Rotate refresh-tokens on sstamp reset (#7031)

When a security-stamp gets reset/rotated we should also rotate all device refresh-tokens to invalidate them.
Else clients are still able to use old refresh tokens.

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>
This commit is contained in:
Mathijs van Veluw
2026-03-29 22:43:36 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 3a1378f469
commit f62a7a66c8
6 changed files with 46 additions and 17 deletions
+8 -4
View File
@@ -185,13 +185,14 @@ impl User {
/// These routes are able to use the previous stamp id for the next 2 minutes.
/// After these 2 minutes this stamp will expire.
///
pub fn set_password(
pub async fn set_password(
&mut self,
password: &str,
new_key: Option<String>,
reset_security_stamp: bool,
allow_next_route: Option<Vec<String>>,
) {
conn: &DbConn,
) -> EmptyResult {
self.password_hash = crypto::hash_password(password.as_bytes(), &self.salt, self.password_iterations as u32);
if let Some(route) = allow_next_route {
@@ -203,12 +204,15 @@ impl User {
}
if reset_security_stamp {
self.reset_security_stamp()
self.reset_security_stamp(conn).await?;
}
Ok(())
}
pub fn reset_security_stamp(&mut self) {
pub async fn reset_security_stamp(&mut self, conn: &DbConn) -> EmptyResult {
self.security_stamp = get_uuid();
Device::rotate_refresh_tokens_by_user(&self.uuid, conn).await?;
Ok(())
}
/// Set the stamp_exception to only allow a subsequent request matching a specific route using the current security-stamp.