Several SSO Fixes (#7163)

* Ensure SSO token is only usable on the same client

This commit adds an extra check via cookies to ensure the same browser/client is used to request and provide the SSO token.
Previously it would be able to provide a custom link which attackers could use to steal data.
While an attacker would still need the Master Password to be able to decrypt or execute specific actions, they were able to fetch encrypted data.

Solved with some help of Claude Code.

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

* Check email-verified on SSO login/create

This commit prevents possible account takeover via SSO which doesn't check/validate or provide validated status of the email.
It was checked at other locations, but was skipped here.

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

* Prevent data disclosure via SSO endpoints

This commit prevents some data disclosure and user enumeration by only returning the fake SSO identifier.
Since we do not check the identifier anywhere useful, returning the fake one is just fine.

During an invite to an org, that link contains the correct UUID and will be used for the master password requirements.
For anything else, server admins should set the `SSO_MASTER_PASSWORD_POLICY` env variable.

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

* Adjust admin layout to fix issues when SSO is enabled

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: BlackDex <black.dex@gmail.com>

src/api/core/organizations.rs

@@ -907,36 +907,21 @@ async fn _get_org_details(
     Ok(json!(ciphers_json))
 }
 
-#[derive(Deserialize)]
-#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase")]
-struct OrgDomainDetails {
-    email: String,
-}
-
 // Returning a Domain/Organization here allow to prefill it and prevent prompting the user
-// So we either return an Org name associated to the user or a dummy value.
+// So we return a dummy value, since we only support a single SSO integration, and do not use the response anywhere
 // In use since `v2025.6.0`, appears to use only the first `organizationIdentifier`
-#[post("/organizations/domain/sso/verified", data = "<data>")]
-async fn get_org_domain_sso_verified(data: Json<OrgDomainDetails>, conn: DbConn) -> JsonResult {
-    let data: OrgDomainDetails = data.into_inner();
-
-    let identifiers = match Organization::find_org_user_email(&data.email, &conn)
-        .await
-        .into_iter()
-        .map(|o| (o.name, o.uuid.to_string()))
-        .collect::<Vec<(String, String)>>()
-    {
-        v if !v.is_empty() => v,
-        _ => vec![(FAKE_SSO_IDENTIFIER.to_string(), FAKE_SSO_IDENTIFIER.to_string())],
-    };
-
+#[post("/organizations/domain/sso/verified")]
+fn get_org_domain_sso_verified() -> JsonResult {
+    // Always return a dummy value, no matter if SSO is enabled or not
     Ok(Json(json!({
         "object": "list",
-        "data": identifiers.into_iter().map(|(name, identifier)| json!({
-            "organizationName": name,           // appear unused
-            "organizationIdentifier": identifier,
-            "domainName": CONFIG.domain(),      // appear unused
-        })).collect::<Vec<Value>>()
+        "data": [{
+            "organizationIdentifier": FAKE_SSO_IDENTIFIER,
+            // These appear to be unused
+            "organizationName": FAKE_SSO_IDENTIFIER,
+            "domainName": CONFIG.domain()
+        }],
+        "continuationToken": null
     })))
 }
 
@@ -3049,10 +3034,7 @@ async fn put_reset_password_enrollment(
         err!("User to enroll isn't member of required organization", "The user_id and acting user do not match");
     }
 
-    let Some(mut membership) = Membership::find_confirmed_by_user_and_org(&headers.user.uuid, &org_id, &conn).await
-    else {
-        err!("User to enroll isn't member of required organization")
-    };
+    let mut membership = headers.membership;
 
     check_reset_password_applicable(&org_id, &conn).await?;