => Ok((ContentType::SVG, include_bytes!("../static/images/error-x.svg"))),
-        "hibp.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/hibp.png"))),
-        "vaultwarden-icon.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-icon.png"))),
-        "vaultwarden-favicon.png" => Ok((ContentType::PNG, include_bytes!("../static/images/vaultwarden-favicon.png"))),
-        "404.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/404.css"))),
-        "admin.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.css"))),
-        "admin.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin.js"))),
-        "admin_settings.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_settings.js"))),
-        "admin_users.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_users.js"))),
-        "admin_organizations.js" => {
-            Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_organizations.js")))
-        }
-        "admin_diagnostics.js" => {
-            Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/admin_diagnostics.js")))
-        }
-        "bootstrap.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.css"))),
-        "bootstrap.bundle.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/bootstrap.bundle.js"))),
-        "jdenticon-3.3.0.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/jdenticon-3.3.0.js"))),
-        "datatables.js" => Ok((ContentType::JavaScript, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.js"))),
-        "datatables.css" => Ok((ContentType::CSS, include_bytes!("../static/scripts/datatables.css"))),
-        _ => err!(format!("Static file not found: {filename}")),
+pub fn static_files(filename: &str) -> Result<EtagCached<&'static [u8]>, Error> {
+    if let Some(file) = STATIC_FILES.get(filename) {
+        Ok(EtagCached::new(file.bytes, file.content_type.clone(), &file.etag))
+    } else {
+        err!(format!("Static file not found: {}", filename.escape_debug()))
    }
 }
@@ -314,6 +314,17 @@ impl LoginJwtClaims {
    }
 }

+fn calculate_invite_expire_hours(now: &DateTime<Utc>) -> Result<DateTime<Utc>, Error> {
+    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
+    let Some(hours_delta) = TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours) else {
+        err!("Unable to calculate time delta for invite expire hours. Check `INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS`.");
+    };
+    let Some(exp) = now.checked_add_signed(hours_delta) else {
+        err!("Unable to calculate invitation expire date. Check `INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS`.");
+    };
+    Ok(exp)
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct InviteJwtClaims {
    // Not before
@@ -337,19 +348,19 @@ pub fn generate_invite_claims(
    org_id: OrganizationId,
    member_id: MembershipId,
    invited_by_email: Option<String>,
-) -> InviteJwtClaims {
+) -> Result<InviteJwtClaims, Error> {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
-    InviteJwtClaims {
+    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
+    Ok(InviteJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: exp.timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_INVITE_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: user_id,
        email,
        org_id,
        member_id,
        invited_by_email,
-    }
+    })
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -375,19 +386,19 @@ pub fn generate_emergency_access_invite_claims(
    emer_id: EmergencyAccessId,
    grantor_name: String,
    grantor_email: String,
-) -> EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
+) -> Result<EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims, Error> {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
-    EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
+    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
+    Ok(EmergencyAccessInviteJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: exp.timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_EMERGENCY_ACCESS_INVITE_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: user_id,
        email,
        emer_id,
        grantor_name,
        grantor_email,
-    }
+    })
 }

 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
@@ -492,13 +503,17 @@ pub fn generate_2fa_remember_claims(device_uuid: DeviceId, user_uuid: UserId) ->
    let time_now = Utc::now();
    TwoFactorRememberClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_days(30).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: two_factor_remember_expiration(time_now, CONFIG.two_factor_remember_days()),
        iss: JWT_2FA_REMEMBER_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: device_uuid,
        user_uuid,
    }
 }

+fn two_factor_remember_expiration(time_now: DateTime<Utc>, remember_days: i64) -> i64 {
+    (time_now + TimeDelta::try_days(remember_days).expect("TWO_FACTOR_REMEMBER_DAYS is validated")).timestamp()
+}
+
 #[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
 pub struct BasicJwtClaims {
    // Not before
@@ -521,36 +536,43 @@ impl BasicJwtClaims {
    }
 }

-pub fn generate_delete_claims(uuid: String) -> BasicJwtClaims {
+pub fn generate_delete_claims(uuid: String) -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
-    BasicJwtClaims {
+    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
+    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: exp.timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_DELETE_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: uuid,
-    }
+    })
 }

-pub fn generate_verify_email_claims(user_id: &UserId) -> BasicJwtClaims {
+pub fn generate_verify_email_claims(user_id: &UserId) -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    let expire_hours = i64::from(CONFIG.invitation_expiration_hours());
-    BasicJwtClaims {
+    let exp = calculate_invite_expire_hours(&time_now)?;
+    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_hours(expire_hours).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: exp.timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_VERIFYEMAIL_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: user_id.to_string(),
-    }
+    })
 }

-pub fn generate_admin_claims() -> BasicJwtClaims {
+pub fn generate_admin_claims() -> Result<BasicJwtClaims, Error> {
    let time_now = Utc::now();
-    BasicJwtClaims {
+    let lifetime_minutes = i64::from(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime());
+    let Some(minutes_delta) = TimeDelta::try_minutes(lifetime_minutes) else {
+        err!("Unable to calculate time delta for admin session lifetime. Check `ADMIN_SESSION_LIFETIME`.");
+    };
+    let Some(exp) = time_now.checked_add_signed(minutes_delta) else {
+        err!("Unable to calculate admin session lifetime. Check `ADMIN_SESSION_LIFETIME`.");
+    };
+    Ok(BasicJwtClaims {
        nbf: time_now.timestamp(),
-        exp: (time_now + TimeDelta::try_minutes(CONFIG.admin_session_lifetime()).unwrap()).timestamp(),
+        exp: exp.timestamp(),
        iss: JWT_ADMIN_ISSUER.to_string(),
        sub: "admin_panel".to_owned(),
-    }
+    })
 }

 pub fn generate_send_claims(send_id: &SendId, file_id: &SendFileId) -> BasicJwtClaims {
@@ -72,7 +72,11 @@ impl SendTokens {
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> ApiResult<SendTokens> {
        let Some(send_id) = Self::as_send_id(access_id) else {
-            return Self::invalid_error(&format!("Can't convert {access_id}"), "send_id_invalid", false);
+            return Self::invalid_error(
+                &format!("Can't convert {}", access_id.escape_debug()),
+                "send_id_invalid",
+                false,
+            );
        };

        let Some(send) = Send::find_by_uuid(&send_id, conn).await else {
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
            _usr: ConfigBuilder,

            _overrides: Vec<&'static str>,
+            _config_file_status: ConfigFileStatus,
        }

        // Custom Deserialize for ConfigBuilder, mainly based upon https://serde.rs/deserialize-struct.html
@@ -259,11 +260,22 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                builder
            }

-            async fn from_file() -> Result<Self, Error> {
+            async fn from_file() -> Result<Option<Self>, Error> {
+                // The Fs operator would create the folder if it doesn't exist, which we never want
+                if !CONFIG_FILE_PARENT_DIR.starts_with("s3://") && !std::path::Path::new(&*CONFIG_FILE_PARENT_DIR).is_dir() {
+                    return Ok(None);
+                }
                let operator = storage::operator_for_path(&CONFIG_FILE_PARENT_DIR)?;
-                let config_bytes = operator.read(&CONFIG_FILENAME).await?;
+                let config_bytes = match operator.read(&CONFIG_FILENAME).await {
+                    Ok(bytes) => bytes,
+                    // No config file is fine, should not return any error
+                    Err(e) if e.kind() == opendal::ErrorKind::NotFound => return Ok(None),
+                    // Any other error might be an issue and should be passed back to the caller
+                    Err(e) => return Err(e.into()),
+                };
+                let builder = serde_json::from_slice(&config_bytes.to_vec())?;
                println!("[INFO] Using saved config from `{}` for configuration.\n", *CONFIG_FILE);
-                serde_json::from_slice(&config_bytes.to_vec()).map_err(Into::into)
+                Ok(Some(builder))
            }

            fn clear_non_editable(&mut self) {
@@ -440,6 +452,8 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                    "domain_origin",
                    "domain_path",
                    "domain",
+                    "duo_ikey",
+                    "duo_host",
                    "helo_name",
                    "org_creation_users",
                    "signups_domains_whitelist",
@@ -451,6 +465,8 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                    "sso_authority",
                    "sso_callback_path",
                    "sso_client_id",
+                    "yubico_client_id",
+                    "yubico_server",
                ];

                let cfg = {
@@ -483,6 +499,10 @@ macro_rules! make_config {
                };
                overrides
            }
+
+            pub fn get_config_file_status(&self) -> ConfigFileStatus {
+                self.inner.read().unwrap()._config_file_status
+            }
        }
    };
 }
@@ -539,7 +559,7 @@ make_config! {
    jobs {
        /// Job scheduler poll interval |> How often the job scheduler thread checks for jobs to run.
        /// Set to 0 to globally disable scheduled jobs.
-        job_poll_interval_ms:   u64,    false,  def,    30_000;
+        job_poll_interval_ms:   u32,    false,  def,    30_000;
        /// Send purge schedule |> Cron schedule of the job that checks for Sends past their deletion date.
        /// Defaults to hourly. Set blank to disable this job.
        send_purge_schedule:    String, false,  def,    "0 5 * * * *".to_owned();
@@ -587,6 +607,9 @@ make_config! {
        /// This setting applies globally to all users. To control this on a per-org basis instead, use the "Disable Send" org policy.
        sends_allowed:          bool,   true,   def,    true;

+        /// Fill Assist Rules URL |> HTTPS URL for the server-wide Fill Assist rules feed base directory.
+        fill_assist_rules_url: String, true, def, "https://fillassist.bitwarden.com".to_owned();
+
        /// HIBP Api Key |> HaveIBeenPwned API Key, request it here: https://haveibeenpwned.com/API/Key
        hibp_api_key:           Pass,   true,   option;

@@ -595,19 +618,19 @@ make_config! {
        /// Per-organization attachment storage limit (KB) |> Max kilobytes of attachment storage allowed per org. When this limit is reached, org members will not be allowed to upload further attachments for ciphers owned by that org.
        org_attachment_limit:   i64,    true,   option;
        /// Per-user send storage limit (KB) |> Max kilobytes of sends storage allowed per user. When this limit is reached, the user will not be allowed to upload further sends.
-        user_send_limit:   i64,    true,   option;
+        user_send_limit:        i64,    true,   option;

        /// Trash auto-delete days |> Number of days to wait before auto-deleting a trashed item.
-        /// If unset, trashed items are not auto-deleted. This setting applies globally, so make
+        /// If unset or 0, trashed items are not auto-deleted. This setting applies globally, so make
        /// sure to inform all users of any changes to this setting.
-        trash_auto_delete_days: i64,    true,   option;
+        trash_auto_delete_days: u16,    true,   option;

        /// Incomplete 2FA time limit |> Number of minutes to wait before a 2FA-enabled login is
        /// considered incomplete, resulting in an email notification. An incomplete 2FA login is one
        /// where the correct master password was provided but the required 2FA step was not completed,
        /// which potentially indicates a master password compromise. Set to 0 to disable this check.
        /// This setting applies globally to all users.
-        incomplete_2fa_time_limit: i64, true,   def,    3;
+        incomplete_2fa_time_limit: u16, true,   def,    3;

        /// Disable icon downloads |> Set to true to disable icon downloading in the internal icon service.
        /// This still serves existing icons from $ICON_CACHE_FOLDER, without generating any external
@@ -620,9 +643,9 @@ make_config! {
        /// this will prevent logins from succeeding until the address has been verified
        signups_verify:         bool,   true,   def,    false;
        /// If signups require email verification, automatically re-send verification email if it hasn't been sent for a while (in seconds)
-        signups_verify_resend_time: u64, true,  def,    3_600;
+        signups_verify_resend_time: u32, true,  def,    3_600;
        /// If signups require email verification, limit how many emails are automatically sent when login is attempted (0 means no limit)
-        signups_verify_resend_limit: u32, true, def,    6;
+        signups_verify_resend_limit: u16, true, def,    6;
        /// Email domain whitelist |> Allow signups only from this list of comma-separated domains, even when signups are otherwise disabled
        signups_domains_whitelist: String, true, def,   String::new();
        /// Enable event logging |> Enables event logging for organizations.
@@ -634,7 +657,7 @@ make_config! {
        invitations_allowed:    bool,   true,   def,    true;
        /// Invitation token expiration time (in hours) |> The number of hours after which an organization invite token, emergency access invite token,
        /// email verification token and deletion request token will expire (must be at least 1)
-        invitation_expiration_hours: u32, false, def, 120;
+        invitation_expiration_hours: u16, false, def, 120;
        /// Enable emergency access |> Controls whether users can enable emergency access to their accounts. This setting applies globally to all users.
        emergency_access_allowed:    bool,   true,   def,    true;
        /// Allow email change |> Controls whether users can change their email. This setting applies globally to all users.
@@ -655,8 +678,8 @@ make_config! {
        /// Invitation organization name |> Name shown in the invitation emails that don't come from a specific organization
        invitation_org_name:    String, true,   def,    "Vaultwarden".to_owned();

-        /// Events days retain |> Number of days to retain events stored in the database. If unset, events are kept indefinitely.
-        events_days_retain:     i64,    false,   option;
+        /// Events days retain |> Number of days to retain events stored in the database. If unset or 0, events are kept indefinitely.
+        events_days_retain:     u16,    false,   option;
    },

    client {
@@ -694,13 +717,13 @@ make_config! {
        /// Temporary redirects are useful while testing different icon services, but once a service
        /// has been decided on, consider using permanent redirects for cacheability. The legacy codes
        /// are currently better supported by the Bitwarden clients.
-        icon_redirect_code:     u32,    true,   def,    302;
+        icon_redirect_code:     u16,    true,   def,    302;
        /// Positive icon cache expiry |> Number of seconds to consider that an already cached icon is fresh. After this period, the icon will be refreshed
-        icon_cache_ttl:         u64,    true,   def,    2_592_000;
+        icon_cache_ttl:         u32,    true,   def,    2_592_000;
        /// Negative icon cache expiry |> Number of seconds before trying to download an icon that failed again.
-        icon_cache_negttl:      u64,    true,   def,    259_200;
+        icon_cache_negttl:      u32,    true,   def,    259_200;
        /// Icon download timeout |> Number of seconds when to stop attempting to download an icon.
-        icon_download_timeout:  u64,    true,   def,    10;
+        icon_download_timeout:  u16,    true,   def,    10;

        /// [Deprecated] Icon blacklist Regex |> Use `http_request_block_regex` instead
        icon_blacklist_regex:   String, false,   option;
@@ -717,6 +740,8 @@ make_config! {
        /// Disable Two-Factor remember |> Enabling this would force the users to use a second factor to login every time.
        /// Note that the checkbox would still be present, but ignored.
        disable_2fa_remember:   bool,   true,   def,    false;
+        /// Two-Factor remember duration |> Number of days before a remembered Two-Factor login expires (min: 1, max: 90).
+        two_factor_remember_days: i64,  true,   def,    30;

        /// Disable authenticator time drifted codes to be valid |> Enabling this only allows the current TOTP code to be valid
        /// TOTP codes of the previous and next 30 seconds will be invalid.
@@ -751,11 +776,11 @@ make_config! {
        /// Max database connection retries |> Number of times to retry the database connection during startup, with 1 second between each retry, set to 0 to retry indefinitely
        db_connection_retries:  u32,    false,  def,    15;

-        /// Timeout when acquiring database connection
-        database_timeout:       u64,    false,  def,    30;
+        /// Timeout in seconds when acquiring database connection
+        database_timeout:       u32,    false,  def,    30;

        /// Timeout in seconds before idle connections to the database are closed
-        database_idle_timeout:  u64,    false, def,     600;
+        database_idle_timeout:  u32,    false, def,     600;

        /// Database connection max pool size
        database_max_conns:     u32,    false,  def,    10;
@@ -772,30 +797,34 @@ make_config! {
        /// Allowed iframe ancestors (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains to embed the web vault into an iframe, useful for embedding into secure intranets
        allowed_iframe_ancestors: String, true, def,    String::new();

-        /// Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains to URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
+        /// Allowed connect-src (Know the risks!) |> Allows other domains for URLs which can be loaded using script interfaces like the Forwarded email alias feature
        allowed_connect_src:      String, true, def,    String::new();

        /// Seconds between login requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between login and 2FA requests from the same IP address before rate limiting kicks in
-        login_ratelimit_seconds:       u64, false, def, 60;
+        login_ratelimit_seconds:       u16, false, def, 60;
        /// Max burst size for login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `login_ratelimit_seconds`. Note that this applies to both the login and the 2FA, so it's recommended to allow a burst size of at least 2
-        login_ratelimit_max_burst:     u32, false, def, 10;
+        login_ratelimit_max_burst:     u16, false, def, 10;

        /// Seconds between unauthenticated requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between requests from the same IP address to any of the rate limited unauthenticated endpoints
-        unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds:   u64, false, def, 60;
+        unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds:   u16, false, def, 60;
        /// Max burst size for unauthenticated requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds`. This is shared between several endpoints, so it needs to be more lenient than the login one
-        unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst: u32, false, def, 50;
+        unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst: u16, false, def, 50;

        /// Seconds between admin login requests |> Number of seconds, on average, between admin requests from the same IP address before rate limiting kicks in
-        admin_ratelimit_seconds:       u64, false, def, 300;
+        admin_ratelimit_seconds:       u16, false, def, 300;
        /// Max burst size for admin login requests |> Allow a burst of requests of up to this size, while maintaining the average indicated by `admin_ratelimit_seconds`
-        admin_ratelimit_max_burst:     u32, false, def, 3;
+        admin_ratelimit_max_burst:     u16, false, def, 3;

        /// Admin session lifetime |> Set the lifetime of admin sessions to this value (in minutes).
-        admin_session_lifetime:        i64, true,  def, 20;
+        admin_session_lifetime:        u32, true,  def, 20;

        /// Enable groups (BETA!) (Know the risks!) |> Enables groups support for organizations (Currently contains known issues!).
        org_groups_enabled:            bool, false, def, false;

+        /// Enable Custom roles (EXPERIMENTAL!) (Know the risks!) |> Enables the in-development Custom member role with granular permissions for organizations.
+        /// Only the permissions this version enforces can be granted. Disabling it again keeps the stored Custom roles, but they grant nothing until it is re-enabled.
+        experimental_custom_roles:     bool, false, def, false;
+
        /// Increase note size limit (Know the risks!) |> Sets the secure note size limit to 100_000 instead of the default 10_000.
        /// WARNING: This could cause issues with clients. Also exports will not work on Bitwarden servers!
        increase_note_size_limit:      bool,  true,  def, false;
@@ -844,8 +873,8 @@ make_config! {
        sso_master_password_policy:     String, true,  option;
        /// Use SSO only for auth not the session lifecycle |> Use default Vaultwarden session lifecycle (Idle refresh token valid for 30days)
        sso_auth_only_not_session:      bool,   true,   def,    false;
-        /// Client cache for discovery endpoint. |> Duration in seconds (0 or less to disable). More details: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-SSO-support-using-OpenId-Connect#client-cache
-        sso_client_cache_expiration:    u64,    true,   def,    0;
+        /// Client cache for discovery endpoint. |> Duration in seconds (0 to disable). More details: https://github.com/dani-garcia/vaultwarden/wiki/Enabling-SSO-support-using-OpenId-Connect#client-cache
+        sso_client_cache_expiration:    u32,    true,   def,    0;
        /// Log all tokens |> `LOG_LEVEL=debug` or `LOG_LEVEL=info,vaultwarden::sso=debug` is required
        sso_debug_tokens:               bool,   true,   def,    false;
    },
@@ -903,11 +932,11 @@ make_config! {
        /// SMTP Auth mechanism |> Defaults for SSL is "Plain" and "Login" and nothing for Non-SSL connections. Possible values: ["Plain", "Login", "Xoauth2"]. Multiple options need to be separated by a comma ','.
        smtp_auth_mechanism:           String, true,   option;
        /// SMTP connection timeout |> Number of seconds when to stop trying to connect to the SMTP server
-        smtp_timeout:                  u64,    true,   def,     15;
+        smtp_timeout:                  u16,    true,   def,     15;
        /// Server name sent during HELO |> By default this value should be the machine's hostname, but might need to be changed in case it trips some anti-spam filters
        helo_name:                     String, true,   option;
        /// Embed images as email attachments.
-        smtp_embed_images:             bool, true, def, true;
+        smtp_embed_images:             bool,   true,   def,     true;
        /// _smtp_img_src
        _smtp_img_src:                 String, false, generated, |c| generate_smtp_img_src(c.smtp_embed_images, &c.domain);
        /// Enable SMTP debugging (Know the risks!) |> DANGEROUS: Enabling this will output very detailed SMTP messages. This could contain sensitive information like passwords and usernames! Only enable this during troubleshooting!
@@ -925,9 +954,9 @@ make_config! {
        /// Email token size |> Number of digits in an email 2FA token (min: 6, max: 255). Note that the Bitwarden clients are hardcoded to mention 6 digit codes regardless of this setting.
        email_token_size:       u8,     true,   def,      6;
        /// Token expiration time |> Maximum time in seconds a token is valid. The time the user has to open email client and copy token.
-        email_expiration_time:  u64,    true,   def,      600;
+        email_expiration_time:  u32,    true,   def,      600;
        /// Maximum attempts |> Maximum attempts before an email token is reset and a new email will need to be sent
-        email_attempts_limit:   u64,    true,   def,      3;
+        email_attempts_limit:   u8,     true,   def,      3;
        /// Setup email 2FA at signup |> Setup email 2FA provider on registration regardless of any organization policy
        email_2fa_enforce_on_verified_invite: bool,   true,   def,      false;
        /// Auto-enable 2FA (Know the risks!) |> Automatically setup email 2FA as fallback provider when needed
@@ -983,7 +1012,15 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
    }

    if cfg.database_min_conns > cfg.database_max_conns {
-        err!("`DATABASE_MIN_CONNS` must be smaller than or equal to `DATABASE_MAX_CONNS`.");
+        err!("`DATABASE_MIN_CONNS` must be less than or equal to `DATABASE_MAX_CONNS`.");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.database_timeout < 1 {
+        err!("`DATABASE_TIMEOUT` must be at least 1 second");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.database_idle_timeout < 1 {
+        err!("`DATABASE_IDLE_TIMEOUT` must be at least 1 second");
    }

    if let Some(log_file) = &cfg.log_file
@@ -999,6 +1036,21 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
        );
    }

+    let valid_fill_assist_rules_url = Url::parse(&cfg.fill_assist_rules_url).is_ok_and(|url| {
+        url.scheme() == "https"
+            && url.has_host()
+            && url.username().is_empty()
+            && url.password().is_none()
+            && url.query().is_none()
+            && url.fragment().is_none()
+            && cfg.fill_assist_rules_url.trim() == cfg.fill_assist_rules_url
+    });
+    if !valid_fill_assist_rules_url {
+        err!(
+            "`FILL_ASSIST_RULES_URL` must be a valid HTTPS URL without credentials, query parameters, fragments, or surrounding whitespace."
+        );
+    }
+
    let connect_src = cfg.allowed_connect_src.to_lowercase();
    for url in connect_src.split_whitespace() {
        if !url.starts_with("https://") || Url::parse(url).is_err() {
@@ -1233,6 +1285,10 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
        err!("`INVITATION_EXPIRATION_HOURS` has a minimum duration of 1 hour")
    }

+    if !(1..=90).contains(&cfg.two_factor_remember_days) {
+        err!("`TWO_FACTOR_REMEMBER_DAYS` must be between 1 and 90 days")
+    }
+
    // Validate schedule crontab format
    if !cfg.send_purge_schedule.is_empty() && cfg.send_purge_schedule.parse::<Schedule>().is_err() {
        err!("`SEND_PURGE_SCHEDULE` is not a valid cron expression")
@@ -1274,6 +1330,30 @@ fn validate_config(cfg: &ConfigItems, on_update: bool) -> Result<(), Error> {
        err!("`PURGE_INCOMPLETE_SSO_AUTH` is not a valid cron expression")
    }

+    if cfg.login_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
+        err!("`LOGIN_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.login_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
+        err!("`LOGIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.admin_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
+        err!("`ADMIN_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.admin_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
+        err!("`ADMIN_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds < 1 {
+        err!("`UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_SECONDS` must be at least 1 second");
+    }
+
+    if cfg.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst < 1 {
+        err!("`UNAUTHENTICATED_RATELIMIT_MAX_BURST` must be at least 1");
+    }
+
    if !cfg.disable_admin_token {
        match cfg.admin_token.as_ref() {
            Some(t) if t.starts_with("$argon2") => {
@@ -1429,6 +1509,7 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
    // Autofill Team
    "undetermined-cipher-scenario-logic",
    "enable-basic-auth-response",
+    "fill-assist-targeting-rules",
    "ssh-agent-v2",
    "windows-desktop-autotype",
    "windows-desktop-autotype-ga",
@@ -1443,11 +1524,34 @@ pub const SUPPORTED_FEATURE_FLAGS: &[&str] = &[
    "pm-32009-new-item-types",
 ];

+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Serialize)]
+pub enum ConfigFileStatus {
+    NotFound,
+    Loaded,
+    Error,
+}
+
 impl Config {
    pub async fn load() -> Result<Self, Error> {
        // Loading from env and file
        let env = ConfigBuilder::from_env();
-        let usr = ConfigBuilder::from_file().await.unwrap_or_default();
+        let (usr, config_file_status) = match ConfigBuilder::from_file().await {
+            Ok(Some(usr)) => (usr, ConfigFileStatus::Loaded),
+            Ok(None) => (ConfigBuilder::default(), ConfigFileStatus::NotFound),
+            Err(e) => {
+                println!(
+                    "[ERROR] Failed to load configuration from `{}`\n\
+                    #####################################################################################\n\
+                    # The file seems to exist but might contain invalid JSON or invalid values.         #\n\
+                    # Check the syntax and make sure every value is valid and within its allowed range. #\n\
+                    # This file is not used until those errors are resolved.                            #\n\
+                    #####################################################################################\n\
+                {e:?}\n",
+                    *CONFIG_FILE
+                );
+                (ConfigBuilder::default(), ConfigFileStatus::Error)
+            }
+        };

        // Create merged config, config file overwrites env
        let mut overrides = Vec::new();
@@ -1467,6 +1571,7 @@ impl Config {
                _env: env,
                _usr: usr,
                _overrides: overrides,
+                _config_file_status: config_file_status,
            }),
        })
    }
@@ -1500,6 +1605,7 @@ impl Config {
            writer.config = config;
            writer._usr = builder;
            writer._overrides = overrides;
+            writer._config_file_status = ConfigFileStatus::Loaded;
        }

        //Save to file
@@ -1518,7 +1624,7 @@ impl Config {
    pub fn is_email_domain_allowed(&self, email: &str) -> bool {
        let e: Vec<&str> = email.rsplitn(2, '@').collect();
        if e.len() != 2 || e[0].is_empty() || e[1].is_empty() {
-            warn!("Failed to parse email address '{email}'");
+            warn!("Failed to parse email address '{}'", email.escape_debug());
            return false;
        }
        let email_domain = e[0].to_lowercase();
@@ -1591,6 +1697,7 @@ impl Config {
            writer.config = config;
            writer._usr = usr;
            writer._overrides = Vec::new();
+            writer._config_file_status = ConfigFileStatus::NotFound;
        }

        // Invalidate CSS Cache because several config items might have impact on the rendered CSS
@@ -212,8 +212,8 @@ impl DbPool {
        let pool = Pool::builder()
            .max_size(max_conns)
            .min_idle(Some(CONFIG.database_min_conns()))
-            .idle_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_idle_timeout())))
-            .connection_timeout(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_timeout()))
+            .idle_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_idle_timeout()))))
+            .connection_timeout(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_timeout())))
            .connection_customizer(Box::new(DbConnOptions {
                init_stmts: conn_type.get_init_stmts(),
            }))
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ impl DbPool {

    // Get a connection from the pool
    pub async fn get(&self) -> Result<DbConn, Error> {
-        let duration = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.database_timeout());
+        let duration = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.database_timeout()));
        let permit = match timeout(duration, Arc::clone(&self.semaphore).acquire_owned()).await {
            Ok(p) => p.expect("Semaphore should be open"),
            Err(_) => {
@@ -534,3 +534,74 @@ mod postgresql_migrations {
        Ok(())
    }
 }
+
+/// A throwaway SQLite database with the real schema, for tests that need to run queries.
+#[cfg(all(test, sqlite))]
+pub mod test_db {
+    use super::sqlite_migrations::MIGRATIONS;
+    use diesel::connection::SimpleConnection;
+    use diesel_migrations::MigrationHarness;
+
+    #[test]
+    fn custom_role_migration_preserves_memberships_and_guards_downgrade() {
+        use super::schema::users_organizations::dsl::*;
+        use diesel::{migration::MigrationSource, prelude::*};
+        let mut conn = SqliteConnection::establish(":memory:").unwrap();
+        for migration in conn.pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS).unwrap() {
+            if migration.name().version().to_string() == "20261010120000" {
+                break;
+            }
+            conn.run_migration(&migration).unwrap();
+        }
+        conn.batch_execute(
+            "PRAGMA foreign_keys=OFF;
+            INSERT INTO organizations (uuid,name,billing_email) VALUES ('org','Org','a@b');
+            INSERT INTO users_organizations (uuid,user_uuid,org_uuid,access_all,akey,status,atype) VALUES
+            ('0','0','org',TRUE,'key',2,0), ('1','1','org',TRUE,'key',2,1),
+            ('2','2','org',FALSE,'key',1,2), ('3','3','org',FALSE,'key',2,3), ('4','4','org',TRUE,'key',2,3);",
+        )
+        .unwrap();
+        let rows = |conn: &mut SqliteConnection| {
+            users_organizations
+                .select((uuid, user_uuid, org_uuid, access_all, akey, status, atype))
+                .order(uuid)
+                .load::<(String, String, String, bool, String, i32, i32)>(conn)
+                .unwrap()
+        };
+        let before = rows(&mut conn);
+        conn.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(rows(&mut conn), before);
+        let grants = |conn: &mut SqliteConnection| {
+            diesel::select(diesel::dsl::sql::<diesel::sql_types::BigInt>(
+                "(SELECT COUNT(*) FROM users_organizations WHERE manage_users OR manage_groups OR manage_policies
+                OR create_new_collections OR edit_any_collection OR delete_any_collection
+                OR access_event_logs OR access_import_export OR access_reports)",
+            ))
+            .get_result::<i64>(conn)
+            .unwrap()
+        };
+        assert_eq!(grants(&mut conn), 0);
+        let migration = MigrationSource::<diesel::sqlite::Sqlite>::migrations(&MIGRATIONS)
+            .unwrap()
+            .into_iter()
+            .find(|m| m.name().version().to_string() == "20261010120000")
+            .unwrap();
+        for member_status in [1, 2] {
+            conn.batch_execute(&format!(
+                "UPDATE users_organizations SET atype=4,manage_users=TRUE,status={member_status} WHERE uuid='2'"
+            ))
+            .unwrap();
+            let custom = rows(&mut conn);
+            assert!(conn.revert_migration(&*migration).is_err());
+            assert_eq!(rows(&mut conn), custom);
+            assert!(users_organizations.filter(uuid.eq("2")).select(manage_users).first::<bool>(&mut conn).unwrap());
+        }
+        conn.batch_execute("UPDATE users_organizations SET atype=2,manage_users=FALSE,status=1 WHERE uuid='2'")
+            .unwrap();
+        conn.revert_migration(&*migration).unwrap();
+        assert!(diesel::sql_query("SELECT manage_users FROM users_organizations").execute(&mut conn).is_err());
+        conn.run_pending_migrations(MIGRATIONS).unwrap();
+        assert_eq!(grants(&mut conn), 0);
+        assert_eq!(rows(&mut conn), before);
+    }
+}
@@ -166,6 +166,15 @@ impl AuthRequest {
        .await
    }

+    pub async fn delete_all_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            diesel::delete(auth_requests::table.filter(auth_requests::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .map_res("Error deleting auth requests for user")
+        })
+        .await
+    }
+
    /// Marks the request as used to log in. Returns false when it already was, so it only works once.
    pub async fn set_authentication_date(uuid: &AuthRequestId, conn: &DbConn) -> ApiResult<bool> {
        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
@@ -188,7 +197,7 @@ impl AuthRequest {
    pub async fn purge_expired_auth_requests(conn: &DbConn) {
        // delete auth requests older than 15 minutes which is functionally equivalent to upstream:
        // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/f8ee2270409f7a13125cd414c450740af605a175/src/Sql/dbo/Auth/Stored%20Procedures/AuthRequest_DeleteIfExpired.sql
-        let expiry_time = Utc::now().naive_utc() - chrono::TimeDelta::try_minutes(15).unwrap();
+        let expiry_time = Utc::now().naive_utc() - chrono::TimeDelta::minutes(15);
        for auth_request in Self::find_created_before(&expiry_time, conn).await {
            auth_request.delete(conn).await.ok();
        }
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ use macros::UuidFromParam;

 use super::{
    Archive, Attachment, CollectionCipher, CollectionId, Favorite, FolderCipher, FolderId, Group, Membership,
-    MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrganizationId, User, UserId,
+    MembershipStatus, OrganizationId, User, UserId, organization::ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES,
 };

 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
@@ -494,12 +494,22 @@ impl Cipher {

    /// Purge all ciphers that are old enough to be auto-deleted.
    pub async fn purge_trash(conn: &DbConn) {
-        if let Some(auto_delete_days) = CONFIG.trash_auto_delete_days() {
-            let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
-            let dt = now - TimeDelta::try_days(auto_delete_days).unwrap();
-            for cipher in Self::find_deleted_before(&dt, conn).await {
-                cipher.delete(conn).await.ok();
-            }
+        let Some(auto_delete_days) = CONFIG.trash_auto_delete_days().filter(|&d| d != 0) else {
+            debug!("trash_auto_delete_days is not configured or set to 0, skipping");
+            return;
+        };
+
+        let Some(days) = TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(auto_delete_days)) else {
+            error!("Unable to calculate auto delete days!");
+            return;
+        };
+        let now = Utc::now().naive_utc();
+        let Some(dt) = now.checked_sub_signed(days) else {
+            error!("Unable to calculate trash purge date!");
+            return;
+        };
+        for cipher in Self::find_deleted_before(&dt, conn).await {
+            cipher.delete(conn).await.ok();
        }
    }

@@ -510,7 +520,16 @@ impl Cipher {
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> EmptyResult {
        User::update_uuid_revision(user_uuid, conn).await;
+        self.move_to_folder_without_revision_update(folder_uuid, user_uuid, conn).await
+    }

+    /// Same as `move_to_folder`, but the caller is responsible for updating the user's revision.
+    pub async fn move_to_folder_without_revision_update(
+        &self,
+        folder_uuid: Option<FolderId>,
+        user_uuid: &UserId,
+        conn: &DbConn,
+    ) -> EmptyResult {
        match (self.get_folder_uuid(user_uuid, conn).await, folder_uuid) {
            // No changes
            (None, None) => Ok(()),
@@ -853,7 +872,7 @@ impl Cipher {

                if !visible_only {
                    query = query.or_filter(
-                        users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin/owner
+                        users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin/owner
                    );
                }

@@ -888,7 +907,7 @@ impl Cipher {

                if !visible_only {
                    query = query.or_filter(
-                        users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin/owner
+                        users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin/owner
                    );
                }

@@ -1092,7 +1111,7 @@ impl Cipher {
                            .or(collections_groups::collections_uuid
                                .is_not_null() // Access via groups
                                .and(collections_groups::read_only.eq(false)))
-                            .or(users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32)), // User is admin or owner
+                            .or(users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES)), // User is admin or owner
                    )
                    .select(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
                    .load::<CollectionId>(conn)
@@ -1121,7 +1140,7 @@ impl Cipher {
                            .or(users_collections::user_uuid
                                .eq(user_uuid) // User has access to collection
                                .and(users_collections::read_only.eq(false)))
-                            .or(users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32)), // User is admin or owner
+                            .or(users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES)), // User is admin or owner
                    )
                    .select(ciphers_collections::collection_uuid)
                    .load::<CollectionId>(conn)
@@ -1163,7 +1182,7 @@ impl Cipher {
                )
                .or_filter(users_collections::user_uuid.eq(user_uuid)) // User has access to collection
                .or_filter(users_organizations::access_all.eq(true)) // User has access all
-                .or_filter(users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32)) // User is admin or owner
+                .or_filter(users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES)) // User is admin or owner
                .or_filter(groups::access_all.eq(true)) //Access via group
                .or_filter(collections_groups::collections_uuid.is_not_null()) //Access via group
                .filter(users_organizations::status.eq(MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32))
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use macros::UuidFromParam;

 use super::{
    CipherId, CollectionGroup, GroupUser, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrganizationId,
-    User, UserId,
+    User, UserId, organization::ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES,
 };

 // See (v2026.7.0): https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/5d4461aa42cadbacfef8fe2166c5453a5c52773a/src/Core/AdminConsole/Entities/Collection.cs
@@ -375,7 +375,7 @@ impl Collection {
                                // Directly accessed collection
                                users_organizations::access_all.eq(true).or(
                                    // access_all in Organization
-                                    users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin or owner
+                                    users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin or owner
                                ),
                            )
                            .or(
@@ -412,7 +412,7 @@ impl Collection {
                        // Directly accessed collection
                        users_organizations::access_all.eq(true).or(
                            // access_all in Organization
-                            users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin or owner
+                            users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin or owner
                        ),
                    ))
                    .select(collections::all_columns)
@@ -455,7 +455,7 @@ impl Collection {
                    )
                    .filter(
                        users_organizations::atype
-                            .le(MembershipType::Admin as i32) // Org admin or owner
+                            .eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES) // Org admin or owner
                            .or(users_organizations::access_all.eq(true)) // access_all via membership
                            .or(users_collections::collection_uuid
                                .eq(&self.uuid) // write access given to collection
@@ -489,7 +489,7 @@ impl Collection {
                    )
                    .filter(
                        users_organizations::atype
-                            .le(MembershipType::Admin as i32) // Org admin or owner
+                            .eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES) // Org admin or owner
                            .or(users_organizations::access_all.eq(true)) // access_all via membership
                            .or(users_collections::collection_uuid
                                .eq(&self.uuid) // write access given to collection
@@ -540,7 +540,7 @@ impl Collection {
                            // Directly accessed collection
                            users_organizations::access_all.eq(true).or(
                                // access_all in Organization
-                                users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin or owner
+                                users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin or owner
                            ),
                        )
                        .or(
@@ -600,7 +600,7 @@ impl Collection {
                            // Directly accessed collection
                            users_organizations::access_all.eq(true).or(
                                // access_all in Organization
-                                users_organizations::atype.le(MembershipType::Admin as i32), // Org admin or owner
+                                users_organizations::atype.eq_any(ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES), // Org admin or owner
                            ),
                        )
                        .or(
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
+use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, TimeDelta, Utc};
 use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
 use diesel::prelude::*;
 use serde_json::Value;
@@ -112,8 +112,26 @@ impl EmergencyAccess {
            "object": "emergencyAccessGranteeDetails",
        }))
    }
+
+    pub fn deadline_at(&self) -> Result<NaiveDateTime, crate::Error> {
+        if !(EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE).contains(&self.wait_time_days) {
+            err!("Emergency access wait time is out-of-bounds!")
+        }
+
+        let initiated_at = self.recovery_initiated_at.map_res("Emergency access initiation date missing!")?;
+
+        TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(self.wait_time_days))
+            .and_then(|w| initiated_at.checked_add_signed(w))
+            .map_res("Emergency access deadline is invalid")
+    }
+
+    pub fn is_recovery_allowed(&self, now: &NaiveDateTime) -> Result<bool, crate::Error> {
+        Ok(self.deadline_at()?.le(now))
+    }
 }

+pub const EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE: std::ops::RangeInclusive<i32> = 1..=90;
+
 #[derive(Copy, Clone)]
 pub enum EmergencyAccessType {
    View = 0,
@@ -169,27 +187,42 @@ impl EmergencyAccess {

    pub async fn update_access_status_and_save(
        &mut self,
-        status: i32,
+        from_status: i32,
+        to_status: i32,
        date: &NaiveDateTime,
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> EmptyResult {
+        let uuid = self.uuid.clone();
+        let updated_at = *date;
+        let res = conn
+            .run(move |conn| {
+                crate::util::retry(
+                    || {
+                        diesel::update(
+                            emergency_access::table
+                                .filter(emergency_access::uuid.eq(&uuid))
+                                .filter(emergency_access::status.eq(from_status)),
+                        )
+                        .set((emergency_access::status.eq(to_status), emergency_access::updated_at.eq(updated_at)))
+                        .execute(conn)
+                    },
+                    10,
+                )
+            })
+            .await;
+
+        match res {
+            Ok(1) => {} // One record updated, which is valid
+            Ok(_) => err!("Emergency access status was changed already"),
+            Err(e) => err!("Error updating emergency access status", format!("{e}")),
+        }
+
+        self.status = to_status;
+        self.updated_at = updated_at;
+
        // Update the grantee so that it will refresh it's status.
        User::update_uuid_revision(self.grantee_uuid.as_ref().expect("Error getting grantee"), conn).await;
-        self.status = status;
-        date.clone_into(&mut self.updated_at);
-
-        conn.run(move |conn| {
-            crate::util::retry(
-                || {
-                    diesel::update(emergency_access::table.filter(emergency_access::uuid.eq(&self.uuid)))
-                        .set((emergency_access::status.eq(status), emergency_access::updated_at.eq(date)))
-                        .execute(conn)
-                },
-                10,
-            )
-            .map_res("Error updating emergency access status")
-        })
-        .await
+        Ok(())
    }

    pub async fn update_last_notification_date_and_save(&mut self, date: &NaiveDateTime, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ pub enum EventType {
    CipherSoftDeleted = 1115,
    CipherRestored = 1116,
    CipherClientToggledCardNumberVisible = 1117,
+    CipherClientHttpAuthReleased = 1133,

    // Collection
    CollectionCreated = 1300,
@@ -111,8 +112,8 @@ pub enum EventType {
    // OrganizationUserAutomaticallyConfirmed = 1517,
    // OrganizationUserSelfRevoked = 1518, // User self-revoked due to declining organization data ownership policy
    OrganizationUserAdminResetTwoFactor = 1519,
-    // OrganizationUserRevoked_TwoFactorNonCompliance = 1520,
-    // OrganizationUserRevoked_SingleOrganizationNonCompliance = 1521,
+    OrganizationUserRevokedTwoFactorNonCompliance = 1520,
+    OrganizationUserRevokedSingleOrganizationNonCompliance = 1521,
    OrganizationUserNotificationBannerActionClicked = 1522,

    // Organization
@@ -347,17 +348,23 @@ impl Event {
    }

    pub async fn clean_events(conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        if let Some(days_to_retain) = CONFIG.events_days_retain() {
-            let dt = Utc::now().naive_utc() - TimeDelta::try_days(days_to_retain).unwrap();
-            conn.run(move |conn| {
-                diesel::delete(event::table.filter(event::event_date.lt(dt)))
-                    .execute(conn)
-                    .map_res("Error cleaning old events")
-            })
-            .await
-        } else {
-            Ok(())
-        }
+        let Some(days_to_retain) = CONFIG.events_days_retain().filter(|&d| d != 0) else {
+            return Ok(());
+        };
+
+        let Some(days_to_retain) = TimeDelta::try_days(i64::from(days_to_retain)) else {
+            err!("Unable to calculate the event retention date, check 'EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN'")
+        };
+
+        let Some(dt) = Utc::now().naive_utc().checked_sub_signed(days_to_retain) else {
+            err!("Unable to calculate the event retention date, check 'EVENTS_DAYS_RETAIN'")
+        };
+        conn.run(move |conn| {
+            diesel::delete(event::table.filter(event::event_date.lt(dt)))
+                .execute(conn)
+                .map_res("Error cleaning old events")
+        })
+        .await
    }
 }

@@ -137,15 +137,15 @@ impl CollectionGroup {
    }

    pub fn to_json_details_for_group(&self) -> Value {
-        // If both read_only and hide_passwords are false, then manage should be true
-        // You can't have an entry with read_only and manage, or hide_passwords and manage
-        // Or an entry with everything to false
-        // For backwards compatibility and migration proposes we keep checking read_only and hide_password
+        // Return the stored manage flag. Deriving it from !read_only && !hide_passwords turned the group
+        // permission "Can edit items" (readOnly=false, hidePasswords=false, manage=false) into "Can manage"
+        // in GET /organizations/<org>/collections/details, while GET /groups/<id>/details reported the stored
+        // value. Saving the collection access dialog then persisted manage=true.
        json!({
            "id": self.groups_uuid,
            "readOnly": self.read_only,
            "hidePasswords": self.hide_passwords,
-            "manage": self.manage || (!self.read_only && !self.hide_passwords),
+            "manage": self.manage,
        })
    }
 }
@@ -24,15 +24,17 @@ pub use self::auth_request::{AuthRequest, AuthRequestId};
 pub use self::cipher::{Cipher, CipherId, RepromptType};
 pub use self::collection::{Collection, CollectionCipher, CollectionId, CollectionUser};
 pub use self::device::{Device, DeviceId, DeviceType, DeviceWithAuthRequest, PushId};
-pub use self::emergency_access::{EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType};
+pub use self::emergency_access::{
+    EMERGENCY_ACCESS_TIMEOUT_RANGE, EmergencyAccess, EmergencyAccessId, EmergencyAccessStatus, EmergencyAccessType,
+};
 pub use self::event::{Event, EventType};
 pub use self::favorite::Favorite;
 pub use self::folder::{Folder, FolderCipher, FolderId};
 pub use self::group::{CollectionGroup, Group, GroupId, GroupUser};
-pub use self::org_policy::{OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyId, OrgPolicyType};
+pub use self::org_policy::{FillAssistPolicyData, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyId, OrgPolicyType};
 pub use self::organization::{
-    Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, Organization, OrganizationApiKey,
-    OrganizationId,
+    CustomPermission, Membership, MembershipId, MembershipStatus, MembershipType, OrgApiKeyId, Organization,
+    OrganizationApiKey, OrganizationId, custom_roles_enabled,
 };
 pub use self::send::{Send, SendFileId, SendId, SendType};
 pub use self::sso_auth::{OIDCAuthenticatedUser, OIDCCodeResponseError, SsoAuth};
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ pub enum OrgPolicyType {
    // AutoConfirm = 18, // Not supported (not implemented yet)
    // BlockClaimedDomainAccountCreation = 19, // Not supported (Not AGPLv3 Licensed)
    OrganizationUserNotification = 20,
+    // SendControls = 21, // Not supported yet
+    FillAssist = 22,
 }

 // https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/9ebe16587175b1c0e9208f84397bb75d0d595510/src/Core/AdminConsole/Models/Data/Organizations/Policies/SendOptionsPolicyData.cs#L5
@@ -71,6 +73,14 @@ pub struct ResetPasswordDataModel {
    pub auto_enroll_enabled: bool,
 }

+// https://github.com/bitwarden/server/blob/13bc813de8e715a71d3410f1e584e87ccdf76025/src/Core/AdminConsole/Models/Data/Organizations/Policies/FillAssistPolicyData.cs
+#[derive(Deserialize)]
+#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
+pub struct FillAssistPolicyData {
+    #[serde(alias = "RulesUrl")]
+    pub rules_url: Option<String>,
+}
+
 /// Local methods
 impl OrgPolicy {
    pub fn new(org_uuid: OrganizationId, atype: OrgPolicyType, enabled: bool, data: String) -> Self {
@@ -1,4 +1,7 @@
-use std::cmp::Ordering;
+use std::{
+    cmp::Ordering,
+    collections::{HashMap, HashSet},
+};

 use chrono::{NaiveDateTime, Utc};
 use derive_more::{AsRef, Deref, Display, From};
@@ -21,8 +24,8 @@ use crate::{
 use macros::UuidFromParam;

 use super::{
-    Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionId, CollectionUser, Group, GroupId, GroupUser, OrgPolicy, OrgPolicyType,
-    TwoFactor, User, UserId,
+    Cipher, CipherId, Collection, CollectionGroup, CollectionId, CollectionUser, Group, GroupId, GroupUser, OrgPolicy,
+    OrgPolicyType, TwoFactor, User, UserId,
 };

 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
@@ -41,6 +44,7 @@ pub struct Organization {
 #[diesel(table_name = users_organizations)]
 #[diesel(treat_none_as_null = true)]
 #[diesel(primary_key(uuid))]
+#[expect(clippy::struct_excessive_bools, reason = "Each Custom role permission is a column of its own")]
 pub struct Membership {
    pub uuid: MembershipId,
    pub user_uuid: UserId,
@@ -54,6 +58,17 @@ pub struct Membership {
    pub atype: i32,
    pub reset_password_key: Option<String>,
    pub external_id: Option<String>,
+
+    // The permissions of a Custom role, only accessed through `CustomPermission`.
+    manage_users: bool,
+    manage_groups: bool,
+    manage_policies: bool,
+    create_new_collections: bool,
+    edit_any_collection: bool,
+    delete_any_collection: bool,
+    access_event_logs: bool,
+    access_import_export: bool,
+    access_reports: bool,
 }

 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset)]
@@ -89,42 +104,68 @@ impl MembershipStatus {
    }
 }

-#[derive(Copy, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, num_derive::FromPrimitive)]
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, num_derive::FromPrimitive)]
 pub enum MembershipType {
    Owner = 0,
    Admin = 1,
    User = 2,
+    // The legacy Manager role. The Bitwarden clients no longer know it and are shown a Custom role instead.
    Manager = 3,
+    // Only granted while EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled.
+    Custom = 4,
 }

 impl MembershipType {
    pub fn from_str(s: &str) -> Option<Self> {
-        #[expect(
-            clippy::match_same_arms,
-            reason = "Specifically define `4|Custom` since this is a hack, not a default"
-        )]
        match s {
            "0" | "Owner" => Some(MembershipType::Owner),
            "1" | "Admin" => Some(MembershipType::Admin),
            "2" | "User" => Some(MembershipType::User),
            "3" | "Manager" => Some(MembershipType::Manager),
-            // HACK: We convert the custom role to a manager role
-            "4" | "Custom" => Some(MembershipType::Manager),
+            "4" | "Custom" => Some(MembershipType::Custom),
            _ => None,
        }
    }
+
+    /// The role a member invite or edit from the Bitwarden clients asks for, given the member's current
+    /// role (`None` for an invite).
+    ///
+    /// The clients no longer know the legacy Manager role and are shown a Custom role in its place, so a
+    /// requested Custom role is the legacy Manager unless EXPERIMENTAL_CUSTOM_ROLES is enabled. An existing
+    /// Manager or Custom member keeps their role when the request repeats it, so an unrelated edit never
+    /// turns one into the other.
+    pub fn requested(
+        requested: MembershipType,
+        current: Option<&Membership>,
+        custom_roles_enabled: bool,
+    ) -> MembershipType {
+        if requested != MembershipType::Custom {
+            return requested;
+        }
+        match current {
+            Some(member) if member.has_type(MembershipType::Custom) => MembershipType::Custom,
+            Some(member) if member.has_type(MembershipType::Manager) => MembershipType::Manager,
+            _ if custom_roles_enabled => MembershipType::Custom,
+            _ => MembershipType::Manager,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// The authority of a role, which is what roles are compared by. A Custom member gets its authority from
+    /// its permissions, never from its role, so the role itself ranks right above User and below Manager.
+    const fn rank(self) -> u8 {
+        match self {
+            MembershipType::User => 0,
+            MembershipType::Custom => 1,
+            MembershipType::Manager => 2,
+            MembershipType::Admin => 3,
+            MembershipType::Owner => 4,
+        }
+    }
 }

 impl Ord for MembershipType {
    fn cmp(&self, other: &MembershipType) -> Ordering {
-        // For easy comparison, map each variant to an access level (where 0 is lowest).
-        const ACCESS_LEVEL: [i32; 4] = [
-            3, // Owner
-            2, // Admin
-            0, // User
-            1, // Manager && Custom
-        ];
-        ACCESS_LEVEL[*self as usize].cmp(&ACCESS_LEVEL[*other as usize])
+        self.rank().cmp(&other.rank())
    }
 }

@@ -180,6 +221,91 @@ impl PartialOrd<MembershipType> for i32 {
    }
 }

+/// The granular permissions of the Custom role.
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
+pub enum CustomPermission {
+    ManageUsers,
+    ManageGroups,
+    ManagePolicies,
+    CreateNewCollections,
+    EditAnyCollection,
+    DeleteAnyCollection,
+    AccessEventLogs,
+    AccessImportExport,
+    AccessReports,
+}
+
+/// The permissions this version enforces on every endpoint they open. Only these can be granted, a stored
+/// grant of any other one grants nothing. They are implemented one at a time, so this grows with them.
+const SUPPORTED_CUSTOM_PERMISSIONS: &[CustomPermission] = &[];
+
+impl CustomPermission {
+    pub const ALL: [CustomPermission; 9] = [
+        CustomPermission::ManageUsers,
+        CustomPermission::ManageGroups,
+        CustomPermission::ManagePolicies,
+        CustomPermission::CreateNewCollections,
+        CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection,
+        CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection,
+        CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs,
+        CustomPermission::AccessImportExport,
+        CustomPermission::AccessReports,
+    ];
+
+    /// The key of the permission in the `permissions` object of the Bitwarden clients.
+    pub const fn json_key(self) -> &'static str {
+        match self {
+            CustomPermission::ManageUsers => "manageUsers",
+            CustomPermission::ManageGroups => "manageGroups",
+            CustomPermission::ManagePolicies => "managePolicies",
+            CustomPermission::CreateNewCollections => "createNewCollections",
+            CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection => "editAnyCollection",
+            CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection => "deleteAnyCollection",
+            CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs => "accessEventLogs",
+            CustomPermission::AccessImportExport => "accessImportExport",
+            CustomPermission::AccessReports => "accessReports",
+        }
+    }
+
+    pub fn is_supported(self) -> bool {
+        SUPPORTED_CUSTOM_PERMISSIONS.contains(&self)
+    }
+
+    /// The permissions a member invite or edit grants a Custom role.
+    ///
+    /// A permission is only granted when it is set to `true`, and anything but a boolean is rejected: this
+    /// replaces the member's permissions, so a malformed value must not silently remove one. Granting a
+    /// permission this version does not enforce is rejected as well. The clients also send permissions
+    /// Vaultwarden does not know at all, like `manageSso`, those are ignored.
+    pub fn requested(permissions: &HashMap<String, Value>) -> Result<HashSet<CustomPermission>, crate::Error> {
+        let mut granted = HashSet::new();
+        for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
+            match permissions.get(permission.json_key()) {
+                None | Some(Value::Bool(false)) => {}
+                Some(Value::Bool(true)) if permission.is_supported() => {
+                    granted.insert(permission);
+                }
+                Some(Value::Bool(true)) => {
+                    err!(format!("The Custom role permission '{}' is not supported yet", permission.json_key()))
+                }
+                Some(_) => {
+                    err!(format!("The Custom role permission '{}' must be true or false", permission.json_key()))
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        Ok(granted)
+    }
+}
+
+/// The stored roles with authority over the whole organization. Queries match them by value, comparing
+/// `atype <= Admin` would also match any unknown value below it.
+pub(super) const ORG_ADMIN_ATYPES: [i32; 2] = [MembershipType::Owner as i32, MembershipType::Admin as i32];
+
+/// Whether the experimental Custom role is enabled. Nothing is ever granted through a Custom role otherwise.
+pub fn custom_roles_enabled() -> bool {
+    CONFIG.experimental_custom_roles()
+}
+
 /// Local methods
 impl Organization {
    pub fn new(name: String, billing_email: &str, private_key: Option<String>, public_key: Option<String>) -> Self {
@@ -271,9 +397,92 @@ impl Membership {
            atype: MembershipType::User as i32,
            reset_password_key: None,
            external_id: None,
+
+            manage_users: false,
+            manage_groups: false,
+            manage_policies: false,
+            create_new_collections: false,
+            edit_any_collection: false,
+            delete_any_collection: false,
+            access_event_logs: false,
+            access_import_export: false,
+            access_reports: false,
        }
    }

+    fn custom_permission_mut(&mut self, permission: CustomPermission) -> &mut bool {
+        match permission {
+            CustomPermission::ManageUsers => &mut self.manage_users,
+            CustomPermission::ManageGroups => &mut self.manage_groups,
+            CustomPermission::ManagePolicies => &mut self.manage_policies,
+            CustomPermission::CreateNewCollections => &mut self.create_new_collections,
+            CustomPermission::EditAnyCollection => &mut self.edit_any_collection,
+            CustomPermission::DeleteAnyCollection => &mut self.delete_any_collection,
+            CustomPermission::AccessEventLogs => &mut self.access_event_logs,
+            CustomPermission::AccessImportExport => &mut self.access_import_export,
+            CustomPermission::AccessReports => &mut self.access_reports,
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Change the role. Nothing the old role carried survives a role change: the Custom role permissions are
+    /// dropped, so changing the role back later starts from none. A Custom role never keeps the legacy
+    /// `access_all` flag, its reach only comes from its permissions.
+    pub fn set_type(&mut self, new_type: MembershipType) {
+        if self.atype != new_type as i32 {
+            for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
+                *self.custom_permission_mut(permission) = false;
+            }
+        }
+        if new_type == MembershipType::Custom {
+            self.access_all = false;
+        }
+        self.atype = new_type as i32;
+    }
+
+    /// Grant this Custom member exactly `permissions` out of those this version enforces. A stored grant of a
+    /// permission this version does not enforce is kept as it is: it grants nothing here.
+    pub fn set_custom_permissions(&mut self, permissions: &HashSet<CustomPermission>) {
+        for permission in CustomPermission::ALL.into_iter().filter(|p| p.is_supported()) {
+            *self.custom_permission_mut(permission) = permissions.contains(&permission);
+        }
+    }
+
+    /// Why this legacy Manager can't become a Custom member without losing what they may do now, if they can't. A
+    /// conversion must not silently change their access, and a Custom role can't keep access to all collections
+    /// (which also puts every collection in the Manager's own vault), nor manage any collection yet.
+    pub async fn custom_role_conversion_loss(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<&'static str> {
+        if !self.has_type(MembershipType::Manager) {
+            return None;
+        }
+        if self.access_all {
+            return Some(
+                "This Manager has access to all collections, which a Custom member can't have: the collections they \
+                 aren't assigned to would disappear from their vault. Uncheck Manage all collections for them first, \
+                 or keep the Manager role.",
+            );
+        }
+        // Whatever their status, the collections they manage directly, through a group or through a group with
+        // access to all collections
+        let mut manages = GroupUser::has_full_access_by_member(&self.org_uuid, &self.uuid, conn).await
+            || CollectionUser::find_by_organization_and_user_uuid(&self.org_uuid, &self.user_uuid, conn)
+                .await
+                .iter()
+                .any(|assignment| assignment.manage);
+        for group_user in GroupUser::find_by_member(&self.uuid, conn).await {
+            if manages {
+                break;
+            }
+            manages = CollectionGroup::find_by_group(&group_user.groups_uuid, &self.org_uuid, conn)
+                .await
+                .iter()
+                .any(|assignment| assignment.manage);
+        }
+        manages.then_some(
+            "This Manager manages collections, with the manage permission or through a group with access to all \
+             collections, which a Custom member can't do yet. Remove that first, or keep the Manager role.",
+        )
+    }
+
    pub fn restore(&mut self) -> bool {
        if self.status < MembershipStatus::Invited as i32 {
            self.status += ACTIVATE_REVOKE_DIFF;
@@ -523,7 +732,8 @@ impl Membership {

            // These are per user
            "userId": self.user_uuid,
-            "key": self.akey,
+            // Accepted (not yet confirmed) members have no key yet; send null like upstream, not ""
+            "key": (!self.akey.is_empty()).then_some(&self.akey),
            "status": self.status,
            "type": membership_type,
            "enabled": true,
@@ -711,6 +921,12 @@ impl Membership {
    }

    pub async fn save(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+        // The legacy `access_all` flag reaches every collection, which a Custom role may only do through its
+        // permissions, so it must never be stored on one. `set_type` takes care of this.
+        if self.has_type(MembershipType::Custom) && self.access_all {
+            err!("A Custom role membership can't have access to all collections")
+        }
+
        User::update_uuid_revision(&self.user_uuid, conn).await;

        db_run! { conn:
@@ -1227,13 +1443,93 @@ pub struct OrgApiKeyId(String);
 #[cfg(test)]
 mod tests {
    use super::*;
+    use MembershipType::{Admin, Custom, Manager, Owner, User};
+
+    fn member(role: MembershipType) -> Membership {
+        let mut member = Membership::new("user".into(), "org".into(), None);
+        member.atype = role as i32;
+        member.status = MembershipStatus::Confirmed as i32;
+        member
+    }

    #[test]
-    #[allow(non_snake_case)]
-    fn partial_cmp_MembershipType() {
-        assert!(MembershipType::Owner > MembershipType::Admin);
-        assert!(MembershipType::Admin > MembershipType::Manager);
-        assert!(MembershipType::Manager > MembershipType::User);
-        assert!(MembershipType::Manager == MembershipType::from_str("4").unwrap());
+    fn membership_type_authority() {
+        assert!(Owner > Admin && Admin > Manager && Manager > Custom && Custom > User);
+        assert!((Custom as i32) >= User && (Custom as i32) < Manager && (Custom as i32) < Admin);
+        for raw in [99, -1] {
+            assert_eq!((raw >= User, raw >= Manager, raw >= Admin, raw < Admin), (false, false, false, true));
+        }
+        for (value, expected) in [
+            ("3", Some(Manager)),
+            ("Manager", Some(Manager)),
+            ("4", Some(Custom)),
+            ("Custom", Some(Custom)),
+            ("5", None),
+        ] {
+            assert_eq!(MembershipType::from_str(value), expected);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn requested_membership_type() {
+        for (current, disabled, enabled) in [
+            (None, Manager, Custom),
+            (Some(User), Manager, Custom),
+            (Some(Manager), Manager, Manager),
+            (Some(Custom), Custom, Custom),
+        ] {
+            let current = current.map(member);
+            for (flag, expected) in [(false, disabled), (true, enabled)] {
+                assert_eq!(MembershipType::requested(Custom, current.as_ref(), flag), expected);
+            }
+        }
+        assert_eq!(MembershipType::requested(User, Some(&member(Custom)), true), User);
+        assert_eq!(MembershipType::requested(User, Some(&member(Manager)), true), User);
+        for requested in [Owner, Admin, Manager] {
+            assert_eq!(MembershipType::requested(requested, Some(&member(Custom)), true), requested);
+        }
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn custom_permission_requests() {
+        let ignored = serde_json::from_value(json!({"manageUsers":false,"manageSso":true})).unwrap();
+        assert!(CustomPermission::requested(&ignored).unwrap().is_empty());
+        for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
+            for value in [json!(true), json!(null), json!("true"), json!(1), json!([true])] {
+                let request = HashMap::from([(permission.json_key().to_owned(), value.clone())]);
+                let result = CustomPermission::requested(&request);
+                if value == json!(true) && SUPPORTED_CUSTOM_PERMISSIONS.contains(&permission) {
+                    assert_eq!(result.unwrap(), HashSet::from([permission]));
+                } else {
+                    assert!(result.is_err(), "{permission:?}: {value}");
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        assert_eq!(SUPPORTED_CUSTOM_PERMISSIONS, []);
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn role_changes_drop_custom_permissions() {
+        for (from, to) in [
+            (Custom, Owner),
+            (Custom, Admin),
+            (Custom, Manager),
+            (Custom, User),
+            (User, Custom),
+            (Manager, Custom),
+            (Custom, Custom),
+            (Admin, User),
+        ] {
+            let mut member = member(from);
+            member.access_all = true;
+            for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
+                *member.custom_permission_mut(permission) = true;
+            }
+            member.set_type(to);
+            for permission in CustomPermission::ALL {
+                assert_eq!(*member.custom_permission_mut(permission), from == to, "{from:?} -> {to:?}");
+            }
+            assert_eq!(member.access_all, to != Custom);
+        }
    }
 }
@@ -334,7 +334,6 @@ impl Send {
    pub async fn size_by_user(user_uuid: &UserId, conn: &DbConn) -> Option<i64> {
        #[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
        struct FileData {
-            #[serde(rename = "size", alias = "Size")]
            size: NumberOrString,
        }

@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ impl TwoFactorIncomplete {
        ip: &ClientIp,
        conn: &DbConn,
    ) -> EmptyResult {
-        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() <= 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() == 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
            return Ok(());
        }

@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ impl TwoFactorIncomplete {
    }

    pub async fn mark_complete(user_uuid: &UserId, device_uuid: &DeviceId, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
-        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() <= 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
+        if CONFIG.incomplete_2fa_time_limit() == 0 || !CONFIG.mail_enabled() {
            return Ok(());
        }

@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ use crate::{
 use macros::UuidFromParam;

 use super::{
-    Cipher, Device, EmergencyAccess, Favorite, Folder, Membership, MembershipType, TwoFactor, TwoFactorIncomplete,
+    AuthRequest, Cipher, Device, EmergencyAccess, Favorite, Folder, Membership, MembershipType, TwoFactor,
+    TwoFactorIncomplete,
 };

 #[derive(Identifiable, Queryable, Insertable, AsChangeset, Selectable)]
@@ -361,7 +362,7 @@ impl User {
        }
    }

-    pub async fn delete(self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
+    pub async fn delete(&self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
        for member in Membership::find_confirmed_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await {
            if member.atype == MembershipType::Owner
                && Membership::count_confirmed_by_org_and_type(&member.org_uuid, MembershipType::Owner, conn).await <= 1
@@ -377,13 +378,14 @@ impl User {
        Cipher::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        Favorite::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        Folder::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
+        AuthRequest::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        Device::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        TwoFactor::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        TwoFactorIncomplete::delete_all_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
        Invitation::take(&self.email, conn).await; // Delete invitation if any

        conn.run(move |conn| {
-            diesel::delete(users::table.filter(users::uuid.eq(self.uuid))).execute(conn).map_res("Error deleting user")
+            diesel::delete(users::table.filter(users::uuid.eq(&self.uuid))).execute(conn).map_res("Error deleting user")
        })
        .await
    }
@@ -244,6 +244,15 @@ table! {
        atype -> Integer,
        reset_password_key -> Nullable<Text>,
        external_id -> Nullable<Text>,
+        manage_users -> Bool,
+        manage_groups -> Bool,
+        manage_policies -> Bool,
+        create_new_collections -> Bool,
+        edit_any_collection -> Bool,
+        delete_any_collection -> Bool,
+        access_event_logs -> Bool,
+        access_import_export -> Bool,
+        access_reports -> Bool,
    }
 }

@@ -425,12 +425,12 @@ macro_rules! err_json {
 macro_rules! err_handler {
    ($expr:expr) => {{
        error!(target: "auth", "Unauthorized Error: {}", $expr);
-        return ::rocket::request::Outcome::Error((rocket::http::Status::Unauthorized, $expr));
+        return ::rocket::request::Outcome::Error((::rocket::http::Status::Unauthorized, $expr));
    }};
    ($usr_msg:expr, $log_value:expr) => {{
        let usr_msg = $usr_msg;
        let log_value = $log_value;
        error!(target: "auth", "Unauthorized Error: {usr_msg}. {log_value}");
-        return ::rocket::request::Outcome::Error((rocket::http::Status::Unauthorized, usr_msg));
+        return ::rocket::request::Outcome::Error((::rocket::http::Status::Unauthorized, usr_msg));
    }};
 }
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ fn smtp_transport() -> AsyncSmtpTransport<Tokio1Executor> {

    let smtp_client = AsyncSmtpTransport::<Tokio1Executor>::builder_dangerous(host.as_str())
        .port(CONFIG.smtp_port())
-        .timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.smtp_timeout())));
+        .timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.smtp_timeout()))));

    // Determine security
    let smtp_client = if CONFIG.smtp_security() == *"off" {
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ pub async fn send_password_hint(address: &str, hint: Option<String>) -> EmptyRes
 }

 pub async fn send_delete_account(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = generate_delete_claims(user_id.to_string());
+    let claims = generate_delete_claims(user_id.to_string())?;
    let delete_token = encode_jwt(&claims);

    let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
@@ -187,7 +187,7 @@ pub async fn send_delete_account(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult
 }

 pub async fn send_verify_email(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id);
+    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id)?;
    let verify_email_token = encode_jwt(&claims);

    let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
@@ -206,7 +206,7 @@ pub async fn send_verify_email(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {

 pub async fn send_register_verify_email(email: &str, token: &str) -> EmptyResult {
    let mut query = url::Url::parse("https://query.builder").unwrap();
-    query.query_pairs_mut().append_pair("email", email).append_pair("token", token);
+    query.query_pairs_mut().append_pair("email", email).append_pair("token", token).append_pair("fromEmail", "true");
    let Some(query_string) = query.query() else {
        err!("Failed to build verify URL query parameters")
    };
@@ -237,7 +237,7 @@ pub async fn send_welcome(address: &str) -> EmptyResult {
 }

 pub async fn send_welcome_must_verify(address: &str, user_id: &UserId) -> EmptyResult {
-    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id);
+    let claims = generate_verify_email_claims(user_id)?;
    let verify_email_token = encode_jwt(&claims);

    let (subject, body_html, body_text) = get_text(
@@ -292,7 +292,7 @@ pub async fn send_invite(
        org_id.clone(),
        member_id.clone(),
        invited_by_email,
-    );
+    )?;
    let invite_token = encode_jwt(&claims);
    let mut query = url::Url::parse("https://query.builder").unwrap();
    {
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ pub async fn send_emergency_access_invite(
        emer_id.clone(),
        String::from(grantor_name),
        String::from(grantor_email),
-    );
+    )?;

    // Build the query here to ensure proper escaping
    let mut query = url::Url::parse("https://query.builder").unwrap();
@@ -738,8 +738,8 @@ async fn send_email(address: &str, subject: &str, body_html: String, body_text:
    let smtp_from = Address::from_str(&CONFIG.smtp_from())?;

    let body = if CONFIG.smtp_embed_images() {
-        let logo_gray_body = Body::new(crate::api::static_files("logo-gray.png").unwrap().1.to_vec());
-        let mail_github_body = Body::new(crate::api::static_files("mail-github.png").unwrap().1.to_vec());
+        let logo_gray_body = Body::new(crate::api::STATIC_FILES["logo-gray.png"].bytes.to_vec());
+        let mail_github_body = Body::new(crate::api::STATIC_FILES["mail-github.png"].bytes.to_vec());
        MultiPart::alternative().singlepart(SinglePart::plain(body_text)).multipart(
            MultiPart::related()
                .singlepart(SinglePart::html(body_html))
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ async fn launch_rocket(pool: db::DbPool, extra_debug: bool) -> Result<(), Error>
        .manage(Arc::clone(&WS_ANONYMOUS_SUBSCRIPTIONS))
        .attach(util::AppHeaders())
        .attach(util::Cors())
-        .attach(util::BetterLogging(extra_debug))
+        .attach(util::BetterLogging::new(extra_debug, basepath))
        .ignite()
        .await?;

@@ -729,7 +729,7 @@ fn schedule_jobs(pool: db::DbPool) {
            // Cleanup the event table of records x days old.
            if CONFIG.org_events_enabled()
                && !CONFIG.event_cleanup_schedule().is_empty()
-                && CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_some()
+                && CONFIG.events_days_retain().is_some_and(|d| d != 0)
            {
                sched.add(Job::new(CONFIG.event_cleanup_schedule().parse().unwrap(), || {
                    runtime.spawn(api::event_cleanup_job(pool.clone()));
@@ -754,7 +754,9 @@ fn schedule_jobs(pool: db::DbPool) {
            // tick, the one that was added earlier will run first.
            loop {
                sched.tick();
-                runtime.block_on(tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_millis(CONFIG.job_poll_interval_ms())));
+                runtime.block_on(tokio::time::sleep(tokio::time::Duration::from_millis(u64::from(
+                    CONFIG.job_poll_interval_ms(),
+                ))));
            }
        })
        .expect("Error spawning job scheduler thread");
@@ -7,20 +7,20 @@ use crate::{CONFIG, Error};
 type Limiter<T = IpAddr> = RateLimiter<T, DashMapStateStore<T>, DefaultClock>;

 static LIMITER_LOGIN: LazyLock<Limiter> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_seconds());
-    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_max_burst()).expect("Non-zero login ratelimit burst");
+    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_seconds()));
+    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(u32::from(CONFIG.login_ratelimit_max_burst())).expect("Non-zero login ratelimit burst");
    RateLimiter::keyed(Quota::with_period(seconds).expect("Non-zero login ratelimit seconds").allow_burst(burst))
 });

 static LIMITER_ADMIN: LazyLock<Limiter> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_seconds());
-    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_max_burst()).expect("Non-zero admin ratelimit burst");
+    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_seconds()));
+    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(u32::from(CONFIG.admin_ratelimit_max_burst())).expect("Non-zero admin ratelimit burst");
    RateLimiter::keyed(Quota::with_period(seconds).expect("Non-zero admin ratelimit seconds").allow_burst(burst))
 });

 static LIMITER_UNAUTHENTICATED: LazyLock<Limiter> = LazyLock::new(|| {
-    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds());
-    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst())
+    let seconds = Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_seconds()));
+    let burst = NonZeroU32::new(u32::from(CONFIG.unauthenticated_ratelimit_max_burst()))
        .expect("Non-zero unauthenticated ratelimit burst");
    RateLimiter::keyed(
        Quota::with_period(seconds).expect("Non-zero unauthenticated ratelimit seconds").allow_burst(burst),
@@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ pub async fn exchange_code(
        (_, Some(re)) => {
            let error_msg = format!(
                "SSO authorization failed: {}, {}",
-                re.error,
-                re.error_description.as_ref().unwrap_or(&String::new())
+                re.error.escape_debug(),
+                re.error_description.as_deref().unwrap_or_default().escape_debug()
            );
            sso_auth.delete(conn).await?;
            err!(error_msg);
@@ -309,7 +309,11 @@ pub async fn exchange_code(
        user_name: user_name.clone(),
    };

-    debug!("Authenticated user {authenticated_user:?}");
+    if CONFIG.sso_debug_tokens() {
+        debug!("Authenticated user {authenticated_user:?}");
+    } else {
+        debug!("Authenticated user {identifier}");
+    }
    sso_auth.auth_response = Some(authenticated_user.clone());
    sso_auth.updated_at = Utc::now().naive_utc();
    sso_auth.save(conn).await?;
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ static CLIENT_CACHE_KEY: LazyLock<String> = LazyLock::new(|| "sso-client".to_own
 static CLIENT_CACHE: LazyLock<moka::sync::Cache<String, Client>> = LazyLock::new(|| {
    moka::sync::Cache::builder()
        .max_capacity(1)
-        .time_to_live(Duration::from_secs(CONFIG.sso_client_cache_expiration()))
+        .time_to_live(Duration::from_secs(u64::from(CONFIG.sso_client_cache_expiration())))
        .build()
 });
 static REFRESH_CACHE: LazyLock<moka::future::Cache<String, Result<RefreshTokenResponse, String>>> =
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ impl Client {
                };

                if CONFIG.sso_debug_tokens() {
-                    debug!("Id token: {}", id_token.to_string());
+                    debug!("Id token: {id_token}");
                    debug!("Access token: {}", token_response.access_token().secret());
                    debug!("Refresh token: {:?}", token_response.refresh_token().map(RefreshToken::secret));
                    debug!("Expiration time: {:?}", token_response.expires_in());
@@ -93,7 +93,9 @@ async function generateSupportString(event, dj) {
    supportString += `* Running within a container: ${yn(dj.running_within_container)} (Base: ${dj.container_base_image})\n`;
    supportString += `* Database type: ${dj.db_type}\n`;
    supportString += `* Database version: ${dj.db_version}\n`;
-    supportString += `* Uses config.json: ${yn(dj.overrides !== "")}\n`;
+    supportString += `* Uses config.json: ${yn(dj.config_file_status !== "NotFound")}`;
+    supportString += dj.config_file_status !== "NotFound" ? ` (Valid: ${chk(dj.config_file_status === "Loaded")})\n` : "\n";
+    supportString += `* Environment variables are valid: ${chk(dj.invalid_env_vars == "")}\n`;
    supportString += `* Uses custom templates: ${yn(dj.template_overrides !== "")}${template_overrides}\n`;
    supportString += `* Uses a reverse proxy: ${yn(dj.ip_header_exists)}\n`;
    if (dj.ip_header_exists) {
@@ -116,7 +118,7 @@ async function generateSupportString(event, dj) {
    }
    supportString += `* HTTP Response Checks: ${chk(httpResponseCheck)}\n`;
    if (dj.invalid_feature_flags != "") {
-        supportString += "* Invalid feature flags: true\n";
+        supportString += "* Invalid feature flags: true :x:\n";
    }

    const jsonResponse = await fetch(`${BASE_URL}/admin/diagnostics/config`, {
@@ -132,6 +134,11 @@ async function generateSupportString(event, dj) {
    supportString += "\n### Config & Details (Generated via diagnostics page)\n\n";
    supportString += "<details><summary>Show Config & Details</summary>\n";

+    // Show invalid environment variables if they exists
+    if (dj.invalid_env_vars != "") {
+        supportString += `\n**Invalid environment variables:** ${dj.invalid_env_vars}\n`;
+    }
+
    // Add overrides if they exists
    if (dj.overrides != "") {
        supportString += `\n**Environment settings which are overridden:** ${dj.overrides}\n`;
@@ -173,10 +173,14 @@ const ORG_TYPES = {
        "name": "User",
        "bg": "blue"
    },
-    "4": {
+    "3": {
        "name": "Manager",
        "bg": "green"
    },
+    "4": {
+        "name": "Custom",
+        "bg": "teal"
+    },
 };

 const userOrgTypeDialog = document.getElementById("userOrgTypeDialog");
@@ -187,15 +191,19 @@ userOrgTypeDialog.addEventListener("show.bs.modal", function (event) {
    const userUuid = event.relatedTarget.parentNode.dataset.vwUserUuid;
    // Get org specific values
    const userOrgType = event.relatedTarget.dataset.vwOrgType;
-    const userOrgTypeName = ORG_TYPES[userOrgType]["name"];
    const orgName = event.relatedTarget.dataset.vwOrgName;
    const orgUuid = event.relatedTarget.dataset.vwOrgUuid;

+    document.getElementById("userOrgTypeForm").reset();
    document.getElementById("userOrgTypeDialogOrgName").textContent = orgName;
    document.getElementById("userOrgTypeDialogUserEmail").textContent = userEmail;
    document.getElementById("userOrgTypeUserUuid").value = userUuid;
    document.getElementById("userOrgTypeOrgUuid").value = orgUuid;
-    document.getElementById(`userOrgType${userOrgTypeName}`).checked = true;
+    // The Custom role can only be selected while it is enabled
+    const userOrgTypeRadio = document.getElementById(`userOrgType${ORG_TYPES[userOrgType]?.name}`);
+    if (userOrgTypeRadio) {
+        userOrgTypeRadio.checked = true;
+    }
 }, false);

 // Prevent accidental submission of the form with valid elements after the modal has been hidden.
@@ -222,7 +230,7 @@ function updateUserOrgType(event) {
 function initUserTable() {
    // Color all the org buttons per type
    document.querySelectorAll("button[data-vw-org-type]").forEach(function (e) {
-        const orgType = ORG_TYPES[e.dataset.vwOrgType];
+        const orgType = ORG_TYPES[e.dataset.vwOrgType] ?? { "name": "Unknown", "bg": "gray" };
        e.style.backgroundColor = orgType.bg;
        if (orgType.font !== undefined) {
            e.style.color = orgType.font;
@@ -4,10 +4,10 @@
 *
 * To rebuild or modify this file with the latest versions of the included
 * software please visit:
- *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.3
+ *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.4
 *
 * Included libraries:
- *   DataTables 3.1.3
+ *   DataTables 3.1.4
 */

 /*! DataTables Bootstrap 5 integration
@@ -4,13 +4,13 @@
 *
 * To rebuild or modify this file with the latest versions of the included
 * software please visit:
- *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.3
+ *   https://datatables.net/download/#bs5/dt-3.1.4
 *
 * Included libraries:
- *   DataTables 3.1.3
+ *   DataTables 3.1.4
 */

-/*! DataTables 3.1.3
+/*! DataTables 3.1.4
 * Copyright (c) SpryMedia Ltd - datatables.net/license
 */

@@ -453,6 +453,9 @@ function assignDeep(out, ...inputs) {
            continue;
        }
        for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(input)) {
+            if (key === '__proto__') {
+                continue;
+            }
            if (Array.isArray(value)) {
                if (!Array.isArray(out[key])) {
                    out[key] = [];
@@ -489,6 +492,9 @@ function assignDeep(out, ...inputs) {
 function assignDeepObjects(out, extender, breakRefs = false) {
    let val;
    for (let prop in extender) {
+        if (prop === '__proto__') {
+            continue;
+        }
        if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(extender, prop)) {
            val = extender[prop];
            if (plainObject(val)) {
@@ -2694,7 +2700,7 @@ class Dom {
     */
    prepend(content) {
        return this.each(el => {
-            if (content instanceof Dom) {
+            if (arrayLike(content) || dom(content)) {
                // Reverse the array, so if there are multiple elements, they
                // end up being added sequentially, just like jQuery
                let itemsReversed = Array.from(content).reverse();
@@ -8714,7 +8720,7 @@ const ext = {
    /**
     * DataTables build type (expanded by the download builder)
     */
-    builder: 'bs5/dt-3.1.3',
+    builder: 'bs5/dt-3.1.4',
    /**
     * Buttons. For use with the Buttons extension for DataTables. This is
     * defined here so other extensions can define buttons regardless of load
@@ -8860,7 +8866,7 @@ const ext = {
     * Software version
     *  @type string
     */
-    version: '3.1.3'
+    version: '3.1.4'
 };
 //
 // Backwards compatibility. Alias to pre 1.10 Hungarian notation counter parts
@@ -9559,7 +9565,7 @@ register('destroy()', function (remove) {
        callbackFire(settings, 'destroy', 'destroy', [settings], true);
        // If not being removed from the document, make all columns visible
        if (!remove) {
-            new Api(settings).columns().visible();
+            new Api(settings).columns().visible(true);
        }
        // Container width change listener
        if (settings.resizeObserver) {
@@ -69,12 +69,26 @@
                    </dd>
                    <dt class="col-sm-5">Uses config.json</dt>
                    <dd class="col-sm-7">
-                    {{#if page_data.overrides}}
+                    {{#if (eq page_data.config_file_status "Loaded")}}
                        <span class="d-inline"><b>Yes</b></span>
+                        {{#if page_data.overrides}}
                        <span class="badge bg-info text-dark abbr-badge" title="Environment variables are overwritten by a config.json.&#013;&#010;{{page_data.overrides}}">Details</span>
+                        {{/if}}
+                    {{~else if (eq page_data.config_file_status "Error")}}
+                        <span class="d-inline"><b>Errors</b></span>
+                        <span class="badge bg-danger abbr-badge" title="Config file could not be loaded and was ignored. Check server logs for details.">Details</span>
+                    {{~else}}
+                        <span class="d-inline"><b>No</b></span>
                    {{/if}}
-                    {{#unless page_data.overrides}}
-                        <span class="d-block"><b>No</b></span>
+                    </dd>
+                    <dt class="col-sm-5">Environment variables are valid</dt>
+                    <dd class="col-sm-7">
+                    {{#if page_data.invalid_env_vars}}
+                        <span class="d-inline"><b>No</b></span>
+                        <span class="badge bg-danger abbr-badge" title="Invalid environment variables are found and defaults are used instead.&#013;&#010;{{page_data.invalid_env_vars}}">Details</span>
+                    {{/if}}
+                    {{#unless page_data.invalid_env_vars}}
+                        <span class="d-block"><b>Yes</b></span>
                    {{/unless}}
                    </dd>
                    <dt class="col-sm-5">Uses custom templates</dt>
@@ -135,6 +135,11 @@
                        <div class="radio">
                            <label><input type="radio" value="3" class="form-radio-input" name="user_type" id="userOrgTypeManager">&nbsp;Manager</label>
                        </div>
+                        {{#if custom_roles_enabled}}
+                        <div class="radio">
+                            <label><input type="radio" value="4" class="form-radio-input" name="user_type" id="userOrgTypeCustom">&nbsp;Custom</label>
+                        </div>
+                        {{/if}}
                        <div class="radio">
                            <label><input type="radio" value="1" class="form-radio-input" name="user_type" id="userOrgTypeAdmin">&nbsp;Admin</label>
                        </div>
@@ -98,10 +98,17 @@ app-security > app-two-factor-setup > form {
 }

 /* Hide unsupported Custom Role options */
+{{#if custom_roles_enabled}}
 :is(bit-dialog, [bit-dialog]) div.tw-ml-4:has(bit-form-control input),
 :is(bit-dialog, [bit-dialog]) div.tw-col-span-4:has(input[formcontrolname*="access"], input[formcontrolname*="manage"]) {
  @extend %vw-hide;
 }
+{{else}}
+:is(bit-dialog, [bit-dialog]) div.tw-ml-4:has(bit-form-control input),
+:is(bit-dialog, [bit-dialog]) div.tw-col-span-4:has(input[formcontrolname*="access"], input[formcontrolname*="manage"]) {
+  @extend %vw-hide;
+}
+{{/if}}

 /* Change collapsed menu icon to Vaultwarden */
 bit-nav-logo bit-nav-item a:before {
@@ -210,7 +210,7 @@ impl Fairing for Cors {
 pub struct Cached<R> {
    response: R,
    is_immutable: bool,
-    ttl: u64,
+    ttl: u32,
 }

 impl<R> Cached<R> {
@@ -230,7 +230,7 @@ impl<R> Cached<R> {
        }
    }

-    pub fn ttl(response: R, ttl: u64, is_immutable: bool) -> Cached<R> {
+    pub fn ttl(response: R, ttl: u32, is_immutable: bool) -> Cached<R> {
        Self {
            response,
            is_immutable,
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@ impl<'r, R: 'r + Responder<'r, 'static> + Send> Responder<'r, 'static> for Cache
        res.set_raw_header("Cache-Control", cache_control_header);

        let time_now = Local::now();
-        let expiry_time = time_now + chrono::TimeDelta::try_seconds(self.ttl.try_into().unwrap()).unwrap();
+        let expiry_time = time_now + chrono::TimeDelta::try_seconds(self.ttl.into()).unwrap();
        res.set_raw_header("Expires", format_datetime_http(&expiry_time));
        Ok(res)
    }
@@ -259,14 +259,16 @@ impl<'r, R: 'r + Responder<'r, 'static> + Send> Responder<'r, 'static> for Cache

 pub struct EtagCached<R> {
    response: R,
+    content_type: ContentType,
    etag: String,
 }

 impl<R> EtagCached<R> {
    /// An `etag` response should always be quoted
-    pub fn new(response: R, etag: &str) -> Self {
+    pub fn new(response: R, content_type: ContentType, etag: &str) -> Self {
        Self {
            response,
+            content_type,
            etag: format!("\"{etag}\""),
        }
    }
@@ -288,7 +290,8 @@ impl<'r, R: 'r + Responder<'r, 'static> + Send> Responder<'r, 'static> for EtagC
            self.response.respond_to(request)?
        };

-        // Both 200 (OK) and 304 (Not Modified) need to return the etag and cache-control
+        // Both 200 (OK) and 304 (Not Modified) need to return the Content-Type Etag and Cache-Control
+        res.set_header(self.content_type);
        res.set_raw_header("Etag", self.etag);
        res.set_raw_header("Cache-Control", "public, no-cache");
        Ok(res)
@@ -299,19 +302,69 @@ impl<'r, R: 'r + Responder<'r, 'static> + Send> Responder<'r, 'static> for EtagC
 // Effectively ignores, any static file route, and the alive endpoint
 const LOGGED_ROUTES: [&str; 7] = ["/api", "/admin", "/identity", "/icons", "/attachments", "/events", "/notifications"];

-// Boolean is extra debug, when true, we ignore the whitelist above and also print the mounts
-pub struct BetterLogging(pub bool);
+const MAX_LOGGED_QUERY_BYTES: usize = 100;
+
+// Query values can hold secrets, like the access code of a login request, so we don't log them
+fn redact_query_values(query: &str) -> String {
+    query
+        .split('&')
+        .map(|param| match param.split_once('=') {
+            Some((name, _)) => format!("{name}=…"),
+            None => param.to_owned(),
+        })
+        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
+        .join("&")
+}
+
+// When extra is true, we ignore the whitelist above and also print the mounts
+pub struct BetterLogging {
+    extra: bool,
+    log_requests: bool,
+    log_response: bool,
+    domain_path: String,
+}
+
+impl BetterLogging {
+    pub fn new(extra: bool, domain_path: &str) -> Self {
+        Self {
+            extra,
+            log_requests: log_enabled!(target: "request", log::Level::Info),
+            log_response: log_enabled!(target: "response", log::Level::Info),
+            domain_path: rocket::http::RawStr::new(&domain_path).percent_decode_lossy().into_owned(),
+        }
+    }
+
+    fn log_path<'p>(&self, method: Method, path: &'p rocket::http::RawStr) -> Option<std::borrow::Cow<'p, str>> {
+        if !self.extra && method == Method::Options {
+            return None;
+        }
+        let path = path.percent_decode_lossy();
+        if self.extra {
+            return Some(path);
+        }
+        let subpath = path.strip_prefix(&self.domain_path).unwrap_or(&path);
+        LOGGED_ROUTES.iter().any(|r| subpath.starts_with(r)).then_some(path)
+    }
+}
+
 #[rocket::async_trait]
 impl Fairing for BetterLogging {
    fn info(&self) -> Info {
+        let mut kind = Kind::Liftoff;
+        if self.log_requests {
+            kind = kind | Kind::Request;
+        }
+        if self.log_response {
+            kind = kind | Kind::Response;
+        }
        Info {
            name: "Better Logging",
-            kind: Kind::Liftoff | Kind::Request | Kind::Response,
+            kind,
        }
    }

    async fn on_liftoff(&self, rocket: &Rocket<Orbit>) {
-        if self.0 {
+        if self.extra {
            info!(target: "routes", "Routes loaded:");
            let mut routes: Vec<_> = rocket.routes().collect();
            routes.sort_by_key(|r| r.uri.path());
@@ -335,36 +388,29 @@ impl Fairing for BetterLogging {
    }

    async fn on_request(&self, request: &mut Request<'_>, _data: &mut Data<'_>) {
-        let method = request.method();
-        if !self.0 && method == Method::Options {
-            return;
-        }
        let uri = request.uri();
-        let uri_path = uri.path();
-        let uri_path_str = uri_path.url_decode_lossy();
-        let uri_subpath = uri_path_str.strip_prefix(&CONFIG.domain_path()).unwrap_or(&uri_path_str);
-        if self.0 || LOGGED_ROUTES.iter().any(|r| uri_subpath.starts_with(r)) {
-            match uri.query() {
-                Some(q) => info!(target: "request", "{method} {uri_path_str}?{}", &q[..q.len().min(30)]),
-                None => info!(target: "request", "{method} {uri_path_str}"),
+        let method = request.method();
+        let Some(path) = self.log_path(method, uri.path().raw()) else {
+            return;
+        };
+        match uri.query() {
+            Some(q) => {
+                let query = redact_query_values(q.as_str());
+                let query = &query[..query.floor_char_boundary(MAX_LOGGED_QUERY_BYTES)];
+                info!(target: "request", "{method} {}?{}", path.escape_debug(), query.escape_debug());
            }
+            None => info!(target: "request", "{method} {}", path.escape_debug()),
        }
    }

    async fn on_response<'r>(&self, request: &'r Request<'_>, response: &mut Response<'r>) {
-        if !self.0 && request.method() == Method::Options {
+        if self.log_path(request.method(), request.uri().path().raw()).is_none() {
            return;
        }
-        let uri_path = request.uri().path();
-        let uri_path_str = uri_path.url_decode_lossy();
-        let uri_subpath = uri_path_str.strip_prefix(&CONFIG.domain_path()).unwrap_or(&uri_path_str);
-        if self.0 || LOGGED_ROUTES.iter().any(|r| uri_subpath.starts_with(r)) {
-            let status = response.status();
-            if let Some(route) = request.route() {
-                info!(target: "response", "{route} => {status}");
-            } else {
-                info!(target: "response", "{status}");
-            }
+        let status = response.status();
+        match request.route() {
+            Some(r) => info!(target: "response", "{r} => {status}"),
+            None => info!(target: "response", "{status}"),
        }
    }
 }
@@ -447,20 +493,34 @@ pub fn get_env_str_value(key: &str) -> Option<String> {
    }
 }

-pub fn get_env<V>(key: &str) -> Option<V>
+pub static INVALID_ENV_VARS: std::sync::Mutex<Vec<&'static str>> = std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new());
+
+pub fn get_env<V>(key: &'static str) -> Option<V>
 where
    V: FromStr,
 {
-    try_parse_string(get_env_str_value(key))
+    let value = get_env_str_value(key);
+    let value_is_some = value.is_some();
+    let parsed: Option<V> = try_parse_string(value);
+    if parsed.is_none() && value_is_some {
+        println!("[ERROR] `{key}` contains an invalid value for its type and is ignored, the default is used instead.");
+        INVALID_ENV_VARS.lock().unwrap().push(key);
+    }
+    parsed
 }

-pub fn get_env_bool(key: &str) -> Option<bool> {
+pub fn get_env_bool(key: &'static str) -> Option<bool> {
    const TRUE_VALUES: &[&str] = &["true", "t", "yes", "y", "1"];
    const FALSE_VALUES: &[&str] = &["false", "f", "no", "n", "0"];

    match get_env_str_value(key) {
        Some(val) if TRUE_VALUES.contains(&val.to_lowercase().as_ref()) => Some(true),
        Some(val) if FALSE_VALUES.contains(&val.to_lowercase().as_ref()) => Some(false),
+        Some(_) => {
+            println!("[ERROR] `{key}` contains an invalid boolean value and is ignored, the default is used instead.");
+            INVALID_ENV_VARS.lock().unwrap().push(key);
+            None
+        }
        _ => None,
    }
 }
@@ -982,3 +1042,28 @@ mod tests {
        });
    }
 }
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod query_log_tests {
+    use super::{MAX_LOGGED_QUERY_BYTES, redact_query_values};
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_redact_query_values() {
+        assert_eq!(redact_query_values("code=SECRET"), "code=…");
+        assert_eq!(redact_query_values("code=SECRET&other=SECRET"), "code=…&other=…");
+        assert_eq!(redact_query_values("a=1&b=2&flag"), "a=…&b=…&flag");
+        assert_eq!(redact_query_values("a=b=SECRET"), "a=…");
+        assert_eq!(redact_query_values("a=1&&=SECRET"), "a=…&&=…");
+        assert_eq!(redact_query_values("a=x%26b%3DSECRET"), "a=…");
+        assert_eq!(redact_query_values("a=1;b=SECRET"), "a=…");
+        assert_eq!(redact_query_values("a=1&a=SECRET"), "a=…&a=…");
+        assert_eq!(redact_query_values(""), "");
+    }
+
+    #[test]
+    fn test_redacted_query_truncates_on_a_char_boundary() {
+        let name = "a".repeat(MAX_LOGGED_QUERY_BYTES - 1);
+        let query = redact_query_values(&format!("{name}=SECRET"));
+        assert_eq!(&query[..query.floor_char_boundary(MAX_LOGGED_QUERY_BYTES)], format!("{name}="));
+    }
+}
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
Daniel García	816911001c	Define threat model	2026-11-12 00:41:22 +01:00
miquno	17b159beff	Don't let OpenDAL create a missing config folder (#7935 ) The Fs operator creates its root folder if it doesn't exist, so loading the config created the data folder (or failed with a misleading invalid config.json error when it couldn't). Skip building the operator if the local config folder doesn't exist, so a missing data folder is reported again like before.	2026-11-04 22:17:54 +01:00
Tom	904b80115d	[PR 1] Add experimental Custom Roles foundation (#7847 )	2026-11-04 22:11:52 +01:00
Daniel García	82fc47e83e	Redact query values in request logs (#7929 )	2026-11-03 00:12:56 +01:00
Tom	286499781a	Add Fill Assist feature flag in .env.template (#7928 )	2026-11-02 20:28:51 +01:00
Daniel García	6ed6921cc2	Escape request values in log messages (#7921 )	2026-11-01 22:38:18 +01:00
Mathijs van Veluw	5d870b796f	Clippy fixes, crate and web-vault updates (#7920 )	2026-11-01 18:59:00 +01:00
Tom	79ee29d501	Add HTTP auth and policy revocation audit events (#7919 )	2026-11-01 17:09:56 +01:00
Daniel García	acb574b768	Two small fixes for upstream parity (#7918 )	2026-11-01 16:30:35 +01:00
Cassian433	e056359a42	Send logout notification when deleting a user (#7839 )	2026-10-29 23:16:14 +01:00
Michael Mu	f1c7eccd4a	Bump user revision once for bulk cipher move (#7840 )	2026-10-29 22:38:39 +01:00
Tom	0dbc92f2b7	Make 2FA remember duration configurable (#7421 )	2026-10-29 22:33:26 +01:00
Tom	42660af757	Add registration email verification clicked endpoint (#7790 )	2026-10-29 22:32:37 +01:00
Tom	863395f5e2	Add configurable Fill Assist rules URL (#7791 )	2026-10-29 22:25:23 +01:00
Tauan BF	be5d3ad907	Don't return internal error details in bulk member responses; gate SSO token logging (#7777 )	2026-10-29 22:22:12 +01:00
lede	80d1859452	Fix push device unregistration endpoint (#7891 )	2026-10-29 22:18:00 +01:00
Michael Mu	b723afe08a	Document two feature flags in .env.template (#7841 )	2026-10-29 22:15:26 +01:00
Daniel García	64ae55ceb2	Align cipher org checks & attachment notification with upstream (#7906 )	2026-10-28 23:14:28 +01:00
Luca BeckerandDaniel García	a96912bf21	fix(attachments): enforce quota at v2 metadata reservation (#7450 ) * fix(attachments): enforce quota at v2 metadata reservation POST /ciphers/<id>/attachment/v2 persisted client-declared fileSize without checking USER_ATTACHMENT_LIMIT or ORG_ATTACHMENT_LIMIT, allowing a writer to exhaust org/user quota via metadata-only reservations before uploading bytes. Extract shared quota arithmetic into attachment_quota_remaining and use it from post_attachment_v2 (size_adjust=0) and save_attachment so both paths stay consistent. Add unit tests covering limit, size_adjust, and the v2 over-quota rejection case. * Remove unneeded tests and simplify --------- Co-authored-by: Daniel García <dani-garcia@users.noreply.github.com>	2026-10-28 21:54:06 +01:00
Daniel García	e2d63cfca3	Remove expired cookies from the icon cookie jar (#7905 )	2026-10-28 21:28:02 +01:00
Arthurmeade12	0f44744ef8	Fix typo (#7864 ) sever -> server	2026-10-25 20:42:35 +01:00
Mathijs van Veluw	44c4853d37	Upgrade to Rocket v0.5.2 (#7890 ) Upgrade Rocket to v0.5.2 which has updated all the crate dependencies. Also adjusted some code which I changed with Rkt and during that found some small bugs and fixed those too. Adjusted the ETag Caching a bit. Also updated other crates and GHA. Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>	2026-10-25 17:08:08 +01:00
Tom	e5a90968f2	Fix bulk cipher share response for SDK clients (#7831 ) * Fix bulk cipher share response for SDK clients * Simplify cipher sharing code	2026-10-25 16:49:20 +01:00
Alexander WidakandAlexander Widak	7ce705be56	Return stored manage flag for groups in collections/details (#7795 ) CollectionGroup::to_json_details_for_group derived manage from !read_only && !hide_passwords, so the group permission "Can edit items" was reported as "Can manage collection" by collections/details, while groups/<id>/details reported the stored value. Saving the collection access dialog in the web vault then persisted manage=true. Fixes #7794 Co-authored-by: Alexander Widak <deltatree.widak@gmail.com>	2026-10-25 16:49:12 +01:00
MinchinWebandClaude Opus 5.5	c925c04de0	Send null org key for unconfirmed members in sync (#7850 ) Since #7666 the sync profile's `organizationsNew` also lists Accepted (not yet confirmed) memberships. Their `akey` is still empty, so the response contained `"key": ""`, whereas upstream sends `null` until the member is confirmed. Bitwarden Android 2026.9 prefers `organizationsNew` and only skips organizations whose key is null. The empty string is handed to the SDK, which rejects it ("Invalid asymmetric type, got type 0 with 1 parts"), so the whole `initializeOrgCrypto` call fails: none of the user's organization keys are loaded and every organization item and collection fails to decrypt on that device. Send null for an empty key, matching upstream and the existing handling of the user key in `GET /api/accounts/keys`. Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011UHYQWTz2PkXSCfucaRMZB Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>	2026-10-25 16:49:02 +01:00
Mathijs van Veluw	b71cb7a832	Misc fixes regarding jobs and config (#7858 ) * Fix several scheduled job issues Several jobs could cause a panic, or stop without running through all items because of this panic. This could cause missed items until that panic somehow resolved it self, and probably would never work fully again. This could cause emergency access for example to never work again. Besides this, emergency access was also able to be panic if the wait-time was out-of-bounds and date/time calculation might fail. This is also fixed now by using `checked` functions and continue upon those issues so all awaiting items will be handled. Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com> * Fix several possible panics and overflows Adjust several integer types to be a lower or unsigned type. Most types were too large, only because the function which used this value needed that specific type. But, this allowed too large values which either caused panics or might cause a DoS. This does however might possible cause configurations which have larger values, which are probably way too large anyway to be not loaded or use their defaults. During the config loading, either via env or json, it will show error logs regarding these items. Also fixed an issue with protected actions via OTP, it increased the attempt before it validated if the attempt limit was reached. This could cause an issue when set to `1`, that way it was never allowed, and `3` times would actually be `2`. Also added several config validation checks which otherwise would have prevent Vaultwarden to start, or login, so these will probably not cause issues, else users would already have issues. Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com> * Show config errors on diagnostics page With the previous commits it is now possible to add a warning if their rare issues with loading of the config, either environment variables which we were not able to parse correctly, or if loading the `config.json` failed instead of just showing it wasn't used, while it does exists, which might be confusing. Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com> --------- Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>	2026-10-22 14:20:03 +02:00
Mathijs van Veluw	f4696877b9	Update dependencies (#7882 ) - Updated all the crates - Updated JavaScript libraries - Updated xx to v1.10.0 - Updated Rust to v1.99.1 - Updated GHA & Pre-Commit Resolves #7877 Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>	2026-10-22 12:47:30 +02:00
ump45nose	296599003c	docs: fix connect-src description grammar in config.rs and .env.template (#7866 )	2026-10-22 12:46:26 +02:00
ump45nose	970cc49182	api/icons: fix typos in the minimum PNG size comment (#7867 )	2026-10-22 12:46:00 +02:00
Mathijs van Veluw	58a980f850	Add unsupported riscv64 architecture (#7859 ) This PR makes it easy for users to build a Debian container images which is able to run on a riscv64 architecture using a Debian Container, or if needed, you can extract the binary from this container, but the user needs to be sure the libraries are available and supported if using Docker is not an option. Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>	2026-10-16 11:51:32 +02:00
Cassian433	64895524e4	Delete auth requests when deleting a user (#7837 )	2026-10-10 19:58:40 +02:00